IR 05000313/1992014
| ML20128G600 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1993 |
| From: | Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128G569 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-92-14, 50-368-92-14, NUDOCS 9302160054 | |
| Download: ML20128G600 (18) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION- '
REGION IV
Inspection Report: 50.313/92-14 50-368/92-14
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Operating Licenses: DPR-51 NPF-6
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Lice. - ee: Entergy Operations, In Route 3, Box 137G Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: December 6, 1992, through January 23, 1993 Inspectors: L. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector S, Campbell, Resident Inspector Accompanying personnel: -K. Kennedy, Project Engineer T. Alexion, Project Manager K. Weaver, Engineering Aide Approved: /AllD W. Johns mmm
/[hief,ProjectSectionA F//73 Date:
Inspection Summary
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Areas Inspected (Units 1 and 2): This routine resident inspection' addressed:
operational safety verification, monthly . maintenance observation, bimonthly -
surveill'ance observation, followup on corrective actions for violations, other fol_lowup, and onsite followup of licensee event report *
Results (Units I and 21:
- The operability determinations-.for degraded equipment were conservatively performed on both -units.10perator response .to alarms was-
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appropriate. Housekeeping and plant material condition were good:
-(Section 2).
. 'All maintenance activities observed on both units were conducted properly. The licensee very effectively maintained dosage:as low as reasonably achievable during maintenance on'J unit 2 Charging Pump 2P-36B (Section 3).
/9302160054 PDR 930208 0 ADOCK 05000313 PDR-
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. Surveillance activities for both units were performed properly. A strength was identified in the licensee's efforts in assessing-a governor valve anomaly that did not impact the operability of Emergency Feedwater Pump P-7A. A condition report was initiated when a button on:
the Unit 2 remote shutdown panel did not reduce steam generator' low-pressure setpoint when depressed (Section 4).
- The licensee's decision to enhance their capabilities to detect, quantify, and trend primary-to-secondary steam generator leakage was timely, considering the-tube repairs performed as a result of recent steam generator inspections. The licensee's conservative decision was a strength (Section 6.3).
- The effort to improve maintenance performance by using. multiple debrief to develop improvement plans was a strength (Section 6.4.2).
. The licensee's corrective actions, both completed and planned, appropriately addresseo the weaknesses described in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/92-13; 50-368/92-13 related to the Unit 2 freeze protection program (Section 6.2).
- ~The meteorological tower instrumentation heat tape circuitry was not included in a program to periodically confirm its functionalit However, procedurally controlled alternative methods were available to obtain the same information. Further, the licensee committed ~to develop _
an appropriate method for periodically confirming the functionality of the heater circuitry used to protect meteorological tower instrumentation from freezing (Section 2.3).
Summary of Inspection Findings:
Violation 368/9224-01 was closed (Section 5.1)._
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Unresolved Item 313/9211-06 was closed (Section'6.1).
- Inspection Followup Item 368/9213-01 was closed (Section 6.2).
- Licensee Event Reports 368/90-004, 313/90-011, 313/91-002, 313/91-004, 313/92-003, 368/92-005, 313/92-006, and 368/92-007 were closed (Section 7).
Attachment:
Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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-3-DETAILS 1 PLANT STATUS 1.1 Unit 1 The unit operated at or near full power throughout this inspection perio .2 Unit 2 <
The unit operated at or near full power throughout this inspection perio .2 OPFRATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
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The inspectors routinely toured the facility during normal and backshift hours to assess generd 'lant and equipment conditions, housekeeping, and adherence _
to fire protect in , security, and radiological control measures. 0ngoing work activities were monitored to verify that they were being _ conducted in- -
accordence with approved administrative and technical procedures and that proper communications with the control room staff had been establishe During tours of the control room, the inspectors verified proper staffing, access control, and operator attentiveness. Technical Specification limiting _
conditions for operation were evaluated. The inspectors examined the status -
of control room annunciators, various control room logs, and other_ available licensee documentatio .1 Units l'and 2 - Routine Tours The general plant condition was goo Good housekeeping' practices were .
implemented. No inappropriate fire protection, security, or radiological control measures were identified. -Staffing-'in_-the control-room was always
. consistent with the requirements. Technical Specification 11.miting conditions for operation were appropriately evaluated._ The control room operators,were
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appropriately attentive to annunciators and responded well,; referring to the
, _ alarm. response procedures when appr_opriat Operators demonstrated awareness
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of the distinction between ~ control room wall sockets reserved for. vi_tal -loads, such as the radiological dose assessment computer, and wall sockets' available for general- use, such .as microwave .2 Unit 1 - Operability Determination for Degraded Service Water Pump P-4B On December 16,1992, Service Water _ Pump P-4B was declared inoperable based on -
pump. performance: data. -The pump-performance was degraded below t.he' limiting-
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range of operability as. specified by Procedure 1104.029, Revision 40, Supplement.2, " Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling System." -Service Water
, Pump P-4C was immediately started to maintain operability of Loop.2 service
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-4- I During troubleshooting activities, part of a hard hat was discovered inside Service Water Strainer F-6B.= Service Water Bay B was pumped down and the- +
impeller portion of.-the. pump was inspected for possible damage and additional parts of the hard hat.- A security officer was posted at Security Door-171, which was opened for the routing of hoses during-pumping of the~ service water bay. Additional parts of the hard hat were discovered in the suct_ ion piping.=
The discharge piping between the pump and the strainer was inspected._ Most of-the remaining pieces of the hard hat were found in that location. The .
licensee stated that approximately 80 percent of the hard hat, by_ weight, was retrieved during the inspection. The licensee evaluated the impact of leaving the remaining 20 percent of the hard hat in the system and found it to be-acceptabl The licensee stated that, based upon the results of the inspection, no damage-had occurred to Pump P-48. After the inspections were completed, a surveillance test was performed on Service Water Pump P-48. The pump performed acceptably per Procedure 1104.029 and was declared-operable on-December 1 .3 Unit 2 - High Pressure Safety injection Valve Operability Determination On January 6, while performing Procedure 2104.39, Supplement: 4,2 " Quarterly-HPSI- Valve Stroke Test," the licensee discovered that the valve stem position-indicator on Valve 2-CV-5015-1 did not match the shoulder mark on the valve stem when the valve was in the full open position. - The mark on the. valve stem was found to be approximately 1/2 inch above the. indicator, suggesting that the valve was greater than full open. The licensee declared .the valve inoperable in accordance with Procedure _2104.39, Supplement 4, " Quarterly HPSI Valve Stroke Test," and declared the associated high pressure safety injection header inoperable. Technical Specification Action Statement-3.5.2.a required that the injection header be restored to operable status within 72.' hours or be--
in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.- Of the eight: injection valves that were tested during the surveillance, Valve 2-CV-5015-1 was the only one identified with this conditio .
The valve stem stroke distance for Valve 2-CV-5015-1 was measured from the closed position'to the full.open position, and this measurement was compared to previous data. The licensee. determined that the stroke distance was correct and concluded that the valve stem position indicator wasL not'in_the co'rrect. position. The valve stem position indicator was repositioned and-the valve declared operable on January .4 - Unit 2 - Failure of Meteoroloalcal Tower Instrumentation Due to- Freezing Precipitation-On January 18,-at 4:53 p.m., Unit 2 entered the 7-day. action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.4 because the ~10 meter and 57 meter wind speed indicators at the meteorological tower froze as a result of freezing-
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precipitation and a malfunctioning heater circuit. The neutral wire to the heater circuit was discovered disconnected. Condition Report C-93-0003 was-
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-5-initiated, the wire was reconnected, and wind speed indic'ation was promptly restored. The Technical Specification Action Statement was exited on January 19, at 4:22 p.m., within the allowed outage tim Operators declared the radiological dose assessment computer system (RDACS)
inoperable as a result of the wind speed sensors being inoperabl The wind speed data provided to the RDACS is used in. calculating radiological dose projections in the event of an offsite releas After further review, the licensee determined that the emergency procedures contained compensatory measures for manually inputting wind speed information obtained from the National Weather Bureau, the local airport, or the local radio station, into the RDAC The licensee determined that the RDACS was actually operable and stated that the condition report would be revised to document this chang Similar problems with meteorological tower wind speed indication were documented between 1988 and 199 Condition Report 2-90-0566 was initiated on December 21, 1990. After identifying an equipment failure trend, the-licensee upgraded the 20 watt heater to 80 watts and completed postmodification _ testing on January 2, 1992, The current freezing of the wind _ speed. sensors was the first event since the installation of the higher wattage heater on January 2, 1992, and was determined to have a separate cause from the original failure The licensee committed to develop an appropriate method for periodically confirming the functionality of the heat tape circuitry used to protect meteorological tower instrumentation from freezin See Section 6.2 for further discussion of the Unit 2 freeze protection progra .5 Summary of Findings The operability determinations-for degraded equipment were conservatively performed. Operator response to alarms was appropriate. Housekeeping and '
plant material condition were goo MONTHLY MAINTENANCE OBSERVATION (62703)
Station maintenance activities for the safety-related systems and _ components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and-industry codes or standards, and in conformance with the Technical Specification .1 Unit 2 - Packing and Plunger Replacement on Charging Pump 2P-368 (Job Order (J0)-00886662)
On December 29, the oil, packing, and plungers.for Charging Pump 2P-36B were replaced. The maintenance activity was performed in accordance with Procedure 2402.032, Revision 16, "ANO-2 Mechanical Charging Pump." - The_ oil was sampled and both the oil and the packing were replaced. The oil sample ~
was analyzed and determined to be satisfactory. .Since the plunger replacement-part was not "like-for like," a temporary modification was drafte ,
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i-6-Temporary Hodification 2-92-0050 evaluated the replacement of existing-stainless steel plungers with stainless steel plungers coated with-3 to 5 microns of titanium nitride. The plunger replacement was performed ino an effort to increase the life of the plungers and the packing, thereby reducing-pump outage time, plunger maintenance activities, and radiation exposure-associated with the-activity. There was no environmental qualification issue pertaining to the plunger replacement, and the temporary modification was determined to be acceptabl Quality control personnel verified cleanliness and proper installation of the parts. Measuring equipment at the work site was calibrated. Workers were cognizant of radiation hot spots _ and demonstrated exceptional "as low as '
reasonably achievable" practices. Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 921313, prescribed for this job, estimated that the exposure would be 300 millire The actual received exposure was 412 millirem. - The RWP, which was draf ted in August 1992, only addressed repacking the pump. Five additional jobs associated with the pump overhaul were not considered during initial RWP exposure estimate ,
'following this maintenance evolution, the licensee conducted a lessons learned--
' debriefing to enable them to continually improve their performance. See
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Section 6.4.2 for a discussion of the debriefin ,
3.2 Unit 1 - Troubleshootino of Radiation Detector RE-3815 (JO 00887203)
On January 20, the inspector observed troubleshooting activities associated with the radiation detector located in the service water discharge from the containment cooling coils on Cooler VCC2 The' job request _was initiated on-January 2,1993, when the spurious high alarms were noticed in the control roo 'The maintenance crew appropriately signed in with. operations prior to starting the troubleshooting. All measuring and test' equipment used was within its-calibration interval. The drawings used by maintenance _ personnel met-the drawing control requirements. All of _ the calibration calculations were checked twic Portions of Procedure :304.026, Revision 9, " Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor System Test," were used to confirm that voltage'from'the power supply had not drifted and that the detector was still calibrated. No malfunctions were identified. _ The maintenance personnel indicated that the spurious alarms could be related to electrical noise which was not currently presen The job; order _ remained open to repair the alarm circuit in the event that spurious-alarms recurre The maintenance activities were conducted properly using approved instructions c and drawings'.
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3.3 Summary of Findinas ;
All maintenance activities observed were conducted properly. The licensee very effectively maintained dosage as low as reasonably achievable during maintenance on Charging Pump 2P-36 BIMONTHLYSURVEILLANCEOBSERVATION(61726)
The inspectors observed the Technical Specification required surveillance testing on the systems and components listed below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with Technical Specifications and the licensee's ,
implementing procedure i Unit 1 - P-7A Surveillance Test (JO 00886347)
On December 30, a surveillance test on Emergency Feedwater- Pump P-7A was performod per Procedure 1106.06, Revision 47, " Emergency feodwater Pump Operations," Supplement 2, " Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump P-7A) (d Test been slow (Monthly)." The licensee had noted that Governor Valve CV-6601B ha in returning to the open position after completion of runs during previous surveillance tests. Condition Reports 1-92-0570 and I-92-0598 had documented these finding A root cause analysis was performed. The possibility of binding due to thermal expansion and metal to metal contact was eliminated using temperature ,
and acoustic monitoring data of the stem and bonnet. The governor valve control circuit output to the actuator was measured using a voltmeter and the demand versus speed data collected indicated normal operation during two -
consecutive pump run The governor valve closed in the presence of a demand signal.to prevent ~
overspeeding the turbine upon steam ade.ission. lhe valve appropriately modulated open which enabled the turbine to ramp to full speed.- Thus,.the=
licensee determined that the slow opening of the governor- valve after the pump was-operated did not impact the operability of the-pump. The licensee-.
speculated that the reason for the slow opening of the governor valve was-associated with the actuator oil hydraulic system. The-licensee was proactive in addressing the slow opening of the valve rather than just accepting a-
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successful surveillance test for an operable pump. The licensee's. ef forts to ensure pump operability.were a strengt .2 ' Unit 1 _- Contfol Element Assembly Test (JO 00886587)
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On January 8, a monthly control element assembly (CEA)~ test-was performed per Procedure: 2105.009, Revision'13, Appendix A. "CEA Exercise Test."~ This. test was nerformed to verify the operability-of each CEA' as required by' Technical ,
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Prior to actual CEA movement, two instrument and control technicians-transferred individual CEAs from'the shim bus to the hold. bus and recorded
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l control element drive mechanism control system (CEDMCS) logic circuit voltage i traces. The control room operator entered Technical Specification.3.1. Action C, prior _to conducting the test as required by the test procedure. The technician's supervisor observed the performance of the test and analyzed the !
voltage traces for each CEDMCS to verify proper operation of the logic -
circuit The test was well coordinated and the technicians were in l
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continuous communication with the control room-t later that day, control room operators continued the test by inserting' each ;
CEA seven steps and returning it to its original position. The operator i followed the correct sequence for moving the CEAs and recorded the results ih "
the appropriate table. CEAs were properly-and satisfactorily exercised during the portion of the test observed by the inspector. No concerns were identified during the observation of this tes .3 Unit 2 - Plan (_ Protection System Channel A Test (JO 008869041 On January 12 the inspector observed portions of the performance of Procedure 2304.037 Revision 22, " Plant Protection System Channel A Test."
The calibration of the test equipment used for the surveillance was curren Control room operators placed magnetic labels next to annunciators that were :
expected to alarm during this test, j Suring the performance of the test, the technicians found the setpoint for- 1 Annunciator 2K04C4, "A S/G PRESS SElpolNT !.0,* out of tolerance and mad adjustments to return it to the desired valu Later, the technicians i discovered that Pushbutton 2HS-9112-1, located on the remote shutdown panel, did not reduce the-steam generator low pressure trip setpoint when depresse The technicians secured the test, resttred the system to its normal' .
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configuration, and briefed the shift superintendent on the status of the tes ,
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Condition Report 2-93-0009 was issued later that day in response to this failure, in addition, operators entered Technical: Specification 3.3. :
" Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation," Action. Statement a', whic .
required the inoperable channel be restored to operable 1 status within 30. days-. .
or place the plant in hot shutdown within the next'12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> On January 13, technicians discovered that the Steam Generator A variable setpoint bistable card had failed,= resultit'g in the inability to lower the .
Steam Generator A pressure trip setpoin The card was replaced and Technica Specification 3.3.3.5 was exited following aatisfactory completion of the postmaintenance tes .
4.4 Summar_v of Findings Surveillance activities for both units were performed properly. A-strength-was identified in the. licensee's efforts in ansessing a governor valve ancmaly that did not impact the operability of Emergercy Feedwater Pump P-7A. A
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-9-condition report was initiated when a low pressure setpoint button on the Unit 2 remote shutdown panel did not reduce the steam generator low pressure setpoint when depresse FOLLOWUP ON CORRECT 1VE ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS (92702)
5.1 [ Closed) Violation 368/9214-01: Maintenance Activities Which Caused _a BenLValve Stem and Cracked Disk on High Pressure Safety in_iectioJ1 ijIve2CV-5015-1 This item involved the failure to take sufficient care to keep the stem disk assembly for Valve 2CV-5015-1 from dropping back onto the seat as required by written instructions. The maintenance activities caused the valve stem to-bend and the disk to crack. Condition Report 2-92-0374 was issued to address-the valve cracking problems. The damaged stem / disk assembly was immediately replaced and Valve 2CV-5015-1 was verified to be operable. The maintenance-personnel involved were counseled regarding failure to exercise appropriate precautions to prevent damagr to the valve. Based on a review of the action items associated with Condition Report 2-92-0374 and Entergy Operations'
response to the violation contained in Letter 0CAN119207, this item is close FOLLOWUP (92701) (Closed) Unresolved item 313/9211-06: falsification of Plant Records On April 23, 1992, the NRC staff issued information Notice 92-30,
" falsification of Plant Records," to alert licensees to the NRC's concern that personnel may have falsified logs at several nuclear power plant Following receipt of NRC Information Notice 92-30, Arkansas Nuclear One- 7 management initiated an inspection of all routine operator logs taken from Janucry 24 to February 1, 1992. The Unit-1 inspection identified three nonlicensed operators who had documented log readings or door checks ' .
inconsistent with the security door data. The security door data did not show-that all required door entries were made. However, required door entries were made for all Technical Specification required readings on Unit-1. Based-on further evaluation by the NRC staff, the, licensee's actions in response to the NRC Information Notice were determined to be appropriate. As:part of the implementation of the computerized log keeping system. the waste. control operator and the auxiliary operator logs were streamlined to focus on important attributes. Control room logs are: currently ~being streamlined. The licensee has also-established a repetitive task to ensure that performance:in this area is periodically. evaluated,' These actions should' prevent recurrence of the problem.
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6.2 1 Closed) Inspection Followup Item _368/9213-Oli Unit 2 Freeze Protection Program The following paragraphs provide updated information on the observations:
identified during the previous freeze protection inspection:
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- All heater strip circuits in the refueling water tank (RWT) level 'i transmitter protective boxes were electrically checked and verified as operational. The failed heater stri , previously identified by the inspector, was repaired using J0 00886468. A minor maintenance activity was performed to correct the degraded insulation inside the RWT level transmitter boxes. Additionally, a job request was initiated to replace ,
degraded insulation in all of the sodium hydroxide tank level transmitter boxes. A procedure improvement form (PIF) for Procedure 2306.011. " Unit 2 - Insulation inspection for Freeze Protection Assurance," was initiated to include an inspection of the internals of the level transmitter boxes. The program previously included a daily external inspection of the RWT level transmitters and temperature verification which was logged by the waste control operators. The licensee reviewed waste control operator logs taken on January 19, 1993, and confirmed that the temperatures inside all the RWT level transmitter boxes were above the low temperature tolerance * The licensee stated that protective covering on the condensate storage y tank (CS1) level transmitter boxes was not required because the heater -
strips were sized to maintain acceptable temperature levels without the extra insulation. The licensee verified that the CST level transmitter i boxes were between 68of and 78*F inside the boxes on January 1 * A revision to Procedure 2106.032, " Unit 2 - Operations Freeze Protection i Guide," was incorporated to allow more flexibility for the position of the CST pit hatc * The burned out light bulbs on Boric Acid Annunciator Phaels 2C-330A and -
2C-3308 were replaced. A Plf was submittad to change the monthly lamp .
check in "Non-engineered Safety Featuree Switchgear and Annunciator Surveillance," Supplement 7 to Procedo e 2107.001, " Electrical' System ,
Operations " Revision 32, to include verification of the annunciator .
panel light * J0 00832612 which was initiated on December 25, 1990, to correct 3 sulfuric acid tank heat trace deficiencies . was not completed. However,.
the essential maintenance activities associated with-that JO were complete It was not necessary to prioritize the repair of the sulfuric acid tank heat tracing-because the temperatures needed to freeze sulfuric acid in the' concentrations present, -280F, are unlikely '
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to occur in-Arkansas. The prioritization of the repair of these heat e tape circuits was,therefore justifie _;
The licensee submitted a PIF-to ensure that Procedure 2106.032 was placed on '
the weekly surveillance schedule and reviewed on a weekly basis during the months of October through Harch. Additionally, a planned maintenance sheet-was submitted to planning and scheduling to begin performing the freeze- _
protection guide in September of.each yea U
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A plf was submitted to include daily logging of the CST level transmitter box temperatures on the RWT/ Sodium Hydroxide waste control operator log during the months of October through Marc The licensee corrective actions, both completed and planned, appropriately >
addressed the weaknesses described in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/92-13; 50-368/92-13 related to the Unit 2 freeze protection progra .3 Headquarters or Regional Requests followup 6. Unit 2 - Installation of Nitrogen 16 (N16) Honitoring System During Refueling Outage 2R9, N16 monitoring equipment was installed to enhance the licensee's capabilities to detect, quantify, and trend primary-to-secondary steam generator leakage. The addition of this equipment did not replace the existing equipment and method The system was designed to monitor the steam lines for the presence of N16 and then utilize the reactor power level to quantify the level of primary-to-secondary leakage, lhe equipment included two N16 detectors (one for each steam line), a signal analyzer (to put the signal in a form useable by other equipment), a processing unit (which combines the N16 count rate with a reactor power-level signal to generate a leakage rate), and a recorder. The N16 monitoring system interfaced with the plant computer to provide indication, trending, and alarms. The set)oints for the alarms were variable and controlled by-operators throug1 the plant computer terminal. The alarms driven by the new equipment were " Trouble /Lkrt'Hi," " Secondary Sys Radiation Hi," and " Rate of Change Hi," and were located on Annunciator Panel 2Kil in the control-roo Computer readouts from the N16 monitoring system were available in the control roo The licensee set the."Lkrt Hi" alarm at .01 gpm or 14.4 gpd. This was the lowest leak rate that chemists would be able to detect using a grab samol Since-N16 has a short' half-life, comparison of the N16 leak rate:with the grab
. sample leak rate would enable determination of the location of.the-leak within-the steam generator. . If a leak occurred, the setpoint would then be increase to less-than or equal to twice the new leak rate. The " Trouble" portion of:
the same alarm would actuate based on failures within the monitoring system.'
The licensee set the " Secondary Sys Radiation Hi" alarm setpoint at 0,1 gpm
.or 144 gpd. This setpoint was based-on administrative limits.to ensure that !
the-Technical'Specificstion limit of 0.5 gpm was never challenged.---The " Rate of Change Hi" ~ alarm setpoint was set to alarm if the calculated leak rate was'
expected to double within 1. hou The system only calculated valid leak rates above 20 percent. pover.- The accuracy of the N16 monitors was.plus or minus 10 percent after nonitor . .
adjustment to agree with' grab sample data. Without this adjustment, the N16 leakage. rate could be'in error by.50 percent. All of the signals = hetween the -
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plant computer and the N16 monitoring system were routed through a multiplexer
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-12-in the secondary sampling room. The power for the new equipment was from an existing lighting panel, and the power source was not backed up by an emergency power sourc The licensee's decision to enhance their capabilities to detect, quantify, and trend primary-to-secondary leakage was timely, considering the tube repairs performed as a result of recent steam generator inspections. The licensee's conservative decision was viewed as a strengt .4' Other Followup 6. Unit 2 - Followup of Condition Report 2-92-0459, Radial Peaking Factor Calculational Error On December 15, the Corrective Action Review Board-met to evaluate the root cause and proposed corrective action plan for Condition Report 2-92-045 This condition report identified a calculational error made during the performance of Procedure 2302.034, " Power Ascension Testing Controlling Procedure," which resulted in less conservative radial peaking factor adjustments in the core protection calculator and the core operating limit supervisory syste Condition Report 2-92-0459 was determined to be significant based on the fact that the apparent personnel-error was a recurrence of a similar type calculation error documented in Condition Report 2-91-0453. The actual safety impact of the calculation' error in plant operations was minimal and no Technical Specification limits were expede Basedonahumanperformanceevaluationofreactorengineering,itwis determined that the root cause of the calculation error was>that rear, tor engineering test procedures _ lacked human _ factors considerations and had-inadequate inde)endent verification requirements. -Corrective action't ware-
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planned to esta)1ish and incorporate standards for human performance factors in reactor engineering procedures'and to prepare new guidance for_ independent verification requirements ~in reactor engineering procedures.-
6.4.2 Unit.2 - Mechanical Maintenance Debrief Session on Charging Pump:2P-36B A maintenance debrief was held to assess the implementation of work activities
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performed on Charging Pump 2P-36B and to identify strengths and areas for-improvement. The licensee stated that the debrief was a prototype. session-which would be used to establish a maintenance project debrief program.- The objective of the debrief was to identify-ways.to improve-performance based on?
-an open-and honest exchange of information between personnel involvet in the
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multi-disciplined. safety-rolated activity. .The employees were encouiaged to-
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' describe any _ performance strengths and obstacles that they encountere A meeting summary was written to. document the strengths, weaknesses, and individuals responsible for planned improvement action ,
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6. Unit 2 - Corrective Action Review Board for f ailure of Charging Pump 2P-36C to Develop Adequate Lubr. cation Oil Pressure On January 12, the Corrective Action Review Board met to evaluate three condition reports related to charging pump Condition Reports 2-92-0414-01 and 2-92-0434-00 involved the failure of Charging Pump 2P-360 to develop adequate lubrication oil pressure following a pump start on two separate occasions. The root cause evaluation determined that the probable cause was a worn relief valve, used to control the oil system pressur It was determined that maintenance had never been performed on this relief valve. Debris in the lubrication oil tubing was identified as a potential caus The corrective actions developed were to replace the oil relief valves on all three charging pumps and to perform a reliability centered maintenance review of the chemical and volume control syste Condition Report 2-92-0449-00 was written as a result of the failure of Charging Pump 2P-36A to develop normal flow following a start. The root cause was determined to be accelerated wear of the charging pump internal check valves, resulting in premature failure. Corrective actions identified included installing run time meters on the charging pumps to establish an average part life for check valves and the formation of a multi-discipline group to review previous charging pump problems and develop a formal plan to address the . Unit 2 - Plant Safety Committee Review of Changes to Biocide Addition Program A Plant Safety Committee meeting was conducted on January 8 to review the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation regarding the temporary isolation of the biocide addition system used to add bromine to the Units 1 and 2 service water systems and to the Unit I circulating water system. Temporary isolation of the biocide addition system, anticipated to last approximately 3 weeks, was necessary to allow completion of a system modification which installed a new biocide addition system. This system modification was scheduled to be performed in January because lake temperatures below 50 F are not conducive to the growth of Asian clams and Ectoprocta, the major contributors to biofouling of the service water system. The safety evaluation addressed compensatory measures for biocide addition in the event that the' temperature of the . lake increased to 50 F or higher. The evaluation determined that relevant Technical Specification requirements could ' e satisfied during this period and that the temporary isolation of the biocin addition system maintained .
licensee commitments in this area. The i !. * Safety Committee discussed the items in the safety evaluation and concluded that the temporary isolation of the biocide addition system did not involve an unreviewed safety questio = _ - _ - _ --__- ___-__ __-__ _--__ _ - -
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-14-7 ONSITE FOLLOWUP Of LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (92700)
7.1 JClosed) Licensee Event Report 368190-004: "_ Missing Backwater Valve in
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Ll_cor Drain Created a Condition Which Could Have Prevented the f ulfillment of the Safety function of the Emergency feedwater System" This event involved a missing backwater valve in the floor drain piping of the Emergency feedwater pump 2P-7A room. in addition, subsequent inspection of the [mergency feedwater Pump 2P-7B room backwater drain valve identified the presence of trash and debri The backwater valves were designed to prevent cross-flooding between the emergency feedwater pump room The NRC's review of this event was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/90-05; 50-368/90-05. The licensee documented the event in Condition Report 2-90-0085. The root cause of the event was unknown, however, the ultimate contributing causes were a configuration control weakness and the failure to include the backwater drain valves in the preventive maintenance program. Repairs to the backwater drain valves in Emergency feedwater Pump 2P-7A and 2P-7B rooms were documented on JO 00807640. The backwater valves were given component identification labels and included in the piping and instrument drawings for the turbine building sumps. The valves were also inenrporated into the preventive maintenance program with inspection intervals of every 18 month Based on the review of Condition Report 2-90-0085, NRC Inspection Report 50-315/90-05; 50-368/90-05, piping and instrument drawings for the turbine building sumps, and JO 00807640 this licensee event report is close .2 (Closed) Licensee fvent Retort 313/90-011: " inadvertent Actuat_ ion of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System initiated by a Trip of a Chlorine Monitor Most likely Caused by Radio frequency Interference" This event involved an unexpected actuation of the control room emergency ventilation system following the trip of a chlorine monitor. The immediate cause of the monitor tri) could not be determined, however, the most likely cause was determined to se radio frequency interference caused by a hand held radio in the vicinity of Chlorine Monitor 2CLS-8762- The area in the vicinity of the chlorine monitors was subsequently posted to prohibit use of radio A memorandum was issued to inform plant personnel of the effect of radio frequency interference on the chlorine monitors and to ensure that personnel were aware of the restriction on the use of radios in the are Also, bold stripes were p oted on floors to improve personnel awareness of areas where radio usage is prohibite Based on a review of Condition Report C-90-0093, this licensee event report is close _ - _ - _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ .
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7.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 313/91-002: " inadvertent Actuation of the Combined Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Due to an invalid Unit Two Radiation Monitor Trip Which Was initiated b.y a Transient Noise ;
Spike" This event involved an sutomatic actuation of the control room emerger,cy ,
ventilation system which occurred as a result of the tripping of Radiatio Monitor 2RE-8750-1. The cause of the event was a transient noise spik Radiation Monitor 2RE-8750-1 was reset after the actuation and the. control- .
room emergency ventilation system wat returned to its normal configuration. A new method for determining the trip setpoint for Radiation Honitor 2RE-8750-1 was developed. This method determined the background radiation level by averaging the previous 90 readings. This process resulted in a setpoint which was less susceptible to trips induced by random nois Based on a review of Condition Reports 2-91-0359 and C-91-0045, this licensee event report is close .4 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 3[3/91-004: "
advertent Actuation of the Control Room Emergency Venti ^ ation System due .o a Chlorine Monitor Trip Which was Caused by Personne' Error" This event involved an automatic actuation of the control room emergency ventilation system which occurred as a result of the inadvertent tripping of a chlorine monitor. The cause of the chlorine monitor tripping was a technician working from a ladder near the monitor inadvertently contacting the reset pushbutton of the chlorine monitor. The control-room emergency ~ ventilation system was reset.and returned to its normal configuration.. The. technician was counseled regarding the importance of using caution when working around sensitive plant equipment. Protective covers were placed over the reset
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buttons of the chlorine-monitors to prevent them from being inadvertently depresse Based on review of J0 00843501 anaCondition) Report 91-0049, this licensee event report is close .5 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 313/92-003: " Automatic Initiation of the Emergency Feedwater System Durina Plant Heatup as a Resultlof Securina the Running Reactor-Coolant Pumps Due to Reverse Rotation of an Idle Pump" This event involved an automatic-initiation of the emergency feedwater systent which occurred when operations. personnel secured the reactor coolant-pumps-in response to indications-that an idle reactor coolant pump was rotating in.the' I reverse direction. :The event was documented in NRC Inspection ';
Report- 50-313/92-08:150-368/92-08 and tracked as-Inspection Followup Item 313/9208-02, which was subsequently closed in NRC Inspection : .
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Report 50-313/92-13;-50-368/92-13,- Condition Report 1-92-0341~was' initiated'
and it was determined that the antirotation device.was installed cocked an off center to the motor shaft coupling and that the upper bearing support
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bolts were not adequately torqued due to the loss of work control, incomplete planning and scheduling, and circumventsng established procedures. Condition !
Report 1-92-0341 addressed 10 corrective action items, of which_5 had been i closed. The completed and planned action items ap) eared sufficient to correct ,
the problems. A review of the plant startup and slutdown procedures with respect to the emergenc) feedwater initiation controls' design basis requirements was performed and documented in Condition Report-1-92-034 It was determined that the emergency feedwater initiation controls initiated at the safest and most appropriate tim Based on review of NRC Inspection Peport 50-313/92-08; 50-368/92-08, NRC Inspection Report 50-313/92-13; 50-368/92-13, and Condition Reports 1-92-0340 .
and 1-92-341, this licensee event report is close '
7.6 (Closed) t.icensee Event Report 368/92-005: " Personnel Error Results in "
Failure to Monitor fuel Handlina Area Ventilation Exhaust for Radioactivity as Required by Technical Specifications" This item involved the failure to monitor the fuel handling area ventilation '
exhaust for approximately 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br />. . The root cause was personnel error on the :
part of the chemist who obtained a weekly grab sample from the ventilation ,
pathway.and did not realign the radiation monitor valves-for Super Particulate
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lodine and Noble Gas Monitor (SPING) 7 to their normal configuration. No ..
significant release of radioactivity occurred during the 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br />, based upon results of the weekly grab samples. The chemists who found the SPING-7 valves misaligned immediately realigned them after sampling the vent. 'The chemists also verified valve alignment on the other SPINGs, The individual who failed to return the radiation monitor valves for SPING 7 to their normal configuration was counseled concerning the importance of procedural .
-complianc The event was reviewed with chemists who' perform vent sampling- "
duties. Procedure 1607.010 Revision-6, " Sampling of the ANO Unit 1 Vent,". '
and Procedure 2607.010, R3 vision 5, " Sampling The Unit 2 Vents," were revised
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to include independent verification for restoring the sample valve line u Based on the review of Condition Report 2-92-0211 and Procedures'2607.010 and 1607.010, this licensee event report is close , (Closed) 1.icensee Event Report 313/92-006: " inadvertent Actuatiortof the-Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Due to an Invalid Unit lwo Radiation Monitor Trio-Which was initiated by Electroni: Component Failure" This item involved an inadvertent actuation of the control room emergency ventilation system that occurred'as a result of a spurious trip signal initiated by. Radiation Monitor 2RE-8750- During the' event, the control room emergency ventilation system actuated as designed.~even though no actual high radiation condition existed. JO 00878688
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( -17-was initiated and Circuit Card A2 was replaced on Radiation Monitor 2RE-8750-1. The control room ventilation system was returned to its normal configuratio Based on the review of J0 00878688, this licensee event report is close .8 1 Closed) Licensee Event Report 368/92-007: "High Pressure Safety injection flow Rates Below Safety Analysis And Technical Specification Reautrements Due to incorrect Size of Valve Discs Caused.by /endor Error"'
This item involved unbalanced flow rates through:the high pressure safety -
injection system legs, which were also below the minimum value specified in Technical Specifications and the Safety Analysis Repor This event was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/92-24; 50-368/92-2 The cacse of the event was replacement of the valve disc assemblies in five of the high pressure safety injection valves. The new disc assemblies were not identical to those roolaced and inadvertently modified the flow characteristics of the valves, rendering the nigh pressure safety injection system inoperable. Subsecuently, spara valve disc- assemblies were returned to the vendor and refurbishec to have the correct. flow characteristics and were then installed in all five safety injection valves. A successful flow balance
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test of the high pressure safety injection system was conipicted following installatio Based on review of NRC Inspection Report 50-313/92-24; 50-368/92-24 and an NRC Enforcement Discretion letter dated November 25, 1992, from Mr. James M11hoan to Entergy Operations, this licensee event report is close '
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ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED licensee Personnel C. Anderson, Unit 2 Operations Manager D. Boyd, Licensing Specialist S. Boncheff, Licensing Specialist S. Cotton, Radiation-Protection /Radwaste Manager R. Espolt, Acting Unit 2 Plant Manager M. Frala, Supervisor Chemistry J. Fisicaro, Licensing Director R. King, Licensing Supervisor _
W. McKelvy, Chemistry Superintendent J. Taylor-Brown, Acting Quality Director J. Vandergrif t, Unit 1 Plant Manager 1.2 NRC Personnel L. Smith, Senior Resident inspector '
S. Campbell, Ret.ident inspector The personnel licted above attended the exit meeting. In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel-during this inspection perio EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on January 22, 199 During this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector ____ .
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