ML17339A311

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Revised Pages 1,3 & 5 of IE Insp Repts 50-250/79-26 & 50-251/79-26 on 790806-10.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Replace Original Spray Valve Controller & Failure to Follow Procedures Re Emergency Diesel Generator
ML17339A311
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/04/1979
From: Martin R, Vogtlowell R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML17339A304 List:
References
50-250-79-26, 50-251-79-26, NUDOCS 7911260238
Download: ML17339A311 (6)


See also: IR 05000250/1979026

Text

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UNITEDSTATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION

REGION 11

101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100

ATLANTA,QEORQIA 30303

Report Nos.

50-250/79-26

and 50-251/79-26

Iicensee:

Florida Power and Light Company

9250 West Flagler Street

Miami, Florida

33101

Facility Name:

Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4

Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251

License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41

Inspection at Turkey Point Site near Homestead,

Florida

Inspector:

R. J. Vogt-

well

Approved by:

R. D. Martin, Section Chief,

RONS Branch

SUHSARY

Inspection

on August 6-10,

1979

Areas Inspected

9V

~

te Signed

Date Sig ed

This routine,

unannounced

inspection involved 34 inspector-hours

onsite in the

areas of followup on reportable events;

followup of licensee actions for IE

Bulletins; unit trips from power operation;

Chemical

and Volume Control System

Holdup Tanks; Plant Nuclear Safety Committee review of plant changes.

Results

Of the five areas

inspected,

no apparent

items of noncompliance or deviations

were identified in three areas;

two apparent

items of noncompliance

were found

in two areas

(Xnfrac'tion:

Failure to follow procedures-paragraph

7.a;

Deficienoys

. Failure rbo report<<paragraph

9).

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DETAILS

Persons

Contacted

.-Licensee

Employees

+H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager

+J. K. Hays, Plant Superintendent,

Nuclear

+J. E. Moore, Operations

Superintendent,

Nuclear

+V. B. Wager, Operations

Supervisor,

Nuclear

  • D. W. Jones,

Quality Control Supervisor

+D.

W. Haase,

Technical Department Supervisor

+J. P. Mendieta,

IRC Department Supervisor

L. L. Thomas, Assistant Superintendent

Nuclear Maintenance-Primary

R. E. Garrett, Plant Security Supervisor

J. Hardy, Plant Engineer

W. A. Klein, Engineer,

Technical Department

+R. J.

Spooner,

QAO Supervisor

J. Labarraque,

Plant Engineer

+Attended exit interview.

Exit Interview

The inspection

scope

and findings were summarized

on August 10,

1979 with

those persons

indicated in Paragraph

1 above.

Based

on a request

by the

inspector,

licensee

representatives

committed to reviewing, by September

15,

1979, all nonvital loads

on "D" Motor Control Center. This reviev would

focus on the corrective action that could prevent occurrences

such as the

August 3,

1979 trip of Unit 3 and thus result in the reduction of unnecessary

challenges to the safety systems.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Unresolved item 50-250/79-24-02 is upgraded to an item of noncompliance

(50-250/79-26-02).

For more information see paragraph

9 of this report.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

Followup on Reportable Events

The following events were reviewed to ascertain that:

a.

reporting requirements

were met;

b.

corrective action was taken as required by Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50;

indication.

This resulted in a reactor trip on high pressurizer

pressure.

At the time, neither of the two pressurizer

spray valves

was available.

One was considered

inoperable prior to the transient

and the other, temporarily powered by the non-vital portion of MCC-D

had become unavailable earlier as

a consequence

of the Unit 4 trip..

A review of the pressurizer

spray valves disclosed

inadequacies

in the

administrative controls over the correction of operational

problems

exhibited by spray valve PCV"3-455B.

The original Hagan controller

for spray valve PCV-3-455B had been disconnected

and was. replaced

by

another manual controller which was plugged into the valve control

circuit and which had been taped to the top of a console in the main

control room.

No temporary procedure

had been promulgated to ensure

consistent

understanding

between shifts of the operational control of

this unusual

component configuration.

The lack of a temporary proce-

dure indicates that A.P.0109.6,

"Temporary Procedures",

was not fol-

lowed as required.

The actual installation of the manual controller was not performed

under the guidelines of A. P.

190.15,

"Plant Changes

and Modifications"

which defines

a plant modification as "any change in the plant systems

which accomplishes

a given function by a new method or which alters

the existing approach to accomplishing the function".

This condition also -represents

a failure to follow established plant

procedures.

This is an item of noncompliance.

The inspector reviewed the RTES for Unit 4 Trip Number T101-392 on

August 5, 1979.

While performing routine testing of the turbine trips

a malfunction occurred in the trip reset lever and a turbine trip was

indicated

as reset

when in fact it was not.

This resulted in a turbine

trip and a reactor trip.

To prevent recurrence of trips due to malfunc-

tions of the reset lever,

a Plant Change/Modification was being processed

for implementation

on both units that would provide the operator with

an indication light showing whether or not a turbine trip was reset.

The inspector had no further comments.

8.

Chemical and Volume Control System

(CVCS) - Holdup Tanks

The inspector reviewed the circumstances

associated

with the various failures

experienced with the CVCS-Holdup Tanks

(HUT).

Although the initiating

events for the various failures have not been the same,

the mode of failure

~r'

process" is representative

of an observed

inadequacy in "the implementation

of administrative or procedural controls..." (dictated primarily by A. P.

190.15, Plant Changes

and Nodifications) and as such should have been

reported to the

NRC as required by Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.3.

~ Thus, unresolved

item 50-250/79-24-02 is upgraded to an item of noncompli-

ance

(50-250/79-26-02).