IR 05000293/1986013
| ML20198N502 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1986 |
| From: | Harpster T, Lazarus W, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198N490 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-86-13, NUDOCS 8606060112 | |
| Download: ML20198N502 (3) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-293/86-13 Docket No.
50-293 License No.
DPR-35 Priority
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Category C
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Licensee: Boston Edison M/C Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name:
Pilgrim Generating Station Inspection At:
Plymouth, Massachusetts Inspection Conduc d: -April 3,1986 Inspectors:
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W. ~Th6ma's, Emergency Pre'paredfie'ss
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Specialist Approved by:
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T. p'rgster/phief, Emer(ency
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Freparedh6ss Section Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 3. 1986 (Report No. 50-293/86-13)
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection to followup on licensee action regarding findings identified during previous emergency preparedness inspections and exercises, including observation of a drill to demonstrate control of re-entry team radiation exposure.
Results:
No violations were identified.
The licensee demonstrated acceptable control of re-entry teams to ensure that radiation exposures were evaluated and controlled.
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l DETAILS 1.
PERSON CONTACTED
- C. Fuller, Assistant Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- E. Graham, Compliance Group Leader
- W. Hoey, Sr. Radiation Protection Engineer
- C. Mathis, Nuclear Operations Manager
- D. Pachulski, Nuclear Training Specialist
- R. Silva, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- Indicates those present at the exit interview.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Finding During the emergency exercise conducted on September 5, 1986, it was identified that there was a lack of satisfactory consideration of poten-tial radiation exposure to personnel during re-entry to areas of the plant with high radiation levels. The licensee responded to the concern by developing a procedure to control re-entry, and committed to train per-sonnel in the re-entry procedures and conduct a drill to demonstrate the effectiveness of the re-entry controls.
(This item was tracked as item 50-293/ 85-19-01.)
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed Procedure 5.7.2.16,
"Re-entry", which was determined to adequately address the evaluation of re-entry risks and approval for the re-entry. A drill was conducted which involved the necessity for a team to re-enter an area of high radiation to stop a leak from the scram discharge volume.
Re-entry teams were assembled and briefed by the Operations Support Center (OSC) manager prior to dispatch. All re-entry team members' cumulative radiation exposure histories were determined.
They were then briefed on l
potential radiation environments which could be encountered, and allowable
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exposures. Travel routes to the location of work area were discussed prior to departure and chosen to lessen exposure.
Each re-entry team was accompanied by an HP technician carrying appropriate survey instruments.
Throughout the re-entry the HP technician exercised positive control over team member exposures by indicating which areas were to be avoided because of high dose rates.
All re-entry team personnel were equipped with TLDs and high low range i
dosimeters.
Protective clothing and respirator usage was simulated.
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Repair / corrective action activities were promptly carried out by re-entry team members. All re-entry team personnel appeared to be fully knowledge-able of the work areas and equipment used in attempts to stop the leaking scram discharge volume drain valves and control rod drive hydraulic control unit valves.
Control of the re-entry and evaluation of radiological hazards was acceptable.
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During the drill it was noted that the present layout of the OSC makes accountability difficult. With three unlocked means of egress from the
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OSC, and with only one security guard stationed, OSC personnel could enter and leave without being accounted for.
This will be further evaluated during this next emergency exercise at the station (50-293/86-13-01).
3.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the iicensee at the conclusion of this inspection (see detail 1 for attendees) to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection as detailed in the report.
At no time during this inspection was any written material provided to the licensee.
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