IR 05000293/1986040
| ML20211E893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1987 |
| From: | Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211E867 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-86-40, NUDOCS 8702240435 | |
| Download: ML20211E893 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket / Report N /86-40 Licensee: Boston Edison Company 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Location: Plymouth, Massachusetts Dates: November 24, 1986 - December 31, 1986 Inspectors: M. McBride, Senior Resident Inspector J. Lyash, Resident Inspection R. Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist Approved by: 9k7Lb42 2-Yd7 ff. Wiggi g Chief, Reactor Projects- Date Section It3 Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, plant events, maintenance, surveillance, outage activities, and reports to the NR Results: No violations were identified. The operations staff handled a partial loss of offsite power in a prompt, professional manner (section 4.c).
Inspector concerns included the following:
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Improper electrical splices that could affect safety equipment are discussed in section An improperly modified primary containment isolation valve was identified (section 3.b).
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A G.E. HFA relay failure is discussed in section 4 A lack of preplanning for a significant plant electrical bus isolation is discussed in section Recurring losses of offsite power caused by switchyard washing activities are discussed in section Inadequate vehicle radiological surveys are discussed in section Two inadequate Licensee Event Reports (LER's) are discussed in section g22gy f3$ 3
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page S umma ry o f Fa c i l i ty Ac t i v i ti e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Followup on Previous Inspection Findi ngs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Violations, Unresolved Items, Inspector Follow Items, TMI Action Plan Items Routine Periodic Inspections .................................... 2 l
l Plant Tour Observations l
' Plant Maintenance and Outage Activities Radiation Protection and Chemistry Review of Plant Events .......................................... 7 l- Refuel Floor Radiation Monitor Alarm Inoperable Isolation of Motor Control Centers B14 and B18 Partial Loss of Offsite Power Improper Vehicle Release from Site............................... 11 Review of Licensee Event Reports ( LERs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise .......................... 13 Management Meetings ............................................. 13 Attachment I - Persons Contacted
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DETAILS 1.0 Summary of Facility Activities The plant was shutdown on April 12, 1986 for unscheduled maintenance. On July 25, 1986, Boston Edison announced that the outage would be extended to include refueling and completion of certain modification .0 Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (86-29-04): review licensee evaluation of core spray check valve failure. On August 26, 1986, core spray pump B failed to meet rated flow during its monthly inservice tes Subsequent investigation identified that the full flow test line check valve disc had become disassociated from the hanger ar The licensee believes that the failure was caused by poor design of the disc anti-rotation devic This device consists of two raised areas on the back of the disc which should bear against the sides of the hanger. The design is deficient allowing the disc to rotate and the raised areas become lodged under the hanger. This created a bending moment on the disc stud and caused its fracture. The disc was temporarily repaired as described in Temporary Modification (TM) TM-86-27. It was also found that the A loop core spray full flow test line check valve had been improperly modified in the pas This finding is described in detail in section 3.c of this report. The A loop check valve was reinstalled under TM-86-35. All other RHR and core spray pump discharge and test line check valves were disassembled and inspected. No additional problems were identified. Performance testing of the B core spray pump after repair of the failed valve was satisfactory. TM-86-27 and 86-35 require replacement of the core spray test line check valves with stainless steel discs, including an improved anti-rotation device, prior to requiring primary containment integrit Based on the above this item is close (Update) Inspector Follow Item (86-34-05): review licensee evaluation of piping surface indications. This item was last updated in inspection report 50-293/86-37. On December 17, 1986 the licensee reported via ENS the identification of a linear surface indication on the core spray system. This indication appears to be similar to those previously identified. The inspector will continue to review ISI results and licensee evaluations in this are .0 Routine Periodic Inspections The inspectors routinely toured the facility to assess general plant and equipment conditions, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection, security and radiological control measures. Ongoing work activities were monitored to verify that they were being conducted in accordance with approved administrative and technical procedures, and that proper communications with the control room staff had been established. The inspector observed valve, instrument and electrical equipment lineups in
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the field to ensure that they were consistent with system operability requirements and operating procedure During tours of the control room the inspectors verified proper staffing, access control and operator attentiveness. Adherence to procedures and limiting conditions for operations were evaluated. The inspectors examined equipment lineup and operability, instrument traces and status of control room annunciators. Various control room logs and other available licensee documentation were reviewe In addition to routine equipment operability confirmation the inspectors performed independent walkdowns of selected safety system Confirmation of the as-built system configuration, identification of any degraded conditions and procedure adequacy were evaluate The inspector observed and reviewed outage activities, maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, procedures, codes and standard Involvement of QA/QC, safety tag use, personnel qualifications, fire protection precautions, retest requirements, and reportability were assesse The inspector observed tests to verify performance in accordance with approved procedures and LCO's, collection of valid test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolutio Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the reporting period. Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observed. Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological points throughout the facility were taken by the inspecto Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, personnel identification, access control, badging, and compensatory measures when required.
I Plant Tour Observations On December 13, 1986, the inspector toured the drywell and noted water slowly dripping down two thermocouple electrical cables at the top level of the drywell. The drywell head and the reactor vessel head had been removed and the reactor vessel cavity was filled with water at the time of the tour. The licensee subsequently stated that the water was leaking from the reactor cavity seal at the points where the thermocouple cables penetrated the cavity. The cables were attached to reactor vessel flange thermocouples. The licensee stated that a maintenance request to repair the leaking cable penetrations had been initiated. The repairs will be made
! after refueling activities are finished and the cavity is drained.
l The inspector had no further questions.
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b. Plant Maintenance and Outage Activities
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On December 4, 1986 a potentially inoperable pipe snubber on the shutdown cooling suction line was identified and reported l to the NRC via ENS. The as found piston rod extension was approximately one inch less than the specified value. Boston Edison Quality Control (QC) issued Nonconformance Report (NCR)
number 86-108 documenting the failure. The NCR was referred to engineering for performance of an operability analysis and disposition. The visual examination of the snubber was performed and documented on November 4, 1986 by contractor personnel. Licensee QC was not informed and an NCR written until December 4, 1986. The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the delay in reporting by the contractor, General Electric (GE). Investigation by the licensee indicates that the delay was the result of poor communication between levels of GE supervision, weakness in training and the practice of submitting negative inspection results without first obtaining and documenting the issuance of an NC In response to the problem, GE issued NCR GE-001. Corrective actions taken to disposition this NCR included: 1) retraining of personnel; 2) revision of the GE QA manual to require reporting of non-acceptance items to the licensee within one hour; 3) requirement to record the licensee NCR number on non-acceptable inspection data sheet prior to submissio These actions appear appropriate and were promptly implemente The resident inspectors will monitor performance in this are On December 29, 1986, the licensee discovered that Raychem splices on all three phases of 480 VAC power cables for the
"B" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump motor were improperly installed. The licensee indicated that the defective splices had been installed on August 16, 1986, following RHR pump disassembly and inspection. The splices did not contain adhesive at certain boundaries within the splice, contrary to manufacturer requirement In addition, the electrical insulation was nicked and up to 10 (out of 323) strands of conductor were found broken in the cables. The licensee stated that a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) had been issued last August for the nicked insulation but the broken con-ductors had not been noted at the time. The licensee also stated that the splices had extended out on the cables beyond the mini-mum required distance from bare conductor, i.e., beyond two inches from the nick The defective splices were discovered during the installation of alternate cables for 10 CFR 50 appendix R modifications. At the close of the inspection, the licensee had not completed their review of this proble The acceptability of splicing activities is unresolved, pending the completion of the licensee's evaluation (86-40-01).
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The A and C residual heat removal (RHR) pumps were reassembled and tested during the inspection period. The A RHR pump shaft and impeller showed significant discoloration and distortion as described in inspection report 50-293/86-34. Both the shaft and impeller were replaced. The A pump casing was found to be distorted. Extensive machining of the casing and stuffing box was required to restore design tolerances. The machining and modification process was conducted for Boston Edison by General t
Electric in conjunction with the pump vendor. The D RHR pump also showed signs of overheating. The licensee in cooperation with the vendor is evaluating the overheating and distortion to determine possible cause The inspector will review the results of this evaluatio Post work performance testing of the A and C RHR pumps was completed with acceptable result The A core spray pump was reassembled during the period. Post work performance testing identified that the rated flow of 3600 gpm could not be achieved. Licensee investigation is in progres The inspector noted that performance testing of the B core spray pump demonstrated that the pump could meet the 3600 gpm at 253 psig required by technical specifications, however, no margin to this criteria was available. Any deterioration in pump perfor-mance will result in a failure to meet technical specification requirement The inspectors will review the results of the licensee evaluation for the core spray pump flow problem during a future inspectio A primary containment isolation valve which had been improperly modified and did not meet design requirements was identified by the licensee during the inspection period. This valve may have been in this condition since 197 The A core spray test line check valve 1400-35 was disassembled and inspected during licensee followup of the A core spray pump flow problem. The valve disc, as described in applicable design documents, is a forged stainless steel disc with an integral stu Upon disassembly of the 1400-35 valve it was found that the valve disc had been modified. The original stainless steel stud had been removed, drilled out, and replaced with a common steel stud and spacer arrangement. This valve serves as a primary contain-ment isolation valve. The as-found condition does not comply with design requirements. The inspector questioned licensee engineering personnel on the origin and implementation of this modification. Investigation by the licensee identified no record of the modification. Maintenance Request (MR) No. 79-1231, dated May 30, 1979 was issued to investigate core spray flow problem This MR states that the valve disc was repaired, but does not detail the type of repair performed. The MR required QC inspec-tion of any replacement parts, however no QC inspection records could be located. The removal of the valve was performed with the unit at full power, violating primary containment integrit . _ . -. -. ..
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This was the subject of special inspection 50-293/79-16, a Notice of Violation, and an Immediate Action Lette It does not appear that the implementation of the unauthorized modificatfon was recognized at that time. The licensee is continuing to review records and has written Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report No.86-215 to track this review. This item will remain unresolved pending completion of the licensee's review and further evaluation by the inspector (86-40-02).
The valve has been reassembled under Temporary Modification (TM)
86-35. The present configuration does not meet ASME code re-quirements and must therefore be replaced. TM 86-35 allows the present configuration for six months or until primary containment is require Similar modification of check valve 1400-214 in the B core spray loop was recently performed following its failur The replacement of these two check valve discs is tracked by the applicable temporary modifications referenced abov Radiation Protection and Chemistry The inspector reviewed the adequacy and effectiveness of personnel contamination control. Particular attention was directed to the positioning and use of " friskers". The inspector also discussed with cognizant licensee personnel Information Notice No. 86-23, Excessive Skin Exposures Due to Contamination with Hot Particles, dated April 9, 1986. The licensee has experienced some problems with hot particles. Such particles are capable of causing a large skin exposure in a short time period.
I Within the scope of this review, no violations were identified. The following was noted:
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The licensee was aware of the Information Notice. The licensee contacted the facilities discussed in the Notice to ascertain the source of the particle The licensee has established and implemented special training for personnel who work in areas where particles have been identified (e.g. CRD Rebuild Room). The training discusses identification and actions to be take New work activities where particles could be present ( under vessel sump work) are reviewed specifically with respect to particle contro .
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Regarding frisking:
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personnel were observed to be " frisking out" properl friskers'have been placed on all elevations of the Reactor Building for personnel us instructions for use are posted at each friske procedures are in place to determine skin dose from particle <
Within the scope of this review, the following items for improvement were identified:
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Friskers are not provided in the Rad Waste Complex (elev - 3').
Licensee personnel indicated high and fluctuating background levels (e.g. several millirem / hour) precluded the use of friskers in this complex. Currently personnel must go up at least one elevation to use a frisker. The inspector was informed that a review is currently underway to provide for shielded frisking booths in several plant locations such as the Rad Waste Comple Current procedural guidance does not contain a recommendation to place friskers as close as reasonably possible to radio-
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logical work location Licensee personnel indicated the above described matters would be reviewe .0 Review of Plant-Events The inspectors followed-up on events occurring during the period to deter-mine if the licensee's response was thorough and effective. Independent reviews of the events were conducted to verify the accuracy and complete-ness of licensee informatio Refuel Floor Radiation Monitor Inoperable On December 16, 1986, the "0" refueling floor ventilation radiation monitor would not give a high alarm on panel 905 in the control room during a routine surveillance test. Subsequently, the licensee determined that the alarm contact on G.E. HFA relay 16AK580 did not close when the relay deenergized during the test. The licensee's preliminary evaluation indicated that the relay properly changed state during the test and that only the alarm contact did not clos Failure and Malfunction Report (F&MR) No.86-416 was promptly initiated and the NRC notified via the ENS telephone line. The li-censee's evaluation of the failure was not completed at the end of the-inspection period. This item is unresolved pending a determina-tion of 1) the root cause for the failure and 2) the safety signifi-cance of this failure mode (86-40-03).
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8 Isolation of Motor Control Centers B14 and 818 On December 22, 1986, two 480 VAC motor control centers (MCC) and a 125 VDC bus were removed from service to install new cabling for fire protection (10 CFR 50 Appendix R), modifications. An apparent lack of effective preplanr.ing for the isolations caused the following problems:
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The isolation of 125 VDC bus D8 under Maintenance Request (MR)
86-46-309 removed DC control power from several components, including a shutdown cooling isclation valve, M0-1001-4 Following the isolation, the insper. tor expressed concern that while the automatic closure of this valve on low reactor vessel water level was not required by the Technical Specifications in the current plant mode,-it seemed prudent to have the capability to at least electrically close the valve while the reactor was in shutdown coolin The licensee agreed and subsequently issued instructions to operations personnel in Night Orders to close the valve by manually depressing an electrical closing contactor at the valve motor breaker if any unusual plant condition aros A second redundant isolation valve, M0-1001-50, was operable and would automatically close on a low level isolation signa The following day, operations personnel attempted to close the M0-1001-47 valve after the plant partially lost off site powe However, the valve could not be readily closed because of unexpected electrical arcing when the electrical contactor was closed. Also, the valve closing time was not known and seating currents had to be measured to determine when the valve was fully closed. As a result several minutes were lost while an electrician was summoned to the valve motor breaker to assist the closing operatio Operations personnel had previously assumed that the closing contactor would seal-in once it was pressed and that the contactor would automatically open when closing torque switches in the valve motor operator activated. However, the seal-in feature and the torque switches were disabled when control power was removed from the motor breaker. The licensee later stated that the arcing was normal for a DC breake The inspector noted that operators displayed appropriate caution and avoided damaging MO-1001-47 valve when the closing operation did not go as planned. However, the delay caused by a lack of detailed closing instructions could have caused operational problems if the valve had to be closed to maintain reactor water level. NRC Information Notice 86-74, " Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory because of Misalignent of RHR Valves", describes several of these events at other plant ,
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9 i The inspector also expressed concern that unnecessary closures of the valve might risk valve or motor operator damage since the torque and limit switches were deactivated. The licensee later issued more detailed closing instructions to the operators and required that the 1001-47 valve be closed only if the redundant, 1001-50 valve would not clos The inspector observed an operator training session and noted that each operator was required to simulate closing the valv The operators were told to estimate the required closing time (18 seconds) by counting out loud rather than using a stop watch. Licensee engineering personnel later indicated that if necessary, it was acceptable to estimate the closing time because: 1) the valve actually only took 16 seconds to close, 2) at least 10 additional seconds of locked-rotor current were required to damage the operator, and 3) the valve could not be physically overstressed by the motor operator. The engineering staff subsequently contacted the plant and recommended that the operators use a stopwatc Several engineered safety features were unexpectedly activated when MCC B18 was isolated for maintenance request 86-46-311 on December 22,198 The activated features included partial primary and secondary isolations, a half-scram, and the initiation of the standby gas treatment system. The equipment was activated because one of two reactor protection system motor generator sets (RPS MG sets) was deenergized by the MCC B18 isolation. The MCC and RPS MG set were promptly reenergized. Subsequently, a temporary feed was established for the MG set under temporary modification 86-43, so that MCC B18 could be removed from service without activating the safety feature The problems with the D8 and B18 isolations indicate a lack of effective preplanning. The engineering department was not consulted about the isolations, although they were involved with the MCC modifications. Instead, operations shift personnel were required to evaluate the extensive tag outs at the last minut At the exit meeting, the licensee acknowledged the problem and stated that future maintenance with extensive tagouts would be more thoroughly planned. The inspector will review the adequacy of preplanning in future routine inspections and had no further question c. Loss of Normal Offsite Power to the Station On December 23,1986 at 11:17 a.m., normal offsite power was lost for about 30 minutes when an electrical fault occurred in the station 345 kv switchyard. The reactor was in the cold condition with the reactor head off and the refueling cavity filled with water
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at the time. The fault was caused by water mist that lightly coated an insulator in a live section of the switchyard during a switchyard washing operation. An adjacent deenergized section of the switchyard was being washed at the time to remove ocean salt buildup. Precautions are taken to remove the salt with heavy streams of water to avoid faulting. According to knowledgeable licensee representatives, a light coating of water can generate an electrically conducting medium on the insulators which can cause a faul One of the two diesel generators was out of service at the time for Appendix R modifications. The second diesel generator started and loaded normally when power was lost. A 24 kv offsite power source was used to power the emergency loads normally supplied by the second diesel generator. Several engineered safety features were activated by the power loss including secondary containment isolation, standby gas treatment initiation, shutdown cooling isolation, and reactor scram. These actuations were reset after power was reestablishe The inspector observed control room activities during the power loss. The operators acted promptly to identify the cause of the power loss and establish backup power to the station. Although shutdown cooling was isolated from the reactor during this period, core heatup was minimal due to the extended shutdown and associated fission product decay. Overall, the operations staff handled the power loss in a controlled professional manner.No switchyard or station damage was caused by the power loss. A similar power loss caused by switchyard washing operations occurred in September 1985.
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The inspector subsequently interviewed the supervisor in charge of the washing activities, toured the washing area, and reviewed proce-dure 3.M.3-20, " Live High Pressure Wet Washing Procedure". The supervisor indicated that he noticed the water mist on the live in-sulator a few seconds prior to the faul Before he could halt the washing activities, the insulator faulted. He stated that the wind was calm, which allowed the mist to accumulate and rise vertically (to coat the live insulator). He said he had washed the yard many times before over the past several year The supervisor indicated that while he used 3.M.3-20, the procedure was not strictly aplicable because it was only designated for washing live sections of the switchyard. On December 23, only deenergized sections of the switchyard were being washed. The inspector noted that one of the procedural checklists 3.M.3.20c, " Hot Wash Crew Brief",
was not completed on December 23, prior to the incident. Instead, the crew briefing was conducted and documented the previous da Although it was acceptable to brief the crew the previous day, the control room notification step on the checklist should have been done on December 23. The licensee agreed to change the procedure to 1)
address washing both the live and deenergized sections of the switch-yard and 2) require that the control rooin be given adequate notifi-cation so that the operators can anticipate a potential power los .
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The inspector found the wind precautions in the procedure adequate, but noted that switchyard washing operations required considerable care and attention to avoid the development of fault The licensee stated that certain portions of the insulators were not washed by rainfall, causing a salt buildup. A different insulator design was being considered for the switchyard which could minimize this problem. The inspector had no further questions at this tim The adequacy and effectiveness of the procedural changes and corrective actions for the salt buildup are considered unresolved and will be reviewed during a future inspection (86-40-04).
5.0 Improper Vehicle Releases from the Site On November 25, 1986 a contractor cement truck was released from the Pilgrim site without proper radiological clearance. The truck did not enter any radiologically contaminated areas. Upon completion of the delivery the truck proceeded to the contractor's security gate for egress from the sit Established procedures require that any vehicle leaving the site be thoroughly surveyed to identify any radioactive contamination; regardless of whether it has entered a contaminated area. Radiation Protection and Security personnel are jointly responsible to assure this survey is per-forme Due to confusion among the security guards the truck was allowed to leave the site prior to performance of the required surve Surveys of the areas where the truck had been, and the paths taken between these areas detected no contamination. A survey of the truck was subsequently performed at its destination, Kingsto Both the survey and analysis of the cement contained in the truck identified no contaminatio Disciplinary actions were taken against the individuals involved. All site security personnel were retrained in the procedure used to process vehicle release. Security procedures were revised to require approval of the onshift security supervisor prior to clearing any vehicle for egres The Security Supervisor is now responsible to ensure that appropriate release authorization has been obtained from the Radiological Protection organizatio On December 6,1986, a contractor laundry truck left the Pilgrim site without proper radiological clearance. The truck had also not entered a contaminated area. Its release was caused by confusion resulting from efforts to allow an ambulance prompt access ta the site for a medical emergency. The truck driver was instructed to remain just outside the gate while the ambulance was admitted. The driver of the truck did not understand the instructions and left Boston Edison property. The truck was later located, surveyed and no radioactive contamination found. In the future, security personnel will accompany vehicles outside exit gates during unusual circumstances, such as this event, to ensure that appropri-ate instructions are given to the drivers and radiological surveys made.
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During the exit interview, the inspector expressed concern that this type of incident is repetitive. While the improper release of the cement truck was in itself of low safety significance, the repeated failure of corrective actions to fully address this area is a matter of concer This matter was reviewed and further discussed in Inspection Report 86-4 .0 Review of LER's LER's submitted to NRC:RI were reviewed to verify that the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LER's were reviewed:
LER N Event Date Report Date Subject 86-25 11/11/86 11/25/86 Misalignment of the Fire Suppression Water System 86-27 11/19/86 12/18/86 Loss of Offsite Power Due to Severe Winter Storm The inspector noted the following problems with the LERs:
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LER 86-025-00 appeared incomplete because it failed to describe the equipment damage caused by running the fire pumps without a suction source. In fact, severe damage to the electric fire pump packing and impeller were noted after the even As a result, the pump could not pass surveillance flow rate requirement LER 86-027-00 stated that, during the November 19, 1986 loss of offsite power, the 24 KV shutdown transformer remained available throughout the event. Based on observation by the inspector and discussions with operations personnel it appears that the shutdown transformer was also lost for a short period of time early in the event. Therefore all sources of offsite power were briefly lost contrary to the statements in the LE At the exit meeting, the licensee agreed to review the LER's and appropriately modify them. The inspector had no further questions concerning the LER' At the exit meeting, the inspector asked whether the diesel driven fire pump would be inspected, given the severely damaged impeller found in the electric driven pump. The licensee stated that the diesel would not be in-spected following repairs to the electric pump; rather the licensee would rely on the results of surveillance testing conducted on the pump. The inspectors will monitor these testing activitie .
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7.0 Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise On December 10, 1986 the licensee conducted its annual emergency prepared-ness exercise. Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency and the Department of Public Health participated. The NRC also participated, establishing the Region I Incident Response Center and dispatching a team to the sit In addition. NRC representatives were present in the emergency facilities to evaluate the licensee's performanc The NRC observation team found the licensee's performance good during the exercise. The complete NRC evaluation of the exercise will be documented in inspection report number 50-293/86-3 .0 Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection period, meetings -
were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and preliminary findings of the resident inspectors. No written material was given to the licensee that was not previously available to the publi On December 17, 1986 the NRC Region I Administrator. Dr. T. Murley, addressed a hearing held by the Joint Committee on Energy for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Dr. Murley discussed the status of management and plant hardware improvements at Pilgrim and answered questions from the Committe Also addressing the hearing were Governor Dukakis, the licensee and other interested partie r-4
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Attachment I to Inspection Report 50-293/86-40 Persons Contacted ik L. Oxsen, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- A. Pederson, Nuclear Operations Manager
- *K. Roo'erts, Director Outage Management D. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager N. Brosee, Maintenance Section Head T. Sowdon, Radiological Section Head J. Seery, Technical Section Head E. Ziemianski, Management Services Section Head
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P. Mastrangelo, Chief Operating Engineer R. Sherry, Chief Maintenance Engineer
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- Senior licensee representative present at the exit meeting, y (
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