IR 05000293/1986033
| ML20215N474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1986 |
| From: | Conklin C, Lazarus W, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215N473 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-86-33, NUDOCS 8611060049 | |
| Download: ML20215N474 (7) | |
Text
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-293/86-33 Docket No. 50-293 L1 cense No.
DPR-35 Licensee: Boston Edison M/C Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name: Pilgrim Generating Station Inspection At: Plymouth and Braintree, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: Septe'mber 30 to October 3,1986 Inspectors: I
/OM 9/F4
,_
,
W.~ T as, eam 14ader, 'EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS
/ d(te
~
/tfZ1 b6
/ /
cvW C.
in, GP Specialist, EP8J, EP&RPB, date Approved by:,
.
Aerw
/v
+
Pf.-
W. M azar @ Chief, Emergency date Preparedness Section, EP&RPB, DRSS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 30 to October 3, 1986 (Report No. 50-293/86-33).
Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection to followup on licensee action regarding findings identified during previous emergency preparedness inspections and exercises.
Results: No violations were identified.
During this inspection eleven open items were closed.
Five open items remain, including one opened during this inspection which will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
gehtotB88 BIh8)h G
l
-
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. Quinn, Compliance Engineer
- C. Fuller, Assistant Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- R. Silva, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator T. Tracy, Nuclear Engineering Group Leader V. Zukauskas, Senior Nuclear Engineer L. Dooley, Technical Training Supervisor
- A. Pedersen, Station Manager
- L. Oxsen, Vice President Nuclear Operations
- K. Roberts, Director Outage Management
- K. Ward, Systems Analysis Engineer
- Indicates those present at the exit interview 2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) (84-05-16) (Deviation):
Describe or reference by procedure a.
the program for exposure control during emergencies The inspector reviewed procedure 5.7.2.16, Re-Entry, Revision 4, dated February 20, 1986. The Re-entry procedure establishes emer-gency radiation exposure guidelines and requires that the Emergency Director determine whether re-entry should be performed (based upon a comparison of benefits to be gained versus potential radiation exposure). Approval of re-entry is formally documented, and all re-entry team personnel are logged in and out of the TSC/OSC complex.
Training on the use of this procedure for all Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel assigned to the OSC has been completed.
In addition, a re-entry drill was held on March 23, 1986 to demon-strate the use of the re-entry procedure. This drill was observed by the' Region I inspectors who determined that the re-entry procedure and'its use were acceptable.
Based upon the above review this item is closed.
.
b.
(0 pen) (84-35-01) Deviation): Use of EOF is inefficient in fulfill-ing its function. Space limitations, unsatisfactory habitability conditions, noise, location of state and NRC areas, crowding, etc.,
should be eliminated.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans for, and toured the new near-site EOF, which is located approximately 3.5 miles from the Pilgrim station on the grounds near the Plymouth County Correctional Facility. The EOF was constructed to provide shielding and filtered ventilation to meet the habitability requirements necessary for a facility within the 10 mile EPZ.
The ceiling and walls are solid poured concrete, of 8 to 10 inches thick without voids, and the (..
.
...
.
-
...
_.
.
.
ventilation system is designed to provide a slight positive pressure within the EOF when operated under accident conditions. A pressure test was conducted on October 15, 1986. As a result of the test, work is in progress to repair all identified air leaks. A retest of the ventilation system is scheduled in the near future.
c.
(Closed) (84-35-05) (Deviation):
Internal organization of the E0F is not conducive for optimum information flow.
The new EOF is large enough to support the EOF function without crowd-
~
ing or undue interference among EOF functional groups.
Communica-tions capability is installed and operational between the Control Room, TSC/OSC and the Recovery Center.
Backup communication links are also available. At the present time the alternate E0F (AEOF) is located in Bridgewater, Massachusetts, but plans are to move this facility to the Braintree, Massachusetts Corporate Office Building sometime in the future. This item will also be observed during the next emergency preparedness exercise.
Based upon the above review this item is closed.
-
d.
(Closed) (84-41-01) Unresolved):
Revise the EAL on hurricane wind-speed to indicate any hurricane force peak winds.
The following documents were reviewed:
PNPP procedures 5.7.1.1.,
Emergency Categories and Associated Emergency Action Levels; PNPS FSAR section 12.2; and the Saffir/Simpson Scale for hurricanes.
The Unusual Event EAL for hurricane has been revised to reflect the National Weather Service definition for hurricanes. All PNPS struc-tures are designed to withstand tornado force winds of 300 MPH. The maximum predicted hurricane for this locality is a Category 3 (sus-tained wind speeds of 111-130 MPH) with peak force winds (gusts) of less than 180 MPH. Any potential hurricane peak wind force would fall significantly below the design criteria for the PNPS structures.
Based upon the above review this item is closed.
e.
(Closed) (84-41-03) (IFI): Provide more comprehensive initial dose calculation and assessment training.
The inspectors reviewed the instructional module and the lesson plan for the enhanced dose assessment training that has been instituted, and determined that the scope and depth of the training are adequate.
The inspectors also verified that SR0's and STA's (who perform initial dose assessment calculations) have received the training.
During a subsequent routine EP inspection, walk-through examinations will be performed to determine competence in performance of initial dose assessment calculations.
s
%___
.._ -. -.. -.
'
'
'
'
^
,
.
.
.
Based upon the above review this item is closed, f.
(Closed) (84-41-08) (IFI):
Implement a tracking system for general and specialized EP training to provide continuous assurance that personnel are trained.
The following documents were reviewed: PNPS Emergency Plan, Section N.8; Matrix of required training versus emergency organization assignments, dated September 25, 1986; and the PNPS Training Manual.
The inspector was able to ascertain the status of emergency personnel required training by use of the matrix. The matrix includes post-tion, personnel, required training programs and date of completion.
Based upon the above review this item is closed.
g.
(Closed) (84-41-11) (Unresolved):
Determine locations for stockpiling Emergency Preparedness information brochures.
The inspectors reviewed Emergency Preparedness Group Work Instruction-1.0, Dissemination of Emergency Information to the Public, dated July 29, 1986. The purpose of this work instruction is to ensure that the annual requirement to disseminate emergency information to the public is met.
The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator is re-sponsible for having reviews / revisions performed and mailings /distri-butions made in accordance with NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1.
'
Section 6.0, Procedure, contains procedures to review the previous year's brochure or information packet, placards or postings pre-viously affixed and distribution of informational brochures.
Section 7.0, Exhibits, contains a listing of informational brochure
.
locations, including the number of copies for each location, a sample letter to brochure locations, a listing of informational placard locations and a sample placard.
Based upon the above review this item is closed.
h.
(Closed) (85-19-01) (IFI):
Improve program for evaluation / control of re-entry team rad exposure.
Refer to the review of 84-05-16.
i.
(Closed) (85-19-02) (Unresolved):
Develop plans / procedures for
relocation to alternate EOF.
The inspectors reviewed procedure 5.7.2.28, Relocation to Alternate EOF, Revision 1.
This procedure adequately describes this function.
Based upon the above review this item is closed.
_
-,
-
.
_
_ - _ _
- _.
-
. _ -
.
.
J.
(0 pen) (85-19-04) (IFI):
Improve communications between control room, TSC and EOF.
-
l The inspectors verified that adequate communications equipment is installed and operational, and links all emergency response facili-ties.
This item will remain open pending demonstration of the use of this equipment during the next emergency preparedness exercise.
k.
(Closed) (85-19-05) (IFI):
Emergency Director did not provide guidance to TSC.
The responsibilities of the Emergency Director have been changed.
In addition, a new position, Emergency Coordinator, has been created.
These changes will allow the respective managers, Emergency Director
~
,
I in the TSC and Emergency Coordinator in the EOF, to concentrate on their duties and responsibilities. All required training has been
performed, or is current with retraining scheduled. This item will
~
also be observed during the next emergency preparedness exercise.
Based upon the above review this item is closed.
}
1.
(Closed) (85-19-06) (IFI): Screen data passed to state-too j
technical / unrefined.
!
Much of the raw data concerning the accident situation was obtained from the EOF status boards by the state personnel located in the E0F.
To alleviate this problem, new status boards have been installed in
,
the EOF, which are clearer, more concise and easier to interpret.
In addition, a new emergency organization assignment has been added, a Communications Liaison, who will report to the principal off-site
-
Governmental Emergency Center, normally MCDA Headquarters in I
Framingham, Massachusetts. The communications Liaison will be avail-able to clarify any technical information communicated between Pilgrim Station, the EOF and MCDA. This item will also be observed during the next emergency preparedness exercise.
Based upon the above review this item is closed.
m.
(0 pen) (85-19-07) (IFI):
Essential information not displayed or trended in EOF.
New status boards have been acquired and are in place. These boards adequately address the necessary data to be disp.yed/ trended. This item will remain open pending further evaluation during the emergency preparedness exercise.
!
.
.
_ _ _.
, _ _.. _ _
_.
. _ _ _ _. _ _
.
--s
.
.
n.
(Closed) (85-19-08) (IFI): Establish access controls for EOF to limit those necessary.
The E0F is a secured facility. A representative of the PNPS Security Force is assigned to man the security office in the EOF and control access.
In addition, security is provided by the Plymouth County Sheriff's'
department located on the first floor.
Based upon the above review this item is closed, o.
(0 pen) (86-13-01) (IFI):
Improve accountability controls for OSC.
The OSC/TSC had been rearranged and administrative steps have been taken to ensure personnel accountability. Additional security guards are also assigned to the OSC/TSC.
This item will remain open pending further evaluation during the emergency preparedness exercise.
3.0 Inspection Findings Open Items The inspector identified the following new areas which need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action:
a.
(Open) 86-33-01) (IFI): A review of the PNPS Emergency Cate-gories and Associated Action Levels revealed several instances where the initiating conditions did not conform with the guid-ance contained in Appendix 1 of NUREG 0654. This included initiating conditions that are less conservative and a lack of certain initiating conditions. Specific examples by event classification include:
Unusual Event no reference to loss of offsite power, a less conservative fire initiating condition, and an earthquake initiating condition inconsistent with Appendix 1; Alert
- no reference to fuel damage accident, a less conservative fire initiating condition, an earthquake initiating condition inconsistent with Appendix 1, and several omissions of initiating conditions from natural phenomena or other hazard; f
m
-
7
.
Site Area Emergency - incorrect initiating conditions'for failure of the reactor to shutdown, no reference to damage of spent fuel in containment, and complete omission of initiating conditions;for natural phenomena or other hazards; and General Emergency - incorrect initiating conditions for failure of the reactor to shutdown.
The licensee has committed to review and evaluate the emergency action
'
, level initialing conditions and initiate corrective action based.upon this review. This review is expected to be complete by December 15, 1986 with appropriate corrective actions complete by January 15, 1987.
4.0 Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspectors met with the repre-sentatives of the licensee listed in Detail 1 to discuss the findings of this inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and indicated
-
that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified open items
- following receipt of this report. At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
-'
-
- ~
-
_
_
.
.
s