IR 05000282/1987006
| ML20216F966 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1987 |
| From: | Defayette R, Drouin B, Grant W, Hague R, Januska A, Neisler J, Matthew Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216F941 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-87-06, 50-282-87-6, 50-306-87-06, 50-306-87-6, NUDOCS 8706300985 | |
| Download: ML20216F966 (16) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
' REGION III
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Reports.No. 50-282/87006(DRP);'50-306/87006(DRP)
Docket Nos. .50-282;'504306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mal Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie: Island' Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota .
Inspection Conducted: May 11-15, 1987-d '
InspectorsFlR. L.-Hague
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f.g. raze
/t A. G. Janus a
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. Smith R.9/A p . S. Drouin
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Approved By: R."W.DeFayettI'
Team Leader b /2 [f-Date /'
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8706300985 870612
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Inspection Summary Inspection from May 11-15, 1987 (Reports Nos. 50-282/87006(DRP); 50-306/87006(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Special mid-SALP team inspection by region based and resident inspectors in the areas of: operations; radiological protection; chemistry; instrumentation and controls; security, and emergency preparedness. The security results are being reported in separate reports (50-282/87007(DRP)
and 50-306/87007(ORP)).
Results: The team found no evidence that the licensee's performance is declining in any of the areas it investigated. No violations were identified in any of the area j l
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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Northern States Power Company E. L. Watzl, Plant Manager M. B. Sellman, General Superintendent, Operations R. L. Lindsey, Assistant to Plant Manager R. K. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services A. D. Smith, General Superintendent, Planning and Services D. A. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection M. A. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering T. E. Diercks, Security Shift Supervisor D. J. Mendele, Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection T. E. Amundson, Superintendent, Training R. G. Fraser, Production Engineer W. C. Gauger, Supervisor, I&C K. M. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering P. H. Kamman, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations QA A. A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer G. E. Malinowski, Radiation Protection Coordinator B. F. Stephens, Operations Engineer T. J. Asmus, Radiation Protection !
T. M. Gatten, Chemistry Coordinator J. N. Johnson, Plant Office Manager A. C. Johnson, Radiation Protection Supervisor R. C. Berghammer, Plant Services Supervisor G. T. Lenertz, General Superintendent of Maintenance D. M. Vincent, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction '
H. O. Nelson, Reactor Engineer G. Hudson, Administrator of Nuclear Security and Services L. Anderson, Operations K. J. Albrecht, Director, Power Supply QA j J. P. Delkers, Quality Control Specialist i C. L. Probst, Quality Control Specialist D. A. Ludwig, Radit. tion Protection Specialist T. A. Geronimo, Contract, Radiation Protection Specialist D. Larimer, Radiochemistry Supervisor S. Lappegaard, Chemist T. Gatten, Radiation Protection Coordinator ,
A. McLeran, Radiation Protection Specialist )
J. Hopkins, Radiation Protection Specialist '
J. Lucas, Radiation Protection Specialist D. Jagusch, Assistant Plant Equipment Operator USNRC R. W. DeFayette, Team Leader M. J. Smith, Emergency Preparedness Inspector R. L. Hague, Senior Resident Inspector, Point Beach
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J. E. Hard, Senior Resident Inspector, Prairie Island M. M. Moser, Resident Inspector, Prairie Island W. B. Grant,' Radiation Specialist ' >
A.'G.Januska, Radiation Specialist J. H. Neisler, I&C Inspector B. S. Drouin, Physical Security Inspector Many of the:above persons attended the exit meeting. The inspectors also contacted other personnel during the course of the inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings i (Closed) Open Items (282/306 86999-01; 282/306 86999-02; 282/87999-01):
During the period of January 7,1986 to May 1,1986, the licensee declared three Notifications of Unusual Event (NUEs). The NUEs occurred on September 8, 1986, December 27, 1986 and March 30, 1987. The inspector reviewed the licensee's records and related documentation concerning
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these NUEs. The declarations were determined to be consistent with
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the licensee's EALs and all notifications were completed as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. These items are close ^3 (Closed) Open Item (306/84012-01): Determine sampling line loss correction factors due to iodine plate out and particulate deposition N during normal and accident conditions for NUREG 0737 Item F.1.2. The licensee conducted a short term test of the sampling system and has n'
established line losses for iodine and particulate during normal operating conditions. A contract for a long term study of possible line losses during normal and accident condition has been signed. The long term study (21 months) will be conducted at several nuclear plants including Prairie Islan . Introduction Prairie Island is one of three sites in Region III on the reduced inspection program which means that routine inspections normally are conducted only by the resident inspectors. These inspections consist primarily of essential coverage in the areas of safety verification, ESF ;
systems, surveillance, and maintenance. The NRC policy for sites on this -l program is to conduct a team inspection midway through the SALP period to review any areas which have not been addressed in depth as a result of the resident inspector's routine inspections. This report documents the results of such a team inspection for Prairie Island. The areas reviewed were: operations; radiological protection; chemistry; instrumentation and controls; emergency preparedness; and security. The security results are being transmitted in separate reports (50-282/87007(DRP) and 50-306/86007(DRP)).
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4 '. - Operations- Areas Reviewed The inspection encompassed the following areas: management involvement in plant operations, licensed and unlicensed opera;or qualifications and performance, control room activities, conduct of plant tours and surveillances, plant houseke e ng and other
, area ' b .- Observations / Discussions .;
(1) Management Involvement in Operations During the inspection, Unit I was nearing the end of a maintenance and refueling outage and Unit 2 was operating j at near full power. Each morning the licensee holds a morning 1 meeting and encourages attendance by anyone who is availabl !
Those meetings usually draw up to 50 people with discussions covering plant status and general items of interes If necessary, a management staff meeting is held immediately {
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after the morning meeting. The General Superintendent of Operations was in the Control Room every morning reviewing operations of the previous evening and discussing with the Shift Superintendents planned evolutions for the day. Reactor Operators interviewed believed that management was responsive'
to their needs and concerns. The inspector concludes that
- s management involvement with plant operations at Prairie Island is effectiv (2) Unlicensed Operator Performance i
The licensee has two levels of unlicensed operators. The i senior position is designated Assistant Plant Equipment Operator (APE 0) and the junior position is designated Plant !
Attendant (PA). The inspector accompanied an Assistant Plant j Equipment Operator during his mid-shift tour of the Auxiliary .,
Building. The operator made a very thorough tour investigating
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and. checking many more things than were on the check-off lis The inspector also observed the APE 0 and an AP coordinate a ;
waste discharge and a transfer of water to the spent fuel pi The old waste discharge panel has been replaced with a cathode ray tube (CRT) and terminal which allows the operator to verify the lineup prior to commencing a discharge. This system appears beneficial to the operators. The operators also have a terminal for maintaining a watch relief status form. The operator generates a hard copy at the end of his shift and uses it during his turnover to the on-coming shift. The operators appeared knowledgeable and attentive to their dutie I i
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(3) Control Room Activities (a) Shi f t ' Complin.ent The licensee's Control Room compliment includes a shift supervisor, a lead plant equipment and reactor operator and a plant equipment and reactor operator for each uni They are also in the process of implementing a new position of shift manager for each shift. This position will be filled by an SR0 with a college degree and eventually i replace the ' shift technical advisor position. Presently, four shift supervisors are in a program in which they i spend approximately half their time on shift and half !
attending classes for their degree. This program appears to have the full support of those participatin !
(b) Shift Turnovers The inspector observed several shift turnovers between each of the Control Room watchstanders. As with the unlicensed operators, both the shift supervisor and the lead plant equipment and reactor operator have a computer terminal on which they generate a hard copy of a shift turnover information sheet. These sheets, coupled with their handwritten logs, provide a complete record of the shift's activities. Turnovers were formal and included a board walkdow (c) Tagout Control The lead plant equipment and reactor operator is responsible for the tagouts on his unit with the shift j supervisor's approval. The licensee has taken further '
advantage of the use of the computer terminal for generating tag labels. The necessary tagout lineups for several preventive maintenance and routine evolutions have ,
been entered into the computer. When one of those tagouts !
is mluired, the lead plant equipment and reactor operator co9 s up the tagout by number and tha computer prints out the labels for the tags and the tagout signoff shee This system savet a great deal of the operator's tim (d) Draving Availability A controlled set of system drawings is kept by the lead plant equipment and reactor operator for each uni When a change is made to a system, the responsible engineer supplies an updated l print to the Control Room. This updated print is kept by the operators until it is incorporated into the controlled set. The inspectors verified that there was a small number of these updated prints waiting for incorporation. The operators believe this system j is adequate.
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(e) Temporary' Procedure Changes The inspector witnessed several temporary procedure chan Both shift. supervisors
- (SR0geswhileintheControlRoo s) are required to sign and date the temporary change. On one occasion, the shift' supervisor recognized-that a permanent' change to the procedure was appropriate and provided the necessary procedure change forms to the individual requesting the temporary change. The system appears adequate and properly implemente .(f) Surveillance Activities Individuals performing surveillance informed both.the cognizant' shift supervisor and the reactor operators of the impending tests. The reactor' operators in turn informed them of what_ annunciators to expect during
" various parts of the surveillance procedure. On one occasion on Unit 1, a rod motion surveillance was being run while the reactor operator was performing the steam generator crevice flush procedure and maintenance personnel were removing equipment from the containment causing numerous nuisance alarms from airlock door opening At this point, the operator enlisted the aid of two newly licensed operators to acknowledge.the nuisance alarms allowing him'to concentrate on the procedures in progres (4) Housekeeping During plant tours, the inspector observed generally good housekeeping' practices. Even~though one unit was still in
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an outage, obvious efforts were being taken to minimize unnecessary material in the operating spaces. A concerted effort is being undertaken to repaint the Auxiliary Building which should further promote good housekeeping consciousnes c. Summary Comments It appears that operations at Prairie Island are conducted by competent individuals with good management oversight and involvement. Both licensed and unlicensed operators were cognizant-of their responsibilities and accomplished their duties in a professional manner. Control Room activities, although at times hectic due to one unit being in an outage, were noticeably maintained under control of operations personnel. Housekeeping was above average for this vintage plant and efforts on improvements were evident.
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i 5. . Instrument and Control m , Areas Reviewed .)
Although the inspection focused on the observation of work activities, it also included a review of other I&C related functions. The principal areas inspected were: review of recent plant trips; observation of I&C surveillance testing; examination of measuring'and test equipment, and procedure revie Observations / Discussions (1) Review of Recent Plant Trips The inspector reviewed three plant trips'that occurred betwee l May 1986 and March J?87, each of which occurred during the performance of the Safeguards Logic Test surveillance procedure by instrument specialists. The' licensee had investigated the trips and determined that the root cause of the trips was the requirement for personnel to place the logic system in the ;
simulated injection mode several times during the surveillanc The Safeguards Logic Test was revised to reduce the number of times the system was placed in this injection mode. The licensee's corrective action for the plant trips appears to be acceptable to prevent recurrence of this type of plant "
tri (2) Obser 4 tion of I&C Surveillance Testing This portion-of the inspection involved the direct observation of work by instrument and control section personnel during the routine performance of their duties. The inspector observed all or portions of the performance of the following surveillances:
(a) Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Channel Calibration for N42 and N43 Channel (b) Monthly Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Tes (c) Rod Insertion Monitor Functional Tes (d) Deviation Comparator Function Tes The above tests were performed according to each step in the respective procedure. All deviations required the review and approval of two senior reactor operators before proceedin Communications between plant operators and I&C technicians prior to and while performing the tests appeared to ensure that operations personnel are aware of the status of plent systems, i
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On system restoration, the operator and the I&C specialist
' checked each item of the approved restoration checklist before the system was turned back to plant operations. The
' individuals performing the surveillance observed the procedural requirements for independent verification of tests and instrument settings. For the tests observed during this inspection, I&C personnel demonstrated a thorough knowledge of their assigned tasks that indicated the training for I&C personnel has been effectiv (3) Measuring and Testing Equipment (M&TE)
The inspector examined 16 pieces of measuring and test equipment in the I&C section. The equipment examined included pressure test gauges, frequency counters, timing devices, thermocouple calibrators, digital volt meters, decade resistance boxes and voltage standard Documentation consisting of calibration cards, completed calibration procedures and calibration stickers for each piece of equipment provided evidence that the test equipment was in calibration as defined by approved procedure Discussions with I&C personnel revealed that each was aware of the requirements for the use of calibrated test equipment. The inspector also observed, while
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witnessing I&C personnel performing surveillance tests, that l only equipment with current calibration was used in the test, '
(4) Procedure Review The inspector reviewed ten I&C surveillance procedures and i three quality control procedures. The procedures appeared to be technically correct, and required the appropriate independent verifications and second level and management reviews for {
results approva Summary Comments Based upon the inspector's observations and discussions, it appears that the Prairie Island I&C program is well managed, has trained and knowledgeable personnel, and is implemented in an acceptable '
manner. Surveillance tests are performed on time and correctly and good communications are maintained with the Control Room during the test . Radiological Protection Areas Reviewed )
During this inspection the Prairie Island radiation protection program was evaluated while Unit I was in a refueling / maintenance outage and Unit 2 was operational. Areas reviewed were: organization and management control; training and qualification of contract radiation
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protection workers; external and internal exposure controls; posting
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and labeling; high radiation area controls; staffing; ALARA practices and policies; and radioactive material and contamination control The inspector made several entries into the containment and auxiliary buildings, observed personnel working, observed several RWP job activities, held discussions with licensee and contractor workers, and made independent radiation measurements, b. Observation / Discussions Radiation Protection (RP) Group staffing has remained very stabl The staff consists of 19 radiation protection specialists (RPSs),
two coordinators (foremen), an RP Supervisor and five radiological engineers. Staffing appears to be adequate to efficiently implement the iadiation protection program. The technical RP staff meets the Technical Specification (T/S) ANSI qualifications. During the outage licensee RPSs were supported by 32 contractor technicians. The RPSs (both licensee and contractor), provided radiation protection coverage and overview functions for contract and licensee workers on all shifts. Observations and discussions with several of the RPSs indicated they were knowledgeable of their job function .
Observations of RPSs providing job coverage and surveillance l indicated they performed their job function wel !
Radiation protection personnel were involved in pre-outage reviews, were notified of major jobs in advance of the outage, and conducted pre-job ALARA review Lessons learned from previous outages were used in planning this outage. Major jobs included eddy current ,
testing of steam generator tubes, sleeving of up to 120 steam '
generator tubes, replacement of reactor coolant pump seals, sludge lancing, inservice inspection (131) activities and installation of nozzle restraints. All RP personnel assigned to job coverage functions in containment and the auxiliary building were informed of their responsibilities; it did not appear that any of the jobs were performed without HP knowledge or adequate coverag It appeared that ALARA reviews for certain outage tasks were conducted and that ALARA engineering was accomplished. The effectiveness of the ALARA program is reflected in the licensee's low exposure histor During the outage al1 personnel involved in radiation area work were monitored using vendor TLDs and in-house Self Reading Dosimeters (SRDs).
Additionally extremity badges and multiple dosimetry badges were i available for use when significant extremity dose or doses to various areas of the whole body were expected. The contractor TLDs are used '
for the official dosimeter record if the TLD and SRD readings compare within plus or minus 20%. In accordance with Radiation Protection Implementing Procedure 1116, if the TLD and the SRD readings differ by more than 20% and the difference between the two is more than 50 mR an Exposure Correction-Radiation Occurrence Report is written (ROR).
This ROR documents the event and describes the cause, if determined and assigns the most accurate dose. From April 7, 1987, when the !
outage started to May 13, the total whole body dose was 93 person-re !
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The licensee has a goal of 115 person-rem for this outage. Total whole body dose for 1987 to date is about 114 person-rem. The licensee projects a total dose of approximately 200 person-rem for 1987; the-licensee's average yearly whole body dose for the previous five years has been about 200 person-rem, which is substantially below the average for U.S. PWR During the outage engineering controls, air sampling and contamination control, and approved respiratory protection equipment were used to control internal exposures. A. selected review of air samples and smear survey results indicated sufficient air samples had been taken and analyzed and surveys conducte A Whole Body Count (WBC) program is used to evaluate the radiation protection program effectiveness. WBCs are performed before and after the outage on all personnel involved. This included all workers on RWPs which involved entrance into the auxiliary buildin No results exceeding the 40 MPC-hour control measure were noted for 1986 or 1987 to date. The whole body counter is calibrated by the vendor annuall l Auxiliary and containment building access and egress were well controlled by RPSs. The flow of persons, materials, and equipment in and out of these control points is monitored by the RPSs, as is the personal frisking performed using portable friskers or whole body friskers. Adequate radiation protection coverage was provide Selected RWP jobs were observed and associated radiation surveys were reviewed; it appeared outage activities were conducted in accordance with special instructions and requirements. Sufficient air samples, surveys, and smears were made to reflect radiological condition The licensee's Technical Specifications (T/S) require each High ,
Radiation Area (HRA) in which the intensity of radiation is greater '
than 1000 mrem /hr to be provided with locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry. It was noted that HRAs are maintained locke Keys to.the HRAs are issued by the RPSs at access control. Entrance to HRAs are posted and controlled by RW Very High Radiation Areas I (VHRAs) are areas in which the intensity of radiation is high enough to result in doses above regulatory limits for a few moments exposur These areas include the incore thimble chase area when the thimbles are withdrawn (Sump C) and the reactor head area during power operation. Access to these VHRAs requires approval of the plant manager or his designee. The keys to these areas are not issued ;
unless review of plant status assures that these areas are not at l
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All other radiation areas and HRAs inspected were posted and controlled in accordance with regulatory requirements. In addition l to the posting required by regulations, the licensee posts dose rate l and contamination levels on maps at the entrance to these areas and on floor plan maps of the containment and auxiliary building located at access control. Independent surveys performed by the inspector verified " Hot Spot" and radiation field posting i
Sufficient calibrated portable dose. rate instruments were available j for use during this outage. Two whole body friskers (Friska11) are j used at the access control point located at the auxiliary building j exit to the turbine building -and one gamma sensitive (Gamma 10)
portal monitor is located in the guard house. The use of these '
instruments has been a significant improvement in the licensee's personal contamination detection progra The licensee has continued to dedicate a crew of about 15 full l time plant helpers to implement a strong contamination control and housekeeping program. In addition, during the outage a dedicated crew of 12 contract workers performed decontamination in containment. This has resulted in good contamination control and is evidenced by the reduced number of areas controlled because i
of contamination and the relatively few personnel and equipment l contamination event During tours of the plant, the inspector noted that persons were (
adhering to procedural and regulatory requirements. This included '
observation of workers performing activities under several RWP Posted radiation fields.and areas were controlled as required and RPSs implemented good radiological control and performed adequate surveillance Summary The station continues to have a good radiation protection program that is well adhered to by the staff and to maintain a strong contamination control program. It appears the radiation protection staff is well qualified, well managed, competent, and supported by station management. Good radiological controls and surveillances were observed, as were adherence to procedures, RWPs, and special instructions. The exposure control and ALARA programs are sound.
l 7. Chemistry / Radiochemistry Areas Reviewed l The inspector reviewed the chemistry program and performed a l cursory review of the control of liquid radiological effluent The chemistry program review included (1) observation of analyses of nonradioactive liquid samples provided to the licensee, (2) analysis of a charcoal adsorber and a simulated air particulate sample, (3) review of spiked sample results and (4) discussion with Radiation
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Protection Specialists (RPS). The control of liquid radiological effluents was limited to a discussion of the sequence of a liquid release, observation of valve alignment to transfer tank contents prior to recirculating, sampling and release, review of records of an actual release and a brief review of past semiannual liquid release summaries, b. Observations / Discussions
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The inspector provided the licensee with nonradioactive liquid samples which had been prepared and analyzed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) for the NRC. The samples containing chloride, fluoride, sulfate and boron, were diluted by licensee laboratory personnel to concentrations within the range normally analyze Analyses were performed in triplicate using normally used routine procedures. Three analytes were measured at two concentrations and one at three concentrations. The licensee achieved seven agreements and two disagreements with BNL results. In some instances where the uncertainty of the licensee's mean value is much less than that of the NRC's value, the NRC's uncertainly was used for determining comparisons. The two disagreements, both fluoride, are not considered significant. Both values, although in disagreement, were within ten percent of the NRC values. Possible causes for the disagreements were discussed with the licensee who acknowledged the inspector's comment The inspector observed the analyses discussed above. The specialist followed current procedures, was acquainted with each step used and used prudent practices while performing the analyses. Discussion with laboratory personne1' indicated a high degree of familiarity with the lab equipment, the chemistry /QC data base, analytical methodology and lab and counting room operation The laboratory staff is small and has been relatively stabl Interaction between specialists is good. Scheduling is computerized, and the combinations of stability and automated scheduling results in minimal supervision. Chemistry management personnel tour the lab :
dail Supervision is the responsibility of, but not limited to, the Radiation Protection Coordinator. Management / supervision involvement is usually an as needed basis and appears to be effectiv The licensee recently rearranged lab benches which resulted in increased i work space and reduced congestion. The " hot" lab and counting room are {
clean and chemicals and supplies adequate. A Dionex ion chromatograph ]
and a Mettler automatic titrator are the t'wo most used nonprocess j instruments and were well maintaine )
i A charcoal adsorber and a particulate filter spiked with radioactivity I were supplied to the license They were analyzed as actual samples i and the results compared against those obtained from Region III I analyses. Although all comparisons were in agreement, the charcoal
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adsorber results indicate a conservative bias. The bias was confirmed by comparing the licensee's values against the source' certificate values. .The licensee plans to verify the source values used to-
-generate efficiency curves for the adsorber geometr The inspector discussed liquid radwaste release requirements with an Assistant Plant Equipment Operator. The operator' described the process starting with the issuance of a procedure pocket through actual release to.the river. .The operator demonstrated valve alignment and transferred
- an ADT Condensate Receiver Tank to a Monitor Tank via ion exchange columns. Paperwork from another release was examined and found to !
be complete. Both the operator and specialists appear knowledgeable of their responsibilities with regard to this type of releas Summary
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Chemistry and Operations personnel contacted were knowledgeable of their responsibilities. Observations of their performance indicated adherence and attentiveness to procedures. The chemistry groups'
methodology on state of the art equipment is an asset to their l program. , Both groups have upgraded their areas and equipment to
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provide better controls. The work areas visited and associated equipment observed are well maintaine . Emergency Preparedness
' Areas Reviewed i
The inspector reviewed the following areas of the emergency preparedness program: emergency plan and implementing procedures, emergency facilities, equipment, instrumentation and supplies, organization and management control, training and audits. The review was conducted to determine whether the licensee's emergency program is being maintained ~1n a state of operational readiness and to determine if changes to the licensee's program since the last inspection meet NRC requirement ! Observation / Discussions !
The inspector determined that changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures were submitted to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q). Current copies of the emergency plan and implementing procedures were readily available in the licensee's emergency response facilities. The inspector reviewed the emergency i plan and implementing procedures and verified that no major or significant changes had occurred in the program since the last i inspectio .
The inspector toured the emergency response facilities (ERFs)
and verified the operational readiness of the ERFs, equipment, instrumentation and supplies. Communications equipment was tested, inplant and onsite radiological survey equipment and emergency kits l
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were inventoried and data acquisition systems were activated to demonstrate to the inspector their operational readiness. The inspector did not observe any significant changes .in facilities
. or related equipment and procedures since the last inspectio The inspector reviewed records of communication, health physics, radiological monitoring, medical and shift augmentation drill !
Written drill critique reports were included in each drill recor '
All required drills were conducted within the specified time frame A review of shift augmentation drills conducted on February 27, 1985
- and December 12, 1986 determined the licensee could augmcat its staff in a timely manner. .However, the. nearly two year time interval between drills does not adequately ensure the licensee's capability
- to provide initial facility response at all. times per 10 CFR 50.47(b).
The conducting of these drills on a semiannual basis should be specified in the Emergency Plan. This to ensure that the licensee will provide an ongoing verification that the commitments on timeliness of shift augmentation are being maintained. A discussion regarding the timeliness of these drills was held with plant management which indicated a review of the shif t augmentation drill program would be conducted. The licensee's progress on this. issue will be tracked as Open Items No. 282/87007-01 and No. 306/87007-0 The inspector interviewed the Emergency Planning Coordinator, and reviewed documentation to verify that changes in corporate or plant staffs did not result in any degradation of the emergency response organization. All individuals had completed training requirements
. and were qualified to fulfill assigned responsibilities. Agreements-with offsite support organizations were verified to be up-to-dat The Emergency Planning Coordinator is being promoted to another
- position in the licensee's organization and his duties will be assigned immediately to a staff member qualified to assume these responsibilitie . Training of key offsite support personnel and corporate emergency personnel had changed since the last inspection. This change was an effort to develop better coordination between Northern States Power, the States of Wisconsin and Minnesota and local personne Although the basic lesson plans for training had not changed, the licensee's presentation had been changed to emphasize a " hands-on" approach. This training was coordinated and jointly conducted with the States of Minnesota and Wisconsin and local personnel. Training of key offsite personnel was conducted in January 1986 and 1987. All required corporate emergency personnel training and training for j State and local officials had been conducted annuall The inspector reviewed documentation regarding the subject of railroad l blockage of the single vehicular grade crossing to the Prairie Island plant. This issue was raised due to an incident on January 30, 1987, ,
when the crossing was blocked for an unusually long period of tim l To address this problem, the licensee, in conjunction with officials
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of the Soo Railroad, issued General Station Orders that advised railroad employees that this crossing was a " Critical Crossing." A
" Critical Crossing" designation means all unnecessary blockage is to
< be averted. In the event of an emergency situation, every effort will be extended to minimize the time duration of the blockag Such measures may include the uncoupling of rail cars to allow crossing without excessive delay. This agreement was documented in a licensee memorandum dated April 2, 1987, with copies to railroad officials. The inspector determined this action should alleviate the crossing blockag The inspector reviewed the Prairie Island annual audit records, drill and exercise documentation and interviewed plant personne Corporate Quality Assurance personnel conducted the annual audit of the licensee's emergency preparedness program from March 10 to May 23, 1986. A prior audit was conducted from February 1 to March 21, 1985. The 1987 audit was in the scheduling proces The 1986 audit included evaluation of interfaces with state and local governments, licensee drills, exercises, training and facilities and equipmen Copies of the audit report were sent to the State of Minnesota DES and State of Wisconsin DEG. Audit findings and drill or exercise weaknesses are tracked on the licensee's Emergency Preparedness Action Item list. The General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry is responsible for the list and its items are reviewed during monthly EP Advisory Committee meeting Summary
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The licensee continues to maintain a quality 2mergency Preparedness Program. The plant has integrated the Emergency Preparedness Program into its day-to-day operations. Surve111ances of equipment, facilities, and emergency kits are performed by the Radiological Protection group, while EP training is integrated into normally required training. Audit findings and NRC concerns were adequately tracked and received timely resolutions. The emergency organization was well qualified and supported by plant management. The off-site liaison program is well managed and supported by licensee' corporate managemen . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the licensee, the inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in this inspection repor _ _ - - _ - - - - - - _ - - - - - - _ - -