ML20149K043
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| ML20149K043 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149K038 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-97-03, 50-293-97-3, NUDOCS 9707290216 | |
| Download: ML20149K043 (74) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1997003
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ENCLOSURE 2
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. REGION I ,
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Docket No. 50-293 j
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Licensee No. DPR-35 l
' Report No.. 97-03
Licensee: Boston Edison Company
800 Boylston Street ;
Boston, Massachusetts 02199 ,
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Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station i
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Location: Plymouth, Massachusetts
- Dates: 4/29 - 6/24/97
inspectors: Richard A. Laura, Senior Resident inspector
Beth E. Korona, Resident inspector
John H. Lusher, DRS EP Specialist
James D. Noggle, DRS Senior Radiation Specialist
Approved by: Richard Conte, Reactor Projects Branch 8
Division of Reactor Projects I
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9707290216 970722 5~' l
' POR ADOCK 05000293 )
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-293/97-03
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering,- ,
maintenance, and plant support. The report covers resident inspection for the period'of
April 29 through June 24,1997; in addition, this report includes the results of announced ,
. inspections by regional emergency preparedness and radiation specialist inspectors.
Operations:
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' A thorough pre-evolutionary briefing was held ' prior to the start of dredging of the intake
I canal with emphasis placed on mitigating potential plant impact by establishing a dedicated
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watch in the intake structure and by continuously operating the travelling screens. Also,
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operators closely monitored the ultimate heat sink temperature and promptly followed the
containment cooling technical specification requirements when inlet water temperatures '
reached 64.1 demees Fahrenheit. (Section 01.1)
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Three deficiencies were identified tours of plant areas, including the control room, such as
an out-of-calibration standby gas treatment system flow indicator (i.e., F1-8127) located on
control room panel C-7, a high pressure coolant injection system snubber which
inadvertently had a nonconformance report tag hanging, and a small void existed in a fire -
seallocated in the recirculation pump motor-generator set room. (Section 01.1)
A potential weakness (IFl 97-03-01) was identified in the criteria used to develop the
locked valve list contained in procedure 8.C.13 involving the SSW system header pressure ,
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switch root and isolation valves. (Section O3.1) I
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An alert reactor' building tour' operator identified the isolation of the "A" loop of the ECCS
reference leg backfill system. Operators responded to this discovery appropriately by
entering the applicable tracking LCO, returning the system to operation, and revising the
procedure. (Section O3.2) ;
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M.aintenance:
Knowledgeable operators and instrumentation and control technicians performed
surveillance and maintenance activities in a controlled and professional manner, utilizing
approved procedures and work packages. Personnel appropriately stopped a HPCl
. -instrument functional test when the instrument did not reset per the procedure. The-
' subsequent actions to write an MR to adjust any packing leaks and to perform a calibration
of the affected switches was' conservative and served to thoroughly verify operability.
(Section M1.1)
Positive progress'was made in the overall reduction of longstanding scaffold structures
erected near safety related equipment in plant areas following the completion of RFO11.
~ Longer term decontamination and preservation efforts were planned in 1998 for the two
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RHR quadrant rooms. (Section M2.1)
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Electricians competently replaced SRM/lRM drive control relay coils and interfaced
effectively with the supervisor who remained at the work site. The awareness of vendor
related relay information by the electrician was considered a positive attribute. (Section
M4.1)
Based on a selected review of problem reports of issues relating to receipt and inspection
activities, no past programmatic breakdown of receipt and inspection activities was
evident. Performance issues similar to those in other plant departments were generally self
identified with the initiation of problem reports. A tho,'ough BECo review was performed of
an individual QC inspector who was directly involved with the improper acceptance of
cracked safety related batteries and improper performance of inspection attributes of two
swagelock fittings. No evidence existed that improper parts were installed in safety related
applications that would result in inoperabilities.
(Section M7.1) 1
Enaineerina:
Operations, engineering, and maintenance personnel interfaced well to restore the "A" l
reactor protection system bus and troubleshoot the motor-generator set following an RPS l
trip and half scram. The system engineer was knowledgeable of industry problems in this
area and provided valuable direction during the troubleshooting activity which discovered a
miswired component provided by the vendor. Appropriate corrective actions were planned
including a root cause analysis for the MG set breaker trip, a temporary procedure to
gather additional data should another trip occur, and a Part 21 determination and ;
discussion with the vendor. (Section E4.1)
Plant Supoort:
BECo continues to maintain a good emergency preparedness program. The emergency
response plan and implementing procedures were current and effectively implemented.
The emergency facilities, equipment, instruments and supplies were found to be '
maintained in a state of readiness. All required inventories were completed. A sampling of
emergency response organization personnel training records indicated that training and
qualifications were current. Reports indicated that quality assurance audits were thorough
and that they satisfied NRC requirements. The licensee is effectively utilizing the CEPG
and continuing to meet its offsite emergency preparedness commitments. (Sections P2 -
P8)
Good trending of plant system leakage and making improvements in the reduction of solid
radwaste output from the plant were evident. Radwaste transportation procedures were
adequate; there was frequent reference to regulations in lieu of detailed instruction. In
addition, some of these references were incorrect. Oversight of the
radwaste/ transportation program was not very effective. Audit coverage for both onsite
and offsite radwaste processing and shipping activities was very weak. Self-checking of
shipments was not formalized and lacked independence of review. Long-term lay up of the
waste feed tank and floc recycle tank as abandoned equipment remained to be
accomplished. (Sections R1 - R8)
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A violation (97-03-02) was identified when a station services worker tied a radiologically
. controlled area (RCA) door open without informing radiation protection personnel or
- stationing a barricade to prevent inadvertent personnel ingress or egress. This problem in
combination with a few previous ones which directly impacted plant equipment indicated a
programmatic weakness in the waste control technician training program. (Section R1.2)
Chemistry tech'nicians drew a gaseous ' sample demonstrating the reliability of the PASS
system equipment. Very good procedural adherence was evident and one minor equipment
work around condition was identified involving the gas vial holder. (Section R4.3)
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. TABLE OF CONTENTS
EX EC UTIVE S U M M A RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Summ ary of Pla nt Statu s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. OPERATIONS .................................................. 1
01 Conduct of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
01.1 General Comments ................................. 1
03 Operations Procedures and Documentation ..................... 2
03.1 Locked Valve List .................................. 2
03.2 Isolation of Reactor Vessel Level instrumentation Reference
Leg Backfill System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
211. MAINTENANCE ................................................ 4
M1 Conduct of Maintenance .................................. 4 I
M 1.1 General Comments ................................. 4
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment ...... 6
M2.1 (Closed) Inspector Follow ! tem (50-293/95-13-01): Plant
Housekeeping and Scaf folding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
M4.1 Electrical Maintenance Activities on CR120A Ir dustrial Control
Relays .......................................... 6
M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities .................... 7 ;
M7.1 Receipt and Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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ill . EN G I N E E RI N G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
E4.1 Half Scram Due to Tripped "A" RPS Motor-Generator Set . . . . . . 9
IV. PLA N T S U PPO R T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls . . . . . . . . . . . 11
R1.1 Liquid.To-Solid Radwaste Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
R1.2 (OPEN) Violation 97-03-02: Radiological Controlled Area
Boundary Door ................................... 12
R2 Status of RP&C facilities and Equipment ...................... 13
R2.1 Onsite Radwaste Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
R2.2 Laidup Radwaste Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
R3 RP&C Procedures and Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
R3.1 Radwaste/ Transportation Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 j
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
R4.1 Radwaste Sampling and Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
' R4.2 Radioactive Material Shipping Documentation Review . . . . . . . . 15
R4.3 Post Accident Sampling System Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1
R5 Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 I
R5,1 Radwaste Transportation Training for Shippers and RP
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Te c h nici a n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
R7 - Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities ........................ 16
R8 Miscellaneous RP&C issues ............................... 17
R8.1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
F2 , Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources ............... 18
P3 EP Procedures and Documentation .......................... 18
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
P5 - Staff Training and Qualification in EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
P6 EP Organization and Administration ......................... 21
P7-- Quality Assurance in EP Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
P8 Miscellaneous issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
P8.1 Yankee Atomic Central Emergency Preparedness Group (CEPG) . 22
P8.2 Braintree Reception Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
V. M A N A G E M E NT M EETI N G S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
X1 Exit Meeting Summ ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
X3 Management Meeting Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 6
X4 Review of UFS AR Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
INSPECTION PRO CEDURES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND UPDATED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ......................................... 27
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REPORT DETAILS
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Summarv of Plant Status
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I ' Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) began the period operating at approximately one *
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hundred percent rated core thermal power where it remained until May 24. Operators
[ reduced power to approximately 50 percent on the 24th to perform a scheduled backwash
; of the main. condenser. Operstors returned the unit to-100 percent power on May 25,
l following the backwash.
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Operators maintained the teactor at 100 percent power until 10:28 on June 11, when.a
generator core monitor trouble alarm actuated. Operators commenced a downpower by I
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reducing recirculation flow and took actions to verify the alarm per the alarm response
procedure and procedure 2.4.158, Core Monitor Trouble. At approximately 75 percent
[ power, operators determined the signal was invalid. Operators then verified acceptable-
stator bar temperatures and,'at 12:20 that day, restored the reactor to approximately 100
percent power, where it remained though the rest of the period, a
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l. OPERATIONS
01- Conduct of Operations' ;
.01.1 General Comments (71707)
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Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspector conducted frequent reviews of ongoing
{ plant operations. 'in general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety
conscious. During tours of the control room, the inspectors discussed any observed
' alarms with the operators and verified that they were aware of any lit alarms and the
reasons for them. . Any anomalies noted during tours were discussed with the nuclear
[ watch engineer (NWE).
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For example, the inspector identified that standby gas treatment (SBGT) system common
flow instrument F1-8127 indicated 1150 scfm in lieu of 0 when SBGT was not running and
the dampers were closed. F18127 is located on control room back panel C7. The nuclear
watch engineer (NWE) initiated problem report no. 97.9335 to evaluate the condition and
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identify corrective actions, as needed. A subsequent l&C calibration determined that the
flow transmitter and indicator were both out of calibration. The inspector concluded that
operators missed the identification of this SBGT system indication anomaly during routine I
panel walkdowns.
' Also, when touring the recirculation pump motor-generator (MG) set room located on the
51 foot elevation in the reactor building, the inspector questioned the operability of fire -
penetration seal 65.21.02 due to a small void in the top of the seal. After determining the
- seal was degraded but operable, the fire protection engineer initiated work request tag l
: (WRT) 047714 to seal the void with adhesive caulk. The inspector' reviewed the
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' Topical headings such as 01, M8, etc., are used in accordance with the NRC standardized
reactor inspection report outline.- Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topics.
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inspection criteria contained in Appendix A-7 of fire seal specification M-750 and
independently confirmed the adequacy of the fire protection engineers operability decision.
Lastly, during an inspection of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system components,
the inspector observed an Nonconformance Report (NCR) tag hanging on a new safety
related snubber installed during RFO11. As a result, quality assurance personnel initiated
PR 97.1896 which preliminarily determined that the snubber was operable but the NCR tag
had not been removed due to a personnel error. Other specific events and noteworthy l
observations are detailed in the following sections.
The inspector attended the pre-evolutionary briefing (PEB) held for dredging of the intake
canal to the intake structure. The removal of approximately 30,000 cubic yards of sand
was planned. Precautionary measures were discussed and implemented after the PEB such
as stationing a designated intake structure watch and continuously operating all travelling
screens. Operators were aware of the status of dredging operations and no problems were
observed by the inspector. Also, operators closely monitored the salt service water (SSW) ;
inlet temperatures which approached and on a few occasions exceeded an instantaneous
reading of 65 degrees Fahrenheit during this inspection period. As previously committed to
the NRC, BECo appropriately declared containment cooling systems inoperable and
followed the technical specifications. BECo previously submitted a license amendment
submittal to increase the SSW temperature limit to 75 degrees Fahrenheit.
03 Operations Procedures and Documentation
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03.1 Locked Valve List
a. Inspection Scone
A general inspection of the intake structure was performed with special emphasis on the
configuration of safety related equipment. Valves designated to be locked per procedure
8.C.13, Locked Component Lineup Surveillance, were verified.
b. Observations and Findinas
Valves required to be locked per 8.C.13 in the intake structure were verified to be correctly
positioned and locked. Aware of a past service water operational performance inspection
(SWSOPI) observation that the safety significance of the salt service water (SSW) header
pressure switches was not always fully recognized, the inspector verified that each root
and isolation valve for the four SSW header pressure switch were open. Each cf the two l
SSW headers has two redundant pressure switches (i.e., PS-3828A&B and 3829A&B) l
which sense a low header pressure and provides an input to start a SSW pump when l
recovering from a loss of AC electrical power condition. The inspector noted that the l
pressure switch root and isolation valves were not locked.
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Procedure 8.C.13 did not require the aforementioned valves to be locked, but the inspector I
noted that criteria "A" for requiring a valve to be locked specified that manual valves
which, if out of position, could defeat safety related function, should be locked. Four
examples were listed under criteria "A" in procedure 8.C.13 referenced process fluid valves
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(e.g. suction, discharge and drain valves) as opposed to instrument and pressure switches.
The inspector also obtained copies and reviewed BECo engineering response
memorandums 90-468 and 90-729 which provided guidance in the development of the
locked valve list in procedure 8 C.13. The inspector expressed concern to the operations l
department manager that although the examples of criteria "A" in 8.C.13 deal with process I
valves, a literalinterpretation could encompass the SSW pressure switches root and
isolation valves. Aside from the locked valve criteria contained in 6.C.13, the inspector
notes the important design function of the SSW pressure switches. The operations and
engineering department managers initiated a review of the criteria contained in 8 C.13. ,
The criteria "A" in 8.C.13 was sparse and open to interpretation, the planned review was !
intended to provide clearer guidance and to determine the need to lock the SSW system
root and isolation valves. This issue will remain as an inspector follow item (IFl 97-03-01)
pending further NRC and BECo review.
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c. Conclusions
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A potential weakness was identified in the criteria used to develop the locked valve list I
contained in procedure 8.C.13 involving the SSW system header pressure switch root and )
isolation valves. (IFl 97-03-01) !
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03.2 Isolation of Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Reference Lea Backfill System i
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a. Inspection Scope (71707) i
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On May 5,1997, a reactor building tour operator identified the isolation of the "A"
reference leg backfill system for the safety-related reactor vessel level instrumentation.
The inspector reviewed the conditions surrounding this event and the discussed the
completed problem report and corrective actions with operations management.
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b. Observations and Findinas l
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Following the discovery of the isolated reference leg backfill system, PR 97.9323 was I
initiated and operators appropriately entered a tracking limiting condition for operation
(LCO) in accordance with procedure 1.3.34, Conduct of Operation. The reference leg
backfill system is not covered in the plant technical specifications, however this procedure
addresses this system and requires a traking LCO be entered. At the end of fourteen
days, procedure 1.3.34 requires entry into an active LCO to ensure certain actions are l
taken to highlight the issue to operators. l
Through discussion with the operations manager, the inspector learned that operators
determined that the system had been out of service beginning on April 30, when the i
system was taken out of service to troubleshoot flow blockage indications. Operators
removed the system from service per procedure 2.2.80; Reactor Vessel Level,
Temperature, and Internal Prersure instrumentation; Section 7.2, Securing the ECCS ,
Reference Leg Backfill System. Tnis section directed personnel to close HO-C2205A-1, the I
inlet block valve to the reactor water level backfill supply to C2205. The system was
isolated because the cause of the blockage was not known at the time. On a subsequent l
shift, plant personnel determined a filter changeout was required. This filter change was
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performed per Section 7.3, Changeout of Reactor Water Level Reference Leg Backfill Filter
Elements,.of procedure 2.2.80,
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' Operators appropriately backdated the tracking LCO to the date of the filter changeout and
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restored the system to service in a timely manner, within the 14 day LCO time. The valve
"was opened and both trains of the backfill system were walked down to verify proper
alignment.
j After review of the associated documents and discussion with operations management, the
- inspector verified that the apparent cause of the backfill system isolation was an
incomplete procedure. Section 7.3 of 2.2.80 did not direct personnel to open HO-
C2206A-1 to restore the system to operation after the filter changeout. This valve was
closed per Section 7.2 when the system was isolated. Altnough filter changeouts have
been performed in the past per this procedure, typically only Section 7.3 is performed.
This section does not direct the clocure of the subject valve, therefore system restoration
.is complete.
The inspector ver~fied that appropriate corrective acticn was taken to prevent recurrence.
- Procedure 2.2.80, Section 7.3 was immediately changed to include a step to open/ verify l
- . open this valve, as well as the sister valve on the other train of the backfill system. This' l
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licensee identified and corrected procedure inadequacy is a non-cited violation in l
accordance with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
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c. Conclusi20.1
An alert reactor building tour operator identified the isolation of the "A" loop of the ECCS
. reference leg backfill system. Operators responded to this discovery appropriately by
entering the applicable tracking LCO, returning the system to operation, and revising the
procedure.
i ll. MAINTENANCE l M1 Conduct of Maintenance 9 l M1.1 General Comments
a. insoection Scoce (61726. 62707)
Using inspection procedures 61726 and 62707, the inspector observed portions of
- - selected maintenance and surveillance activities to verify proper calibration of test
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Instrumentation, use of approved procedures, performance of the work by qualified
personnel,-conformance to limiting conditions for operation, and correct system restoration
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following maintenance and/or testing. The following activities were observed:
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e 8.9.16.1 Manually Start and Load Blackout Diesel Via the Shutdown
Transformer
e - 8.M.2-2.5.1 HPCI Steam Line High Flow Isolation
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b. Observations and Findinos
Operators started and loaded the station blackout (SBO) dieselin accordance with
procedure 8.9.16.1. The inspector discussed various portions of the procedure with the
operators and found theni to be knowledgeable of the procedure and operation of the SBO
diesel. For instance, when a local SBO diesel trip alarm was received during the course of
the surveillance, operators expected the alarm and were knowledgeable of its cause. The
inspector noted the Work-It-Now (WIN) team leader inspecting various locations on the
diesel for leaks to verify that recent repairs were satisfactory. This showed attitude of
ownership of the part of maintenance for the work they do. The inspector noted two -
equipment deficiencies while at the SBO diesel, a minor oil leak on the oil supply line and a
missing screw on a side access cover to conduit into the generator terminal box. The
inspector discussed these items with the reactor operator who subsequently wrote work
requests for the deficiencies. Operators took required readings and completed the
surveillance in a professional manner.
While l&C technicians w'ere performing Attachment 2 of 8.M.2-2.5.1, the HPCI steam line
high flow instrumentation functional test, the first of two differential pressure indicating
switches failed to reset after satisfactorily bringing in the expected elarm. The inspectors
observed operations, engineering, and l&C actions following this failure and noted good
communication and sound decision making. The surveillance was stopped and a
maintenance request (MR) 19701738 was written to adjust packing leaks suspected on the
instrument lines, specifically the bypass valve on the 3 way manifold for the instrument.
In addition a re-brief of the surveillance was conducted to review expected alarms,
communications protocol, and procedure progression. In order to verify that the problem I
was not calibration of the instrument, l&C performed at applicable portions of Attachment
2 to the procedure which provides directions for a calibration test as well as a functional
test. The inspector observed l&C technicians perform the calibration test in the cable
spreading room and "B" quadrant in accordance with the approved procedure and MR.
The procedure verified the calibration of both switches and discovered that the 3 way
valve needed to be replaced. However, since I&C technicians returned the valve to its
closed position following the calibration, the instrument was declared operable and the .l'
LCO, entered to perform the original functional test, was appropriately exited following the
satisfactory completion of the test.
c. Conclusions
Knowledgeable operators and instrumentation-and-control technicians performed
surveillance and maintenance activities in a controlled and professional manner, utilizing
approved procedures and work packages. Personnel appropriately stopped a HPCI ;
instrument functional test when the instrument did not reset per the procedure. The
subsequent actions to write an MR to adjust any packing leaks and to perform a calibration
of the affected switches was conservative and served to thoroughly verify operability.
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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M 2.1 (Closed 1]nsoector Follow item (50-293/95-13-01): Plant Housekeepina and
Scaffoldina,
a. Insoection Scoce (62707)
Two large and longstanding scaffolds were left erected near safety related equipment
located in the "A" RHR quadrant room and the 51 foot elevation of the reactor building.
Additionally, a g;.nerally slow clean-up of plant areas occurred following refueling outage
(RFO) no.10 in thb summer of 1995. A review of these two issues was performed to
determine the proper resolution.
b. Observations and Findinas
During routine tours of plant areas following the completion of RFO11 in April 1997, the
inspector observed that the two aforementioned scaffolds were disassembled and
removed. The removal of the scaffolds eliminated any potential interaction between
nearby safety related equipment and the scaffold structure during a potential seismic
event. Also, significant progress was made cleaning plant areas following the completion ;
of RFO11 which was a noted improvement when compared to the cleanup efforts
following RFO10. As the last phase of the material plant condition upgrade process, BECo
planned to decontaminate and coat piping with preservation paint in the "A" and "B' RHR
quadrant rooms. This effort is intended to greatly reduce the radiation dose rates and
contamination levels to allow easier worker and management ingress and egress during
routine plent activities. The inspector determined that IFl 95-13-01 was closed.
c. Conclusions
Positive progress was made in the overall reduction of longstanding scaffold structures
erected near safety related equipment in plant areas following the completion of RFO11.
Longer term decontamination and preservatico efforts were planned in 1998 for the two
RHR quadrant rooms.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowled 9e and Performance
M4.1 Electrical Maintenance Activities on CR120A industrial Control Relavs
a. Insoection Scone (62707)
The inspector observed electricians replace several coils in CR 120 relays in applications
for SRM/lRM drive control relays. The relays provide control and indication of the drive
positions,
b. Observations and Findinas
At the work site located in the reactor building, the inspector observed effective
supervisory oversight of the work activities.- The work was performed using procedure
':
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7
-3.M.3-55, CR 120A Relay Maintenance, and maintenance request (MR) P9400734. The
work consisted of replacement of the coil assembly in the relay and installation of a new,
nonflammable contact arm retainer which was the subject of General Electric (GE) Service
Information Letter (SIL) 220. The inspector visually examined the relay contact faces
which appeared slightly degraded and questioned why the contact faces were not cleaned.
The electrician informed the inspector that the relay vendor instructions caution against ;
cleaning the relay contacts to minimize wearing of the silver coating on the contact faces.
-
The inspector obtained a copy of the vendor information (V-0383) which stated that filing
or dressing of the contacts only results in loss of silver and reduces normal contact life.
. The inspector had no further questions in this regard but considered the electricians
awareness of vendor related information as a positive attribute, i
When reviewing the vendor related instructions, the electrician informed the 6spector of a
potential problem involving the spacing between each relay in panel C2214. The ;
instructions specified that the relays should be mounted perpendicular to the panel with !
'
11/16 inch gap between each relay. Some of the relays installed in panel C2214 had no'
' space between each other. The inspector questioned the electrician and supervisor how :
.this potential conflict would be resolved. The electrical supervisor initiated problem report .j
(PR) 97.2121 for evaluation and corrective actions. Engineering personnel contacted GE to j
'
determined the reason for the specified 1/16 inch spacing. The basis for the gap was to.
allow for thermal expansion of the re!ay; however, the relays mounted in panel C2214
were mounted on a track that allows the relays to move laterally. An engineering :
evaluation was performed which determined the relays were operable. One PR action item
was initiated to change the vendor related information. The inrspector interviewed the
system engineer who indicated that the PR was still being evaluated for final corrective
actions.
C. Conclusions
Electricians competently replaced SRM/lRM drive control relay coils and interfaced
effectively with the supervisor who remained at the work site. The awareness of vendor
related relay information by the electrician was a positive attribete.
M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities
M7.1 Receiot and Inspection
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a. Insoection Scoce (62707.92903) .
1
As a follow up to the receipt and inspection issues documented in Section M7.1 of NRC !
Inspection Report No. 50-293/96-06, the inspector reviewed various other past receipt and ;
- inspection issues to identify any potential trends or weaknesses. The previous concern j
dealt with a calibration anomaly of the "B" scale of the Rockwell hardness tester and a l
violation was cited for BECo not taking adequate corrective actions in NRC Inspection
- Report 50-293/96-06.
4
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b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector reviewed the 'ollowing problem reports (PR) potentially related to receipt and
inspection. interviewed various quality assurance and maintenance personnel involved with
the issues and reviewed relevant procedures and documentation:
* PR97.0464, February 12,1997, Cracked bolts.
* PR96.9154, April 2,1996, Cracks found in replacement SRM/lRM selector
switches.
* PR96-219, June 19,1996, Fire door Jamb only had 3 holes vice 4 as
required
* PR96-0084, March 6,1996, Replacement Door 162 had hinges in incorrect l
location
* PR96-007, January 5,1996, Dragon valves inspection question
* PR95-0493, January 31,1995, inconsistent receipt and inspection
methodology ,
* PR95.0466, June 14,1997, incomplete inspection of Swagelock fittings ]
* PR94.9440, September 20,1994, Cracks in batteries not found during I
receipt and inspection )
* PR94-194, April 14,1994, EQ stab assembly purchase order questions i
l
Dased on the review, the inspector made several performance observations. First, two of
the more significant problems involved PHs 94.9440 and 95.0446 and in both cases the
same individual did not complete the required inspection activities. Specifically, PR94-
9440 documented an instance where sixty-three 125 vdc safety related batteries were
accepted through receipt and inspection by performing a sample inspection of 20 batteries.
Subsequently, after a system engineer identified cracking in the negative bus bar in one
battery, further inspection revealed that 31 of the total 63 batteries had internal bus bar
cracking. Additionally, the inspector also became aware that the QC inspector did not
complete the required sample inspection of 20 batteries and only inspected 1 battery. That
was evident because only 1 battery shipping box had been opened. The QC inspector
neither detected the internal battery bus bar cracking nor completed the required inspection
of 20 batteries. BECo initiated corrective actions including the development of a specific
battery receipt and inspection checklist. New batteries were procured before installation
into the plant. The most probable cause of the cracked bus bars was determined to be
physical shock during shipping from the vendor.
PR95.0466 documents an instance where the same QC inspector signed off that the
attributes fo.r visual and/or dimensional checks when the swagelock fittings remained
sealed in the suppliers sealed package. BEOo completed a thorough review in response to
PR 95-0466 to determine the problem scope in this crea of receipt and inspection and
implemented adequate corrective actions. The review of other BECo receipt inspector's
work and identified no similarly significant problems; however, some errors were made by
a contractor who no longer works at PNPS. The corrective actions in PR 95.0446 were
largely directed to determine the extent of the problem which turned out to be an individual
performance issue. BECo took disciplinary actions with the receipt inspector who was
involved with both the cracked batteries and the swagelock fittings. During the review,
various parts were placed in a hold status pending verification of proper receipt and
inspection.
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The inspector made other observations including the corrective actions taken to address j
the cracked SRM/lRM control switches discussed in PR 96.9154. BECo was unable to
determine at what point the switches became damaged. The inspector considered it
positive that electricians in the field identified the cracks and initiated a problem report. l
BECo initiated discussions with the switch vendor who later determined that the switch l
connecting screw was overtorqued probably causing the bakelite material to crack. BECo l
and the vendor were unable to determine at what point the switch became damaged since l
the switches passed BECo receipt and inspection. Although the cause was indeterminate 1
or unknown, the inspector identified that overall no lessons learned were developed from l
the most probable cause(s) and that the l&C and quality assurance department inputs to )
the PR resolution were defensive in nature. The problem assessment committee (PAC) did !
not specify any further actions which the inspector considered to be a weakness. One l
lesson learned was to brief I&C and electricians on the possible consequence of
overtorquing fasteners on electrical devices. The BECo QA assessment team leader
acknowledged the inspector's concern.
The other problem reports reviewed adequately evaluated and initiated corrective actions
as required. The inspector reviewed the BECo policy for on-the-job receipt inspector
training which has been in effect since at least 1989 and identified no significant problems. l
The inspector also reviewed quality assurance (QA) deficiency report (DR) 1955, dated l
March 25,1992, which related to a concern of a noncertified individual who performed a
receipt inspection on an SBM control switch as part of on-the-job training. The DR
response documented that no physical discrepancies were found with the aforementioned
SBM switch or a sample of other of his work. The inspector had no questions or concerns,
c. Conclusions
Based on a selected review of problem reports of issues relating to receipt and inspection
activities, no past programmatic breakdown of receipt and inspection activities was
evident. Performance issues similar to those in other plant departments were generally self
identified with the initiation of problem reports. A thorough BECo review was performed of
an individual OC inspector who was directly involved with the improper acceptance of
cracked safety related batteries and improper performance of inspection attributes of two
swagelock fittings. No evidence existed that improper parts were installed in safety related
applications that would result in inoperabilities.
Ill. ENGINEERING
E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance
E4.1 Half Geram Due to Tricoed "A" RPS Motor-Generator Set
a. Insocction Egooe (37551,62707)
On June 10, the "A" reactor protection system (RPS) motor-generator (MG) set tripped,
causing a half scram. No control rods were inserted as a result of the half scram, as the
other channel of RPS remained energized. The inspector reviewed the corrective
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maintenance performed and discussed these actions with e-lab technicians and the system l
engineer to determine the adequacy of BECo's response and engineering involvement in the ;
troubleshooting activity. j
1
b. Observations and Find:nas
,
The "A" and "B" trains of RPS are supplied by the "A" RPS MG set through electrical )
protection assemblies (EPAs) 1 and 2 and the "B" RPS MG set through EPAs 3 and 4, I
respectively. In addition, a third backup supply through EPAs 5 and 6 is available to power i
either RPS bus. The EPAs provide redundant, Class 1E overvoltage, undervoltage and ]
underfrequency protection. Following the half scram, operetors appropriately placed the i
"A" RPS bus on the backup supply and reset the half scram. )
l
The inspector discussed the maintenance request (MR) and work performed with one of l
the E-lab technicians and the system engineer and reviewed the completed MR 1970174e
and troubleshooting procedure. The technicians methodically performed the
troubleshooting activity in accordance with the approved procedure and MR. Initially the j
problem was thought to be an EPA card problem, as discussed in GE service information
letter (SIL) 496, Revision 1, Supplement 1, which addressed EPA logic card changes to
correct a condition on the undervoltage and underfrequency circuits. However, the initial
troubleshooting determined that the problem was related to an overvoltage condition.
I
As part of the troubleshooting activity, the E-lab technicians replaced both the spike- -
I
suppressor and voltage regulator for the "A" RPS MG set. After the new spike suppressor j
'
and voltage regulator were installed, the new voltage regulator was damaged when the
system was energized. The old voltage regulator was re-installed and the same problem
occurred. The tech..cians visually verified the connections on the old spike suppressor j
were the same as the new suppressor. Since only one spare voltage regulator was left in
the warehouse, the NWE directed that the system engineer be contacted to help determine
the cause of the problem. The system engineer responded to the site during the early
morning hours on a weekend to assist the troubleshooting activity. Per the engineer's
suggestion, the technicians performed a point-by-point verification of the new spike
suppressor and discovered that it was incorrectly designed. After the modified spike
suppressor and another new voltage regulator were installed, the MG set was restored
with no further problems.
The inspector questioned the reason for the original overvoltage condition since this
troubleshooting, although restoring the system to an operable condition, did not find a root i
'
cause. The system engineer acknowledged that the root cause was outstanding and
confirmed that one is planned. The root cause determination will require a physical
inspection of the old spike suppressor by either BECo or vendor personnel. In addition, the
inspector inquired as to the Part 21 aspects of the miswired spike suppressor. Again, the
system engineer was aware this aspect needed to be addressed and indicated that the
vendor would be contacted. In addition to planning a root cause on the spike suppressor,
the system engineer developed a temporary procedure to install instrumentation to monitor
voltage and frequency on the MG set output breaker which would provide this information
fotbwing a subsequent MG set isolation. This TP was in supervisory review at the
conclusion of the report period.
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c. Conclusions
Operations, engineering, and maintenance personnel interfaced well to restore the "A" )
reactor protection system bus and troubleshoot the motor-generator set following an RPS )
trip and half scram. The system engineer was knowledgeable of industry problems in this !
area and provided valuable direction during the troubleshooting activity which discovered a
miswired component provided by the vendor. Appropriate corrective actions were planned
including a root cause analysis for the MG set breaker trip, a temporary procedure to
gather additional data should another trip occur, and a Part 21 determination and
discussion with the vendor. I
IV. PLANT SUPPORT
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls l
R 1.1 Liouid-To-Solid Radwaste Processina
a. Insoection Scope (86750)
Through review of liquid radwaste processing documents, radwaste system walkdowns,
and interviews with licensee staff, the incpector reviewed Pilgrim Station liquid radwaste
processing and resulting solids generation with respect to requirements,
b. Observations and Findinas
The licensee monitors and trends liquid radwaste inleakage from the plant to help identify
leakage sources. Currently, approximately one-half of liquids collected are from the turbine
building equipment sump. Total radwaste inleakage averaged approximately 32 gallons per
minute, with approximately 17 million gallons of water processed per year. Solid radwaste
generated during 1996 was 3400 cubic feet, down from 5200 cubic feet in 1995.
During this inspection, the licensee was modifying a cubicle in the radwaste building to
install a Thermex ultra filtration unit designed to replace the radwaste diatomaceous earth
flat bed filter units. The Thermex system is targeted for startup in early July 1997. This
reverse osmosis system is expected to reduce the amount of solid radwaste from 1000
cubic feet of spent diatomaceous earth media to 200 cubic feet per year. UFSAR, process
control program, and operating procedure changes remain to be completed. Currently,
Pilgrim Station generates approximately 12-14 liners of solid radwaste per year. With the
new Thermex system in operation, the licensee projects generation of 6-8 liners of solid
radwaste per year.
c. Conclusionq
The licensee continues to provide good trending of plant leakage and making improvements
in the re. duction of solid radwaste from the plant.
W4wmdae-a-+a aiGA Je ashe-4.w-wmer- ai-n -: ,.--,. ----w--
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R1.2 ' (OPEN) Violation 97-03-02: Radioloaical Controlled Area Boundarv Door
a.- Insoection Scope (71750)
- During tours of plant areas inside of the radiological controlled area (RCA), the inspector
-verified proper radiological postings and boundaries.
b.- Observations and Findinas
On June 2,.1997, the inspector identified that the boiler room door, which forms part of ,
the RCA boundary,'was tied open with no barricade posted, warning sign or watch ;
stationed. The inspector notified the radiological protection (RP) technician stationed at the
'
redline area who was unaware of the door being tied open. The door wes immediately
untied and closed. Technical specification (TS) 6.11 specifies that radiation protection
procedures shall be adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure. ,
PNPS procedure no.1.3.114, Conduct of Radiological Operations, section 5.1, General -
Requirements, specifies not to move or remove any radiological postings or boundailes
unless directed by RP personnel to do so. The inspector determined that the action of -
. . tieing open the boiler room door without permission by RP personnel was a violation (50- ,
' 293/97-03-02) of section 5.1.1. of procedure 1.3.114.
'
The RP technician initiated PR 97.2021 to initiate a review and develop corrective actions
as needed. The RP technician determined that a waste control technician (WCT) in the
station services department had tied the door open to allow the floor to dry after cleaning.
The inspector expressed concern to the station services department manager that the WCT
training for activities with the potential to affect plant equipment or controls was weak.
During RF011 (April 1997) the inspector recalls that a salt service water pump became
i
inoperable when the electrical breaker was inadvertently bumped open during a cleaning-
activity. Additionally, a plant transient (i.e.,100 to 70% rapid downpower) occurred on
July 19,1995 when the lube oil sightglass on the "B" seawater pump motor became
inverted during a cleaning and painting activity. The oil drained from the sightglass which
wiped the motor bearing. Thece examples clearly demonstrate the potential for adverse
plant impact during routine and nonroutine station services activities. The station services
t department manager acknowledged the inspector's concern.
The inspector was informed later in this inspection period of the BECo intent to improve
.WCT training. Station services personnel interfaced with the training department personnel
to formalize a specific WCT training plan. Training improvements were divided into short,
l' - intermediate and long term initiatives. The training was intended to include " plant impact"
_
training to highlight the various ways that plant equipment could adversely be impacted
during station services activities thus causing a plant transient or scram. The inspector
'
noted that executive level BECo management involvement was necessary to ensure the
proper resources and oversight to provide more effective training in this area.
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c. Conclusions
A violation (97.-03-02) was identified when a station services worker tied a radiologically
controlled area (RCA) door open without informing radiation protection personnel or
stationing a barricade to prevent inadvertent personnel ingress or egrass. This problem and
a few previous ones, which directly impacted plant equipment, indicated weakness in the
waste control technician training program.
R2 Status of RP&C facilities and Equipment i
I
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R2.1 Onsite Radwaste Storaae
a. Inspection Scooe (86750)
The' inspector reviewed the condition and radwaste storage inventory of the trash l
compaction facility (TCF) and the low level radwaste storage facility (LLRWSF). i
'b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector noted an accumulation of outage material staged for survey located inside-
, the TCF as well as in'eight sea vans and six B 25 boxes located outside of the TCF.
The LLRWSF was observed to contain 31 on-site storage containers (OSSCs) containing
spent resin liners and filters. The inspector noted regular surveys outside the shielded
walls of the facility indicated less than 0.2 Mr/hr.
The inspector questioned the licensee about the significant amount of radioactive material i
and packaged radioactive waste stored in the TCP and LLRWSF. The licensee indicated
that there is currently a backlog in surveying radioactive material since the spring 1997
.efueling outage recently ended. The backlog of spent resin liners was a result of planning
~
!
to use an emerging volume reduction technology to process spent resins, j
c. Conclusions
The inspector noted that all of the sea vans and B-25 boxes were locked and controlled by
RP technicians and that the radiation levels associated with the LLRWSF were below
regulatory requirements.
R2.2 Laiduo Radwaste Eauioment
!
The inspector reviewed the status of formerly utilized radwaste processing equipment for
safe long-term lay up. The waste feed tank and the floc recycle tanks were previously
identified by the NRC as possibly containing waste material. During this inspection, the
inspector checked progress with dispositioning contents of these two tanks. A
maintenance request has scheduled opening and inspecting the waste feed tank on July 7,
1997. The floc recycle tank was still under engineering review. Licensee disposition of
the waste feed tank and floc recycle tank is an inspection followup item (50-293/97-03-
03).
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i- R3 RP&C Procedures and Documentation-
I
l R3.1 Radwuste/Transoortation Procedures
- ' "e. Inspection Scoce (Tl 2515/133) ;
~ '
Due to a major revision of Title 49 C#R 171-178 effective April 1,1996, a comprehensive
- procadure review was conducted at the Pilgrim nuclear power p' ant.
! 'The foliowing procedures were reviewed:
1 1.15.3,' Rev. 3, " Process Control Program"
1.16 4, Rev.1, " Radioactive Material Processing, Packaging, and Shipping Quality
Control Program"-
'
1.16.1, Rev. 3, " Spent Fuel Pool Inventory Control"
1.18.1, Dev. O, " Facilities Division Performance Assessment Program"
- 2.5.1.10,Mev. 6, " Transferring of Spent Bead Resin and Dewatering HlC Liners
LUsing Vectie (Pacific Nuclear) Dewatering Systems"
~
; 2.5.1.11, Rev. 3, " Transferring of Sludge and Dewatering HIC Liners Using Vectra l
(Pacific Nucleer) Dewatering Systems" l
4 2.5.1.14, Rev.1, Transferring and Dewatering Beadex Liners Using Vectra (Pacific l
'
Nuclear) Dewatecing System"
'
2.5.1.15, Rev. 2, " Filling, Dewatering, Closure, and Preparing for Disposal of Non-
Compactible Material Using Vectra Foam Filter EL-142 High Integrity Container"
2.5.1.6, Rev. 3, " Dewatering the Spent Resin Tank From the Radwaste Trucklock"
2.5.2.17, Rev. 2, " Processing Liquid Radioactive Discharges"
,
6.9-160, Rev. 32, " Rad;oactive Material Shipment Administrative Package Process"
'
6.9-174, Rev.11,'Packeging Radioactive Material for Shipment"
6.9194, Rev. 9, " Loading Transport Vehicle for Radioactive Shipments"
'
6.9-211, Rev. 9, " 10 CFR 61 Sampling"
6.9 213, Rev. 4, " Handling and Loading Procedure for Type B Shipping Casks"
6.9-218, Rev. 8, " Operation and Control of the TCF and the Hazardous Materials l
Storage Area"
6.9-303, Rev. 2, " Operation of the Interim Low Level Radwaste Storage Facility"
.
b. Observations and Findinas i
l
Procedure 6.9' 160 did not provide detailed instruction, but instead referenced DOT
regulations. - Some of these references were incorrect. Other procedure errors were minor
and were discussed with the licensee during a. detailed inspection debrief.
c. Conclusions _ ,
Although' adequate, radwaste transportation procedures did not provide details in that they
- had frequent reference to regulations and relied heavily on skills-of-the-trade. Some
- references were incorrect, but did not result in any sliipment errors.
4 @
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R4 . Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C
:
R4.1 Radwaste Samol, ipa and Characterization
,
a. Insoection Scooe'
Same as Section R1.1. Y
; "
b. -Qbservations and Findinas
'The inspector verified that the transport characterization tables (A1/A2 values) had been ,
updated to reflect current regulations ~ .
Five solid radioactive waste streams were sampled and characterized by an outside
radiochemical laboratory.in September 1996. '
>
'
. c. Conclusions ~
i
. The waste stream characterizations were timely and appropriately utilized by the licensee
to report radionuclide': activities of each radioactive material / waste shipment during the .
1996 - May 1997 timeframe.
R4.2 ~ Radioactive Material Shionino Documentation Review
a. insoection Scope
Same as Section R3.1.
b. Observations. Findinas and Conclusions
.The inspector's review of selected radioactive material shipments made during 1997
indicated that the shipments met all regulatory requirements. As mentioned in Section R7
of this report, the second reviewer of each shipment reinitiated the shipping record
contents page, which did not indicate what was reviewed. This area should be enhanced.
R4.3 Eost Accident Samolina System Ooeration
,
a. insoeetion Scope (71750)
4
The reliability.of the post accident sampling system (PASS) equipment was verified when
- chemistry technicians drew a gaseous sample,
b. Observations and Findinas
.
The teci clans used very good procedural adherence while drawing the gaseous PASS -
sample. t he PASS ' system equipment functioned 'as designed. Difficulty was experienced
,
Lwith calibrating the laboratory gaseous analyzer equipment. The chemistry procedure
' provided general guidance for the calibration requiring the technicians to consult with a
.
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more experienced technical for advice. The chemistry personnel initiated a procedure
change to provide more specificity for the analyzer calibration process. One small ,
'
chemistry work-around condition was observed when the technicians used a piece of duct
tape to hold the gas vial positioner in place to engage a microswitch. The technicians
initiated PR 97,1957 to evaluate the problem and obtain corrective actions to eliminate the l
l
work around condition. Overall, the PASS equipment worked as designed and the
chemistry technicians used very good procedural adherence when collecting and analyzing
a gaseous sample,
c. Conclusions
Chemistry technicians drew a gaseous sample demonstrating the reliability of the PASS
system equipment. Very good procedural adherence was evident and one minor equipment
work around condition was identified involving the gas vial holder.
R5 Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C
RS.1 Radweste Transoortation Trainina for Shicoers and RP Technicians I
a. Insoection Scoce
Same as Section R3.1
b. Observations and Findinas
The two authorized shippers attended a regulations training courso in the fall of 1995
which fulfilled regulatory requirements. The RP technicians were provided a one-hour
overview briefing on NRC Bulletin 79-19 on a biennial basis, however, inspector review of
the training materialindicated that although NRC Bulletin 79-19 requirements were
described, there was little training material that described the transport requirements
pertaining to their RP duties. The licensee stated that training module T-TT-02-01-01
would be evaluated and necessary improvements made.
c. Conclusions
The licensee met the training requirements for radioactive material shippers and RP
technicians.
R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities
a. Inspection Scope
Same as Section R1.1.
b. Observations and Findinas
The QA Plan has been revised and has reduced the periodic audit function of the
radwaste/ transportation program to an annual collection and summary of QA surveillances
. - .
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for the program area. During 1996 there were a total of 60 radioactive material shipments ,
made of which, only two were reviewed by the QA group. During 1997 through this
inspection period, there have been a total of 81 radioactive material shipments, with oaly
two QA surveillances provided.
QA audits of radwaste processing vendors were spotty, with some audits having been
performed in the last 3 years and some not. BECo commitments to NRC Bulletin 79-19
were intended to establish and implement a management controlled audit function of all l
transfers, packaging and transport activities.
The licensee currently utilizes a self assessment or cross check to ensure each radioactive
material shipment is correct. The inspector noted that both authorized shippers cross
check each other, operate out of the same office, and report to the same supervisor and
are not independent of the shipping operation. The inspector also noted that the cross
checking consists of redundant initiating of the shipment iecord contents page. No formal l
I
checklist or other documentation of an independent review is made.
c. Conclusions
' The licensee's audit program for the radwaste/ transportation program was found to be very
weak. The licensee stated that the audit program for this program area would be l
'
reevaluated.
Reviews of radioactive material shipments are not independent of the radwaste shipping
program and are not formally accomplished. The licensee indicated the intention of
formalizing this review and utilizing other Services Division staff that are independent of
the shipping office to provide the reviews.
Oversight of the radwaste/ transportation program was not very effective.
R8 Miscellaneous RP&C issues
R8.1 Uodated Final Safety Analysis Reoort (UFSAR)
'
a. Insoection Scoce
'
The inspector reviewed current Pilgrim Station practices with respect to Sections 9.2 and
9.3 of the UFSAR.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector's review of the indicated sections of the UFSAR reflected current plant
configuration and radwaste processing practices. One P&lD plant drawing (M235, UFSAR
figure 9.31) did not indicate that the floc recycle tank had been abandoned in place and
the licensee indicated that this correction would be made. Other sections of the UFSAR
properly described the abandoned equipment.
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c, Conclusions
Other than one drawing update that was needed, the UFSAR description of solid radwaste
processing was accurate and correctly reflected current plant operations.
P2 Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources
a. insoection Scope (82701)
Determine whether key facilities and equipment are adequately maintained and determine i
whether changes made since the last inspection are technically adequate, meet NRC l
requirements, licensee commitments, and are appropriately incorporated into the
emergency plan and implementing procedures.
b. Observations and Findinas
I
The inspector toured the technical support center (TSC), operational support center (OSC),
and the emergency operations facility (EOF). The inspector found the emergency facilities
and equipment to be adequately maintained. Survey equipment and dosimetry were within j
.the calibration requirements. Additionally the inspector reviewed the TSC and EOF i
ventilation test and found them to meet NRC requirements,
c. Conclusion
The facilities were found to be adequately maintained in a state of operational readiness.
P3 EP Procedures and Documentation
a. Inspection Scope (82701)
Determine if significant or major changes have been made to the emergency preparedness
program, assess whether these changes have adversely affected the licensee's overall
state of emergency preparedness and have been appropriately incorporated into the
licensee's emergency plan and implemMting procedures.
Verify that major or significant changes to the emergency plan and implementing
procedures have been reviewed, approved, and distributed in accordance with approved
licensee procedures and NRC requirements before implementation.
. b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector reviewed Revision 18, of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station emergency Plan,
changes to the emergency plan implementing procedure (EP IP) and emergency plan
administrative procedures (EP-AD). The inspector noted a minor procedural weakness with
procedure EP-AD-110, Emergency Preparedness Department organizational requirements
which did not include the interface requirements with the central emergency preparedness
group (CEPG) for the position descriptions of the Regulatory Regulations Group Manager
and the Emergency Preparedness Manager. BECo agreed to provide more specificity of the
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interface in the aforementioned procedure. The inspector also reviewed the
10CFR50.54(q) reviews for changes to the corporate radiological emergency plan and for
the recent changes to the emergency plan and emergency plan implementing procedures.
Additionally, the inspector noted that the licensee had reviewed, approved, and Jistributed
in accordance with approved licensee procedures and NRC requirements before
implementation.
c. Conclusion l
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The revisions to the emergency plan and emergency plan implementing procedures meet-
the requirements of 10CFR50.54(q), and will continue to be reviewed during further l
'
inspections.
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP
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a. Inspection Scoce (82701)
Evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's controls in identifying, resolving and preventing
problems by reviewing such areas as corrective action systems, root cause analyses,
safety committees, and self assessment in the area of emergency preparedness.
Determine whether there are strengths or weaknesses in the licensee's controls for the
identification and resolution of the reviewed issues that could enhance or degrade plant
operations or safety.
b. Observations and findinas
The inspector reviewed the self-assessments for the last quarter 1996 and first quarter
1997.
In the review of the last quarter 1996 self-assessment the inspector noted that the licensee
had identified that there was a problem getting personnel to perform as controllers for
drills. The licensee was taking corrective measure to ensure that upper management was
kept informed of the problem, and that if the person could not participate in tSe drill as a
controller, a qualified replacement would be provided,
in the review of the first quarter 1997 self-assessment the inspector notec it at the
licensee had identified that after the change of the Regulatory Relations Group Manager
and changes of the Emergency Preparedness Group in 1996, the Regulatory Relations
Group Manager, Emergency Preparedness Manager and other upper management personnel
had visited the Civil Defense Directors and other risk community officials to ensure that
commitments were being met, and that this had not been done since early 1996 and
should be done on a more r.tgular basis.
Additionally, the Emergency Preparedness Manager demonstrated the integrated action
data base (IADB) and the emergency preparedness activity scheduling system (EPASS)
tracking systems for the inspector. The IADB system is the station wide tracking system
and is used to track the more significant programmatic issues. The EPASS system is used
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to track emergency preparedness drill / exercise and other EP issues. Both systems were
easily accessible and provided the necessary data (e.g., date entered, description, a
responsible person, due date, corrective measure taken for closure, etc.). The licensee
also has the ability to inter link the training data base to the emergency response
organization data base to ensure that all emergency response personnel on the duty roster
are qualified.
c. Conclusion
Overall, the licensee effectively controls its emergency preparedness program and resolves ,
'
issues.
P5 Staff Training and Qualification in EP i
a. Insoection Scope (82701)
Interview a small sample of individuals assigned key roles for emergency response to l
determine whether they have been trained as required and understand their emergency I
assignments, responsibilities, authorities, and changes to the implementing procedures.
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If changes have been made to the licensee's emergency preparedness program since the '
last inspection, determine whether responsible personnel are aware of the changes,
understand them, and have been adequately trained to implement them,
b. Observations and findinas
The inspector interviewed and performed walkthroughs using scenarios with two
emergency directors and two nuclear watch engineers to determine the effectiveness of
emergency preparedness training. The scenarios were designed to require identifying and
classifying at least two emergency classification levels one which was the General
Emergency, therefore, requiring a protective action recommendation to be made, and the
notification forms to be properly filled out. The emergency directors and nuclear watch
engineers performed very well making the appropriate emergency action level :
classifications in a timely manor, completing the notification forms properly and in a timely I
manor, and followed the new protective action recommendation process, which
implemented the NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, REVISION 1, SUPPLEMENT 3, Criteria for !
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness in Support of
Nuclear Power Plants, and made conect and appropriate corrective actions for the plant
conditions presented, in a timely manor as established in the emergency plan.
Additionally, the inspector interviewed the emergency planning trainer, reviewed the
emergency response organization training records, reviewed the emergency plan overview
and the dose assessment and protective action recommendations lesson plans and
examinations. During the review of the emergency response organization training records
the inspector found approximately 30 out of 675 personnel would not meet their training
requirements as of May 31,1997, and verified with the emergency preparedness manager
that these personnel were not on the duty roster which was issued May 30,1997. The
lesson plans reviewed were complete, informative and up-to-date.
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c. Conclusion I
'Overall, the emergency preparedness training program is being effectively implemented.
, P6 EP Organization and Administration
a. Insoection Scope (82701)
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Determine if changes have been made to the emergency organization or management !
control systems, determine the effect of these changes on the licensee's emergency'
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preparedness program and verify that these changes have been properly incorporated into ,
the emergency plan and implementing procedures. !
b. Observations and Findinas
: Since the last inspection the emergency preparedness staff has had some major changes.
The emergency preparedness manager reports to the regulator relations manager. .The
emergency preparedness manager has the emergency preparedness readiness coordinator
and the emergency preparedness planning coordinator reporting to him.
1
The emergency preparedness coordinator oversees onsite training, assists in offsite 1
training, coordinates drill and exercises, maintains the emergency response organization
roster, and has 4 siren and communications engineers and 2 facility and equipment l'
specialists reporting to him. Additionally, the coordinator interfaces with the Yankee
Atomic Central Emergency Preparedness Group (CEPG) as necessary in performance of
their duties and functions.
I
The emergency preparedness planning coordinator, coordinates offsite interfaces, oversees j
the following: offsite training program requirements; onsite and offsite plans and
procedures and administrative procedure maintenance; cooperate response plan, and the
public information program. Additionally, the emergency preparedness planning
coordinator interfaces with the Yankee Atomic CEPG in coordinating their performance of ,
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offsite emergency preparedness activities. Further discussion of the Yankee Atomic CEPG
activities will be discussed in Section P8.
These changes in the emergency preparedness staff have been reflected in revisions 17,
17A and 18 of the emergency plan.
The licensee has five emergency directors (EDs). All five of the Eds are in upper-
management at the site. This demonstrates management's commitment to actively
support the emergency response organization. The inspector reviewed other emergency
- response organization positions and determined that all key positions were at least three
deep and thus the licensee was meeting, and in most cases exceeding its goal of being at
least two persons deep in the emergency response organization.
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c. Conclut i2D
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Overall, the inspector determined that the licensee has sufficient personnel in place to
maintain the emergency preparedness program and to staff the emergency response
organization.
P7 Quality Assurance in EP Activities
'a. Insoection Scoce (82701)
~
Examine independent and internal review and audit reports for the licensee's emergency
preparedness programs since the last inspection to determine compliance with NRC
requirements and licensee commitments.
.
b. Observations and Findinas
. The inspector reviewed quality assurance group audit 96-08 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
PROGRAM, audit surveillances: 96-067,TSC and OSC Walk-through Training on Process
Changes, 96-069 Emergency Preparedness Drill: Activation of TSC and OSC, and 96-071
. Emergency Preparedness Drill: Activation of Emergency Off site Facility (EOF). Audit
report 96-08 identified one Problem Report 96.0428, Approval forms for scenario package
96-01 were missing, and one Recommendation Report 96.0095, Provide written policy on
assignment of CEPG personnel in BECo ERO positions. There were no reoccurrences of
items from previous audit reports,
c. Conclusion
.
The inspector found that the audits were comprehensive and thorough and identified areas
requiring corrective measures. The audits satisfied 10CFR50.54(t) requirements.
P8 Miscellaneous issues (82701)
P8.1 Yankee Atomic Central Emeraency Preoaredness Group (CEPG) ,
a. Insoection Scope
f
To determine the effect of the licensee's reduction in the emergency preparedness staff
,
and the transfer of off-site emergency preparedness duties to the Yankee Atomic Central
Emergency Preparedness Group (CEPG).
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector reviewed pertinent licensee documentation and interviewed key members of
the licensee's EP staff and CEPG personnel to determine the effect of the licensee's
reduction in EP staff and utilization of the CEPG organization. The inspector also discussed
. the licensee's support of offsite EP activities with the FEMA Region i Regional Assistance
Committee Chairman (RAC) Chair person.
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Boston Edison utilizes the services of the CEPG, which is a functional group of the Yankee
Atomic Electric Company, to provide support to the licensee's emergency preparedness
program. Boston Edison maintains overall responsibility for onsite and offsite EP programs
with CEPG providing assistance as needed. All work performed by CEPG personnel is done
under the direction of Boston Edison EP managers.
The PNPS Emergency Plan (Rev.18) has been revised to reflect the assistance of the CEPG
and the responsibilities of the EP managers for interfacing with the CEPG. The utilization
of the CEPG is also indicated in EP administrative procedure EP-AD-110, " Emergency
Preparedness Organization and Responsibilities," Rev. 3 (undated), however, it was noted
that the responsibility for interfacing with the CEPG is not included in the position
descriptions for the Regulatory Relations Group Manager and the EP Department Manager.
The licensee entered into an agreement with Yankee Atomic for the services of the CEPG
on June 1,1996, as reflected in purchase order LSP006591, Emergency Planning. The
purchase order indicates that the services to be provided by CEPG include both onsite and
offsite EP tasks.
Prior to the formation of the CEPG, the EP staff consisted of 17 personnel including EP
managers, emergency planners, siren and facility and equipment specialista, and clerical.
The current Boston Edison EP staff consists of 10 personnel including 3 EP managers, 5
siren and facility and equipment specialists, and 2 clerical. The licensee EP staff is
supported by 5 CEPG professional emergency planners of which 3 are Yankee Atomic
employees and 2 are Yankee Atomic contractors. Four of the CEPG staff are currently
working full time on Pilgrim offsite activities and one is working about 50% of his time on
Pilgrim onsite assignments. The EP staff is also augmented by other Yankee Atomic
contractors as needed for special activities such as the establishment of the new Braintree
Reception Center.
The CEPG staff report to the CEPG Manager for administrative purposes, however, Pilgrim
EP tasks are performed at the direction of the licensee's EP managers. The CEPG Manager
and the 5 CEPG support staff are physically co-located with the Boston Edison EP staff.
The CEPG Manager estimates that approximately 50% of his time is devoted to supporting !
Boston Edison. The CEPG Manager and 4 of the 5 CEPG staff are former Boston Edison EP I
employees or contractors who were involved in the licensee's offsite EP program. Thus i
continuity has been maintained between the licensee EP department and the EPZ and I
reception center town emergency management organizations. In addition, according to the
EP Department Manager, the licensee's financial support for the offsite EP program has
remained the same and has not been affected by the utilization of the CEPG organization. ;
1
The licensee has an effective assessment program for monitoring the performance of the i
EP organization including the CEPG. As part of the assessment program, the EP Planning
Coordinator reviews the EP program commitrr:ent list on a quarterly basis to assure that the
onsite and offsito EP commitments are being met. The inspector reviewed the self
assessment summary reports for the last quarter of 1996 and the first quarter of 1997 as
well as the CEPG Manager's monthly status reports and a preliminary CEPG annual report.
The self assessment report for 1997 identified the need for the RRG Manager and EP
Department Manager to meet with local officials on a more frequent basis to strengthen
the lines of communication.
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The inspector met with the FEMA Region i RAC chair at the FEMA regional offices on May
29i 1997, to verify the adequacy of the licensee's support to the offsite response
- organizations supporting the Pilgrim emergency plan. The RAC chair had been briefed by
Boston Edison on the CEPG concept and was familiar with it. The RAC chair expressed :
satisfaction with the level and commitment of licensee support for offsite EP at Pilgrim.
c. - Conclusion
The inspector determined that the licensee is effectively utilizing the CEPG and continuing
to meet its offsite EP commitments.
P8.2 Braintree Reception Center
. a. Insoection Sc. gag
!
To review the licensee's actions for assisting the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the
. replacement of the South Weymouth reception center.
b. ~ Observationa and Findinas
. The inspector interviewed licensee and CEPG staff to determine the lice'isee's actions for
assisting the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in replacing the South Weymouth reception
center which was necessitated by the impending shutdown of the South Weymouth Naval
Air Station. On May 27,1997, MEMA announced that the reception center in the Town of ,
Braintree at the Braintree High School had replaced the South Weymouth reception center. )
The licensee had been actively involved in the negotiations for the use of Braintree High
School. . In addition, the licensee had assisted the Massachusetts Emergency Management
- Agency (MEMA) in oreparing for the transition by revising the plan and procedures, j
developing radio a.u newspaper announcements of the change, and in training the i
reception center staff for the new facility.
The inspector toured the new reception center and observed CEPG staff conducting
tre'Wg of the various functional groups which staff the reception center. Discussions with
N representatives during the tour confirmed that the licensee and the Commonwealth I
hau .vorked closely together to establish the Braintree facility. Several factors contributed l
to the selection of the Braintree reception center. It is located in the same general area as I
the South Weymouth reception center and the majority of the staff are the same as the ;
South Weymouth staff. In addition, Braintree High School is also a host school. ;
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c. Conclusion
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BECo actively assisted in a very timely manner the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in
establishing the Braintree reception center as the replacement for the South Weymouth
facility.
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V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
i
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the I
conclusion of the inspection on 7/15/97. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented.
X3 Management Meeting Summary
On June 5,1997, the NRC convened a management meeting with BECo managers at PNPS
to discuss overall performance trends. Enclosure 3 contains the briefing notes presented
to the NRC during the meeting.
X4 Review of UFSAR Commitments
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR
description highlighted the need for aoditional verification that licensees were complying
with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) commitments. For an indeterminate -
time period, all reactor inspections will provide additional attention to UFSAR commitments
and their incorporation into plant practices and procedures. While performing inspections
discussed in this report, inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR. No ;
inconsistencies were noted.
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7
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Ti 2515/133: Implementation of Revised 49CFR Parts 100-179 and 10 CFR Part 71
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and
Preventing Problems
IP 61726: Surveillance Observation l
, IP 62707: Maintenance Observation
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
IP 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
IP 82701: Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program
.lP 86750: Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of
Radioactive Materials
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Non-routine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities
IP 92901: Followup - Operations
IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance
IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support i
IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors ]
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND UPDATED
OPENED
IFl 97-03-01 SSW pressure switch root valves not included in 8.C.13.
VIO 97-03-02 RCA door found tied open.
IFl 97-03-03 Disposition of Waste Feed Tank and Floc Recycle Tank as abandoned
equipment.
CLOSED
IFl 95-13-01 Longstanding scaffolding left erected in RHR quadrant rooms
UPDATED
None
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ALARA As Low As is Reasonably Achievable ,
APRMs . Average Power Range Monitors
BECo, ' Boston Edison Company _ l
CEPG Central Emergency Preparedness Group ;
CFR Code of Federal Regulations i
CRD Control Rod Drive
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
EAL Emergency Action Level-
EOF Emergency Operations Facility
EP Emergency Preparedness
EPIC ~ Emergency.and Plant Information Computer ,
ERO Emergency Response Organization
ESF Engineered Safety Feature
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
gpm gallons per minute _ )'
I&C Instrumentation and Controls
IFl Inspection Follow-Up Item :
IR Inspection Report
LER- Licensee Event Report -
LLRWSF Low level radioactive waste storage facility
MEMA Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
MG Motor Generator
MR Maintenance Request
NCV Non Cited Violation
NOV Notice of. Violation
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
.
NUREG 0654 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response 1
!
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG 0654 l
FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, EALs
NWE Nuclear Watch Engineer
OSC Operational Support Center
. PAR Protective Action Recommendation
PNPS. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station-
PR Problem Report
QA -. Quality Assurance ,
RAC , Regional Assistance Committee
'
'RHR- Residual Heat Removal
RP Radiological Protection i
RRG; _ Regulatory Relations Group l
SRO Senior Reactor Operator
TCF : Trash compaction facility J
TM Temporary Modification
,TS Technical Specification '
,
iTSC. Technical Support Center L. UFSAR _ Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
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ENCLOSURE #3
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BECo PRESENTATION MATERIAL
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FROM JUNE 5,1997 ONSITE MEETING
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ENCLOSURE 3
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: Boston Edison
: NRC
PRESENTATION
June 5,1997
4 i G ! I
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xanwammemseeemnewmemmensraumranswemammencesa
PRESENTATION AGENDA
I
elNTRODUCTION E.T. BOULETTE
e OPERATIONS T.E. TREPANIER
eMAINTENANCE W.J. DICROCE
e PROCEDURE ADHERENCE T.A. SULLIVAN
- e PLANT SUPPORT C.S. GODDARD
e ENGINEERING J.P. GER ETY
1-2
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INTRODUCTION
<
eWelcoming Remarks l
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OPERATIONS
Tom Trepanier
Operations Manager
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anamarmuun u -
emmanm
o Plant is at 100% power with no significant l
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equipment challenges l
- eSuccessful Refueling Outage l
- Process changes successful- work release, I
tagging, work control center, control room !
environment
,
.
- Effective planning - shutdown safety plan
Handled challenges well
+ Main Transformer failure
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. Severe storm
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s License exam completed May 1997 l
eSRO license class to begin July 1997
===unwmame== mamma =====mweermamwwsamme
AREAS OF CURRENT AND FUTURE
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FOCUS
e Procedural Adherence - Continue to lower threshold on
procedure workarounds and procedure adherence
(radwaste and off-normal procedures)
e Reactivity Management -High energy cores )
e Self-Checking skills. 1
program has been highly successful in equipment
operations
- expanded to normal tours / turnover
e Complacency - Use of independent peer assessments as a
tool :
- First completed - December 1996 l
Second scheduled prior to end of 1997 l
S-6
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OPERATING WORKAROUNDS
e Operating not Operatgr Workarounds
- e Recognized need to formalize proce=- .
. .
- Issued station procedure -
'
Training scheduled
: eTransient/Non Transient Categorization
'
e Cooperation between Operations, Maintenance, l
Engineering and other support groups ongoing and
,
improving
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OPERATING WORKAROUNDS (Cont.)
, ,
e Corrected most transient workarounds
MO-220-3
- MO-S1 ,_
.
RWCU Letdown
e Outstanding transient workarounds
Feedwater Regulating Valves
- CRD system, "all rods in", and select matrix
'
e Continue to strongly focus on eliminating
challenges to operators and other personnel
,
7-8
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CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN '
e
o Contracted FPI - blueprint
;
'e Proceduralized process changes ;
'
s" Error Free" policy !
eTrained all personnel on new process l
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- CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (Cont.;l
! 2
Status /Results
.
- e Significant increase in number of Problem Reports
(28661st qtr.1997 vs.1366 total in 1996)
e Significant decrease in threshold
. - More "near misses"
- SCAQ/non-SCAQ ratio has significantly decreased
-
e Decrease in " events" concurrent with increase in
Problem Reports
J l - 9-10
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CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (Cont.)
e Encouragement for High Self Improvement
Performance Ratio (SIPR)
eStill maturing
- - Confidence in our process
Common Cause Analysis (CCA) makes sense
Continue to improve our self-assessment and
self-improvement
e Areas of focus:
'
- Additional administrative burden
!
Reduce backlog - real time turnaround
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EMMC5tBEEEEUIMM2 MEW 5EiWA2!PKEtrA&E1@@90 MOD 3E18Mmmesil5E18st32!sausu l
SIGNIFICANT HUMAN PERFORMANC l
PROBLEM REPORTS - NOVEMBER 1994 ;
'
TO THE PRESENT
... . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . _ _ . . _ . . - . . . _ . ~ . . _ . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . .
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STATION SELF IMPROVEMENT l
PERFORMANCE RATIO !
(SIPR) l
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SUMMARY
h !
,
o Summary - process changes to unburden operating
crews, focus on procedural adherence,
self-checking, self-assessment, and
self-improvements have lead to strong
aerformance. Ourjob is to continue these
mprovements.
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MAINTENANCE
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Bill DiCroce
Maintenance & Projects Manager
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MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENTS
e Background - Mid 1994, several occurrences
focused attention to weaknesses in the
Maintenance functional area
e Maintenance improvement Plan developed
and implemented
e Results have been positive
.
m,
y
15-16
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HUMAN ERROR REDUCTION
.
.o Quality is the top priority.
- Rework rate of 0.5 - 1.5%.
Human performance error reduction of 32%
kom 1995 to 1996
'
[ eWorkers routinely briefed by management -
that there is always enough time to do the job
right, the first time ;
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oIncreased time dedicated to continuing 1
training
eHuman performance matrix of Maintenance
i staff to identify individual trends !
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IMPROVED WORK CONTROL PROCESS &
,
MAINTENANCE PRODUCTIVITY
i e More efficient work management and higher ,
productivity has resulted in a substantial backlog l
reduction [60% reduction between June 1995 to
- January 1997]
e Reduced maintenance request backlog resulted in:
- - Improved safety system reliability
'
Reduced challenged to operators (316 day run
following RFO-10)
- Reduced number of operating workarounds
17-18
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CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE BACKLOG
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NOTI NO DAfAet41 DUE TO AFos11
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1996 I
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SAFETY SYSTEM
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
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SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Residua; Heat Removal (RHR)
Ibe Salety hystem perMmutnr.e 1% cat 0s is ceAned as the num of the unavadsbehty of the components in the
%ybi'km d'# ring 3 ghen time [tefQd de/93*d by the 08)I%8f Of tr&nS in ft16 bystern. The convennt unavadsibil4 a
the ratio of rne hours that the components were unaLie to perm their inte.ded forsten 's tw trmra the system
Wat rSQtJ8 red f0 be avadabM ffJr sarcce
Jf
8 3 Ti Af;;d8 a T ' .8
'
Unavailabihty Rato
0 04
YTD -
YTD YTD
Jan
Unmv-Hrs Unmv-Rate Goa!
25.00 0 0168 0.030 3 003 - -
fh
Feb 25 00 0.030 E
0.0000
Mu 30.25 0.0060 0.030 o 02 -
--
-
"
Apr 30.25 0 0052 0.030 - n .-
'
May 30.25 0.0041 0.030 y a L
Jun 30.25 0.0035 0.030 o 01 l _
~
'
r y
~
' ul
J 30.25 0.0030 0.030 s
Aug 30.25 0.0026 0.G30 o
a
7
> n
'
bCOG 1 > $
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Sep 302.75 0.0230 0.030
Oct 302.75 0.0207 0.030 YTD Actual YTO Goal
Nov 302.75 0.0188 0.030 C -
Dec 302.75 0.0172 0.030 f
w
- . .-
1996
SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
High Pressure injection / Heat Removal Systems
The saWy s(vern perfornunce incheator e do tnod r as the wim raf too unavailaanty of the compventa en the
systern stating a gNeo hme genod Jeded by tre number of tram sn the system The component vrievaAacotty is
the tatto of the hours that the coniponants were unable to putform then !rrtended furotion to N bours the sys'em
was es.1vired te he evadab> for 5,e.twica
1%6 Vtum = 'JC 1'.f
Unavailabinty Rate w% w
YTD 0"
YTD YTD
Unav-Hrs Unav-Rate Goal g .
Jan 10.3 0 013 0 015
Feb 23.5 0 019 0.015 f 002 ~
-
Mar
Apr
24 5
68.6
0 011
0 012 0 015
0 015
J,i 0015 -
f
~
'Maj 69 0 0 009 0.015 1 _.,
-
~
- --
'Jun 81.3 0 009 0.015 f UU' ,
>
Jul 86 8 0 009 0.015
~
~~-
0 005 -
p ' '
--
Aug 87.8 0 00_7 0.015 r
Jan Feb Mar Apr May 1 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Nov 89.1 YTD ActimI YTD Goal
0 006 J0.015 C
Dec 89 1 0 005 !Oli5
af8
21-22
l
1
. _ _ _ . _ _ . __ _ . .
1996
SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
EMERGENCY AC POWER
Ttw sa50 tf setem performance mdeator s def'ned as tne num of the una rajabiitty of the components *n me
sistem dunng a given t;me period d.wsoed by the nurrte 9f trains us the system. The component unavailabertv is
ing rato of tr.e hours that trie ccmponents were unabe to perform their riended funct.oo to ti o hoursit.e system
was requwod to be a'sailable for service
W- A :.a s 00'4
.
Unavailability Rato ' * " ^ " ' ' "*
YTD YTD YTD 0 012
Unav Hrs Unav-Rate Goal
Jan 0.00 0 0000 0.010 0 01 ~~ -
Feb 0.00 0.0000 0.010 jn, .
Mar 12.75 0.0060 0.010 g g
Apr 12.75 0.0040 0.010 5 000s {
j
- -
'
May 12.75 0.0035 0.010 - -
.* - "
Jun 12.75 0.0029 0.010 gom 7 -
-
_,_
Jul 12.75 0.0025 0.010 g
.
,
-
- r
7
-
'Aug 25.65 0.0044 0.010
,
,
,,
z^ 3 ,
.
, q
'
Sip 25.65 0.0039 0.010 0
= Q'1 ~ '
i
35.40 0.0048 0 010
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Od Nov Dec
Oct
Nov 35 40 0.0044 0.010 YTD Actual YTD Goal
Dec 46 15 0 0050 0 010 C~l
nrr t
1
1
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Y I
l
1997 l
SAFETY SYSTEM l
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
i
23-24
. 4
=.e
._. _
1997
SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
'ra 'a**ts ett a m ;>d y- ave *Westos i Ww4 at N u.m d the 9ede rwtWv Of '.'*a wgwr>ntits in tx
s en dac9) 3 gen time ural twwJ e, the ev%r.J Per.s r, tN s,wr Tim carww ouvakreay a
+8ee rathi j r., we tw tre t.crernemawa vare stanche o Murm ra.cr oferned fat:cr 1)!t e ren tae siste ri
we ta $ireJ N ra avu%tw ica 1,c*we
l
)
Unavattability P. ate '.994
.3a i. 4-tua.
. 2 -e04'4 r j
OS
YTD YTD YTD ""
thav+t s unav-Rate Goal ,, _
Jan 38 90 0 0520 0 000 g j,
Feb 295 00 0 4400 0 080 0.3 -
5
War 351 00 0 3170 0 080 .J # a I' l
Apr 351 00 0 2377 0 000 '
02 -
M 0 080 l
1
' ef )
Jun 0 000 '01 -
,k l
Fl '- :
~ ~. _ . . . _ . . .
3 '
g 0. ,
a.a r us, u , ava a.i 4.e s., o. Nov o
s,p ooso 4,, i
od 0 080 no u , yro a.,, l
w 00e0 ca '
Oec 0 080 i
l
r sgs t l
. ._
1997
SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
High Pressure injection / Heat Removal Systems
Tne ust, syre.s ;ww.nu w nrhaw wet u tc, an of ibe .muaww, et % w,xmenu, in the
% l'Hi1 dtJf>J A ) s*O IFP W.N#10, w .1rMi Oy the Muq+8 M 0 p R,e g e 1r.4 5, ftW . Ihe i # peut kqhd!db 4w $
T 4 '4i4 (# ItB hWN 1* At ther C. tr.$ Cf enf t /.#tYr td o%e hi paefsem the'"' m'dCM t.af tr M ?.e "'71*% !*4 b'pW
Mn4 ikCJ'AC f:M Fits 1W.le IUt htfYn'M
Unavailability Rate w em . e, s
tw a .m. 3 una
00s
YTD YTD YlD
un v+ir. un ,ami. on.e
Jan 23 0 0.031 0.015 ~
1
Feb 23 0 0 011 0.015 Im0
T
M
' a_r_23.0 0 011 OT[5 t T6
Apr 43 6 0 015 0 015 0 02 - -
4
May 0.015
Jun 0 015 ,,, .
- r
*
# 0 015 '
*
Aus 0 011
Sep 0015 0
# " "" # # M N * '* D
Od
.
0 015
Nov 0.015 yto Actuan YTD oces
Dec I 0 015 O
-we
25-26
-.- . . .-. . . .- - i
,
. . -
,
_ _
. _
1997
SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
EMERGENCY AC POWER
l
Tne saht, s twm te s re smaux ,uen u as n suo i ms v.avern J w w 1.m s e tu
%f41d dWf IP-f CUT [*J%M ufle DMat*strj e5
r.4 <s"ln 1J1N A gi@ te*#
iow:wr,vaensis aW p ht
u ik
u Jed by the Mir'so,L f ven
wev%r Ede'4vin vIT.e %fal4"Ecm :~ M.un % system
erv19u
M4 ft%fFd P314. Jv4F4M is serv';e
Unavaltability Rate $$ $ $$
Y1D YTD YTD 0 012
Unev Hrs Unavaato Goal
Jan 0 00 0.0000 0.010 0M ' ' " ~ '~~
'
Feb 0 00 0.000 03Id j0# ~
Mar 0 00 0.0006~dM g
Apr 0 00 0.0000 0 010 '
o 00s -
May 0.010 =
Jun 0 010 ' O 008 -
j
-
Jul 0.010 1
kug 0* '
0.010
Sep 0.010 o
--
Od 0.010 -'" F * " * * " "MN* **
';
Nov 0.010 YTD W YTD M
g 0 010 a
~ . ,
$
.
1
OPERATING WORK AROUNDS i
. -
3 .- 29
28
24
3
I3N 19 19
18
4
16
13
gg
12
3 -
0
0
5 5 $
. i i i i i i i
1/1 M M St M M M M M tort 11/1 12ft M M M M 7tt M M Hrt titt 12/1
OATI BY MONTH (199611997)
l E RONN#sGREmIR O TRANSENT E OUTAM E OUTACFTRANSIENT l
ve :c
'4.iF Iv0tii& h $ dl1 )' @ M VI (I#I1
27-28
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . -. .- . _ _
- -. - - . - . _ - . _ -- . - . -
,
y
~
.,
CONTROL ROOM DEFICIENCIES
k
"
i ,, "-"="- t
, _
- >
-
r 5 5 r g ;
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d
l GREATLY IMPROVED WORK FORCE .
MORALE AND INVOLVEMENT
.
! e Critical Maintenance activities now performed
in-house
- e Prolects that were historically out-sourced now
, performed in-house whenever practical to <
maintain in-house knowledge of new systems
. (e.g., RFO-11 Construction Power Modification,
Switchyard breaker replacements, Turbine
Performance Monitoring System, Refueling
Team)
t 1
29-30 . . _ _ _ - _ . __ . ___. . - - --
._
_,
; l
,
.:
'
am a-amma-amemanaamcam aammmmumna p
-
GREATLY IMPROVED WORK FORC
j MORALE AND INVOLVEMENT (Cont.)
.
4
eZero grievances in the Maintenance area
; during 1996 indicating improved
i management / labor relations
* Multi-disciplined teams (e.g., WIN team, project
i teams, RFO -11 clean-up team) improving
'
. interdiscipline, craft level communication and
- understanding 1
! I i ! 4
:
I l
l
%3Cd/ MICE &%&TATM3OM$tt$4NU%l/WG$23kDMJEMS$5ffidt4EM%QQ11!MOK4%%#ML1
. INCREASED SUPERVISOR INVOLVEMENT &
OWNERSHIP OF WORK SCHEDULE
'
!
e Supervisors develop and approve schedule with l
l '
work control personnel resulting in realistic
man-loading which avoids scheduling pressures
-
eimproved schedule adherence has resulted in
excellent preventative maintenance execution
i .
31-32
. _ _ . . - , - . - - - -
,
1
:
1
MAINTENANCE MSTP PERFORMANCE INDICATOR j
( DEFERRAL RATE FOR PREVIOUS SIX MONTHS ) l
,.
I
'2 33 I
>-
12
l
* -
#
,,, .1.
k, 1
-
=
.,
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1
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78
' ~
l
No. 21
, _
% "i
...
.. . . . . . . . . ' . -
1rl M 3r1 #1 M M 7t1 M M fori 11/1 131 1r1 2/1 M M
1:; i ,r. , c ,, w ,,
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MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONAL
h
IMPROVEMENTS
eimplemented l&C and Maintenance lead
.
technicians to reduce the burden on supervisors
thereby allowing more opportunity for the i
supervisor to monitor and coach in the field l
e Created a PM/RCM Coordinator to focus our
efforts on reducing the PM deferral rate and
incorporate RCM into our PM program
>
33-34
l
__-__-_____--_-_______---___.-__--_____-_____-__--
- .. - -. -- . . : ' :
,
mmmeumwwaraemanenwnwnwunm:numwwsrmnwnummm
-
AREAS OF CURRENT AND FUTURE
FOCUS
I e Procedural adherence and usage improvements
- Identified by our corrective action and
self-assessment programs
4
Actions are in progress or planned as follows:
. Incorporated an administrative procedure training I
'
module into Maintenance training in the fall of 1996
with inclusion into the continuing training program
i
-
I
1
. A
- - m - em m - - - - -3a. - m m - - - -, -
,
PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE AND USA
IMPROVEMENTS (Cont.)
Identified industry leaders in Maintenance
simulators for STAR and procedure usage
i
training and have assigned project supervisor
to develop construction plan and schedule
, "
o Conducted repeated work control training
sessions for plant and support personnel
based on lessons learned during work control
process maturation
35-36
_ _ - _ . . . _ - . - -- . . - . . - _ . . . - -
:
'
!
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PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE AND USAGE
IMPROVEMENTS (Cont.)
.
- . Developed / implemented procedural usage
JPM type testing for Maintenance
- 3ersonnel. Used during l&C and
i Waintenance lead technician selection i process
Plan to expand the use of craft personnel to
rewrite procedures from training and
mock-up environments in order to improve
i procedure quality
I
! 1 !
I
20%28b%WWMfA51%EDC415@SO48HSSWM33ES%E9*,3AM3@%ICMW32MtOWJOPIAC314JJAMS
i MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONAL
- IMPROVEMENTS
I ,
e Developing plan for a Maintenance support
organization to improve our:
'
Corrective action program responses
Procedure quality improvement capabilities
e Developing plan for an in-house Maintenance
Projects Team to improve our:
- Project implementation and planning
- Vendor interface and oversight
l
37-38
..- - - . ._.. - ..
- ._. - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ .
- __ - -. -. . _ - . _ - .-
: .
:
mawanawrmwawum::xmnummawawammu;mnus wwmmanua
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS (Cont.) !
'
e Develop Air-Operated Valve (AOV) program to:
- Identify and categorize safety significant AOVs
Perform design basis review as needed
Establish PM & diagnostic requirements
;
a f e
nummaan nwnana n m monwaanna munn.-a,
SUMMARY OF IMPROVEMENTS
&
! '
eThe improvements completed have raised the i
performance of the PNPS Maintenance
- organizations (Maintenance,1&C, Work
Control) and provide a solid foundation. The
results demonstrate our organization's :
progress. Our commitment to continuous
-
improvement drives us to constantly
re-evaluate our position and develop new !
strategies that ensure superior performance. '
i
l
3940
. -, . . . . _ _ _
:
:
susmuumwm eeuwwa:amwnxvwmmwssnannsmatw:carrenan
3
'
PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE ;
. ,
1
-
!
Ted Sullivan
, Plant Manager J
1
!
l
o.maeawmwwaure manmaanamamammwwwnwa $ 4
PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE
- e Measures I
. e Methods of Quantification
e Procedure Quality issues
1
e Self Identified Weakness !
eimprovements
e Procedure Improvement Process Team
'
!
41-42 I
. . . . . . -- . -
:
:
mswwuwwxwareneanmana:atumranunmanmxemmwanmessw
i PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE MEASURE
o Problem Reports
Pro dure Quality
Human Performan l
.
e Self-Assessments I
Performan Assessment Program
o Human Performan Matrix
.. eLessons Leamed l
e Simulator Performan
i 1
St?Muut1lR'#DL%wJGDC4%#MLMJ%fMM3tVRiniD%iG4M%"AMMntsM:,54tMRIG%Ah1
PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE MEASURE
(Cont.)
.
eJob Performan Measures (JPMs)
Technical and Operator Programs
equality Assurance Oversight .
Audits
'
Surveillan s
DRs
e Human Performan Monitoring Program
43-44 !
- - -
. .- _ .- . _ - . _ .. . .. - _ - _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ " ,
4
!
unswunwan rsw.umwaswwnmv.mumnuunwnssmsmesmnwanun
HOW IS PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE
- BEING QUANTIFIED
;
- eCorrective Action Process
; * Problem Reports
. Trending and Tracking
. Common Cause Analysis
eObservation Reports
* Results fed back for inclusion into
'
Self-Assessments
i e Monthly Human Performance Reports i . 1 i i
' '
'r '- -
'8 d d
i
HOW IS PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE
BEING QUANTIFIED (Cont.)
. '
* Self-Improvement Performance Ratio (SIPR)
* Inappropriate Action Report
* Trend Analysis
. Human Performance Ratio
.Significant Human Performance Problem Reports
! , !
45-46
_,
. - . _ :
i
f
anwtsmunervenmsmamm:nnremutwmmw:nnmuww sunumna
-
INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS
PROCEDURE NON-COMPLIANCE ,
1
l
< . . - _ - . _ . . . _ . . . _ _ _ , . _ . _ . _ - - . . . _ _ . . . . _ . - . _ _ _
,
i
. .
I !
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1
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INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS
.
PROCEDURE NON-COMPLIANCE l
eJanuary 1997 - April 1997
e148 Inappropriate Actions
e 10 of 148 ( 7%) Technical
. (93%) Administrative
I
,
Examples: - Operator failed to follow the
requirements of 8.C.13 for installation
'
of valve locking device (Technical) l
!
- Wrong revision to PNPS 3.M.4-48.2
was used (Administrative)
47-48
-.- . _ . . - .. . _ _ - - _.
s
t
,
axemummwnwanzmummwarauxemumwwwawuuurenewmuu
INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS
PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES
4 i
1
e.. . . . . . . - - . . ~ . . . , _ . . . . . . . . . _ . - . . - - . _ _ _ . .
.
.- i
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INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS
&
i
PROCEDURE DEFICIENCIES
eJanuary 1997 - April 1997
-e129 Inappropriate Actions
! e44 of 129: (34%) Technical
(66%) Administrative
i
Examples: -H2 trailer pressure too low when swapping
to new trailer (Technical)
-Incorrect note referenced (Administrative)
.
49-50
. _ . .
.. - --. -. -. ._-_ _ _
: 1
I
)
NW3C#kM3M.2&MD3h5W2WM4M$iM'fM^f3!X1fA%8'f%"lWGB tMD%%D$30M%R*C%d%4MhM!)PZ4628MVJ
SIGNIFICANT HUMAN PERFORMANCF
PROBLEM REPORTS - NOVEMBER 1994
~
TO THE PRESENT
i. . _ . _ - . _ . - . . . - _ . - . . - . - . _ - ~ . . _ . . . . - - . _ ~ - .
...-7
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HUMAN PERFORMANCE RATIO
1
1
03-------'---- - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
l
I i
0 26 .
e.,------------------------------------------ ---- -~'
l ] s. --+- Human Pertwmawe Reen
..e..A
j 02 L ---- "-- - - - - - - - - - g 1 M HPR- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-- - - - - - 4
'
's. . , ...s,,'s I
'*
o ss .- --- ------- - - %,; . . ,,,,------ ,------------ --- -4
.. ,
,
'
St.- -------- -- ---- --- -- - - -- l'Do er . , - ---- -- ----
--{ l
a../
1
5....,
o ne .. . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - -------
=-
-t
. - V
h86 A+46 On606 Co.M pef 98 Asc es hes Aess On698 Decret Psl> 07 Apr-97
The graph depeem be rate af mywBent human getuemenee prohaem reparen tu be had numba et menedy Inasien perfamience
repene ele =esed improvement m ede eres e assueted by a desseerg Immen perhrmenee nose A new teseew to berg estaeaghed
flue is fio esenni beenrg er he twerheid ftw utenaryme human portrmenos peshMene
1
,
51-52
_ _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ . --. _. . - . ._ .-
:
I
mmwaeumanummmwennuznummeauawamumusammwnume
STATION SELF IMPROVEMENT
.
PERFORMANCE RATIO
i (SIPR)
._ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
3 ,
I
'
..
j,
-
______________1
e
"
. ________ _______________
)
, _ _ _ . __ r _ _ ..: _ _ _ _.! l
'"
, _ ._. __. __ .. __ __ ._ __ .. .
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W ; W i IR t i
"
a E i !
.. - . . - - - - , - -
~t===.:,::::::: 't%==::: Orr
armummmmmanumawannammenwammemamasasema
PROCEDURE QUALITY ISSUES
'
sCommon Cause Analysis (CCA)
Level of detail within procedures, complexity
of the task, safety significance and skill of
the craft
Simplify the procedure revision process
Required training of personnel to optimize
.
level of detailin procedures
l Procedure revision tracking and trending
53-54
. _ _ . . .._ _ _ . _ . _ _
-- -_
. - - - .. . - . . . - - .. -.. _ _ . - - -
'
s
anzumnowwwannwmansuummmmnuummwaramwavanamwn
.
PROCEDURE QUALITY ISSUES (Cont.)
o Administrative Procedures
l e Upper Tier procedures:
Nuclear Organization Mission, Organization &
Policies (MOPS)
- Nuclear Organization Procedures (NOPs)
i , i i- ,
ACEO@@AUGM*XJM 4Wic.1RYf15EtsktAUCsirr$4GYtw st!?;&i412ML1DfjMar##GFsaws pulmtra
SELF-IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES
,
e Administrative procedures
- e Level of detail- commensurate with the task
. e~ Procedure revision process
eTraining of personnel on administrative
procedures
4
55-56
, --. --
. . - .. . . - -
. _ _ . . _ _ _ -
!
I
wwtnuutnurmwasswmamecnassunsarsesmura;wassan mza;nnsnaa
, ACTIVITIES PERFORMED TO ENSURE
l PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE 3
o Plant Manager communicates expectations
e Focused administrative training
e Hands on simulator training - both Technical &
Operations
- e Small specific training sessions
.
Work control process
e Plant status update conducted by department
managers
, i ! . i
1TJWiet antF#16mmSh@MN/ Ante &4HMmpK2 fat 112$ 23tR!MD%TMC4LMMETJ!fsc
ACTIVITIES PERFORMED TO ENSURE
PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE (Cont.)
eJPMs faulted on specific tasks
- e Radwaste procedures
eValidation of procedures prior to infrequently
.
performed evolution
e Simulator procedure validation
e Monitor activities in the field
,
- Feedback to self-assessment system
'
57-58
.- . .. -- - -. . ..
!
' t ,
'
amarannawmmauswawa wmanwaansmwmmu m wnmus nmstaten
'
PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT TEAM
PROCESS
:
e Multi-disciplined Team
- Customer Focus
; - Worker Level l
-
eGoals:
- Reduce level of effort required to produce quality ;
i
procedures
Improve usability of procedures for normal operations
l
Optimize cycle time to develop new and to modify
procedures
Improve quality of procedures (determine appropriate i
>
level of detail)
i
;
--------, m,--m-
PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT TEAM
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PROCESS (Cont.?
eobjectives:
! - Identify required process changes l
- Train organization on new process by end of
.
September 1997
Implement new process
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PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT PROCESS '
TIMELINE
einitial meeting May 21-22,1997
e Develop standards June 1997
e Add detail to process June 1997 ;
eWriters guide modified July 1997
eTest and revise process September 1997
eTrain on new process & September 1997.
, link with hardware upgrades -
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PLANT SUPPORT
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! Clair Goddard
Nuclear Services Manager
L
61-62
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PLANT SUPPORT - RP AND ALARA
e Areas identified for improvement
4 Radioactive material control
Station ALARA performance
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eWorker involvement and Training )
,
- Cross-functional self-assessment and benchmarking
Radiation protection work practices team
Site-wide training by VPNO/SD, Plant Manager and
RPM l
.
e improvements in the Tool Control Process )
Tools available for workers
Eliminated need to move tools outside RCA
eTechnician Performance and Accountability
eImproved Monitoring Capability
Small Article Monitors (SAMs)
Locking all Radioactive Material Seavans '
63-64
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POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED
e No loss or transfer of radioactive material to
unlicensed parties
e Onsite radioactive material events have
significantly decreased from more than 30 in
RFO-10 to 3 (none actually RAM) total in 1997
which included RFO-11
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[ ALARA PROGRAM PROGRESS l e Dose Reduction Action Plan (DRAP) drives
- improvements to reduce dose
. e 1996 was the lowest dose year in the history of
- Pilgrim Station (116 Rem)
'
2 outages (1 planned,1 forced)
! Pre-outage work i e Outage dose is still high but DRAP provides i long-term plan for reducing source term.
- Active since mid-1995
l - 115 items completed ! ' Over 1200 rem estimated to be saved over the
- remaining life of the plant
! l .
65-66
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o Recirc System Chemical Decontamination
(saved > 150 Rem in RFO-11)
eZinc injection
eTorus de-sludging - allowing access to the Torus
Compartment.
e Permanent shielding in the RHR quads and on the
recirculation risers in the drywell
NESG supportlownership integral to this success
e Fuel Pool Cooling System hydrolaze
e MOV Sentry remote monitoring system
,
o Remote temperature / vibration monitors for RHR and
l Core Spray pumps ! e Remote Camera and Dosimetry Monitoring Systems '
e 70% Reduction in Hot Spots from 63 (mid-1995) to 18
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ONGOING INITIATIVES
! e Chemical Decontamination of RHR loops in 1998
- *Thermex system to replace Flatbed Filters (3rd qtr.1997)
less exposure due to retirement of Flatbed Filters
less solid radioactive waste generated
'
improved water quality
'
sCameras for High Rad areas
-
e Reactor Water Cleanup Septa replacement
e RWCU and Chemical Decontamination
- e Fuel Pool Cooling System Decontamination
e Future' Chemical Decontamination of the Recirc System
'
e Permanent shielding of torus shell, drywell, scram headers
67-68
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WHAT DOES FUTURE LOOK LIKE7
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e Non-Outage years < 80 Rem ~~
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o Refueling Outage Years < 250 Rem
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e New Redline (Access Control Point) and PRORAD Iraprovements
More space and PRORAD terminals
- State-of-the-art portal monitors i
Full-service dosimetry office I
'
PRORAD programming improvements
Over 1000 electronic dosimiters in inventory
- Implemented use of SAMs for material release
Alternate access / egress points on turbine deck and makeup demin j
area
e Modified RWP Process to increase efficiency while maintaining
radiological safety
Reduced number of RWPs by 2/3
Standardized RWP format
Expanded use of general RWPs to include access to contaminated
areas ,
Changed the briefing process to focus on the briefing itself rather i
than the computer input
- Allowed field revisions to RWPs
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69-70
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o Other process improvements
Participation in multi-disciplined teams
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Dose goal was developed based on solid work scope
information
- Implemented lead RP technician positions
ALERT training for contractors: practical rather than classroom
o Performance Results
4
- Lower threshold for initiating prs facilitated identifying issues
associated with electronic c osimetry
. Radioactive material outside RCA reduced from > 30 to 3
,
, . 15 CRDs replaced in 16 h'o'urs witnoutincident
.
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONTINUED
. IMPROVEMENT ,
e Outage dose continues to be our biggest challenge
'
eInterdisciplinary communication needs
improvement (e.g., ALARA on Strainer Project)
.
Worker input sessions
PDC process changes will enhance ALARA/NESG
interface
e Opportunities exist to reduce radwaste
e Comprehensive Solid Radwaste Program
Improvement Plan
Perform detailed assessment utilizing industry
peers
Improve procedure quality
4
71-72
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PLANT SUPPORT - SECURITY
'
.
e Areas identified for improvement
- Self-assessment capability
Reliability of security system hardware
.
Maintenance i
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SECURITY PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS
e Security improvement Plan
Detailed self-assessment utilizing industry peer and QA
)ersonnel
Vianagement reviews
e Self-assessment program improvements
, Strengthened management involvement
Broader scope
e Eliminated self-screening companies with few exceptions
eMaintenance support of security equipment strengthened
e Security hardware improvements
Communications equipment
- Sector post environmental enclosures
Photo Imaging System
Personnel Access Data System (PADS) and Nuclear
Personnel System (NPS)
Replacement of cameras will commence in 1997
_
73-74
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ENGINEERING
!
I ! John Gerety l Deputy Nuclear Engineering Manager ! l L
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DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION
REVITALIZED
e Utilize Major Programs
- A-46
Setpoint Project
ECCS Design Bases Review 1
- Equipment Qualification l
1
- MOV Project (GL 89-10) !
i'
eldentify needs to support ongoing and future
modification work
e Establish an effective framework to capture !
information
75-76
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FSAR REVIEWS IMPROVE DOCUMENT
&
QUALITY
, s
- e Preliminary review completed
e No operability issues identified
e Discrepancies identified have been
'
documented and will be incorporated into the
i next FSAR update
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COMPLEMENT CHANGES TO OPTIMlZ l
- WORK FORCE ;
1
e NESG workforce remained stable during this )
evaluation period
eTeams being formed to identify ways to
improve efficiency i
eGoal to keep engineering work in-house with
the exception of specialty analysis
e Continue to improve vendor oversight
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77-78
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ENGINEERING SELF-ASSESSMENT
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RESULTS
: 'e Calculations - No technical issues identified
- that would invalidate conclusions
j e Procedure Adherence - Training conducted to
; correct problems identified in the PDC closeout ,
,
process l
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ENGINEERING SUPPORT PERSONNEC
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(ESP) TRAINING ENHANCEMENTS
eTopics identified by the NESG Departments
eTraining Committee coordinating requests and
'
feedback
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79-80
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