ML20216G818

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Insp Rept 50-293/97-09 on 970827-28.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Access Authorization Program
ML20216G818
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 09/04/1997
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216G810 List:
References
50-293-97-09, 50-293-97-9, NUDOCS 9709160058
Download: ML20216G818 (7)


See also: IR 05000293/1997009

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

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REGION I
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- Docket No:' '50 293 -;

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Report No:; 50 293/97 09..  :

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l Licensee:'~ Boston Edison Company-: ,

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Facility:- Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station =

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' Location: - . Plymouth, MA j

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Dates: August 27 28,1997

Y- Inspectors: G. C. Smith, St. Security Specialist -

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. R. Rosano, Sr. Program Manager -

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Michael C. Modes, Chief -

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- Approved by:

Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch

Division of Reactor Safety- 1

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

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On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and

Vermont that left four people dead. - The individual was subsequently killed in a

confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities

later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence.

Because the individual had been granted access to three nucit e.: power plants, special NRC

inspections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization

programs, as implementec, identified information that should have precluded the individual

from being granted unescorted access.

The licensee's access authorization program was inspected August 27 and 28,1997, and

determined to meet the regulatory requiremsnts. The NRC did not identify any information,

used by the licensee in processing the individual for access authorization, that should have

precluded the licensee from grariting the individual unescorted access to the secured i

portions of their plant.

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Bgport Details

88- Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues

S8.1 StatIAl

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On August:19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire

and Vermont that lef t four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a .

confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities.- Law enforcement

authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence in

New Hampshire. Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to

three nuclear power plants, specialinspections wero initiated at each of the plants

- to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorization (AA) programs in

order to determine if they met tho regulatory requirements and the licensee's

physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have -

been identified during the AA process that should have precluded the individual ,

being granted unescorted access.

The individual had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 and

1995 and to Pilgrim in 1997 basad on completion of all componer,ts of the access

authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to Indian

Point (IP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilgrim and an update -

of his activities for the approximate 2 month period between the time he left Pilgrim

and began work at IP 3, as provided for in the AA requirements. The NRC

inspection included a review of the AA programs at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and

IP 3.i

S8.2 Access Authorization Proaram and Procedures

a. Insoection Scone

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's security plans and access authorization

procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's access authorization

program,

b. Observations and Findingg

The review of the licensee's security plan (the Plan) and AA preedures disclosed

that the Plan and procedures, as written and implemented, satisfied the

requirements el 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for

Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide

5.66,_" Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants." Interviews with

personnel disclosed they were knowledgeable of the AA requirements contained in

the regulations, the Plan and the AA procedures.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors' review disclosed that the licensee's AA program, as implemented,

met all regulatory rec,uirements.

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S8.3 Backaround Investiaation (BI) Elements

a. Insoection Scope

The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determine the

adequac of the program in determining the true identity of the individual and to

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develop liformation concerning employment history, educational history, credit

historv, criminal history and character and reputation of the individual prior to

granting unescorted access,

b. Observation and Findjngi

The inspectors reviewed the results of the individual's background investigation (BI)

and determined that the scope and depth of the BI met the licensee's program

commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments

on which to base a determination for access authorization. In accordance with

10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating critninal history checks on

individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all

information received from the U.S. Attorney Gc.1eral. One licensee (Vermont

Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the

criminal history check twice (once in 1992 and once in 1995), in both cases, prior

arrests were identified. The inspectors determinod that the information had been

properly evaluated and adjudicated prior to granting unescorted access, in addition,

Bostor? Edison submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check in

December 1996. The information received back from the criminal history check

indicated no prior arrest data. The NRC is pursuing this issue with the FBI to

determine why the prior arrest data was not identified during the 1996 criminal

history check,

c. Conclusion

Although the 1996 criminal history check did not identify any prior arrests, the

inspectors concluded that there were no deficiencies in the processes used by either

licensee to ir.itiate the enminal history checks.

S8.4 Psycholoaical Evgluations

a. IDsoection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's psychological testing program procedures to

insure they met applicable requirements.

b. Observations. Findinas and Conclusions

The licensee contracted with licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the

psychological testing program and to perform the requisite evaluations. After the

psychological tests were administered, the answer sheets were forwarded to the

psychologist for evaluation, and if the need for a clinical interview was indicated,

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- the psychologist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial

to the licensee. The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 1996.

The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinicalinterview and the psychologist

conducting the interview recommended, after conducting the interview, that site

access be granted.

The inspectors determined that the licensees' psychological evaluation program was ,

t,eing implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.

S8.5 Behavior Observation Prooram-(DOP)

a. Insocction Scong

The inspectors reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and

lesbon plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the ,

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licensees' programs.

b. Observations and Findinog

Yhe programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in common with, the

licensees' Fitness for Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson

plant indicated that they met all regulatory requirements. Interviews with several of

the individuals' pu;t supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program

requiiements e they demonstreted an awareness and sensitivity to detect and

report adve; r 'innges in behavior,

c. Conclu_sino

The inspectors concluded that the BOP was being effectively implemented.

S8.0 Tomoorarv Access Authorization

a. ininggtion Scone

The inspectors reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope

investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted

access authorization, as permitted by the rule.

b. Observations Findinos and Conclusions

The records of the abbreviated scope investigations were determined to contain

adequate information (character and reputation frorn a developed reference, past

year's employment history, and a credit check) on which to base temporary access

authorization. The inspectors noted that, in these records of abbreviated scope

investination, there was no data which necessitated rescission of access

auth5tation following receipt of the full S year investigation.

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S8.7 Audha  !

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a. Innosction Scone i

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The inspectors reviewed the most recent audits of the contractors used by each  !

licensee to conduct Bl. j

b. Observations and Findinas  ;

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The inspectors' review disclosed that the audits were comprehensive in scope and i

. ' depth. The audit findings were administrative in nature and no programmatic  :

deficiencies were identified. ,

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S8.8 Search Eaulomant

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a. inanection Scone

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The inspectors reviewed the licensees' procedures for testing personnel and i

package search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment and

observed licensee testing of the search equipment to assess its effectiveness.  !

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b. Observations and Findinas

Test procedures were adequate to properly evaluate the search equipment -[

performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not  !

experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment

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determined that it was operable,

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c. Conclusign [

The inspectors determined that the personnel and pacl: age search equipment was

being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan .

requirements and was capable of performing its' intended functions. l

X1 Ealt interview _

An exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that -

time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary

findings were presented. The licansees acknowledged the preliminary inspection ,

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED  ;

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Licenses

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J. Neal, Protection Services Department Manager t

N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations Manager

E. Neary, Security Operations Supervisor

W. Riggs, Nuclear Services Group Manager

T. Campbsll, Security Services Supervisor

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R. Wheat, Project Manager, Protection Technology

N. Medcalf, Administrator, Protection Technology  ;

C. Stanley, Security Specialist, Protection Technology j

All of the above licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting conducted by i

telephone on September 3,1997. The inspectors also Interviewed other licensee and

contractor personnel,

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