IR 05000313/1992013
| ML20126J224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/28/1992 |
| From: | Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126J200 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-92-13, 50-368-92-13, NUDOCS 9301060082 | |
| Download: ML20126J224 (19) | |
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APPENDIX-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report: 50-313/92-13 50-368/92-13 Operating Licenses: DPR-51 NPF-6 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Route 3, Box 137G Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: October 25 through December 5, 1992 Inspectors: L. J. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector S. J. Campbell, Resident Inspector K. D. Weaver, Engineering Aide Approved: [A E h / 3./2 8/ 92_
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ITfili~am 0.gohnson, lef, Project Section A Date/
Inspection Summary Areas Inspected: This routine resident inspection addressed onsite followup of events, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance-observation, bimonthly surveillance observation, engineered safeguards feature walkdown, cold weather preparations, Headquarters or Regional requests followup, and cpen item followu Results:
Weak health physics practices were observed during_ the replacement of the dielectric in Oxygen Analyzer AE-1878-2 (paragraph 4.2).
- The licensee's plan to optimize work flow in the control room, " Arkansas
- Nuclear One Unit One and Unit Two Control Room Work Flow Analysis," was-proactive in minimizing congestion, thereby alleviating administrative burdens of the control room operational staff and was considered a strength (paragraph (8.1.2).
Unit 1 implemented an effective freeze protection program that was checked daily during auxiliary operator rounds between October 31 through March 31 (paragraph 7.1).
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-2-The implementation of the Unit 2 freeze protection program was incomplete during.a period of cold weather and was viewed as weak. Followup inspection
- of the implementation of the-Unit 2 freeze protection program will be-performed (paragraph 7.2).
The licensee's commitment to sharing precise technical information concerning timer setpoints of ABB relays which could have safety impact at other_.-
facilities was viewed as a strength (paragraph 8.1.7).-
The lack of controlled wiring diagrams was viewed as a weakness. However, the-inspector determined there was no regulatory basis for requiring the licensee to develop electrical connection drawings, if adequate work instructions were provided for work involving the cabinets without electrical wiring diagrams (paragraph 8.3.2).
Summary of Inspection Findings:
e Inspection Followup Item-50-368/9213-01 (paragraph 7.2) was opene * Unresolved item 368/9213-02 (paragraph 8.1.1) was_ opene e Inspection Followup Item 313/9208-02 (paragraph 8.3.1) was closed, o Three Mile Islan. Action Plan Item III.D,3.4, " Control Room Habitability,"
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remained open (paragraph 8.2).
- Unresolved item 368/9211-04 (paragraph 8.3.2) was close Attachment:
-o Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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-3-DETAILS 1 PLANT STATUS 1.1 Unit 1 Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. The unit reduced power for monthly testing of the governor / throttle valve testing and returned to 100 percent power the same day. The unit remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
1.2 Unit 2 Unit 2 began the inspection period at 75 percent power following the conclusion of Refueling Outage 2R9. The unit reached 100 percent power on October 28. On October 30 the unit reduced power to 95 percent for moderator.
temperature coefficient testing. The unit returned to 100 percent power on October 3 The unit reduced power to 70 percent on November 19 for condenser tube repairs. The unit was returned to 100 percent power on-November 20. On November 21 the unit reduced power to 30 percent at the request of the system dispatcher. The unit returned to 100 percent power on November 23. The unit remained at 100 percent power throughout the rest of the inspection perio _
2 ONSITE FOLLOWUP OF EVENTS (93702)
2.1 Unit 1 - Emergency Feedwater Pump P-7A Turbine Governor Valve Repair and Subsequent Technical Specification Waiver Request On November 2, the Emergency feedwater Pump P-7A turbine tripped on overspeed during routine surveillance testing._ -Pump P-7A was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.4.5.1 was entered. It was-found that the governor-valve stem and bonnet were damaged, allowing excessive steam flow through the governor valve.
Technical Specification 3.4.5.1 requires that _the unit be- taken to hot shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> of declaring one emergency feedwater flow path .
inoperable. The repair of Pump P-7A was projected to take_ longer than the 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> allowed by Technical Specification 3.4. On November 3,_the licensee requested an additional 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> _ allowed outage time in order to provide sufficient time to complete repairs of the valve and eliminate the _
need to put the unit through an unnecessary transient or to allow an-orderly shutdown if repair efforts were unsuccessful. The Unit 2 Technical Specification allowed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> outage time for an emergency feedwater pump as did the Technical Specifications for several other facilities with similar designs identified:by the licensee. The Unit 1 probabilistic risk assessment was still under development, however, the licensee stated- that the results were complete enough to provide a good comparison with the completed Unit ~ 2
-4-probabilistic' risk-assessment. _ Based on that review, the-licensee determined that the conditional probability for core damage due to the increased _ allowed outage time was 6 x 10".-
Compensatory measures, such as' minimizing testing an'd maintenance on the redundant train of safety equipment, placing caution flags to identify critical safety equipment, disallowing discretionary power level changes,- and -
conducting additional staff briefings, were propose Based on a review of the written Technical Specification waiver request, the one-time temporary waiver, which allowed an additional 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> to complete-the requirements of Technical Specification 3.4.5.1, was grante The repairs were completed and the pump was returned to servic OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
The inspectors routinely toured the facility during normal and backshift hours to assess general plant and equipment conditions, housekeeping,'and adherence to fire protection, security, and radiological control measures. Ongoing. work activities were monitored to verify that they were being conducted in accordance with approved administrative and technical procedures and that proper communications with the control room staff had been establishe During tours of the control room, the inspectors verified. proper staffing, access control, and operator attentiveness. Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were evaluated. The inspectors examined status of control room annunciators, various control room logs, and other available licensee documentation.
- 3.1 Unit 1 - Tour of the Auxiliary Building and the Safety-Related Electrical Distribution Rooms All elevations of the auxiliary building, including Decay Heat Vault Rooms A.-
and B, Emergency Diesel Generators K-4A and K-4B, Switchgear Buses A3_and~_A4,_
and both trains of the battery bus were inspected. No operational equipment or radiological discrepancies were note .2 Unit 2 - Tour of the Auxiliary Building and the Safet_y-Related Electrical =
Distribution Rooms The auxiliary building, including high and low pressure injection Pump Rooms A
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and B, Emergency Diesel Generators 2K-4A and 2K-48, Switchgear Buses 2A3 and 2A4, Battery Buses 2D-01 and 20-02, and the swing-bus were inspecte No discrepancies were note _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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-5-3.3 Unit 1 - Emergency Diesel Generator K-4A Operability Evaluation on Condition Report 1-92-0560 Air Receiver Inlet Check Valves F0-54A2 and F0-55A2 for Emergency Diesel Generator K-4A were identified as leaking in Condition Report 1-92-056 The operability determination was reviewed by the inspector and, as written, did not provide a clear basis for determining that the emergency diesel generator was operabl The licensee concurred, rechecked the leakage rates, and revised the operability determination to clarify the basis for determining operability. The revised assessment was acceptable.
3.4 Unit 1 - Degraded Cell on Station Battery On October 27, the licensee discovered that the cell voltage on Cell 18 of Battery D07 dropped below 2.07 volts direct current (VDC). The Unit 1 Technical Specification does not contain specific criteria for determining battery operability. The Unit 1 batteries were similar to the Unit 2 batteries, therefore, the licensee administratively adopted the Unit 2 Technical Specification criteria for determining battery operability.
A 1-hour charge was placed on the battery. This brought it above the allowable value of 2.07 VDC but failed to bring it above the limit of 2.13 VDC, as specified in Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.8.2.3. The emergency diesel generator was started to verify redundant train availability in accordance with Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7. The cell was replaced and the battery was declared operable on the same da .5 Units 1 and 2 - Loss of Radiological Dose Assessment Calculator System (RDACS)
On November 8, the master file server for the RDACS was lost at 7:04 p.m. The super particulate, iodine and noble gas monitors, which provided input to the RDACS remained operable but the automatic alarm function was lost. On the basis that the alarm function was lost, the operators determined that the RDACS was inoperable and appropriately entered Technical Specifications 3.5.7.3 and 3.3.3.9 for Units 1 and 2, respectivel The licensee stated that the failure did not significantly affect emergency response capability and was, therefore, not reportable under 10 CFR 50.7 The backup RDACS system was manually started and could have made the necessary calculations using manual input taken from local read out from the super particulate, iodine, and noble gas monitors. The automatic function was restored at 9:53 .6 Summary of Findings No operational equipment or radiological discrepancies were noted. The operability evaluation for Emergency Diesel Generator K-4A on Condition Report 1-92-0560 did not initially provide a clear bases for determining that the emergency diesel generator was operabl The licensee's method of l
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evaluating the operability' of Unit I station batteries using Unit 2 Technical Specifications was conservativ ;
4- MONTHLY MAINTENANCE OBSERVATION (62703)
Station maintenance activities for the safety-related-systems-and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted i., accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with the Technical Specification .1 Unit 2 - Control Element Assembly No. 47 Reed Switch Position Transmitter 1 Temporary Modification (Job Order (J0) 884572) <
On November 4, Condition Report 2-92-0479 was initiated when Reed Switch Position Transmitter 1 for Control Element Assembly 47 spiked high. Control ,
Element Assembly No. 47 was the target rod for the Group 6 regulating bank,.
and the reed switch position transmitter provided input .into Channel B of the'
core _ protection calculato Temporary Modification _92-2-49 was drafted and evaluated to d'etermine the safety significance of installing a jumper from the reed switch position-transmitter output from Control Element Assembly 1 to_ Channel B of the cor protection calculator. The installation of -the jumper- established _ Control- -
Element Assembly 1- as the target- rod in 1ieu of Control Element- Assembly = 4 Since both control rods were within Group 6 regulating bank,-and-since the associated power cables were in the same cable tray:with the cables: going through the same electrical penetration, the criteria for separation was-maintained.'
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y A concern about the inoperability of Control Element ' Assembly Reed Switch
. Position Transmitter 1- per Technical Specification 3.1.3.2 -(a). was addresse The plant was determined to be less vulnerable to an inadvertent trip 'during a -
transient condition with the' iristallation of the: temporary modification. The temporary modification was approve .2 Unit 1 - Preventive Maintenance on-Oxygen Analyzer (JO 881338)'
r On_ November 10, tha dielectric in' Analyzer AE-1878-2.was replaced' and Sample . -
Desiccant Dryer M-77 was-replaced.- The maintenance was carefully performed.in accordance with: the instruction Weak health physics practices were observed. The workers used clear bags to
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,- tr6nsport potentially contaminated articles from one- contaminated zone- to-another.rather than bags marked for contaminated _ material.; The posting on the
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outside of the cabinet was. not clear. The posting could have been construed to mean that contamination controls were-required for touching outside of the-door. . The intent was to impose-contamination controls when working ~ inside of-the cabinet. One worker repeatedly reached across a contamination control'-
boundary without the required gloves. .ConfusionLexisted over the health; physics _ supervisor's instruction to inform _the health _ physics rover when the -
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-7-work started. The maintenance workers thought he meant to request support if they needed it. Potentially contaminated parts were balanced on their clean edges rather than preparing a controlled lay down are The actual contamination levels were very low. The postings were placed as a precautionary reasure. Swipes were taken and contamination was not spread as a result of these practices. During the inspection period, the licensee responded to a previous radiation worker practice violation without documenting their full corrective action plans. As a result of this inspection, further discussions were held with plant management. They planned to supplement their response to describe more in depth corrective actions which should prevent recurrence of these weaknesses. An additional training program was being administered to the health physics technicians and maintenance personnel. This program addressed the type of weak radiation worker practices which were identifie .3 Unit 1 - Preventive Maintenance on Breaker A407 for Make-up and High Pressure Injection Pump P-36B (JO 879634)
Breaker A407 was removed from its cubicle, cleaned, inspected, and meggered in accordance with Procedure 1412.008, Revision 6, "Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker,"
on November 17. The greases, lubricants, and cleaning solvents listed in the procedure were use The megohm readings were acceptable. . The breaker was manually charged and tripped satisfactorily. The breaker was reinsi.alled. into the cubicle and checked for operability. The-system restoration was satisfactory. No deficiencies were identifie .4 Unit 2 - Maintenance of Boric Acid Pump 2P-39A (JO 879131F-On November 18, Boric Acid Pump 2P-39A was' removed from service for bearing replacement. An identical-maintenance evolution was .previously performed on-the pump for bearing replacement per Procedure 2402.025, Revision 6, " Unit-2 Boric Acid Makeup-Pumps:(2P-39 A and B) Maintenance." However, because the bearing adjustment cap was not tightened evenly, the bearings had'to be- _
replaced again. The pump was reinstalled and a surveillance was successfully-performed'on the pump.. Subsequent bearing casing tem)erature and axial vibration monitoring verified no indications of pump 3 earing wear or impeller-to-casing rub .5 Unit 1 - Weight Handling of Reactor Coolant-Pump P-32D for Shipment IJO 876232)
On November 19, Reactor Coolant Pump P-320 was lifted to Elevation 404' for transfer to shipping casks per Procedure 1409.422, Revision 0, " Disassembly /.
Separation of Reactor Coolant Pump _ and Cover Removed During 1R10." The required lif t permits were complete The planning performed by the Health Physics Department was thoroug Lead shielding and contamination boundaries were erected for the separation of the pump from the cove The boundary was expanded as the pump and the_ cover were .
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-8-lifted and placed into the shipping casks. Dose changes were monitored by health physics during the weight handling of the components. Telemetric dosimetry was used for dose management to monitor changes in dose rates behind
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the lead shielding upon pump and cover separation. The use of telemetr equipment and planning by health physics were strengths.- No discrepancies!
were identifie j 4.6 Unit 1 - Weldino of Pipe Hanger H-63-84A on Decay Heat Removal Cooler VUC-1A Service Water Return Line (JO No. 884145)
The service water return line pipe hanger on Decay Heat Removal Cooler VUC-1A i was removed and rewelded on November 22 because the hanger was not welded per design specifications. The hanger was an American Society of Mechanical Engineers Class 3 support. The requirements for an ignition source permit were satisfied. The welders were trained to the plant's training
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requirements. Appropriate weld maps and drawings were present at the work sit Quality control provided acceptable weld verificatio .7 Summary of Findings The maintenance activities were performed in accordance with established procedural guidelines. Health physics planning and use of telemetric dosimetry for movement of Reactor Coolant Pump P-32D were considered as strengths. Some weak radiological practices were identified during the' oxygen analyzer maintenance. Similar problems were being addressed in the ongoing program for health physics practices to prevent the recurrence of weak radiological practice BIMONTHLY SURVEILLANCE OBSCRVATION (61726)
The inspectors observed the Technical Specification required surveillance testing on the systems and components listed.below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with Technical. Specifications and the licensee's implementing procedure .1 Unit 1 - Station Battery Pilot Cell Test (JO 883713)
On November 16, Procedure 1307.016, Revision 7, Permanent Change 3, " Station Battery Pilot Cell Test," was successfully performed. The electricians found one reading which was high (2.256 volts versus 2,25 volts). They contacted their supervisor as required by the procedure. The reading was determined to-be satisfactor .2 Unit 1 - Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation (JO 883712)
On November 16, the inspector interviewed the instrument technicians regarding the computer run which was performed to determine the need.to calibrate the
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nuclear instrumentation. The technicians were knowledgeable about the computer printout and the acceptance criteria in Procedure 1304.32,
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-9-Revision 10, " Power Range Linear Amplifier Calibration at Power."- It was determined that an adjustment was not require .3 Unit 1 - Channel B Reactor-Protection System Calibration (JO No. 883716)
On November 17, a monthly test was performed on Channel B Reactor Protection System in accordance with Procedure 1304.038, Revision 27, " Unit-1 Reactor Protection System Channel B Test." The digital voltmeter was calibrated. The observed parameters for the channel were within the Technical Specification criterion listed in the procedur The technicians were thorough and knowledgeabl .4 Unit 2 - Calibration of Channel A Nuclear Instrumentation at Power (JO 8749211
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On November 23, Channel A of the nuclear instrumentation system was bypassed to perform a calibration while Unit 2 was at 92 percent power per Procedure 2304.032, Revision 14, " Power Range Linear Amplifier Calibration at Power." All the addressable constants were successfully calculated and input into the core protection calculator to calibrate all channels to-within 1 percent toleranc .5 Unit 2 - Surveillance of Emergency Diesel Generator 2K-4A (JO 884027)
On November 25, a monthly surveillance was performed on Emergency Diesel Generator 2K-4A per Procedure 2104.036, Revision 35, Supplement 1, " Emergency Diesel Generator.0perations." 011 leakage was observed around the exhaust header and around the flange on Lube Oil Strainer 2F-67A. The leakage was enough to form a puddle of oil around these areas. A-job request may be initiated following. verification through direct. observation by system engineering during the succeeding monthly Emergency Diesel Generator 2K-4A surveillance. No operability or safety concerns were identified pertaining to the oil leakage. The surveillance was successfu .6 Sunimary of Findings No discrepancies were identified during the surveillance activitie A-concern about excessive oil leakage during Emergency Diesel Generator 2K-4A surveillance was addressed. No operability or safety concerns were identified in relation to the oil leakag ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS FEATURE WALKDOWN (71710)
6.1 Unit 2 - Walkdown of Emergency Feedwater System On November 13, the emergency feedwater system was inspected. Drawing M-2204,.
" Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Emergency Feedwater," Procedure 2106.006, Revision 40, " Emergency feedwater Operations," and NUREG/CR-5828, " Emergency
- Feedwater System Risk-Based Inspection Guide for the Arkansas Nuclear One i__,_______
-10-Unit 2 Power _ Plant," were used as guidance for the system walkdown. No:
discrepancies were noted for the system alignment, Emergency Feedwater Pump-2P-7A and 2P-78 oil levels, or. breaker cubiclesLfor the associated selected
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motor-operated valve Emergency feedwater Valve 2CV-0795-2 was located in the suction path for the emergency feedwater pumps from the condensate storage tank. -The valve would be used to isolate the nonsafety-related water supply should it be necessary'-
to switch to the safety-related service water supply. J0 875572 was on the y operator and indicated that- the motor on the operator had a low megohm reading during the last preventive maintenance. The-procedural minimum megohm reading was 1.5 megohm The actual reading was .02 megohm Condition Report 2-92-0169 was written to evaluate the condition. The valve was evaluated to be operable based on a successful stroking of the valve without receiving a ground indication alarm. The Arkansas Nuclear One DC system was not grounded and, therefore, a single ground on a component would not render-the component inoperabl The licensee recognized the motor was degraded and planned to correct the condition by June 23, 1993. Thw Station Information_
Management-System, "SIMS Component Data Summary Inquiry," form indicated, in error, that the valve motor was alternating current rather than direct current. The licensee planned to correct the data in the System Information Management System databas A radiological concern was identified about a fan blowing into the cabinet for Hydrogen Purge Supply Radiation Monitor 2RE-8271-2, which was designated as a contaminated area. Health physics personnel provided data indicating that the cat,inet was surveyed clean so the. potential for loose contamination becomin airborne was small. The health physics supervisor stated that the zone was posted for. convenience since the radiation monitor-was worked on frequentl Essentially, the work of posting and deposting the area was~being save No written program existed to control the placement of fans blowing _into ;
posted contaminated areas. The licensee stated that good health physics
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worker practices utilized discretion for the consideration of fan placemer,t and air effluent from heating, ventilation, and air conditioning ' ducts when contaminated areas were erecte .2 Summary of Findings No discrepancies were noted for the system alignment, Emergency Feedwater Pumps 2P-7A and 2P-78 oil levels, or breaker cubicles for the associated motor-operated valves during the emergency feedwater system walkdown. The_ N
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operability assessment for Valve 2CV-0795 was determined to be acceptable.
.The. lack of a _ program to control the placement of. fans which blow into a
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posted contaminated area was viewed as a weakness, l
-11-7 COLD WEATHER PREPARATIONS (71714)
7.1 Unit 1 - Freeze Protection Walkdown On November 22, the Unit I service water intake structure, chlorine area, fire deluge pit, borated water storage tanks, sodium hydroxide tank, and condensate storage tanks were inspected for freeze protection measures. All systems susceptible to cold weather effects listed in Procedure 1307.037, Revision 10,
" Plant Freeze Protection Testing," were protected with heat tracing, space heaters, and/or insulation. The freeze protection system was energized and operating and the thermostats were conservatively set.
Unit 1 implemented an effective freeze protection program that was checked daily during auxiliary operator rounds between October 31 and March 31.
7.2 Unit 2 - Freeze protection Walkdown On November 23, a similar freeze protection inspection was performed on Unit 2. The outside temperature was in the mid-30 F range, with predictions of temperatures in the 20of range _by the end of the week. During the morning crew brief, after the inspector requested operations support to evaluate the effectiveness of the freeze protection program, the shift supervisor directed the operators to perform the freeze protection instruction. The operations portion of the freeze protection program implementation was event driven. The shift supervisors were required to recognize that a period of cold weather was beginning and then to instruct the operators to perform the freeze-protection checklist.
On November 23, the Unit 2 freeze protection program was not fully implemented. Procedure 2106.032, Revision 1, " Unit Two Operations Freeze Protection Guide," was used as a-guide for the inspection. _Several observations were noted and discussed with the licensee, o The refueling water tanks' level transmitter housing had missin insulation and burned duct tape and insulation. One_of the two thermostatically controlled heater strips was not energized. Job Request 885981 was initiated by the operator to repair these deficiencies, e The condensate storage tanks' level transmitter housing had heat tracing installed and energized, but no outside insulation was-provided on the transmitter protective bo The small amount of insulation inside one transmitter box indicated that the insulation was burned as a result of heater strip operatio * The hatch to the condensate storage tank pit was open. .Although the pit-was warm and the potential for piping freezing 'was low, this condition
. deviated from the requirements of the procedur * The boric acid makeup tank annunciator panel contained burned out bulb ;
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e Observation of the cooling tower basin revealed that the sulfuric acid addition line.did not have the required freeze arotection because of system modifications which were in progress. T1e licensee stated that the concentrated sulfuric acid lines at the cooling tower will not freeze, except in extremely cold weather.
e JO 832612 which was initiated to repair Freeze protection Heat Tracing Panel 2C-322 on December 25, 1990, was scheduled to be complete by January 3, 1992, and had not been completed by the end of this inspection period.
The 'bove obst:rvations were discussed with the licensee. The licensee stated that ao actual examples of failures due to freezing have occurred in-several years and that the freeze protection guide will be reviewed and reverified prior to each period of freezing weather.
The following additional information was provided to the inspector and will-require further evaluation: Procedure 2307.037, " Freeze Protection Test," was issued annually by Repetitive Task 014122 and was last performed by the electricians on November 1, 1991. The procedure was currently assigned to the shop for 7erformance under JO 882053. Inspection and. repair of the- refueling water tan ( level transmitter freeze protection was in the scope of procedure 2307.037. Similarly, Procedure 2306.011, " Insulation Inspection,"
was issued yearly by Repetitive Task 003255. The inspection was last performed June 30, 1992, and is scheduled to be performed June 5, 1993.
Unit 2 electrical maintenance was researching the scope of J0 832612 to -
confirm that the repair of safety-related equipment was appropriately prioritized.
Further followup inspection of the implementation of the Unit 2 freeze protection program will be performed. This review will be tracked as Inspection Followup Item 50-368/9213-01.
7,3 Summary of Findings Unit 1 implemented an effective freeze protection program that was checked daily during auxiliary operator rounds between October 31 and March 31. The implementation of the Unit 2 freeze protection program was incomplete during a-period of cold weather and was viewed as weak. Followup inspection of the implementation of the Unit 2 freeze protection program will be performe .
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-13-8 FOLLOWUP (92701)
8.1 Headauarters or Reaional Reauests followup 8.1.1 Unit 2 - Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) Honthly Operability Test A review was performed of the licensee's procedures implementing certain COLSS azimuthal power tilt Technical Specification surveillance requirements to determine if a problem existed similar to that identified on Waterford 3 Licensee Event Report 50-382/92-001-01, lhe licensee stated that the requirements of Technical Specification 4.2. were met by two means. The first was that Annunciator 2K100-2, "CPC AZ TILT EXCEEDED," was designed to actuate when the azimuthal tilt value calculated in COLSS exceeded the azimuthal tilt alarm limit. The second was that, per _
Operations Log 1015.003B-6, " Power distribution and Burn-up Log," the COLSS calculated azimuthal tilt and the azimuthal tilt allowance used in the core protection calculators (CPCs) were compared and logged every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> as a conservative measur Procedure 2312.001, Revision 4 "COLSS Monthly Operability Test," was reviewed to verify that the requirements of Technical Specification 4.2.3.c were me The procedure was initiated on a monthly interval to test and prove the annunciator for the departure of nucleate boiling ratio power limit, the kilowatt per foot power -limit, and the CPC azimuthal tilt limit using simulated test alarm setpoint Procedure 2312.001 required that the CPC' azimuthal tilt allowance be set to zero, which resulted in the COLSS azimuthal tilt alarm limit exceeding its limit and actuatin Review of the procedure and interviews with computer support personnel confirmed that COLSS software as well as the annunciator hardware were functionally tested.. However, a requirement for direct comparison between the COLSS azimuthal' power. tilt alarm.setpoint and the CPC azimuthal power tilt allot ance was not incorporated into procedures. The-licensee planned to improve their procedures to include a direct comparison, however, they maintained that if the calculations performed to meet Technical Specification 4.2.3.d were performed correctly, then the existing surveillance-tests met the intent of Technical Specification 4.2. They initially viewed the intent of Technical Specification 4.2.-3.c as being restricted to a functional test of the software and the alar Procedure 2302.005 was performed on a monthly interval _to satisfy the requirement of Technical Specification 4.2.3.d. Procedure 2302.005 requires-independent calculations' using -incore detectors to verify. the validity of- the
- COLSS calculated azimuthal power tilt. - Procedure 2302.005 had provisions to set the COLSS azimuthal tilt alarm limit at the appropriate value and itL satisfied the requirements of Technical Specification 4.2. _ - _ . .. . . . _ .
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-14-Subsequent to the initial; discussions with the inspector, the licensee-identified that.the COLSS azimuthal-power tilt alarm setpoint and-the CPC azimuthal power tilt allowances were set nonconservatively._ The licensee initiated Condition Report 2-92-0476 and immediately corrected the c0LSS
- azimuthal power tilt alarm setpoint. The licensee-indicated that th .
discrepancy probably occurred during the previous performance of -
Procedure 2302.005, Revision 12, Plant Change 3 " Periodic Core Power Distribution."
Although- the procedure did include provisions to calculate and set new a COLSS-azimuthal tilt alarm setpoint, the procedure was_ performed incorrectly. -
resulting in _the COLSS azimuthal tilt alarm being set higher than the CPC azimuthal tilt allowance. Due to the error, Surveillance Requirements 4.2. and 4.2.3.d were performed, but the-licensee did not:immediately recognize the incorrect alarm setpoin Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.3 was never exceeded. Based on the review, no operability or safety concerns ex4 ted and long-term corrective action plans were being developed. The lice.aee stated that other Combustion Engineering plants view the intent.of their surveillance requirements similar-to Surveillance Requirement 4.2.3.c to be restricted to a' functional tes Further review to determine whether or not the failure'to maintain.the COLSS azimuthal tilt alarm set to actuate when the COLSS calculated azimuthal tilt
- exceeded the azimuthal power tilt allowance used in-the CPCs constituted a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.2.3.s or 4.03
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is planned. This item is unresolved. (368/9213-02).
8.1.2-Units 1 and 2 Control Room Work Flow Analysis -
A preliminary plan to design and engineer a' layout of a facility for both-control rooms in order to optimize work flow was reviewed. The overall-objective of the plan was to provide more space for the operations _ personnel-and other plant personnel to-interface outside the control room in order to-reduce the potential for impacting control room operations.- The plan was described-in " Arkansas Nuclear One Unit One.and Unit Two Control Room Work
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Flow Analysis," dated September 23, 199 .
. This proposal was proactive in minimizing congestion, thereb3 alleviating-administrative burdens of the control room operational staff and was considered a_ strengt .8.1,3 Units 1-and 2 - Design Basis Reconstitution Program The licensee continued to be on schedule with the development of their Uppe Level Documents. Twenty-six of the 136 which were planned-were issued for use. An additional 79 were in some stage of developmen ;
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-15-8.1.4 Unit l'- Foam in Makeup and High Pressure Injection D"mp P-36f, Lube Oil System Operators noted that the oil level in Make-up and High Pressure Injection
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Pump P-36A could not be determined because of oil foaming. The source of the-foam was air entrainment within the oil due-to meshing of gears in the oil reservoir of the motor housing. Foaming tendencies and air entrainment were generally related to viscosity, oxidation resistance, defoaming activities, and service condition A draft evaluation of environmentally qualified lubricants for safety-related equipment was presented for the existing oil. The decision to use foam inhibitor was discounted because the physical properties of the oil-could be altered and to environmentally qualify the oil with the inhibitor was not cost effective. The existing oil was drained from the oil reservoir and was replaced with Chevron R-0-46 oil. The oil foam thickness decreased substantiall Subsequent test results from the oil manufacturer duplicated 1/4-inch to 1/2-inch foam layer in the laboratory. By letter dated October 5, 1992,-the pump vendor recommended that, because of the licensee's unique lube oil cooling system configuration, lube oil _ heaters be used to heat the oil to the recommended minimum temperature range of 70 F to 800F or to use an oil of-lower. viscosity during periods when the oil temperature was at 40aF. The option to use an oil of lower viscosity was being considered. The
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environmental _qu'alification of the existing oil was acceptabl .1.5 Units 1 and 2 - Spent Fuel Storage' Facility The licensee selected a ventilated concrete storage cask system to be.used to temporarily store spent fuel on site. The ventilated storage cask design provided for passive heat removal between the sealed canister and_ the concrete cask. After the licensing' reviews in accordance with 10 CFR Part 72.214'are c complete, the canisters will be filled with older spent fuel and stored within-the protected area. The licensee planned to complete the project- by February ;
of -1995 to allow for removal of spent fuel from the spent fuel pool _ prior _ to;' R the planned receipt of new f uel for the subsequent-Unit I refuelin .l'.6 Unit 2 - Failure to Log Channel Checks of Undervoltage Devices On-November 3, the licensee reviewed the reportability determination for Condition Report 2-92-0440 with-the inspector. The condition report _ documents the' failure of the control boa.d operator.to take electrical system = status =
logs on October-20, 1992, during the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shif t. The- logs -were taken appropriately-during _ the 12 midnight to 8 a.rn._ shift and during the -
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- 4 a.m.: to 12 midnight; shift. These logs were used to meet the surveillance requirement of Technical' Specification 4.3-2.7.b. The frequency for this requirement was noted as "S,"'or twice per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, which was usually interpreted to mean within~12 hours of the last performance. However, _
j operable alarms -in the control room would have alarmed-on undervoltage-for the -l
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affected components. The safety parameter display system also would have
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H alarmed on undervoltage for the affected-components. On that basis, the licensee determined that the condition did not constitute operation prohibited-
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by the Technical Specifications and was,: therefore, not reportabl .1.7 (Closed) 10 CFR Part 21 Report: ASEA Brown Boveri-(ABB) Model ITE-62L-Solid State Relay On November 11, 1992, Entergy Operations submitted information concerning ABB l Model ITE-62L solid state relay The results of testing revealed that the !
time period of the relays was influenced by the presence an_d duration of- !
inductive load switching. ANO believed that the timer setpoint-change due to ;
the presence of surges constituted an erroneous relay output. The. tests were :
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performed by ABB at AN0's requests to determine the root cause of-relay failures experienced during testing. ABB and ANO differed technically on what they viewed as the specifications for the relays. As a result, ANO submitted the 10 CFR Part 21 Report in lieu of ABB recommendation The licensee identified all the current applications of the relays and-determined that the relays _were acceptable in that application for an interim period or replaced the relays. The remaining installed relays-will be replaced during the next Unit I refueling outage. The licensee also made entries on the Nuclear Network to report the results of the relay testin The licensee's commitment to sharing precise technical information which could have safety impact at other facilities was viewed as a strength. -This item is
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8.2 Three Mile Island Action Plan Reauirement Followup (Temporary Instruction 2515/65-01)
8.2.1 (0 pen) Units l'and 2 Three Mile Island- Action item III.D.3.4, " Control Room Habitability" Action Item III.D.3.4 required that " licensees shall assure that. control room operators will be adequately protected against the effects of accidental release of toxic and radioactive gases and that the nuclear _ power plant can be safely operated or shutdown under design basis accident conditions."
The inspector reviewed the Safety Evaluation performed by _the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on February 12, 1982, and NRC Letter 02821135,-from R. A. Clark to-W. Cavanaugh, dated February-12, 1982. The Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications were also reviewed to verify that the_ existing chlorine detection and prctection system was equally effective whenever Unit 1 or 2 was at powe ' Based on the review, the existing chlorine detection and protection systems for Unit's 1 and 2 was addressed, however, this item will remain open'pending the licensee's submittal concerning the control room ventilation system. .
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-17-8.3 Open item Followup 8.3.1 (Close'd) Inspection Followup Item 313/9208-02: Reactor Coolant-Pump P-32D Anti-Rotation Device Failure This item involved the failure of the antirotation device for Reactor: Coolant -
Pump P-32 The licensee performed a . thorough internal audit on the progressive failure of the anti-rotation device and concluded that the root cause of the failure was process management weaknesses. Specifically, the job to disassemble, inspect, and repair a failed upper thrus(bearing was performed in an expeditious manner, so as to. agree with the existing outage-schedule, and a reduced level of work process controls existed. Further, minimal additional formal planning was performed for the activity beyond the modification section's controlled work package and schedule development proces The loss of work control, planning, and scheduling via circumventing established procedures promoted potential causes to the antirotation device failure, it was determined that the antirotation device was installed cocked ~
and off center to the motor shaft coupling and that the upper bearing support bolts were not adequately torqued. Eccentric pilot shaft rotation, upper shaft whip, and miscentering resulted during pump operation. The pilot bearing clearances were subsequently reduced, allowing the antirotation device rollers to contact the smooth outer bearing = race, destroying the antirotation devic Condition Report 1-92-0341 addressed 10 action items. Five of the action-items had been closed. The remaining action items addressed the incorporation of the condition report as an input into..the quality assurance team on maintenance process and controls, a review and revision _of specific work plans for reactor coolant pump inspections, and assessing the indications of reverse- i rotation of a reactor coolant pump for reliability and sensitivity. The 1 completed and planned action items appeared sufficient to correct the-
-problem =8.3.2 (Closed) Unresolved item 368/9211-04: Lack of ' Controlled Wiring Otagrams-0n September 9,1992, during the replacement of Potter & Brumfield MOR relays in Panel 2C-39, five relays in the safety injection actuation system were inadvertently deenergized. As a result, several safety injection actuation system components were actuate The licensee _ determined that-the jumpers installed to prevent inadvertent actuation during _the relay replacement were inadequat Controlled' schematic information was available. However, the licensee's initial walkdown performed to determine jumper placement was not
- carefully performed. Controlled wiring diagrams-did not-exist"for Panel 2C-39 because the panel;was supplied by a1 vendor. A wiring-table was supplied originally with the. panel, but it was not update a
g o-18-The licensee stated that the'10'CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requirements to-
' maintain drawings were met with- the control of schematic level information.-
- They stated that,'should the need in the future arise, they could walk = down
.the panels at:that time to develop any necessary work instruction The licensee stated that this panel was outside the scope of the electrical drawing upgrade-project which was conducted to. find functi.onal wiring error This panel was not included because it was. fully tested every. outage and has-had very few modifications since initial construction.- On that basis, the licensee determined that Panel 2C-39 was unlikely to contain functional wiring errors. Review of the licensee commitment to the electrical drawing upgrade program was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/91-03;--50-368/91-03 and the implementation was determined to be acceptabl The lack uf controlled wiring diagrams was viewed as a weakness. However,-the inspector determined there was. no regulatory basis for requiring the licensee to develop electrical connection drawings, if adequate work instructions were '
provided for work involving the cabinets without electrical wiring _ diagram .
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p- 3 ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 , Licensee Personnel C. Anderson, Unit 2 Operations Manager S. Boncheff, Licensing Specialist D. Boyd, Licensing Specialist R. Douet, Unit 1 Maintenance Manager B. Eaton, Director of Design Engineering R.'Edington, Unit 2 Plant Manager R. Johannes, Technical Assistant, General Manager Plant Operations
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J. Taylor-Brown, Acting Quality Director J. Vandergrift, Unit 1 Plant Manager C. Warren, Unit 2 Maintenance Manager 1.2 NRC Personnel W. Johnson, Chief, Project Section A S. Campbell,-Resident. Inspector The personnel listed above attended the exit meeting. In addition to the personnel listed above,- the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection perio EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on December 8, 1992. During this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors in connection with this report.