IR 05000293/1997010
| ML20202E760 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202E751 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-97-10, NUDOCS 9712080136 | |
| Download: ML20202E760 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket No.
50 293 License Nos.
DPR 35 Report No.
50 293/97-10
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Licensee:
Boston Edison Company 600 Rocky Hill Roed Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 5599
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Facility:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Dates:
November 4 7,1997 Inspectors:
J. Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region l W. Maier, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region l P. Frechette, Security Specialist, Region i R. Laura, Senior Resident inspector, Pilgrim
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R. Arraighi, Resident inspector, Pilgrim
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Approv6d by:
Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety 9712000136 971126 POR ADOCK 05000293
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O EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant i
Full-participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation i
November 4 7,1997 Inspection Report 50 293/9710
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- Overall performance of the ERO was very good, Simulated events were accurately diagnosed, proper mitigation actions were performed, emergency declarations were timely and accurate, and off site agencies were notified promptly. No exercise weaknesses, safety concerns, or violations of NRC requirements were observed.
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o Report Detalla
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P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance a.
Exercise Evaluation Scope During this inspeed 1, the NRC inspectora observed and evaluated the performance of the licensee's, m.iergency response organization (ERO) during the biennial, full-participation exercise in the simulator control room (SCR), technical support center (TSC), operations support center (OSC), and the emergene operations facility (EOF). The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of ab..ormal plant conditions,
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classification of emergency conditions, notification of offs 4e agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command ar.d con..ol, communications, and the overallimplementation of the emergency plan, in addition, the inspectors attended the post exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self assessment of the exercise.
b.1 Emeraency Response Facility Observations and Cntioue Overall emergency response organization and demonstration of the use of the emergency response facilities was very good as indicated by the followir g:
Good command and control was demonstrated in all facilities
Good recognition of simulated plant conditions and classification of
emergency events Good use of emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and emergency plan
implementing procedures (EPIPs)
Good identification and prioritization f mitigation strategies
Good briefings, debriefings, and timely dispatch of emergency repair teams in
the operational support center Good communicaticas with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Dose projections were completed in a timely manner, and the information
forwarded to '.he Emergency Director and the Commonwealth
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Timely and correct protective action recommendations were given to the
Commonwealth verbally. However, the documentation of the protective action recommendations could have been more timely, b2 Dose Assessment The dose assessment staff performed numerous "what if" projection. Additionally when the simulated release started the dose assessment staff immediately performed real time dose projections to confirm the protective action recommendations that were provided to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
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The dose assessment staff also demonstrated to the inspector its ability to derive a source term from core damage assessment and make appropriate dose projections ast essing the consequences of unmonitored releases or breach of containment.
Additionally, the computer program had been modified to indicate the correct evacuation subareas, therefore closing (IFl 50-293/95 25 02).
b.3 Licensee Exercise Critiaue The licensee's critique was very comprehensive and thorough. It identified all of the observations identified by the NRC inspection team, c.
Overall Exercise Conclusions Overall performance of the ERO was good. Simulated events were accurately diagnosed, proper mitigation actions were performed, emergency declarations were timely and accurate, and offsite agencies were notified promptly. No exercise weaknesses, safety concerns, or violations of NRC requirements were observed.
P8 Miscellaneous EP lasues P8.1 Self-Contained Breathina Anoaratus (SCBA)
The licensee identified, during the exercise, a shortage of personnelin the OSO repair pool who were qualified to wear self contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs).
Only four of the twenty responders, available for repair teams, were qualified according to the licensee's tracking system, and none of the maintenance personnel in the pool were qualified. Due to the exercise scenario, this scarcity of qualified personnel did not cause a problem with response.
The inspectors learned, through discussions with radiation protection, emergancy preparedness and operations personnel, that the administrative tracking system for personnel qualification status with respect to SCBA was inadequate because the qualification tracking printout did not report respirator fit test completion results for the various respirators usea at Pilgrim station.
Paragraph 8.1.2 of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Procedure 6.7-002 " Respiratory Proteation Program," requires users of respirators to satisf actorily complete a quali ative and quantitative fit test before being approved to wear a tight fitting respiratory protection device, such as SCBAs. This procedure requires retesting within twelve calendar months. Departnients require individuals to ensure they accomplish this yearly retest. Qualification tracking reports, however, list only one column for respirator fit test completion even though an individual may wear more than one type of respirator. Radiation protection staff reported that only six of 25 radiation protection technicians were SCBA qualified because the individuals f ailed to schedule their fit test for SCB.
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The shortage of SCBA valified individuals also negatively affected the number of qualified fire brigade members at the station. The inspectors learned, after the exercise, that eight of 39 fire brigade members had lapsed in their qualifications
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because they failed to schedule SCBA fit tests within the required 12 months. The
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Emergency Planning Manager, issued a trouble report describing the problems with SCbA qualifications, c.
Conclusions
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The lack of administrative control over SCBA fit tests, and the resulting shortage of
qualified SCBA wearers, represents a significant preparedness deficiemy. Beyond the requirements of Procedure 6.7 002, described above, the licensee's emergency
plan stipulates that repair and damage control team members receive emergency team training specific to re-entry. The inspectors could not determine whether this issue constitutes a violation of NRG requirements. This issue is being characterized i
as an unresolved item (URI 50 293/97 *0-01)pending the results of the licensee's investigation and further NRC inspection activity.
P8.2 Exercise Control The licensee's simulation of indications in the field caused the TSC/OSC management to defer several tasks that the scenario developers expected them to address. Among these were:
Repair of the "A" standby gas treatment exhaust (SBGT) fan
Replacement of the RHR breaker 2046
The drywell entry to investigate the MSIV f ailure
Excessive source term dose rates, premature failure indications and the alteration of scenario data caused these tasks to be deferred in favor of others with clearer success paths. Also, the controllers in the OSC changed the scenario's radiological data late in the exercise in an attempt to f acilitate the entry and evaluation of repair teams. The controllers eliminated all airborne activity in the reactor t,uilding. This change was made too late in the exeicise to f acilitate the entry of additional teams; rather, it precluded the consideration of administering thyroid blocking agent to the teams already being planned for entry.
One scenario controlissue caused confusion among the TSC/OSC responders. This resulted when the shift crew in the simulator successfuity started the "A" SBGT f an end controllers had to direct its tripping shortly thereafter.
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Conclusion The licensee did not sufficiently control the scenario timeline to ensure players respond to planned activities without the need to make ad hoc changes to the scenario.
V. MANAGEIENT MEETINGS X1 Exit Meeting The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 7,1997. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED fjlorim Nuclear Power Station L. Olivier, Vise President Nuclear H. Oheim, General Manager - Technical Services N. Desmond, Regulatory Relations Group Manager J. Spangler, Emergency Preparedness Department Manager C. Goddard, Plant Manager D. Ellis Principal Engineer - Regulatory Affairs K. Sullivan, Offsite Emergency Preparedness Lead R. Weber, Yankee Atomic Engineering Company G. Vazquez, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator P. Cormier, Senior Nuclear Training Specialist J. - Gerety, Nuclear Engineering Services Group Manager T. Sullivan, Training Manager J. Taorming,l&C Department Manager J. Neal, Nuclear Services Group L. Wetherell, Deputy Engineering Manager
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R. Markovich, Emergency Preparedness Manager, Yankee Atomic Enginaring Company S. McCain, Emergency Preparedness Consultant, Yankee Atomic Engineering Company T. Veukatavawau, Special Project Manager D. Tarantino, Nuclear Information J. Alexander, Quality Assurance Manager T. Swan, Technical Training Manager LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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i 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
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i 82302: Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors
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LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened (URI 50 293/9710 01) Tracking of the training, fit test requirements, and qualificat;on for self contained breathing apparatus for emergency repair teams.
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(IFl 50 239/95 25 01)The delays of field team deployment early in the exercise was -
assessed as an exercise weakness
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(IFl 50 239/95-25-02) Due to the lack of f amiliarity with DAPAR for assessing the consequences of an unmonitored release or a breach of containment, evacuation subareas were incorrectly identified which resulted in an inaccurate initial PAR Discussed None LIST OF ACRONYMS USED EAL Emergency Action Level EC Emergency Coordinator EOF Emergency Operations Facility EP Emergency Preparedness ERF Emergency Response Facility ERO Emergency Response Organization GE General Emergency IFl Inspector Follow-up Item NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSC Operations Support Center PA Public Address system PAR Protective Action Recommendation e
SAE Site Area Emergency SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SCR Simulator Control Room TSC Technical Support Center
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