IR 05000315/2024010
| ML24353A310 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/2024 |
| From: | Matthew Learn NRC/RGN-III/DORS/ERPB |
| To: | Ferneau K Indiana Michigan Power Co |
| References | |
| IR 2024010 | |
| Download: ML24353A310 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2024010 AND 05000316/2024010
Dear Kelly Ferneau:
On November 8, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards.
The team also evaluated the stations effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
December 19, 2024 If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Matthew C. Learn, Acting Branch Chief Engineering and Reactor Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000315 and 05000316 License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000315 and 05000316
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000315/2024010 and 05000316/2024010
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-010-0055
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Facility:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant
Location:
Bridgman, MI
Inspection Dates:
October 21, 2024 to November 08, 2024
Inspectors:
N. Audia, Reactor Inspector
R. Cassara, Resident Inspector
J. Mancuso, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Winslow, Senior Project Engineer
Approved By:
Matthew C. Learn, Acting Branch Chief
Engineering and Reactor Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Establish and Maintain a Procedure for Disassembly and Assembly of the Seal Table Appropriate to the Circumstances Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000315,05000316/2024010-01 Open/Closed
[P.5] -
Operating Experience 71152B The inspectors identified a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1 when the licensee failed to establish and maintain a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee did not include the use of lubrication in maintenance procedure 12-MHP-5021-001-135, Seal Table Disassembly and Assembly, when remaking seal table fitting threaded surfaces. This resulted in galling of Swagelok fitting 2-NZI-J7 and reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
- Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a 5-year review of the source range nuclear instrumentation system. The corrective actions for the following non-cited violations, minor violations (NCVs), and findings were evaluated as part of the assessment: NCV 2023003-01, Movement of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies Without an Operable Fuel Handling Exhaust Train, NCV 2023012-01, Failure to Establish Acceptance Criteria for Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitoring Channel Check, and NCV 2024301-01, Failure to Maintain NRC Licensing Exam Security.
- Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
- Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
- Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Corrective Action Program Effectiveness Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors concluded that the licensees implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.
Problem Identification Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors concluded that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the CAP. The inspectors determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP completely and accurately.
The inspectors performed a 5-year review of the source range nuclear instrumentation system. As part of this review, the inspectors interviewed the system engineer, reviewed plant health reports, and reviewed selective corrective actions and condition evaluation documents.
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective at prioritizing and thoroughly evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. The Initial Screening Committee and the Management Screening Committee meetings were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing issues and prioritizing actions. In addition, the inspectors observed a healthy dialogue between the members of these committees. The members were engaged and challenged each other when dispositioning issues.
Corrective Actions Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems identified using a root cause or other cause methodologies were resolved in accordance with CAP requirements. The inspectors determined that the licensee generally assigned corrective actions that were effective and timely for NRC identified issues.
During the review of a licensees root cause evaluation and in responding to questions by the inspectors, the licensee identified that the storage location, tracking, and review of Engineering Recommendations as a part of shift turnover was not formalized. This observation is documented in the report.
Assessment 71152B Use of Operating Experience The inspectors determined that the licensees utilization of operating experience was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC operating experience information for applicability to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating experience lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations.
The inspectors noted, as part of an apparent cause evaluation review, a missed opportunity to incorporate historical operating experience related to seal table leaks into a site procedure. It was identified as an apparent cause of the failure of a seal table Swagelok fitting in April 2024. The site created a corrective action to incorporate the operating experience into the site procedure. Additionally, the licensee identified a contributing cause associated with post-outage reports from a vendor that were not documented in the CAP. The team identified a finding and associated non-cited violation for the failure to establish and maintain a procedure for disassembly and assembly of the seal table appropriate to the circumstances, and minor performance deficiency for the failure to maintain vendor post-outage reports in accordance with the site procedure documented in this report.
Assessment 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits The inspectors determined that the licensees self-assessments and audits were generally effective. The licensee periodically conducted department self-assessments and nuclear oversight audits throughout the organization. These assessments and audits were generally effective in identifying issues and opportunities for improvement at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team identified issues that were not previously known. The licensees Nuclear Oversight (NOS) also identified deficiencies in the licensees processes, which were addressed through the CAP. The inspectors did not identify any concerns in this area.
Assessment 71152B Safety-Conscious Work Environment The inspectors reviewed results from the 2023 Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) procedure and discussed the program with the ECP manager. Additionally, the inspectors conducted one-on-one interviews with 29 licensee staff concerning the ability to raise issues, the free flow of information, if underlying factors exist that would produce a reluctance to raise nuclear safety concerns, and the effectiveness of the CAP. The inspectors did not identify any impediment to the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment.
In general, the licensees staff was aware of and familiar with the CAP and other processes to raise nuclear safety concerns, such as the ECP. Licensee staff indicated they could raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation. The inspectors did not identify examples of retaliation for raising nuclear safety concerns.
Failure to Establish and Maintain a Procedure for Disassembly and Assembly of the Seal Table Appropriate to the Circumstances Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000315,05000316/2024010-01 Open/Closed
[P.5] -
Operating Experience 71152B The inspectors identified a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1 when the licensee failed to establish and maintain a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee did not include the use of lubrication in maintenance procedure 12-MHP-5021-001-135, Seal Table Disassembly and Assembly, when remaking seal table fitting threaded surfaces. This resulted in galling of Swagelok fitting 2-NZI-J7 and reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage.
Description:
On April 26, 2024, the licensee began to pressurize the RCS at the end of the Unit 2 Cycle 28 refueling outage. During the 300-pound pressure walkdown of Unit 2 containment, a leak was identified associated with a high-pressure Swagelok fitting, 2-NZI-J7, within the seal table.
When the RCS is at 300 psig, maintenance procedure, 12-MHP-5021-001-135, Seal Table Disassembly and Assembly, step 4.3.1.b states, in part, if fittings are leaking, then tighten leaking seals one flat at a time until leak stops or until no more threads are visible between high-pressure lower fitting and Swagelok fitting. After identification of the leak, an adjustment to the fitting was made to improve the leak from 4-5 drops per minute to 1-2 drops per minute where plant operating experience exhibited that the leak would seal itself as RCS pressure rose.
On April 27, 2024, another walkdown of containment was conducted while the RCS was at 1000 psig. The leak associated with 2-NZI-J7 had significantly increased. The operators depressurized the RCS to attempt to tighten the fitting further. When tightening the fitting was unsuccessful, the site ultimately replaced the fitting.
The licensee identified the direct cause of the leak to be galling of the fitting which inhibited the fitting from sealing properly. An investigation into the history of 2-NZI-J7 identified the fitting had a history of leakage tracing back to 2009. It was replaced in 2013 and has required an adjustment due to leakage during every Unit 2 outage since the replacement. The site believes that galling occurred gradually with each disassembly and makeup process.
The site performed a review of operating experience regarding the fitting and identified Westinghouse Technical Bulletin 84-09, Revision 2, Primary System Leaks at Seal Tables. This bulletin was assigned a vendor technical document number by the site on February 9, 1996. The bulletin states, in part, fitting threaded surfaces should be relubricated with Neolube each time they are remade. Additionally, the licensee identified two reports from their current vendor which also recommended the use of lubrication to help prevent galling.
The licensee did not incorporate the use of lubrication on fitting threaded surfaces into 12-MHP-5021-001-135, contrary to Westinghouse and vendor guidance. The use of 12-MHP-5021-001-135 to remake seal table fitting threaded surfaces without lubrication led to the galling of the fittings and RCS leakage.
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced 2-NZI-J7 as an immediate corrective action.
Additionally, the licensee has created an action to revise 12-MHP-5021-001-135 to include the use of lubrication on the threaded surfaces of seal table fittings which is to be completed prior to the next refueling outage.
Corrective Action References: AR 2024-3823, U2 Seal Table Leak at Location J7
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee not establishing and maintaining a procedure for disassembly and assembly of the Unit 2 seal table appropriate to the circumstances is a performance deficiency. Specifically, maintenance procedure 12-MHP-5021-001-135 did not require the use of lubrication when remaking seal table fitting threaded surfaces. As a result, the use of 12-MHP-5021-001-135 led to the galling of 2-NZI-J7, and associated RCS leakage.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the galling of 2-NZI-J7 due to lack of use of lubrication led to RCS leakage. This caused the site to revert reactor pressurization from 1000 psig to fix the fitting.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened the finding using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, Section A, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Initiators. The inspectors answered no to the questions and screened the finding to Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.5 - Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. Specifically, the licensee failed to incorporate relevant operating experience from NSID-TB-84-09 to use lubrication on seal table fitting threaded surfaces into site procedure 12-MHP-5021-001-135. The inspectors determined that the cross-cutting aspect represents present licensee performance despite the finding occurring outside the nominal 3-year period. 2-NZI-J7 has needed an adjustment due to leakage every Unit 2 outage since 2013, and there were opportunities in the last 3 years to identify the need for lubrication prior to the failure of the fitting.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9 addresses, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, and states, in part, maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to the above, from March 1, 2013, through April 27, 2024, the licensee failed to establish and maintain a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee did not include the use of lubrication in 12-MHP-5021-001-135 when remaking seal table fitting threaded surfaces. This resulted in galling of Swagelok fitting 2-NZI-J7 and RCS leakage.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Minor Performance Deficiency 71152B Failure to Maintain Vendor Post-Outage Reports in Accordance with Site Procedure Minor Performance Deficiency: On November 7, 2024, the inspectors reviewed AR 2024-3823, U2 Seal Table Leak at Location J7, which was written due to leakage from 2-NZI-J7 during RCS pressurization at the closure of the Unit 2 Cycle 28 outage. This AR included an associated in-depth apparent cause evaluation (IACE) to identify the cause of the 2-NZI-J7 leakage. The licensee identified a contributing cause which was that deliverables and expectations were not established or communicated between the site and vendor valve personnel.
The licensee identified that the vendor was providing the site with post-outage reports.
Ownership of the vendors contract was not consolidated to a single person, which caused the post-outage reports, dated June 8, 2022, and November 15, 2023, to be received and held by an uninvolved individual. Therefore, these reports were not documented in the sites corrective action program.
Contract Management Procedure, PMP-3140-CON-001, Contract Development, Execution, and Administration, states, in part, that the contract administrator should maintain a contract file during the work. It is important to maintain a complete record of the Contractors work and accomplishments during the entire Contract duration as this file is the central source for all information at this Site, pertaining to this Contract. Contrary to this self-imposed standard, the contract administrator did not receive the post-outage reports from the vendor, which inhibited them from being placed in the contract file. The inspectors determined this was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was of minor significance because it was not associated with one of the cornerstone attributes.
Observation: Engineering Recommendations Not Part of Operations Turnover 71152B The inspectors reviewed AR 2024-4331, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Oscillating Steam Generator Water Levels, and questioned an interim corrective action associated with a communication to Operations on how to conduct future rapid downpowers of the reactor. In the course of their response, the licensee identified that the storage location, tracking, and review of Engineering Recommendations as a part of shift turnover was not formalized. The licensee wrote AR 2024-8253, Engineering Recommendations not part of Operations Turnover. The inspectors reviewed the provided documentation and came to the same conclusion for engineering recommendations. The issue of concern is not a performance deficiency because it is not a result of the licensees failure to meet a requirement or standard.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On November 8, 2024, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Kelly Ferneau, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2010-12917
Seal Table Leak at Fitting J-7
11/30/2010
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2015-5413
Unit 2 Seal Table Leak
04/15/2015
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2016-14517
Boric Acid Leaks on Seal Table
2/19/2016
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2016-14892
BA Leakage at Seal Leak Off Table
2/30/2016
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2019-10136
2-N-23 is Broke
10/19/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2019-11101
Water Leakage on U2 L/C Seal Table
11/08/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2020-2908
2-NRI-32, Ch 2 Source Range was Indication Erratically
03/30/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2020-3925
U2 Seal Table Inactive Leaks
05/07/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2021-4623
Seal Table J7 Location Dry BA
05/19/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2021-6575
N-31 Start Up Range Meter Not Responding
07/28/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2022-4225
Unit 1 N-31 Source Range Failed Low - Loss of Detector Volt
05/13/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2022-9185
Unit 2 Scaler Timer Stopped Responding
11/08/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2022-9292
Unit 2 Audio Count Rate Not Working Following Reactor Trip
11/10/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-1931
2-NRC-6 Indicating at Power Between -.05 and.5 dpm
03/07/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-2620
Evaluators Do Not Implement Student Performance Evals
03/30/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-3814
Undefined Acceptance Criteria for Source Range Channel
Check
05/17/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-3815
CA 2021-7098-7 Action Taken Not as Prescribed
05/17/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-4958
NOS ARMA for In-Storage Preventative Maintenance
Activities
07/06/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-4974
NRC Inspection - Design Control Violation
07/06/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-5234
Tracking Mechanism for SCBA Bottles
07/20/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-5237
Operations Facial Hair Expectations
07/20/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-5586
Failure of Both 12-HV-BD-AFX-1/2
08/02/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-5650
Unlocked Gate
08/07/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-6546
2-CYB-FWA/FWB Configuration Does Not Match ICD
09/14/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-7605
1-PP-3W West MDAFP Control Circuit Cable Found Cut
10/19/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-9004
Clearance Error
11/28/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-9270
Secondary Transient During Unit 2 Main Turbine Valve
Testing
2/09/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-0755
2-NRI-6 is Fluctuating at 1 DPM
01/28/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-1261
Part 21 Evaluation: Ametek Capacitors in Inverter
2/13/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-1656
Revision to OHI-2070 for Reactivation of Licenses
2/27/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-2321
Unplanned Reactor/Turb Trip Due to Thrust Bearing High
Vibration
03/22/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-2417
As Found Set Point Found Out of Spec for 2-NRI-31-DWR
03/25/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-3823
U2 Seal Table Leak at Location J7
04/27/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-3987
U2 Seal Table from F7 Lower Swagelok Fitting
05/02/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-3997
During NOP/NOT Walkdown Seal Table H13 Exhibited BA
Water
05/02/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-4039
1-NRI-31 has Spikes, Counts on Scaler/Timer, Audio Blip
05/02/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-4331
Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip (Oscillation S/G Water Levels)
05/15/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-4939
Risk Statused Incorrectly for Seal Table Leakage
06/11/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-5121
Part 21 Evaluation for Flowserve 1/2 1878 Piston Check
Valve
06/18/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-5668
2-HV-AFX Flow Rate Change
07/17/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-5717
NRC Observation during 71130.04 Inspection
07/18/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-5827
NRC ILT Exam Security Issue
07/24/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-6515
Review of NRC Information Notices/Generic
Correspondence
08/26/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-6704
QHSA 2022-10086 Does Not Meet Procedure Requirements
09/04/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-7197
Worker Had to Change AR
09/26/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2022-9793
Operability Determination Quick Hit Self-assessment
2/01/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2022-9799
WANO PO&Cs
2/01/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2023-0443
Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EITER)
(2023)
01/17/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2023-3740
Loss of Electronic Control Due to Light Socket Short Circuit
05/16/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2023-5358
OHI-4023 Rules of Usage
07/26/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2023-9042
RP Human Performance Tools Usage.
11/29/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2024-0208-
2,3,4,5,7,12
24 Part 21 Tracking Items
01/08/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2024-2779
NRC Information Notice 2024-02
04/02/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2024-3050
Adverse Trend in Industry SCRAM Performance
04/09/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
GT 2024-6509
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-02
08/26/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 2023-0299
Incorrect use of Westinghouse Document to Justify Condition 01/11/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 2023-3814
Undefined Acceptance Criteria for Source Range Channel
Check
05/17/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 2024-8016
Missing Information in Quick Hit Self-Assessment
10/23/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 2024-8052
CARC Assignment Does Not Contain Sufficient Evidence
10/24/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 2024-8253
Engineering Recommendations not Part of Operations
Turnover
11/04/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 2024-8348
Contradictions in Seal Table Procedure
11/07/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 2024-8349
Contract Files IAW PMP-3140-CON-001
11/07/2024
Miscellaneous
Initial Screening Agenda Packages
Various
Miscellaneous
Management Screening Committee Packages
Various
Miscellaneous
Corrective Action Review Board Packages
Various
Miscellaneous
Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment
23
Miscellaneous
EQR-002
Engineering Recommendation to Operations
05/15/2024
Miscellaneous
LA-C-1500
Safety Conscious Work Environment Training for Leaders
Miscellaneous
NOS-23-03
Nuclear Oversight Audit NOS-23-03, Material Control and
Measuring and Test Equipment
07/27/2023
Miscellaneous
NOS-23-06
Nuclear Oversight Audit: Fitness for Duty (FFD)
10/11/2023
Miscellaneous
NOS-24-01
Corrective Action Program
03/13/2024
Procedures
2-MHP-5021-
001-135
Seal Table Disassembly and Assembly
Procedures
2-THP-6010-
RPP-019
Locked High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area
Verification
Procedures
2-THP-6010-
RPP-418
HRA, LHRA, and VHRA Posting Checklist
Procedures
OHI-4000
Conduct of Operations: Standards
155
Procedures
PDP-7020-001
Nuclear Oversight Internal Audit Process
Procedures
PMI-2015
Policy for Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment
Procedures
PMI-7030
Corrective Action Program
Procedures
PMP-3140-CON-
001
Contract Development, Execution, and Administration
Procedures
PMP-4010-ODM-
001
Operational Decision Making
Procedures
PMP-5020-FLM-
001
Fluid Leak Management Program
Procedures
PMP-5020-LCD-
001
Control of Leak Collection Devices
Procedures
PMP-6010-RPP-
High, Locked High, and Very High Radiation Area Access
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
003
Procedures
PMP-7030-CAP-
005
Conduct of Causal Evaluations
Procedures
PMP-7030-MOP-
001
Corrective Action Program Management Oversight Process
Procedures
PMP-7030-OE-
001
Operating Experience Program
Procedures
PMP-7034-SAP-
001
Conduct of Self-Assessments
Self-Assessments GT 2022-9799
WANO PO&Cs
2/01/2022
Self-Assessments GT 2023-0330
Predictive Maintenance Program
01/12/2023
Self-Assessments GT 2023-0438
QHSA: Perform Annual RP Program Review (2023)
01/17/2023
Self-Assessments GT 2023-0445
Trending Program Quick Hit Self-Assessment
01/17/2023
Self-Assessments GT 2024-0528
Fluid Leak Management Self-Assessment
01/18/2024
Work Orders
C10070060001
2-NZI-J7, Replace Fitting (Seal Table)
04/29/2024
Work Orders
C10070060002
2-NZI-J7, PMT Leak Check
05/02/2024