IR 05000315/2022004

Integrated Inspection Report 05000315/2022004 and 05000316/2022004 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion

ML23030B844
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	02/01/2023
From:	Nestor Feliz-Adorno NRC/RGN-III/DORS/ERPB
To:	Lies Q Indiana Michigan Power Co
References
EA-21-024, EA-22-109 IR 2022004
Download: ML23030B844 (1)

Text

February 1, 2023

SUBJECT:

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2022004 AND 05000316/2022004 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Q. Shane Lies:

On December 31, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. On January 11, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Kelly Ferneau, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Signed by Feliz-Adorno, Nestor on 02/01/23 Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Engineering & Reactor Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000315; 05000316 License Nos. DPR-58; DPR-74

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000315 and 05000316 License Numbers: DPR-58 and DPR-74 Report Numbers: 05000315/2022004 and 05000316/2022004 Enterprise Identifier: I-2022004-0047 Licensee: Indiana Michigan Power Company Facility: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Location: Bridgman, MI Inspection Dates: October 01, 2022 to December 31, 2022 Inspectors: S. Bell, Health Physicist E. Magnuson, Reactor Inspector J. Mancuso, Resident Inspector J. Meszaros, Project Engineer J. Reed, Health Physicist A. Shaikh, Senior Reactor Inspector P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Engineering & Reactor Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Perform Radiation Surveys During HEPA Pre-Filter Exchange Which Resulted in Unintended and Unnecessary Radiation Dose Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Occupational Green [H.11] - 71124.01 Radiation Safety NCV 05000315,05000316/202200401 Challenge the Open/Closed Unknown A finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was self-revealed to the inspectors for the failure to perform radiation surveys during the pre-filter exchange of the HEPA ventilation system during the execution of steam generator eddy current testing. This failure led to unintended and unnecessary radiation dose to two individuals associated with the task.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status EDG EA-22109 Failure to Comply with 71124.08 Closed 10 CFR Part 37 LER 05000315/2022001-00 LER 2022001-00 for 71153 Closed Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Manual Reactor Trip Following Manual Turbine Trip due to High Vibrations on Main Turbine LER 05000315/2021001-00 LER 2021001-00 for 71153 Closed Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Loss of Train B Reserve Power URI 05000315,05000316/ Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B 71153 Closed 202100101 Reserve Feed Declared Inoperable due to Fault Current

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period. Unit 2 began the inspection period in a refueling outage. On November 10, 2022, during post refueling outage power ascension, the unit tripped at approximately 44 percent power due to feedwater oscillations and hi-hi steam generator level. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on November 15, 2022, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated that flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding on November 14, 2022.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 residual heat removal (RHR) on October 1, 2022

(2) Unit 1 south stator cooling water pump, single point vulnerability due to north stator cooling water pump motor fire on November 11, 2022

(3) Unit 2 600V electrical due to unit forced outage start up on November 11, 2022

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during complete walkdowns of the following:

(1) Unit 1 safety injection system on November 17, 2022

(2) Unit 2 containment spray (CTS) system on December 14, 2022

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire Zone 19; 2 AB diesel generator room, Unit 2, elevation 587' on October 27, 2022

(2) Fire Zone 29C; essential service water pump 2E, Unit 2, elevation 591' on November 22, 2022

(3) Fire Zone 29D; essential service water pump 2W, Unit 2, elevation 591' on November 22, 2022

(4) Fire Zone 44N; auxiliary building north, both units, elevation 609', on

November 29, 2022 Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced drill on November 17, 2022.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) auxiliary building 573' elevation with RHR guarded for refuel outage shutdown cooling on October 3, 2022

(2) turbine building, fire pump house, essential service water on October 20, 2022

71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Unit 2 west component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger (HX) on November 29, 2022.

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from October 11 to October 19, 2022:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities Pressurizer Shell-to-Head Circumferential Weld Ultrasonic (UT) Examination Steam Generator 2 Shell-to-Nozzle Weld Magnetic Particle (MT) Examination 2-GFW-R-139 Pipe Support Visual (VT-3) Examination 2-GESW-R-61 Pipe Support Visual (VT-3) Examination 2-GSI-L-76 Pipe Support Welding Modification AR 20213698; Evaluate Relevant Conditions Identified During Reactor Vessel Closure Head Exam 03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities Bare Metal Visual Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper Head 03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities AR 20215820; 2QPI-253 Discolored Boric Acid AR 20221224; Apparent Through-wall Leak on Elbow AR 202110381; Boron Buildup on 2 CS-311N AR 20216111; U2 South Safety Injection Pump Outboard Mechanical Seal Leak AR 20220400; East Charging Pump Discharge Pressure Indicator Leak AR 20215643; 2SI-157-L4 Boric Acid Leak

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 shutdown for refuel outage U2C27 on October 1, 2022.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated performance during and emergency planning drill on November 29, 2022.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) 2-HE-15E; CCW HX on October 15, 2022

(2) 2-HE-15W; west CCW HX on October 28, 2022

(3) Unit 2 main steam action on November 15, 2022

(4) Unit 2 primary water storage tank heat trace failure/repair on December 19, 2022

(5) Unit 1 significant leak from #2 electro-hydraulic control pump on December 20, 2022

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:

(1) electric fire pump maintenance on November 28, 2022

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) cycle 124, week 01 with Unit 2 refueling outage, east motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump, and essential service water crosstie valves closed on October 3, 2022

(2) cycle 124, week 04 with Unit 2 refueling outage, Train B emergency diesel generator (EDG), CCW, direct current (DC), and ESW work on October 24, 2022

(3) cycle 124, week 05 with Unit 2 refueling outage, Unit 2 containment integrated leak rate test with accumulators depressurized/RHR guarded, train B DC, ESW, plant air compressor & CCW work, Unit 1 centrifugal charging pump work on October 31, 2022

(4) cycle 124, week 06 with Unit 1 north stator cooling water pump motor fire and single point vulnerability on November 11, 2022

(5) cycle 124, week 07 with Unit 2 non-essential service water work and Unit 1 AB EDG and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing on November 14, 2022

(6) cycle 124, week 09 with Unit 2 SSPS testing, Unit 1 east emergency core cooling system work, and electric fire pump maintenance on November 28, 2022

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) AR 20227912; 4KV Bus T11A Phase 3 to Phase 1 UV Relay 127-3-T11a Failed Surveillance on October 6, 2022

(2) AR 20227889; Tayco Igniter Engineering Changes did not Consider all Critical Characteristics on October 6, 2022

(3) AR 20228546; 287X-OA did not Trip as Expected on October 21, 2022

(4) ARs 20229340 and 20226991; Suspected ESW Leak on 1-HV-AFP-T2AC Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Room Cooler #2 on November 17, 2022

(5) AR 20229520; Electric Fire Pump 12-FP-646 Discharge Check Valve PP-144 Leaking By on November 22, 2022

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

(1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Change (EC) 54744; Unit 2 MSR-FW Digital Control Upgrade on October 3, 2022

Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors verified the site Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)were updated in accordance with the Pressurized Water Reactor Generic Severe Accident Technical Guidelines and validated in accordance with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1401, Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis Events and Severe Accidents, Revision 1, as follows:

Changes to the Donald C. Cook Unit 1 and Unit 2 SAMGs were reviewed during the weeks of October 31 through November 14, 2022.

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (11 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

(1) Unit 2 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump following planned work on September 19, 2022

(2) 2-HE-15E; post tube replacement leak on October 13 and 14, 2022

(3) 2CD EDG after maintenance on October 14, 2022

(4) 2-HE-15E; final post-maintenance test (PMT) leak inspection on October 16, 2022

(5) east CCW PMT following work on October 17, 2022

(6) 2 AB EDG after maintenance on October 18, 2022

(7) 2-HE-15W; final PMT leak inspection on October 28, 2022

(8) 2-WMO-104-ACT PMT on October 31, 2022

(9) ice condenser PMT per 2-OHP-4021082-020 on November 04, 2022

(10) 10PP112N Unit 1 north stator cooling water pump motor replacement on November 11, 2022

(11) west containment spray following packing adjustment on December 13, 2022

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the Unit 2 cycle 37 refuel outage from October 1 through November 6, 2022.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1) 2-OHP-4030001-002; Unit 2 Containment Inspection, Mode 3 Down on October 1, 2022

(2) 2-OHP-4030322-217A; UC27 Train A Loss of Offsite Power/Loss of Cooling Accident Testing on October 2, 2022

(3) 2D3ICEWDN3 Ice Condenser Walkdown on October 31, 2022

(4) 2-OHP-4030217-0541; Unit 2 RHR Suction Interlock Test on October 31, 2022

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2 TREVI testing on September 29, 2021

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) 2-EHP-4030234-202; Unit 2 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test on

October 31, 2022 Ice Condenser Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) U2C27 ice condenser basket weighing surveillance on October 1, 2022

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) FLEX pump on September 20, 2022

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.0102.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes:

RMA-2080-EPA-008: Screening # 2233, June 22, 2022 This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)

(1) (Partial)

The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards during steam generator eddy current testing.

71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment

Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:

(1) internal dose assessment dated June 7, 2022, including vendor bio-assay results

71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling,

Storage, & Transportation

Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling, and securing the following radioactive materials:

(1) the temporary refueling outage radioactive material storage area located inside the protected area

(2) the radioactive material building located outside the protected area

Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)

The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:

(1) the radioactive material storage building

(2) the 587' radioactive waste drumming room

(3) the 609' radioactive waste annex

Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste:

(1) primary system mechanical filter

(2) dry active waste

(3) primary system spent resin

Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive waste shipment #DCC22078.

Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:

(1) Radioactive Waste Shipment DCC21038, which contained spent resins transported in a Type A package

(2) Radioactive Waste Shipment DCC21039, which contained spent resins transported in a general design package

(3) Radioactive Waste Shipment DCC22078, which contained dry active waste transported in general design packages

(4) Radioactive Waste Shipment DCC22067, which contained mechanical filters transported in a general design package

(5) Radioactive Material Shipment DCC-043, which contained contaminated equipment transported in a general design package

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) ===

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) AR 20215596; Replacement of Unit 2 Moisture Separator Reheater Expansion Joint Primary (A, B, C Right and Left) and Balance (B Right and Left) on October 1, 2022

(2) AR 20211900; Both Units Lost Train B Reserve Feed on October 1, 2022

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in reactor coolant system leakage that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 5000315/2021001-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Loss of Train B Reserve Power (ADAMS Accession No. ML21119A378). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.

(2) LER 5000315/2022001-00, Manual Reactor Trip Following Manual Turbine Trip due to High Vibrations on Main Turbine (ADAMS Accession No. ML22202A055). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.

Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee actions surrounding NOED EA-21024 Enforcement Discretion for Technical Specifications 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating,"

due to Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B reserve feed being declared inoperable due to fault current on March 1, 2021, which can be accessed at https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2106/ML21063A568.pdf.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Perform Radiation Surveys During HEPA Pre-Filter Exchange Which Resulted in Unintended and Unnecessary Radiation Dose Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Occupational Green [H.11] - 71124.01 Radiation Safety NCV 05000315,05000316/202200401 Challenge the Open/Closed Unknown A finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501(a) was self-revealed to the inspectors for the failure to perform radiation surveys during the pre-filter exchange of the HEPA ventilation system during the execution of steam generator eddy current testing. This failure led to unintended and unnecessary radiation dose to two individuals associated with the task.

Description:

The licensee was performing eddy current testing using the Westinghouse Zepher system on the Unit 1 steam generators as part of the refueling outage activities. The steam generator ventilation utilized a two-staged filtration system. The first stage was a filter housing containing numerous filter elements and the second stage contained a pre-filter and HEPA filter for the removal of particulate contamination.

On nightshift April 17, 2022, due to increased dose rates in the area, the radiation protection supervisor decided to change the second stage HEPA pre-filter on steam generators 11 and 12. The supervisor required respiratory protection for the job based on a total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) evaluation for the job which was titled, S/G HEPA Filter Element Removal. The job was completed without incident.

On dayshift April 18, 2022, due to increased dose rates in the area, the decision was made to change the second stage HEPA pre-filters again on steam generators 11 and 12. The dayshift radiation protection supervisor did not require respiratory protection for the job, with face shields being worn. The supervisor believed that the TEDE evaluation was for the exchange of the first stage filters located in the filter housing prior to the HEPA and was not applicable for the second stage pre-filter exchange. The supervisor had previously exchanged HEPA pre-filters, although with significantly reduced radiation levels, successfully without the usage of respiratory protection. The supervisor failed to recognize that the increased radiation levels could result in airborne radiological conditions during the pre-filter exchange. The supervisor incorrectly assumed that the containment measures in place would be sufficient to eliminate the possibility of airborne radioactivity.

Radiation Protection Technicians (RPTs) proceeded with the second stage pre-filter change out. During this time, an RPT identified an AMS-4 air monitor in the low ceiling area of containment trending upwards. Concurrently, another RPT observed an AMS-4 alarm, located on the pressurizer deck trending upward. These AMS-4s while in the general area, were not located near the steam generator HEPAs 11 and 12. The individuals exited the area. Two of the RPTs associated with the job were unable to pass radiation monitoring equipment located at the radiologically controlled area exit. These individuals were subsequently evaluated for internal radiation dose using in-vivo and in-vitro methodologies.

Corrective Actions: The licensee expanded procedural requirements to include added expanded radiological controls during HEPA pre-filter exchange and to perform additional training on this event to associated staff.

Corrective Action References: AR 20223333

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to adequately survey (or implement ventilation controls or follow licensee procedures) in an area that in a reasonable exposure scenario could have been the source of internal exposure.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Program and Process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate increasing radiological levels and the potential for airborne radioactivity during the exchange of second stage HEPA pre-filters during steam generator eddy current testing. The failure to evaluate the radiological hazards impeded the licensees ability to use procedures and engineering controls to achieve occupational doses as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). This resulted in unintended and unnecessary radiation dose for two RPTs associated with the work. One individual received 18 mrem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) and the other less than 10 mrem CEDE.

Additionally Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, provides guidance for minor and more than minor performance deficiencies. Example 6h has the same performance deficiency to this event. Example 6h provided guidance that the performance deficiency is more than minor if a worker received or was likely to receive greater than 10 mrem CEDE.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors determined the significance was very-low safety significance (Green) because the finding was: 1) not associated with ALARA Planning or Work Controls; 2) was not an over-exposure; 3) was not a substantial potential for an over-exposure; and 4) the agility to assess dose was not compromised.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. The licensee failed, when faced with unknown radiological conditions, to access the current radiological conditions including the potential for airborne radioactivity. Had the licensee stopped and re-assessed the radiological conditions, procedures would have required the usage of additional radiological controls.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee make or cause to be made surveys that may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in Part 20 and that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation levels, concentrations or quantities of radioactive materials, and the potential radiological hazards that could be present.

Title 10 CFR 20.1101(b) requires that the licensee use, to the extent practical, procedures and engineering controls based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses and doses to members of the public that are ALARA.

Title 10 CFR 20.1003 Definitions, states, as used in this part:

Survey means an evaluation of the radiological conditions and potential hazards incident to the production, use, transfer, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive material or other sources of radiation. When appropriate, such an evaluation includes a physical survey of the location of radioactive material and measurements or calculations of levels of radiation, or concentrations or quantities of radioactive material present.

ALARA (acronym for "as low as is reasonably achievable") means making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to radiation as far below the dose limits in this part as is practical consistent with the purpose for which the licensed activity is undertaken, taking into account the state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, and in relation to utilization of nuclear energy and licensed materials in the public interest.

Contrary to the above, on April 18, 2022, the licensee did not make surveys to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1101(b), which requires the use of procedures and engineering controls based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses that are ALARA. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate increasing radiological levels and the potential for airborne radioactivity during the exchange of HEPA pre-filters during steam generator eddy current testing. The failure to evaluate the radiological hazards impeded the licensees ability to use procedures and engineering controls to achieve occupational doses ALARA, which resulted in two individuals receiving unintended and unnecessary radiation dose.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Enforcement Enforcement Action EA-22109: Failure to Comply with 71124.08 Discretion 10 CFR Part 37

Description:

On November 15, 2016, the licensee was issued NRC Inspection Report Nos.

05000315/2016404 and 05000316/2016404, which documented a licensee identified violation of 10 CFR Part 37, Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2, Quantities of Radioactive Material at Facilities with a 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection Program. The violation met the criteria for Enforcement Discretion as described in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 14001, "Interim Guidance for Dispositioning 10 CFR Part 37 Violations with Respect to Large Components or Robust Structures Containing Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of Material at Power Reactor Facilities Licensed Under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52."

Subsequently, the inspectors re-evaluated this activity and found that while a violation of regulatory requirements continues to exist, the conditions remain within the criteria for enforcement discretion established within EGM 14001.

Corrective Actions: As specified in EGM 14001, the application of discretion is authorized until the underlying technical issue is dispositioned through rulemaking or other regulatory action. Additional corrective actions are not required.

Corrective Action References: Not Applicable.

Enforcement:

Violation: On November 15, 2016, a violation of 10 CFR Part 37 was documented in DC Cook Inspection Report Nos. 05000315/2016404 and 05000316/2016404. The inspectors determined that the previously identified violation remains.

Basis for Discretion: This violation met the criteria for Enforcement Discretion as described in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 14001, "Interim Guidance for Dispositioning 10 CFR Part 37 Violations with Respect to Large Components or Robust Structures Containing Category 1 or Category 2 Quantities of Material at Power Reactor Facilities Licensed Under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52."

Observation: Both Units Lost Train B Reserve Feed 71152A An electrical fault occurred on February 26, 2021, between the high side of the reserve auxiliary transformer and associated breaker on the Train B reserve feed for both units.

Corrective Action Request (AR) 20211900 documented the issue. The licensee submitted a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) request. The NRC granted the verbal request and subsequently issued NOED No. EA-21024 (ML21063A568) to exercise discretion and not enforce compliance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.A.3 Condition A.3. Inspection reports 05000315/2021001 and 05000316/2021001 documented an Unresolved Item for inspectors to review cause and corrective actions. On September 24, 2021, AR 20218026 documented an electrical fault occurred on reserve feed at the 12AB loop feed enclosure resulting in a loss of Train B reserve feed to both units. On July 27, 2022, AR 20226095 documented indications of partial discharge on the 12AB Loop Feed Enclosure.

The inspectors reviewed AR 20211900, AR 20218026, and AR 20226095, including corrective actions/causal analysis and did not identify any concerns with corrective actions taken or planned. Additionally, inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency leading to the need for the NOED. Unresolved Items05000315/2021001-01 and 05000316/2021001-02 are closed. For the February 26, 2021, event, the licensee submitted LER 05000315/2021001-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Loss of Train B Reserve Power. Reference section 71153 of this report for closure of the LER.

URI Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B Reserve Feed Declared 71153 Inoperable due to Fault Current URI 05000315,05000316/202100101

Description:

On February 26, 2021, at 1008 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.83544e-4 months <br />, a fault current occurred between the high side of the reserve auxiliary transformer and associated breaker on the Train B reserve feed for both units. This caused the circuit breakers to open, removing access to one of the two immediate offsite power sources at both units. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train B reserve feed were declared inoperable and required action A of TS 3.8.1 was entered for both units. TS 3.8.1 Condition A.3 requires operability be restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the plant be in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in Mode 5 within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Licensee investigation identified a failed bus structure in loop feeder enclosure #1 which feeds both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Repair/replacement was required to return the circuit to operable status, however the time to complete repairs exceeded the 72-hour completion time of TS 3.8.1 Condition A.3. The other immediate offsite power source, all four emergency diesel generators, and the backup offsite power source remained fully functional.

On February 28, 2021, the licensee requested enforcement discretion to not enforce compliance with the TS 3.8.1 Condition A.3 completion time for an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to allow time to repair the failed bus structure and perform necessary post maintenance testing. Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at approximately 100% power. Without this enforcement discretion, Unit 1 and Unit 2 were required to be in MODE 3 by 1608 hours0.0186 days <br />0.447 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.11844e-4 months <br /> on March 1, 2021, and Mode 5 by 2208 hours0.0256 days <br />0.613 hours <br />0.00365 weeks <br />8.40144e-4 months <br /> on March 2, 2021.

The NRC granted the verbal request and subsequently issued NOED No. EA-21024 (ML21063A568) to exercise discretion and not enforce compliance with TS 3.8.1.A.3 Condition A.3, for a 48-hour period starting on March 1, 2021, and ending at 1006 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.82783e-4 months <br />, on March 3, 2021. The NOED approval basis and required compensatory measures were documented by NRC letter to Indiana Michigan Power Company, dated March 4, 2021. The repair and post maintenance activities were completed with equipment restored to service at 0522 hours0.00604 days <br />0.145 hours <br />8.630952e-4 weeks <br />1.98621e-4 months <br /> on March 2, 2021. During the NOED period, inspectors verified whether the required NOED actions were adequately performed.

Corrective Action Reference(s): AR

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On January 11, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to K. Ferneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On October 20, 2022, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Q. Lies, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.

On November 9, 2022, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to K. Ferneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On December 1, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency action level and emergency plan changes inspection results to K. Ferneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

THIRD PARTY REVIEWS Inspectors reviewed the Institute on Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) report for the assessment conducted in late 2022. The inspectors evaluated this report to ensure that NRC perspectives of licensee performance were consistent with any issues identified during the assessment. The inspectors also reviewed this report to determine whether INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC follow-up.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Procedures 12-OHP- Severe Weather 024

22001-010

2-OHP-4027- Flood Response Deployment 002

FSG-1501

2-OHP-4021082- Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21A and 042

2 Associated Motor Control Center

PMP-5055-SWM- Severe Weather Guidelines 013

001

PMP-5091-FLD- Flood Protection Program Implementation 010

001

71111.04 Corrective Action AR 20222149 Leakby on 1-IPI-262-V1 03/18/2022

Documents

Drawings OP-15142 Flow Diagram Emergency Core Cooling (SIS) 051

Procedures 1-OHP-4021059- Generator Stator Cooling Water System Operation 33

001

1-OHP-4030108- E.C.C.S. Valve Position Verification 5

053V

2-OHP-4021009- Placing the Containment Spray System in Standby 34

001 Readiness

2-OHP-4021082- Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21A and 046

20 Associated Motor Control Center

2-OHP-4021082- Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21B and 043

21 Associated Motor Control Center

2-OHP-4021082- Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21BMC and 030

2 Associated Motor Control Center

2-OHP-4021082- Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21C and 042

23 Associated Motor Control Center

2-OHP-4021082- Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21D and 049

24 Associated Motor Control Center

2-OHP-4021082- Removal and Restoration of Power to 600V Bus 21CMC and 033

25 Associated Motor Control Center

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.05 Corrective Action AR 20229764 Piping Insulation Found Uninstalled 11/30/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous 422063-D U2 CCW Motor and Pump 000

Procedures 1-IHP-4030166- AB & CD Diesel Generator Rooms Fire Detection System 4

2 Thermistor String Channel Operational Test & Supervisory

Circuit Check

1-IHP-4030166- Unit 1 AB Diesel Generator Room CO2 Fire Suppression 7

008 Test

2-FPP- Fire Detection Instrumentation Unit 2 Fire Zone 29 3

270066-059 Trains A & B

FIRE-PRE- DC Cook Nuclear Power Plant - Fire Protection Program - 042

PLANS- Fire Pre-Plans Volume 1

VOLUME-1

Work Orders 5554566201 Auxiliary Building Elev. 609/620 Fire Protection Water 03/25/2021

Sprinkler

71111.06 Calculations PRA-FLOOD-004 Internal Flooding - Qualitative Screening Analysis 002

71111.07A Miscellaneous DB-12-CCW Component Cooling Water System 12

Procedures 12-EHP- Heat Exchanger Inspection; 2-HE-15W West Component 14

8913001-002 Cooling Water Heat Exchanger

2-EHP- Heat Exchanger Inspection; 2-HE-15E East Component 14

8913001-002 Cooling Water Heat Exchanger

71111.08P Corrective Action AR 20109411 2-GESW-R61, Missing Two Washer Plates 09/14/2010

Documents AR 202110381 Boron Buildup on 2-CS-311N 12/22/2021

AR 20213698 Evaluate Relevant Conditions Identified During RVCH Exam 04/29/2021

AR 20215643 2-SI-157-L4 Has a Leak 06/23/2021

AR 20215820 2-QPI-253 Discolored Boric Acid 06/29/2021

AR 202161111 U2 South Safety Injection Pump Outboard Mechanical Seal 07/12/2021

Leak

AR 20220400 2QPI-253 East Charging Pump Discharge Pressure 01/15/2022

Indicator

AR 20221224 Apparent Through-Wall Leak on Elbow 02/13/2022

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Engineering EC 0000051113 Evaluate and Accept Existing Plant Configuration by 02/15/2011

Changes Updating Required Documents

Miscellaneous AEP-NRC- Request for Relief Related to ASME Code Case N-7206, 10/24/2022

2261 Supplemental Examination Requirements ISIR-506

NDE Reports U2-MT-22002 Steam Generator 2 Nozzle-To-Shell Weld Magnetic Particle 10/22/2022

Examination

U2-UT-22024 Pressurizer Shell-To-Head Circumferential Weld Ultrasonic 10/25/2022

Examination

U2-VT-22026 Piping Support 2-GESW-R-61 Visual Examination 10/11/2022

U2-VT-22029 Piping Support 2-GFW-R-139-W Visual Examination 10/11/2022

Procedures 12-QHP-5050- Magnetic Particle Examination 009

NDE-002

WDI-STD-1138 Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds > 2 Inches 6

in Thickness in Accordance With ASME Section XI,

Appendix I

Work Orders WO Modify Support 2-GSI-L-76 With Thicker Welds 08/05/2022

C10036388021

71111.11Q Miscellaneous EP-S-NOV22 Emergency Planning 2022 November Drill 10/12/2022

Procedures 2-OHP-4021001- Power Reduction 061

003

PMP-4015-RMP- Reactivity Management Plan 16

001

71111.12 Corrective Action AR 20218107 MRule Reliability Criteria for Function MS-08 Exceeded 09/28/2021

Documents AR 202210166 Unexpected Control Room Alarm in Unit 2 12/15/2022

AR 202210218 1-PP-9032 EHC Leak 12/19/2022

AR 202210286 Fretting on 1-QP-191A 12/21/2022

AR 202210289 2-QP-188B - Degradation of Stainless Braid on EHC Hose 12/21/2022

AR 202210290 2-QP-191B - Degradation of Stainless Braid on EHC Hose 12/21/2022

Procedures 1-OHP-SP-467 Venting Middle Control Fluid Pump Discharge Hose 0

Work Orders 55540826 2-HE-15W, Perform Partial Tube Replacement 0

55540828 2-HE-15E, Perform Partial Tube Replacement 0

5556336102 MTP, 12-PP-144, 12-IHP-4030066-002 Electric Fire Pump 12/06/2022

C10044823 1-PP-903--2 EHC Leak 12/20/2022

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.13 Miscellaneous Unit Risk Report - Work Week Cycle 124, Week 01 0

Unit Risk Report - Work Week Cycle 124, Week 04 0

Unit Risk Report - Work Week Cycle 124, Week 05 0

Unit 1 Online Risk (N Stator Cooling Water MTR) Cycle 124, 02

Week 06

71111.15 Corrective Action AR 20226991 Suspected ESW Leak on 1-HV-AFP-T2AC U1 TDAFP Room 09/02/2022

Documents Cooler #2

AR 20227889 Tayco Igniter EC's did not Consider All Critical 10/05/2022

Characteristics

AR 20227912 4KV Bus T11A Phase 3 to Phase 1 UV Relay 127-3-T11a 10/06/2022

Failed Surveillance

AR 20228546 287X-OA did not Trip as Expected 10/21/2022

AR 20229340 1-HV-AFP-T2AC 11/13/2022

Drawings OP-298021 Generator & Transformer Differential 038

Operability AR 20226691 1-HV-AFP-T2AC ESW Leak 09/09/2022

Evaluations AR 20227889 Basis for Operability (ODE) 10/06/2022

Procedures 2-IHP-6030-IMP- Unit Overall Differential and Volts/Hz Relay Trip Check 013

654

TSG-1 Severe Accident Guidance - Instrumentation 0

Work Orders 5556320501 287-OA, 287X-OA, 87X1-OA,87X2-OA, Trip Test Lock Out 10/21/2022

Relay

71111.18 Engineering EC-0000054744 Unit 2 Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) System Controls 0

Changes Upgrade

Miscellaneous LTR-RAM-1840 Transmittal of DC Cook SAMG Validation Report 0

LTR-RAM-1857 D.C. Cook PWROG SAMG Deviation Document 0

Operability SAG-10 Severe Accident Guidance - Control SFP Level 0

Evaluations

Procedures DPG Severe Accident Guidance - Diagnostic Process Guideline 0

SAG-1 Severe Accident Guidance - Initial Response 0

SAG-2 Severe Accident Guidance - TSC Recommending Strategies 0

SAG-3 Severe Accident Guidance - Inject into Steam Generators 0

SAG-4 Severe Accident Guidance - Depressurize RCS 0

SAG-5 Severe Accident Guidance - Inject into RCS 0

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

SAG-6 Inject into Containment 0

SAG-7 Severe Accident Guidance - Reduce Containment Hydrogen 0

SAG-8 Severe Accident Guidance - Control Containment Pressure 0

SAG-9 Severe Accident Guidance - Mitigate Fission Product 0

Release

TSG-2 Severe Accident Guidance - Ultimate Decision Maker 0

TSG-3 Severe Accident Guidance - Site Capabilities 0

TSG-4 Severe Accident Guidance - Benefit Consequence 0

71111.19 Procedures 1-MHP-5021159- Stator Cooling Water Pump Maintenance 9

001

2-OHP-4030216- East Component Cooling Water Loop Surveillance Test 37

20E

2-OHP-4030216- East Component Cooling Water Loop Surveillance Test 37

20E

2-OHP-4030232- AB Diesel Generator Operability Test (Train B) 71

27AB

2-OHP-4030232- CD Diesel Generator Operability Test (Train A) 68

27CD

2-OHP-4030256- West Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Test 18

017W

55540826 MTM, 2-HE-15W, Perform Final PMT Leak Inspection 0

55540828 MTM, 2-HE-15E, Perform Final PMT Leak Inspection 0

Work Orders 5530973806 1-PP-112N-MTR; Perform Final PMT 11/11/2022

5551900301 MTM, 1-CTS-126W (MM) Torque Packing, Clean BA 12/12/2022

(20185664)

5554921101 2-WMO-104, Repack Valve 10/27/2022

55562603 Ice Condenser Closeout 0

C10033452001 2-WMO-104-ACT Remove Motor Operator 10/26/2022

71111.20 Miscellaneous GT 20222138-1 U2C27 Refueling Outage Shutdown Safety Plan Report 0

Procedures 12-MHP-4050- Reactor Vessel Head Removal with Fuel in the Vessel 2

FHP-023

PMP-2060-FFD- Performance of Fatigue Assessments 13

2

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

PMP-2060-WHL- Work Hour Limitation and Fatigue Management 11

001

71111.22 Procedures 12-EHP- Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Verification with Lift 09/29/2022

4030051-256 Assist Device

2-MHP- Ice Condenser Weighing Surveillance 29

4030010-001

2-EHP-4030234- Integrated Leak Rate Test 017

2

2-OHP-4030001- Containment Inspection Tours 46

2

2-OHP-4030217- RHR Suction Valve Interlock Test 000

054I

2-OHP-4030232- DG2CD Load Sequence and ESF Testing 60

217A

2-OHP-4030232- DG2CD Load Sequencing and ESF 10/23/2022

217A U2C27

5556457201 MTX 2-OME-ICE-COND Pre-Outage Ice Basket Weighing 07/21/2022

Surveillance

Work Orders 55564575 Ice Condenser Closeout/Walkdown 0

C10011624001 Hale Portable Pumps Functional Check 09/20/2022

71114.04 Miscellaneous CEP Rev 46 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan 46

CEP Rev 47 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan 47

Procedures RMA-2080-EPA- 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening Form 06/22/2022

008: Screening #

233

71124.01 Corrective Action 20223333 Two Positive Whole Body Counts 04/19/2022

Documents

71124.04 Calculations 29274 Internal Dose Assessment Including Vendor Bio-Assay 06/07/2022

Results.

71124.08 Miscellaneous 10 CFR 37 Annual Coordination with Local Law 07/13/2022

Enforcement

444923004 10 CFR 61 Analysis for Primary System Filters 01/11/2018

2629002 10 CFR 61 Analysis for Dry Active Waste 11/20/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

571389001 10 CFR 61 Analysis for Primary System Spent Resin 12/16/2021

Procedures 12-THP-6010- Operation of the Radioactive Material Building 14

RPP-607

2-THP-6010- Solid Waste/Material Handling and Packaging 22

RPP-905

PMP-6010-PCP- Radioactive Waste Process Control Program 15

900

PMP-6010-PCP- Shipment of Radioactive Materials and Waste 7

901

SPP-2060-SFI- Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Radioactive 8

217 Material

Self-Assessments Radioactive Material Transportation and Radioactive Waste 09/28/2022

Self Assessment

Shipping Records DCC21038 Radioactive Waste Shipment of Spent Resin 09/01/2021

DCC21039 Radioactive Waste Shipment of Spent Resins 09/02/2021

DCC22043 Radioactive Material Shipment of Contaminated Equipment 05/31/2022

DCC22067 Radioactive Waste Shipment of Mechanical Filters 08/30/2022

DCC22078 Radioactive Waste Shipment of Dry Active Waste 10/19/2022

71151 Miscellaneous MSPI Derivation Report - MSPI Emergency AC Power 0

System (October 2021 - September 2022) - Unit 1

MSPI Derivation Report - MSPI Emergency AC Power 0

System (October 2021 - September 2022) - Unit 2

Operational Narrative Logs 0

Reactor Coolant System Leakage Performance Indicator 0

Data (October 2021 - September 2022) - Unit 1

Reactor Coolant System Leakage Performance Indicator 0

Data (October 2021 - September 2022) - Unit 2

71152A Corrective Action AR 20211900 Both Units Lost Train B Reserve Feed 02/26/2021

Documents AR 20215596 Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip 06/23/2021

AR 20218026 Station Lost Train B Reserve Feed for Both Units 09/24/2021

AR 20226095 Indications of Partial Discharge on 12AB Loop Feed 07/27/2022

Work Orders C10028999 U2 MSR "XJ" Cross-Over Bellows Replacement 09/26/2022

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71152S Corrective Action ARs (July through December 2022) 0

Documents AR 20229996 RCS Leakrate at Tier 2 Notification Level 12/10/2022

71153 Corrective Action AR 20216095 Indications of Partial Discharge on 12AB Loop Feed 07/27/2022

Documents Enclosure

AR 20218026 Station Lost Train B Reserve Feed for Both Units 09/24/2021

AR 20221900 Both Units Lost Train B Reserve Feed 02/26/2021

AR 20224598 MT Shaft Hi/Hi Limit Alarm 05/23/2022

AR 20224615 Unit 1 Manual Trip during Turbine Startup 05/23/2022

AR 20224630 Manuals Rx Trip due to High Vibrations 05/24/2022

AR 20224756 Revise 1-MHP-5021150-001 05/29/2022

Procedures PMP-4010-TRP- Reactor Trip Review 22

001

24