IR 05000282/1987002
| ML20212P650 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1987 |
| From: | Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212P629 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.D.2, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-TM 50-282-87-02, 50-282-87-2, 50-306-87-02, 50-306-87-2, NUDOCS 8703160182 | |
| Download: ML20212P650 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM ISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-282/87002(DRP);50-306/87002(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee:
Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis,MN 55401 Facility Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota Inspection Conducted:
December 14, 1986 through February 14, 1987 Inspectors:
J. E. Hard M. M. Moser
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k hlhYW l
R. DeFayette, Ch6f.b
.3 l3/87
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Approved By:
ReactorProjectsSection28 Date'
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Inspection Summary Inspection on December 14, 1986 through February 14,1987(ReportsNo.
50-282/8/002(DRP); 50-306/8/002(URP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of previous ins)ection fin, dings maintenance surveillances, ESF systems, facility modificationsplantoperationalsafetylingactiv refue trainingprogram,corporatemanagementchange,followupofLicenseeEvent
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and IE Bulletins.
Reports, TMI items, ions were identified in the 11 areas inspected, Results:
No violat t
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted J. Howard, President and Chief Executive Officer C. Larson, Vice President, Nuclear Generation P. Kamman, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations Quality Assurance E. Eckholt Senior Nuclear Safety / Technical Services Engineer
- E. Watz1 k
- D.Mendele,lantManagerPlant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Pr R. Lindse, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance uperintendent, Operations M. Balk,l e, Superintendent, Radiation Protection D. Schue G. Lenertz, Superintendent, Maintenance J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
- K. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering R.Conklin,perintendent,NuclearEngineeringSupervisor, Security and Services M. Klee Su D. Vincent, Project Manacer, Nuclear Engineering and Construction J. Goldsmith Superintencent, Nuclear Technical Services
$e$taffEngineer
- A. Hunstad nior Scheduling Engineer A. Smith A. Vukmir,, Site Services Representative, Westinghouse The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members ofthetechnicalandengineeringstaffs$hiftTechnicalAdvIsors.torand shift supervisors reac auxiliary operators, QA personnel, and
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting of February 17, 1987.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92703)
-Licenseehasenactedabeardpollcya/85016-02).t Prairie Island which requires (Closed) Open Item (282/85020-02 306 Beard Policy.
allFireBrigadePersonnelplusRadiationProtectionpersonnelassigned toashift(OutyH.P.")tobecleanshaven.
(Closed)OpenItem(282/85324-03;306/85022-03).
RHR Cubicle Air Monitor description.
Revision 4 to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) has been issued and more accuratt.y describes the installation and operation of the RHR cubicle air monitors (R-26 and R-27).
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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Both units were base loaded at 100% power except for reductions for weekend load following and surveillance testing.
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed shift turnovers.
The inspector verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper
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return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building,
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turbine building and external areas of the plant were conducted to observe plant eguipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
On December 27, 1986, the licensee reported an unusual event when the cooling water (CW) supply to the site s two emergency diesel generators was cut off.
During a surveillance test the No. 12 diesel driven coolingwaterpumpwasdeclaredinoperabiebecauseofaleakingcooling water hose.
Coincidently, the No. 22 diesel driven coolin had been out of service for repairs to the CW supply line.g water pump The licensee initiated a plant shutdown as recuired by technical specifications.
The No.12 pump hose was repaired anc the cooling water pump was tested and declared operable.
The Unusual Event was then terminated and full power operation was resumed.
t On January 15 1987, the control room operators noted an unexpected lightonthe$afetyInjectionactivepanelforUnit1. The light was for CV-31938, a caustic addition motor operated valve for the containment spray system.
Investigation showed the control circuit (Panel 161, Circuit 10) had been disrupted while electricians were performing a survey of fuse ratings.
This disruption had caused the valve to open automatically, as designed and resulted in a small amount of caustic addition to the section of,line downstream.
The valve-open condition existed for about 30 minutes before being corrected.
The affected line was subsequently flushed.
On February 4, 1987 during a surveillance test, the 0-2 diesel generator trippedbecauseoflowjacketcoolantpressure.
This was caused by air entering the coolant system.
The diesel was declared inoperable and corrective action involved inspection of air cooler gaskets and the installation of an automatic venting system on the coolant system.
The specific source of air entrainment was not identified but will
. be investigated during the upcoming annual PM inspection scheduled for March 1987.
D-2 was declared operable following the successful
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completion of a full load test with the venting system in service.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
l 4.
Maintenance Observation (62703, 62700)
Routine, reventive,andcorrectivemaintenanceactivities(on safety-re ated systems and components) listed below were i
observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or
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andinconformancewithTechnicalSpecifications.
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standards, items were considered during this review:the limiting I
following conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
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inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:
Heater drain pump
Unit 1 Tsaychem splice inspection
12 Diesel driven cooling water pump repairs
D-2 Diesel generator coolant system troubleshooting
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance (61726)
The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testitg of safety-related systems and components.
The ins)ection included verifying that the tests were scheduled and performed wit 11n Technical Specifica: ion requirements, observing that procedures were being followed by qualified operators, that Limiting Conditions for Operation (.COs) were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirements.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:
SP 1100 Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump surveillance SP 1102 Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump surveillance SP 1201F Waste gas calibration SP 1688 Monthly security E-field surveillance SP 1728 Siren encoder validation SP 1732 Spent fuel pool evacuation drill SP 2001 Operations section daily log SP 2001aa Reactor coolant system leakage test SP 2005 Nuclear power range daily calibration
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SP 2006 Quarterly axial offset calibration SP 2093 Dieselgeneratormanualand4kvvoltagerejection-restoration scheme surveillance Fire Drill No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of both emergency diesel generator systems.
Observations included confirmation of selected portions of the licensee's procedures,
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checklists,-plant drawings, verification of correct valve and power
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supply breaker positions to insure that plant equipment and instrumentation are properly aligned and local system indication to insure proper operation within pres,cribed limits.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Preparations For Refuelina And Spent Fuel Pool Activities (60705, 86700)
The inspectors observed new fuel assembly receipt inspection and storage operations during several shifts. Observations included confirmation of-properly qualified and supervised personnel, ling equipment, proper use of approved fuel handling procedures, proper use of fuel hand radiation controls, and good housekeepir,g.
The inspectors also observed portions of a fuel reconstitution effort in which the individual fuel rods from three damaged fuel assemblies were removed inspected and reconstituted into three new fuel assembly cages.
Allfuelrodswerereused.
On February 4, 1987, the licensee announced plans to demonstrate the feasibility of large scale spent fuel consolidation at Prairie Island beginning in mid-1987.
The demonstration will involve about 50 spent fuel-assemblies and entails transferring the spent fuel rods to special storage containers with com)act fuel rod spacing.
The consolidation of spent fuel would nearly dou)1e the existing storage capacity.
Other activities include an effort to reduce the levels of dissolved silicainthespentfualpool(SFP)andbothrefuelingwaterstorage tanks (RWST)usingareverseosmosisfilteringsystem.
Since commencing operation in January, silica concentration has been reduced from 20 PPM to 3.7 PPM in the spent fuel pool at the end of this reporting period.
The goal of this effort is to reach a silica concentration of 1 PPM for the SFP and RWST's which would be below the 2 PPM maximum silica level
. recommended by Westinghouse.
It is thought that excessive silica levels in the reactor coolant may reduce heat transfer efficiency in the core.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Facility Modifications (37700)
In order to provide better administration of modification work, as of March 1,in reporting to the Vice President, Nuclear Generation.1987, the N will beg An extensive modification to the spent fuel pool transfer canal mechanical system has been undertaken.
This upgrade involves replacing the original underwater airmotor/ chain drive system (for moving the fuel conveyor car horizontallybetweencontainmentandthespentfuelpit)withanelectric winch / cable drive system.
It is expected that the new fuel transfer system will improve the reliability and operation of the system and will also result in lower radiation exposure during system maintenance.
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9.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
- review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:
(0 pen)282/85013-LL Failure of Feedwater MOV. One of the five action items resulting from this event has been completed. Work is continuing on electrical protection coordination, motor valve electrical
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protection, investigation into inability to move the valve off its seat, and review of feedwater design and operation. A supplement to the LER is to be prepared by the licensee.
(Closed) 282/86008-LL Unit 1 exceeded 100% power.
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(Closed) 282/86010-LL Reactor trip during E-H controller trouble shooting (0 pen)
282/86011-LL Both diesel driven cooling water pumps out of service.
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10. TM1 Followup (92701)
I.D.2.2 and I.D.2.3 - SPDS The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) installation was compared to the description provided in licensee's letters to NRR dated April 10, 1984 and April-17, 1985. The inspector has discussed the results of this
comparison with the NRR Project Manager for Prairie Island.
Since differences between the committed installation and the actual installation
'are minor, it is concluded by the inspector and by NRR that the licensee has met the NRC requirement to have in place a fully operational SPDS by December 31, 1986. The licensee is planning to submit to NRR a final report which will list and justify differences between the stated and
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actual installations. Differences noted by the inspector are as follows:
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Secondary displays have been removed from the design
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Two rather than three secondary CRTs are provided
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Data is not readable from 15 feet (actually about seven feet)
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IR Startup Rate is not displayed
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Reactor Trip Status is not displayed
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Auxiliary Feedwater Flow is not separately displayed
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The displayed ranges of several parameters were not as stated
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previously
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A new system operating procedure plus revisions to existing operating rocedures were available in the control room. A system description p(BSection)waspreparedanddistributed. An on-call list of computer i
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trained experts has been provided to the control room.
A system for
monitoring system availability to demonstrate compliance with the 99%
requirement has been established.
TMI Item II.B.2.3, Equipment Qualification This item was the subject of inspection by a Region III-based team on h December 2, 1986.
On the basis of its Inspection November 17 throug/86012(DRS); 50-306/86014(DRS), this item is closed Report No.
50-282 for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
11.
LicensedOperatorRequalificationTraining(41701)
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The inspector reviewed plant operating history, selected two events and verified that lessons learned from the events were effectively factored into the training program.
Regarding one event the inspector verified thatrequiredtrainingwasreceivedbytheinvolvedpersonnel.
The inspector reviewed the records of three senior reactor operators (SR0s)andtworeactoroperators(R0s)andverifiedthatthefollowing required documents were contained:
a copy of the most recent annual written examination and individual's responses; and the most current Jerformance evaluation for the shift op(USAR).erating R0 and SR0 as require
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ay the Updated Safety Analysis Report The inspector reviewed the documentation of additional training received in identified deficient areas and confirmed that required self-study or required lectures were completed for these areas for two SR0s and two R0s.
One of these SR0s was interviewed and the inspector concluded that the training documented was the actual training received.
The inspector l
verified that for those who failed the annual requalification exam, I
written notification was given to the plant operations superintendent by the plant training superintendent.
This is a requirement of the USAR.
The inspector noted that the licensee recently implemented the Prairie-Island Training Procedure No. 4.2, titled " Remedial Training." This procedure provides a format to document in individual's required remedial training.
The training center currently lists an individual's required training and provides an initial space for documenting completion of each requirement by the lead arogram instructor.
After discussion with the
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inspector, the licensee las changed the procedure to reflect this practice.
The inspector reviewed the computer program used to track licensed individuals receiving all required requalification lectures.
The in)ut to the tracking system is the class attendance documents.
The review slowed all licensed operators received at least the minimum required lectures.
i The requalification annual exam pass rates for the 1986 calendar year based on results available at the time of inspection were 95 percent
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for SR0s and 100 percent for R0s.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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12.
Headquarters Request (92704)
In response to an NRC Headquarters request dated January 30, 1987 on the subjectofthinningofsecondarypiping,thefollowinginformationwas provided on February 3:
1.
Does Licensee have a program? Yes. The Thickness Survey Program for turbine-side piping is based on the guidelines proposed at the 1984 EPRI Nuclear Turbine Piping System Erosion / Corrosion Workshop.
Because of the 1986 Surry event thisprogramhasbeenexpandedtoincludeadditionalinspectIon areas.
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Factors included in Program.
All factors listed in the request are included for consideration in the Program development.
These factors are:
Carbon steel fittings and spools.
Fittings less than ten pipe diameters apart.
Bulk flow greater than ten feet per second.
Fluid temperature between 195 and 440 degrees F.
Oxygen concentration less than 600 ppb.
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How many measurements will be taken and where will they be taken?
Original Program -
Six to eight areas on crossunder piping for each Unit 12 areas on extraction )iping for each Unit Three to five areas on 1 eater drain tank discharge piping for each Unit Two areas on Unit 2 feedwater pump discharge piping
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Additions to Program -
About ten areas on feedwater pump suction piping for each Unit Two areas on feedwater pump discharge piping for each Unit 4.
Results of measurements taken.
Active erosion / corrosion mechanisms exist in most of the piping systems covered by the original program.
This piping mainly contains low quality steam.
For example, severe wall loss has been found in the large diameter crossunder piping.
EPRI guidelines have been fairly accurate in predicting where to find the areas that have wall loss.
Additional measurements made because of the Surry event, have not shown any significant wall thinning.
however, ions made in four areas to date, all on the suction Examinat side of the feedwater pumps show that any thinning is less than10%oftheoriginalwallthickness.
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13.
Emergency Preparedness (82701)
On January 30 1987, road access to and from the plant was blocked for onehourand$2minutesbecauseofafreighttrainbreakdownonthe nearby tracks.
This is a repeat situation which has occurred several times over the past few years.
Discussions are being held with the licensee regarding possible corrective actions.
14.
Corporate Management Change (30702)
On February 2, 1987 James Howard, formerly President and CEO of Ameritech, assumedresponsibi1ItyasPresidentandCEOofNorthernStatesPowerCo.
Donald McCarthy remains in his position as Chairman of the Board.
Mr. Howard introduced himself to the Senior Resident Inspector and met briefly on February 5.
15.
ExitInterview(30703)
The inspectors met the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on February 17, 1987.
The inspectors discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
The inspectors also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any document / processes as proprietary.
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