IR 05000293/1997008
| ML20212D743 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212D725 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-97-08, 50-293-97-8, NUDOCS 9710310177 | |
| Download: ML20212D743 (61) | |
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Enclosure 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
License N DPR 35
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Report N ,
Docket N .
Licensee: Boston Edison Company 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station inspection Period: August 5 - September 13,1997 Inspectors: R. Laura, Senior Resident inspector R. Arrighi, Resident inspector
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J. Noggle, Radiation Specialist inspector Approved by: R. Conte, Chief Reactor Projects Branch No. 8 Division of Reactor Projects
9710310177 971024 PL'R ADOCK 05000293 G PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-293/97-08 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenancs, and plant support. The report covers a 5.5 week period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes the results of announced inspections by a regional specialist inspector in the area of health physics, t Operations Progress has been made at reducing the number of identified " operating work arounds" (38 to 20). The licensee has scheduled to resolve a majority of the issues within the next several months. None of the items affect the power operations of the unit. Actions are planned to review operational procedures to identify any accepted compensatory measures. (Section O.2.1)
The seaweed intrusion event was handled very well by the operating crew considering the rapid redur, tion in the "A" seawater pump suction welllevel. Operators followed procedurrs and effectively placed the plant in a safe condition to mitigate the consequences of a decreasing intake structure water level. Effective and prompt communications between the screen house and the control room allowed operators to quickly assess plant conditions and direct additional personnel to the traveling screen pmblem. BECo effectively identified enhancements in addition to underlying causes.
(Soction O 2.2)
Malatenance LCO maintenance on the RCIC system was well controlled by carefully scheduling various maintenance tasks with the installation of mechanical and I&C modifications. The l&C and mechanics performed safety related work in a deliberate manner. Effective supervisory and system engineer involvement contributed towards quality work (Section M.1.1)
The failure of the "A" SSW motor shaft is believed to be due to fatigue failure; final analysis is not expected until the 'ater part of September 1997. NRC staff plans further review of the failure mechanism of the "A" SSW motor shaft and the potential generic- applicability to the other SSW purrps. (IFl 97 08 01). (Section M.1.2)
No safety related equipment operability problems were noted. The corrective maintenance running repair backlog shows a decline over a two year period. The licensee has, for the most part, been able to achieve lower goals. An increase in the actual number of corrective maintenance MRs was experienced during the RFO, however this number has begun to decrease since the completion of the RFO. Changes in the work control process and increased management focus appeared to have contributed to overall improvement in this area. (Section M.2.1)ii
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b The safety evaluation for dredging of the intake canal was determined to be adequate.
(Section E.2.1)
The modification of the microprocessor controlling the regulating transformers only addressed the specific deficiency that led to the unit loss of offsite power in April 1997.
The corrective action was narrowly focused and did not address other potential transformer shutdown mechanisms that were introduced by the original modification that replaced a distribution transformer with the microprocessor controlled regulating transformer. This is an Unresolved item. (Section E.8.1)
Plant Sucoort The problem report progrum was revised effective January 1,1997, which resulted in an increased volume of radiological problem reporting. The inspectors sampling of these reports indicate that the safety consequence of most of these was low. Two potentially significant issues included, improper electronic dosimetry logging by personnel and contaminated tool control within the RCA.
Higher than average BWR exposure performance continues at Pilgrim Station. The licensee has not made consistent progress in controlling cobalt input, which remains high, however, recent zinc injection shows some promise in curbing the rate of source term buildup at the station.
Inaccurate work hour tracking was determined to be a weakness in the ALARA program.
Weakness in work-hour estimating and tracking affects the ability to accurately monitor the time parameter of exposure accrual.
RP instrument and dosimetry calibrations were correctly performed and met requirements.
Management oversight of RP program was adequate with some improvement in the RP self-assessment area.
Internal dose assessment procedures were not complete, with some improvements needed
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- TABLE OF CONTENTS EX E C U TIV E S U M M A RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Summary of Plant Status ............................................1 1. O P E R AT I O N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 01 Conduct of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 01.1 General Commente (71707) ...........................1 02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment ................... 1 02.1 Operating Work-arounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 O2.2 Se a we ed Intrusio n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 II. MAINTENANCE . . . .............................................4 M1 Conduct of M aintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 M 1.1 G e ne ral Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 M1.2 Salt Service Water (SSW) Motor Shaft Shear ............... 5 M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . 5 M2.1 Corrective Maintenance Backlog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 ,
M7.1 Receipt and Inspection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902) ..................... 7 M8.1 (Closed) Follow-Up Item 50-293/96-02-01: Work Control . . . . . . . 7 Ill . E N GI N E E RI N G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment ..................8 E2.1 Safety Evaluation for the intake Canal Dredging Operation . . . . . . 8 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 E8.1 LER 97-007, Regulating Transformer Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 IV. PLA NT S U PPO RT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 R1.1 External and Internal Exposure Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 R1.2 Source Term Reduction Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 R7.1 Audits and Assessments . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 R7.2 Radiological Problem Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 R8 Miscellaneous RP&C issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 R8.1 (Closed) LER 97-01: Special Nuclear Material Accountability . . . 16 R8.2 (Closed) LER 97-02: Steam Jet Air Ejector Alternate Sampling Not Performed in accordance with Technical Specifications . . . . . . . 16 R8.3 (Closed) LER 97-05: Turbine Building Effluent Monitor Operability
..............................................17 R8.4 (Closed) IFl 96-03-03: ALARA Maintenance Hour Tracking .... 17 R8.5 (Closed) IFl 97-03-03: Layup of Radwaste Equipment (Waste Feed Tank and Floc Recycle Tank) . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 R8.6 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) ............. 18 iv j
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- e V. M A N AG EM ENT M E ETING S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 X1 Exit Meeting Summ ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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X4 Review of UFSAR Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................21 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED . . . . . . . . . . .....................22 V
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REPORT DETAILS
Summarv of Plant Status Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) began the period operating at approximately 100%
l reactor power. On August 23,1997, power was reduced to 49% to maintain condenser vacuum due to a sudden influx of seaweed onto the intake structure traveling screens.
Further details of this event are discussed in Section 02.2 of this report. The operators returned the reactor to 100% power operation on August 24,1997 where it operated at or near power level through>ut the remainder of the inspection period.
I. OPERATIONS Conduct of Operations' 01.1 General Comments (717071 Using Inspection Procedure 71707,the inspector conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, in general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. During tours of the control room, the inspectors discussed any observed alarms with the operators and verified that they were aware of any lit alarms and the reasons for them.- Any anomalies noted during tours were discussed with the nuclear watch engineer (NWE). Other specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the following sections. Shift turnovers and pre-evolutionary briefs were thorough. Senior -
management presence in the control room was evident. The nuclear watch engineer closely tracked operations equipment problems in the morning report and briefed personnel at the plant manager's morning meeting.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Operatina Work-arounds a.
insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspector performed a review of the number of operations compensatory measures
" work-arounds" to identify any significant operating issues or relevant trends, b, Observations and Findinos A review of the operations compensatory measures revealed that they have trended down from 38 to 20 during this assessment period. Approximately half of the items are less that six months old; with the oldest being two and a half years of age. A review of the scheduled completion dates indicate that the licensee plans to resolve, with the exception of those items that cannot be completed on-line, the majority of the issues within the next several months.
The inspector discussed each of the identified " work arounds" with the assistant Topical headings such as 01 M8, etc., are used in accordance with the NRC standardized reactor inspection report outline. Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topics.
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operations department manager to assess the significant of each item. The majority of the items did not affect normal operation of the unit. The most significant issues deal with the control rod position indication (RPI) in that it does not pmvide full-in indication to the RPI system due to rod over-travel; and the feed water system regulating valve hunting. The licensee plans on reviewing applicable station procedures for cases of procedural steps may have been established to provide accepted compensatory actions for less than optimal equipment performance. This action was in response to a previous NRC violation (50-293/97-01-02).
c. Conclusions
Progress har been made at reducing the number of identified " operating work arounds" (38 to 20). The licensee has scheduled to resolve the majority of the issues within the next several months. None of the items affect the power operation of the unit. Actions are planned to review operational procedures to identify any accepted compensatory measures.
O2.2 Seaweed Intrusion a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
On August 23,1997, the control room received the traveling screen high differential pressure (DP) alarm due to seaweed intrusion. Operators entered the applicable abnormal operating procedures (AOP) to trip the affected seawater pump and lower reactor power to <
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maintain condenser vacuum. The inspector reviewed the plant computer traces, control -
room logs, and AOPs to assess operator performance, b.
Observations and Findinas At approximately 8:00 am on Saturday August 23, a large amount of seaweed blocked the "C" and "D" traveling screens. This blockage caused the traveling screen high DP alarm to annunciate and lead to a rapid drop (2 feet per minute) in the "A" seawater pump suction welllevel. Operators shifted screen speed from slow to fast and began lowering reactor power in accordance with AOP 2.4.154, " Intake Structure Fouling."
The equipment operator stationed at the intake structure monitoring the seaweed dredging operation reported that the "C" and "D" traveling screens had tripped and attempted to restart u e screens. Suction level continued to decrease and operators tripped the "A" seawater pump and performed a rapid power reduction using the rapid power reduction array to maintain condenser vacuum in accordance with AOP 2.4.36.
Equipment operators restarted the traveling screens; and the pump suction level was recovered. The lowest level reached in the "A" seawater pump suction level was (-)13 feet. Reactor power was reduced to 49 percent and condenser vacuum degraded 2 percent to 25 in HG. Operators returned the plant to 100 percent power on August 24, 1997.
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BECo management directed that a post trip review of the event be performed to document i the unexplained power decrease. The licensee identified that the seawater pump tripped on thermal overload; the screen shear pins did not break as designed. The shear pins are designed to break at 75 percent of rated motor load. Inspection revealed that the wrong style shear pins were installed in the "C" and "D" traveling screens. The correct style pins were installed in the "A" and "B" screens.
The restart of the "C" and "D" traveling screens was delayed because operators were not familiar with the thermal overload reset buttons for the traveling screens. These resets were installed as part of plant design change 85-800.
The inspectors review of the AOPs, logs, and computer printouts revealed that crew quickly recognized and responded to the event. The operator in the screen house provided prompt information and took immediate actions to mitigate the incident. A delay in starting the "C" and "D" screens was noted due to operator unfamiliarity with resetting the screen thermal overioad. No control rods became mispositioned due to the rapid downpower which was an improvement over a previous event. Correct procedure adherence was noted.
Dredging of the intake canal was secured at 8:00 pm the day before the seaweed intrusion event. A tug boat-was in the process of repositioning the scow next to the barge in -
preparation for recommencing the dredging operation for the day. The tug boat operator swung the tug boat around, with the stern of the boat f acing the intake structure, to push the scow into position. The " normal practice" was for the barge bucket to pull the scow (not using the tug boat inside the intake canal). Verbally, the dredging company had told the licensee that this would be the practice on how the scow would be moved. However, a temporary s aperintendent was in charge of the dredging operation this day. This condition was either not known and/or not conveyed to the tug boat superintendent.
This condition was not specifically addressed in the related safety evaluation, but selected conditions of the safety evaluation were met, such as the operator stationed at the screen house to monitor for any intake of sand or other unusual conditions (also in section E.2.1).
A problem report was generated to document and follow up on these problems, c.
Conclusion The seaweed intrusion event was handled very well by the operating crew considering the rapid reduction in the "A" seawater pump suction welllevel. Operators followed procedures and effectively placed the plant in a safe condition to mitigate the consequences of a decreasing intake structure water level. Effective and prompt communications between the screen house and the control room allowed operators to quickly assess plant conditions and direct additional personnel to the traveling screen problem. BECo effectively identified enhancements in addition to underlying causes of the event.
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11. MAINTEN ANCE M1 Conduct of Maintenance M 1.1 General Comments a.
Insoection Scoce (61726. 62703)
Using inspection procedures 61726 and 62703, the inspector observed portions of selected maintenance and surveillance activities to verify proper calibration of test instrumentation, use of approved procedures, performance of the work by qualified personnel, conformance to limiting conditions for operation, and correct system restoration following maintenance and/or testing. Some activities observed include the following:
- P9501340 Clean and Inspect RCIC exhaust steam trap
- E97000011nstall new RCIC pressure switches 1360-9a,c,d per PDC 95-34 e 19701442 RCIC turbine lubricating oil change
- 8.5.2.2.1 "B" Train RHR Pump Operability Test
- E9700050 Exhaust diaphragm high pressure setpoint change per PDC 97-27 b. Observations and Findinas The inspector observed the conduct of on-line maintenance for the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system which placed the unit in a 14 day shutdown technical specification (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO). A number of various preventive and corrective maintenancc tasks were scheduled and completed. Additionally, several modifications were made to RCIC system cornponents as safety enhancements. For example, PDC 94-29 installed a much smaller mesh lubricating oil filter and also better venting for the RCIC turbine lubricating oil sump. The mechanics installing the modification were very experienced in fit-up of the new tubing and mechanical joints. Effective oversight of the LCO maintenance activities by the maintenance supervisor, RCIC system engineer and plant manager were evident. No concerns were identified.
c. Conclusion LCO maintenance on the RCIC system was well controlled by carefully scheduling various maintenance tasks with the installation cf mechanical and l&C modifiedtions. The l&C and mechanics performed safety related work in a deliberate manner. Effective supervisory and system engineer involvement contributed towards quality work.
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M1.2 Salt Service Water (SSW) Motor Shaft Shear a.
Insoection Scone (62703)
On August 26,1997, the motor drive shaf t for the "A" SSW sheared while in service.
Operators noticed that the "A" loop SSW had decreased to 12 psi with both the "A" and "B" SSW pumps running. Normal SSW discharge pressure is 30 psi. The inspector reviewed portions of maintenance activity MR 19702240that repaired and investigated the cause of this failure.
Observations and Findingg The SSW motor shaft is made of solid monel,13/16 inch in dicmeter. The motor shaft screws into a coupling which attaches to the pump shaf t. The:a is a key way at each end of the motor shaft. Inspection revealed that the 'oreak occurred a few inches above the coupling at the top of the key way, not the threaded portion.
The shaft had been in service for approximately one year prior to this failure. The shaft
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had been purchased with two other motor shafts, both of which were in use. The other -
) two shafts have been installed for approximately seven years.
The licensee postulated that the f ailure of the shaft was the result of fatigue f ailure. There was no indication of key or key way damage at the motor end upon pump disassembly and inspection. The pump shaft was able to be rotated freely by hand. The motor vibrations for the pump were last performed on August 9,1997; all readings were satisf actory. The licensee sent the motor shaft to Mass Materials for physical analysis; the results are expected in the latter part of September 1997,
c. Conclusions
The failure of the "A" SSW motor shaft is believed to be due to fatigue failure; Gaal analysis is not expected until the later part of September 1997. NRC staff plans future review of the failure mechanism of the "A" SSW motor shaft and the potential generic applicability to the other SSW pumps (IFl 97 08-01).
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Corrective Maintenance Backfoo a.
Insoection Scoce (62703)
The inspector performed a review of the licensee's corrective maintenance running repair backlog to detennine the number and nature of outstanding maintenance requests (MRs)and identify any relevant trends.
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Observations and Findinas A review of corrective maintenance backlog revealed that as of September 1,1997, the actual number of running repair MRs was 417. This is above the licensee's estehlished goal of 302 MRs. Running repair MRs are those maintenance items that can be rerformed with the unit on line.
A review of the performance indicator data revealed that the backlog goal has been trending down from 439 MRs in January 1,1996, to 250 MRs for over a 2 year period.
The data indicates that the licensee has, for the most part, been achieving their established goal. However, the actual total of MRs increased by 100 MRs over the February to May time period. The licensee attributed this increase to the recent refueling outage (RFO) and the change in coding of approximately 80 MRs from minor maintenance work to backlog.
Sirice the end of the RFO, the numbers of corrective maintenance MRs have been trending dowri.
Discussions with the Work Control Department Manager revealed that the licensee attributes the ability to lower and maintain the work backlog goal to changes made in the work control process in November 1995. Additional f actors include schedular adherence -
and an increased management focus,
c. Conclusions
No safety related equipment operability problems were noted. The corrective maintenance
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running repair backlog shows a decline over a two year period. The licensee has, for the most part, been able to achieve lower goals. An increase in the actual number of corrective maintenance MRs was experienced during the RFO, however this number has begun to decrease since the completion of the RFO. Changes in the work control process and increased management focus appeared to have contributed to overallimprovement in this area.
M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities M7.1 Recelot end insoection Activities a.
Inspection Scone (62703)
An Office of Investigation
- (01) review determined that two receipt and inspection documents contained inaccurate informatio1 due to an individual OC inspector performance problem. Related issues were initially documented and assessed in Section M7.1 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-293/97-03, b.
f>bservations and Findinas The first inaccurate receipt and inspection document involved an inspection plan to inspect a semple size of 20 of 63 total 125-volt de safety related batteries. During field instr 411ation the system engineer identified some internal battery deficiencies which called inte- question the adequacy of the BECo receipt inspection. Subsequently BECo determined i
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that only one battery shipping box had been opened during receipt inspection indicating that the intent of MRIR 94 2604 to receipt inspect 20 batteries was violated. The batteries were replaced with new ones prior to returning the system back to operation. The inspector noted that the inadequate receipt inspection was self identified by the system engineer in the field and proper corrective actions were implemented.
The second inaccurate receipt inspection document involved the inspection of two swagelock fittings per MRIR 95 4711. T.ae fittings had been signed by the same QC inspector that the various dimensional checks, using precision test equipment, and inspections had been performed satisfactorily. However, another QC inspector found that the sealed plastic bag containing the fittings had never been opened indicating the measurements and inspection had not been done. Again, this problem was self identified, a Jetailed problem scope determination was performed and the parts had not yet been installed into the plant. The inspector had no concerns,
c. Conclusions
Taken collectively, these non repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violations are being treated as Non-Cited Violations (NCV 97 08-02 and 97-08-03), consistent with Section Vll B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The same QC inspector caused both instances of inaccurate receipt inspection records. GECo took disciplinary action with the individual involved and thoroughly and comprehensively reviewed the circumstances to assure no programmatic problems existed (Inspection Report 50-293/97 03).
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Follow Un item 50 293/96-02-01: Work Control A concern was documented in NRC inspection Report No. 50-293/96-02that involved the clarity of managements expectations for the conduct of safety related work when using vendor manuals. Subsequently BECo issued a revision to procedure 1.5.20, Work Control Process, that addressed the level of work plan detail required to perform work tasks.
Specifically, Section 7.4.2. on work plan organization, was changed to require quality verification steps into work plans when using vendor manuals for guidance. The quality verification steps include critical elements of work as defined by the maintenance planning team. Also, the procedure revision clarified when the use of ORC approved procedures was required for complex maintenance tasks. Training was held with work control personnel on the changes. Tnis unresolved item (50-293/96-02 01)is considered closed.
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IJl. ENGINEERiNQ E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Ece!pment E2.1 Safety Evaluation for the intake Canal Dredoina Operation a.
insoection Scepp (37551)
On August 23,1997, the unit experienced fouling of the intake structure. The inspector reviewed the conditions leading up to the event (Section 02.2)and the 50.59 evaluation for the intake canal dredging operation to determine the adequacy of the controls in place for dredging and the adequacy of the 50.59 evaluation, b.
Observation 6nd Findinas The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation for the dredging operation and noted that it concluded that the dredging operation would result in an increase of suspended sand end silt, but the amount of suspended solids was not expected to impact the operation of the salt service water (SSW) pumps or any equipment in the service water system. An analysis had been performed that mdicated a rapid settling of ?t", pended solids in the immediate area of dredging with a greatly reduced amount of suspended sediment downstream of the dredging. Interviews with dredgers had indicated that the amount of sediment disturbed during the dredging would be no greater than that expected during a storm.
As noted in Section O2.2, the way the tug boat moved the scow was probably a factor in the seaweed intrusion. There was no mention on the methon of moving the scow inside the canalin the safety evaluation. Discussions with the licensee rt.vealed that the dredging company had verbally indicated to the licensee that the scow would be positioned by pulling it with the bow bucket, not with the tug boat. A temporary superintendent was in charge of the dredging operation that day. This conditiori was either not known and/or not
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conveyed to the tug boat superintendent. Further, this condition was not addressed in the safety evaluation, nor were there any administrative control in place to restrict movement of the tug boat. Selected conditions of safety evaluation were met, such as an operator stationed at the screen house to monitor for any intake of sand or unusual coriditions and removal of the barge upon threat of a storm.
There had been a storm a few days prior to the fouling of the intake structure. Past experience (October 6,1995) resulted in a similar seaweed intrusion event causing fouling of the traveling screen.
c. Conclusions
The safety evaluation for dredging of the intake canal was determined to be adequate.
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues E8.1 LER 97 M7, Reculatino Transformer Shutdown a.
Insoection Scoce During a winter storm in April 1997, PNGS experienced a voltage transient on the 500 kV transmission system that resulted in shutdown of the regulating transformers feeding both safety-related instrument busses. The licensee issued LER 97-007, Sateguards Buses De-energized and 1.oss of Off site Power, on May 1,1997. This was previously documented in NRC inspection report 50-293/37 02, dated May 22,1997. A related violation was also issued at that time based on failure to correctly translate the design requirements into specifi::ations, drawings, procedures and instructions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the event to assess their cotrective actions.
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Observations and Findinos The inspectors noted the original 480/120 Volt stepdown transformers X55 and X56, supplying the safety-related power panels Y3/Y31 and Y4/Y41, were standard distribution .
transformers. Thsse units were replaced with regulating transformers by modification PDC >
9159A in 1992. Safety evaluations SE 2664 (April 20,1992) and SE 2708 (September 14,1992) suppe*ted this change. The inspectors found that neither SE addressed the potential for microprocessor-induced shutdowns of the regulating transformers.
The inspectors found that the licensee's response to the violation (BECo letter 2.97.005, dated June 20,1997) identified the rear,on for the April 1,1997, Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) that resulted from the loss of the safeguards 120V power panets bus was that the
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purchase specification for the regulating transformers (E15A) did not specify ope:ation during voltage transients. The inspectors noted that problem report PR 971658, dated May 29,1997, identified the cause of the regulating transformer shutdown as an undervoltage shutdown through the microprocessor controller that was not identified in sny of the vendor documentation. The microprocessors were replaced by modification PDC 0711 on April 12,1997, with units that would not chutdown if the input voltage went beyond the i 20% specified input voltage rango required to assure output regulation.
The inspector notM that the original specification had not been modified for the purchase of the replacement microprocessors. The k.spectors reviewed the purchase documents (PO number NST023054)that were used to buy the replacement microprocessors as commercial grade items (CGI) and dedicate them for this safety related application (CGI Engineering Evaluation No. 773, dated April 9,1997.) Those documents included a test procedure to verify the operation of the unit beyond the i 20% input voltage range. The inspectors noted that the licensee's telephone call record with the regulating transformer manufacturer's representatives (prepared on September 4,1997) documented calls between April 8 and April 11,1997. This record documented that there were other conditions listed in the vendor instruction manual that would result in shutoown of the regulating transformer. However, the inspectors found that the purchase documents only addressed the elimination of the undervoltage and overvoltage shutdowns and did not address any other potential shutdown mechanisms.
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The PR-971658 also identified a deficiency in the purchase specification for the regulating
- transformers, EI SA, which did not request that the transformers continue to operate during all voltage transients. The inspectors reviewed the latest revision of specification E15A ,
(that had completed the review cycle on August 21,1997, but was stillin the approval l cycle.) The inspector confirmed that the specification now contained a requiremer. to ride l through undervoltage and overvoltage transients. However, the inspectors noted that the specification still did not address other voltage transients such as harmonic distortion or noise.
The inspem a reviewed safety evaluation (SE) SE 3091, dated April 10,1997, which supported mc,. Teation PDC 9711 to remove the undervoltage trip of the transformers.
The inspectors found that the SE f ailed to address other conditions that could shutdown the transformers through the microprocessor controllers. The inspectors reviewed the vendor manual for the regulating transformers, V 1184, Rev.1, and found that the I microprocessor would shutdown the trsasformer for three other conditions. These shutdowns included high temperature, overcurrent and bilicon controlled rectifier (SCR) i firing errors. The inspector also found there were no tests or surveillances to confirm the accuracy of the high temperature and overcurrent shutdown values. These were additional l
modes of f ailures that could result in loss of the safety-related safeguards power panels that had previously not axisted with the original distribution type transformers. During the l inspectors review of the vendor manual and the associated vendor drawings, the inspector j found numerous minor discrepancies between those documents and the as built equipment.
The incpectors noted that there was no electrical design guide for digital controlled equipment. The licensee's Systems and Safety Analysis group prepared a generic design guide, SB 8,10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations, dated May 22,1996, to address evaluations of digital equipment. YAEC procedure S&SA Design Guide SB8,10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations, dated May 22,1966. states that the safety evaluation should determine if the digital replacement items are subject to a new type of failure not previously analyzed in the FSAR. The inspectors confirmed that this guide was not used in the evaluation of modification PDC 97-11 (which changed the regulating transformer microprocessor controllers) because the electrical group was unaware of its existence.
Generic Letter GL 95-02, Use of NUMARCMPRIReport TR-102348, " Guideline on 1.icensing Digital Upgrades,"in Determining the Acceptability of Performing Analog to-DigitalRep/acements under 10 CFR 50.59, provi'Jes additional guidance. This guidance included the staff position that the system level failures to be evaluated for failures of a different type than previously reviewed "should be the digital system being installed."
Further, GL95-02 also stated the staff position on determining whether or not an Unreviewed Safety Question is involved with the installation of a digital system. The inspector did not complete his review of this area.
c. Conclusions
The licensee's modification of the microprocessor addressed the specific deficiency that led to the unit LOOP in April 1997. However, the inspectors concluded the licensee's corrective action was narrowly focused and did not address other potential transformer shutdown mechanisms that were introduced by the original modification which replaced a distribuilon transformer with the microprocessor-controlled regulating transformer. The inspector could not determine if an Unreviewed Safety Question was created due to the installation of the original and recently modified microprocessor controlled transformer.
This item is Unresolved pending further NRC review. (URI 50 293/97 08 08)
The inspectors concluded the lic,ensee's review of the vendor's documentation associated with the regulating transformers was superficial, in that they f ailed to note that the instruction rnanual contained contradictions and the electrical schematic contained wiring and symbol errors.
IV. PLANT SUPPOR_T R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R 1.1 External and internal !:xoosure Instrumentation a.
Insoection Scoce (83750)
The inspector reviewed RP instrument calibrations, interviewed cognizant licensee personnel and observed instrument calibration methods. The air sample and whole body counting equipment calibrations were also reviewed. The inspector reviewed the latest Nadonal Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) testing and inspection results. Respiratory protection equipment, processing and issue controls were also reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the latest cesium 137 source calibrator calibration and determined ,
that the licensee established discrete distances from the source for calibration of RP portable instruments and used a transfer standard electrometer calibrated at National Institutes of Science and Technology (NIST) to establish the precise radiation levels at those distances. This was an improved method over previous calibration practices.
Calibration documentation was in order and the useable RP instruments sampled were all within the calibration frequency.
The inspector requested the licensee to makeup a smear sample of approximately 5,000 dpm for testing the alarm setpoints of the contamination monitoring equipment utilized by the licensee for monitoring personnel and equipment prior to being released from the radiological controlled area (RCA). The inspector observed daily source checks being performed by the licensee staff of each monitor followed by a measurement of the smear sample to indicate proper alarm function of the applicable instrumentation. The Aptec personnel contamination monitors, small article monitors, and portable G-M friskers were tested. Each instrument that was in-service as determined by the daily source checks, appropriately alarmed when exposed to the plant smear sample.
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The air sample counting equipment was in the process of being calibrated during this inspection. The inspector verified the use of NIST traceable calibration sources and verified that correct calibration procedures were being followed. Quality control charts were reviewed that had been established from the previous calibration. Appropriate acceptance criteria at the ,
.3 standard deviations was utilized and regular tracking of
instrumentation performance based on calibration values was maintained.
Annual ceHbrations of the f astscan whole body counter (Nal detectors) for both thyroid and lung calibrations had been performed within the past year. The licensee also maintains a chair counter (a single germanium detector) and the inspector verified that a proper calibration for the lung geometry had been completed within the past year. The inspector also reviewed the internal exposure calculation basis and determined that the licensee appropriately accounts for non gamma emitting radionuclides based on the latest 10CFR61 laboratory analyses. A review of selected interno axposure assessments indicated minimal documentation of reviewed air sample data, RWP entry times, and other related documents. The inspector noted several internai exposure assessments that utilized whole body count measurements from the f astscan Nal counter. The inspector reviewed the principal gamma energies expected from the plant mix of radionuclides and determined that due to the relatively poor energy resolution of the f astscan Nal detectors when compared to the germanium chair counter, that many of the plant specific radionuclides may not be-adequately resolved and properly identified by the fastscan whole body counter (13 overlapping gamma energy peaks representing 9 radionuclides). The inspector determined that the licensee lacked specific guidance on when the germanium chair counter should be used in order to ensure accurate whole body count measurements are made to support internal exposure assessments.
Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) are utilized for determining employee dose of record. TLD processing and dose determinations are provided by Yankee Atomic Environmental Laboratory. The TLDs utilized at Pilgrim Station were tested under the NVLAP program in 1996 with excellent test results, passing in all nine radiation / angle of incidence categories. The NVLAP onsite inspection findings indicated that a very high quality TLD processing service was provided. Pilgrim Station also provides a quality assurance check on the vendor dosimetry service by providing radiation-spiked TLD badges along with the normal personnel TLDs every quarter. Fourth quarter 1996 QA results were reviewed, which indicated continued good performance by the vendor TLD service.
The inspector observed that only NIOSH approved equipment was in use. A calibrated air in-leakage test piece was utilized to test every respirator face piece after every wash and within one month of processing prior to use. Respirator particulate canisters are discarded after each use and only new NIOSH/MSHA approved new canisters are used. The inspector verified that respirator issue is controlled through use of the Prorad computer system. Only personnel that have successfully passed the respirator training program, f acial fit test and physical examination are authorized by the Prorad computer system to be issued a respirator.
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c. Conclusions
The licensee verified that the portable RP instrument calibration program was correctly performed. Also, the contamination monitoring instruments were properly adjusted to alarm to prevent the release of contaminated personnel or equipment. The air sample counting equipment and whole body counting equipment were also properly calibrated and utilized appropriate daily quality control source checks for each type of RP instrumentation discussed above. The TLD processing is provided by an offsite vendor service. Review of calibration testing and inspection indicated very high quality results were attained with effective licensee quality assurance program providing feedback on the TLD procescing service results between calibration periods. The inspector noted that in the internal exposure measurement and assessment area, that the internal exposure assessment methods currently utilized are not proceduralized to ensure consistency and to capture all pertinent records and that there is currently no procedural guidance to specify when a germanium detector body count should be provided in order to accurately measure and identify the radionuclides present.
RI.2 Source Term Reduction Program a.
Insoection Scope (83750)
Pilgrim Station continues to accrue occupational exposures higher than the average U.S.
BWR, Based on two-year rolling average of annual collective personnel exposures, for the past six years (1991-1996), Pilgrim has been approximately 15% above the national BWR average. Based on a Spring 1997 refueling outage that resulted in 476 peuon-rem and a .
projected 1997 exposure of 565 person-rem, the licensee is projected to be approximately 35% higher than the national BWR average for 1997. The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for controlling / reducing source term contributors. A review of licensee--
documents and interviews with cognizant personnel was conducted.
b.
Qbservations and Findinas Between 1988 and 1989, the licensee conducted a radiation source term reduction program. This was an engineering study that reviewed the plant design and identified the principal cobalt 59 contributors (precursor of cobalt-60), the corrosion rates and transfer (if any) into the reactor. Control rods were identified as an important source of cobalt-60 and were recommended to be replaced with low cobalt materials. Approximately 117 valves were identified as containing stellite (high cobalt 59 content) that had an unfiltered pathway into the reactor vessel, in addition, the licensee's study identified that the reactor
-water cleanup filter septa should be replaced with a higher efficiency filter. Based on this study, a further study was funded and in 1990 ABB Atom provided a report that stated that the largest cobalt 60 contributor to plant dose rates was from the control rod blade
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stellite components and recommended replacement of all control rods with a non stellite roller design. Subsequently, the licensee replaced 40 control rods with stellite-free material in 1991 as those control rods had reached the end of their service life. Another 95 control rods in the reactor still contain stellite rollers and have not be replaced up to the present time.
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Another significant suurce of cobalt 59 material reported in the licensee's 1989 study included stellite valve faces found throughout the feedwater system. Approx.mately 'i ,7 '
feedwater valves were identified that contain stellite and were upstream of any water cleanup system. It was recommended that these valves be targeted for replacement with non stellite face material at the end of service life. Some material specifications were written, however, currently, the licensee has not replaced any valve faces with non-stellite materials (other than the feedwater regulator valves that were replaced in 1977 as a valve upgrade). The 1995 replacement of the low pressure turbine was repfaced with low cobalt turbine blade erosion shields, however, the turbine is located downstroam of the condensate deep bed demineralizers and would not be expected to impact the source term contribution.
Reactor water chemistry results indicated fairly stable cobalt 60 levels of 3E-4 uCl/mi over the last five years, which was high as compared with the 1997 BWR median value of 1.5E-4 uCi/ml. Since December 20,1996, the licensee began the injection of depleted zinc oxide into the reactor vessel. Since that time, the licensee has observed a 50%
decrease in soluble cobalt 60 concentration (BE 5 uCi/ml) with no change in the insoluble cobalt 60 fraction (1.2E 4 uCl/ml).
i A significant source term perturbation occurred during the last operating cycle during increased hydrogen injection and oscillations in the injection rate. Sign!!icantly higher (four times) drywell dose rates were observed during a September maintenance outage.
Subsequent chemical decontamination during the Spring 1997 refueling outage resulted in effectively mitigating the increased effects, however, due to some implementation difficulties, the source term remained at similar levels as compared to previous outages.
Between 1988 and 1990, the licensee studied the causes for high source term at Pilgrim Station and made recommendations for controlling the cobalt-59 input to the reactor. The licensee has replaced one third of the control rods with non-cobalt 59 material. Since that time until late December 1996, no other significant plant changes have occurred to alter
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the relatively high cobalt inventory at the station. Since December 20,1996, the licensee has been injecting depleted zine oxide into the reactor water and has begun to see an approximate 25% reduction in total cobalt 60 content in reactor water, bringing Pilgrim a little closer to the average BWR cobalt 60 concentration. Source term effects of this chemistry improvement initiative have not yet been measured.
c. Conclusions
The licensee has not made consistent progress in controlling cobalt input, which remains -
high, however, recent zinc injectiore shows some promise in curbing the rate of source term buildup at the station, i
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R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities R7.1 Audits and Assessments a.
Insoection Scone The inspector revie~wed the latest licensee conducted quality assurance RP audit, recent results of the RP self assessment program, and the inspector reviewed selected radiological problem reports from January 1997 through mid-August 1997.
b.
Observations and Findinat The licensee conducted a quality assurance (QA) audit of the RP program in October 1996.
This audit provided a good scope of review of the program area and included a technical specialist from outside of the licensee's organization. The licensee has revised the Quality Assurance Manual to provide for annual RP program review consisting of a review of the planned QA surveillances of the RP program in lieu of biennial RP audits. The RP group also provides periodic self assessments. After a reviea of the January August 1997 RP self-astessments, the inspector determined that several of these were good and the general cuality of these reports was improving. A number of program improvements and problem r00erts have been generated through the RP self assessment program. The form of QA program oversight has been substantially revised from an audit to a surveillance monitoring program and will be revisited at a later date, c.
Conclusione The management oversight of the RP program included RP staff contribution in the form of self assessments, and a quality assurance program audit performed in the fall of 1996. RP program self-assessments have been improving.
R7.2 Radioloaical Problem Reports
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insoection Scoce (83750)
The inspector reviewed selected radiological problem reports during the period from January through August 1997 to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action process. This consisted cf a review of documentatica and interviews with licensee personnel, b.
Observations and Findinas The licensee recorded approximately 456 rt diological problem reports from January 1st through August 15,1997. The inspector reviewed 74 radiological problem reports and noted that there were at least 56 radiological problem reports (RPRs) associated with electronic dosimetry log-in/ log-out errors during the first half of 1997. Problem report no.
97 0480 was written to address all of these RPRs. This RPR was initiated February 14, 1997 and is still open and unresolved during the time of this inspection, approximately six months later. Another significant problem report, No. 97-2082 that was initiated on June 12, lug 7, identified the finding of 23 tools with loose contamination stored in the " Park Street" RCA tool depot (fixed contamination tool storage location). This RPR was also unresolved at the time of this inspection. Bcth of these problem reports had identified a large variety of concerns, however, the corrective actions had yet to be determined.
c. Conclusions
The problem report program was revised effective January 1,1997, which resulted in an increased volume of radiological problem reporting. The inspectors sampling of these reports indicate that the safety consequence of most of these was low. Two potentially significant issues included, improper electronic dosimetry logging by personnel and contaminated tool control within the RCA.
R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lasues R8.1 (Closed) LER 97 01: Special Nuclear Material Accountability in the Spring of 1995, the licensee reported a loss of seven nuclear detectors containing special nuclear material, which were subsequently recovered. The NRC issued Violation 50-293/95-09-03for failing to keep accurate records indicatir g the location of all special nuclear material. In response, the licenseo conducted a new baseline inventory of special nuclear material. Subsequent to the inventory and records research, on January 20, 1997. BECo determined and reported to the NRC Operations Center additional material for which there was a loss of accountability. The material was used small nuclear detectors and were probably disposed of during the 1975 to 1987 time frame when detailed records of less than 1 gram of special nuclear material were not kept. These irradiated nuclear detectors woula have exhibited very high radiation levels, were previously stored in the spent fuel pool and would have been easily detected by plant radiation monitors. BECo -
reported these nuclear detectors were probably dispond of as radwaste during one of several spent fuel pool cleanout projects during the 1975 to 1987 time frame.
This issue was discussed in Inspection Report No. 50 293/97-01 as additional examples stemming directly from BECo corrective actions in response to the previous violation (50-293/95-09-03). During the January 1997 inspection when the reportability issue surfaced, BECo was responsive and timely in reporting the additional findings to the NRC operations center and in writing LER 97 01, issued February 14,1997. BECo, reported that, since no record of special nuclear material transfer to a disposal faciiity was made, the misplaced SNM was technically lost. Accordingly, in light of the age of this additional information and past performance problem, BECo could not have reasonably prevented the violation dealing with the subject detectors. This non-repetitive (after 1995), licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section Vil B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-293/97-08-04).
R8.2 [ Closed) LER 97-02: Steam Jet Air Elector Alternate Samolina Not Performed in p_gagrdance with Technical Specifications Technical Specification 3/4.8.G.1 requires isotopic analysis of samples taken at the off-gas system steam jet air ejector to ensure that noble gas release rate does not exceed 500,000 uCi/sec. Since 1990, the licensee has taken the required samples at the augmented off-gas cystem recombiner outlet rather than at the SJAE as specified by Technical
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- Specifications. The sample location was changed due to a GE SIL that recommended this change of sample location due to the presence of hydrogen and potential for an explosive mixture of off gas at the steam Jet air ejector location. The difference in transit time between the SJAE and recombiner outlet is negligible and the results of sampling at either location is expected to be consistent. The licensee has submitted a Technical Specification change to allow sampling at either point. This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section Vil B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50 293/97 08 05).
R8.3 (Closed) LER 97 05: Turbine Buildina Effluent Monitor Operability Technical Specification 3.2.F establishes the limiting conditions fcr operation for effluent monitoring instrumentation. At least one turbine building vent monitor is required to be operable. If the monitor is not restored to operability within 7 days a report to the NRC is required to be submitted within 14 days of the event. The turbine building effluent monitor was inoperable for greater than 7 days and a special report was not submitted to the NRC as required, however the plant was shutdown for refueling when the monitor was made inoperable when no potqntial for the release of radioactive material existed. There was no j safety consequence of the turbine building monitor being out of service during the refueling
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outage time period. The cause of the monitor being out of service occurred during i performance of the effluent monitor calibration procedure when the power supply to the l monitor failed making the monitor inoperable. Initially, the limiting condition of operation (LCO) was identified by the nuclear operations supervisor, however, the NOS believed the LCO did not apply to shutdown conditions. Training of operations staff was conducted to clarify the LCO applicability to all modes of operation. This non repetitive, licensee
! identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non Cited Violation consistent with
- Section Vil B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50 293/97-08-06).
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i R8.4 (Closed) IFl 96-03-03: ALARA Maintenance Hour Trackina
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Pilgrim's exposure estimating and tracking system records both exposure and time i parameters. Both are utilized to measure dose rate reduction and work performance j efficiencies. During a previous inspection, drywell work tracked well with respect to exposure estimates, however the work hours were generally three times the work hours
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estimated to perform the tasks.
l l During this inspection, results from the Spring 1997 refueling outage were reviewed and l investigation into the work hour tracking process was performed. The RP control point l
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work activities were reviewed first as they perform local electronic dosimeter tracking.
Torus work tracked well with respect to estimates. However, the torus support work
= accrued 3.7 times the estimated work hours while remaining within the exposure estimate.
Drywell work hours ranged from 0.5 to 2.5 times estimates. Refuel floor control point work hour tracking was relatively accurate ranging from 0.5 to 2 times estimated values.
i Other work not controlled by a local RP control point with local electronic dosimeter tracking, were less accurate. Non-high radiation area motor operated valve work performed during the outage recorded four-times the estimated work hours. Non-high radiation area instrumentation and control maintenance work totaled 4.1 times estimated
, values.
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The inspector's review indicated that there were at least two sources of error. The use of local RP control points with electronic dosimeter logging stations provided the most reliable work hour tracking values. In other areas where a local electronic dosimeter logging station wSs not provided, work hours tended to be greatly inflated. Another source of error har, been recognized by the licensee by a plethora of problem reports dealing with the logging practices by the workers. Currently, entry and exit from the radiologically controlled area (RCA) does not control worker log-out more than once per day. Greater than 24-hour log in creates a computer flag and action is taken to enforce workers to log out of the exposure and work hour tracking system. Control of log-out for each RCA entry is currently being reviewed by the licensee, but has not yet been solved. The issue of inaccurate work hour tracking has been determined to be a weakness in the ALARA program. In assessing this issue, the inspector follow up item is now closed.
R8.5 (Closed) IFl 97-03-03: Lavao of Radweste Eauioment (Waste Feed Tank and Floc Reevele Tank)
During a previous inspection of retired radwaste processing vessels, the inspector could i not determine whether the waste feed tank and floc recycle tanks had been properly layed up. During this irwpection, the inspector reviewed documentation and internal pictures of-the waste feed tank indicating that this tank and been properly drained and isolated from plant systems. The floc recycle tank is currently being evaluated by engineering to determine a disposition plan for this equipment. Therefore, the originalinspection follow up item is closed and a new inspection follow up item is opened to follow the licensee's actions with respect to ensuring long term layup of the floc recycle tank (IFl 97-08-07).
R8.6 Undated Final Safety Analysis Reoort (UFSAR)a.
insoection Scoce The inspector reviewed current Pilgrim Station practices with respect to Sections 12.3 and 13.2 of the UFSAR.
b.
Observations and Findinas
, The inspector's review of Section 12.3 of the UFSAR describes high radiation area, locked high radiation area and very high radiauon area controls in accordance with Technical Specifications and 10CFR20. Section 13.2 of the UFSAR specifies the qualification requirements of the Radiation Protection Manager. The Pilgrim RPM has been enrolled in Senior Reacto: Operator Training with an acting RPM appointed for six months. The acting RPM's qualifications were reviewed with respect to the Reg Guide 1.8 requirements and found to be in conformance.
c. Conclusions
The UFSAR Sections 12.3 and 13.2 were accurate and correctly reflected current plant operations.
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Y. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings
- presented. Also during this period, Mr. Bruce Boger, Director, Division of Reactor Projects 1/11 conducted a management visit on September 4 5,1997.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
X4 Review of UFSAR Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facijny in a manner contrary to the UFSAR description highlighted the need for additlenal verification that licensees were complying with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) commitments. For an indeterminate time period, all reactor inspections will provide additional attention to UFSAR commitments
- and their incorporation into plant practic9s and procedures. While performin0 inspections discussed in this report, inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR. No inconsistencies were noted.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 62703: Maintenance Observation IP 64704: Fire Protection Program IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 73051: ' Inservice Inspection Review of Program IP 73753: Inservice Inspection IP 83729: Occupational Exposure During Extended Outages IP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure IP 92700: Onsite Follow up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Pow ' Reactor Facilities IP 92902: Follow up - Engineering IP 92903: - Follow up Maintenance,
-IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Dago.e_Il Iynn Toolc 50 293/97 08-01 IFl SSW Pump Shaft root cause and implications.
50 293/97 08 07 IFl Disposition of Floc Recycle Tank for long term layup.
50 293/97-08 08 URI Digital Controls issue Closed (New and Previous) -
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50 293/97 08-02 NCV Receipt inspection batterles 50 293/97-08-03 NCV Receipt inspetion swagelock fittings LER 97 01 NCV Response to NOV, found other SNM tracking discrepancies 50 293/97 08 04 from 19751987 time frame.
LER 97 02 NCV Air sampling required at SJAE, but taken at augmented off-gas 50 293/97 08 05 recombiner outlet. TS change in process.
LER 97 05 NCV Turbine building effluent monitor out of service during refueling 50-293/97-08 06 outage. 7 day LCO not resolved.
50 293/96-02-01 URI Work Control Instructions 50 293/96-03-03 IFl ALARA manhour tracking is assessed as an ALARA program weakness.
50 293/97 03 03 IFl Waste feed tank was drained and dispositioned as laidup equipment. Floc recycle tank remains to be dispositioned, so a new IFl was opened to track this item.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED "
l ALARA As Low As is Re asonably Achievable BECo Boston Edison Company BWR Boiling water reactor CFR Code of Federal Regulations EP Emergency Preparedness ESF Engineered Safety Feature GM Geiger Mueller gpm gallons per minute IFl Inspection Follow Up ltem IR Inspection Report LER Licensee Event Report NCV Non-Cited Violation NICSH NationalInstitute for Occupational Safety and Health NIST NationalInstitutes of Science and Technology NOV Notice of Violation NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office of Investigation PNPS Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station PR Problem Report QA Quality assurance RHR Residual Heat Removal RP Radiation Protection RCA Radiological controlled area RPM Radiation protection manager RPR Radiological problem report RWP Radiation work permit SJAE Steam jet air ejector TLD Thermoluminescent dosimeter TS Technical Specification
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l ENCLOSURE 2 01 INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 195 032S(REDACTED)
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l Title: PILGRIM NVCLEAR POWER STATION:
DISCRININATION AGAINST A QA ENGINEER FOR QUESTIONING A CALIBRATION CHECK ON A ROCKWELL HARONESS TESTER FOR A QA RECEIPT INSPECTION Licensee: Case No.: 1 95 032S Boston Edison Company Report Date: July 18, 1997 RFD #1 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth HA 02360 Control Office: OI:RI Docket No.: 50 293 Status: CLOSED Reported by: Reviewed and Approved by:
P f\J h1111am J.
Yfs, 3peEfal ' Agent
,b Barry'RI Litts1 Director Office of v gations Office of Investigations Field Offi ion I Field Office, Region I Participating Personnel:
Ernest P. Wilson, Sr. Special Agent Office of Investigations Field Office, Region I EBUllE DC NOT D INATE, LAC N THE PUE IC UENT ROOM OR SCUSS TF OF THIS RE INVESTIGATI OUT! IDE MtC W ITY llE APP 1 t0VING CIAL 0F THIS PDF T.
ZED DI LOSURE MA RESUL' IN INISTRATI ACTION AND/0R CRI NAL PROSE 014
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SYN 0PSIS This investigation was initiated by the Offic- Investigations (01),
Region I (RI), on December 3,1996, to deter a if a Boston Eriison Com)any (BECo) Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer, worku at the Pilgrim Nuclear )ower Station (PNPS), was discriminated against by Qi su>ervision/ management for questioning the need to perform a calibration enect on a Rockwell Hardness Tester (RHT), prior to its use on May 29, 1995, during a receipt it.spection.
Based on the evidence developed during this investigation 01 could not substantiate the allegation of harassment and intimidation against the QA Engineer by BECo supervisory / management personnel, as a result of the issue raised on May 29, 1995.
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i NO PUBLIC DIS SURE APPR0 0F FIE OFF DIltECTOR, FFI.
OF VESTIGAT S ,-
REG Case No. 1 95 032S 1
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l l TABLE OF CONTENTS fiqe SYNOPSIS .................................
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ..........................5 DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION .........................
Applicable Regulations .......................
Purmse of Investigation ......................
Bac(ground ............................7 Interview of Alleger ........................
Coordination with Regional Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allegation: Discrimination Against a Quality Assurance (QA)
Engineer for Questioning a Calibration Check on a Rockwell Hardness Tester for a QA Recei . . . . .
Evidence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . .pt Inspection
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Agent's Analysis ...
.....................25 Conclusion ............................27
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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LIST OF EXHIBITS ............................31
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NC T. PUBLICD LOSU PRO 0F
FIEl$OF E D[ RECT OF CE OF NV STIGA S,
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Case No. 1 95 032S 3
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
EXHIBIT
l BERNARDO, Jose)h. former Quality Control Engineer at Pilgrim
Nuclear )ower Station (PNPS), presently employed by Yankee
Atomic (assigned to PNPS) . . ...................28
CARARRA, Ronald, Boston Edison Company (BECo) Labor Relations
Specialist, PNPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
CIBELLI, Jack, Human Resource Consultant, BECo .............33
DESH0ND, Nancy Regulatory Relations Group Manager, PNPS . . . . . . . . 32
FAHULARI, Frank, former Quality Assurance Department Manager, PNPS . . . 18
FOLEY, Douglas, former Associate Engineer / Quality Assurance
Receipt Inspector, PNPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
HEGERICH, Edward, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer, PNPS . . . . . . . . 24
0'BRIEN, Kelly, Union Steward, PNPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
MAREN, Susan, Manager of Labor Relations, BEco .............36
.................... e Q
SIMONS, Linda, former Procurement Quality Engineering
Supervisor, PNPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
SULLIVAN, Paul, Senior Quality Engineer / Receipt Inspection, PNPS . . . . 15
VENKATARAHAN, T.V., Quality Assurance Department Manager, PNPS . . . . . 26
.
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DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION
ADD 11 cable Reaulations
CFR 50.5: Deliberate misconduct (1995 Edition)
CFR 50.7: Employee protection (1995 Edition)
CFR 50,9: Complete and accurate information (1995 Edition)
Purcose of Investiaation
This investigation was initiated by the Office of Investigations (01),
Region I (RI), on December 3, 1996. The purpose of the investigation was to
determine if a Boston Edison Company (BECo) Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer,
Douglas
management: specifically, Frank FAMULARI, Quality Assurance Department
Manager; and, Jack CIBELLI, Manager of Human Relations, as a result of FOLEY
= questioning the need to perform a calibration check on a Rockwell Hardness
Tester (RHT), prior to its use on May 29, 1995 (Exhibit 1).
Backaround
On June 28, 1995, 01 initiated an investigation (1 95 032) in response to
allegations by FOLEY that his supervisor suggested that he perform a go/no go
test on a RHT, prior to using it in a QA receipt inspection. FOLEY refused to
perform the test, citing that the operating procedure did not allow for this
type of test. This refusal resulted in an argument between FOLEY and his
supervisor (Exhibit 1A).
FOLEY contends that, as a result of this incident, he was subjected to
harassment and intimidation by his su urvisors and management at BECo,
specifically FAMULARI and CIBELL
a verbal reprimand, revocation of his site access, and a 20 day suspension
(Exhibit 2).
FOLEY states that he was the subject of two retaliatory audits, one of which
resulted in a verbal reprimand on June 12, 1995, the second of which was
considered in disciplinary hearings on June 14 and 19,1995, and again on
July 5, 1995. These hearings resulted in FOLEY being suspended on June 27
-1995, for a period of 20 days. FOLEY returned to work on July 25, 1995, and
was placed in remediation training, pending his re certification as a Level II
Receipt Inspector.
On November 13, 1995. FOLEY was advised that his bid for a union position as a
work control planner had been accepted, effective November 10, 1995. The new
position took him out of the QA Department and he received a $6,000 raise.
PUBL C SCl' ., WI PR0fAL
FIE OF E )IRE
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Case No. 1 95 032S 7
(
On October 30, 1995. BECo reduced FOLEY's suspension to three days, and
reimbursed him for his lost salary (Exhibit 34).
On April 19, 1996, 01 closed the initial investigation (1 95 032) due to 01:RI
pursuing investigations with higher priorities; and, because FOLEY advised 0I
that he did not want his name associated with any investigation at Pilgrim.
On August 28, 1996, BECo expunged the three day suspension from FOLEY's
record, and reimbursed him for his lost salary (Exhibit 11).
On October 30, 1996, NRC Inspection Report 50 293/96 06 (Exhibit 3) was
issued. BECo was cited for the following deficiencies: failure to write a
problem report when the calibration of the RHT became suspect; the accuracy of
the test blocks used in the calibration check of the RHT was not properly
dismsitioned; a training problem existed regarding the ball penetrator; and,
weat communications existed between QA receipt inspectors and BECo maintenance
technicians.
On November 12, 1996, and again on November 19, 1996. FOLEY had telephone
conversations with David VIT0, the NRC Senior Allegation Coordinator, and
expressed his most recent concerns. FOLEY had learned that the NRC resident
inspectors were preparing an Inspection Report, which would justify his
original allegation (that on May 29, 1995, he was correct in questioning
Senior QA Engineer Paul SULLIVAN regarding the use of a RHT, during a QA
i receipt inspection).
'
On December 3,1996, the case was re opened as a supplemental investigation
(Exhibit 1).
Interview of Alleogt
FOLEY was interviewad by OI on August 14, 1995 (Exhibit 4), February 5, 1997
(Exhibit 5), and June 11, 1997 (Exhibit 6). He stated that, as a result of an
i incident on May 29, 1995, in which he questioned SULLIVAN's order to calibrate
a Rockwell Hardness Tester (RHT), he had become the victim of harassment and
intimidation (H&I). This H&I, by his supervisors at BECo was evidenced by
having his work subjected to an unprecedented audit; receiving a verbal
'
reprimand for poor work performance; having his site access revoked, with the
notice publicly displayed, resulting in humiliation: being suspended for 20
- days, w '1 out pay
- revocatior of his certifications; and returning to work
under e 'mely trying working conditions.
FOLEY sta,ted working for BECo at PNPS on July 15, 1985, as a plant equipment
operator. From July 15, 1988, thru October 14, 1990, he worked as a nuclear
technician in the On Site Safety and Performance Division, and later in the
- Reactor Safety Performance Division. FOLEY was transferred to the Quality
,
Assurance Division on May 9,1991, where he was an Associate Quality Control
Engineer in Receipt Inspection (RI) (Exhibit 4, pp. 250 and 251).
!
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Case No. 1 95 032S 8
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3-
AGENT'S NOTE:- The organizational chart for the Quality Assurance
-
Department, dated February 15, 1995, depicts the following:
Department Manager Frank FAMULARI: Division Manager -
Richie VENKATARAMAN: Procurement-Quality Engineering Supervisor -
Linda SIMONS: Senior Quality Engineer /Rweipt Inspection -
caul SULLIVAN: Engineer Associate - [buglas FOLEY (Exhibit 7),
FOLEY said that on May 29, 1995, he and SULLIVAN were working in RI. when
SULLIVAN asked him to perform a "go/no go type of test" on a RHT. This tester
is : calibrated piece of equipment which is used to test the hardness of
materials dedicated for the nuclear power plant (Exhibit 4, p. 6). '
In his interview on August 14, 1995, FOLEY stated SULLIVAN had told him to
check the "A" scale "because the machine had been experiencing some problems
-
earlier, prior to the event on May 29th." FOLEY said he referred to Quality
Control Instruction (QCI) 7.15 to review the test procedure. FOLEY told
SULLIVAN that, per QCI 7.15, they cauld not perform that particular type of-
test. SULLIVAN reviewed the procedure himself, disagreed with FOLEY, and told
FOLEY to perform the test. FOLEY stated that, )er SULLIVAN, section 6.1 was
) 'the correct section to calibrate the machine. 0 LEY re. read the
told SULLIVAN he could not perform the type of test he (SULLIVAN) procedure and
was asking
- - for, it would be a violation of QCI 7.15 (Exhibit 4, pp. 6 and 7).
AGENT'S NOTE: A copy of QC17.15 (Exhibit 8) was obtained from BECo and
details calibration under section 6.1. Section 6.1.1 deals with the
annual calibration of the RHT by PNPS Instrument and Control (I&E)
personnel, or recalibration by vendor personnel. Sections 6.1.2 thru
6.1.5 deal with the calibration check to be performed by Level II or III
receipt inspectors who have been trained in the use of the RH
- T.
In his interview on June 11, 1997, FOLEY stated that his concern was whether
the "B" scale, which he was told was out of calibration, would affect the "A"
scale. "I did not feel comfortable going ahead with the test without
questioning that." FOLEY wanted a BECo technician to inspect the machine, and
recalibrate it, if necessary. He. stated SULLIVAN had not areviously informed
him the "B" scale was out, nor had he been informed that SJLLIVAN had spoken
with the vendor and had been given the okay to use the "A" scale (Exhibit 6,
pp. 20 and 21).
FOLEY stated he was aware of procedures that called for a calibration check to
'
be performed prior to each use of the RHT, but he had never performed the test
prior to May 29, 1995'(Exhibit 6, p. 24).
FOLEY said he had received instructions on the RHT in March of 1995, but he
- thought those instructions were basic, inadequate, and he felt very
uncomfortable with the machine (Exhibit 6, pp. 26 and 27).
FOLEY further stated that after the argument with SULLIVAN he did not take
advantage of the corrective actions system by filing a problem report, nor did
he mention the incident to his acting supervisor, Mr. SCANNEL, from whom he
=
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Case No. 1 95 032S 9
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l had received permission to leave the station early that same day (Exhibit 6,
pp. 30 and 33).
FOLEY recalled that on June 5, 1995. FAMULARI asked to meet with him in his
office to discuss his performance, which was slipping, and his relationship
with SULLIVAN.- FOLEY stated he tried to bring up the issue of the RHT, but
FAMULARI told him he did not want to talk about it at that time. During the
meeting, FAMULARI advised FOLEY to improve his wrformance, work habits, and
hisrelationshipwithSULLIVAN. When asked. F0_EY told FAMULARI that he and
SULLIVAN had a pretty good" relationship. At the close of the meeting FOLEY
said FAMULARI told him that SULLIVAN was now his supervisor (Exhibit 4,
pp. 10 14).
On June 7,1995, FOLi.( was counseled by SULLIVAN and SIMONS. SIMONS
instructed him to be at his work station for his posted hours, 7:00 a.m. to
3:30 p.m., Monday thru Friday. In addition, if-he were to leave his office
for any reason, lunch, coffee, the men's room, he was to notify SULLIVAN.
FOLEY stated the result of this order was that ". . . I could not perform my
job' . . . became less productive . . . rendered me quite ineffective . . ."
(Exhibit 4. pp. 19 21).
On June-12, 1995, FOLEY received a verbal reprimand from FAMULARI for improper
personnel conduct. Also present at the meeting were VENKATARAMAN and
SULLIVA
- N. The improper conduct was twofold: first, mor work performance
based on a recent audit, performed by SULLIVAN, whic1 revealed eight errors on
Material Receipt Inspections Reports (MRIR) that FOLEY had prepared:- secondly,
FOLEY left the station early on May 29, 1995, without notifying his
supervisor, SULLIVA
- N. FAMULARI, once again, stated that the reprimand had
nothing to do with the iricident of May 29th (E::hibit 4, pp. 30 and 31: and
Exhibit 9).
AGENT'S NOTE: During the course of the interview on August 14, 1995,
Kelley O'BRIEN, FOLEY's union representative, provided information that
he had obtained thru his own investigation. 0'BRIEN stated that
following the June 12th meeting SULLIVAN gave him a copy of a memo
(Exhibit 10) he (SULLIVAN) had written to SIMONS. The memo was dated
May 31, 1995, and listed eight MRIR's prepared by FOLEY, which SULLIVAN
claimed contained mistakes. Sullivan told O'BRIEN he had randomly
sampled 20 MRIRs and found the eight mistakes (Exhibit 4, pp. 61 63).
FOLEY contends that SULLIVAN's audit was a sham, created to initiate
discipline in accordance with BECo's progressive disciplinary policy
(Exhibit 4, pp. 67 and 68).
On June 14,1995, at 8:30 a.m., FOLEY was called to a meeting in FAMULARI's
office: SULLIVAN, VENKATARAMAN, and HIGGINS, were also present. FAMULARI
informed FOLEY that he was suspected of falsifying MRIRs involving swagelock
fittings. A continuing insmction had revealed sealed plastic bags, which
contained fittings, that F0.EY-had signed as= having inspected. FAMULARI's
position was that the inspection could not have been performed without opening
\
GION I
Case No. 1 95 032S 10
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the plastic bags.- FAMULARI placed FOLEY on administrative leave, with pay.
-pending an internal audit which would encompass all of FOLEY's work in 1995,
and earlier, if necessary. FOLEY stated that he was not given the opportunity
to offer an explanation for the findings in the inspection (Exhibit 4,
pp. 92 and 93).
On June 15, 1995, FOLEY was advised by VENKATARAMAN that his access to the
plant had been pulled, for " safety applicable to the investigation," and that
it should be available on Monday morning, the 19th of June (Exhibit 4,
p. 100).
This same dey, FOLEY was advised by a co worker, Bob CURRAN, that an 8 X 11
notice indicating, ". . . Badge 680 . . . do not issue FOLEY," had been
placed in public view at the Security office where employees enter the plant.
FOLEY said that he was " upset, angered and embarrassed" over this incident.
He stated this action negatively effected his credibility, reputation, and the .
relationship which he had established in his ten years at the station. He was !
deeply hurt by this incident, ". . . it appeared I was being disciplined for
no reason, and it was public information at that point . . . ." (Exhibit 4,
pp. 102 and 103).
On June 18, 1995, FOLEY called the NRC. He stated the events that occurred
between May 29th and June 14th had escalated greatly. He was now charged with
falsification of documents and was facing the loss of his job. He said the
issue of the RKT was foremost-in his mind, at the time of the call, because
his concerns, regarding the RHT, were being ignored by management
(Exhibit 6, pp. 71 73).
FOLEY attended a meeting on June 19, 1995, that was chaired by FAMULARI to
discuss the findings of the audit. Attendees at the meeting included
VENKATARAMAN, CIBELLI, and O'BRIEN. FOLEY recalled FAMULARI began the meeting
by saying this meeting had nothing to do with the incident of May 29th, nor
was this a harassment issue. The topic would be FOLEY's performance
(Exhibit 4, pp. 118 and 119).
FAMULARI stated the audit, which commenced on June 14, 1995, provided the
following results: Inspector HEGERICH had 32 items reviewed out of 302,
resulting in 1 problem: Inspector SULLIVAN had 15 items revtwed out of 77,
resulting in 0 problems: Inspector GUNN had 29 items reviewed out of 186,
resulting in 0 problems: FOLEY had 247 items reviewed cut of 247, resulting in
problems (Exhibit 4, pp.130 and 131).
FOLEY stated FAMULARI explained that one of the problem packages dated back to
1994. and would be the basis for expanding the audit to all of 1994, in
accordance with Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines
(Exhibit 4, pp. 131 and 132).
At the conclusion of the meeting, FOLEY was informed that he would remain on
administrative leave. On June 27, 1995, FOLEY received a telephone call from
FI y FIC DI , OF E OF I IGATI S.
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Case No. 1 95-032S 11
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FAMULARI and was advised that he was suspended, indefinitely, for the ten
discrepancies found in the packages examined for 1995 (Exhibit 4, p. 182).
On June 29, 1995, and again on July 5,1995. FOLEY attended formal suspension
heari s, which were a union requirement. Present at the meetings were:
FAMU I, VENKATARAMAN, CARRARA HEGERICH, and BERNARDO, representing BECo.
On FOLEY's behalf, union representatives included: Frank TOLAND, PARMENTER,
O'BRIEN, and CLANC
- Y. At the conclusion of these meetings, the 20 day
suspension, without pay, was formally placed in effect (Exhibit 4, p. 235).
Upon his return to work, FOLEY contends that he continued to be harassed by
management. He was not permitted to return to his old office. He was
.
'
assigned to a cubicle adjacent to FAMULARI's office, which had no phone or
lamp, and was refused access to a secretary. As part of the remediation '
.
process, /0 LEY was instructed to review BECo's procedures.. ANSI standards, and
codes, and direct any questions he might have to SIMONS or SULLIVAN
(Exhibit 4, pp. 280 283).
FOLEY su'osecuently failed a written test, which was prepared and administered
by SIMONS.Je contends the test was customized, subjective, 6nd was not a
typical certification exam. He also failed a practical inspection exam, which
was administered by SULLIVAN. He contends that his failure was based on
criteria which should not have been considered (Exhibit 6.-pp. 92 94).
.FOLEY stated that the recertification process and the conditions which he
worked under, upor. his return to the station, were a continuation of the
harassment and intimidation by BEco (Exhibit 4, p. 285).
FOLEY stated that the remaining three days on his suspension were removed
after a complete investigation of all the work that he had performed in RI,
encompassing 1991 thru 1995. FOLEY concluded that the results of the
inspection were the basis for Sue MAREN, BEco's Manager of Labor Relations,
sending him a letter dated August 26, 1996 (Exhibit 11), expunging the
previous disciplinary action from his record (Exhibit 6, pp. 86 88).
FOLEY claims FAMULARI and CIBELLI are the individuals responsible for the
harassment, intimidation, and deliberate retaliation he received at PNPS. He
believes that SULLIVAN, and SIMON were only acting on orders received from
them-(Exhibit 6, pp. 112 and 113).
Coordination With Reaional Staff
The RI ARB met on November 26, 1996, and requested that 01 pursue this matter.
The ARB set a high priority for this investigation, due to involvement by
second level supervision.
SRI LAURA assisted 01 during the investigation to facilitate the
identification and resolution of any new issues.that arose. SRI LAURA also
participated in interviews with the alleger and BECo QA management personnel.
C DIRE FFIC INVE T S,
FIQ ,
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Case No. 1-95 032S 12
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- A11eaation: Discrimination Aaainst a Quality Asstrance (QA) Enaineer for
Questionina a Calibration Check on a Rockwel' Harcness Tester for a 0A Receipt
Insoection
Evidence - Analvsis
1. Protected Activity
>
On May 29, 1995 FOLEY, while working in receipt inspection, refused to
perform a calibration check on the RHT, when instructed to do so by
SULLIVAN. FOLEY advised SULLIVAN that Quality Control Instruction
Procedure (QCI) 7.15 prohibited this type of test.
In addition. FOLEY, having just been made aware of a problem with one of
the scales on the RHT that is frequently used in receipt inspection, was
concerned that one scale might affect the other, thereby placing the
machine out of calibration. FOLEY said his concern was that by using a
machine that may have been out of calibration, he may have inspected and
accepted parts for dedication to the nuclear power plant that were
-
unsafe,
2. Knowledae of FOLEY's Protected Activity
'
As a result of the concerns expressed by FOLEY, and the disagreement
over the interpretation of QCI 7.15 on May 29, 1995, SULLIVAN spoke with
his supervisor, Linda SIMONS. He requested that SIMONS review the-
questioned )rocedure. SIMONS, with the su:oort of her supervisor,
FAMULARI, w1ose immediate concern was the HT and the material it may
have been used on, researched the procedure development of the RH
- T.
This project started on May 30, 1995, and concluded on June 26, 1995,
with a memo to the file (Exhibit 12). In the memo she stated that QCI
7.15 was based on appropriate ASTM standards, and, in the opinion of
BECo metallurgical engineers and Wilson Instrument representatives, the
procedure was clear and adequate.
On June 14, 1995. BEco technicians inspected the RHT and.found the "B"
scale out of calibration. On June 21, 1995, HUMENICK, a representative
of Instron, the RHT vendor, inspected the machine and found the machine
-to be in calibration, however, the test blocks being used by BECo for
the "B" scale were out of tolerance. This inspection was the result of
a service request made by SULLIVAN on May 25, 1995 (Exhibit 16).
3. Unfavorable Actions Taken Aaainst FOLEY
The following items have been provided by F0 LEY, throughout he course of
this investigation, as exam)les of retaliatory actions taken by BECo
management, as a result of 11s bringing up a nuclear related-safety
concern:
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Case No. 1 95 045 13
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a. Sullivan performing an un characteristic audit of his work on
May 30, 1995.
b. A meeting on or about May 30, 1995, between the Human
Relations and Quality Assurance Departments discussing the
possible suspension of FOLEY because of his behavior,
c.- Counseling session with FAMULARI on June 5, 1995, over
FOLEY's work performance and his relationship with SULLIVA
- N.
d. Counseling by SIMONS on or about June 7, 1995. FOLEY says he was
restricted to his work station, thereby interfering with his
ability to perform his job.
e. Issuance of a verbal reprimand from FAMULARI on June 12, 1995.
The issues included poor work performance, unauthorized absence,
insubordination, and poor attitude,
f. On June 14, 1995. FOLEY's work product was questioned by the QA
Department and they alleged falsification of records on his part.
This resulted in his removal from the department, a revocation of
his certifications, and an audit of all his work in 1995, i
g. On June 27, 1995. FOLEY was suspended for 20 days for
falsification of inspection reports,
h. 5 July 25,1995, FOLEY returned to work and was subjected to
difficult working conditions. He took part .in a remediation
process, which he describes as atypical, subjective, and based on
criteria which should not have been considered. .
4. Did the Unfavorable Actions-Result from FOLEY Enaaoina in a
)rotected Activity
The basis for FOLEY's claim is the use of the RHT on May 29, 1995. In
his interviews, FOLEY presented two issues with respect to the use of
the equipment. 01 will address each issue separately:
Interpretation of BECo Procedure QCI 7.15
The first issue was articulated in FOLEY's interview on August 14, 1995.
FOLEY stated SULLIVAN had directed him to perform a calibration check on
the "A' scale prior to using the RHT to test material for dedication to
the plant; and had also informed him that the machine had been
experiencing some difficulties in the past. FOLEY referred to BEco
procedure QCI 7.15 and informed SULLIVAN that, per the arocedure, they
were not allowed to perform a calibration check on the uiT. SULLIVAN
reviewed the procedure and instructed FOLEY that aaragraph 6.1 of the
procedure was the authorization for the test: F0_EY disagreed and
refused to perform the test (Exhibit 4, pp. 6 and 7).
N PUBLI LOSUR_ , PR OF
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Case No. 1 95 032S 14
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FOLEY's account differs from that of SULLIVAN, who advised 01 that -
while performing his normal duties as lead inspector, he reviewed MRIR
4837 (Exhibit 14) which had been prepared by FOLEY on May 24, 1995.
In his review, SULLIVAN noted that FOLEY had used the "B" scale on the
RHT, and had not included five standardization tests, or a calibration
check (Exhibit 15, p. 42).
'SULLIVAN brought the discrepancy in MRIR 95 4837 to FOLEY's attention
and instructed him to perform the test on the "A" scale, noting the
prior problems with the "B" scale. He also instructed FOLEY to perform
a calibration check, prior to use. FOLEY read QCI 7.15 and told
SULLIVAN the procedure did not call for him to perform the test.
SULLIVAN read the procedure and disagreed. FOLEY remained strong in his
position and refused to perform the calibration check. SULLIVAN stated
that, although the discussion may have escalated into shouting, and
possibly foul language, he "didn't really think much of it"
(Exhibit 15, pp. 62 and 63).
AGENT'S NOTE: At no time during the three OI interviews
with FOLEY, did he mention that the basis for the discussion
between himself and SULLIVAN on May 29, 1995, was to correct
a mistake he had made while performing an inspection on
May 24, 1995.
Following the disagreement with FOLEY, SULLIVAN spoke to his supervisor,
Linda SIMONS, and told her of the incident. SULLIVAN asked SIMONS to
review the procedure: he presented both his argument and FOLEY's
argument. SIMONS agreed with SULLIVAN's position that the calibration
check had to be done prior to use, and had to be documented in the MRIR
(Exhibt 15, pp. 63 65).
SULLIVAN. stated the calibration check was a procedure recommended by the
American Society of Testing Material Standards (ASTM), and-Instron,
Inc., the equipment vendor. As such, the recommendation to perform a
calibration check was written into QCI 7.15 by SULLIVAN. This document
was reviewed :nd approved by BECo QA management on March 9, 1995.
Although the wording in the QCI says that a calibration check was a
" recommendation", SULLIVAN said standard practice in RI required the
calibration check (Exhibit 15, pp. 57-59).
The MRIR 95 4837 cover sheet is~ dated May 25, 1995, and has FOLEY's
initials as the ins)ector. Page. ten is the Commercial Grade Item (CGI)
Evaluation. Sheet .wlich calls for testing using the RHT under section
three. The report reflects that FOLEY performed a test using the "B"
scale on May 24, 1995, but failed to perform, and notate, a calibration
check prior to use (Exhibit 14).
AGENT'S NOTE: In FOLEY's August 1995 interview. he maintains the
procedure did not call for the calibration check. This
contradicts information he gave 01 in June 1997.
=
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. Case No. 1 95 032S 15
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On June 11.-1997. FOLEY told 01 he was aware of the procedure that-
called for a calibration check to be performed before each use tf the
RHT, but he had never performed this test prior to use. He stated that,
during prior uses of the RHT, he had never referred to QCI 7.15, a
procedure which had been written by SULLIVAN. FOLEY said BECo
management was in the trocess of implementing the procedure and training
on the machines. FOLEY recalled being trained on the RHT, by the
vendor. in March of 1995; however, he thought these instructions were
basic and inadequate, and he felt uncomfortable with the machine 1
(Exhibit 6, pp. 26 and 27).
AGENT'S NOTE: The possibility exists that FOLEY did not
comprehend the difference between a calibration of the RHT, as
opposed to a calibration check of the RHT. These are two
aifferent procedures. to be performed by different entities. QCI
7.15 addresses the calibration in section 6.1.1 and addresses
calibration checks in sections 6.1.2 thru 6.1.5.
Calibration of "B" Scale
The second issue articulated by FOLEY in his interview on June 11, 1997,
was his concern how the "B" scale, which he was told was out of
calibration, would affect the "A" scale. He said he was not comfortable
going ahead with the RHT test without questioning the calibration of the
machine. He further stated SULLIVAN had not previously told him the "B"
scale was out of calibration: nor was he informed by SULLIVAN that. per
a conversation with the vendor, he had been given the okay to use the
"A" scale. .FOLEY stated he wanted to have a BEco technician inspect the
machine (Exhibit 6, pp. 20 and 21).
AGENT'S NOTE: This issue is an apparent contradiction to FOLEY's
statements of August 1995. Earlier, FOLEY-said he questioned
whether the procedure permitted him to perform the test; whereas
he is now stating he would not be comfortable performing the test
with a questionable calibration of the "B" scale.
On October 30, 1996, the NRC issued Inspection Report 50 293/ % 06. In
the report, BECo is cited for being in violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, that recuires conditions
adverse to quality-be )romptly identified and correctec. Specifically,
in February of 1995 SU_LIVAN had become aware of a problem with the
calibration of the "B" scale on the RHT. Contrary to established
procedure, which would call for a Problem Report or notification of BECo
technicians,. he relied on verbal advice from the vendor. In addition.
SULLIVAN failed to place a limited use sticker on the RHT, and relied on
informal notification of other inspectors in RI of the existing oroblem
(Exhibit 3, p. 16).
SULLIVAN admits to having overall responsibility for the RHT in RI. He
recalls having discovered the problem with the RHT-in February 1995
FOR .C DI APP AL 0
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Case No. 1-95 032S 16
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ . . . . . . _ .
>
! while performing an inspection.- and he accepts'the blame for not
! following BECo's reporting procedures. -In retros)ect, SULLIVAN stated
-he should have put a limited use sticker on the RiT as soon as he
realized there was a problem. . After speaking with the vendor, and being
advised that it was okay to use the "A" scale, SULLIVAN stated he
informed FOLEY and HEGERICH of the problem with the "B" scale. He said
there was an informal atmosphere in RI, with just the three inspectors
working there. SULLIVAN told them that he had spoken with Bill HUMENICK
(vendor's representative), and that they would begin to use the "A"
scale (Exhibit 15, p. 48).
'On May 25.-1995, SULLIVAN prepared a Request for Materials and Services
Stock Authorization (Exhibit 16) to have Wilson Instrumenc, a Division
of Instron, perform a calibration of the "B" scale on the RHT, and to
.
have the test blocks used for calibration checks certified to ASTM E-18
standards. This request was approved by the QA department on May 30,
1995.
Subsequent to a meeting with SULLIVAN on May 30, 1995, SIMONS, with the
concurrence of her supervisor, Frank FAMULARI, researched the procedural
development of QCI 7.15. In the opinion of Instron-representatives and
BECo metallurgical engineers,. the procedure was clear and adequate, and
SIMONS decided there was no reason to amend the procedure. SIMONS
drafted a memo to the file, dated June 26, 1995, noting her results
(Exhibit 12). SIMONS recalls that the inspectors in RI had been
retrained on the RHT in March of 1995, and that FOLEY could have
requested additional training on the RHT, if he thought it was necessary
(Exhibit 17, pp. 61 63).
Frank FAMULARI advised that u)on learning of the RHT situation from
SIMONS, which concerned possi)le misinterpretation of the procedure by
FOLEY, his immediate concern was the RHT and the material it may have
been used on. He instructed SIMONS to perform a review of the procedure
and to have the RHT calibrated (Exhibit 18).
SIMONS faulted SULLIVAN, procedurally, for not placing a limited use
sticker on the RHT in February of 1995, when it was determined that the
"B" scale was out of calibration. SIMONS also stated SULLIVAN was
incorrect in the method he followed to have the problem corrected.
However she did not feel that SULLIVAN's errors were willful in nature.
She o)ined that SULLIVAN made an honest mistake, which did not merit =
punis1 ment (Exhibit 17, pp. 64 and 65).
SIMONS also recalled an earlier incident in September of 1994 involving
FOLEY, which resulted in QADP 7.13 (Exhibit 19) being amended. FOLEY
had performed an inspection of batteries and filed an inspection report
that he had inspected twenty of the sixty three batteries in accordance
with a normal sampling plan (Exhibit 20). During installation of the
batteries, an engineer observed that one of the batteries had internal
--
cracks. - This resulted in all of the batteries being placed on hold.
OR PUB I ISCL. WI PROV
FI . CE DIRE , 0FFI 0 INVE ONS,
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Case No. 1-95-032S 17
..
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
During reinspection, thirty one the sixty three batteries were found to
be defective. It was also determined that F0 LEY had inspected only one
battery. The batteries were packaged four to a pallet, only one pallet
had been opened, and only one battery had been exposed (Exhibit 17,
! pp. 25 and 26).
In a counselling session SIMONS and Nancy DESH0ND conducted with FOLEY,
SIMONS said FOLEY admitted he had looked at one battery. He stated he
verified the part numbers on the exterior of the shipping containers and
assumed the betteries were inside. SIMONS' concern wcs that the HRIR,
as submitted, gave the impression that FOLEY had inspected a sample of
, twenty batteries. FOLEY argued that the procedure did not tell him to
l
open the container. As a result, the aforementioned procedure was
amended (Exhibit 17, pp. 36 and 37).
SIMONS stated that no adverse action was taken against FOLEY for this ,
incident. However, it was her belief that a notation would be made in
his personnel record by FAMULARI, but this was never done (Exhibit 17,
p. 41).
SIMONS characterized FOLEY as " lazy" and said he did not meet her
expectations with respect to performance. She added, ". . . it was my
impression that he could have also worked a little harder, spent more
time doing receiving inspection. I had noted that he was absent from
the area quite a bit. He had a tendency to roam and talk to people and
not pay attention to his work" (Exhibit 17, pp. 45 and 46).
am e
station and talk to peo)le. Mas aware of several occasions when 6X
lso stated that he
SIMONS had
did not believe counseled
FOLEY F0_EY
did his share of the over
wor this matter. @k in RI.7g
He felt FOLEY
knew his limitations and culled some of the easier work, such as
warehouse return M .
AGENT'S NOTE:6 appears to be a credible witness. He
presently has no ties to PNPS, and was not at the plant during the
summer of 1995.
SIMONS recalled the incident of May 29, 1995, between FOLEY and SULLIVAN
over the RHT. SIMONS said SULLIVAN reported FOLEY for insubordination
when FOLEY refused to perform a required calibration check of the RHT,
prior to its use. SIMONS' handwritten notes (Exhibit 22) indicate that
SULLIVAN, at a meeting on May 30, 1995, informed her of FOLEY's refusal
to work (Exhibit 17, p. 67).
In addition, SIMONS said SULLIVAN reported that FOLEY had misinterpreted
procedures, made mistakes, failed to pay attention to detail, and left
work early without authorization. SIMONS asked SULLIVAN to provide her
with past examples of, his poor work performance (Exhibit 17, pp. 70 79).
NC PUBL SCLOS Ill10' PROVAL OF
FIEy0 CE REC , FFIC F INVE T iS,
ON I
Case No. 1-95-032S , 18
O
>-
SIMONS admits that, had it not been for the complaint made by SULLIVAN'
on May 30th, she would not have-requested SULLIVAN to perform the audit
of FOLEY's work, in which he found eight mistakes in 20 packages.
SIMONS said, however, that if the same complaint been made of someone
else in the department, she would have requested a similar audit
(Exhibit 17, pp. 98 102).
-When SULLIVAN took over RI from HEGERICH, he was advised by HEGERICH to
review FOLEY's reports because he was known to make mistakes.. Some of :
these mistakes he classified as subtle, others were " big" (Exhibit 15,
p. 18).- SULLIVAN recalls sending the May 31, 1995, memo to SIMONS
detailing his audit of FOLEY's work. He recalls that FOLEY's work had
gotten to the point where he was tired of making corrections and giving
him the work back; so he brought it to the attention of SIMONS. He
stated the incident with the RHT had nothing to do with the audit,
adding:
"So I generated this, but one had nothing to do with the other,
though. Once that hardness testing thing was done, you know, that
was gone, in my opinion. I didn't even think of that. This was
an ongoing thing with his work" (Exhibit 15, p. 69).
Ron CARRARA, BECo Labor Relations Staff Assistant, )rovided the-
following information regarding his involvement in 0 LEY's disciplinary
procedure. CARRARA stated his first involvement was at a meeting with
SIMONS, SULLIVAN, and VENKATARAMAN, at which time they had requested his
help in dealing with FOLEY on an insubordination issue.
CARRARA was unable to recall the details of this meeting, however, he
recalled SULLIVAN claimed that FOLEY had been givi him a hard time,.
had been swearing at him, and had felt threatened b him, SIMONS added
that she had been having a problem with FOLEY for a ong time,
characterizing him as a " pain." CARRARA stated that the complaints were
-minor (Exhibit 23,epp. 7 9, and 57).
AGENT'S NOTE: SULLIVAN advised OI that following his
conversations with SIMONS about FOLEY, he thought that FOLEY was
going to go after him (Exhibit 15, p. 130).
CARRARA's advice was being sought in an attempt to suspend FOLEY. After
hearing all of the facts, including SULLIVAN's admission that he had
also sworn at FOLEY, CARRARA squashed the suspension requested by the
department. VENKATARAMAN agreed with CARARRA's decision (Exhibit 23,
p. 8).
Regarding the issue of FOLEY's work performance, which was brought up by
SIMONS, CARRARA told her if she had problems with FOLEY's work
performance, she was to start progressive discipline (Exhibit 23,
p. 57).
NO OR PUB ISCL I ROVAL t0F
FIELy) ICE DIRE OR, FFIC INVE T D4S,
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Case No. 1 95 032S 19
I
b
l'
AGENT'S NOTE: CARRARA explained the progressive disciplinary
process used by BEco. The first action, a non disciplinary
action, is counseling.- This is an informal discussion with the
- employee to discuss problems. -In the case of a union employee, it
is not necessary to have a union representative present. A verbal
reprimand issued to an employee is not considered to be part of
the progressive disciplinary process, however, it is a candatory
first ste). The verbal re)rimand may be given by the supervisor,
without_tle knowledge of t1e Human Relations Department. The next
step, a written reprimand, is part of the progressive disciplinary
process and becomes part of the employees personnel record. A
copy of a verbal reprimand would go tha union, when applicable
(Exhibit 23, pp.1215).
FOLEY was the subject of two counseling sessions in June of 1995. The
first occurred on June 5th with FAMULARI. FAMULARI called FOLEY to his
office and advised him a union steward was not necessary, as it was to
be-an informal meeting. FAMULARI had received indications from SIMONS,
SULLIVAN, and HEGERICH that FOLEY's performance was deteriorating.
FAMULARI recalled FOLEY wanted to talk about the RHT issue of May 29,
1995, but FAMULARI told him the issue was being addressed. FAMULARI
wanted to discuss FOLEY's relationship with SULLIVAN and counsel him.
FAMULARI said there was nothing reduced to writing at this meeting-
because of its informal nature. FAMULARI said FOLEY refused to accept i
blame for any issue, and placed the problem on SULLIVAN, the machine,
the procedure, and management's failure to understand; in general, the
"world was wrong." FAMULARI described FOLEY as a " Master of
Deflection," because he had the ability to turn an issue around and
direct 1t at another person (Exhibit 18).
When asked if FOLEY had tried to bring up a safety related concern with
respect to the RHT, FAMULARI categorically denied that FOLEY ever
specifically mentioned a safety concern with respect to the May 29th
incident. FAMULARI said FOLEY had two formal avenues available to him
to report nuclear safety issues: the Employee Concerns Program, and the
standard Problem Reporting system. Either system would have generated
an immediate action on the part of management. FAMULARI said FOLEY
failed to use either process (Exhibit 18). .,
The second counseling session was on June 7, 1995, with SIMONS and
SULLIVAN. The previous day SIMONS had attempted to contact FOLEY in R
- I.
SULLIVAN stated that FOLEY had already left for the day, taking
advantage of " clean up time." This prompted a meeting the following
day, at which SIMONS communicated her expectations with res)ect to work
hours and work location. FOLEY was instructed that his worc location
was RI, not Pilgrim Station. If he had to leave RI to perform a task,
he was to inform SULLIVAN. She was advising him to be courteous and
inform his supervisor if he left his work area. SIMONS said FOLEY asked
if these notifications included use of the men's room and coffee breaks.
She was adamant that these restrictions did not interfere with his
FI DIRE ,
REGION I
r Case No. 1-95 032S 20
.
. .
ability to wrform his job, and had nothing to do with the argument i
FOLEY and SJLLIVAN had on the 29th of May. She described it as an
ongoing, non ending . scenario (Exhibit 17, pp. 88 90).
SIMONS provided 0I with a copy of a memo, dated June 8, 1995, detailing
the session with FOLEY (Exhibit 17A).
Based on the advice of i .a Human Relations De)artment, FAMULARI gave
FOLEY a verbal reprimand on June 12, 1995. T1e basis for the reprimand
was: (1) leaving the
- (2) work performance:,and plant without authorization
(3) FOLEY's on May
refusal to recognize 29, 1995:
SULLIVAN as
his supervisor (Exhibit 18).
Evidence of FOLEY's poor work performance was presented by SULLIVAN, who
produced 8 out 20 MRIR packages that had been returned to FOLEY for
rework over the previous two weeks (Exhibit 10).
FAMULARI -tated tne audit ren,uested by SIMONS was not a retaliatory
,
action on her part in response to the incident of May 29th. This was I
part of the oversight process of a sumrvisor reviewing the work '
It was SJLLIVAN's job to review FOLEY's )
grformance
IR packagesof anforemployee.
correctness (Exhibit 18).
'
Additional Information Relevant to BECo's Action Reaardina FOLEY
HEGERICH said that on June 14, 1995, while conducting a routine inspection,
HEGERICH prepared to finish MRIR's 95 4605 (Exhibit 31) and 95 4711
, (Exhibit 31A), which FOLEY had begun on May 24, 1995, but had pi ad on hold
pending a spectrometer test. In preparing to complete the inspection, he
reviewed the CGI checklist of what had to be done. On MRIR 95 4711 he noted
that the attribute for dimensions had been checked as completed, although the
items were still in sealed bags. A further review of the CGI checklist
> revealed that the dimensions had been taken by a caliper. In his opinion, it
was impossible to take a critical measurement of swagelocks, using calipers,
- without removing the swagelocks from the plastic bag. HEGERICH brought the
matter to the attention of SULLIVAN, who referred the matter to FAMULARI
,
(Exhibit 24, pp. 42 46).
I FAMULARI said HEGERICH came to his office and displayed three sealed plastic
l bags containing swagelocks, with MRIR 95 4711 (Exhibit 31A), prepared by
i FOLEY. He recalled that the paperwork indicated that certain attributes of
the inspection had been completed. FAMULARI recalled that these attributes
l could not have been inspected without opening the plastic bags. FAMULARI
l viewed the MRIR as a falsified document (Exhibit 18).
l AGENT'S NOTE: At the direction of FAMULARI HEGERICH prepared Problem
'
Report (PR) 95 0466, which detailed his findings in the inspection
(Exhibit 30).
.
OR PUB L DISCL S WITi@h&PP10 0F
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Case No. 1 95 032S 21
l
FAMULARI said his concerns escalated quickly; first, he was concerned about
the safety of the alant; and secondly, he was concerned about FOLEY and his
job wrformance. AMULARI admits he was agitated about having to deal with
anotler "F0 LEY problem." He recalled the battery incident from 1994, the
recent performance issue with the eight MRIR's, and now he had an issue
dealing with the falsification of an inspection report (Exhibit 18).
FAMULARI contacted NRC Senior Resident Richard LAURA to advise him of a
potential issue. He then contacted BECo's Human Resources Department to
advise them of the problem. FAMULARI recalled that he did not want FOLEY in
RI until the issue was resolved. He decided to send him home, with pay, while
the initial investigation got under way (Exhibit 18).
AGENT'S NOTE: PNPS Senior Resident Inspector LAURA's log, dated
June 14, 1995, refers to the notification from FAMULARI (Exhibit 25).
At a meeting later the same day with F0 LEY ar.d his union steward, FAMULARI
accused FOLEY of falsifying insmction reports and advised him the NRC had
been notified. FOLEY was sent lome on paid leave, and was told a review of
his work, as well as the work of other inspectors, would begin immediately.
FAMULARI is adamant that F0 LEY was not singled cut. His concern was the
safety of the plant. The review would start with a 100% review of FOLEY's
work because of known problems. The work of the remaining inspectors would be
subject to a sampling. If there was a problem found, the sample would be
increased for that particular inspector. If a second
of the inspector's work would ba reviewed (Exhibit 18) problem was found,100 %
.
Regarding FOLEY's use of calipers to measure items in sealed plastic bags,
FAMULARI said receipt inspectors are not trained to do this, and the Quality
Assurance Procedures do not allow for this. It would be impossible to obtain
an accurate measurement of an attribute,'when it is enclosed in plastic.
FAMULARI believes that FOLEY's deteriorating wrformance may have been due to
boredom. He described FOLEY as being "less t1an stellar" on small part
inspections, or multiple inspections of small parts (Exhibit 18).
FAHULARI, frustrated over the repeated problems with FOLEY, admits he had made
up his mind prior to the meeting as to the corrective actions he would take.
He also stated he would not have been receptive to an attempt by F0 LEY to
divert the topic of the meeting to the issue of the RHT, which he considered
to be ender investigation (Exhibit 18).
The audit ordered by FAMULARI was undertaken by inde andent auditors under the
direction of VENKATARAMAN (Exhibit 26, p. 33). Joe 3ERNARDO, a qualified
receipt inspector, was placed in charge of the audit. VENKATARAMAN advised OI
the purpose of the audit was to determine the extent of the problem, i.e.,
improper inspections (Exhibit 26, p. 33).
AGENT'S NOTE: VENKATARAMAN provided 01 with a copy of an Executive
Summary (Exhibit 27), prepared at the request of SRI LAURA. The summary
delineated the criteria for the audit: basically, the auditors were
NC OR Pl DISCl WI APP 0 0F
FIEp IC E DI T , 0F E F IN IGAT S.
GION I
Case No. 1 95 032S 22
w
-
L
charged with determining whether the. items in the warehouse could have
been inspected based on the condition of the packaging as found.
VENKATARAMAN stated FOLEY was not being singled out because of the incident
with SULLIVAN on May 29, 1995. The audit was to determine the scope of a
potential problem with improper inspection procedures (Exhibit 26, p. 35).
VENKATARAHAN stated all of FOLEY's crk would be looked at first, based on his
known problems. The work of the other inspectors would be looked at later, -
and sampled, in accordance with standard procedures (Exhibit 26, p. 36).
-
BERNARDO, who was in charge of the actual audit, said that he was recruited
for the job by FAMULARI-because of previous audit experience. BERNARD 0 said
the safety of the plant was the main issue during the audit. He stated-that
he was not directed by BECo to make a finding against FOLEY. The criteria for
the inspection of FOLEY's werk was the same as the other inspectors. FOLEY
._
w as not being singled out, nor was he the subject of any harassment by BECo .
-management (Exhibit 28, pp. 24. 41, and 44).
-On June 19, 1995, the results of the audit were discussed at the first of two
sus nsion hearings. O'BRIEN,-FOLEY's union representative, advised 01 that
he lieved the audit results were biased. Following the June 19th meeting,
O'BRIEN said that he made several visits to the warehouse and conducted his -
own audit using the criteria that the MRIR contained 15 items or less.
According to BECo's sample plan, all items in these MRIRs would have to be
inspected, therefore all bags / containers would have to be owned. O'BRIEN was
able to document insactions that had been conducted by HEGERICH, SULLIVAN,
ard GUNN, where the ags had not been opened. O'BRIEN mada additional trips
to the warehouse where these discrepancies were witnessed by a fellow
employee, Bob CLANCY, and by NRC's Rich LAURA. O'BRIEN made the results of
his inspection known at FOLEY's suspension hearing on . lune 29, 1995. He feels
that this information was instrumental in keeping FOLEY from being terminated
+
(Exhibit 29).
During these meetings FOLEY had an opportunity to address the issue of the
. swagelock inspections. In his first 01 interview on August 14, 1995, he gave
the following explanation regarding MRIR 95 4605 (Exhibit 31): FOLEY stopped
the inspection of the material when he realized the sactrometer machine was
out of order, and he would not be able to rform a c1emical analysis. He
. said
"
he had not signed off on dimensions, cause they were not done,
. . . the bag was not open." Other attributes which he had marked as " Sat,"
he stated were not complete. FOLEY then placed the MRIR on hold, pending the
return of the spectrometer (Exhibit 4, pp.140 and 141).
With respect to the second MRIR, No. 95 4711 (Exhibit 31A), FOLEY stated the
package contained three particular line items. He had performed the
dimensionals and the visuals on two, but not gotten to the third line item,
however, he had recorded it on the traveler, which is the form used to track
the use of the calipers. FOLEY said he recorded all three stock symbols on
that traveler. He added, "So, they assumed that I took measurements on the
N OR P DISCLC WI' PROV O iF
FIE(LD C DI 0FF INVE iTIONA
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Case No. 1 95-032S 23
. . .
third bag of swagelocks, which I didn't at that point, because the bag was
closed, and I didn't complete the inspection" (Exhibit 4, p.160).
In a subsequent 01 interview on June 11, 1997. FOLEY contends he took the
dimensions of the swagelocks through the plastic bags using calipers and
marked the corresponding attribute on the Commercial Grade Item (CGI) check
list. Although several remaining attributes are marked ." SAT" with FOLEY's
initials, FOLEY said he did not inspect them. He contends these attributes
could not be inspected through plastic, and that he made a mistake when he
marked these items inspected. The attributes include the-visual inspection of
flow path, and visual inspection of fittings for damage (Exhibit 6, p.144).
As a result of the issues O'BRIEN raised at the suspension hearings, BECo
agreed to a walk through of the warehouse. DESMOND advised 0I that she
participated in the walk through of the warehouse with union representatives
and CIBELLI. DESMOND observed several items she believed could not be
adequately inspected, since they were still sealed in plastic bags.
Identifying stickers on the outside of the bags, partially obstructed the view
of the item inside. DESMOND explained, however, certain attributes can be
inspected through plastic, and that it is the responsibility of the ins
to review the purchase order to see what attributes must ba inspected.She pector
. stated that, had she been in charge of RI at the time, she would have been
concerned. This concern would be directed at all the inspectors, who appear o
to have been taking shortcuts in their inspections. DESMOND opined that the
issue of FOLEY allegedly falsifying an ins)ection report is more significant
than the discrepancies found in the walk t1 rough. In her opinion, the act of-
signing off on dimensions, which were not taken, shows intent (Exhibit 32,
pp. 32-53).
CIBELLI advised OI that, as a result of the warehouse walk through with
management and union representatives, he reduced FOLEY's 20 suspension to
three days. In a letter to the union president, dated October 30, 1995
(Exhibit 34), he stated this action was based on a review of receipt
ins)ection prtctices. CIBELLI told 01 there were several things that he had
loo (ed at that changed his focus from the evidence he heard during the
suspension hearings. Based on his observations, he believed that FOLEY
deserved a normal suspension of three days, as o) posed to the highly unusual
days he had imposed earlier. He-stated that 0 LEY was wrong, because he
did not perform his inspections )roperly. and he deserved the three day
suspension. CIBELLI' indicated tlat, although FOLEY falsified the inspection
report, CIBELLI does not know what FOLEY's intent was. CIBELLI stated that it
was his decision alone to reduce the suspension to three days, just as it was
his decision to initially suspend FOLEY for 20 days. There was no inpJt from
BECo management on either decision (Exhibit 34, pp. 47 54).
A subsequent audit was performed as a result of the swagelock. issue
(Exhibit 27). The audit encompassed inspections performed over a fou year
period,1991 thru 1995, for inspectors FOLEY aad GUNN. The 1295 MRIk packages
prepared by FOLEY- and GUNN were evaluated, resulting in 712 reinspections.
The 73 items were identified as potential problems because they were in sealed
i PUB ISCL0 RE THOUT OV
FI 0 DIRE FFICE WEST IONS,
REGION I
-Case No. 1-95 032S 24
- - - - - - _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
>
packages. These items were consistent with the swagelock issue because of the
sealed packages, but they differed in that they did not have falsified
inspection reports. One of the HRIR packages pre ared b
similar to the swagelock falsification issue GUNN was found to be @
The remainder of the items were reins)ected and found to be satisfactory. qc
Packages prepared by SULLIVAN and HEGERICH were reviewed for the years 1995,
1994, and 1993 (sampling only), with only two problems found.
On July 3,1997, MAREN advised 0I that her letter dated August 26, 1996, to
FOLEY (Exhibit 11), in which she stated his record would be expunged based on
the recommendation of his department, was strictly the result of union
negotiations, as confirmed in T0 LAND's reply to MAREN dated August 30, 1996
, (Exhibit 35). The letter was not based on BECo acknowledging they had made a ,
i
mistake in suspending FOLEY. MAREN also contradicted FOLEY's claim that the
QA audit had cleared of him of any wrong doing, and that MAREN's letter was an
exoneration. HAREN said she and TOLAND, the union president, " worked out a
deal to make the problem go away." In addition, any reference to a department
recommendation, would be to the de)artment where FOLEY was working at the time
the letter was written (not QA). iAREN said it was standard procedure to call
the employee's department head to see if he/she was the current subject of
additional disciplinary action. If that was the case, the department could
delay or eliminate the record expungement (Exhibit 36).
Aaent's Analysis
FOLEY's initial allegation was that he refused to perform the calibration
check because the procedure. QCI 7.15, prohibited this type of test. In a
subsequent interview, FOLEY contradicted this statement and said he was aware
of the procedure that called for the calibration check, but that he had never "
performed the test. He also stated that, although he had received training on
the RHT in March of 1995, he felt this training was inadequate, and he felt
uncomfortable with the machine. FOLEY could have requested additional
training on the RHT to correct this perceived deficiency, but he elected not
to do so.
Throughout the course of this investigation F0 LEY omitted material information
relevant to the discussion he had with SULLIVAN over the use of the RHT on
May 29, 1995. FOLEY failed to reveal that SULLIVAN had approached him to
correct mistakes on an HRIR that FOLEY had arepared five days earlier. FOLEY
led OI to believe the argument with SULLIVAi was over an inspection that was
originating that day. The investigation indicates SULLIVAN returned an HRIR
to FOLEY, instructing him to re do the portion of the inspection involving
hardness testing. In addition, FOLEY was instructed to use the "A" scale and
to perform a calibration check prior to use.
FOLEY's use of the "B" scale in the HRIR questioned by SULLIVAN on May 29,
1995, also could be considered a aerformance problem. Although SULLIVAN did
not handle the problem with the RiT according to BECo procedure, HEGERICH
stated the inspectors in RI were advised by SULLIVAN of the 3roblem with the
"B" scale, and that the vendor had said the "A" scale could >e used. The
N PUBLI SCLOSU OUT / PR OF
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Case No. 1 95 032S 25
,
l
contact with the vendor was initiated by SULLIVAN and is supported by BECo
' documents.
SULLIVAN's discussions with SIMONS on May 30,<1995, were directed towards-
FOLEY's misinterpretation of a QA procedure, his failure to follow an order
from a supervisor, poor work performance, and unauthorized absence. SIMONS'
res)onse was to request an example of. the alleged )oor work performance from
SUL_IVAN, which he provided the following day. F0.EY's work had already been
the subject of a supervisory review, and a procedure had already been
re written due to a past misinterpretation. ;
FAMULARI's counseling session with FOLEY on June 5, 1995, was directed at work !
performance issues, and also at FOLEY's failure to accept SULLIVAN as his
supervisor. FOLEY has admitted to 01 that he did not feel SULLIVAN was
technically qualified to supervise RI, because he lacked a technical degree.
FOLEY's refusal to acknowledge SULLIVAN's position is evidenced by FOLEY's
refusal to read QCI 7.15, which had been written by SULLIVAN: his refusal to <
accept SULLIVAN's interpretation of QCI 7.15; and his refusal to accept '
SULLIVAN's explanation of the allowed use of the "t," scale following
consultation with the vendor. FOLEY's refusal to acknowledge SULLIVAN as his
supervisor is noted in 01 interviews with HEGERICH, FAMULARI, and SIMONS. He
was described as being very argumentative: he could never be wrong, he always
had to be right.
SIMONS* counseling session with FOLEY on June 7,1995, was also directed at a
work performance issue, his tendency to leave his work station for prolonged
periods of time, without advising SULLIVAN, his superviscr. A second issue ,
was FOLEY's unauthorized absence for several hours on May 29, 1995. Following
the discussion with SULLIVAN, FOLEY obtained permission to leave the plant
early from a second level supervisor, bypassing his first level supervisor,
SULLIVA
- N.
The verbal reprimand issued by Frank FAMULARI on June 12, 1995, was predicated
on the following issues: work performance, unauthorized absence, faulty
inspection reports, and FOLEY's attitude. At the time of the reprimand, FOLEY '
said he attempted to bring up the RHT, but FAMULARI :afused to address the l
1ssue. The investigation has shown that BECo management was in the process of
addressing the issue, which was the interpretation QCI 7.15.
Between May 29, 1995, and July 5,1995, FOLEY never mentioned that he had a
safety concern, nor did he take advantage of the available procedures to
submit the perceived safety concern in writing. Many of the individuals
interviewed in the investigation were not aware of FOLEY's safety concern
until it was mentioned by 01 during the interview.
The actions taken by management between May 30, 1995, and June 13, 1995.
- a> pear to be reasonable actions in dealing with FOLEY's performance problems.
T1e incident on May 29, 1995, stemmed from a performance problem, an
inaccurate inspection report on the aart of F0 LEY. It also revealed a
misinterpretation of procedures on t1e part of FOLEY, his inability to accept
OR PU ISCL WI R0 F
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Case No. 1-95 032S 26
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supervision, and his unauthorized absence. FOLEY's supervisors reacted
immediately to both problems with the RHT: the perceived misinterpretation on
the part of FOLEY, and the )roblem with the "B" scale. In subsequent
counseling sessions with F0_EY, management directed their attention to the
issues of his work performance, problem with supervision, and attitude. They
elected not to discuss the issue of the RHT, which they considered to be under
review, and an attempt by FOLEY to divert the topic of the meetings.
Conclusion
Based on the evidence developed during this investigation 01 could not
substantiate the allegation of harassment and intimidation against FOLEY, by
BEco management personnel, because of the issue FOLEY raised on May 29, 1995,
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during a receipt inspection.
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Case No. 1 95 032S 27
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
i
During the course of the investigation several issues developed regarding the
,
union's involvement in the FOLEY matter.
,
First, the general consensus among the individuals interviewed was that
- if a BECo non union member had been accused of falsifying records, it
! would have been a firing offense. They opined that it was FOLEY's union
l
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ties which enabled him to keep his job, bid on a better position, get a
raise, and have his record expunged. A contract employee who was
j familiar with the FOLEY situation said, ". . . that making a notation
- for an inspection that could not have been performed was extremely
i serious, and would have been grounds for dismissal at other plants where
j he has worked" (Exhibit 21).
l Secondly, the union bargaining agreement does not permit members to be
i subjected to formal performance evaluations. This creates a void when
- trying to establish a work performance record for an individual. An
informal procedure to keep track of performance is available to BECo
management; but, it is not mandatory, and it is infrequently used.
Third, BECo's expungement of FOLEY's record by the Corporate Labor
in the technical reinstatement 'f FOLEY's Level II certifications, which
! are necessary for receipt inspection. In so doing, PNPS could have been
forced to put FOLEY, an individual suspected of falsifying records, back
. into RI, knowing that his integrity was suspect, and his ability to
perform inspections was questionable.
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Case No. 1-95 032S 30
LIST OF EXHIBITS
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Exhibit
No. Descriotion
Investigation Status Record 1 95 032S, dated December 3, 1996.
lA Investigation Status Record 1 95 032. dated June 28, 1995.
Allegation Receipt Report RI 95 A 0106, dated June 18, 1995.
Excerpt Pilgrim Inspection Report, 50 293/96 06, dated October 30,
1996.
Transcribed Interview of FOLEY, dated August 14, 1995.
Interview Report of FOLEY, dated February 5, 1997.
Transcribed Interview of FOLEY, dated June 11, 1997.
QA Department Organizational Chart, dated February 15, 1995.
BECo Quality Control Instruction 7.15, dated March 9,1995,
Verbal Reprimand given to FOLEY, dated June 12, 1995.
SULLIVAN's Memo to SIMONS, Referencing Review of FOLEY's Work,
dated May 31, 1995.
MAREN's Letter to FOLEY, Referencing the Expungement of his
record, dated August, 26, 1996.
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SidONS' Memo to File, Referencing Procedure Review of RHT, dated
June 26, 1995.
QA Surveillance Report, RHT, dated September 18, 1996.
MRIR 95 4837, dated May 24, 1995.
Transcribed Interview of SULLIVAN, dated June 11, 1997.
,
Request for Materials and Service Stock Authorization, dated
May 25, 1995.
Transcribed Interview of SIMONS, dated May 6, 1997.
17A SIMONS' Memo Detailing the June 7th Counselling Session.
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Interview Report of FAMULARI, dated June 13, 1997.
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Case No. 1 95 032S '31
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I 19 Excerpt of QADP 7.13, dated February 1,1994.
19A Excerpt of QADP 7.13, dated October U,1994.
ERPI Sampling Plans, dated June 1992.
Interview Report o g , dated May 6, 1997. CK 7 e
SIMONS' Daily Planner.
Transcribed Interview of CARRARA, dated May 6,1997.
Transcribed Interview of HEGERICH, dated May 6, 1997.
SRI LAURA's Log Referencing Notification from FAMULARI on June 14,
1995.
Transcribed Interview of VENKATARAMAN, dated June 10, 1997.
Executive Summary, prepared by VENKATARAMAN, Referencing the Audit
in Receipt Inspection.
Transcribed Interview of BERNARDO, dated June 10, 1997.
Interview Report of 0'BRIEN, dated May 5,1997.
Probi m Report No. 95 0466, dated June 15, 1995.
MRIR No. 95 4605, December 10, 1996.
31A MRIR No. 95 4711, December 13, 1996.
Transcribed Interview of DESMOND, dated May 7, 1997.
Transcribed Interview of CIBELLI, dated June 10, 1997
CIBELLI's Letter to FOLEY's Union Informing Them of Suspension .
Reduction, dated October 30, 1995.
T0 LAND's Letter to MAREN, Stating the Expungement of FOLEY's
Record Was Based on a Negotiated Agreement with the Union, and Not
on Management's Recommendation, dated August 30, 1996.
Conversation Record of MAREN, dated July 3,1997.
FIE D DIREC , FFICE :NVESTI S.
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Case No. 1-95-032S 32
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