IR 05000327/2020010

Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000327/2020010 and 05000328/2020010

ML20112F443
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/21/2020
From:	James Baptist NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1
To:	Jim Barstow Tennessee Valley Authority
References
IR 2020010
Download: ML20112F443 (18)

Text

April 21, 2020

SUBJECT:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 & 2 - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000327/2020010 AND 05000328/2020010

Dear Mr. Barstow:

On March 13, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2. On April 17, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Matthew Rasmussen and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000327 and 05000328 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000327 and 05000328

License Numbers:

DPR-77 and DPR-79

Report Numbers:

05000327/2020010 and 05000328/2020010

Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority

Facility:

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location:

Soddy Daisy, TN

Inspection Dates:

February 24, 2020 to March 13, 2020

Inspectors:

M. Greenleaf, Reactor Inspector

G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector

R. Patterson, Senior Reactor Inspector

A. Rosebrook, Senior Reactor Analyst

Approved By:

James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate Guidance for Motor Operated Valve Capability Assumptions Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000327,05000328/2020010-01 Open/Closed

[P.3] -

Resolution 71111.21N.

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, subsection 55a(b)(3)(ii), for the licensees failure to establish a program that ensured that all the design basis safety functions of certain motor-operated valves (MOVs) would be met. Specifically, since at least identification of the issue in 2016, the licensee had not incorporated appropriate guidance for ensuring that the leak tight safety function of inservice test (IST) Category A valves would be met into their MOV program documents.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a Requirements POV Review (IP Section 03)

The inspectors:

a. Determined whether the sampled POVs are being tested and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or licensing bases.

Specific Guidance b. Determined whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis functions.

c. Determined whether testing of the sampled POVs is adequate to demonstrate the capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions.

d. Evaluated maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if accessible).

(1)1-FCV-67-146, Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1A1/1A2 Discharge Control Valve (2)2-FCV-63-73, Containment Sump Flow Isolation Valve (3)1-FCV-63-011, RHR Heat Exchanger 1B-B to SIS Pumps (4)1-FCV-63-008, RHR Heat Exchanger A to CVCS Charging Pumps (5)1-FSV-68-394, Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve (6)2-LCV-3-148, Steam Generator Level Control Valve (7)1-FCV-68-333, RCS Pressurizer Relief Flow Control Valve (8)1-FCV-63-001, Refueling Water Storage Tank to RHR Pump Flow Control Valve

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate Guidance for Motor Operated Valve Capability Assumptions Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity

Green NCV 05000327,05000328/2020010-01 Open/Closed

[P.3] -

Resolution 71111.21N.0

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, subsection 55a(b)(3)(ii), for the licensees failure to establish a program that ensured that all the design basis safety functions of certain motor-operated valves (MOVs) would be met. Specifically, since at least identification of the issue in 2016, the licensee had not incorporated appropriate guidance for ensuring that the leak tight safety function of inservice test (IST) Category A valves would be met into their MOV program documents.

Description:

During the inspection, the inspectors observed that the licensees calculation design standard, DS-M18.2.21, "Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Calculations," Revision 25, referenced General Engineering Specification G-50, "Torque and Limit Switch Settings for Motor-Operated Valves," Revision 11, and stated: Torque switch controlled MOVs that set the bypass limit switch at >98% (Reference General Engineering Specification G-50) can base margin on design/limit switch controlled equation. The inspectors were concerned that the licensee could misapply the calculation of actuator thrust capability to motor-operated valves that are classified as Category A within the licensees IST program. Valves considered Category A are valves that have a leak tight function. The concern was that the design/limit switch-controlled equation allows full actuator capability to be used for comparison against the valve required thrust in their margin calculations, rather than a lower, more limiting value based on the torque switch setting. The full actuator capability is appropriate to be assumed to be applied until the design/limit switch controlled circuit de-energizes the MOV. However, it is inappropriate to be assumed for MOV program margin calculation purposes if a valve is demonstrated to perform its leak tight safety function after setting the design/limit switch controlled circuit under static conditions and expect it to perform under design basis differential pressure (dP) and flow conditions.

In Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," the NRC staff requested licensees to verify the design-basis capability of their safety-related MOVs and to establish long-term motor-operated valve (MOV) programs. On December 21, 1989, TVA responded to the GL, and made the following commitment: "TVA will develop and implement a comprehensive motor-operated valve testing and surveillance program for Browns Ferry, Watts Bar, and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants satisfying the intent of Generic Letter 89-10 by June 28, 1994." On September 14, 1990, the NRC responded to TVA's commitment letter with the following: "In your response to GL 89-10 dated December 21, 1989, you committed to develop and implement a program to satisfy the intent of GL 89-10. The staff interprets this as a commitment to meet the schedule and recommendations provided in the generic letter and its supplement dated June 13, 1990."

Supplement 1 to GL 89-10, "Results of the Public Workshops," dated June 13, 1990, contained the following position in question 32 regarding the demonstration necessary to show that valve safety functions in the closed position were met:

"May an MOV be considered closed simply if the torque switch trips in the last 2 to 3 percent of the stroke?

NRC staff response - No. The staff considers an MOV to be closed if the applicable system train is capable of meeting all of its required safety functions with the MOV in that position, and the MOV meets the necessary leak-tightness criteria. A licensee cannot assume that an MOV will be adequately closed simply because the torque switch was bypassed until the last 2 to 3 percent of the stroke. In terms of the generic letter, the staff will accept closure of an MOV to within 2 to 3 percent during a test to have demonstrated that the MOV is operable in the close direction under design-basis conditions, provided the MOV will perform its safety function in that position. As this would leave almost no operability margin, the licensee would need to demonstrate that the test fully met the design-basis conditions, with degraded voltage."

In 2016, the licensee reviewed their MOV program, as documented in Document No. 3640, ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] OM [Operation and Maintenance] Code Appendix III Gap Assessment for TVAs Nuclear Stations, Revision 1, and determined that General Engineering Specification G-50 should be updated. Comments in the gap analysis stated that the licensee needed to, provide basis for the 98% close torque switch bypass to ensure valve closure, define how to calculate margin, and if it is permissible to use for valves that have specific leakage requirements.

The licensee generated a condition report (CR 1271906) and updated the G-50 specification (Rev. 11) in January 2020 to include additional guidance for isolation valves that are considered IST Category A. The guidance stated:

For safety-related, GL89-10/App. III Program MOVs which are required for containment isolation/LLRT [local leak rate test], control switch trip must be set at or beyond hard seat contact (C11). This may be accomplished by making the valve position or limit seated, or by setting the torque switch so that the valve can produce the required thrust to achieve hard seat contact under maximum dP conditions."

The inspectors concluded the updated guidance was insufficient because the licensee did not demonstrate the new control switch trip setting (at or beyond hard seat contact) would ensure that the leak tight function would be met. The licensee assumed that additional loading that would occur after the control switch trip would provide sufficient sealing load under design basis conditions. However, the licensee did not have an analysis or test data to support their judgement.

Inspectors determined that the licensee misapplied the calculation of actuator capability to 13 valves within the program. Ten of the affected valves required re-evaluation for operability because they were calculated to have negative margin when considering torque switch control instead of limit switch control. The station wrote CR 1590551 to address the inspectors concern and determined that the 13 valves with a leak tight requirement that utilize this setup assumption would be able to provide their safety functions. For some of the affected valves, the licensee changed their assumptions by crediting measured inertial loading or reanalyzed thrust requirements to demonstrate margin between the torque switch setting and the required thrust during the applicable containment isolation event. The inspectors noted that although the licensee had plans to revise all Sequoyah GL 89-10 / 96-05 MOV calculations as documented in CR 1459470, the updates would have been based on the recently revised G-50 guidance which was insufficient, without additional justification, to demonstrate the leak tight functions would be met.

Corrective Actions: After the inspectors identified the concern, the licensee reviewed the 13 affected valves that had bypass limit switches set to >98% and determined that they could demonstrate the valves would remain operable. The licensee also generated CR 1602141 to address vulnerabilities in the MOV program guidance documents.

Corrective Action References: CRs 1602141 and 1590551.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to incorporate appropriate guidance into fleet design standard DS-M18.2.21 and fleet General Engineering Specification G-50 to ensure that the leak tight safety function of IST Category A valves would be met was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, More than minor example 3a states: When revising the calculation, the licensee had to do one of the following:

(a) use a different calculation methodology because the original methodology resulted in unfavorable margin;

(b) revise assumptions solely to obtain favorable results; (c)revise other calculations in order to establish operability or functionality; or

(d) the remaining margin falls outside the licensees design process acceptance criteria. Unfavorable margin means that had the correct values been used originally, the licensees design process would not have accepted the modification. In order to provide reasonable assurance that the safety function would be met, the licensee had to revise their assumptions for some of the affected valves to obtain favorable results.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity," the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment; did not represent the failure of containment pressure control equipment; did not represent the failure of containment heat removal components; and did not involve the actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.3 - Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Following identification of the issue in 2016, the licensee completed corrective actions by updating the MOV program guidance in January 2020, but the actions taken were not effective in that the MOV program after correction did not ensure all the valve safety functions would be met.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), subsection 50.55a(b)(3)(ii)required, in part, that licensees must establish a program to ensure that MOVs continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Contrary to this, since at least identification of the issue in 2016, the licensee did not establish a program that ensured the valves that had a leak tight function were capable of performing all their design basis safety functions. Specifically, the licensee had not correctly incorporated guidance for demonstrating that the leak tight safety function of containment isolation valves would be met into their MOV program guidance.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On April 17, 2020, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Mr. Matthew Rasmussen and other members of the licensee staff.

• On March 12, 2020, the inspectors presented the onsite debrief inspection results to Mr.

Matthew Rasmussen and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.21N.02 Calculations

00D53EPMRJP061091

Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Population at Sequoyah

Units 1 & 2

Revs. 19

and 20

03D53EPMWLL063094

AFW Hydraulic Analysis

Rev. 16

1-FCV-63-001

Documentation of Design Basis Review, Required

Thrust Calc and Valve & Actuator Capability

Assessment for 1-FCV-63-001

Rev. 5

1-FCV-63-008

Documentation of Design Basis Review, Required

Thrust Calc and Valve & Actuator Capability

Assessment for 1-FCV-63-008

Rev. 2

1-FCV-63-011

Documentation of Design Basis Review, Required

Thrust Calc and Valve & Actuator Capability

Assessment for 1-FCV-63-011

Rev. 4

1-FCV-67-146

DOCUMENTATION OF DESIGN BASIS REVIEW,

REQUIRED TORQUE CALC AND VALVE AND

ACTUATOR CAPABILITY

ASSESSMENT FOR 1-FCV-67-146

Rev. 3

1-FCV-68-333

Documentation of Design Basis Review, Required

Thrust Calc and Valve & Actuator Capability

Assessment for 1-FCV-68-333

Rev. 7

2-FCV-63-073

DOCUMENTATION OF DESIGN BASIS REVIEW,

REQUIRED THRUST CALC AND VALVE &

ACTUATOR

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT FOR 2-FCV-63-073

Rev. 5

2-FCV-70-134

Documentation of Design Basis Review, Required

Thrust Calc and Valve and Actuator Capability

Assessment for 2-FCV-70-134

Rev. 3

MD000099920040148

Setpoint Review for Category 2 AOVs

Rev. 10

MDQ00000320020129

AFW AOV System Review

Rev. 1

MDQ00000320020130

Evaluation of Required Thrust for MDAFW Large

LCVs

Rev. 1

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

MDQ00006720000095

ERCW Flow Balance Hydraulic Model

Rev. 17

MDQ0000682017000375 Reactor Head Vent Capacity Analysis

Rev. N/A

MDQ00099920080190

Documentation of GL 89-10 Henry Pratt Butterfly

Valve Static Testing Acceptance Criteria

Rev. 4

MDQ00099920110249

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant JOG MOV Periodic

Verification Classification

Rev. 0

MDQ0009992014000158 Analysis of DP test data to support the SON MOV

Program

Rev. 2

MDQ0999980039

MOV Thrust Requirements Considering Pressure

Lock Using ComEd Methodology

Rev. 5

OSG70020

Safety Injection System (063) 10 CFR 50.49

Category and Operating Times

Rev. 19

SCG-4M-00794

Seismic Analysis Crane Aloyco 12 lnch 300 LB

Valves

Rev. 4

SQNETAPAC

Auxiliary Power System

Revs. 95

and 96

SQS20200

SQN Probabilistic Risk Assessment -MOV Risk

Ranking

Rev. 3

Corrective

Action

Documents

1017597

1018105

1108722

1157371

211795

237177

241396

271906

297216

1316892

1338800

1365730

1366082

1395498

1405334

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

1459470

1494559

1497075

1498362

1567574

1570428

1570436

1570440

1570523

1580811

1586882

1589446

1592228

2691

753504

SQ971023PER

SQPER921503

Corrective

Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR 1589744

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 Clean Boron from stem,

yoke and bonnet

CR 1589753

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 unrestrained ladder in U1

669 PC along right side wall 20 ft in Czone

CR 1589781

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Walkdown of ERCW

Mezzanine HK Issues

CR 1589999

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Incorrect Units within

WO 111930198

CR 1590230

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Incorporation of EPRI

Guide 3002008055 into DS-M18.2.21

CR 1590489

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Incorrect EQ

Temperature used in GL 89-10 Calculation

CR 1590513

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Update CAT Record

CR 1590551

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Category A MOVs

Identified Which Take Credit for 98% Torque Switch

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Bypass

CR 1590580

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - DCA Not Incorporated

into WO 119465059

CR 1591403

SQN POV DBAI 2020010

CR 1591559

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - EQ Binder status

CR 1592321

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - excessive grease found

on actuator for 1-FCV-70-8

CR 1592546

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Incorrect Stem Factor

used in GL 89-10 Calculations 1-and 2-FCV-63-008

03/05/2020

CR 1593643

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Discrepancy between

GL 89-10 calculation 2-FCV-63-073 and

00D53EPMRJP061091

CR 1593694

NRC POV DBAI 2020010 - Lack of critical thinking

for not including inertial loading into MOV Calc

CR 1593729

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Clarify 110% Extended

Actuator Use in DS-M18.2.21

CR 1602141

SQN POV DBAI 2020010 - Lack of Guidance for

MOV Margin Determination for All Accide

Drawings

2-403-0244

Limitorque Valve Control Diagram

Rev. 9

1, 2-45N779-26

Wiring Diagram 480V Shutdown Aux Power

Schematic Diagrams SH 26

Rev. 33

1, 2-45N779-48

Wiring Diagrams 480V Shutdown Aux Power

Schematic Diagrams SH-48

Rev. 4

1,2-47W432-2

Mechanical Residual Heat Removal System Piping

Rev. 11

1,2-47W813-1

Flow Diagram Reactor Cooling System

Rev. 58

1,2-47W845-2

Mechanical Flow Diagram-Essential Raw Cooling

Water System

Rev. 115

1-47A941-104

Thrust Requirements for 1-FCV-68-333

Rev. 1

1-47A941-166

Torque Requirements for Motor Operated Butterfly

Valves

Rev. 2

1-47A941-40

Thrust Requirements for Motor Operated Valve 1-

FCV-63-008

Rev. 1

1-47W811-1

Flow Diagram Safety Injection System

Rev. 77

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2-47A941-48

Thrust Requirements for Motor Operated Valve 2-

FCV-63-073

Rev. 0

2-47W432-1

Mechanical Residual Heat Removal System Piping

Rev. 6

2-47W803-2

Flow Diagram Auxiliary Feed Water

Rev. 78

2-47W811-1

Flow Diagram Safety Injection System

Rev. 62

79AB-001

Solenoid Oper Globe Valve High Temp, High Press

Energize to Open 1" SW

Rev. M

88415

Velan 3 Inch Forged Bolted Bonnet Valve

Rev. 8

94-13295

ASA Series 300 8" No. S70W DD Weld Ends

Outside Screw & Yoke Double Disc Gate Valve with

SMB-1 Limitorque Valve Control, Lip Seal and Limit

Switches

Rev. 8

94-13300

Double Disc Gate Valve Stainless Steel, Weld Ends,

Outside Screw w/ SMB-3 Limitorque Act. & Limit

Switches Size: 18" Class (S70) 300

Rev. 1

C-8152

General Arrangement HB Operator SMB000 Motor

Rev. 901

E-2303

Cross Section ASME Section III Standard Nuclear

Class 3 N-MKII Valve

dated

5/10/72

K-7634-E

Crane 300lb Cast Alloy Split-Wedge Disc Valve

Rev. 3

Engineering

Changes

D22542

Resolve Component Cooling System Concerns

Related to Appendix R

Rev. A

D22564

Modify Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) to meet JOG

Class A or B Requirements

Rev. A

DCN 21550

AFW Level Control Valves-Actuator Capability

Increase

Rev. A

DCN 22501

Increase the capability of 2-FCV-63-72 & -73 to

operate under differential pressure

Rev. A

DCN 23623

Degraded Non-Conforming MOV Modifications -

Gears/Actuators/Motor/Cable Reroute

Rev. A

DCN S-13223

Values shown on drawing series 47A941 for

"Minimum Thrust at Torque Switch Trip" do not

agree with the values shown in the supporting

calculations. Revise drawings as required.

Rev. A

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

DCN X00156

Modify Dwgs of Sump Valve Room Manways

Rev. B

EDC E-20067

Revise 47A941 series drawings to incorporate new

switch settings

Rev. A

EQV 23070

Replace Motor SQN-2-MTRB-063-0073-B

Rev. A

SQN-100516

MOV Stem Thread Removal Option to Facilitate

Future QSS Installation for Selected Valves

Rev. 0

Engineering

Evaluations

2761C

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant JOG MOV Periodic

Verification Classification

Rev. 0

EWR-15-PEG-063-579

Approve Drawing and Design Reports for ASME

Valve Disc; TVA P.O. #768647; Flowserve's SO #

110676; Typ TIIC # CVP637B and CVQ672F

07/02/2015

RIMS B88940823002

Engineering Analysis of Torque Requirements and

Material, Design and Dimensional Data for Nuclear

Butterfly Valves

dated

7/15/94

SCG4M00766

Seismic Qualification of Anchor Darling 18" 300lb

Double Disc Gate Valve (Motor Operated)

Rev. 7

SCG4M00816

Seismic Qualification of 24" Henry Pratt Butterfly

Valves, UNID Nos. 1-FCV-67-146, 2-FCV-67-146,

and 0-FCV-67-152 (Mk No. 47W450-20)

Rev. 3

SQNEQ-EM-028

Essentially Mild Documentation for Limitorque

Actuators

Rev. 13

SQS40077

RHR Sump Valve Room - Safety Evaluation

dated

5/20/82

Miscellaneous

DS-M18.2.21

Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque

Calculations

Rev. 25

Equipment Specification

678765

Motor Operated Valves for TVA Sequoyah Nuclear

Plants Units 1 and 2

Rev. 1

ER-5.0

Equipment Inaccuracy for Motor Operated Valves

Rev. 27

G-50

Torque, Thrust and Control Switch Settings for

Motor-Operated Valves

Revs. 10

and 11

G-955186

Solenoid Operated Globe and Throttle Valves

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III

Class 1, 2, and 3

Rev. 1

ML020360077

COMMENTS ON JOINT OWNERS' GROUP AIR

dated

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM DOCUMENT

10/8/99

NPG-SPP-09.26.13

Air Operated Valve Program

Rev. 0

NPG-SPP-09.26.14

Motor Operated Valve Program

Rev. 4

RIMS B38920730807

Limitorque Corporation Letter-Actuator Data

Analysis

dated

7/29/92

SQN-DC-V-21.0

Environmental Design

Rev. 28

SQN-DC-V-27.3

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant-Safety Injection System

Rev. 24

SQN-DC-V-27.3

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Safety Injection System

Rev. 24

SQN-DC-V-27.4

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Reactor Coolant System

Rev. 25

SQN-DC-V-7.4

Essential Raw Cooling Water System (67)

Rev. 34

SQNEQ-MOV-005

Limitorque Actuators Outside Containment With

Brakes

Rev. 47

SQNEQ-SOL-010

Target Rock Solenoid Valves

Rev. 23

Procedures

0-SI-SVX-063-266.0

ASME Valve Code Testing

Rev. 0035

0-SI-SXV-063-266.0

ASME Code Valve Testing

Rev. 34

dated

11/17/18

0-SI-SXV-067-266.0

ASME Code Valve Testing

Rev. 35

dated

10/16/19

0-SI-SXV-068-266.0

ASME Code Valve Testing

Rev. 14

0-TI-SXI-000-200.0

Inservice Testing Program

Rev. 4

2-SI-SLT-088-156.0

Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test

Rev. 2

dated

2/24/06

2-SO-63-5

Emergency Core Cooling System

Rev. 62

NPG-SPP-22.300

Corrective Action Program

Rev. 17

Self-

Assessments

CR 1563644

Self Assessment for Power Operated Valves

(POVs) in regards to NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.21N.02, "Design-Bases Capability of Power-

Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a

Requirements"

Rev. 0

Work Orders

111980783

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

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