IR 05000261/1988016
| ML14191A961 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Garner L, Latta R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14191A960 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-88-16, NUDOCS 8808100093 | |
| Download: ML14191A961 (12) | |
Text
REG(4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION il 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 010 Report No.:
50-261/88-16 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-261 License No.: DPR-23 Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Inspection Conducted: June 10 -
July 10, 1988 Inspectors:
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L. W. Garner, Senior si ent#4nspector Date Signed.L Date Signed Approved by:
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L P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Dte Sfgned Reactor Projects Section 1A Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of operational safety verification, physical protection, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, ESF system walkdown, onsite followup of events at operating power reactors and onsite review committe Results: A second example of the violation issued in Inspection Report 261/88-07 was identified, paragraph PDR ADOc 880726 G
K 05000261 PNU
REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted R. Barnett, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical
- G. Beatty, Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Project Department C. Bethea, Manager Training R. Chambers, Engineering Supervisor, Performance
- S. Clark, Project Engineer Design Engineering D. Crocker, Supervisor, Radiation Control
- J. Curley, Director, Regulatory Compliance J. Eaddy, Supervisor, Environmental and Chemistry R. Femal, Shift Foreman, Operations W. Flanagan, Manager, Design Engineering W. Gainey, Support Supervisor, Operations P. Harding, Project Specialist, Radiation Control E. Harris, Director, Onsite Nuclear Safety
- M. Heath, Project Engineer Technical Support R. Johnson, Manager, Control and Administration D. Knight, Shift Foreman, Operations E. Lee, Shift Foreman, Operations F. Lowery, Manager, Operations D. McCaskill, Shift Foreman, Operations
- A. McCauley, Principle Engineer - Onsite Nuclear Safety R. Miller, Maintenance Supervisor, Mechanical R. Moore, Shift Foreman, Operations
- R. Morgan, Plant General Manager D. Myers, Shift Foreman, Operations D. Nelson, Operating Supervisor, Operations M. Page, Engineering Supervisor, Plant Systems D. Quick, Manager, Maintenance D. Sayre, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance D. Seagle,. Shift Foreman, Operations J. Sheppard, Manager, Operations R. Steele, Shift Foreman, Operations
- H. Young, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
- G. Walters, Project Engineer, Onsite Nuclear Safety Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors
- L. Garner
- R. Latta
- Attended exit interview on July 11, 198 Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
This area was not inspecte. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and that the, licensee management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operatio These activities were confirmed by the following: direct observations, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee management and personnel, independent verifications of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and reviews of facility record Periodically, the inspectors reviewed shift logs, operations records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions to verify operability of safety related equipment and compliance with TS. Specific items reviewed include the following: control room logs, maintenance work requests, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, and equipment tagout record Through periodic observations of work in progress and discussions with operations staff members, the inspectors verified that the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions; responding properly to alarm conditions; adhering to procedures and applicable administrative controls; and aware of equipment out of service, surveillance testing, and maintenance activities in progres The inspectors routinely observed shift changes to verify that continuity of system status was maintained and that proper control room staffing existe The inspectors also observed that access to the control room was controlled and operations personnel were carrying out their assigned duties in an attentive and professional manne The control room was observed to be free of unnecessary distraction The inspectors performed channel checks, reviewed component status and safety related parameters, including SPDS information, to verify conformance with the T During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected LCOs. This verification was accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records. The inspectors verified the axial flux difference was within the values required by the T Plant tours were routinely conducted to verify the operability of standby equipment; assess the general condition of plant equipment; and verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls and equipment tag out procedures were being properly implemente These tours verified the following: the absence of unusual fluid leaks; the lack of visual degradation of pipe, conduit and seismic supports; the proper positions and indications of important valves and circuit breakers; the lack of conditions of which could invalidate EQ; the operability of safety related instrumentation; the calibration of safety related and control instrumentation including area radiation monitors, friskers and portal monitors; the operability of fire suppression and fire fighting equipment; and the operability of emergency lighting equipment. The inspectors also verified that housekeeping was adequate and areas were free of unnecessary fire hazards and combustible material On June 22, 1988, the inspectors observed major portions 'of a combined functional drill conducted by the license The exercise commenced at approximately 9:30 and was concluded at 1:20 The accident scenario was based on a small LOCA with initial fuel damage caused by loose parts in the cor Subsequent simulated events increased the severity of the initial conditions through a reactor trip and steam generator tube rupture with a stuck open steam generator PORV which provided a potential leak path to the environmen This emergency exercise included participation by licensee personnel in the control room, technical support center, operational support center, emergency operations facility and the corporate media cente In conjunction with this combined functional drill, the licensee assigned an evaluation team to overview and critique the drill and to assure that the intended objectives were achieved. These objectives included successful demonstration of the following activities:
- Accident Assessment and Emergency Classification
- Notification, Mobilization, and Communication
- Dose Calculation and Radiological Assessment
- Protective Response Facility Operation
- Recovery Operations The inspectors witnessed the initiating event response by operations personnel in the control room and the subsequent progression of events which led to assembly of the emergency response staf The inspectors also observed the establishment of emergency communications, the assessment of simulated plant off-normal conditions, the activation of the emergency operations center, and the simulated recovery efforts initiated by the licensee. The inspectors determined that the licensee successfully demonstrated the capability to address the scenario objectives and to implement the applicable portions of the emergency preparedness plan. No significant weaknesses were identified during the combined functional dril The licensee is pursuing corrective action involving improvements in plant communication systems, specific procedural enhancements and ALARA concepts in the post accident sampling are No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Physical Protection (71707)
In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The inspectors verified by general observation, perimeter walkdowns, and interviews that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirement The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed to verify that daily activities were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the security pla Activities inspected included:
protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; patrols; escorting of visitors; and compensatory measure In addition, the inspectors routinely observed protected and vital area lighting and barrier integrit No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed certain surveillance related activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirement For the surveillance test procedures listed below the inspectors determined that precautions and LCOs were met, the tests were completed at the required frequency, the tests conformed to TS requirements, the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the tests, the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, and the required test instrumentation was properly calibrate Upon completion of the testing, the inspectors observed that the recorded test data was accurate, complete, and met TS requirements, and test discrepancies were properly rectifie The inspectors independently verified that the systems were properly returned to servic Specifically, the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
a. OST-251 (revision 15) RHR Component Test The purpose of this surveillance test is to verify the mechanical performance and assess the operational readiness of components in the RHR system to fulfill their required safety function During the performance of this test the inspectors witnessed the verification of proper oil levels in each of the RHR pumps, the starting and running of the "A" pump, and the recording of pump discharge and differential pressures, and pump vibration amplitudes. The inspectors noted that the installed flow indicator FI-608, located on the RHR recirculation line during pump testing, was pegged high and was recorded as being greater than 300 gpm. As stated in the test procedure RHR flow rate does not have a corresponding acceptance value, in that the test is performed in a fixed resistance syste However, for purposes of evaluating system performance and component trending, it was identified to the license The inspectors were informed that PIR 88-015 had been previously written to replace FI-608 with a device adequately sized to measure single pump recirculation flo *
b. EST-071 (revision 1) Flux Map Code Verification This test is designed to verify that the constant values employed in the flux map program are correct prior to each flux ma The inspectors reviewed the completed attachments of the subject procedure and determined that they were consistent with the values stored in the ERFIS Computer. No deficiencies were identified during the conduct of this tes c. EST-002 (revision 5) Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Axial Offset Calibration The inspectors ascertained that appropriate prerequisites and initial plant conditions for the measurements were met and that the calculations for establishing the target axial flux difference for each of the excore detectors was correc The inspectors also determined that the ERFIS computer was updated to reflect the current target axial flux difference and that the control operators were utilizing the current target axial flux values. No deficiencies were identified during the conduct of this tes d. OST-910 (revision 9) Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator The weekly conduct of this surveillance test is designed to verify the operability of the DS diesel generator under emergency conditions and to confirm the operational readiness of associated mechanical and electrical component Specifically, the inspectors witnessed the manually initiated start of the DS diesel and determined that it was properly synchronized with other power sources and that the assumption of load by the associated generator did not exceed the prescribed 2400 kw or 300 amps. The inspectors also determined that all components associated with the DS diesel. generator appeared to function properly and that the recorded readings were within the normal rang e. OST-401 (revision 10) Emergency Diesels The inspectors witnessed the operability testing of both EDG A and Specifically, the inspectors observed the preoperational checks conducted by the operations personnel performing the test, as well as the starting and manual synchronization of the diesel Additionally, the inspectors determined that the operational check of the redundant solenoid air start valves were properly accomplished, that the recorded operational parameters were within the specified tolerance and that both diesel generators assumed and maintained the desired loa No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed several maintenance related activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS, and appropriate industry codes and standard The inspectors determined that these activities were not violating LCOs and that redundant components were operabl The inspectors also determined that activities were accomplished by qualified personnel using approved procedures, QC hold points were established where required, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to work initiation, proper radiological controls were adhered to, appropriate ignition and fire prevention controls were implemented, replacement parts and materials used were properly certified, and the effected equipment was properly tested before being returned to servic In particular, the inspectors observed/
reviewed the following maintenance activities:
a. WR/JO 88-BYA201
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Calibrate the RHR pumps discharge pressure indicators PI-600 and PI-60 WR/JO 88-AEXC1 - Calibrate the charging pump B discharge pressure indicator PI-15 c. WR/JO 88-BOM284 -
Perform F delta I calibration of N-41 detecto d. MST-101 (revision 6) Boric Acid Heat Tracing Operability No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by performing a walkdown of the Service Water Syste During the performance of this system walkdown the inspectors also observed major portions of OST-302 (revision 21),
Service Water System Component Tes The inspectors confirmed that the system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuratio The inspectors examined piping and component configurations in the service water intake structure, component cooling water intake structure, component cooling water heat exchanger room, charging pump room, service water booster pump area, EDG rooms, SI pump room, AFW pumps, RHR pump pit, and in the turbine buildin Observed conditions were determined to be in agreement with flow diagram G-190199, Service and Cooling Water System Flow Diagram, sheet 2 (revision 24),
sheet 3 (revision 20), sheet 4 (revision 27), sheet 5 (revision 20), sheet 6 (revision 24), sheet 7 (revision 26), sheet 8 (revision 22), sheet 9 (revision 27),
and sheet 10 (revision 24).
The inspectors examined the general condition of valves in the system and verified that they were installed correctly and that they did not exhibit excessive packing leakage. The inspectors witnessed the operability testing of system pumps and associated check valves and determined that the recorded flows and vibrational amplitude values were within the acceptance test criteri The inspectors also verified that valves were locked as required, pipe and conduit supports appeared to be installed correctly, the system pumps were lubricated, service water was available to the pump seal heat exchangers, valves required for automatic operation were energized, and. local and remote indications agreed with actual valve stem position During the conduct of the system walkdown the inspectors noted several components with missing label plate The inspectors also identified a broken temperature indicator (TI-1662A) and a cracked conduit cover on valve V6-16B. These items were identified to the licensee and corrective action work requests initiated. Additionally, the inspectors identified two loose fasteners on the base supports of the north header service water strainer S6-1B. A work request was also issued to correct this condito As documented in CP&L correspondence NED-R-3012, the service water pipe stress analysis does not take credit for the subject bolts as anchor points and are not required as part of the seismic support The inspectors determined that this response was adequate and no further action is required on this matte No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
a. On June 7, 1988, at approximately 7:00 p.m., with Unit 2 operating at 60% reactor power, an empty hydrazine drum exploded during the process of transferring 50% sodium hydroxide from a storage tank. No personal injuries resulted from the event and only minor damage was sustained to the metal siding on the caustic tank room located at the southwest corner of the turbine buildin The explosion was determined to be the result of a chemical reaction between residual hydrazine in the drum, which had not been properly cleaned prior to reuse, and the introduced sodium hydroxid Following this event, the licensee suspended any further transfer of sodium hydroxide and initiated a review of the incident, including the practices involved in the reuse of chemical container As a result of this occurrence, an unusual event was declared at 8:50 p.m., on the same day in accordance with PEP-101 (revision 5),
Initial Emergency Action At 9:25 p.m., the NRC Operations Center was notified of the unusual event and that the attendant circumstances allowed a simultaneous termination of the even However, due to a personnel error, neither the state nor the county warning points were notified of the declaration of the unusual event or its subsequent termination until 6:13 a.m. on the following da As stated in PEP-102 (revision 9), Emergency Control - Unusual Event, Attachment 5.2, the immediate notification checklist for an unusual event requires contacting the state and counties within 15 minutes of the time the unusual event is declared by the site emergency coordinato The failure to identify that an unusual event declaration was required per PEP-101 for approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 50
minutes after the event and notifications were not made to the state or county in accordance with PEP-102 are considered as a second example of the NOV issued in inspection report 261/88-0 Because the event occurred during the 30 day response period of the NOV, the licensee addressed this event in their response, dated June 24, 198 A subsequent review by the inspectors determined that additional actions over and above those described in the response are necessary to prevent future similar occurrences. These concerns were expressed to the Plant Manager by the cognizant Region II Section Chief during a-telephone conversation on July 11, 1988. The licensee indicated that they would address these concerns and supplement their June 24 response on or before August 12, 198 Since no new NOV is being issued, the NOV issued in 261/88-07 report is restated below for clarity with the second example adde Technical Specification 6.5.1.1.1.e requires that the licensee implement written procedures for Emergency Plan implementatio Plant Emergency Procedure PEP-101 (revision 5), Initial Emergency Actions, Attachment 9.1, Item 3 requires that an unusual event be declared when a leak of RCS fluid exceeds 10 gpm and Item 1 requires that an unusual event be declared when any unplanned exposion occurs within the site boundary. Plant Emergency Procedure PEP-102, (revision 9) Emergency Control - Unusual Event, Attachment 5.2 requires that the state and county warning points be contacted within 15 minutes of the declaration of an unusual even Contrary to the above, emergency plan implementing procedure PEP-101 was not properly implemented in that on April 30, 1988, the RCS leak rate exceeded 10 gpm at 12:10 p.m.; but an unusual event was not declared until 6:10 p. Contrary to the above, emergency plan implementing procedures PEP 101 and 102 were not properly implemented in that on June 7, 1988, an unplanned explosion occurred within the site boundary at 7:00 but an unusual event was not declared until 8:50 p.m. and state and county warning points were contacted in 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> instead of 15 minute b. On June 20, 1988, the commission issued amendment number 119 to the Unit 2 TS to allow resumption of power operation at 2300 MWt. The Licensee began increasing -power in discrete steps while monitoring core performanc Full power operation was obtained on June 24, 198 c. On June 23, 1988, the licensee, while performing reviews of the EQ program, determined that the SI pump room had been identified as a radiation harsh environment; however, except for Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation, none of the installed equipment was included in the EQ progra The major components affected are the electrical components associated with the three SI pumps and the two CV spray
9 pump The inspectors attended special PNSC meetings on June 25 and 30, 1988, which addressed justification for continued operation with the unqualified equipment. In summary, the June 25 meeting concluded the following:
(1) The SI pump components are qualifiable based upon discussions with Westinghouse, the motor vendor, and/or by comparison of properties with similar materials which are qualifie (2) The CV spray pumps are not necessary during the recirculation phase of an accident per existing safety analysi Containment pressure control during the recirculation phase can be accomplished by one of the two trains of CV fan cooler The radiation harsh environment in the SI pump room is not established until the suction of the pumps in the room are switched over to the containment sump. Therefore, the CV spray pumps are operable without being qualified during the injection phase of an acciden The PNSC approved engineering evaluation ENG 88-079 which documents the supporting evidence for the above conclusion After the meeting, the inspectors questioned whether or not EQ of the room coolers is required to support operability of the SI pumps during an accident scenari The PNSC of June 30 addressed this issu Engineering calculations were presented which showed that for the peak anticipated room temperature without the room coolers operating after initiation of the recirculation phase, the SI motors would operate in excess of 70 day A similar calculation for the RHR pumps indicated operation for greater than 40 day These results are documented in ENG 88-08 ENG 88-080 also provided additional clarification of the basis presented in ENG 88-079 to support that the SI pump motor power cable is qualifiabl The licensee anticipates that the EQ packages for the SI pumps should be complete by August 31, 198 The inspectors concur with the Licensee's assessment that continued operation with the above identified EQ issues is within the accepted safety analysis of the plant and is therefore justifie Subsequent to the above meetings, the licensee has determined that except for the equipment discussed above, no other equipment in the SI pump room requires EQ designation. The licensee is pursuing EQ of the room coolers because of the desirability of being able to maintain the rooms at a lower temperature during postulated accident Pending further review by the inspectors of the circumstances surrounding the identified EQ issues, this will be considered as an UNR item:
Resolution of EQ Issues Associated with SI and RHR Pump Rooms, (261/88-16-01).
A second example of the NOV issued in inspection report 261/88-07 was identified in the areas inspecte. Onsite Review Committee (40700)
The inspectors evaluated certain activities of the PNSC to determine whether the onsite review functions were conducted in accordance with TS and other regulatory requirements. In particular, the inspectors attended special PNSC meetings on June 25 and 30, 1988, concerning justification for continued operation with unqualified equipment (see paragraph 8.c.).
It was ascertained that provisions of the TS dealing with membership, review process, and qualifications were satisfie Previous meeting minutes were reviewed to confirm that decisions and recommendations were accurately reflected in the minutes. The inspectors also followed up on selected previously identified PNSC activities to independently confirm that corrective actions were progressing satisfactoril No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 11, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed belo Dissenting comments were not received from the license Proprietary information is not contained in this report.. No written material was given to the licensee by the Resident Inspectors during this report perio Item Number Status Description/Reference Paragraph 88-07-01 Open Violation - Failure to Declare an Unusual Event After Exceeding a RCS Leak Rate of 10 gpm. Second example -
(paragraph 8.a.).
88-16-01 Open Unresolved Item* - Resolution of EQ Issues Associated with SI and RHR Pump Rooms -
(paragraph 8.c.).
- Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation.
List of Abbreviations AFW Auxiliary Feedwater ALARA As Low As Reasonably +Achievable AMP Amperes CP&L Carolina Power and Light
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CV Containment Vessel DS Dedicated Shutdown EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EQ Environmental Qualifications ERFIS Emergency Response Facility Information System EST Engineering Surveillence Test ESF Engineered Safety Feature FI Flow Indicator Kw Kilowatt LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MST Maintenance Surveillance Test NOV Notice of Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OST Operations Surveillance Test PEP Plant Emergency Procedure PI Pressure Indicator PIR Plant Improvement Request PNSC Plant Nuclear Safety Committee RHR Residual Heat Removal SI Safety Injection SPDS Safety Parameter Display System TI Temperature Indicator TS Technical Specification WR/JO Work Request/Job Order