IR 05000293/1997099

Correction to SALP Rept 50-293/97-99.Page 2 of Subj Rept Corrected

ML20203G655
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	11/26/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203E322	List: IR 05000293/1997099 ML20203E318
References
50-293-97-99, NUDOCS 9712180180
Download: ML20203G655 (1)

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significant equipment issues at an early stage, but some lesser significant problems were overlooked. An operator identified a subtle but significant equipment problem involving a through wallleak in the heat exchanger channel head of the "B" reactor building closed loop cooling water system resulting in a plant shutdown for repairs. Despite the lower problem reporting threshold, operators and line managers missed some configuration control discrepancies and indicator problems in the control room. Also, two longstanding operator workaround conditions, that complicated post scram recovery efforts, were not challenged by the operations staf Operators responded well to plant transients with few exceptions noted. An example was the prompt operator response during a sudden insurge of seaweed on the intake structure screens that resulted in a safe transition to a lower power level without damage to the sea water pumps an improved response when compared to a similar event in the last SALP period. Also, dur:ng the last refueling outage, operators responded effectively to two significant events involving a main transformer failure and also a fullloss of offsite power (Unusual Event). However, an operating crew f ailed to follow the abnormal procedure in response to feedwater system regulating valve malfunction. Overall, the operational transient history reflected positively on operator performanc Operator training was generally effective. improvement was indicated by five of six operator licensa candidates passing the NRC license examination. The increased use of senior operating training personnel to analyze integrated crew response to transients contributed to more effective operations department self assessment. However, an operator knowledge deficiency involving the generator out of phase block circuitry became evident when several attempts were needed to resynchronize the generator or to the electrical grid. The plant simulator did not model well the shrink and swell of reactor vessel water level during power transient potentially irupacting training effectivenes During the February 1997 scram, operators experienced shrink and swell that eventually led to the isolation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection system which complicated recovery action Despite efforts to improve, problems persisted in the area of procedure quality and us Procedure quality issues were contributing causes for an engineered safety feature actuation, the unavailability of the station blackout diesel generator during a loss of offsite i power event, and an incorrectly positioned reactor vessel water level detector keep fill l system valve. Also, certain operational procedures were inadequate in that they potentially l allowed conditions outside the design bases such as for maximum and minimum flowrates for containment cooling during a loss of coolant accident. Instances of improper procedure use occurred. Most notable was the failure of an operating crew to promptly shut down the reactor on conditions of significant feedwater oscillation The Operations area is rated Category PDR AIO;K 05000293 G PDR