ML20135D635

Insp Repts 50-269/85-20,50-270/85-20 & 50-287/85-20 on 850709-0812.Violations Noted:Failure to Address Inoperable Effluent Monitors in Semiannual Rept & Failure to Rept Revs to FSAR as Required

ML20135D635
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	08/27/1985
From:	Bryant J, Dance H, King L, Sasser M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135D575	List: ML20135D573 ML20135D584 ML20135D635
References
50-269-85-20, 50-270-85-20, 50-287-85-20, NUDOCS 8509160120
Download: ML20135D635 (10)

See also: IR 05000269/1985020

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UNITED STATES

[pR CEGO'o, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1. \. '* REGION ll

I I I o 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

I. f AT L ANT A, GEORGI A 30323

s, w.....f

Report Nos: 50-269/85-20, 50-270/85-20, and 50-287/85-20

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, N.C. 28242

Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55

Inspection Conducted: J - August 12, 1985

Inspectors: , , n i' s j Al

J.W Bryant '[ // DSte Sitned

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M. K. SaMer '

. &w /e Y Y N~

// ~ Date SMJned

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LTPf. Ki6cj

'[ //~ Date Signed

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Approved by: .

&% _T 2. 7 h.1

. Dance, 9ection Chief Dhte Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 373 inspector-hours on site

in the areas of operations, surveillance, maintenance, plant trips, inspector

followup items, licensee event reports, station modifications, and independent

inspection.

Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations

were identified in seven areas; two items of noncompliance were found in one

area: (Violations: Failure to address inoperable effluent monitors in semiannual

report and failure to report revisions to the FSAR as required).

8509160120 850020

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

, Licensee Employees

, *M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager

• J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations

• T. S. Barr, Superintendent of Technical Services

• R. Knoerr, Project Service Engineer

• R. T. Bond, Compliance Engineer

• T. C. Matthews, Technical Specialist

• C. Harlin, HP Coordinator

• E. Brown, Health Physics

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and staff engineers.

Resident Inspectors

• J. C. Bryant

M. K. Sasser

• L. P. King

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview l

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 9, 1985, [

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with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee made no

specific comments concerning the two violations (paragraphs 8 and 13). The ~

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or

reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. -

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters I

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(Closed) VIO/287/84-36-01: Failure to document startup actions - Unit 3.

Corrective actions have been taken and have been reviewed by the resident

inspectors.

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i (Closed) VIO/269/85-03-01: Inadequate preparation for shipment of radio-

active material. The licensee's corrective actions were inspected by a

Regional inspector and found to be satisfactory.  ;

4. Unresolved Items  !

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Unrosolved items were not identified on this inspection. [

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5. Plant Operations

l The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to

verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications

(TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, shif t turnover

records and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed

routinely. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance,

chemistry, healtt physics and performance personnel.

Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basis.

Inspections were conducted on day and on night shif ts, during week days and

on weekends. Some inspections were made during shift change in order to

evaluate shif t turnover performance. Actions observed were conducted as

required by Operations Management Procedure 2-1. The complement of licensed

personnel on each shif t inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS.

Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of

plant conditions.

Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis.

The areas toured included the following:

i Turbine Building

1 Auxiliary Building

Units 1,2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms

I Units 1,2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms

Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area

During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,

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equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.

Unit 1 began the report period at 100% power and continued at that level

until 12:53 pm on July 15 when IB main feedwater pump (MFDWP) control valves

closed causing a reactor power run back. Fifteen seconds later MFDWP stop

valves reset themselves and reopened. Operators took control and reduced

power to 55%. After several hours investigation, without determining the

cause of valves closing or reopening, MFDWP B was returned to service and

power ascension began. At 8:48 p.m. on July 15, after perturbations were

received in feedwater flow, MFDWP B was shut down and power reduced to 60%.

On July 17, Unit 1 power was increased to 100% with MF0WP B in " Hand" and

continued operation in that mode through the remainder of the report

period.

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Unit 2 began the report period critical at low power awaiting generator

field breaker replacement. The breaker was replaced and Unit 2 placed on

line at 4:37 a.m. on July 10. Power was increased to 94% where it was

limited by steam generator "B" level. At 7:10 pm on July 11, Unit 2 tripped

from 94% power due to high reactor coolant pressure resulting from an

erroneous signal which closed the turbine control and intercept valves. The

erroneous signal was caused by a mechanic who, while investigating a problem

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with the turbine header pressure control portion of the ICS, plugged in a

] test meter and introduced a noise signal which caused the valves to close. '

All reactor systems performed normally and there was no ESF actuation. The

reactor was critical again at 8:31 p.m. and power was returned to 94% and '

f continued at that power level throughout the remainder of the report period.

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i Unit 3 operated at essentially full power until 3:16 p.m. on July 14 when

power was reduced to 70% and reactor coolant pump (RCP) 382 was taken out of

service due to low oil level in the lower oil pot. The unit was shut down  ;

briefly on July 2 to refill the same pot (see Report No. 50-?87/85-17). .

i After shut down of the RCP, Unit 3 was increased to 74% power and continued  !

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operation at that level with three RCP's in service. At 2:37 a.m. on July

23, Unit 3 tripped on high RCS pressure following a feedwater transient

i apparently caused by an Integrated Control System (ICS) failure. This trip .

l is discussed in more detail in paragraph 9. y

! The unit continued operation at 74% until shut down for refueling on August

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I No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Surveillance Testing i

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j The surveillance tests listed below were reviewed and/or witnessed by the i

j inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy.  !

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The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites,

instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin

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work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of .

j deficiencies noted, and review of completed work.

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The tests witnr :ed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that

! approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, '

4 prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, tests [

j were acceptable and systems restoration was completed, t

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l Surveillances witnessed in whole or in part are as follows: .l

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j WR 55313A Source & Intermediate Range Test, Unit 2 i

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WR 55314A RPS Channel A Calibration & Functional Test, Unit 2

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PT/0/A/1600/10 SSF Diesel Monthly Run Test

No violations or deviations were identified,

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7. Maintenance Activities

Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting

period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that

approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the

skill of the trade. Activities, procedures and work requests were examined

to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire,

cleanliness, and exposure control, proper return of equipment to service,

and that limiting conditions for operation were met.

Maintenance work witnessed in whole or in part was as follows:

MP/0/A/2001/4 CRD Breaker Inspection and Maintenance, unit 2

IP/0/8/330/9 CRD System Check Before Test Trip of CR0 Breakers

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Inoperable Effluent Monitors

The inspectors reviewed the performance of radiation instrumentation alarms

(RIA's) for liquid and gaseous effluents to determine that performance was

satisfactory or that proper compensatory action was being taken. The

inspectors found that a number of RIA's were inoperable but that in each

case proper sampling was being performed as required by TS 3.5.5-1 and

3.5.5-2. However, TS also require that if a monitor is out of service for

more than 30 days, the matter will be addressed in the next Semiannual

Radioactive Effluent Release Report along with an explanation of why the

inoperability was not corrected in a timely manner.

The inspectors found the following monitors to have been out-of-service for

more than 30 days:

(a) Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) monitors

1. 1RIA-35 inoperable beginning 11/9/84 or before (Unit 1)

fi. 3RIA-35 inoperable beginning 11/25/84 or before (Unit 3)

(b) Gaseous Waste Decay Tank monitors

A minimum of one of either RIA-37 or RIA-38 is required operable during

gas releases. RIA-37 is always inoperable during a release because the

instrument always goes offscale, due to either poor design or the fact

that waste gas in not allowed to decay as long as originally planned

when the system was designed. Therefore, when RIA-38 is inoperable the

minimum is not met and compensatory action is required. 1RIA-38 has

been inoperable since 10/12/84.

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Although sampling had been performed as required by TS, the semiannual

report for the period July 1 - December 31, 1984 did not address the

inoperable monitors in any fashion. This is an apparent violation of

TS 3.5.5.1 and 3.5.5.2; (Violation- Failure to address inoperable

effluent monitors in semiannual report, 269, 270, 287/85-20-01).

9. Unit 3 Trip

On July 23, Unit 3 was in 3 reactor coolant pump (RCP) operation at 74%

power. Feedwater flow was unbalanced and close to maximum on A main feed-

water pump (MFDWP) due to the unbalanced primary system. A surge in A

MFDWP caused heat generation limits to be reached which caused an excessive

reduction in A MFDWP flow. Operators took manual control of feedwater flow

but could not prevent a trip on reactor coolant system high pressure seconds

later. Safety systems functioned properly during the transient. The steam

generator levels were maintained by B MFDWP, all steam safety valves

reseated properly. There was no engineered safeguards actuation. Cause of

the feedwater transient was later found to be a failed feedwater ratio

multiplier in the Integrated Control System (ICS). Difficulty was experi- >

enced with several secondary system controls, apparently caused by problems

with one electrical breaker. Approximately one hour after the trip the

turbine driven emergency feedwater pump (TDEFWP) was locked out due to

excessive relay chatter. The TDEFWP had not been called upon to operate

during the transient and was not operating when locked out.

The ratio multiplier and breaker were replaced and the reactor was taken

critical at 11:25 a.m. and raised to 5% power. The TDEFWP was inspected and

tested and declared operable at 5:15 p.m. The turbine generator was placed

on line at 5:46 p.m. and reactor power was increased to 72% by 6:00 a.m. on

July 24.

10. Review of Licensee Event Reports

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The inspectors reviewed nonroutine event reports to verify that report

details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, de-

scribed corrective actions appropriate for the identified cause, and

adequately addressed the event and any generic implications. In addition,

as appropriate, the inspectors examined operating and maintenance logs, and

records and internal investigation reports. Personnel were interviewed to

verify that the report accurately reflected the circumstances of the event,

that the corrective action had been taken or responsibility assigned to

assure completion, and that the event was reviewed by the licensee, as

stipulated in the TS. The following event reports were reviewed:

(Closed) LER 269/83-19: Potential deficiency of capstan springs in Pacific

Scientific mechanical snubbers. The one snubber that was in service was

replaced with a nonsuspect snubber. This snubber and the eleven in stores

were returned to the manufacturer,

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(Closed) LER 269/84-01: Boron concentration of core flood tank less than

TS requirements. Procedures have been modified and now direct boration to

2100 ppm whenever water is drained from a core flood tank.

(Closed) LER 269/83-21: Freezing of BWST level and temperature trans-

mitters. The licensee's proposed modification to move the transmitters into

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the auxiliary building could not be carried out; however, other methods of

protection were employed and proved successful in sub zero temperatures in

January 1985.

(Closed) LER 269/84-05: Surveillance interval exceeded for some Keowee

fire protection equipment. Satisfactory program modifications to prevent

recurrence have been completed.

(Closed) LER 269/85-03: ESFAS HPI system actuation setpoint adjustment.

The inspectors have reviewed events and actions taken and have dicussed the

matter with Reactor Licensing. It appears that Licensee actions have been

timely and conservative. Although the research by B&W which precipitated

the set point changes continues, the research is being followed by Reactor

Licensing. This LER is closed.

(Closed) LER 269/85-06: Reactor trip from 17% power during a divergent l

secondary pressure swing. Licensee action during the event was proper. .

There is an ongoing program to determine possible changes to prevent this

recurring instability.

(Closed) LER 270/85-02: Reactor trip at low power on high flux indication

from recorder during low power physics testing.

(Closed) LER 270/85-04: Reactor trip on loss of main feedwater caused by

short circuit in a terminal block. Reactor was at 29% power with only one

main feedwater pump in operation.

(Closed) LER 270/85-05: Reactor trip due to high reactor coolant system

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pressure. Trip resulted from closure of turbine control and intercept

valves initiated by a spurious signal. Signal originated in the EHC cabinet

while maintenance work was in progress within the EHC cabinet.

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(Closed) LER 287/81-13: A one inch breach in a fire barrier was discovered  !

in the floor - cause unclear. An extensive program of fire barrie'r

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improvement has been implemented.

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(Closed) LER 287/84-05: Instrument air line to the Powdex outlet valves was

accidentally sheared. Procedures have been modified to require placing the '

turbine driven emergency feedwater pump (TDEFWP) in "Run" after automatic

actuation. This will prevent automatic shut down of the TDEFWP upon placing ,

main feed pumps on line. Operator action is required to shut down the '

TDEFWP.

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j 11. Inspector Followup Items f

l (Closed) IFI 269/84-06-01: Core flood tanks. This item is the same as LER [

269/84-01, closed elsewhere in this report.  !

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(Closed) IFI 269/84-36-02: Code safety valves reseating late. The  !

licenses' ongoing program to refurbish main steam safety valves is described i

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in Report No. 50-269/85-01 and is in progress. This item is closed. I

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12. Unit 3 Refueling Shutdown - End of Cycle 8 *

, Unit 3 was shut down on August 8,1985 for the end of cycle 8 refueling, j

l The shutdown is scheduled to last 57 days. Some of the major work scheduled j

is as follows

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a. Eddy current inspection of approximately 4300 steam generator tubes. [

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b. Sludge lance both steam generators.

I c. Disassemble and rework two low pressure turbines.

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d. Disassemble and rework both main feedwater pump turbines.  !

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e. Remove and rework one reactor coolant pump.  !

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f. Inspect, test and plug moisture separator reheater tubes. i

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g. Aris hot leg inspection, j

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13. Changes to the FSAR l

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Title 10, Part 50.71 (4), of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that  !

l all revisions to the FSAR be filed with NRR no less frequently than annually  ;

and that revisions are reported within six months of the change.  !

l Changes to the Oconee FSAR for the period ending December 31, 1984 were not ,

filed by July 1,1985 nor was a request for an extension filed or. granted by i

j that date. In a letter dated July 1,1985 the licensee stated that the  !

i report would be late. This action does not appear to meet requirements of i

the regulation and is an apparent violation,(Violation 50-269,270,287/85-02; l

Failure to report revisions to the FSAR as required).  ;

14. Design, Design Changes, and Modifications (37700)

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The inspectors reviewed the Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) f

l program and several procedure changes which had been made since i

the last inspection in this area. They reviewed several com- '

, pleted, or essentially completed, NSMs to determine if they had  !

been reviewed and approved by the licensee in accordance with  ;

l 10 CFR 50.59 and the TS, and if the reviews were technically i

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adequate. The NSM packages were examined to verify that work was

controlled by established procedure, completed work was properly

tested and met acceptance criteria, and that operating and sur-

veillance procedures, operator training, and as-built drawings

were modified to reflect the changes.

The following NSMs were reviewed:

ON-0803 Quench Tank Drain Pumps

ON-0821 Permanent Installation of RIAs in Turbine

Building Sumps

ON-1965 Replace Decay Heat Removal Suction Valves with

Different Operators

ON-2288 Provide Auto Actuation of Shunt Trip on Control

Rod Drive Circuit Breakers

ON-1396 Reactor Building Sample System - Upgrade Post

Accident Sampling System - Unit 3

ON-2248 Sump Level Indicators - Unit 3

The inspectors found that program requirements were met and

procedures followed. One area was questioned in that ON-2288

reflected that NRR notification and a change of TS were not

required. The licensee stated that the NSM was so marked because

an affirmative statement at that point in the procedure automati-

cally stopped work on the NSM until NRR approval for the

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modification was obtained and TS changes were approved. This NSM

was made by direction of NRR and a TS change has been submitted by

direction of NRR; therefore, the licensee said the NSM was not

marked as requiring approval, in order to avoid delay. The NRR

letter requires that shunt and undervoltage trips be tested

independently. Oconee procedures require this independent testing

and the inspectors have verified that it is performed in this

manner.

In progress NSM 1935, Unit spent fuel pool and recirculating water

upgrade, was inspected to determine if the modification was being

performed in accordance with requirements, testing was satis-

factory, and appropriate controls were in effect.

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The weld program procedure was reviewed from initiation of the

isometrics through QA review of the completed welds. Two welds

were tracked from preparation of the weld data card, through

welder qualification to review of radiographs. No problems were

identified.

A large number of NSMs have been completed physically but remain

open waiting completion of all paperwork. The licensee has

established a task force to correct this problem and to prioritize

the NSM backlog. At this time, the task force has reviewed

approximately 1500 outstanding NSMs and has closed out over 1300.

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The inspectors reviewed Oconee Nuclear Station Directive 2.3.5,

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Control of Temporary Modifications (TSM). This document was

approved on December 1, 1984 and was modified on May 20, 1985. ,

The document established controls, which met the requirements of

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10 CFR 50.59, the TS, installed jumpers and other temporary

modifications.

l The directive requires that .all TSMs be reviewed every three

i months to determine status and continuing need. This program is

l implemented by a notice of required review from the project

j operating engineer to the originator of the modification request.

The review is made and a report sent to Project Services, which

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maintains the NSM file. On review of selected TSMs, the

inspectors found two instances where, although the notice of

', review had been sent two months previously, there was no

documentation that the review had been made. There is no feedback

i to the operating engineer as to whether of not the review was

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At the exit interview, the licensee acknowledged the apparent

loophole and stated that it would be reviewed and corrected. The

j resident inspectors will followup on the significance of any

possibly missed reviews and on the system of control. This is an

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inspector followup item (IFI 50-270/85-20-03, Review of Temporary

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Modifications).

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During inspection, the inspectors noted a temporary jumper which

l was not listed in the control room TSM log book. This work

request, No. 49814, was initiated on September 2, 1980, four years

, before the current TSM program was begun. The TSM installed a

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jumper on 2RIA36 (radiation instrument alarm); the jumper is still

, in place. The inspectors will pursue this item to determine the

] propriety of installing and leaving the jumper in place under a

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TSM (IFI 270/85-20-04, Long term temporary modifications). The

licensee has a recently initiated program in effect to locate and

correct any outstanding TSMs which are not properly identified and

logged.

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No violations or deviations were identified,

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