ML20216G818
| ML20216G818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216G810 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-97-09, 50-293-97-9, NUDOCS 9709160058 | |
| Download: ML20216G818 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1997009
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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- REGION I
- Docket No:'
'50 293
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Report No:;
50 293/97 09..
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l Licensee:'~
Boston Edison Company-:
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Facility:-
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station =
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' Location: -
. Plymouth, MA
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Dates:
August 27 28,1997
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Inspectors:
G. C. Smith, St. Security Specialist
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. R. Rosano, Sr. Program Manager -
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- Approved by:
Michael C. Modes, Chief -
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Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch
Division of Reactor Safety-
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
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On August 19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and
Vermont that left four people dead. - The individual was subsequently killed in a
confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities
later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence.
Because the individual had been granted access to three nucit e.: power plants, special NRC
inspections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization
programs, as implementec, identified information that should have precluded the individual
from being granted unescorted access.
The licensee's access authorization program was inspected August 27 and 28,1997, and
determined to meet the regulatory requiremsnts. The NRC did not identify any information,
used by the licensee in processing the individual for access authorization, that should have
precluded the licensee from grariting the individual unescorted access to the secured
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portions of their plant.
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Bgport Details
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Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues
S8.1 StatIAl
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On August:19,1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire
and Vermont that lef t four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a
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confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities.- Law enforcement
authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence in
New Hampshire. Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to
three nuclear power plants, specialinspections wero initiated at each of the plants
- to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorization (AA) programs in
order to determine if they met tho regulatory requirements and the licensee's
physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have -
been identified during the AA process that should have precluded the individual
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being granted unescorted access.
The individual had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 and
1995 and to Pilgrim in 1997 basad on completion of all componer,ts of the access
authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to Indian
Point (IP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilgrim and an update
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of his activities for the approximate 2 month period between the time he left Pilgrim
and began work at IP 3, as provided for in the AA requirements. The NRC
inspection included a review of the AA programs at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and
IP 3.i
S8.2 Access Authorization Proaram and Procedures
a.
Insoection Scone
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's security plans and access authorization
procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's access authorization
program,
b.
Observations and Findingg
The review of the licensee's security plan (the Plan) and AA preedures disclosed
that the Plan and procedures, as written and implemented, satisfied the
requirements el 10 CFR 73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for
Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66,_" Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants." Interviews with
personnel disclosed they were knowledgeable of the AA requirements contained in
the regulations, the Plan and the AA procedures.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors' review disclosed that the licensee's AA program, as implemented,
met all regulatory rec,uirements.
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S8.3 Backaround Investiaation (BI) Elements
a.
Insoection Scope
The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determine the
adequac of the program in determining the true identity of the individual and to
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develop liformation concerning employment history, educational history, credit
historv, criminal history and character and reputation of the individual prior to
granting unescorted access,
b.
Observation and Findjngi
The inspectors reviewed the results of the individual's background investigation (BI)
and determined that the scope and depth of the BI met the licensee's program
commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments
on which to base a determination for access authorization. In accordance with
10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating critninal history checks on
individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all
information received from the U.S. Attorney Gc.1eral. One licensee (Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the
criminal history check twice (once in 1992 and once in 1995), in both cases, prior
arrests were identified. The inspectors determinod that the information had been
properly evaluated and adjudicated prior to granting unescorted access, in addition,
Bostor? Edison submitted fingerprint cards to initiate the criminal history check in
December 1996. The information received back from the criminal history check
indicated no prior arrest data. The NRC is pursuing this issue with the FBI to
determine why the prior arrest data was not identified during the 1996 criminal
history check,
c.
Conclusion
Although the 1996 criminal history check did not identify any prior arrests, the
inspectors concluded that there were no deficiencies in the processes used by either
licensee to ir.itiate the enminal history checks.
S8.4 Psycholoaical Evgluations
a.
IDsoection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's psychological testing program procedures to
insure they met applicable requirements.
b.
Observations. Findinas and Conclusions
The licensee contracted with licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the
psychological testing program and to perform the requisite evaluations. After the
psychological tests were administered, the answer sheets were forwarded to the
psychologist for evaluation, and if the need for a clinical interview was indicated,
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the psychologist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial
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to the licensee. The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 1996.
The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinicalinterview and the psychologist
conducting the interview recommended, after conducting the interview, that site
access be granted.
The inspectors determined that the licensees' psychological evaluation program was
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t,eing implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.
S8.5 Behavior Observation Prooram-(DOP)
a.
Insocction Scong
The inspectors reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and
lesbon plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the
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licensees' programs.
b.
Observations and Findinog
Yhe programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in common with, the
licensees' Fitness for Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson
plant indicated that they met all regulatory requirements. Interviews with several of
the individuals' pu;t supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program
requiiements e they demonstreted an awareness and sensitivity to detect and
report adve;
r 'innges in behavior,
c.
Conclu_sino
The inspectors concluded that the BOP was being effectively implemented.
S8.0 Tomoorarv Access Authorization
a.
ininggtion Scone
The inspectors reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope
investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted
access authorization, as permitted by the rule.
b.
Observations Findinos and Conclusions
The records of the abbreviated scope investigations were determined to contain
adequate information (character and reputation frorn a developed reference, past
year's employment history, and a credit check) on which to base temporary access
authorization. The inspectors noted that, in these records of abbreviated scope
investination, there was no data which necessitated rescission of access
auth5tation following receipt of the full S year investigation.
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S8.7 Audha
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Innosction Scone
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The inspectors reviewed the most recent audits of the contractors used by each
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licensee to conduct Bl.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors' review disclosed that the audits were comprehensive in scope and
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' depth. The audit findings were administrative in nature and no programmatic
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deficiencies were identified.
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S8.8 Search Eaulomant
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inanection Scone
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The inspectors reviewed the licensees' procedures for testing personnel and
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package search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment and
observed licensee testing of the search equipment to assess its effectiveness.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
Test procedures were adequate to properly evaluate the search equipment
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performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not
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experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment
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determined that it was operable,
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c.
Conclusign
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The inspectors determined that the personnel and pacl: age search equipment was
being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan
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requirements and was capable of performing its' intended functions.
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Ealt interview _
An exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that -
time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary
findings were presented. The licansees acknowledged the preliminary inspection
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED
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Licenses
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J. Neal, Protection Services Department Manager
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N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations Manager
E. Neary, Security Operations Supervisor
W. Riggs, Nuclear Services Group Manager
T. Campbsll, Security Services Supervisor
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R. Wheat, Project Manager, Protection Technology
N. Medcalf, Administrator, Protection Technology
C. Stanley, Security Specialist, Protection Technology
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All of the above licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting conducted by
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telephone on September 3,1997. The inspectors also Interviewed other licensee and
contractor personnel,
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