ML20058A175
| ML20058A175 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1993 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058A177 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-14, 50-364-93-14, NUDOCS 9311300141 | |
| Download: ML20058A175 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1993014
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SALP REPORT - FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
50-348/93-14 & 50-364/93-14
I.
BACXGROUND
The SALP Board convened on October 13, 1993, to assess the nuclear safety
performance of Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Units 1 and 2 for the period May 31,
1992 to September 25, 1993. The Borrd was conducted pursuant to NRC
Management Directive (MD) 8.6 (see NiC Administrative Letter 93-02).
Board
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members were Albert F. Gibson (Board Chairman), Director, Division of Reactor
Safety, NRC Region II (RII); J. Philip Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation
Safety and Safeguards, NRC RII; Jon R. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of
Reactor Projects, NRC RII; and S. Singh Bajwa, Acting Project Directorate II-
1, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The performance category ratings and the assessment functional areas used
below are defined and described in RC MD 8.6, " Systematic Assessment of
Licensee Perfcrmance (SALP)."
II. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - OPERATIONS
During the previous assessment period a decline in performance was noted in
the operations area. A significant number of personnel errors and equipment
malfunctions had resulted in challenges for operators to respond to reactor
plant transients. Management challenges were noted with reducing the number
of plant transients, personnel errors, and improving log keeping.
Configuration control was weak both at power and during plant shutdown
conditions.
During this assessment period the licensee corporate and station management,
as well as the operations staff, increased attention to these areas.
Management remained knowledgeable of emerging issues and participated in key
decisions. Periodic meetings were held among plant management and also with
station staff.
Plant management continued to disseminate plant and industry
event information to station employees. Control room professionalism was
maintained at a high level; the control room was quiet and the number of
operating parameters in alarm (lit annunciators) was small
(usually less than
five). New procedures were implemented late in the period to further improve
control room formality and communications. Computerized plant equipment
parameter logkeeping was initiated allowing more effective trending of
equipment. Overall operational performance of the two units improved this
period as indicated by a marked reduction in the number of reactor protection.
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system actuations: two this period (one manual and one automatic) compared to
15 last period (four manual and 11 automatic).
The Operations staff remained stable and well qualified. .0perations training
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programs were re-accredited, and licensed operator requalification program
implementation was excellent.
Licensee management provided support for
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operations group team building training to improve overall performance.
Operators were sent on visits to other power plants to observe control room
operations. Trip reports summarizing new ideas for control room conduct were
9311300141 931112
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distributed as part of a weekly operation % euartment newsletter.
In
addition, overtime was significantly reduced from a past practice of up to
12-hour days, seven days a week during outages, to a 1992 average of about
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> / week and in 1993 an average of about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> / week.
This showed direct
involvement by operations management to improve working conditions and
operational performance.
During this period, self identification of operational errors was excellent.
Most procedural violations were identified by the licensee, or were self
disclosing and for which corrective actions were prempt.
Plant management
became directly involved with discussions regarding the root cause of
personnel errors. The licensee audited the effectiveness of control room
attentiveness and logkeeping, two areas discussed in the previous assessment
report. Comprehensive troubleshooting was performed in response to an anomaly
with the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction pressure, and good
self-identification of questionable traceability of lubricating greases was
noted by plant operators.
Plant equipment configuration control and personal errors continued to be a
challenge. .During a forced outage of Unit 2 in February 1993, there were two
instances of unplanned safety injection: one due to improper valve
sequencing, and the other due to improper testing. Although wrong-unit,
wrong-train events continued during this period, their number and safety
significance (including duration) decreased. An incorrect auxiliary feedwater
remote control switch was operated during testing but promptly corrected; and
the wrong diesel generator circuit breaker was opened but annunciated in the
control room and was promptly corrected. An improper lineup for the Unit 2
containment component cooling water system in September 1993, (and a recent
event outside the SALP period involving interruption of component cooling to
the spent fuel pool) indicated a continuing weakness in the area of
configuration control.
The Operations area is rated Category 1.
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III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - MAINTENANCE
In the previous SALP,. maintenance was rated Category 2.
While generally good
performance was demonstrated, there were instances of inadequate supervisory
oversight, declining equipment material conditioas, and weaknesses in
procedural adherence.
During this SALP assessment period, NRC staff observed that performance
generally improved in the maintenance area. The licensee took initiatives to
improve plant lighting, reduce leaks, and improve plant material conditions,
all of which contributed to an improved maintenance program and a reduction in
the backlog of maintenance work orders.
In addition, strong maintenance
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support contributed to improved equipment performance, as evidenced by
significantly fewer reactor trips and forced shutdowns.
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There were a number of examples of improved management attention which
contributed to a high level of safety performance.
Following the lightning
strike on July 1, 1993, the prompt identification and repair of the
circulating water pump motor damage showed the capability of the maintenance
team to perform a difficult task under tight schedular restrictions with a
minimal adverse affect on the plant. Management implemented several positive
initiatives to enhance maintenance performance.
Examples included a reduction
in overtime during outages, the pre-release work control process, continued
use of the maintenance support engineering group, sending maintenance
personnel to team building sessions, the stop, think, act, review (STAR)
program, and maintaining a 24-hour presence of a maintenance shift supervisor
on site.
Improved steam generator eddy current surveillance and analysis
techniques were strengths. The licensee also significantly improved the
avaflability of the emergency diesel generators during the assessment period.
Individual events detracted from the generally improving good performance.
Several events were attributed to personnel errors and lack of procedural
adherence.
Examples included improper disassembly and assembly of the
component cooling water pump motor bearings, improper installation of valves
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in the emergency diesel generator air compressors, improper use of electrical
jumpers during surveillance testing that resulted in two engineered safety
feature actuations, use of the wrong data table during performance of a
nuclear instrumentation calibration, and erroneous removal of the output
breaker from the wrong unit emergency diesel generator. Most of these events
occurred during the first portion of the assessment period and the licensee's
measures to improve communication, teamwork, and self-verification had a
beneficial impact on reducing the frequency of these events. However, at the
end of the assessment period, two more events occurred (inadvertent breaching
of tiie control room pressure boundary and operation of the wrong motor-
operated valve during MOVATS testing) that indicated this challenge remained.
Root-cause evaluations and corrective actions were generally good.
However,
during the assessment period, the licensee failed to identify the root cause
of continuing instrumentation calibration problems and to take timely
corrective action.
For example, the licensee failed to identify the cause of,
and take timely corrective action for, emergency diesel generator load
sequencer timing relays that were out of calibration and failed to require
evaluations for as-found out-of-tolerance readings as part of the calibration
check program for service water instrumentation.
Maintenance performance improved during this period. The qualification and
skill level of craft personnel contributed significantly to the overall
excellent plant material condition and equipment reliability.
However,
challenges remain to reduce personnel errors and provide more attention to
detailed planning before performing maintenance work.
The Maintenance area is rated Category 2.
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING
In the previous SALP period engineering was rated Category 2 with an improving
trend,
Strengths during that period included a well qualified staff,
effective self-initiated assessments of safety systems, and improved support
to operations and maintenance staffs. Challenges included a design control
problem associated with the RTD bypass loop modification and inadequate
incorporation of setpoint tolerances in associated drawings.
The qualifications of the engineering staff remained a strength during this
SALP period.
Excellent knowledge of regulatory requirements and plant design
bases was evident in licensing submittals and during inspections conducted by
the NRC.
Knowledgeable site and corporate engineering staffs aided in the
resolution of problems and in the completion of several design changes to
inprove the station electrical distribution system.
Management emphasized improvements in plant safety and risk reduction during
operation and outages.
Steps to reduce risks identified by probability risk
assessment were included in operating procedures, and a program to ensure
reliable decay heat removal during outages was implemented.
The fuel was
removed from the reactor in order to reduce the duration of mid-loop
operations which reduced risk. Outage activities were prioritized and
scheduled to reduce risk.
Strong design control was applied to safety related equipment.
Drawings were
legible and accurate; the design bases of service water and electrical
distribution systems were well documented; safety evaluations performed
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 were adequate, and plant modifications were properly
designed.
Effective self-assessments continued during this SALP period.
Strengths noted
included overview and audits of site engineering by the Corporate Nuclear
Operations Review Board; and reviews of design outputs by the Technical
Adequacy Review Board and the Design Adequacy Review Committee.
Engineering
reviews identified design deficiencies in service water and electrical
distribution systems; and, except as noted below,-engineering support for
resolution of these deficiencies was effective.
Strong support was generally provided for the maintenance of plant equipment,
but this support was not fully effective in addressing failures in the areas
of instrumentation and controls.
Strengths included:
Use of thermography,
vibration analysis and time domain reflectometry on emergency diesel
generators; development and implementation of an effective, conservative
program for eddy current inspection of steam generator tubes; and,
strengthening of the program for maintenance and surveillance of motor
operated valves.
However, problems occurred in the area of instrumentation
and controls because of the failure to identify and correct the causes of
these problems.
In summary, overall performance in the area of Engineering continued to
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improve this period.
Strengths were noted in staff qualifications, risk
management, design control, and self-assessments.
Support to maintenance
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remained strong except for evaluation and correction of failures in the
instrumentation and control area.
The Engineering area is rated Category 1.
V.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT
This new functional area consolidates assessments of plant support activities
that were previously provided in several different functional areas. The new
area includes assessments of radiological controls and chemistry (rated
category 1 in the previous SALP), emergency preparedness (previously category
2), security (previously category 1) and fire protection and housekeeping (not
individually rated in the past).
Radiological exposures, both external and internal have been effectively
controlled this period. A comprehensive program for maintaining radiation
exposures as low as reasonably achievable resulted in a reduced source term
and has been a significant factor in the effectiveness of internal and
external exposure control programs.
Examples included reducing the rate of
plant shutdown to reduce the spread of activation products throughout the
reactor coolant system (soft shutdown), teledosimetry and submicron
filtration.
The 1992 collective dose of 805 persan-rem was largely associated
with outage work and considered consistent with outage activities.
Radiological effluents were well controlled during this period, and
radioactive waste was well managed.
Effluent release concentrations were well
within Technical Specification limits, and offsite doses were only a fraction
of a percentage of regulatory limits.
The environmental monitoring program
confirmed the low concentration of radioactivity in effluent from the site.
The licensee has been proactive with respect to management of solid
radioactive wastes and has significantly reduced waste volumes by safely
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packaging and shipping them to an authorized disposal facility.
In general,
root cause evaluations and corrective actions for problems improved this
period, however there were problems concerning evaluation of batch liquid
releases and adherence to Radiation Control procedures.
The facility's emergency re:ponse capability was maintained in a good state of
readiness this period.
Performance improvements were noted in the emergency
preparedness area. The licensee maintained good working relations with;
offsite emergency preparedness authorities.
The annual exercise was
successful, and no exercise weaknesses were observed.
The licensee used a
series of drills, a number of which were above regulatory requirements, to
enhance the level of preparedness. These drills demonstrated that the program
was well supported by licensee management. Additionally, emergency response
management demonstrated a wide ranging familiarity with emergency response
methodology which contributed positively to the level of performance. During
the period, the licensee made significant progress toward meeting NRC criteria
relative to addressing the previously NRC identified issue concerning timely
staffing and activation of the E0F. To achieve this the licensee revised the
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response concept, implementing procedures, made necessary E0F modifications,
and provided additional training to the staff.
The security program continued to be effectively implemented this period.
Performance was improved as a result of a noteworthy training program which
included realistic drills and a thorough critique process. A high level of
management support was evidenced this period by improved weaponry and response
equipment and other programmatic improvements. During the later portion of
this assessment period, the NRC identified problems with the recently required
access authorization program.
The fire protection program was effectively implemented this period.
Ignition
sources and combustible material were well controlled, and the installation of
a new jockey pump in the fire main system resulted in an improved stable fire -
main system operating pressure.
A major contributor to the superior level of safety performance in the plant
support area was a strong level of management support and effective, well
administered training programs in the areas of emergency preparedness,
security, fire protection, and radiation protection.
Housekeeping has been improved during this period.
Maintenance has reduced
the number of small leaks, and the repainting program progressed.
The Plant Support area is rated Category 1.
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