IR 05000315/2022004
| ML23030B844 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/2023 |
| From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno NRC/RGN-III/DORS/ERPB |
| To: | Lies Q Indiana Michigan Power Co |
| References | |
| EA-21-024, EA-22-109 IR 2022004 | |
| Download: ML23030B844 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2022004 AND 05000316/2022004 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Q. Shane Lies:
On December 31, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. On January 11, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Kelly Ferneau, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
February 1, 2023 If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Engineering & Reactor Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000315; 05000316 License Nos. DPR-58; DPR-74
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000315 and 05000316
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000315/2022004 and 05000316/2022004
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022004-0047
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Facility:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant
Location:
Bridgman, MI
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2022 to December 31, 2022
Inspectors:
S. Bell, Health Physicist
E. Magnuson, Reactor Inspector
J. Mancuso, Resident Inspector
J. Meszaros, Project Engineer
J. Reed, Health Physicist
A. Shaikh, Senior Reactor Inspector
P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Engineering & Reactor Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Perform Radiation Surveys During HEPA Pre-Filter Exchange Which Resulted in Unintended and Unnecessary Radiation Dose Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000315,05000316/202200401 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71124.01 A finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was self-revealed to the inspectors for the failure to perform radiation surveys during the pre-filter exchange of the HEPA ventilation system during the execution of steam generator eddy current testing. This failure led to unintended and unnecessary radiation dose to two individuals associated with the task.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status EDG EA-22109 Failure to Comply with 10 CFR Part 37 71124.08 Closed LER 05000315/2022001-00 LER 2022001-00 for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Manual Reactor Trip Following Manual Turbine Trip due to High Vibrations on Main Turbine 71153 Closed LER 05000315/2021001-00 LER 2021001-00 for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Loss of Train B Reserve Power 71153 Closed URI 05000315,05000316/
202100101 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B Reserve Feed Declared Inoperable due to Fault Current 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period. Unit 2 began the inspection period in a refueling outage. On November 10, 2022, during post refueling outage power ascension, the unit tripped at approximately 44 percent power due to feedwater oscillations and hi-hi steam generator level. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on November 15, 2022, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated that flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding on November 14, 2022.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 residual heat removal (RHR) on October 1, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 south stator cooling water pump, single point vulnerability due to north stator cooling water pump motor fire on November 11, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 600V electrical due to unit forced outage start up on November 11, 2022
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during complete walkdowns of the following:
- (1) Unit 1 safety injection system on November 17, 2022
- (2) Unit 2 containment spray (CTS) system on December 14, 2022
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 19; 2 AB diesel generator room, Unit 2, elevation 587' on October 27, 2022
- (2) Fire Zone 29C; essential service water pump 2E, Unit 2, elevation 591' on November 22, 2022
- (3) Fire Zone 29D; essential service water pump 2W, Unit 2, elevation 591' on November 22, 2022
- (4) Fire Zone 44N; auxiliary building north, both units, elevation 609', on November 29, 2022
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced drill on November 17, 2022.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
(1)auxiliary building 573' elevation with RHR guarded for refuel outage shutdown cooling on October 3, 2022 (2)turbine building, fire pump house, essential service water on October 20, 2022
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from October 11 to October 19, 2022:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities
Pressurizer Shell-to-Head Circumferential Weld Ultrasonic (UT) Examination
Steam Generator 2 Shell-to-Nozzle Weld Magnetic Particle (MT) Examination
2-GFW-R-139 Pipe Support Visual (VT-3) Examination
2-GESW-R-61 Pipe Support Visual (VT-3) Examination
2-GSI-L-76 Pipe Support Welding Modification
AR 20213698; Evaluate Relevant Conditions Identified During Reactor Vessel Closure Head Exam 03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities
Bare Metal Visual Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper Head 03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities
AR 20215820; 2QPI-253 Discolored Boric Acid
AR 20221224; Apparent Through-wall Leak on Elbow
AR 202110381; Boron Buildup on 2 CS-311N
AR 20216111; U2 South Safety Injection Pump Outboard Mechanical Seal Leak
AR 20220400; East Charging Pump Discharge Pressure Indicator Leak
AR 20215643; 2SI-157-L4 Boric Acid Leak
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 shutdown for refuel outage U2C27 on October 1, 2022.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated performance during and emergency planning drill on November 29, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)2-HE-15E; CCW HX on October 15, 2022 (2)2-HE-15W; west CCW HX on October 28, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 main steam action on November 15, 2022
- (4) Unit 2 primary water storage tank heat trace failure/repair on December 19, 2022
- (5) Unit 1 significant leak from #2 electro-hydraulic control pump on December 20, 2022
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
(1)electric fire pump maintenance on November 28, 2022
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)cycle 124, week 01 with Unit 2 refueling outage, east motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump, and essential service water crosstie valves closed on October 3, 2022 (2)cycle 124, week 04 with Unit 2 refueling outage, Train B emergency diesel generator (EDG), CCW, direct current (DC), and ESW work on October 24, 2022 (3)cycle 124, week 05 with Unit 2 refueling outage, Unit 2 containment integrated leak rate test with accumulators depressurized/RHR guarded, train B DC, ESW, plant air compressor & CCW work, Unit 1 centrifugal charging pump work on October 31, 2022 (4)cycle 124, week 06 with Unit 1 north stator cooling water pump motor fire and single point vulnerability on November 11, 2022 (5)cycle 124, week 07 with Unit 2 non-essential service water work and Unit 1 AB EDG and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing on November 14, 2022 (6)cycle 124, week 09 with Unit 2 SSPS testing, Unit 1 east emergency core cooling system work, and electric fire pump maintenance on November 28, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) AR 20227912; 4KV Bus T11A Phase 3 to Phase 1 UV Relay 127-3-T11a Failed Surveillance on October 6, 2022
- (2) AR 20227889; Tayco Igniter Engineering Changes did not Consider all Critical Characteristics on October 6, 2022
- (4) ARs 20229340 and 20226991; Suspected ESW Leak on 1-HV-AFP-T2AC Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Room Cooler #2 on November 17, 2022
- (5) AR 20229520; Electric Fire Pump 12-FP-646 Discharge Check Valve PP-144 Leaking By on November 22, 2022
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 54744; Unit 2 MSR-FW Digital Control Upgrade on October 3, 2022
Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors verified the site Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)were updated in accordance with the Pressurized Water Reactor Generic Severe Accident Technical Guidelines and validated in accordance with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1401, Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis Events and Severe Accidents, Revision 1, as follows:
Changes to the Donald C. Cook Unit 1 and Unit 2 SAMGs were reviewed during the weeks of October 31 through November 14, 2022.
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (11 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
- (1) Unit 2 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump following planned work on September 19, 2022 (2)2-HE-15E; post tube replacement leak on October 13 and 14, 2022 (3)2CD EDG after maintenance on October 14, 2022 (4)2-HE-15E; final post-maintenance test (PMT) leak inspection on October 16, 2022 (5)east CCW PMT following work on October 17, 2022 (6)2 AB EDG after maintenance on October 18, 2022 (7)2-HE-15W; final PMT leak inspection on October 28, 2022 (8)2-WMO-104-ACT PMT on October 31, 2022 (9)ice condenser PMT per 2-OHP-4021082-020 on November 04, 2022 (10)10PP112N Unit 1 north stator cooling water pump motor replacement on November 11, 2022 (11)west containment spray following packing adjustment on December 13, 2022
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the Unit 2 cycle 37 refuel outage from October 1 through November 6, 2022.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
(1)2-OHP-4030001-002; Unit 2 Containment Inspection, Mode 3 Down on October 1, 2022 (2)2-OHP-4030322-217A; UC27 Train A Loss of Offsite Power/Loss of Cooling Accident Testing on October 2, 2022 (3)2D3ICEWDN3 Ice Condenser Walkdown on October 31, 2022 (4)2-OHP-4030217-0541; Unit 2 RHR Suction Interlock Test on October 31, 2022
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 TREVI testing on September 29, 2021
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)2-EHP-4030234-202; Unit 2 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test on October 31, 2022
Ice Condenser Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) U2C27 ice condenser basket weighing surveillance on October 1, 2022
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) FLEX pump on September 20, 2022
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.0102.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes:
RMA-2080-EPA-008: Screening # 2233, June 22, 2022 This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards during steam generator eddy current testing.
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:
- (1) internal dose assessment dated June 7, 2022, including vendor bio-assay results
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling,
Storage, & Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling, and securing the following radioactive materials:
(1)the temporary refueling outage radioactive material storage area located inside the protected area (2)the radioactive material building located outside the protected area
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
(1)the radioactive material storage building (2)the 587' radioactive waste drumming room (3)the 609' radioactive waste annex
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste: (1)primary system mechanical filter (2)dry active waste (3)primary system spent resin
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive waste shipment #DCC22078.
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) Radioactive Waste Shipment DCC21038, which contained spent resins transported in a Type A package
- (2) Radioactive Waste Shipment DCC21039, which contained spent resins transported in a general design package
- (3) Radioactive Waste Shipment DCC22078, which contained dry active waste transported in general design packages
- (4) Radioactive Waste Shipment DCC22067, which contained mechanical filters transported in a general design package
- (5) Radioactive Material Shipment DCC-043, which contained contaminated equipment transported in a general design package
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) AR 20215596; Replacement of Unit 2 Moisture Separator Reheater Expansion Joint Primary (A, B, C Right and Left) and Balance (B Right and Left) on October 1, 2022
- (2) AR 20211900; Both Units Lost Train B Reserve Feed on October 1, 2022
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in reactor coolant system leakage that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 5000315/2021001-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Loss of Train B Reserve Power (ADAMS Accession No. ML21119A378). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.
- (2) LER 5000315/2022001-00, Manual Reactor Trip Following Manual Turbine Trip due to High Vibrations on Main Turbine (ADAMS Accession No. ML22202A055). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.
Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee actions surrounding NOED EA-21024 Enforcement Discretion for Technical Specifications 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating,"
due to Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B reserve feed being declared inoperable due to fault current on March 1, 2021, which can be accessed at https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2106/ML21063A568.pdf.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Perform Radiation Surveys During HEPA Pre-Filter Exchange Which Resulted in Unintended and Unnecessary Radiation Dose Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000315,05000316/202200401 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71124.01 A finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was self-revealed to the inspectors for the failure to perform radiation surveys during the pre-filter exchange of the HEPA ventilation system during the execution of steam generator eddy current testing. This failure led to unintended and unnecessary radiation dose to two individuals associated with the task.
Description:
The licensee was performing eddy current testing using the Westinghouse Zepher system on the Unit 1 steam generators as part of the refueling outage activities. The steam generator ventilation utilized a two-staged filtration system. The first stage was a filter housing containing numerous filter elements and the second stage contained a pre-filter and HEPA filter for the removal of particulate contamination.
On nightshift April 17, 2022, due to increased dose rates in the area, the radiation protection supervisor decided to change the second stage HEPA pre-filter on steam generators 11 and 12. The supervisor required respiratory protection for the job based on a total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) evaluation for the job which was titled, S/G HEPA Filter Element Removal. The job was completed without incident.
On dayshift April 18, 2022, due to increased dose rates in the area, the decision was made to change the second stage HEPA pre-filters again on steam generators 11 and 12. The dayshift radiation protection supervisor did not require respiratory protection for the job, with face shields being worn. The supervisor believed that the TEDE evaluation was for the exchange of the first stage filters located in the filter housing prior to the HEPA and was not applicable for the second stage pre-filter exchange. The supervisor had previously exchanged HEPA pre-filters, although with significantly reduced radiation levels, successfully without the usage of respiratory protection. The supervisor failed to recognize that the increased radiation levels could result in airborne radiological conditions during the pre-filter exchange. The supervisor incorrectly assumed that the containment measures in place would be sufficient to eliminate the possibility of airborne radioactivity.
Radiation Protection Technicians (RPTs) proceeded with the second stage pre-filter change out. During this time, an RPT identified an AMS-4 air monitor in the low ceiling area of containment trending upwards. Concurrently, another RPT observed an AMS-4 alarm, located on the pressurizer deck trending upward. These AMS-4s while in the general area, were not located near the steam generator HEPAs 11 and 12. The individuals exited the area. Two of the RPTs associated with the job were unable to pass radiation monitoring equipment located at the radiologically controlled area exit. These individuals were subsequently evaluated for internal radiation dose using in-vivo and in-vitro methodologies.
Corrective Actions: The licensee expanded procedural requirements to include added expanded radiological controls during HEPA pre-filter exchange and to perform additional training on this event to associated staff.
Corrective Action References: AR 20223333
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to adequately survey (or implement ventilation controls or follow licensee procedures) in an area that in a reasonable exposure scenario could have been the source of internal exposure.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Program and Process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate increasing radiological levels and the potential for airborne radioactivity during the exchange of second stage HEPA pre-filters during steam generator eddy current testing. The failure to evaluate the radiological hazards impeded the licensees ability to use procedures and engineering controls to achieve occupational doses as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). This resulted in unintended and unnecessary radiation dose for two RPTs associated with the work. One individual received 18 mrem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) and the other less than 10 mrem CEDE.
Additionally Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, provides guidance for minor and more than minor performance deficiencies. Example 6h has the same performance deficiency to this event. Example 6h provided guidance that the performance deficiency is more than minor if a worker received or was likely to receive greater than 10 mrem CEDE.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors determined the significance was very-low safety significance (Green) because the finding was: 1) not associated with ALARA Planning or Work Controls; 2) was not an over-exposure; 3) was not a substantial potential for an over-exposure; and 4) the agility to assess dose was not compromised.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. The licensee failed, when faced with unknown radiological conditions, to access the current radiological conditions including the potential for airborne radioactivity. Had the licensee stopped and re-assessed the radiological conditions, procedures would have required the usage of additional radiological controls.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee make or cause to be made surveys that may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in Part 20 and that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation levels, concentrations or quantities of radioactive materials, and the potential radiological hazards that could be present.
Title 10 CFR 20.1101(b) requires that the licensee use, to the extent practical, procedures and engineering controls based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses and doses to members of the public that are ALARA.
Title 10 CFR 20.1003 Definitions, states, as used in this part:
Survey means an evaluation of the radiological conditions and potential hazards incident to the production, use, transfer, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive material or other sources of radiation. When appropriate, such an evaluation includes a physical survey of the location of radioactive material and measurements or calculations of levels of radiation, or concentrations or quantities of radioactive material present.
ALARA (acronym for "as low as is reasonably achievable") means making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to radiation as far below the dose limits in this part as is practical consistent with the purpose for which the licensed activity is undertaken, taking into account the state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, and in relation to utilization of nuclear energy and licensed materials in the public interest.
Contrary to the above, on April 18, 2022, the licensee did not make surveys to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1101(b), which requires the use of procedures and engineering controls based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses that are ALARA. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate increasing radiological levels and the potential for airborne radioactivity during the exchange of HEPA pre-filters during steam generator eddy current testing. The failure to evaluate the radiological hazards impeded the licensees ability to use procedures and engineering controls to achieve occupational doses ALARA, which resulted in two individuals receiving unintended and unnecessary radiation dose.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Enforcement Discretion Enforcement Action EA-22109: Failure to Comply with 10 CFR Part 37 71124.08
Description:
On November 15, 2016, the licensee was issued NRC Inspection Report Nos.
05000315/2016404 and 05000316/2016404, which documented a licensee identified violation of 10 CFR Part 37, Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2, Quantities of Radioactive Material at Facilities with a 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection Program. The violation met the criteria for Enforcement Discretion as described in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 14001, "Interim Guidance for Dispositioning 10 CFR Part 37 Violations with Respect to Large Components or Robust Structures Containing Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of Material at Power Reactor Facilities Licensed Under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52."
Subsequently, the inspectors re-evaluated this activity and found that while a violation of regulatory requirements continues to exist, the conditions remain within the criteria for enforcement discretion established within EGM 14001.
Corrective Actions: As specified in EGM 14001, the application of discretion is authorized until the underlying technical issue is dispositioned through rulemaking or other regulatory action. Additional corrective actions are not required.
Corrective Action References: Not Applicable.
Enforcement:
Violation: On November 15, 2016, a violation of 10 CFR Part 37 was documented in DC Cook Inspection Report Nos. 05000315/2016404 and 05000316/2016404. The inspectors determined that the previously identified violation remains.
Basis for Discretion: This violation met the criteria for Enforcement Discretion as described in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 14001, "Interim Guidance for Dispositioning 10 CFR Part 37 Violations with Respect to Large Components or Robust Structures Containing Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of Material at Power Reactor Facilities Licensed Under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52."
Observation: Both Units Lost Train B Reserve Feed 71152A An electrical fault occurred on February 26, 2021, between the high side of the reserve auxiliary transformer and associated breaker on the Train B reserve feed for both units.
Corrective Action Request (AR) 20211900 documented the issue. The licensee submitted a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) request. The NRC granted the verbal request and subsequently issued NOED No. EA-21024 (ML21063A568) to exercise discretion and not enforce compliance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.A.3 Condition A.3. Inspection reports 05000315/2021001 and 05000316/2021001 documented an Unresolved Item for inspectors to review cause and corrective actions. On September 24, 2021, AR 20218026 documented an electrical fault occurred on reserve feed at the 12AB loop feed enclosure resulting in a loss of Train B reserve feed to both units. On July 27, 2022, AR 20226095 documented indications of partial discharge on the 12AB Loop Feed Enclosure.
The inspectors reviewed AR 20211900, AR 20218026, and AR 20226095, including corrective actions/causal analysis and did not identify any concerns with corrective actions taken or planned. Additionally, inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency leading to the need for the NOED. Unresolved Items05000315/2021001-01 and 05000316/2021001-02 are closed. For the February 26, 2021, event, the licensee submitted LER 05000315/2021001-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Loss of Train B Reserve Power. Reference section 71153 of this report for closure of the LER.
URI Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B Reserve Feed Declared Inoperable due to Fault Current URI 05000315,05000316/202100101 71153
Description:
On February 26, 2021, at 1008 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.83544e-4 months <br />, a fault current occurred between the high side of the reserve auxiliary transformer and associated breaker on the Train B reserve feed for both units. This caused the circuit breakers to open, removing access to one of the two immediate offsite power sources at both units. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B reserve feed were declared inoperable and required action A of TS 3.8.1 was entered for both units. TS 3.8.1 Condition A.3 requires operability be restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the plant be in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in Mode 5 within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Licensee investigation identified a failed bus structure in loop feeder enclosure #1 which feeds both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Repair/replacement was required to return the circuit to operable status, however the time to complete repairs exceeded the 72-hour completion time of TS 3.8.1 Condition A.3. The other immediate offsite power source, all four emergency diesel generators, and the backup offsite power source remained fully functional.
On February 28, 2021, the licensee requested enforcement discretion to not enforce compliance with the TS 3.8.1 Condition A.3 completion time for an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to allow time to repair the failed bus structure and perform necessary post maintenance testing. Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at approximately 100% power. Without this enforcement discretion, Unit 1 and Unit 2 were required to be in MODE 3 by 1608 hours0.0186 days <br />0.447 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.11844e-4 months <br /> on March 1, 2021, and Mode 5 by 2208 hours0.0256 days <br />0.613 hours <br />0.00365 weeks <br />8.40144e-4 months <br /> on March 2, 2021.
The NRC granted the verbal request and subsequently issued NOED No. EA-21024 (ML21063A568) to exercise discretion and not enforce compliance with TS 3.8.1.A.3 Condition A.3, for a 48-hour period starting on March 1, 2021, and ending at 1006 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.82783e-4 months <br />, on March 3, 2021. The NOED approval basis and required compensatory measures were documented by NRC letter to Indiana Michigan Power Company, dated March 4, 2021. The repair and post maintenance activities were completed with equipment restored to service at 0522 hours0.00604 days <br />0.145 hours <br />8.630952e-4 weeks <br />1.98621e-4 months <br /> on March 2, 2021. During the NOED period, inspectors verified whether the required NOED actions were adequately performed.
Corrective Action Reference(s): AR
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On January 11, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to K. Ferneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 20, 2022, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Q. Lies, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
On November 9, 2022, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to K. Ferneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On December 1, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency action level and emergency plan changes inspection results to K. Ferneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS Inspectors reviewed the Institute on Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) report for the assessment conducted in late 2022. The inspectors evaluated this report to ensure that NRC perspectives of licensee performance were consistent with any issues identified during the assessment. The inspectors also reviewed this report to determine whether INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC follow-up.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2-OHP-
22001-010
Severe Weather
24
2-OHP-4027-
FSG-1501
Flood Response Deployment
2
2-OHP-4021082-
2
Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21A and
Associated Motor Control Center
2
PMP-5055-SWM-
001
Severe Weather Guidelines
013
Procedures
PMP-5091-FLD-
001
Flood Protection Program Implementation
010
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 20222149
Leakby on 1-IPI-262-V1
03/18/2022
Drawings
Flow Diagram Emergency Core Cooling (SIS)
051
1-OHP-4021059-
001
Generator Stator Cooling Water System Operation
1-OHP-4030108-
053V
E.C.C.S. Valve Position Verification
2-OHP-4021009-
001
Placing the Containment Spray System in Standby
Readiness
2-OHP-4021082-
20
Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21A and
Associated Motor Control Center
046
2-OHP-4021082-
21
Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21B and
Associated Motor Control Center
043
2-OHP-4021082-
2
Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21BMC and
Associated Motor Control Center
030
2-OHP-4021082-
23
Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21C and
Associated Motor Control Center
2
2-OHP-4021082-
24
Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21D and
Associated Motor Control Center
049
Procedures
2-OHP-4021082-
25
Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21CMC and
Associated Motor Control Center
033
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 20229764
Piping Insulation Found Uninstalled
11/30/2022
Miscellaneous
2063-D
U2 CCW Motor and Pump
000
1-IHP-4030166-
2
AB & CD Diesel Generator Rooms Fire Detection System
Thermistor String Channel Operational Test & Supervisory
Circuit Check
1-IHP-4030166-
008
Unit 1 AB Diesel Generator Room CO2 Fire Suppression
Test
2-FPP-
270066-059
Fire Detection Instrumentation Unit 2 Fire Zone 29
Trains A & B
Procedures
FIRE-PRE-
PLANS-
VOLUME-1
DC Cook Nuclear Power Plant - Fire Protection Program -
Fire Pre-Plans Volume 1
2
Work Orders
5554566201
Auxiliary Building Elev. 609/620 Fire Protection Water
Sprinkler
03/25/2021
Calculations
PRA-FLOOD-004
Internal Flooding - Qualitative Screening Analysis
2
Miscellaneous
DB-12-CCW
Component Cooling Water System
2-EHP-
8913001-002
Heat Exchanger Inspection; 2-HE-15W West Component
Cooling Water Heat Exchanger
Procedures
2-EHP-
8913001-002
Heat Exchanger Inspection; 2-HE-15E East Component
Cooling Water Heat Exchanger
AR 20109411
2-GESW-R61, Missing Two Washer Plates
09/14/2010
AR 202110381
Boron Buildup on 2-CS-311N
2/22/2021
AR 20213698
Evaluate Relevant Conditions Identified During RVCH Exam
04/29/2021
AR 20215643
2-SI-157-L4 Has a Leak
06/23/2021
AR 20215820
2-QPI-253 Discolored Boric Acid
06/29/2021
AR 202161111
U2 South Safety Injection Pump Outboard Mechanical Seal
Leak
07/12/2021
AR 20220400
2QPI-253 East Charging Pump Discharge Pressure
Indicator
01/15/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 20221224
Apparent Through-Wall Leak on Elbow
2/13/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Engineering
Changes
Evaluate and Accept Existing Plant Configuration by
Updating Required Documents
2/15/2011
Miscellaneous
AEP-NRC-
2261
Request for Relief Related to ASME Code Case N-7206,
Supplemental Examination Requirements ISIR-506
10/24/2022
U2-MT-22002
Steam Generator 2 Nozzle-To-Shell Weld Magnetic Particle
Examination
10/22/2022
U2-UT-22024
Pressurizer Shell-To-Head Circumferential Weld Ultrasonic
Examination
10/25/2022
U2-VT-22026
Piping Support 2-GESW-R-61 Visual Examination
10/11/2022
NDE Reports
U2-VT-22029
Piping Support 2-GFW-R-139-W Visual Examination
10/11/2022
2-QHP-5050-
NDE-002
Magnetic Particle Examination
009
Procedures
WDI-STD-1138
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds > 2 Inches
in Thickness in Accordance With ASME Section XI,
Appendix I
Work Orders
C10036388021
Modify Support 2-GSI-L-76 With Thicker Welds
08/05/2022
Miscellaneous
Emergency Planning 2022 November Drill
10/12/2022
2-OHP-4021001-
003
Power Reduction
061
Procedures
PMP-4015-RMP-
001
Reactivity Management Plan
AR 20218107
MRule Reliability Criteria for Function MS-08 Exceeded
09/28/2021
AR 202210166
Unexpected Control Room Alarm in Unit 2
2/15/2022
AR 202210218
1-PP-9032 EHC Leak
2/19/2022
AR 202210286
Fretting on 1-QP-191A
2/21/2022
AR 202210289
2-QP-188B - Degradation of Stainless Braid on EHC Hose
2/21/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 202210290
2-QP-191B - Degradation of Stainless Braid on EHC Hose
2/21/2022
Procedures
1-OHP-SP-467
Venting Middle Control Fluid Pump Discharge Hose
55540826
2-HE-15W, Perform Partial Tube Replacement
55540828
2-HE-15E, Perform Partial Tube Replacement
5556336102
MTP, 12-PP-144, 12-IHP-4030066-002 Electric Fire Pump
2/06/2022
Work Orders
C10044823
1-PP-903--2 EHC Leak
2/20/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Unit Risk Report - Work Week Cycle 124, Week 01
Unit Risk Report - Work Week Cycle 124, Week 04
Unit Risk Report - Work Week Cycle 124, Week 05
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Online Risk (N Stator Cooling Water MTR) Cycle 124,
Week 06
AR 20226991
Suspected ESW Leak on 1-HV-AFP-T2AC U1 TDAFP Room
Cooler #2
09/02/2022
AR 20227889
Tayco Igniter EC's did not Consider All Critical
Characteristics
10/05/2022
AR 20227912
4KV Bus T11A Phase 3 to Phase 1 UV Relay 127-3-T11a
Failed Surveillance
10/06/2022
AR 20228546
287X-OA did not Trip as Expected
10/21/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 20229340
1-HV-AFP-T2AC
11/13/2022
Drawings
OP-298021
Generator & Transformer Differential
038
AR 20226691
1-HV-AFP-T2AC ESW Leak
09/09/2022
Operability
Evaluations
AR 20227889
Basis for Operability (ODE)
10/06/2022
2-IHP-6030-IMP-
654
Unit Overall Differential and Volts/Hz Relay Trip Check
013
Procedures
Severe Accident Guidance - Instrumentation
Work Orders
5556320501
287-OA, 287X-OA, 87X1-OA,87X2-OA, Trip Test Lock Out
Relay
10/21/2022
Engineering
Changes
Unit 2 Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) System Controls
Upgrade
LTR-RAM-1840
Transmittal of DC Cook SAMG Validation Report
Miscellaneous
LTR-RAM-1857
D.C. Cook PWROG SAMG Deviation Document
Operability
Evaluations
SAG-10
Severe Accident Guidance - Control SFP Level
DPG
Severe Accident Guidance - Diagnostic Process Guideline
SAG-1
Severe Accident Guidance - Initial Response
SAG-2
Severe Accident Guidance - TSC Recommending Strategies
SAG-3
Severe Accident Guidance - Inject into Steam Generators
SAG-4
Severe Accident Guidance - Depressurize RCS
Procedures
SAG-5
Severe Accident Guidance - Inject into RCS
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SAG-6
Inject into Containment
SAG-7
Severe Accident Guidance - Reduce Containment Hydrogen
SAG-8
Severe Accident Guidance - Control Containment Pressure
SAG-9
Severe Accident Guidance - Mitigate Fission Product
Release
Severe Accident Guidance - Ultimate Decision Maker
Severe Accident Guidance - Site Capabilities
Severe Accident Guidance - Benefit Consequence
1-MHP-5021159-
001
Stator Cooling Water Pump Maintenance
2-OHP-4030216-
20E
East Component Cooling Water Loop Surveillance Test
2-OHP-4030216-
20E
East Component Cooling Water Loop Surveillance Test
2-OHP-4030232-
27AB
AB Diesel Generator Operability Test (Train B)
2-OHP-4030232-
27CD
CD Diesel Generator Operability Test (Train A)
2-OHP-4030256-
017W
West Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Test
55540826
MTM, 2-HE-15W, Perform Final PMT Leak Inspection
Procedures
55540828
MTM, 2-HE-15E, Perform Final PMT Leak Inspection
5530973806
1-PP-112N-MTR; Perform Final PMT
11/11/2022
5551900301
MTM, 1-CTS-126W (MM) Torque Packing, Clean BA
(20185664)
2/12/2022
5554921101
2-WMO-104, Repack Valve
10/27/2022
55562603
Ice Condenser Closeout
Work Orders
C10033452001
2-WMO-104-ACT Remove Motor Operator
10/26/2022
Miscellaneous
GT 20222138-1
U2C27 Refueling Outage Shutdown Safety Plan Report
2-MHP-4050-
FHP-023
Reactor Vessel Head Removal with Fuel in the Vessel
Procedures
PMP-2060-FFD-
2
Performance of Fatigue Assessments
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PMP-2060-WHL-
001
Work Hour Limitation and Fatigue Management
2-EHP-
4030051-256
Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Verification with Lift
Assist Device
09/29/2022
2-MHP-
4030010-001
Ice Condenser Weighing Surveillance
2-EHP-4030234-
2
017
2-OHP-4030001-
2
Containment Inspection Tours
2-OHP-4030217-
054I
RHR Suction Valve Interlock Test
000
2-OHP-4030232-
217A
DG2CD Load Sequence and ESF Testing
2-OHP-4030232-
217A U2C27
DG2CD Load Sequencing and ESF
10/23/2022
Procedures
5556457201
MTX 2-OME-ICE-COND Pre-Outage Ice Basket Weighing
Surveillance
07/21/2022
55564575
Ice Condenser Closeout/Walkdown
Work Orders
C10011624001
Hale Portable Pumps Functional Check
09/20/2022
CEP Rev 46
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan
Miscellaneous
CEP Rev 47
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan
Procedures
RMA-2080-EPA-
008: Screening #
233
CFR 50.54(q) Screening Form
06/22/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
223333
Two Positive Whole Body Counts
04/19/2022
Calculations
274
Internal Dose Assessment Including Vendor Bio-Assay
Results.
06/07/2022
CFR 37 Annual Coordination with Local Law
Enforcement
07/13/2022
444923004
CFR 61 Analysis for Primary System Filters
01/11/2018
Miscellaneous
2629002
CFR 61 Analysis for Dry Active Waste
11/20/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
571389001
CFR 61 Analysis for Primary System Spent Resin
2/16/2021
2-THP-6010-
RPP-607
Operation of the Radioactive Material Building
2-THP-6010-
RPP-905
Solid Waste/Material Handling and Packaging
PMP-6010-PCP-
900
Radioactive Waste Process Control Program
PMP-6010-PCP-
901
Shipment of Radioactive Materials and Waste
Procedures
SPP-2060-SFI-
217
Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Radioactive
Material
Self-Assessments
Radioactive Material Transportation and Radioactive Waste
Self Assessment
09/28/2022
DCC21038
Radioactive Waste Shipment of Spent Resin
09/01/2021
DCC21039
Radioactive Waste Shipment of Spent Resins
09/02/2021
DCC22043
Radioactive Material Shipment of Contaminated Equipment
05/31/2022
DCC22067
Radioactive Waste Shipment of Mechanical Filters
08/30/2022
Shipping Records
DCC22078
Radioactive Waste Shipment of Dry Active Waste
10/19/2022
MSPI Derivation Report - MSPI Emergency AC Power
System (October 2021 - September 2022) - Unit 1
MSPI Derivation Report - MSPI Emergency AC Power
System (October 2021 - September 2022) - Unit 2
Operational Narrative Logs
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Performance Indicator
Data (October 2021 - September 2022) - Unit 1
71151
Miscellaneous
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Performance Indicator
Data (October 2021 - September 2022) - Unit 2
AR 20211900
Both Units Lost Train B Reserve Feed
2/26/2021
AR 20215596
Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip
06/23/2021
AR 20218026
Station Lost Train B Reserve Feed for Both Units
09/24/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 20226095
Indications of Partial Discharge on 12AB Loop Feed
07/27/2022
Work Orders
C10028999
U2 MSR "XJ" Cross-Over Bellows Replacement
09/26/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
ARs (July through December 2022)
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 20229996
RCS Leakrate at Tier 2 Notification Level
2/10/2022
AR 20216095
Indications of Partial Discharge on 12AB Loop Feed
07/27/2022
AR 20218026
Station Lost Train B Reserve Feed for Both Units
09/24/2021
AR 20221900
Both Units Lost Train B Reserve Feed
2/26/2021
AR 20224598
MT Shaft Hi/Hi Limit Alarm
05/23/2022
AR 20224615
Unit 1 Manual Trip during Turbine Startup
05/23/2022
AR 20224630
Manuals Rx Trip due to High Vibrations
05/24/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 20224756
Revise 1-MHP-5021150-001
05/29/2022
Procedures
PMP-4010-TRP-
001
Reactor Trip Review
2