IR 05000315/1997022
| ML17334A579 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17334A578 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-97-22, 50-316-97-22, NUDOCS 9712040125 | |
| Download: ML17334A579 (32) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
50-315; 50-316 DPR-58; DPR-74 Report Nos:
50-315/97022(DRS); 50-316/97022(DRS)
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company Facility:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 8 2 Location:
1 Cook Place Bridgman, MI 49106 Dates:
October 25-31, 1997 Inspectors:
Approved by:
James Foster, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst Thomas Ploski, Emergency Response Coordinator pl James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety 9712040125 971126 PDR ADOCK 05000315
1'
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 8 2 NRC Inspection Reports 50-315/97022; 50-316/97022 This inspection reviewed the Emergency Preparedness (EP) program, an aspect of Plant Support.
This was an announced inspection conducted by two regional personnel.
Based on this review of the EP program, the licensee has developed a program that provides trained staff, comprehensive procedures and adequately maintained facilities, all focused on mitigating the effects of plant emergencies.
The emergency preparedness program was in a commendable state of operational readiness and emergency response facilities were well-maintained, as evidenced by their material condition. A new Emergency Operations Facility, located in a portion of the Buchanan Office Building should be a program enhancement when completed.
Plant personnel performed effectively during two actual activations of the Emergency Plan. Quality assurance oversight of the program was very competent.
The overall effectiveness of the licensee's emergency preparedness facilities, equipment, training, and organization was effective. (Sections P2.1, P3, P5, and P6)
Licensee personnel performed appropriately during two actual activations (Unusual Events) of the Emergency Plan. A procedure had been developed for review of actual events.
Review of the events was very good.
(Section P1.1)
Each emergency response facilitywas well maintained and in an excellent operational state of readiness.
The proposed EOF had adequate space, lighting, telephone and electrical outlets. The proposed layout of the facilitywas acceptable.
An appropriate plan for turnover from the old facilityto the new.
(Section P2.1)
Procedure reviews indicated that EP procedures provided detailed guidance on responding to declared emergencies.
No procedural problems were identified.
Condition Report documentation indicated that plant staff made good use of an Operating Experience report to identify a problem, and had taken aggressive actions to correct the lack of current respirator qualifications for members of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). (Section P3)
The EP training program was very effective. Drills were used as an efficient and performance-based requaiification method.
Training records were complete, indicated that ERO members were trained within the required frequency.
The quality of drill critiques improved during 1997. The ERO's staffing levels were excellent for all key and support positions. (Section P5)
J
The organizational structure of the EP program was unchanged from the last routine inspection.
An anticipated new position would include a manager with oversight of Emergency Preparedness and Security programs.
Strong management oversight and support of the emergency preparedness program was identified. (Section P6)
The licensee's 1996 surveillances and 1997 audits of EP activities were very effective and satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t).
(Section P7)
D a s V
P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Activities P1.1 tual E r
nA t'v ti a.
In t'S
The inspectors reviewed the two actual classifiable events which occurred since the last routine inspection.
Also reviewed was the procedure for performing reviews of actual events.
n serv tion An Unusual Event was declared at 10:00 a.m. on April 14, 1997, when both trains of Unit 2 emergency diesel generators were taken out of service simultaneously.
The unit was in mode 6 with the entire core offloaded into the spent fuel pool. This event, due to Unit 2 outage maintenance activities, was anticipated well in advance. Notifications were made prior to the event. The event was terminated at 9:20 a.m. on April 21, 1997.
An Unusual Event was declared at 8:00 p.m on September 8, 1997, when both trains of containment spray and emergency core cooling systems were declared inoperable due to the potential loss of recirculation capability. An NRC architect-engineering team inspection had raised questions as to whether there would be a sufficient volume of water reaching the containment sump to maintain long-term recirculating water. This potential loss also resulted in the potential loss of containment capability. Both units were placed in cold shutdown.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 3:03 a.m. on September 10, 1997.
Discussion with the EP staff indicated that a formal procedure had been created for the review of actual classiTiable events.
Plant Manager's Instruction (PMI) 2080,
"Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures',
section 5.7, referred to Attachment 2,
"Emergency Declaration Summary."
lt was indicated that "an Emergency Declaration Summary (attachment 2) shall be completed for each emergency declaration at the Cook Nuclear Plant." The Emergency Declaration Summary served as a checklist with space for comments, which provides for event response assessment.
While no facilities or response personnel had been activated for the Unusual Events, review of the events was very good.
Records indicated that the classiTications were conservative and notifications had been made in a timely manner.
The documentation package for the both events was complete, including press releases and media article c.
Con~lci~ins The inspectors concluded that the licensee had appropriately implemented the emergency plan in declaring two Unusual Events.
Notifications had been performed in a timely manner.
A procedure had been developed for review of actual events.
While no facilities or response personnel had been activated for the Unusual Events, review of the events was very good.
P2 Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources P2.1 n
iliti a.
Ins ti nS
1 The inspectors toured the Control Rooms, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Staging Area (OSA), alternate OSA, and current Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
to assess their material condition. The inspectors also toured the proposed EOF that the, licensee planned to complete by February 1998. An offsite monitoring team vehicle was also inspected.
The inspectors requested that numerous storage locations of emergency supplies and equipment be unlocked so that their contents could be examined.
Records of periodic inventories and equipment tests were also reviewed.
b.
i i
The Control Room and emergency response facilities were well maintained.
The following facilityenhancements were identified. A computer terminal was added to the OSA so that personnel could access real-time information from the plant process computer.
Several status boards in the TSC and EOF were improved either in quality or organization.
This willassist in evaluation and tracking of signiTicant data.
The licensee was revising posted maps of the plume pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) in order to depict the boundaries of geopolitical subareas in which offsite officials would implement protective actions.
The licensee planned to complete these EPZ map revisions by 1998. These actions willenhance timeliness of offsite protective action recommendations.
Current copies of the Emergency Plan, it's implementing procedures, and related forms were present in each facility, as required.
All radiation detection instruments'alibration stickers indicated that they were currently calibrated.
Two of three teletectors stored in the OSA, properly labeled "Emergency Plan Equipment," were determined to have malfunctions, which the licensee promptly corrected.
Discussion with radiation protection and instrumentation personnel indicated that the particular model had problems with the lithium battery holder which had been identified, discussed with the vender, and possible modiTications were under review. A benefit of this model was that it contained self-diagnostic circuitry which checked for six
possible failures and would provide a malfunction alarm before the instrument was used.
It was noted that other operable instruments were available ifthose in the OSA failed to function. The instruments had been properly checked on a quarterly basis.
A portion of the Buchanan Office Building had been proposed as a location for the Emergency Operations Facility. The building was fourteen miles from the plant (twenty miles via roadway), and houses the American Electric Power nuclear staff. The proposed EOF had adequate space, lighting, telephone and electrical outlets. The proposed layout of the facilitywas acceptable.
Discussion indicated that training of personnel on use of the new facilitywas scheduled to begin in December 1997, with the goal of full implementation of the facility by February 1998.
Licensee personnel advised that the facilitywiring was complete; copiers purchased; Plant Process Computer monitors installed; an auxiliary power switch was on order; and additional telephones had been ordered.
The licensee has developed detailed plans for the move, including having at least one "shakedown" drill prior to declaring the new EOF in service.
The facilitywillnot have an emergency diesel generator; however, two distribution circuits to the building will have an automatic switch between them, providing redundancy.
The proposed layout of the facilitywas reviewed, and proposed seating arrangements, telephones, and seating for a responding NRC Site Team discussed.
A total of thirteen vehicles were available for use of the ERO during an emergency.
The
"sampling van" was inspected and found to be in excellent condition.
Records for the prompt alert and notification siren system were reviewed.
Documentation indicated that siren operability for 1996 averaged 98.94 percent, with the lowest month reporting a 97.47 percent operable.
These averages exceeded the criteria for acceptability over a 12 month period. The 1996 average population coverage was 99.99 percent.
Twenty-six new electronic sirens were installed, and nine of the older sirens were removed from the system.
Review of a sample of emergency facilityequipment inventories indicated that equipment had been properly inventoried and replaced as necessary in a timely manner.
Overall, emergency response facilities were in very good material condition. Several minor facilityenhancements were noted in each facility. The proposed EOF had adequate space, lighting, telephone and electrical outlets. The proposed layout of the facilitywas acceptable.
The licensee's plans for ensuring operability of the new EOF are adequat P3 EP Procedures and Documentation a.
In The inspectors reviewed a selection of licensee emergency procedures and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
Condition Reports assigned to the Emergency Planning Group were also reviewed.
b.
in Implementing procedure PMP 2081 EPP.303, "Offsite Radiological Assessment," was acceptably revised in June 1997, to indicate that the default duration of a radiological release was one rather than eight hours, which was consistent with revised Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for projected offsite doses and a revision to the Dose Assessment Program (DAP).
Implementing procedure PMP 2081 EPP.306, "De-escalation or Termination of the Emergency and Recovery," was acceptably revised in October 1997 to delete an obsolete reference to the transport of a contaminated, injured worker to a local hospital as being an Unusual Event. The procedure was also revised to include acceptable guidance on the anticipated needs of an NRC root cause investigation team and acceptable guidance on notifying NRC and FEMA prior to a reactor start up following a natural disaster.
Implementing procedure PMP 2081 EPP.303, "Offsite Radiological Assessment," was acceptably revised in June 1997 to indicate that the default duration of a radiological release was one rather than eight hours, which was consistent with revised EALs for projected offsite doses and a revision to the Dose Assessment, Program (DAP).
Implementing procedure PMP 2081 EPP.306, "De-escalation'or Termination of the Emergency and Recovery," was acceptably revised in October 1997 to delete an obsolete reference to the transport of a contaminated, injured worker to a local hospital as being an Unusual Event. The procedure was also revised to include acceptable guidance on the anticipated needs of an NRC root cause investigation team and acceptable guidance on notifying NRC and FEMA prior to a reactor start up following a natural disaster.
The EAL scheme developed by the Nuclear Utilities Management Council (NUMARC)
has been adapted to the site, reviewed and approved by the NRC, and formally adopted on June 4, 1997.
Review of procedure PMP 2080.EPP.101, Revision 2, "Emergency Classification," indicated that the procedure contained the approved EALs.
The Indiana and Michigan and American Electric Power emergency manuals had been combined into one volume, the AEP Emergency Response Manual.
The following EPIPs were reviewed; no deficiencies were identified:
PMP 2080 EPP.103, "Alert,"rev. 3, dated February 16, 1996.
PMP 2080 EPP.106, "Initial Offsite Notification', rev. 11 dated May 23, 1997.
PMP 2081 EPP.101, "Activation and operation of the Technical Support Center",
rev. 2, dated July 18, 1997.
A post-inspection comparison of implementing procedure dates with procedures maintained in Region III indicated that procedure changes had not been provided to NRC Region III since June 1994.
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, V, "Implementing Procedures,"
requires licensees who are authorized to operate a nuclear power facility to submit any changes to the emergency plan or procedures to the Commission within 30 days of such changes.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that emergency plan implementing procedures had been provided to NRC Headquarters and the Resident Inspector, but the Region had mistakenly been removed from procedure change distribution. Licensee personnel indicated that action would be taken to provide current copies of the implementing procedures and ensuring the Region was on distribution.
'
review of Condition Reports assigned to the emergency preparedness group since the beginning of 1996 until the current date (eleven condition reports) did not indicate major problems.
Two of the Condition Reports were discussed in detail with the EP staff. CR-97-2110 dealt with the State of Michigan informing the licensee that the Emergency Response Data System did not function during a drill. Contact with State of Michigan personnel indicated that the problem was not with licensee equipment or data, and had been corrected.
On September 9, 1997, the licensee began a follow up investigation after identifying similar respirator qualifications problems to those identified by an Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Operating Experience (OE) report. CR-97-1583, "Some licensed operators did not possess required corrective lenses approved for use with SCBA" documented the initial investigation findings. CR-97-2431 was subsequently issued based on finding that respirator qualifications had not been properly maintained for some Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel assigned to report to the TSC or OSA, and a program did not exist for tracking of these qualifications.
The licensee's immediate corrective actions were to ensure that all licensed operators were properly fit-tested for respirators and that corrective lens inserts were available for those operators who needed them. The last individual requiring respirator requalification was qualified on October 29, 1997.
Planned Iong-term corrective action included updating the computerized tracking system to alert supervisors of the need to test members of their staff before their respirator qualifications expire. This issue was an Unresolved Item (50-315/97015-02; 50-316/97015-02) in NRC inspection report 50-315/316/97015, and will remain open pending completion of the long-term corrective action Procedure reviews indicated that EP procedures provided detailed guidance on responding to declared emergencies.
No procedural problems were identiTied.
Condition Report documentation indicated that plant staff made good use of an Operating Experience report to identify a problem, and had taken aggressive actions to correct the lack of current respirator qualifications for members of the ERO.
p5 Staff Training and Qualification in EP The inspectors reviewed the licensee's EP training program.
This included review of the following: select lessons plans and related attendance records; records of periodic drills and related critique forms; and training activities involving offsite support organizations.
The inspectors assessed the staffing levels and training status of all members of the ERO. The inspectors also interviewed two key ERO members.
b.
Per Revision 7 of the "Training Program Management Plan," dated July 1997, ERO members were required to remain qualiTied for their assigned positions either by annually participating in a drill or by attending requaliTication training and passing an examination.
Personnel were also given the option of taking a requaliTication
"challenge" examination.
A test score exceeding 80 percent would result in a waiver from attending classroom training. Successful completion of requalification training was required every 365 days based on the latter of the dates of the last drill participation or passing the relevant examination.
The drills used as training were verified to be demonstrations of actual plan performance.
Each drill is adequately monitored and critiqued. This ensures any deficiencies in meeting e-plan commitments will be identiTied.
Records review indicated that all ERO members listed on the October 1997 revision of the ERO call out roster completed requaliTication training in one of the approved methods within 365 days of their previous training.
The licensee implemented revised Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in June 1997, which were based on NUMARCguidance and approved by NRC in April 1997.
Records review indicated that all Senior Reactor Operators (SROs), Reactor Operators (ROs),
and Shift Technical Advisors (STAs) were trained on these revised EALs, including several approved refinements.
The associated lesson plans accurately reflected the approved EALs, as listed in the current procedure revision.
The licensee's Emergency Plan indicated that any onshift SRO, RO, or STA was qualified to perform an initial offsite dose projection using the DAP and to develop an associated offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). Discussion indicated that the DAP code would be changed from FORTRAN to Delphi to make it compatible with
j,
the Windows personal computer operating system.
Records indicated that all SROs,,
ROs, and STAs completed training on these tasks during the Fall of 1996.
Review of the relevant lesson plan indicated that it accurately reflected procedural guidance and included several sample problems.
The cognizant instructor indicated that students were required to use DAP computers to complete the sample problems.
Discussion with cognizant licensee staff indicated that requalification training for members of the EOF's protective measures team was usually accomplished by participation in a drill or an exercise.
A relevant lesson plan was reviewed and was determined to accurately reflect information in the revisions of the relevant procedures that were current when the lesson plan was last used in 1996. The lesson plan's appendices contained more in depth information so that an instructor could better respond to students'uestions on several aspects of performing dose projections or developing an offsite PAR.
Records indicated that all required emergency plan drills and an exercise were successfully conducted since mid-1996 with the exception of an annual post accident sampling system drill that was scheduled for December 1997, subsequent to this inspection.
The completeness and quality of the records associated with these drills improved beginning in 1997. Documentation for the drills contained comprehensive self-assessments of drill activities, and references to the Emergency Plan Action Tracking System numbers for items determined to require corrective action.
Records indicated that training sessions and drills involving two local hospitals'nd one local ambulance service's staffs were successfully conducted and critiqued during 1996 and 1997. Annual training with members of several local fire departments was completed in 1997. A media orientation training session was held in mid-1997. An annual meeting with State and county officials to discuss EALs and other matters of mutual interest was also held during 1997.
Two key ERO members, the TSC Technical Director and the Environmental Assessment Director, were interviewed.
Both demonstrated very good knowledge of their emergency responsibilities and procedures.
Review of the October 1997 revision to the ERO call out roster indicated that typically three persons were assigned to each response position, except for positions filled by much more numerous Health Physics, Chemistry or craft specialists.
No one was assigned to multiple response positions.
Records indicated that semi-annual, off-hours augmentation drills were successfully conducted and critiqued. The licensee indicated that one drill each year included having contacted personnel report to their assigned response facilities.
Documentation indicated that the annual EAL training for offsite authorities (conducted jointlywith personnel from the Palisades plant) was conducted on June 5, 1997. The meeting agenda provided for review of both plants EALS and a discussion of dry cask storage at Palisades.
c.
QQnCfllRQQR Overall, the EP training program was considered very good.
Drills and their critiques were used as an efficient and performance-based method to complete requalification training in a number of cases.
Training records were complete and indicated that all currently assigned ERO members were trained within the procedurally required frequency.
The quality of several types of drills'ritiques improved during 1997. The ERO's staffing levels were excellent for all key and support positions.
P6 EP Organization and Administration The inspectors held discussions with the EP staff regarding the current station organization and reviewed the current organizational chart.
b.
i i
b rv tin The overall organization and management structure of the EP function was unchanged from the last routine inspection.
The Emergency Planning Coordinator reported directly to the Site Vice President, who reported directly to the Senior Vice President, Nuclear.
The remainder of the Emergency Planning organization consisted of Two Assistant Emergency Planning Coordinator positions which reported to the Emergency Coordinator, and an Emergency Planning Trainer (also Lead Exercise Controller), who reported to the Operations Training Manager.
One of the two Assistant Emergency Planning Coordinators was formerly assigned to the corporate office, and had been transferred to the site.
Discussion indicated that in mid November 1997, plans were made to establish a position having oversight responsibilities for Emergency Planning and Security. This manager would report to the Site Vice President, and the Emergency Planning Coordinator and staff would report to this person.
Alldiscussions indicated strong management oversight and support for the emergency preparedness program.
The EP Coordinator retained the Severe Accident Management (SAM) program.
The EP staff utilized the Emergency Plan Action Tracking System (EPATS) to track items assigned for EP staff completion.
The licensee can generate lists of assigned action items and describe the current progress for each.
The former nuclear staff located in Columbus, Ohio, has been relocated to the Buchanan Office Building (BOB). The "Headquarters Support Group" (formerly the Initial Assessment Group) was also located at the BOB.
f I
The structure of the EP function was unchanged from the last routine inspection.
A new position would include oversight of Emergency Preparedness and Security programs.
Management oversight and support of the emergency preparedness program was indicated.
P7 Quality Assurance In EP Activities P7.1 ~i a.
I ti The Inspector reviewed Quality Assurance Department Audits which have been performed since the last routine inspection.
b.
i i n The inspectors reviewed Performance Assurance Audit PA-97-03, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness (PMI-2080)," dated April 18, 1997. This audit was conducted by three individuals between January 30, 1997 and April 17, 1997, and resulted in the issuance of one Condition Report regarding equipment inventories.
Inventory problems were corrected and inventory forms were revised to provide more detail as to requirements during the audit, so no response to the Condition Report was required. A short, standardized questionnaire was utilized for interviews with offsite authorities in assessing the adequacy of offsite interface.
The audit concluded that the
"implementation of the Plant Emergency Plan was determined to be effective." The overall audit effort was excellent.
The audit report findings indicated that a comprehensive program review had been performed.
The following Performance Assurance Surveillance Reports were also reviewed:
SURV-96-339, "Emergency Preparedness DrillAssessment (PMI-2080)"
SURV-96-345, "Emergency Preparedness Exercise Assessment" SURV-97-154, "Emergency Preparedness DrillAssessment" The 1996 surveillances and 1997 audit of the EP program satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t) with respect to scope.
Discussion and a review of records also indicated that the licensee had filled the requirement to make relevant audit results available to State and county officials during May, 1997.
c.
@~i~in The licensee's surveillances and 1997 audits of EP activities were very effective and satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). The overall audit effort was excellent.
The audit report findings indicated that a comprehensive program review had been performed.
P8 Miscellaneous EP Issues I
n ti n F II w N
-
Training modules for key incident response personnel did not contain information relative to the NRC Incident Response Program nor that of the Department of Energy. A training.session had been conducted on this information, and a formal training module drafted.
The module was reviewed in detail and corrected where in error. Discussion indicated that the individuals to receive the formalized training module had been selected and advised of the training, and potential training dates prior to the end of 1977 proposed.
This item is closed.
I e t'F liow-u I
m
-
As a result of a potential problem identified during the 1996 Exercise, plant personnel were requested to clarify the desired degree of Performance Assessment (PA) involvement in emergency inplant team activities. Discussion with plant personnel indicated that the issue had been evaluated, and it was determined that, as they were not part of the Emergency Response Organization, Performance Assessment personnel would not be assigned as a routine part of the OSA.. There was agreement that a need to include PA personnel on an inplant team had the potential to delay inplant teams.
It was indicated that additional guidance would be provided in Procedure PMP 2081 EPP.203 (Revision 4),
section 4.2, "Limitations/Precautions," to clarify the indication that "Plant procedures and administrative controls used during normal operations should remain in force to the extent consistent with the timely completion of the mission." This item is closed.
ti F
II
-
te 0-1 -
- 'uring the 1997 Exercise, the licensee identified that a controller had to intervene during PAR development for the second PAR when containment radiation levels exceeded 25,000 R/hr in the containment building. Exercise participants were aware that a revised PAR was required, but discussion of attachment 2, "Core/Containment PAR Guidance," to the PAR procedure (PMP 2081 EPP.305, "Protective Action Recommendations" ) delayed formulation of the PAR. Block 5 of the attachment described conditions where containment pressure exceeds or is equal to 2.9 psig, and this condition was not met, confusing decision makers.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that a revised PAR flowchart was under development, and would be discussed with State of Michigan officials during a November 1997 meeting of the Michigan Dose Assessment Group.
The licensee was considering using the PAR flowchart provided in NRC Response Technical Manual 96. This item willremain open.
n I
cti nF II w it m50-
7
-
Subsequent tothe1997 evaluated exercise, it was determined that the licensee's exercise controllers simulated some response teams to fix needed equipment to keep the exercise timeline on track.
Controllers injected this information without informing participants in the TSC. This item willremain open pending demonstration in an exercise or drill.
V. Mana e
X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 31, 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
+Discussion with the licensee EP staff regarding current revisions of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures took place on November 13, 1997, subsequent to the inspection.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
(
(
PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
~Lie n~
K. Baker, Production Engineering A. Blind, Site Vice President M. Depuyet, Nuclear Licensing E. Fitzpatrick, Executive Vice-President R. Gillespie, Operations P. Holland, Radiation Protection R. Krieger, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator D. Loope, Training D. Mihalik, Emergency Planning D. Noble, Radiation Protection Superintendent A. Olvera, Nuclear Licensing K. Pinkowski, Performance Assessment J. Sampson, Plant Manager J. Smith, Emergency Planning T. Stephens, Nuclear Licensing S. Wolf, Performance Assessment B. Bartlett, Senior Resident Inspector J. Maynen, Resident Inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82701 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program ITEMS CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Ch~
315/94019-02 IFI Training on NRC Incident response.
50-315-01; 316/97013-01 IFI PA involvement in emergency inpiant teams.
Disig~d 50-315-02; 316/97013-02 IFI PAR procedure clarification.
50-315-03; 316/97013-03 IFI Exercise controllers simulated response teams without
.
communicating this.
50-315-02; 316/97015-02 IFI Maintenance of respirator qualification LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AEP BOB CFR CRS CR DAP DPR DRP DRS EAL EAD EOF EP ENS EPATS EPGR EPIP EPZ ERDS ERO FORTRAN IFI IR NRC NUMARC OE OSA PA PAR PASS PDR PMI PMP R&CM RO RP RPT SAM SCBA SEC SRO SS STA SURV TSC UFSAR American Electric Power Buchanan Office Building Code of Federal Regulations Control Room Simulator Condition Report Dose Assessment Program Demonstration Power Reactor Division of Reactor Projects Division of Reactor Safety Emergency Action Level Environmental Assessment Director Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Preparedness Emergency NotiTication System Emergency Plan Action Tracking System Emergency Planning Guidance Recommendation Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Emergency Planning Zone Emergency Response Data System Emergency Response Organization Formula Translation Inspection Follow up Item
Inspection Report
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Management and Resources
Council
Operating Experience
Operations Staging Area
Performance Assessment
Protective Action Recommendation
Post Accident Sampling System
NRC Public Document Room
Plant Manage Vs Instruction
Plant Manager's Procedure
Recovery and Control Manager
Reactor Operator
Radiation Protection
Radiation Protection Technician
Severe Accident Management
Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
Site Emergency Coordinator
Senior Reactor Operator
Shift Supervisor
Surveillance
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
N
J
0