ML20133G837
ML20133G837 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Farley, 05000248 |
Issue date: | 01/09/1997 |
From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20133G830 | List: |
References | |
50-348-96-99, 50-364-96-99, NUDOCS 9701160183 | |
Download: ML20133G837 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1996099
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SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE REPORT
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT !'
! 50-348/96-99 AND 50-364/96-99
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j The SALP Board convened on December 18. 1996, to assess the nuclear
safety performance of Farley Nuclear Plant for the period March 26, 1995,
through November 23, 1996. The Board was conducted in accordance with -
i Management Directive 8.6. " Systematic Assessment of Licensee !
Performance." Board members were J. R. Jotuison (Board Chairperson) !
Director. Division of Reactor Projects: A. F. Gibson (former) Director. !
Division of Reactor Safety; and H._N. Berkow. Director. Project i
Directorate II-2. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. This assessment j
was reviewed and approved by the Regional Administrator. ;
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II. Plant Operations
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This functional area addresses the control and execution of activities :
directly related to operating the plant. It includes activities such as l
plant startup, plant shutdown, and response to transients. It also
includes initial and requalification training programs for licensed
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operators, i
Overall performance in the Plant Operations area remained superior. The I
early portion of the assessment period was challenged by a significant ;
number of lant transients: automatic and manual trips along with several '
power redu tions and forced outages. These were prhi.arily caused by-
secondary plant chemistry as well as main feedwater and main turbine
control system equipment problems, and not by operator errors. The i'
latter part of the period was characterized by much more stable plant
operations with no automatic trips in 1996. ;
Performance by licensed operators was generally excellent. Their i
knowledge and performance during plant maneuvers was superior throughout ,
the period. Particularly noteworthy was the proper implementation of l
plant operating procedures for routine startups and shutdowns. Defueling l
and refueling activities on both units were well controlled. Excellent 3
implementation of abnormal and emergency operating 3rocedures was
observed during multi le transients due to electro-lydraulic control ;
(EHC) system and fee ater pump problems, as well as responses to '
significant secondary system steam leaks. This performance was
indicative of experienced and well trained licensed operators. The i
licensed operator requalification training was considered good; however. !
documentation of the conduct of remedial training was weak on occasion.
Routine plant shifts were well staffed with experienced operators. j
Stable and consistent crews were maintained for a year period. In ;
addition, during the latest refueling outage. the entire shift crew '
remained together. strengthening teamwork for the outage. O :
overtime was well controlled. Staffing of the technical su]perator
port center I
with Operations supervisors to assure proper tagging and scledulire of
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maintenance demonstrated an excellent safety focus. Improved performance
was noted with wrong unit, wrong train component operation.
Certain personnel errors related to system configuration control remained
a challenge, especially in the latter part of the period. Configuration
control was also a challenge during the last SALP period. Several
personnel errors by non-licensed system operators resulted in operability (
challenges to emergency diesel generators and transients in the letdown ;
and volume control tank portions of the' reactor coolant system. '
Operations management was closely involved in the review of plant
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incidents and occurrence reports. Senior reactor operator (SR0) -
experience in site managerial positions remained a strength throughout
the Farley organization. This included not only SRO qualification but
also significant on-shift operating experience. , Management participation
during requalification exams improved late in the period. Control room :
professionalism, awareness demonstrated by operators at the controls, and
a minimum of lit annunciators or control room deficiencies indicated
strong management support for. plant operations. Management decisions to
shut down Unit 1 for a short mid-cycle outage prior to the olympic games. '
and a decision to shut down Unit 2 3rior to the arrival of hurricane Opal
were considered conservative, and t1e evolutions were conducted without '
incident.
Operations self-assessments and safety committee reviews were generally i
acceptable. Root cause trending of human performance problems has
improved. Management typically supported sending shift crews to other
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facilities to benchmark good practices. During the last month of this
assessment period, plant management initiated a manager's tour program to
improve in-plant observations and self-assessments. The site audit
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program conducted by the Safety Audit and Engineering Review group was
l thorough and self-critical, and included extensive SR0 expertise as well
as other specialists when required.
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The Plant Operations area is rated Category 1. !
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III. MAINTENANCE
l This functional area addresses activities associated with diagnostic,
predictive, preventive, and corrective maintenance of plant structures.
! systems and components: maintenance of the physical condition of the
l plant: and training of the maintenance staff. It also includes
l surveillance testing, in-service inspection and testing, instrument !
I calibration, operability testing, post-maintenance testing, post-outage
testing, containment leak rate testing, and special testing.
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Management support and involvement were evident in the planning and i
- conduct of plant maintenance activities. This involvement was
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demonstrated by the successful completion of three outages and many major
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maintenance evolutions. The pre-planning and control of work packages !
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were considered good. Good support to Operations reduced the number of
operator work arounds and corrective maintenance backlogs.
The surveillance, in-service inspection and in-service testing programs
continued to be effectively implemented. The predictive maintenance
program was also effective. Safety-related equipment performance was
good; however. Balance of Plant (BOP) equipment problems continued to
adversely affect the overall performance of the plant, as evidenced by
numerous power reductions, transients, and trips. The majority of these
power reductions and trips were cauxd by main turbine and main feedwater
pum) EHC problems and steam generator (SG) chemistry control (sodium)
pro]lems during the first half of the period.
The SG maintenance and inspection program was a strength. Management was
effective in monitoring and maintaining the integrity of the SGs.
The corrective actions and root cause analyses of maintenance issues
continued to be generally effective. The corrective actions addressed
immediate needs and the long-term actions were appropriately based on
root cause evaluations. This was demonstrated by the resolution of the
electro-hydraulic control system problems.
Personnel errors, mostly due to a lack of attention to detail, adversely
affected some maintenance activities. Procedural issues contributed to
several maintenance and test deficiencies. Additionally, emergency
diesel generator availability was adversely impacted by several problems
associated with fuel oil leaks, service water leaks and surveillance
test failures.
The Maintenance area is rated Category 2.
IV. ENGINEERING
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This functional area addresses engineering and technical support
activities. It includes support to operations and maintenance,
management support for process improvement initiatives, modifications,
root cause analysis, corrective actions, as well as licensing activities. )
Engineering performance continued at a superior level during this period.
Previously identified strengths were maintained, and the licensee
aggressively addressed challenges to safety and operation.
Engineering support to Operations and Maintenance was effective. This
was evident in major maintenance and modification activities, aggressive
and innovative SG maintenance and repair activities, and actions related
to BOP equipment. The quality and effectiveness of major modifications
demonstrated further improvement over the previous period.
Several instances of breakdowns in communication, oversight, and quality
assurance between Farley personnel and vendors were observed with regard
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' to understanding current plant design configuration and technical
support. Continued attention to vendor control is considered a challenge i
to assure continued success.
Engineering root cause analyses and follow-up corrective actions were
.' com3rehensive and effective, especially during the latter part of the ~
SAL) period. Engineering was a major contributor to resolution of the SG :
- numerous power reductions while returning from the Unit 2 refueling
3 outage in April 1995. :
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With the exception of vendor oversight, effective management oversight at
the site and in the corporate office continued during this SALP period. ,
Farley management has conducted several performance improvement !
initiatives including: the Safety System Self-Assessment Program to
identify and correct design and operational deficiencies in critical ,
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safety systems: the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Verification l
Program to assure conformance with the license: and the Single Point
Vulnerability Study to identify major contributors to trips, power i
reductions and shutdowns. Several process improvements have also been
implemented including the Engineering Projects Council and Configuration
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Control Board. i
While modification control was generally good. there were several '
instances of inadequate control of the as-built configuration, both pre- )
existing and recent, involving welds, pipe supports, bolt torque values ;
- and other systems and components that collectively indicate the need for i
additional management focus. ;
Licensing submittals were generally of high quality: however, some l
significant licensing action requests were not submitted in a timely
manner to fully support the requested review schedule.
The Engineering area is rated Category 1
V. PLANT SUPPORT
This functional area assesses activities related to the plant support
function, including radiological controls, radioactive effluents and
waste, plant chemistry, emergency preparedness, security, fire protection
and housekeeping.
The radiological control program provided good 3rotection of the health
and safety of facility workers and members of t1e public. The program
was effective in limiting the internal and external radiation exposures
of workers to levels well below established regulatory limits. The ALARA
program was satisfactory. Extensive steam generator work contributed
significantly to occupational radiation exposure but administrative
controls and other dose reduction initiatives were effective in reducing
dose. The effluent control program limited exposures to members of the
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public by maintaining radionuclide effluent releases, and the resultant
radiation' doses from those releases, at a small percentage of regulatory
limits. The environmental monitoring program confirmed the effectivcness
of the effluent release program. The chemistry program maintained good
3rimary coolant quality. Radioactive waste storage on site was minimal.
Resolution of procedural and equipment inadequacies and reduction of the
frequency of procedural non-compliances, noted toward the end of the
assessment period, are challenges to the radiological control program.
The emergency preparedness program was effective in maintaining site
readiness to respond to emergencies; however, weaknesses associated with
the tone alert radio system were corrected late in the period. Emergency
preparedcess training and drills were appropriate.
The licensee continued to have a strong, well-ma'naged security program.
Equipment was reliable and consistently met the requirements of the
Physical Security Plan. Security management was generally proactive in
recognizing potential weaknesses. Plant operations continued to have
good communications with the security force. Trairing and qualification
of the security force was a strength. Continued vigilance regarding
thorough searches of items entering the protected area was a challenge.
Performance in implementation of the fire protection program declined
during this SALP period. Organization and administration of the fire
protection program was good. Fire protection and prevention procedures,
including procedures for the control of ignition sources, transient
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combustibles and housekeeping, were adequate. Implementation of
procedures was satisfactory except for specific instances of inadequate
control of the fire watch program. The fire brigade training program and
performance of the fire brigade during drills and actual fires were good.
Quality assurance audits of the fire protection program were generally
thorough and corrective action for identified major problems was timely;
however, these audits did not detect poor inspection programs for fire
barriers.
Maintenance and aerformance of the fire protection systems and equipment
were marginal. iultiple failures of the diesel driven fire pumps
occurred during the first part of the SALP cycle. Performance improved
toward the end of the aeriod due to enhanced preventive maintenance and
accelerated testing. iultiple failures of the automatic sprinkler
systems occurred in early 1996. Enhanced 3reventive maintenance and
accelerated testing were im)lemented but )y the end of the SALP period,
the root cause of the sprincler system problem had not been identified.
Maintenance and inspection of Kaowool raceway fire barriers were
inadequate, resulting in fire barriers that failed to meet the required
design configuration. The facility fire protect.on program, as it
relates to equipment and fire barriers, warrants increased management
attention.
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Plant housekeeping for both units degraded significantly during Unit 1
Refueling Outage 13 and cleanup actions were very slow following
com)letion of the refueling outage. Housekeeping practices associated
wit 1 the material condition and maintenance of the radiation monitoring
systems were not fully effective. Station management has recently
initiated a management tour program, in part, to improve observation of
housekeeping and material condition.
The Plant Support area is rated Category 2.
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