IR 05000313/1992028

Insp Repts 50-313/92-28 & 50-368/92-28 on 921207-11. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Access Authorization Program as Relates to Granting of Unescorted Access to Plant Site

ML20127C627
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	01/07/1993
From:	Spitzberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127C611	List: IR 05000313/1992028 ML20127C608 ML20127C623
References
50-313-92-28, 50-368-92-28, NUDOCS 9301140276
Download: ML20127C627 (10)

Text

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - ___ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

!

APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Inspection Report: 50-313/92-28; 50-368/92-28 Operating License: DRP-51 NPF-6 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Route 3, Box 137G Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Facility Nanie: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 .

Inspection At: Jackson, Mississippi Russellville, Arkansas inspection Conducted: December 7-11, 1992 Inspectors: A. B. Earnest, Physical Security Specialist Facilities Inspection Programs Section T. W. Dexter, Senior Physical Specialist Facilities Inspection Programs Section Accompanying Personnel: N. E. Ervin, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved: j /- 7- 95 blef

~^

0 7 Wi FS itz er c Date Facilities Inspec ion Prog ams Section Inspection Summary Areas inspected: Special inspection of the licensee's Access Authorization program as it relates to the granting of unescorted access to the plant sit Results:

• There was good management oversight, involvement, and support for the program at the corporate level (Section 1.1).

. Mar,1gement responsibilities as described in procedures were poorly defintd and confusing. The procedures were general and lacked specificity (Section 1.1).

e The licensee and some of the licensee's vendors are refusing to release employment information to other vendors, contractors, and licensees even 9301140276 930111 3 PDR ADOCK 0500

. - _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _-_.._- _- _ . . _ _ . _ . _ . . _ .

.

'

,

'

,

2-

"

-

i when such requests are accompanied by a signed release. This is an unresolved item (Section 1.2). ,

t

• The licensee was not informing their self-screening contractors of '

information such as NRC issued Information Notice This was considered a program weakness (Section 1.3).  ;

• 1he licensee's program of psychological evaluations was good #

(Section 1.3).

• The licensee had not notified employees of the requirement to report any arrest which could impact their trustworthiness. This was a violation (Section 1.4).

• The "grandfathering," reinstatement, and transfer portions of the program  ;

were well implemented (Section 1.5).

l l * 1he licensee had a good program to deny or revoke unescorted access (Section 1.6).

• The licensee had a good program to protect personal information from unauthorized disclosure (Section 1.7).

• A significant weakness was identified in the area of self-screening audits. The licensee did not pursue negative audit findings that were identified in audits completed by other licensees (Section 1.8). ,

l * The licensee had organized a records retention system that should be

'

adequate to ensure that correct records are retained for the correct period of time (Section 1.9).

Summarv of Inspection findinas:

-

• Violation 313/9228-01; 368/9228-01 was opened (Section 1.4).

• Unresolved item 313/9228-02;-368/9228-02 was opened (Section.l.2).

• - Inspection followup Item 313/9228-03; 368/9228-03 was opened (Section 1.8).

- Attachment:

• 1 Attachment - Persons contacted-and exit meetin ,

--. - _

-

'

%F v4 er- F e-pa w-pv"p3, w g7 inr %''-'--'t-'r@'1 1P--'-O"h+mu' TC 't WS' '5"'t M'r- "

-

-f 2 *1- '9"' FE N*I"'

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

'

DETAILS 1 ACCESS AUTHORIZATION (TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/116)

On April 25, 1991, the Commission published 10 CFR 73.56 which required licensees to design and implement access authorization programs by April 27, 1992. The primary objective of the access authorization requirements is to ensure that all individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable and neither constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public nor have a potential to commit radirlogical sabotage. This inspection conducted an in-depth examination of the AND Access Authorization Program at both Entergy Operation; Corporate offices and at the plant sit _

l.1 Access Authorization Program Admintetration/Organitation The ANO Access Authorization Program is centrally directed from the Entergy Corporate office. The primary responsibility for the administration of the program is assigned to the Corporate Security Department. Each plant operated by Entergy has a corporate security representative and staff that directs and operates the Access Authorization Program at the individual plant sites. At ANO, the corporate security representative was the individual responsible for making a final determination as to whether unescorted access would be grante The inspectors interviewed program administrators and site representatives and determined that they were professional and dedicated to performing their responsibilities in as responsible a manner as possible. The inspectors reviewed the corporate and plant Access Authorization procedures. The inspectors made the observation to the licensee that the procedures appeared to be very general rather than providing the detail and specificity necessary to implement the program. In addition, the inspectors determined that the portions of both procedures that dealt with the individual responsibilities appeared to be confusing. Without conducting interviews, it was difficult to

-

pinpoint individual responsibilities. The licensee agreed to review the procedure After extensive interviews with corporate and plant staff and management, the inspectors determined that there was good management oversight, effective program management, and good support for the progra Conclusion The inspectors found the corporate security staff to be professional. In addition, it was apparent that the parent corporation (Entergy) supported the Access Authorization program and provided satisfactory oversigh .2 Background investigations lhe inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews to determine the adequacy of the program to verify the true identity of an applicant and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service, and the character and reputation

. _ _ . _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _-_-_ _ _

. _ _ _ . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

'

.

. .

4 ,

of the applicants prior to granting them unescorted access to protected and  !

vital area The inspectors requested and received 21 background investigation files from the licensee. The flies were broken down into 13 files from the licensee and 8 from self-screening contractors. The files appeared to be complete with the exception of one area discussed belo In numerous files, the inspectors noted that employment contacts made by the contractor performing the background screen often resulted in the company contacted refusing to release information other than dates of employmen This also included instances in which the licensee refused to verify past employment of a person being screened for access. Regulatory Guide 5.66 states that the licensee should determine complete dates of employment, position held, disciplinary history, reason for termination, eligibility for rehire, and any other information that would adversely reflect upon the '

reliability and trustworthiness of the individua Paragraph-(f)(2),

10 CFR 73.56, requires that "l.icensees, contractors, and vendors shall make available such personal information to another licensee, contractor, or vendor provided that the request is accompanied by a signed release from the individual." The contact records indicated that numerous licensees, contractors, and vendors refused to answer most of the questions posed by the investigative contractor. The contractor had made most of the_ contacts by telephone; however, the licensee stated that the companies were offered the signed releases and still refused the information, including their own company. The licensee considered that the phone call contact constituted a

"best effort." The issue of what should constitute a "best effort" will be referred to NRC licadquarters for guidance. The failure to confirm required employment information and the refusal of licensees, contractors, and vendors to release the information is considered an unresolved item (313/9228-02; 368/9228-02).

Conclusion The inspectors reviewed 21 licensee and contractor background investigation files. An unresolved item was identified in the area of employment contacts that indicated that some licensees, contractors, and vendors were withholding some employment information. Except-for that one area the inspectors _

determined that the licensee had an adequate background investigations i

progra .3 Ps_vchological Evaluations The inspectors reviewed the li_censee's program for administering psychological L tests and the methodology of evaluating the results of-those-test ' Regulatory Guide 5.66 states that the tests'must be evaluated by qualified ,

and, if applicable, licensed psychologists or psychiatrists.

! The licensee had contracted with a asychologist in_ Jackson, Mississipp'i, to administer, control, and evaluate tie tests of the employees seeking acces The psychologist under contract developed standards for use in reviewing test results. While the licensee does not require the self-screeners to review the

"

. .--.a- . - . ., w. . .- - . - .- _- , , ._

'

.

.

'

.

'S'

test results to the same standard, the self-screening records appeared to meet regulatory requirement The psychological tests were given at the site. They were proctored by licensee staff in order to prevent compronitse. The persons taking the tests were positively identified prior to being given the test. The licensee was aware of NRC Information Notice addressing access authorization concerns; however, these Information Notices had not been sent to the contractors. The failure to inform the contractors may have resulted in one of the self-screening contractors mailing the psychological tests to their em)1oyees seeking access. Mailing the tests potentially allowed compromise of tie tes The licensee discovered what the contractor had done and required it to correct this practice, if the licensee had notified their contractors of Information Notices, the incident might not have occurred. The failure to inform the contractors was identified as a program weaknes Conclusion The licensee's psychological evaluation program appeared to be good. A good standard was developed and used by the licensee. A weakness was identified that indicated the licensee was not providing program information_ promulgated by NRC to their contractor .4 Behavioral Observation The licensee's behavioral observation program was inspected to determine if the licensee had a training and retraining program in place to train supervisors and managers to have the awareness and sensitivity to detect and report changes in behavior which could adversely affect trustworthiness and reliability and to refer those persons to appropriate licensee management for evaluation and actio The inspectors reviewed licensee training records, lesson plans, and procedures. In addition, the inspectors interviewed licensee supervisory and management personnel from the first line supervisor through the vice president level. All of the supervisory and management personnel had been trained in behavioral observation. It was apparent that the behavioral observation program had been implemented and that training and annual retraining were on-going._ liowever, the inspectors determined from interviews with licensee personnel that the program did not appear to provide adequate emphasis on non-drug and alcohol related behavior. The inspectors informed the licensee of this observatio Paragraph 1.3.1 of the licensee's Industrial Security Plan states that "ANO commits to Regulatory Guide 5.66." Paragraph 9.0 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 states, " Individuals with unescorted access authorization must be notified of his/her_ responsibility to report any arrest that may impact upon his/her trustworthiness." Licensee Procedure AS.1, paragraph 5.13.2, also requires

.that all personnel be notified of the responsibility to report arrest The inspectors determined that the licensee had only notified employees that arrests involving drugs and alcohol have to.be reported. The failure to

. . - . . _ - - - - - . - . - - - . - _

. - . - - - . - . -

.

.

,

.

.

-

G-notify the employees of the responsibility to report all arrests which could )

affect their trustworthiness did not meet the Industrial Security Plan and is -

i a violation (313/9228-01; 368/9228-01). l Conclusion The licensee's behavioral observation program was well organized and ensured that all applicable supervisors and managers had been trained and retrained as I appropriate. The inspectors noted that the training appeared not to emphasize aberrant behavior other than that resulting from substance abuse. The ,

'

licensee was in violation in that their requirement to inform all employees that they had to report arrests which affect their trustworthiness and not 1 just drug and alcohol related arrests had not been implemente ,

1.5 "Grandfathering." Reinstatement. Transfer, and Temporary Access Authorizati_ojl The licensee's records were reviewed to determine if they were correctly

"grandfathering," reinstating, transferring, and granting temporary access authorization There were no problems identified with the licensee's "grandfathering" or reinstatement program The inspectors reviewed four examples of access authorization transfers. The licensee had a form that was used to gain information. The licensee does a good job of transferring clearance The inspectors reviewed the temporary access authorization files on several employees. While the licensee had a system to prevent temporary unescorted access in excess of 180 days, they did not utilize an administrative control to track the personnel granted temporary access. The temporary files were mixed in with the completed files. The only means of ensuring that personnel granted temporary access did not exceed 180 days in this status was a badge expiration computer check. The inspectors concluded that without further '

controls, the licensee risked allowing a temporary access employee to exceed the 180-day limi Conclusion i The licensee had a good program to " grandfather," reinstate, and transfer l

access authorizations. There was no specific record of employees to assure l

that none maintained temporary access past the 180-day limi .6 Denial or Revocation of Unescorted Access The corporate security representative at ANO was the individual responsible .

for making a final determination as to whether unescorted access would be grante The inspectors reviewed files in which-fingerprint submittals had bee >

l' returned with a criminal record, in ten instances, the persons were granted access. The inspectors reviewed and agreed with the rationale used by the licensee in arriving at the decision in each instance. Another four files l

}

I.n- -.-_y-, _ ,---...v,., _ . , , .,.,_._.__.-m_.._________~__mm___m .m, _ , _ . - . . _ _ _ . . . , _ , _ . _ , _ _ , . ~ , . , , . . , _ . . -

_

_ _

_ _

_,..__ .. _ _ _ _ __ ._ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ __ _._ _ _ . _

.

. i

,

.

. 7 were reviewed wherein all four persons investigated were denied access because of a criminal record.. The criteria used by the licensee appeared to be consistent and equitable. The persons denied access were notified of their denial of access and of their right to review and reply to anything in the records used as a reason for access denia Conclusion The licensee had a good program for denying or revoking unescorted acces ,

1.7 Protection of Personal Information

'

The inspectors interviewed licensee staff and management in order to ascertain that personal information was arotected from disclosure to anyone without a need to know and authority to 1 ave access to this information. The background information files were kept in locked containers with access limited to only those staff members with a need for access. Procedural restrictions were in place to ensure that information was not released to anyone els Conclusion The licensee had a good program to protect personal information from unauthorized disclosur .8 Audits

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's audit program to determine if audits of sufficient depth had been conducted. The licensee had copies of several audits of contractor programs in their records. These audits were done by I other licensees and, according to the rule, can be accepted by the licensee to satisfy their own audit requirements. Each licensee retains responsibility for the effectiveness of the contractors' programs and for the implementation l of appropriate corrective actions by the contractors.

!

The inspectors determined that Entergy is a member of INDEX, which is a company that acts as a depository for clearances, background investigations, and audits. Since INDEX is not a licensee, audits conducted under their

- auspices- are completed by teams made u) from various licensees.- The lead auditor of each team uses an audit num)er from his parent utility and takes responsibility for the audit as a representative of his parent utilit Basically, if the lead' auditor is from Entergy, the audit carries an Entergy-audit number and is considered to be an Entergy audi The inspectors reviewed several such audits' received by Entergy from INDEX and ,

other licensees. While the audits appeared to be adequate, the licenae

,

program did not ensure that appropriate corrective action was taken by the l contractors. Entergy made no effort to determine if the weaknesses discovered

!

during audits affected any individuals already granted access at Entergy

,

plants. One audit disclosed falsification by a background investigator, yet I the audit report -failed to indicate whether the contractor adequately reviewed all of the work of the investigato N"'ther the licensee nor the contractor appears to have contacted all affected utilities regarding _the falsificatio .

e-tw ggv w- 3 w+ y-- -wo., , - y- r--' 8-7r--=-- yTr--f T Y *-

-_ - - -- - - - - - - _ _ - - - - - - .- - - - . . -

k

. i

.

'

. of background investigations. When interviewed, licensee staff indicated that they had not followed up on the audit and could not state whether the ,

falsification issue involved any personnel granted unescorted access to AN The inspectors concluded that the licensee's failure to assure resolution of third-part audit findings constituted a significant program weakness. This will remain an Inspection followup Item (313/9228-03; 368/9228-03).

Licensees are allowed to grant access based on the investigation of  !

backgrounds by self-screening contractors and background investigation i contractors. The licensee normally receives only a statement that an  ;

individual either meets or does not meet licensee program requirements. That j discretion was allowed by the rule based on the premise of good audits of the contractor programs. Audit Program weaknesses, as described in the paragraph above, can also bring into question the validity of licensee's review of background information of the audits are not adequate or if identified audit findings are not adequately resolve Conclusion The inspectors identified a significant program weakness in the area of audit finding followup. The licensee had not followed up on audit findings received from other sources in order to ensure that proper corrective actions were take .9 Record Retention The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records retention activities in order i to ensure that records relating to access authorization are retained for the appropriate time.

, The inspectors determined that the licensee's procedure for records retention

'

correctly identified the required records and times for the records retaine Since the advent of the rule, the licensee had maintained the proper record The licensee maintains the records on microfiche at their corporate headquarter ,

Conclusion The licensee had organized a records retention system and supporting procedures that should be adequate to ensure that the correct records are retained for the correct period of time.

l

!

l'

!

.

- . _ _ ._

. - - , - - .. -.---,. ..,.., ~- -

, . . - . . ,- - . ,..-.,,_n.--..._-. --- .. . , - - - , . . - .

- . .. _- . -- . .- - . - . . _ - - - . - . _ .

.

.

.

ATTACHMENT 1 1 PERSONS CONTACTED

• J. W Yelverton, Vice President, Operations

• J. D. Vandergrift, Unit 1 Plant Manager

• R. K. Edington, Unit 2 Plant Manager

• D. R. Denton, Director, Support

• G. A. Ellis, Manager, Corporate Security '

• J. Taylor-Brown, Acting Director, Quality

+D. James, licensing Supervisor

• R. L. Sears, Coordinator, Nuclear Security

• B. Jackson, Technical Training Supervisor

• K. Tate, Supervisor, Investigations

• H. Cooper, Licensing Specialist

• H. Williams, Security Superintendent 1.2 NRC Perso1nel

• B. Hurray, Chief, facilities Inspection Programs Section

• J. L. Pellet, Chief, Operations Section

• S. Campbell, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those that attended the exit intervie In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period. Those employees included members of the licensee's technical and management staff and members of the security organizatio * Denotes those that attended the exit intervie EXIT INTERVIEW An exit meeting was conducted on December 11, 1992. During this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector _