IR 05000261/1988006

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Insp Rept 50-261/88-06 on 880311-0410.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previous Enforcement Items,Operational Safety Verification,Physical Protection & Surveillance & Maint Observation
ML14191A924
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/12/1988
From: Fredrickson P, Garner L, Latta R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML14191A923 List:
References
50-261-88-06, 50-261-88-6, NUDOCS 8805240421
Download: ML14191A924 (10)


Text

C REG(,

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, N ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:

50-261/88-06 Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:

50-261 License No.:

DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted: March 11 - April 10, 1988 Inspector:

_ _7 L. W. arner, Seni VRedent Inspector Dte Signed Contributing Inspector: P. Hopkins, Resident Inspector (Summer)

Approved by:

.5/F P. E. Fredrickso, C*F gate Signed Reactor Projects Section 1A Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of followup on previous enforcement items, review of LERs, operational safety verification, physical protection, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, ESF system walkdown, onsite followup of events at operating power reactors and onsite review committe Results:

No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte :805240421 880512 PDR ADOCK 05000261

DCD

REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted R. Barnett, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical

  • G. Beatty, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project Department C. Bethea, Manager Training R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Performance
  • J. Curley, Director, Regulatory Compliance R. Femal, Shift Foreman, Operations W. Flanagan, Manager, Design Engineering W. Gainey, Support Supervisor, Operations E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations F. Lowery, Manager, Operations D. McCaskill, Shift Foreman, Operations
  • A. McCauley, Principle Engineer, Onsite Nuclear Safety R. Miller, Maintenance Supervisor, Mechanical R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations
  • R. Morgan, Plant General Manager D. Myers, Shift Foreman, Operations D. Nelson, Operating Supervisor M. Page, Engineering Supervisor, Plant Systems D. Quick, Manager, Maintenance D. Sayre, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance D. Seagle, Shift Foreman, Operations R. Smith, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

  • L. Garner R. Latta
  • Attended exit interview on April 14, 1988 2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 14, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed belo Dissenting comments were not received from the license Proprietary information is not contained in this repor No written material was given to the licensee by the Resident Inspectors during this report perio Note:

A list of abbreviations used in this report is contained in paragraph 1 Item Number Status Description/Reference Paragraph LER88-01 Closed Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Turbine Trip on Loss of Autostop Oil Pressur Open IFI - Review Inadvertent Shipment of Contaminated Liquid to Quadrex (paragraph 10.a).

88-06-02 Open UNR* - Reporting Requirements Associated with Loss of Emergency Siren Capability (paragraph 10.b.).

  • Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

This area was not inspecte. Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (93702)

The listed LER was reviewed to verify that the information provided met NRC reporting requirement The verification included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of the even Onsite inspections were performed and concluded that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with existing requirements, license conditions and commitments. The following report is considered closed:

(Closed)

LER.88-01; Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Turbine Trip on Loss of Autostop Oil Pressur As previously documented in Inspection Report 261/88-03 the faulty relief valves in the turbine electro-hydraulic control system have been replaced and the inspectors witnessed the successful completion of the post maintenance acceptance testing as controlled by OST-551. This item is close No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and that the licensee management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operatio These

activities were confirmed, by direct observations, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee management and personnel, independent verifications of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and reviews of facility record Periodically, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, operations records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions to Verify operability of safety related equipment and compliance with T Specific items reviewed include control room logs, maintenance work requests, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs, and equipment tagout record Through periodic observations of work in progress and discussions with operation staff members, the inspectors verified that the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions, responding properly to alarm conditions, adhering to procedures and applicable administrative controls, aware of equipment out of service, and surveillance testing and maintenance activities in progres The inspectors routinely observed shift changes to verify that continuity of system status was maintained and that proper control room staffing existed. The inspectors also observed that access to the control room was controlled and operations personnel were carrying out their assigned duties in an attentive and professional manne The control room was observed to be free of unnecessary distractions. The inspectors performed channel checks, reviewed component status and safety related parameters, including SPDS information, to verify conformance with the T During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operatio This verification was accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and record The inspectors verified the axial flux difference was within the values required by the T Plant tours were routinely conducted to verify the operability of standby equipment, to assess the general condition of plant equipment, and to verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, and equipment tag out procedures were being properly implemented. These tours verified the absence of unusual fluid leaks, the lack of visual degradation of pipe, conduit and seismic supports, the proper positions and indications of important valves and circuit breakers, the lack of conditions which could invalidate environmental qualifications, the operability of safety related instrumentation, the calibration of safety related and control instrumentation (including area radiation monitors, friskers and portal monitors),

the operability of fire suppression and fire fighting equipment, and the operability of emergency lighting equipmen The inspectors also verified that housekeeping was adequate and areas were free of unnecessary fire hazards and combustible material No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Physical Protection (71707)

In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The inspectors verified by general observation, perimeter walkdowns and interviews that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed to verify that daily activities were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the security pla Activities inspected included protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory measures. In addition, the inspectors routinely observed protected and vital area lighting and barrier integrit No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed certain surveillance related activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirement The inspectors determined that the surveillance test procedures listed below conformed to TS requirements, that all precautions and LCOs were met, and that the surveillance test was completed at the required frequency. The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, and that the required test instrumentation was properly calibrate Upon completion of the testing, the inspectors observed that recorded test data was accurate, complete and met TS requirements, and test discrepancies were properly rectifie The inspectors independently verified that the systems were properly returned to service. Specifically, the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:

a. OST-010 (revision 7) Power Range Calorimetric During Power Operation The stated purpose of this test is to ensure an accurate power range neutron indication by comparing the power range channel instrument readings to the calculated thermal power. The successful completion of this surveillance test satisfies TS 4.1.1 and Table 4.1-1, Item The. inspectors witnessed all aspects of this surveillance test and verified that the core thermal power did not exceed the TS authorized limit of 1380 MW b. OST-353 (revision 6) Containment Spray System Component Test The test is performed quarterly to verify operability of the containment spray system valves as required by ASME Section X The inspector verified that each valve stroked within the acceptance criteria provided in the procedur c. MST-003 (revision 11) T Avg and Delta T Protection Channel Testing The bi-weekly conduct of this surveillance test verifies the operability of overtemperature and overpower protection channel sets I, II, and III and satisfies the requirements of TS. Specifically, the inspectors observed the redundant verification of selected test channel positions by the operations personnel stationed at the reactor turbine generator board and by the I & C technicians involved. The inspectors determined that the required annuniciators for this test provided the proper status and alarm function and that the test voltages as measured in the protection channel cabinets were within the required tolerance d. MST-014 (revision 13)

Steam Generator Pressure Protection Channel Testing The inspectors witnessed major portions of this surveillance test which is conducted monthly to determine the operability of the steam generator pressure protection channel sets II, III, and I In particular the inspectors confirmed that the required annunicators gave the proper status, that the associated alarms responded as required, and that the specified test voltages were acceptabl e. MST-015 (revision 7) Turbine First Stage Protection Channel Testing As required by TS, this surveillance test is conducted monthly to determine the operability of the turbine first stage pressure protection channel sets III and IV. The inspectors determined that:

all independent verifications were properly performed, the recorded test voltages were within the acceptable tolerance, and participating personnel observed all test prerequisites and limitation f. OST-401 (revision 17) Emergency Diesels The inspectors witnessed the performance of the normal surveillance tests on both EDG A and B. The inspectors observed that both EDGs started, were paralleled to the grid, and operated satisfactorily throughout the 90 minute operating tim See WR/JO 88-AEHC1 in paragraph 8 below for additional information concerning EDG No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed several maintenance related activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS and appropriate industry codes and standard The inspectors determined that these activities were not violating LCOs and that redundant components were

operabl The inspectors also determined that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, that QC hold points were established where required, that required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to work initiation, that proper radiological controls were adhered to, that appropriate ignition and fire prevention controls were implemented, and that replacement parts and materials used were properly certifie The inspectors confirmed that these activities were accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures and that the effected equipment was. properly tested before being returned to servic In particular the inspectors observed/reviewed the following maintenance activities:

a. WR/JO 87-ARKB1 - Adjust Spring Pack and Torque Switch Setting o V2-14 A, B, and C, and V2-16 A, B, and b. WR/JO 88-ADCN1 - Repair/Replace EDG B starting Air Low Pressure Alar c. WR/JO 88-AEHC1 -

Investigate Response of EDG B to Manual Load Demand WR/JO 88-AEHC1 was issued on April 5, 1988, when a control operator unsuccessfully attempted to increase load on EDG B above 2200 Kw during post maintenance testin The inspector observed trouble shooting activities which included checking of fuel racks for freedom of movement, verification of proper governor speed setting clutch drive torque and transient/step load response testing of the EDG governo The licensee concluded that the governor response to manual load changes was slow ( the time from a step load demand to the time the governor completes positioning the fuel racks is between 25 and 30 seconds).

Discussions with technical representatives of Woodward Governor Co.,

the cognizant vendor, indicated that the operation of the EDG in this manner could be expected as a result of the governor compensation adjustments made in February, 1988, to reduce the amount of no load speed oscillation For this governor design, increased stability during no load conditions is at the expense of a fast manual load response capability. The representative confirmed that a slow response time to manual load demand changes in no way effects the EDG's ability to automatically respond to load changes on the output bu Through interview of the control operator and observation of over and under adjustments of load demand by other operators, including one on the previous morning, the inspector concluded that the operator, as well as others who have indicated the response is sluggish, are not accustomed to the way in which the EDG B governor respond As a temporary measure, operating crews have been instructed to wait at least 15 seconds between demand changes to prevent excessive load swings. The licensee is presently evaluating the need to change procedures to provide a similar cautio Though the event demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the expected response of EDG B during manual loading, the inspector noted that the operator's actions represented a highly professional mannerism, in that when faced

with an unexpected situation, instead of trying to force the expected response, he elected to rectify and consult with his supervisor concerning the potential proble No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the containment spray syste The inspectors confirmed that both train A and B spray systems were aligned in accordance with attachment 9.1 of OP-202, Safety Injection and Containment Vessel Spray System, revision 1 The inspectors verified that valves were locked as required, pipe and conduit supports appeared to be installed correctly, the system pumps were lubricated, valves required for automatic operation were energized, local and remote indications agreed with actual valve stem positions, and actuation instrumentation was in service. Minor conduit support problems for SI-844A, Spray Pump A Suction Valve, were reported to the licensee for correction. The inspectors also verified that OP-202 attachment 9.1 correctly reflected the as built system configuration as shown on drawing 5379-1082 sheet 3, Safety Injection System Flow Diagram, revision 2 No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)

a. Inadvertent Shipment of Contaminated Liquid On March 14, 1988, Quadrex Recycle Center of Oakridge, Tennessee notified the licensee that 9 gallons of liquid had been received in a shipment of contaminated solid material. The shipping papers did not indicate that liquid waste was being shippe Approximately 7 gallons of the liquid was found in a decontamination tank with the remainder in a shielding devic The isotopic activity of the contaminated liquid was CO-57 1.49 E-03 microcuries/ml, CO-60 9.44 E-01 micrcuries/ml and Mn-54 2.22 E-02 microcuries/m The liquid was processed by Quadrex and sent to Barnwell, S. C. for buria The shield and tank were decontaminated and returned to the sit The licensee suspended radioactive shipments from the site unless special authorization was granted by the Manager of E & RC until an investigation into the cause of the event was complete The investigation, as documented in Plant Operating Experience Report 88-10, was issued on April 7, 198 Authorization to resume normal shipments was reinstated by the Manager of E & RC on this dat The circumstances surrounding this event and adequacy of corrective actions to prevent recurrence will be inspected by cognizant inspectors from the Region II office during a future routine inspection. This item is considered as an IFI:

Review Inadvertent Shipment of Contaminated Liquid to Quadrex (261/88-06-01).

b. Lee County Emergency Sirens On March 28, 1988, at 8:40 a.m.,

licensee personnel discovered via meter counters that all four Lee County emergency sirens had not been tested at the required frequency. The Lee county police dispatcher was contacted. The police department radio, used for initiating the weekly silent test, had been out of service since March 26, 198 Since the county has no backup radio, this rendered all four of the Lee county sirens within the 10 mile EPZ inoperabl The radio was restored to service on March 29, 198 The county has backup contingency plans to notify the approximately 1,200 people in the effected area via use of police department personnel if it had become necessary. The licensee notified the State of South Carolina of the loss of the siren Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(vi) a four hour notification was made to the NRC because notification was made to other government agencie Because the Lee County sirens represent only 4 out of 45 sirens and the number of people represent less than 5% of the 10 mile EPZ population, the licensee determined that this event did not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(V).

The reporting requirement states that the NRC be notified within one hour of any event that results in a major loss of offsite response capability or communications capability. The inspectors informed the licensee that this may indeed be reportabl The licensee disagreed with the inspectors positio However, while reviewing their position, the licensee determined that unlike the other two CP&L nuclear sites which have written guidance on what constitutes a major loss, HBR procedures contain no written guidance. The need for such quidance is currently being evaluate This is considered to be an UNR item pending review and resolution by the Region II Emergency Preparedness staff:

Reporting Requirements Associated With Loss of Emergency Siren Capability (261/88-06-02).

No violations or deviations were found within the areas inspecte.

Onsite Review Committee (40700)

The inspectors evaluated certain activities of the plant nuclear safety committee to determine whether the onsite review functions were conducted in accordance with TS and other regulatory requirement In particular, the inspectors attended the special PNSC meeting held on March 15, 1988, concerning revisions to procedures associated with accumulator chargin It was ascertained that provisions of the TS dealing with membership, review process, frequency, qualifications, etc., were satisfied, and that the previous meeting minutes were reviewed to confirm that decisions and recommendations were accurately reflected in the minutes. The inspectors also followed up on selected previously identified PNSC activities to independently confirm that corrective actions were progressing satisfactoril No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte.

Backup Inspector Inspection The resident inspector from V. C. Summer, one of the designated backup inspectors for HBR, assisted the resident inspectors in their routine duties during the period March 21 - March 25, 1988. In addition, the HBR site backup inspector participated in site training to maintain a current access badge, toured the TSC and EOF, refamiliarized himself with plant emergency procedures and met with key members of the plant staf.

List of Abbreviations ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AVG Average CFR Code of Federal Regulations CP&L Carolina Power and Light E & RC Environment and Radiation Control EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPZ Emergency Protection Zone ESF Engineered Safety Feature(s)

.F Fahrenheit FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report HBR H. B. Robinson I & C Instrumentation & Control IFI Inspector Followup Item(s)

Kw Kilowatt LCO Limiting Conditions for Operations LER Licensee Event Report MST Maintenance Surveillance Test MWt Megawatt Thermal NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OST Operations Surveillance Test OT Delta T Overtemperature Delta Temperature PNSC Plant Nuclear System QC Quality Control SPDS Safety Parameter Display Systems T

Temperature TS Technical Specification TSC Technical Support Center UNR Unresolved Item W/R Work Request WR/JO Work Request/Job Order