ML20206L458
| ML20206L458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1988 |
| From: | Carrasco J, Chaudhary S, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206L449 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-88-30, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8811290576 | |
| Download: ML20206L458 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1988030
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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Report No.
50-293/88-30
Docket No,'
50-293
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License No. OPR-35
Licensee: Boston Edison Company
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
3
RFD #1 Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360
Facility Name:
P!!:r!e: Mue!e:r Generatin; Statien
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Inspection At:
Plymouth, Massachusetts and Braintree, Massachusetts
Inspection Conducted: October 27, 1988 - November 18, 1988
Inspectors:
a.4 M4
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audha
or Reactor Engineer
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J:-fhrfrasco, R actor Engineer
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Approved by:
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MPS, EB, DRS
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R. Strosnfder, Chief
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Inspection Summary:
Special announced inspection on October 27 -
November 18, 1988 (Report No. 50-293/38-30)
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Area Inspected:
The inspection .:uvered licensee follow-up activities with
regard to loose anchor bolts found in a pipe support base plate, the safety
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significance of this discrepan:y, and the adequacy of the licensee's previous
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programs in response to NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14,
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Results: The inspection did not identify any condition that would adversely
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impact system operability and safety.
The licensae's bulletin follow-up
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program was found to be adequate.
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8311290576 881121
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1.
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF INSPECTION
On October 14, 1988, an NRC inspector identified a penetration support
(No. X-52) with two loose concrete expansion anchor bolts in one of the
base plates. The base plate was ceiling mounted and had a total of six
anchor bolts to transfer load to the structural concrete in the ceiling.
The penetration support was on the "B" loop of the residual heat removal
system at elevation 33'-6", inside the "B" valve room in tne reactor
building.
The deficiency was brought to the attention of the licensee
and subsequently the licensee implemented an extensive program of plant
walk-down inspectioas, anchor bolt torque testing, stress analyses and
records reviews to determine the extent and safety significance of the
problem.
An NRC inspection of licensee activities regcrding this issue was conducted
at the Pilgrim plant and at the licensee engineering offices in Braintree,
Massachusetts during the period from October 27 to November 4, 1988.
Further review of the findings from licensee plant walk-down and stress
analyses of piping supports'was performed in the NRC Region I office during
the week of November 14, 1988, and a management meeting was held with the
licensee on November 17, 1988 in the NRC Region I office to discuss NRC
findings and licensee actions to resolve *this issue. The objective of the
NRC inspection was to assess the extent and safety significance of the
loose anchor bolt problem and to assess the adequacy of the licensee's
actions to resolve the issue. During the course of the inspection the
scope of the licensee's activities and the NRC inspection was expanded to
include un assessment of the effectiveness of t*evious activites by the
licensee in response to NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 regarding piping
support base plates, and "as-built" configurations, respectively.
Section 2.0 of this report presents the NRC inspection findings regarding
the licensee's activities.
Section 3.0 presents a summary of the
management meeting held on November 17, and Section 4.0 presents the
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conclusions. Attachment 1 is a list of persons contacted during the
inspection, Attachment 2 1s a list of documents reviewed and Attachment 3
is an attendance list and copy of the licensee's presentation from the
November 17 management meeting.
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2.0 CONDUCT OF INSPECTION
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Following discovery of the loose anchor bolts in containment penetration
pipe support X-52, the licensee implemented a program to 16ntify and
examine simiitar penetration supports.
The purpose of the program was to
determine the extent of the loose anchor bolt problem and to erify the
integrity of similiar suppe -ts..on other primary containment penetrations.
The licenseis program incsuded a review of plant drawings to determine
the location and type of supports on systems penetrating the primary
containment drywell. The licensee identified 393 drywell penetrations.
Out of these 393 penetrations, 303 are small bore (2 1/2 inches or less in
diameter) and hoe no pipe supports.
For the remaining 90 large bore
penetrations, draw!ngs were reviewed and inspections were performed in the
plant to determine if there were any supports installed to strengthen the
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penetrations. The resiew identified 16 large bore piping penetrations in
primary containment with supplementary structural steel and base plates,
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These penetrations are l hted below.
Penetrations with drilled in expansion anchors:
X-12,
RHR Shutdown Cooling, A-RHR Valve Room
X-51A, RHR-LPCI Loop "A", A-RHR Valve Room
X-518, RHR-LPCI Loop "B", B-RHR Valve Room
X-52,
HPCI Steam Supply, B-RHR Valve Room
X-53,
RCIC Steam Supply, TIP Room, and
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- X-7A thru 0, X-8, X-9A and B, (Steam Tunnel Gang Support).
Penetrations with cast-in place anchors:
X-14,
RWCU Ht Ex Su; tion, RWCU Ht Ex Room
X-16A, Core Spray Loop "A",
RWCU Ht Ex Room
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X-16B, Core Spray Loop "B", MG Set Rm Area, and
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X-17,
RHR Head Spray, Full Pool Ht Ex Room.
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These penet. rations involved ten supports, because one of the supports
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(identified with *) was a "gang" support for seven piping penetrations.
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For penetration X-14, the licensee's inspection indicated that the support
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was installed using "Wej-it" anchors, although the design drawing
indicated cast-it place anchors.
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The licensee :onducted in plant inspections that included torque testing
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of all the anchor bolts in the ten containment penetration pipe supports
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as well as comparison of the "as-built" configuration of the supports to
the design drawings.
This inspection identified two loose base plate
anchor bolts in support X-51A in addition to the two loose bolts that had
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been observed in support X-52.
Also, several discrepancies between the
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"as-built" configuration of the supports and the design drawings were
identified.
These discrepancies included items such as missing cross
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bracing, missing gusset, plates and, in some cases, over sized structural
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members.
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's follow-up on this problem to
verify that the safety significance of the identified deficiencies was
being properly evaluated and that licensee actions were adequate to
resolve the issue. On October 27, 1988, two NRC inspectors performed an
inspection in the plant to visually examine support X-52 in which the
loose anchor bolts were initially observed and other similiar containment
penetration supports that the licensee had identified arJ examined.
Also, the findings from the licensee's plant inspectione and their
ongoing evaluations were reviewed by the NRC inspecurs at the licensee's
engineering offices in Braintree, Massachusetts.
Based on this review
and discussion with licensee personnel engaged in the follow-up on this
problem, the NRC inspectors identified the two following coacerns:
1.
Adequacy of the containment penetration pipe supports to assure
systm operability considering the deficiencies identified in the
licensee's walk-Jown inspections, and
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Adequacy of the licensee's previous programs and actions in
response co NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 regarding piping support
base plates and "as-built" discrepancies, respectively.
The licensee's actions and NRC inspection activities in these two creas
are discussed in the following sections.
2.1 Adequacy-of "As-Built" Containment Penetration Pipe Supports.
Because original design calculations could not be located for all of
the containment penetration pipe supports and because of the
discrepant conditions identified, the licensee performed stress
analyses for all ten of the penetration pipe supports. Two sets of
analyses were performed.
The first analyzed the "as-found"
condition of the discrepant supports to determine if the identified
discrepancies would impact system operability.
For these analyses a
minimum factor of safety of two was considered necessary to demonstrate
system operability. This approach is consistent with NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14. The second set of analyses was performed to determine
if the applicable code factors of safety committed to in the FSAR
were satisfied or if modifications or repairs to the discrepant
supports were necessary.
The NRC inspectors reviewed in detail the reanalyses of all ten
containment penetration pipe supports to determine the technical
validity of the analytical apnroach and the acceptability of the
results of the calculations,
ihe reviews were performed at the BECo
engineering offices during the period from October 28, 1988 to
November 4, 1988, and in the NRC Region I offices during the week of
November 14.
The following aspects c the calculations were
reviewed:
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- Origin and validity of the loads on the supports;
- Coordinate axis and orientation of the loads used in the
analyses;
- Methods and basis of load combinations;
- Transformation of loads from global to local axes, as
required;
- Validity of the mathematical models in representing the
correct "as-built" geometry and dimensions of the supports;
- Validity of interaction equations for structural members,
eided connections, cast-in place anchors, and concrete
expansion anchors;
- Random checks of numerical values; and
- Overall validity of assumptions, analytical procedures, and
conclusions.
The inspectors also verified that the containment penetration pipe
supports were properly modeled as anchor points in the piping stress
analysis models.
Based on their review, the NRC inspectors identified no deficiencies
in the licensee analyses and concluded that the analyses were properly
performed and supported the licensee's conclusions.
The results of the licensee's calculations indicated that all ten
containment penetration pipe supports had a minium factor of safety
of two in their "as-found" condition.
Thus indicating that the
identified discrepancies between the "as-found" configuations and
design drawings did not affect system operability.
The licensee's
calculations also demonstrated that eight of the ten supports
satisfied the applicable code factors of safety committed to in the
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FSAR and that the remaining two supports would satisfy those factors
of safety af ter repair or modification.
The licensee informed the
NRC that the specific repairs and modifications required are in
progress, and are expected to be complete by November 22, 1988.
The licensee also performed a records review and physical
examinations to determine the cause of the loose anchor bolts
identified in supports X-52 and X-51A.
It was determined that the
entainment penetration pipe supports were included on the
containment civil / structural design drawings and not on the piping
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drawings that had been used to establish the Bulletin 79-02 and
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79-14 and pipe support ISI programs. As a result, the containment
per etration pipe supports apparently had not received the same
tk sughness of inspection as other piping supports. The licensee
, u formed a review of other civil structural drawings and a plant
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walk-down to verify that no other supports had been missed in a
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similiar fashion.
In addition, the licensee performed physical
inspections of the loose anchor bolts found in supports X-52 and
X-51A.
These particular bolts were "Wej-it" type anchor bolts located
in ceiling and wall base plates.
Examinations revealed that the bolt
holes in support X-52 had been drilled oversize and the bolts grouted
in place. The anchor spades on the bolts showed no indication that
they had been properly set and the washer tabs that operate the anchor
spade push rods were bent on two bolts. The loose bolts in X-51A also
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appeared to have not been properly anchored when Initially installed.
As a result of these observations, it was concluded that the failures
were most likely due to improper installation in the difficult over
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head and wall positions.
Torque testing of other bolts as described
later in this report included a large number of additonal "Wej-it"
type anchors and no other loose "Wej-it" anchors were identified.
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The NRC inspectors reviewed licensee data and visually examined removed
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"Wej-it" bolts and concluded that no generic installation problem
existed.
2.2 Adequacy of Prior Activities Related To Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14
The loose anchor bolts and "as-built" discrepancies identified in the
containment penetration pipe supports raised concerns regarding the
adequacy of prior licensee activities in response to NRC Bulletins
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79-02 and 79-14 regarding piping support base plates and "as-built"
configuations, respectively. To address this concern the licensee
performed ir ,, ant inspections of piping supports included in the
79-02 and 79-14 programs and other supports, including dual service
pipe whip restraint / pipe supports and civil structures (cat walks,
etc.) utilizing anchor bolt supports. A review of previous pipe
support inservice inspection program results also was performed.
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Licensee Inspections c' Supports in the 79-02 and 79-14 Programs
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The licensee initiated a program of "as-built" verification inspec-
tions and anchor bolt torque testing for pipe supports that were
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included in the NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 programs.
Statistical
sampling methods described in, "Sampling procedures and Tables for
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Inspection by Attribute", MIL-Standard 1050, indicated that a sample
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size of 80 was necessary to provide a 95% confidence level of a .95
probability that the percentage of defective supports was five percent
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or less. The actual number of supports inspected to verify the
"as-built" configuration was 115.
These supports were included on
nine isometric drawings selected from the five plant systems identified
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as most important to risk in the pilgrim Individual plant Evaluation
(IPE).
The selected systems were: high pressure core injection
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(HPCI), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), residual heat removal
(RHR/LPCI), core / pray (CS) and salt service water (SSW).
In addition,
184 base plates were inspected and 160 anchor bolts torque tested in
accordance with mant.facturer reconmendations. These inspections and
tests identified four 1cose anchor bolts out of the 160 tested and
five discrepancies in a pports; none of which impacted system oper-
ability.
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The most significant discrepancy identified was a failed member on an
RHR pipe support.
The failure occurred at a fillet weld between a
vertical tubular support member and a ceiling base plate.
The licensee
performed visual examin.. tons of twelve other supports in the RHR
system (not part of the original 115 sample) and found no other
damaged supports.. Licensee evaluation concluded that the failure was
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the result of lack of penetration of the fillet weld and possible
thermal hydraulic loads in the system; although, no other evidence of
significant pipe motion or damage was observed. Also, the licensee
reviewed the erection / installation documents of the support to identify
the welder who had performed the installation welding. By this review
of records the licensee established that the. two welders who had
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performed welding on the failed support r. iso had worked on six (6)
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other supports in addition to the one i,ith the' failed weld.
The
licensee performed visual examinations of these supports and found
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that two welds had minor discrepanctes (one with weld spatter and
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one undersized). All inspected welds, however, were determined to be
acceptable for intended service.
Dual Service Supports and Civil Structure Inspections
In addition to the above, the licensee performed "as-built"
inspections of 15 supports in balance-of plant systems,14 supports
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in non-safety related high energy systems, performed torque testing
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on 125 anchor bolts in pipe whip restraints and 94 anchor bolts in
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civil / structural supports such as catwalks. These inspections
revealed no significant "as-built" discrepancies. Of the 207 anchor
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bolts tested,16 failed to reach the manufacturer specified torque
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values.
As of November 18, none of the conditions found were determined
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to affect system operability; although, analyses of some conditions
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were still in progress.
In addition to operability analyses, the
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licensee was performing analyses to confirm that the discrepant supports
satisfy applicable code factors of safety or will satisfy these
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factors of safety af ter repairs are completed. The inspectors reviewed
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in detail analyses for the following dual service supports:
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H 12-115, H 12-1-116, H 12-1-117 (i %.681),
H 12-1-111, H 12-1-112, H 12-1-113 (150.680)
H 23-1-102 (I50.602)
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H6-1-200 & H6-1-201 (ISO, 644), and
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H 1-1-200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205 (1S0.694)
The above review indicated that there was no appannt tret.d or
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programatic inadequacy in the design of these supports. Also, the
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review of discrepancies identified in the licensee's inspection did
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not disclose any safety significant problem in the installa',fon of
these supports.
The results of the operabil.ity analyses and the analyses to
demonii.ral.e code safety factors will be examined during a future NRC
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inspection (IFl 293/88-30-01).
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Piping Support ISI Procram Review
The inspectors determined that the licensee's inservice inspection-
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program includes a visual inspection of 100% of the safety related
piping supports every ten years. Since 1985, approximately 600
supports have been inspected by the licensee under this program.
The inspectors questioned whether these inspections had revealed any
discrepant conditions relevant to the current issues. The licensee
performed a review of the non-conformanco reports associated with ISI
activities. The results of this review indicated that there was no
discernable trend or other evidence indicating previous similar pipe
support problems.
3.0 NOVEMBER 17, 1988 MEETING
A management meeting was held with the licensee on November 17, 1988
in the NRC Region I office to discuss the NRC inspection findings,
the safety significance of the loose anchor bolts and the licensees
program for resolving the issue. A list of the meeting attendees and
a copy of the licensee presentation are included in Attachment 3.
During the meeting the licensee presented the scope and findings of
their program to resolve the loose anchor bolt concern and their
schedule for final dispositon of identified discrepancies. The
licensee indicated that all necessary repairs would be completed by
approximately November 22.
They also stated that their review to
determine if any aspect of the issue requires reportability under
10CFR S0.72 would be completed by approximately the end of November.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS
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Based on the above inspections, evaluations, and observations by
inspectors, the NRC Region I staff identified no conditions regarding
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the containment drywell penetrations th..>tould adversely impact
operability of the associated systems.
The licensee's plan to repair
and restore the pipe supports to meet their design safety rargin
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required by ASME code prior to plant start-up is acceptable. The
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licensee's exter ive ti. plant walk down inspections, reanalyses and
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in-depth evaluations of identified deficiencies, and corrective
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actions, when necessery, have provided confidence in the reliability
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of plant safety' systems to fulfill their intended fcction.
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Additionally, the licensee's efforts to assure the tdequacy of prior
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activities relative to Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 have demonstrated
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that those activities were generally adequate to identify and
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resolve significant deficiencies as was intended by the bulletins.
The licensee's current efforts in this area have been extensive and
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are based on recognized statistical methods to provide an acceptable
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level of confidence that systems important to safety are operable,
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The above conclusion is also supported by the licensee's in-service
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inspection program for pipe supports, the results of which do not
indicate any adverse trend in this area.
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Attachment 1
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PERSONS CONTACTED
BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
R.
N'. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
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H. V. 0heim, Deputy Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department
R. V. Fairbank, Design Section Manager
R. E. Grazio, Regulatory Section Manager
P. Hamilton, Compliance Division Manager
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W. Riggs, Fluid Systems & Mechanical Components Division Manager
F. N. Famulari, Quality Assurance Manager
N. L. Desmond, Operations Quality Control Division Manager
T. J. Tracy, Civil Structural Division Minager
J. Jerz, Project Manager
S. Roberts, Principal Mechanical Engineer
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V. J. Zukauskas, Principal Structural Engineer
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L. Chan, Mechanical Enginaar
G. Mileris, Hechinical Engineer
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R. C. Chugh, Structural Engineer
J. G. Dyckman, Structural Engineer
C. T. Pitts, Structural Engineer
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C. D. Rydman, Structural Engineer
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S. L. Manning, Structural Engineer
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CYGNA ENERGY SERVICES
N. Williams, Project Engineer
BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION
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N. Goel, Pipe Stress Analist
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R. Canti, Pipe Stress Analist
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Attachment 2
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DOCUMENT REVIEWED
CALCULATIONS
BECo Calc No.
Title
C15.0.2740, Rev. O
Support for Penetration
X-12
C15.0.2741, Rev. O
Support for Penetration
X-51A
C15.0.2742, Rev. O
Support for Penetration
X-518
C15.0.2729, Rev. O
Support for Penetration
X-52
C15.0.2743, Rev. O
Support for Penetration
X-53
C15.0.2744, Rev. O
Support for Fenetration
X-7,8,9
C15.0.2733, Ray. O
Support for Penetration
X-14
C15.0.2735, Rev. O
Support for Penetration
X-16A
C1:i.0.2745, Rev. O
Support for Penetration
X-16B
C15.0.2734, Rev.,0
Support for Penetration
X-17
C15.0.2747. Rav. O
C15.0.2736, Rev. O
C15.0.2737, Rev. O
Pipe Support H12-1-111 (PR-12-1-1)
H12-1-112 (PR-12-1-2), H12-1-113 (PR-12-1-3),
ISO 680
C15.0.2738, Rev. O
C15.0.2746, Rev. O
Pipe Supports H12-1-115 (PR-12-1-5),
H12-1-116 (PR-12-1-6), H12-1-117 (PR-12-1-7),
150 681
DRAWINGS
BEco Orawing No.
Drawing Title
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H33, Rev. E5
Piping & Mechanical - Reactor Building Areas 1
and 3, plan above EL. 23'-0" to EL 40'-9".
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M35, Rev. E5
Piping & Mechanical - Reactor Building Area
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3, plan above EL 40'-9".
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H36, Rev. E3
Piping & Mechanical - Reactor Building Areas
1 and 3, plan above EL.51'-0".
H36, Rev. E3
Piping & Mechanical - Reactor Building Areas
1 and 3, plan above EL.74'-3".
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C127, Rev. 3
Reactor Building - Main Steam Pipe supports
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(sheet 1)
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Attachment 2-
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DOCUMENT REVIEWED Cont.
C127A, Rev. 5
Reactor Building - Miscellaneous Pipe
. supports (sheet 2)
Cl34, Rev. E2
Reactor Building - Steel Framing at Elev.
51'-0; Plan, Sections and Details
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C135, Rev. 5
Reactor Building - Steel Framing et Elev.
51'-0", Details (SH.2)
C152, Rev. E2
Reactor Building - Containment Vessel
Requirements, Drywell; Plans, Sections and
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Penetr&tions
C153, Rev. E4
Reactor Building - Containment Vessel
Requirements, Suppression Chamber; Plan,
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' Sections and Penetrations
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C373, Rev. 3
Reactor Building, Miscellaneous Structural
Steel (Sheet 3)
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C357, Rev. El
Reactor Building, Miscellaneous Structural
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Steel; Pipe Restraints for Main Steam and
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C803, Rev. E3
Reactor Building, R. H. R. Valve Compartment
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FL. El. 23'-0", Pipe Restraints, Anchor,
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Valve and Cable Protection
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C805, Rev. E2
Reactor Building, R. W. C. V. Compartments EL
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S1'-0" Pipe Restraints, M.0. Valve and Cable
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Protection
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In addition to the above, substantial number of other documents were reviewed.
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Those documents included correspondences, specifications, procedures,
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instructions, safety data sheets, and engineering and safety evaluations.
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.,ATTACHMEllT 3
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0mlSSION
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DATE:
/Vo v . / 7, /9 68
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SUDJECT:
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AGENDA
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Summary and Conclusion
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initial Finding and BECo. Response
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Investigation Process and Completeness
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IV
Positive Results
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Subsequent Findings and Disposition
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Sumniary and Conclusions
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ACHIEVED HIGH CONFIDENCE IN PIPE SUPPORTS AND
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BASE PLATE ANCHORAGE THROUGH EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION
Pipe Suppo.rts installed per Stress Analysis of Record
' Anchor Bolts, including Wej-its, Properly Installed
Findings Few, Significance Low, None Reportable ~
Soundness of IEB 79-02,79-14 Programs Consistently
Evident
System Operability Consistently Demonstrated
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INVESTIGATION PROCESS WAS DISCIPLINED
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AND THOROUGH
Find Deviation
Define Problem
Identify Causes, Contributing Factors
Postulate Extent, Potential Significance
Establish Reportability
Initiate Corrective / Preventive Actions
Capture Lessons Learned
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SIGNIFICANCE OF LOOSE BOLT QUICKLY RECOGNIZED
Close to Restart
Potential Programmatic Implications identified
- Tack Welded Fasteners
- Wej-Its
Potentially Large Scope
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BECO'S RESPONSE WAS CONSISTENT WITH
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POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE
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Effort Directed by Senior Level Managers
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Use of Utility Resources Maximized
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Series of Checks / Balances Set in P! ace
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Management _ Oversight Established Early
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8000 Engineering and QA Manhours
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Expended Over 34 Days
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PIPE SUPPORT LOCATION. ORIENTATION. FUNCTION
AGREED WITH ANALYSIS AND lEB 79-14 INSPECTION RESULTS
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Walkdowns Performed on Five Most Safety Significant
Systems Based on IPE Results
- Represented a Sample Population of Hangers Meeting
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MIL STD 105D Criteria
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Only One Minor Deviation Was Found
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No Additional Supports identified
As-Found Conditions Confirmed Operable
Pipe Penetration Anchors Were Considered as Pipe Stress
Analysis Termination Points
Dual Purpose Whip Restraints Were Considered in the Pipe
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Stress Analysis
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ANCHOR BOLT CONFIRMATORY WALKDOWN RESULTS
AGREED WITH IEB 79-02 INSPECTION RESULTS
Sample Population for Walkdowns Exceeded
MIL STD 105D Criteria
Only 2 Repairs Required as a Result of
Walkdowns
Torque Tests Performed on Identified Wej-Its
for Large Bore; Safety Related Pipe
Torque Tests Were Approximately 95%
Successful
No Reportable Findings
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IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION ISOLATED THE ISSUE
TO LIMITED NUMBER OF BOLT INSTALLATIONS
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Initial Problem (Tack Welded Nuts to Plate) Found in Only
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One Other Place
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Anchor Sensitive Walkdown by Expert Consultants
Revealed Just Three items of Significance
Installation Problems Limited to Wej-Its
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- Use of Wej-Its Limited
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- Findings Modest
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- Installation Craftsmanship Good
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EXPOSURE REDUCTION MEASURES WERE USED
THROUGHOUT THE FIELD WORK
Lifts and Ladders in Place of Scaffolding
Remote inspection Device Used Where Possible
Inspection Teams Staffing
- Minimum Size Sufficient to Perform the Function
- Personnel Qualifications Reviewed
Pre-inspection Review Meetings
- Reviewed Detailed Task Scope
- Attended by ALARA and Radiation Protection
Supervision
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Engineering Products Were Established to Respect ALARA
- Detailed Review to Ensure Sufficient Detail
- On-Site Engineering Coverage Provided
- Cautions in PDC About ALARA Group Involvement
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Dedicated RWPs Generated for Exposure Tracking
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ALARA PERFORMANCE WAS CLOSELY MONITORED-
THROUGHOUT THE INVESTIGATION
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Penetration Support inspection Repair
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ALARA Budget
4.2 Person Rem
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3.82 Person Rem (100% Complete)
Expended
Anchor Bolt inspection / Test
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3.0 Person Rem
ALARA Budget
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2.013 Person Rem (95% Complete)
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Expended
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WALKDOWN, TEST & INSPECTION SUMMARY
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SCOPE
DATES
PlPE
ANCHOR
B/P
FINDINGS
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SUPPTS
BOLTS
79-14
10/30
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Consistent with79-14
79-02
11/5 & 6
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=298
- g 184 Consistent with 79-02
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EQE
11/8-10
3 Items of Significance
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Inspections Cnmt Pipe 10/21
10
Minor Physical Deviations
Anchors
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Cnmt Pen
10/31
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Verified No Steel
w/o Steel
BOP W!R
10/30
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FW Pipe Support w/o Vert Rest.
NSR HEL
11/11
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No Wej-Its Found
"Baseline"
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Loose Bolt in X-51B
79-02
11/7-11
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33
160
156 Passed,4 Failed
Whip Rest.
11/11-13
125
117 Passed,8 Failed
EQE
11/12
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90 Passed,4 Failed
RETEST
11/12-14
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5 Passed
Whip Rest.
11/14
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One Short Bolt
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Walkdowns
Tack Weld
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2 Supports w/ Tack Welds
79-14 Supp
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Operable As-Found
Analyses
Other,Supp
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Operable As-Found (prelim.)
Pipe
11/2-18
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Operable As-Found
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SUMMARY OF INSPECTION FINDINGS
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Scope
issues
Disposition
Status
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Tack Welded
Containment
Anchor Bolts
X-52 Repair
Complete
X-52
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Pipe Whip
X-51B Accept-As-Is
F/C 11/18
Restraint
X-51 B
inspections
Minor Phys.ical
Accept-As-Is
F/C 11/20
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Dev,iations
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Tack Welds
Others Observed
Accept-As-Is
Complete
FW Pipe Support w/o
Accept-As-Is
Complete
Vertical Restraint
RHR Pipe Support
Repair
Complete
IEB 79-02/14
Weld Failure
Samples
SSW Pipe Support
Repair
F/C 11/18
HPCI Pipe Support
Ac~ceptable As-Is
Complete
Loos
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DP S
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Repair
F/C 11/18
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D/G Fuel Oil Line
Acceptable As-Is
F/C 11/18
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SUMMARY OF INSPECTION FINDINGS (cont'd)
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Scope
issues
Disposition
Status
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immovable Nuts (154)
Accept-As-Is
Complete
Spinners (3)
Reset
Complete
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Spinner.cp)
Repair
F/C 11/22
Toque Test
Oversized Nut
Repair
F/C 11/18
Pull Out (1)
Repair
F/C 11/22
Cut Ends (4)
Accept-As-lo
F/C 11/18
Cut Ends (2)
Repair
F/C 11/22
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Severed Bolt (1)
Accept-As-Is
F/C 11/18
Ultr sonic
Short Bolt (1)
Accept-As-Is
F/C 11/18
Analysis /
Five Conflicts
Evaluation and
Contplete
Coniiquration
Vecilication
Revised Analysis
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ACHIEVED HIGH CONFIDENCE IN PIPE SUPPORTS AND
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BASE PLATE ANCHORAGE THROUGH EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATIOt!
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Pipe Setports Installed per Stress Analysis of Record
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Anchor Bolts, including Wej-Its, Proparly Installed
Findings Few, Significance Low, i;or:0 Reportable
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Soundness of IEB 79-02,79-14 Programs Consistently
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Evident
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System Operability Consistently Demonstrated
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