IR 05000315/1998015
| ML17335A180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17335A179 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-98-15, 50-316-98-15, NUDOCS 9808270306 | |
| Download: ML17335A180 (18) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
50-315; 50-316 DPR-58; DPR-74 Report No:
50-315/98015(DRP); 50-316/98015(DRP)
Licensee:
In'diana and Michigan Power
. 500 Circle Drive Buchanan, Ml 49107-1395 Facility':
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Generating Plant Location:
1 Cook Place Bridgmna, MI 49106 Dates:
June 12 through July 16, 1998 Inspectors:
Approved by:
B. L. Bartlett, Senior Resident Inspector B. J.
Fuller, Resident Inspector J, D. Maynen, Resident Inspector E. R. Schweibinz, Project Engineer B. L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6
'2808270306 9808i2 PDR ADOCK 050003i5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY D. C. Cook Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-315/98015(DRP); 50-316/98015(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support.
The report covers a 5-week period of resident inspection and includes the follow-up to issues identified during previous inspection reports.
~Oeralions The inspectors identified that the licensee was inappropriately entering and exiting an adminfstrative Limiting Condition for Operation {LCO)whenever the outside air temperature exceeded 88'F. The licensed operators had questioned whether this was a conservative practice but had not taken actions to resolve their questions or to ask for management assistance.
The inspectors'eview of other licensee entries into TS LCOs determined there appeared to be an appropriate use of LCO time clocks (Section 01.2).
. Maintenance Steady progress was being made in repairs to the ice condensers in both units. Some instances of foreign material intrusion into the ice making system were quickly identified and corrected.
Initial lapses in command and control which resulted in minor scheduled impacts were part of the reason the licensee assigned additional project management
{Section M2.1).
\\
The inspectors concluded that the licensee staff responded appropriately to mitigate the consequences of an oil leak in the Unit 2 main turbine lubricating oil cooler.
However, the inspectors concluded that this leak was caused by equipment material condition problems (Section M2.2).
~
CO~ was inadvertently discharged into the auxiliary building crane bay.
Use of a procedure intended for operability testing of the CO, system as the post maintenance testing was identified by the licensee as a significant contributor to the incident. An investigation was promptly initiated and interim preventive actions taken. A formal root cause investigation is being conducted to evaluate this event (Section M4.1).
Plant Su ort
, ~
The inspectors noted several minor occurrences of lack of attention to detail concerning anti-contamination personnel protective clothing dress requirements.
NRC inspection activities will continue to monitor worker compliance with radiation work permit requirements {Section R4.1).
Re ort Details Summa of Plant Status Unit 1 remained in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, during this inspection period. The licensee presented the schedule for restart of Unit 1 to the NRC on July 9, 1998. The schedule indicates that proposed maintenance activities will extend into early November, followed by a 3 to 6-week heat-up and start-up period.
Work on Unit 1 willtake precedence over Unit 2.
Unit 2 remained in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, during this inspection period.
The restart schedule for Unit 2 is not yet 'complete.
I. 0 erations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments 71707 Using the referenced inspection procedure, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of control room and in-plant operation of equipment during the extended outage of both reactor units.
During observations of control room activities such as shift turnovers, operator response to annunciators, and equipment operations, the inspectors identified that control room operators monitored and operated equipment in a professional manner.
01.2 Multi le Entries into An Administrative Technical S ecification TS Limitin Condition for 0 eration LCO Time Clock Unit 2 a.
Ins ection Sco e 71707 During a routine tour of the control room the inspectors questioned the licensee's practice of going into and out of a TS LCO every day and resetting the time clock. The inspectors also performed follow up of the licensed operator's failure to resolve the inappropriate resetting of the LCO.
Ob'servations and Findin s On June 24, 1998, the licensee identified that the 600 VAC transformer room supply fan (2-HV-SGRS-9) was unable to deliver air due to a failed inlet damper.
Licensee procedure 12 Plant Managers Procedure'(PMP) 4030.001.001, Revision 0 addressed the impact of safety-related ventilation on TS required equipment.
As required by attachment 9 to PMP. 4030.001.001, the control room operators verified the outside air temperature was less than 88'F.
Procedure PMP 4030 also required that with 2-HV-SGRS-9 unable to supply air and the outdoor air temperature greater than 88'F, either restore the nonfunctional fan within 7 days or declare all 600 VAC buses inoperable.
The inspectors'eview of the control room logs on June 26, 1998, identified the following pattern of entering and exiting the administrative LCO:
~
June 24, 1998-2:00 p.m. EDT
- 11:20 p.m. EDT Outdoor air temperature greater than 88'F entered 7 day administrative LCO Outdoor air temperature less than 88'F exited 7 day administrative LCO
.
~
June 25, 1998-12:00 p.m. EDT Outdoor air temperature greater than 88'F entered 7 day administrative LCO-1:00 p.m. EDT
- 2:00 p.m. EDT
- 8:00 p.m. EDT Outdoor air temperature less than 88'F exited 7,day administrative LCO Outdoor air temperature greater than 88'F entered 7 day administrative LCO Outdoor air temperature less than 88'F exited 7 day administrative LCO-9:10 p.m. EDT Outdoor air temperature greater than 88'F entered 7 day administrative LCO
~
June 26, 1998-12:20 a.m. EDT Outdoor air temperature less than 88'F exited 7 day administrative LCO The inspectors questioned the Reactor Operators (RO) and the Unit Supervisor (US)
regarding the repeated entries and exits from the administrative LCO and the resultant resetting of the 7-day clock. The operators agreed that the repeated resetting of the clock appeared to be non-conservative and that they had been questioning this practice just before the inspectors raised the issue.
It was not the normal practice of the licensee to enter, exit, and reset time clocks inappropriately.
The inspectors questioned the Shift Supervisor (SS) and the Assistant Shift Supervisor (Assistant SS) on the resetting of the administrative LCO. The shift management stated that they had also discussed the issue, had not reached any conclusions, and had not passed their questions to their management.
The inspectors reviewed the Action Request (AR) for the repair of the inlet damper to 2-HV-SGRS-9 and determined that it was scheduled to be worked on July 13, 1998. This was approximately two weeks after. the 7-day administrative LCO would have expired.
The inspectors informed the SS, the Assistant SS, and the Plant Manager that the resetting of the administrative LCO clock was being performed in a non-conservative manner.
The inspectors also informed licensee management that it was important that operators had recognized and questioned the non-conservative practice but that a decision should have been reached and action taken to resolve the problem.
Following the inspectors'omments the schedule for the repair of the damper was modified. The damper was repaired the following day and the need to enter the administrative LCO was eliminated.
A previous occurrence of the inappropriate resetting of LCO clocks was identified by the NRC inspectors and documented in Inspection Report 50-315/96-002(DRP).
On
February 22, 1996, the NRC inspectors determined that the licensee was performing surveillance activities on the Unit 2 ice condenser.
The surveillance required the entry into an LCO when intermediate deck doors were made inoperable.
The licensee was exiting the LCO at the end of each work day and reentering the LCO on the following day.
Upon
'nspector questioning of the non-conservative practice, the licensee began tracking the time spent in the LCO and implemented a cumulative limit. The cumulative limitwas less than the TS limit and had not been exceeded prior to the inspectors'bservation.
The inspectors review of other licensee entries into TS LCOs determined there appeared to an appropriate use of LCO time clocks. The instances noted above did not appear to be indicative of the licensee's usual practices.
Conclusions The inspectors identified that the licensee was inappropriately entering and exiting an administrative LCO whenever the outside air temperature exceeded 88'F. The licensed operators had questioned whether this was a conservative practice but had not taken actions to resolve their questions or to ask for management assistance.
The inspectors'eview of other licensee entries into TS LCOs determined there appeared to be an appropriate use of LCO time clocks.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments a.-
lns ection Sco e 62707 and 61726 Portions of the followin'g maintenance job orders, action requests, and surveillance activities were observed or revie'wed by the inspectors:
A162056, 2-IFI-335, Residual Heat Removal Return Flow Rate to Reactor Coolant System, Flow Cycling A150707, 2-IFI-335, Residual Heat Removal Return Flow Rate to Reactor Coolant System, Flow Cycling A162563, Standing Ground on Unit 1 250 VDC Vital Bus A163103, Inspection and Cleaning of the Unit 2 Es'sential Service Water Forebay A160832, East Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve 1-IRV-310, leaks by.
12 - Operations Head Procedure (OHP) 4030.Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)
121 MD, Revision 3, Electric Fire Pump Operability Test 01-OHP 4030.STP.0526E, Revision 6, Centrifugal Charging Pump Operability Test
l
Observations and Findin s The inspectors observed that the workers followed their procedures and appropriately documented the required information. The action request initiated for the standing ground on the Unit 1 vital 250 VDC bu's had been worked and the ground had been cleared; however, at the end of the inspection period the job order had not been closed in the licensees work control system.
Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Ice Condenser Re airs Both Units
'.
Ins ection Sco e
The inspectors observed licensee activities involved with inspection and repair of the Unit 1 ice condenser and preparation to perform the melt out of the Unit 2 ice condenser.
b.
'bservations and Findin s The licensee continued to manufacture borated ice for reloading into the Unit 1 ice condenser after the material condition problems in the ice condenser are repaired.
As the loading capability rate greatly exceeds the ice production rate, the licensee is making and storing ice in preparations for the reloading activities.
Early ice production difficulties appear to have been overcome; however, production was interrupted by two instances of foreign material entering the ice making machinery.
The first instance occurred when a flashlight used for inspection in the ice bin area was allowed to enter the bin and was crushed by the ice auger.
The person assigned to monitor foreign material exclusion at the ice loading station immediately identified the foreign material as it emerged from the ice transport system and stopped the ice loading operation.
The foreign material was removed from the ice transport system and flushes of the system were performed to assure proper cleanliness.
The entire flashlight was recovered from the melt water of the discarded batch of ice. The second instance of foreign material occurred when grease from the ice auger drive entered the ice bin,
.
contaminating the batch of ice in the bin. The grease was immediately identified by the ice making machine operators and ice production was stopped.
The ice was discarded and the excess grease removed from the ice auger.
Both instances of foreign material entry into the ice making/transport system were quickly identified by the operators and appropriate corrective actions were taken to prevent recurrence.
Preparations for the thaw in Unit 2 included sealing the ice condenser foamed concrete floor and wear slab to minimize water leakage into the floor and the spaces below the ice condenser.
Prior to sealing the floor, heating of the concrete was required to defrost the floor, thus improving the adhesion of, the sealant.
During the heating, operators failed to adequately monitor the ice bed temperature and as a result, ice bed temperature increased by 9'F before being identified as a problem.
The rise in ice bed temperature
delayed further work in the ice condenser until ice bed temperatures were reduced.
This instance demonstrated that command and control of ice condenser operations needed improvement.
On June 22, 1998, the licensee announced that a project manager was being brought in from the American Electric Power (AEP) corporate office to oversee the ice condenser repair project.
The project manager had previous nuclear experience at the D. C. Cook site as plant manager.
The assignment of an experienced project manager for the ice condenser work was designed to enhance command and control over ice condenser activities.
c.
Conclusions Steady progress was being made in repairs to the ice condensers in both units. Some instances of foreign material intrusion into the ice making system were quickly identified and corrected.
Initial lapses in command and control which resulted in minor scheduled impacts were part of the reason the licensee assigned additional project management.
M2.2 Oil Release into Lake Michi an Unit 2 a.
Ins ection Sco e
On June 17, 1998, following a second low level alarm in the Unit 2 main turbine lubricating oil (MTLO) tank, oil was discovered in the non-essential service water (NESW) side of the Unit 2 northeast MTLO tank cooler.
The operators isolated the cooler and inspected the system to determine extent of the oil leak. The inspectors observed and followed the licensee's spill response and investigation.
b.
Observations and Findin s
The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 control room logs and Condition Report 98-2774.
These documents indicated the following sequence of events:
On June 12, 1998, the o'perators started the Unit 2 MTLO system in preparation for placing the main turbine on the turning gear.
At the time the system was placed in service, the MTLQ tank level gauge indicated that the tank was full.
On June 15, 1998, a low level alarm was received on the MTLO tank and oil was transferred to the tank to clear the alarm. The tank level was raised to approximately one-quarter full.
On June 16, 1998, a second low level alarm was received on the Unit 2 MTI O tank. The operators sampled the NESW side of the Unit 2 MTLO'tank coolers and found oil on the NESW side of the north cooler.
The Unit 1 circulating water system was isolated to prevent further releases of oil into Lake Michigan through the open discharge cross connect valve. The licensee placed several oil booms in both units'irculating water discharge vaults and around the circulating water pumps.
The licensee's environmental staff reported to the State of Michigan that approximately 900 gallons of oil were missing from the MTLO system but that 120 gallons
had been recovered using the oil booms'.
Following the clean up, the Unit 1 circulating water system was returned to service.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's estimate of oil released from the MTLO system and oil spill recovery actions but did not identify any discrepancies.
The licensee inspected the Unit 2 northeast MTLO cooler and found that seven tubes were leaking and that other tubes were degraded.
The seven leaking tubes were plugged, and the other Unit 2 MTLO coolers were inspected.
All of the Unit 2 MTLO coolers were found to have some degradation.
The licensee planned to inspect all Unit 1 MTLO coolers. The inspectors concluded that the degraded MTLO coolers were indicative of equipment material condition problems; however, outside of the potential for further oil releases to the environment, this event was not safety significant.
The licensee informed the inspectors that the probable cause of the tube degradation was the coolers had been left with standing NESW water and the water had aggressively attacked the tube metal.
The licensee.was performing an assessment of their equipment lay up program for long term shutdown conditions.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee staff responded appropriately to mitigate the consequences of an oil leak in the Unit 2 main turbine lubricating oil cooler.
However, the inspectors concluded that this leak was caused by equipment material condition problems.
Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 a.
Accidental Dischar e of Carbon Dioxide in Auxilia Buildin Ins ection Sco e 62707 An accidental discharge of carbon dioxide (CO~) gas occurred in the auxiliary building during post maintenance testing of 21 CO, hose reel stations.
The inspectors observed, the licensee response and corrective actions.
b.
Observations and Findin s On July 2, 1998, an accidental discharge of approximately one and one-half tons of CO,
.
gas occurred during pressure and operability testing of 21 CO, hose reel stations, installed as part of plant fire protection.
The operability test was being used to satisfy post maintenance testing requirements following replacement of the 21 separate hose reels.
Plant personnel who were not involved with the testing investigated an unusual noise, pinpointing the source as hose station 12-ZCH-21 in the southwest section of the auxiliary building crane bay.
Plant personnel restricted access to the affected area.
Testing personnel had identified a significant leak in another portion of the auxiliary building CO, distribution header and had immediately stopped the test. Testing personnel were not aware of the leak at hose station 12-ZCH-21. Operations department personnel were in process of isolating the CO, system when the leak at 12-ZCH-21 was identifie The cause of the discharge of CO~ was that the discharge valve at the nozzle was installed backwards.
This allowed the valve seat to liftwhen pressurized in the reverse direction, resulting in the discharge of the CO,.
Licensee management promptly and extensively responded to this event.
A Near-Miss-Accident Investigation was initiated to determine the sequence of events and the root causes for the accident.
Issues were identified in the areas of workmanship and supervisory oversight; improper post maintenance testing methodology; lack of communications and follow-up; and scheduler pressures as contributing factors to this event.
Results of the accident investigation had not been formalized as of the end of this inspection period.
The improper post-maintenance methodology involved the use of a test designed as an operability test of the system, not as a post-maintenance test (PMT), after maintenance.
The system operability test used CO, as the test medium, which was suitable for the small puff releases to be used to determine operability of the hose reel system.
The possibility of leaking joints after the hose reel replacements and the consequences associated with a failure of the PMT were not taken into account by the testing or maintenance planning groups.
Personnel were not stationed at hose reel stations, no warning signs were posted and no contingency actions planned for the possibility of PMT failure.
Preventive measures were put in place to preclude completion of the testing until the test procedure was modified, the discharge nozzle was installed correctly and lessons learned training performed for maintenance personnel.
The licensee subsequently determined that PMT leak testing using pressurized air would be performed prior to operability testing using CO2.
Leak testing had not been completed as of the end of this inspection reporting period.
A formal root cause investigation team has been chartered, in addition to the accident investigation team discussed above.
Conclusions CO~ was inadvertently discharged into the auxiliary building crane bay.
Use of a procedure intended for operability testing of the CO, system as the post maintenance testing was identified by the licensee as a significant contributor to the incident. An investigation was promptly initiated and interim preventive actions taken.
A formal root cause investigation is being conducted to research the even III. En ineerin
'ON E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues E8.1 Closed Unresolved Item 50-315/93006-01 DRS:50-316/93006-01 DRS The de raded volta e calculations did not assume the worst case rid volta e as the startin oint for evaluatin the available volta eatmotoro eratedvalve motors.
This item was discussed in Inspection Reports 50-315/94018(DRP), 95006(DRP), and 95010(DRP).
Report 95006 documented that the licensee had revised the majority of the degraded voltage calculations to use the degraded voltage relay setpoint minimum value, and the remainder of the valves in the program were scheduled to be modified to improve the capability at the lower voltage. The inspector verified that the licensee has modified the remainder of the valves to improve capability at the relay setpoint lower voltage.
Report 95006 also documented in Section 6.b that the licensee had not completed evaluation of the existing capability of these valves.
The inspector verified that the licensee has subsequently performed an operability determination for the valves in question, and that they are operable.
This item is closed.
E8.2 Closed Violation 50-315/94009-03 DRS The licensee did not erform an en ineerin evaluation of a motor-o crated valve MOV that was in an over-thrust condition.
This item was discussed in Inspection Report 50-315/94018(DRP).
That report documented that the licensee had completed its evaluation and NRC review of the evaluation package determined it to be adequate.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated July 26, 1994, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified. Corrective actions included revision to Procedure 12 IHP 5030.EMP.002, Revision 2, Change Sheet 5 on June 10, 1994; to require that the justification for acceptance of any test discrepancies be documented in the remarks section of the procedure.
Review of Procedure 12 IHP 5030.EMP.002, June 10, 1998, Revision 6, confirmed that this requirement still existed.
This item is closed.
IV. Plant Su ort R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Radiation Protection and Chemistry (71750)
R4.1 Im ro er. Wearin of Personal Protective Clothin a.
Ins ection Sco e 83750 The inspectors observed work occurring in the lower ice condenser and other portions of containment.
During the work observations the inspectors observed some workers with their protective clothing not secured as required.
b.
Observations and Findin s On June 19, 1998, while inspecting the lower ice condenser in containment, the inspectors identified a Plant Performance Assurance (PPA) technician who was not wearing the hood of his personal protective clothing (PC) as required by the radiation work permit (RWP).
'
The technician had secured the hook and loop fastener of the PC hood behind his neck instead of beneath his chin, exposing his neck to possible contamination.
The inspectors discussed the requirement for wearing of PC hoods with the technician, who stated that it was optional to wear a hard hat in place of the PC hood when working in lower ice, and that ifhe were wearing a hard hat his neck would also be exposed.
The inspectors discussed their observation with the PPA supervisor who subsequently reinforced the requirement for the technician to wear the selected PC ensemble properly. A condition report was initiated to document the occurrence.
On June 23, 1998, while inspecting the upper ice condenser, the inspectors observed three PPA technicians who were wearing their PC hoods with the neck closure unfastened, contrary to the dress requirements of the radiation work permit. The hoods did not have the hook and loop fasteners secured in back, as was the case in the previous issue discussed above, but the hook and loop fastener of the PC hood was unconnected.
After being informed by the inspectors the workers promptly closed the front fasteners.
PPA management initiated an additional condition report and conducted training with all PPA personnel regarding RWP PC dress compliance following the additional NRC inspector findings.
'PA management took prompt action to correct these minor discrepancies in PC compliance.
These occurrences were violations of minor significance that are not subject to formal enforcement action.
b.
Conclusions The inspectors noted several minor occurrences of lack of attention to detail concerning anti-contamination personnel protective clothing dress requirements.
NRC inspection activities will continue to monitor worker compliance with radiation work permit requirements.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities {71750)
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of security and safeguards activities using Inspection Procedure 71750.
No discrepancies were noted.
F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities {71750)
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of fire protection activities using Inspection Procedure 71750.
No discrepancies were noted.
F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues 92700 F8.1 Closed Licensee Event Re ort LER 50-316/93005-00 and 50-316/93005-01 10 CFR 50 A
endix R Cable Routin and Com liance Strate Concerns.
Revision 0 to this LER retracted the 10 CFR 50.72 notification as the conditions were not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(ii){B). The remainder of the Revision 0 described the conditions that were not in compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R from 1986 to 1990,
i and the corrective actions that had been taken in 1990. Also discussed, were the corrective actions that would be taken to ensure the identified issues with the local shutdown indication (LSI) panels did not exist in other LSI panels.
Revision 1 to the LER discussed the corrective actions taken and also stated that no additional cases of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R were identified. This item is closed:
X1 Exit Meeting The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 16, 1998. The licensee had additional comments on some of the findings presented.
No proprietary information was identified by the licensee.
I I
Licensee PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
¹ J. Allard, Ice Project Production Supervisor
¹ G. Allen, Production Engineering
¹ K. Baker, Manager, Production Engineering
¹ A. Barker, Maintenance
¹ P. Barrett, Manager of Protection Assurance
¹ J. Boesch, Maintenance Superintendent
¹ K. Burkett, Plant Protection D. Cooper, Plant Manager
¹ S. Delong, Management Information
¹MB. Depuydt, Nuclear Licensing
¹ S. Farlow, 18C Engineering
¹ M. Finissi, Electrical and Auxiliary Systems Engineering
¹ R. Gillespie, Operations Superintendent
¹ A. Gort, Mechanical Component Engineering
¹ D. Hafer, Manager, Plant Engineering
¹ D. Morey, Corrective Action Supervisor
¹ D. Noble, Radiation Protection/ Chemistry Superintendent
¹ T. Postlewait, Manager, Design Engineering
¹ J. Sampson, Site Vice-President
¹ P. Schoepf, Supervisor, Safety-Related Mechanical Systems
¹ A. Verteramo, Production Engineering
¹ W. Walschot, Corrective Action
¹ P. Wyckoff,.Materials Management USNRC
¹ E. Schweibinz, Project Engineer, Region III Martin-Si mon Consultin Services
¹ J. Martin
¹ J. Crews
¹Denotes those present at the July 16, 1998, exit meeting.
',
IP 37551 IP 61726 IP 62707 IP 71707 IP 71750 IP 92700
'NSPECTION PROCEDURES USED On-site Engineering Surveillance Observations:
Maintenance Observation Plant Operations Plant Support Activities Onsite Review of LERs ITEMS OPENED ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND UPDATED None ITEMS CLOSED 50-315/93006-01; 50-316/93006-01
~50-316/93005-00 and 50-316/93005-01 50-315/94009-03 t
URI The degraded voltage calculations did not assume the worst
'ase grid voltage as the starting point for evaluating the available voltage at motor operated valve motors.
LER 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Cable Routing and Compliance Strategy Concerns.
VIO The licensee did not perform an engineering evaluation of a motor-operated valve {MOV)that was in an over-thrust condition.
ITEMS UPDATED None
'LIST OF ACRONYMS
'
AEP AR BOP bcc BIT cc CCW CFR CR DCC D/G DRP DPR EDT ESF ESW IR JO LCO LER LOCA LSI Ml MOV MTLO NESW NOV NRC NRR OHI PC PMI PMP PPA PDR QC RG ROC RWP STP UFSAR URI American Electric Power Action Request Balance of plant blind carbon copy Boron Injection Tank carbon copy Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Condition Report Donald C. Cook Emergency Diesel Generator Division of Reactor Projects Demonstration Power Reactor Eastern Daylight Time Engineered Safety Feature Essential Service Water
Inspection Report
Job Order
Limiting Condition for Operation
Licensee Event Report
Loss of Coolant Accident
Local Shutdown Indication
Motor-Operated Valve
Main Turbine Lubricating Oil
Non-Essential Service Water
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Operations Head Instruction
Protective Clothing
Plant Manager's Instruction
Plant Manager's Procedure
Plant Performance Assurance
Public Document Room
, Quality Control
Regulatory Guide
Restart Oversight Committee
Radiation Work Permit
Surveillance Test Procedure
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Unresolved Item
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