IR 05000269/1987008

Enforcement Conference Repts 50-269/87-08,50-270/87-08 & 50-287/87-08 on 861222.Major Areas Discussed:Safety Sys Functional Insp & Associated Safety Implications

ML20211B528
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	02/05/1987
From:	Burger C, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211B506	List: IR 05000269/1987008 ML20211B503
References
50-269-87-08-EC, 50-269-87-8-EC, 50-270-87-08, 50-270-87-8, 50-287-87-08, 50-287-87-8, NUDOCS 8702190438
Download: ML20211B528 (31)

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ENCLOSURE 1 Report Nos.: 50-269/87-08, 50-270/87-08, and 50-287/87-08 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos: 50-269, 50-270 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 and 50-287 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Enforcement Co ference t Region II Office: December 22, 1986 Inspector: /f ,

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C. W. frurter 17dte Tigne5 Approved by:

T. A. Peeblss', Sectt'on Chief

. d ) , j'-B 7 Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY An Enforcement Conference was held on December 22, 1986, to brief NRC on the assessments and actions taken regarding the Safety Systea Functional Inspection (SSFI) findings. Details of the event are described in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269,270,287/86-1 %h PDR O

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REPORT DETAILS 1. Personnel Attending Enforcement Conference Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, DPC M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager, Oconee N. Rutherford, System Engineer, Licensing R. B. Priory, Vice President, Design Engineering B. L. Peele, Principal Engineer, Design Engineering D. W. Murdock, Principal Engineer, Design Engineering F. E. Owens, Shift Supervisor, Compliance Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator, RII M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, RII L. A. Reyes, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DPR), RII V. W. Panciera, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RII G. E. Edison, Deputy Director, Project Directorate #6, NRR H. N. Pastis, Project Manager - Oconee/PWR-6/NRR T. A. Peebles, Section Chief, DRP, RII J. C. Bryant, Senior Resident Inspector - Oconee C. W. Burger, Project Inspector, DPR, RII L. J. Callan, Chief, Performance Appraisal Section, IE T. O. Martin, Inspection Specialist, IE G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement Investigation and Coordination Staff, RII B. Uryc, Enforcement Specialist, RII L. Trocine, Enforcement Specialist, RII 2. Event Discussion The NRC staff opened the discussions concerning the SSFI findings and the associated safety implication Duke Power Company (DPC) provided a description of the findings, assessment of the findings and the associated actions. The meeting sumary notes are described below. The details are discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269,270,287/86-1 Meeting Summary The following findings were discussed at the meeting:

Emergency Feedwater Pump Runout - This finding could occur if the flow control valves stayed in the fully open positio This situation had not been previously analyzed by DP r i

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Undersized Relief Valve - This finding relates to the relief valve in the steam supply line to the turbine - driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW)

Pump. The DPC assessment determined the valve to be undersized for the resultant transient in which the upstream control valve fails in the full open position. The result would be to exceed the design pressure of that segment of pipin Lack of Design Analysis - This finding deals with modifications that were performed without completed critical design analysis involving EFW total discharge head, EFW net positive suction head, Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) System total discharge head, EFW System flow, High Pressure Injection (HPI) Orifice Calcula-tions and EFW Orifice calculation Inadequate Design Analysis - This finding relates to errors found in design analysis calculations involving: EFW minimum and maximum flows and Keowee dynamic analysi Operability of Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (TDEFWP) - The finding is a concern of the inspection team that the Unit 3 TDEFWP did not meet Technical Specification (TS) operability requirements from June 7 - June 22, 198 The sequence of events and summary are included in the handout DPC concluded that the pump was operable as require Inadequate Testing of Batteries - This finding involves a TS require-ment of an annual one-hour discharge service test and the inspection team interpretation requiring a stepped discharge current one-hour profile in lieu of the constant current one-hour test presently used by DP DPC maintains that their testing program intent is supported in their licensing documentatio Inoperable Keowee Batteries - This finding involves spacer material which was not added between the batteries as required for seismic qualificatio DPC maintains this occurred due to personnel error in transmitting the drawing for implementatio Check Velve Testing - This finding involves the ASME Code Section XI requirement "To verify operational readiness for valves which are required to perform a specific function in shutting down a reactor to cold shutdown or in mitigating the consequences of an accident." The inspection team is concerned that full cycling and flow verification of two check valves were not performed in accordance with the provisions of the ASME Code as required by TS 4. _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

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Another concern by the team involves two other check valves which are not periodically tested in the reverse flow directio DPC maintains that provisions for reverse flow testing were not provided in the original design, that the valves are tested in accordance with the ,

inservice inspection program and that cost of the modification required '

for reverse flow testing is not warranted compared to benefits gained by the ability to test for back flow, b. Sumary The NRC discussed each of the findings in detail with DPC and advised DPC that a decision regarding each finding would be forthcoming. The

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NRC thanked DPC for their very candid and comprehensive presentation '

and their positive response to NRC concerns.

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ENCLOSURE 2

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OCONEE MEETING HAND 0UTS DUKE POWER COMPANY '

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE DECEMBER 22, 1986 Opening Remarks H. B. Tucker Duke Discussion Of Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) Findings e Inadequate Design & Implementation B. L. Peele Of Design D. W. Murdock-R. B. Priory i M. S. Tuckman e Failure To Meet LC0's M. S. Tuckman D. W. Nurdock e Miscellaneous SSFI Findings M. S. Tuckman e Duke Discussion Of The Emergency M. S. Tuckman Condenser Circulating Water System f e Closing Remarks H. B. Tucker

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PUMP RUN0VT UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-14 SSFI REFERENCE PARAGRAPHS 2.1.3/3. SUMMARY OF FINDING e [jERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP RUNOUT COULD OCCUR DURING NORMAL r W ACTUATION IF FLOW CONTROL VALVES STAYED FULLY OPE eDESIGN ANALYSIS ON PUMP RUNOUT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY PERFORME BACKGROUND eDUKE ADVISED NRC, IN 5-7-80 RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN 80-04, THAT AUXILIARY FEEDWATER RUNOUT WAS NOT EXPLICITLY ADDRESSED BY THE FSAR ANALYSIS, AND THAT OPERATOR ACTION WAS TO BE USED TO MITIGATE THE TRANSIEN eDUKE TRAINING PERSONNEL HAD NOTED THAT OCONEE SIMULATOR WAS MODELING UNDESIRABLY HIGH EFW FLOW RATES' CALCULATIONS CONCERNINGEFWFLOWCAPACITYWEREINITIATED1[8 .

DUKE ASSESSMENT eExISTING EFW SYSTEM, WITH OPERATOR ACTION, FULFILLS INTENDED FUNCTIO eADDED MARGIN IS PRESENT DUE TO OTHER DIVERSE SYSTEMS AVAILABLE (AUXILIARY SERVICE WATER, STANDBY SHUTDOWN rACILITY, MAIN FEEDWATER)

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PLANNED ACTION e0PERATING PROCEDURE REVISIONS AND TRAINING HAVE BEEN COMPLETED TO ALERT OPERATORS TO THE EFW FLOW LIMITATIONS, AS SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO THE PUMP r

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UNDERSIZED RELIEF VALVE UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-15 SSFI REFERENCE PARAGRAPHS 2.1.2/3.4.4, 3.4.7(5)

SUMMARY OF FINDING eRELIEF VALVE IN STEAM SUPPLY LINE TO TURBINE-DRIVEN EFW PUMP WAS REPLACED VIA MODIFICATION DESIGNED 11-85, BuT SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS WERE NOT RECALCULATE eRELIEF VALVE IS UNDERSIZE DUKE ASSESSMENT eVALVE CHANGEOUT WAS INTENDED TO BE REPLACEMENT WITH AN EQUIVALENT VALVE, THEREFORE USE OF ORIGINAL COMPONENT PARAMETERS WAS PROPE eCALCULATION WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY EQUIVALENC ,

e0RIGINAL RELIEF VALVE WAS UNDERSIZED FOR ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT OF UPSTREAM CONTROL VALVE FAILING FULLY OPE eRESULT WOULD BE TO EXCEED STATED DESIGN PRESSURE OF PIPING SEGMENT, POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO TWO STEAM TRAP PLANNED ACTION eDUKE HAS INITIATED MOD TO RAISE DESIGN PRESSURE RATING OF PIPING AND REPLACE STEAM TRAP e0VERPRESSURE-DESIGN REFRESHER COURSE WILL BE CONDUCTE r

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LACK 0F DESIGN ANALYSIS EFW/SSF SYSTEM FLOW CALCULATIONS UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-17 SSFI REFERENCE PARAGRAPHS 2.2.3/3.4.7 (1,2,4)

SUMMARY OF FINDING

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eMODIFICATIONS WERE DONE WITHOUT RELATED CRITICAL DESIGN ANALYSES BEING PERFORMED OR COMPLETED:

-EFW TOTAL DISCHARGE HEAD-EFW NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD-SSF ASW TOTAL DISCHARGE HEAD

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-EFW SYSTEM FLOW DUKE ASSESSMENT

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eCALCULATIONS HAD BEEN PERFORMED ON SYSTEM PARAMETERS, BUT WERE NOT PROPERLY DOCUMENTED AND FILE ePRE-0PERATIONAL TESTING SUBSTANTIATED SSF TOTAL DISCHARGE HEA eEFW PUMPS HAVE PERFORMED ADEQUATELY IN SERVICE SINCE THEIR INSTALLATIO GLACK OF DOCUMENTATION IS UNTYPICAL OF CURRENT DUKE DESIGN PRACTIC .

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LACK OF DESIGN ANALYSIS

[FW/SSFSYSTEMFLOWCALCULATIONS (CONTINUED)

PLANNED ACTIONS eFORMAL, DOCUMENTED CALCULATIONS DEMONSTRATING SSF ASW CAPABILITY WERE COMPLETED 12/15/8 eFORMAL, DOCUMENTED CA(Cyt, T],0NS DEMONSTRATING EFW CAPABILITY WILL BE COMPLETED BY J/21 8/.

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LACK OF DESIGN ANALYSIS HPI ORIFICE CALCULATIONS UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-17 SSFI REFERENCE PARAGRAPHS 2.3.2(1)/3.4.7(3)

SUMMARY OF FINDING e0RIFICE SIZING CALCULATIONS WERE EITHER NOT DONE OR NOT DOCUMENTED DURING MODIFICATIONS TO INSTALL CROSSOVER FLOW PATHS AND SAFETY RELATED FLOW INDICATION IN THE HIGH-PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTE ASSESSMENT eTHE 1979 CALCULATIONS TO SIZE THE SUBJECT FLOW ORIFICES HAVE BEEN RETRIEVE . .

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PLANNED ACTIONS eCALCULATIONS ARE BEING RE-PERFORMED, DOCUMENTED AND ONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CURRENT QUALITY ASSURANCE ROGRA eCONFIRMATORY CALCULATIONS INDICATE THAT NO CHANGES ARE NECESSARY TO THE ORIGINALLY SPECIFIED ORIFICE SIZE .

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INADEQUATE DESIGN ANALYSIS EFW ORIFICE CALCULATIONS UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-18 SSFI REFERENCE PARAGRAPHS 2.3.2 (1)/3.4.8 (1)

SUMMARY OF FINDING e0RIFICE SIZING CALCULATIONS WERE NOT CHECKED OR VERIFIED AND THE PREPARER WAS NOT IDENTIFIE eDESIGN ANALYSES DID NOT HAVE FILE IDENTIFIERS AND WERE NOT IDENTIFIED AS QA CONDITION ASSESSMENT

eDUKE POWER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE RETRIEVED CALCULATIONS PERFORMED IN 1979 WERE LACKING IN THE SIGNATURES AND OTHER AREAS DESCRIBED ABOV PLANNED ACTION eCALCULATIONS ARE BEING RE-PERFORMED, DOCUMENTED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CURRENT QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRA eCONFIRMATORY CALCULATIONS INDICATE NO CHANGES ARE NECESSARY TO.THE ORIGINALLY SPECIFIED ORIFICE SIZE e

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INADEQUATE DESIGN ANALYSIS EFW MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM FLOWS UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269,.270, 287/86-16-18 SSFI REFERENCE PARAGRAPHS 2.3.2/3.4.8(2)

SUMMARY OF FINDING eCALCULATION OF BEST-ESTIMATE EFW FLOWS CONTAINED ERRORS:

-FRICTION FACTOR OF 0.015 INSTEAD OF 0.016 LOCAL DISCREPANCIES IN PIPING GEOMETRY MODE TILTING DISC CHECK INSTEAD OF SWING CHECK VALV DUKE ASSESSMENT eDUKE ACKNOWLEDGES THESE DETAIL ERRORS WERE PRESEN eNEGLIGIBLE EFFECT ON CONCLUSIONS OF THE CALCULATIONJ CORRECTED ANALYSIS YIELDED FLOW RATE DIFFERENCE OF NO MORE THAN 1.2% -- WELL WITHIN ACCURACY OF METHO eCALCULATION INCORPORATED ACTUAL, MEASURED OPERATING DATA WHICH IMPROVED THE ACCURACY OF OVERALL FLOW MODE ACTION TAKEN eCALCULATION WAS REVISED AND CORRECTED DURING AUDI F'

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INADEQUATE DESIGN ANALYSIS KE0 WEE' DYNAMIC ANALYSIS UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-18 SSFI REFERENCE PARAGRAPHS 2.3.2(1)/3.4.8(3)

SUMMARY OF FINDING

• FOCUSED ON A 1980 DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE MOTOR STARTING CAPABILITY OF THE STANDBY POWER SUPPLY FED THROUGH THE UNDERGROUND FEEDER FROM KE0 WEE HYDRO STATION FOR A NON-LOCA LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVEN * ANALYSIS WAS CONSIDERED DEFICIENT IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

(A) DID NOT INCLUDE IMPEDANCES FROM THE 600 VOLT BUSSES TO THE TERMINALS OF 600 VOLT LOAD (B) REACTOR BUILDING COOLING UNIT FAN B WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSI (C) ANALYSIS WAS NOT TREATED AS A DESIGN CALCULATION AND WAS NOT CHECKED OR DESIGN VERIFIE ASSESSMENT

• CABLE IMPEDANCE TO 600V LOADS WAS NOT CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS AND THUS WAS NOT EXPLICITLY CONSIDERE * RBCU FAN B IS NOT A NORMALLY RUNNING LOhD AND WOULD NOT BE AUTOMATICALLY STARTED UPON A NON-LOCA TRANSFER TO THE KE0 WEE SOURC * DUKE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ANALYSIS WAS NOT TREATED AS A DESIGN CALCULATION AND WAS NOT SIGNED AS BEING CHECKED OR DESIC" VERIFIE .

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ACTIONS TAKEN

• THE DYNAMIC ANALYSIS WAS REPERFORMED USING THE ORIGINAL COMPUTER MODEL TO SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE THE WORST CASE 600V LOAD CABLE IMPEDANCE AND THE RESULTS WERE ACCEPT-ABL * SINCE RBCU FAN B COULD BE RUN IN OFF NORMAL SITUATIONS, THE ANALYSIS WAS REPERFORMED USING THE ORIGINAL ~ COMPUTER MODEL ASSUMING DIFFERENT RUNNING COMBINATIONS OF FANS A, B, AND C AND THE RESULTS WERE ACCEPTABL * THE ANALYSIS WILL BE REPERFORMED USING THE ORIGINAL OR AN ALTERNATE EQUIVALENT CALCULATIONAL TECHNIQUE AND WILL BE PERFORMED, CHECKED, APPROVED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORD-ANCE WITH OUR CURRENT QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM.

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OPERABILITY OF TDEFWP ITEM 3. (UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-03)

.N R C CONCERN: THE TEAM WAS CONCERNED THAT THE UNIT 3 TDEFW PUMP DID NOT MEET TECH-NICAL SPECIFICATION OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS -

FROM JUNE 7 THROUGH JUNE 22, 198 l-l l

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS JUNE 7, 1984 0930 . PUMP FAILED PERFORMANCE TEST ON FIRST ATTEMP . DECLARED INOPERABLE (SRO LOG)

1O45 . PUMP ACHIEVED PROPER SPEED AND DISCHARGE PRESSURE BUT GOVERNOR WAS SLUGGIS . TDEFWP PASSED PERFORMANCE TES DECLARED OPERABL .. R & R ISSUED ON MAIN STEAM SUPPLY TO TDEFW TDEFWP LINED UP TO AUXILIARY STEAM SUPPL JUNE 7 THROUGH JUNE 13

. MAINTENANCE PERFORMED ON 3MS-87 (MAIN STEAM SUPPLY)

JUNE 13 1539 . TDEFWP TESTED SUCCESSFULLY, '

BUT NOTICEABLY SLO WORK REQUEST ISSUED TO INVESTI-GATE SLUGGISH l. RESPONS . CLEARED R & REALIGNED MAIN STEAM SUPPLY TO TDEFW JUNE 22 L356 . TDEFWP MAINTENANCE, GOVERNOR l CLEANED, AND TESTIN . TDEFWP DECLARED INOPERABLE ( (SRO LOG)

2300 . SUCCESSFUL PUMP TES TDEFWP DECLARED OPERABLE ON BOTH MAIN AND AUXILIARY STEAM SUPPLIE .

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SUMMARY:

. PROBLEMS WITH TDEFWP RESPONSE WERE ENCOUNTERE . MAINTENANCE WAS PERFORMED TO SYSTEMATICALLY CORRECT SUSPECTED PROBLEM . TESTING WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY PROPER OPERATION AFTER MAINTENANC . TDEFWP WAS DECLARED OPERABLE /

INOPERABLE AS APPROPRIATE (NOTED IN SRO/RO LOGS) FOLLOWING EVALUATION BY ENGINEERIN CONCLUSION:

THE UNIT 3 TDEFW PUMP WAS OPERABLE AS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND MAINTENANCE WAS SYSTEMATICALLY

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INADEQUATE TESTING OF BATTERIES UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-12 SSFI REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 3. SUMMARY OF FINDING

• TECH SPEC 4.6.10 REQUIRES AN ANNUAL ONE-HOUR DISCHARGE SERVICE TES * AUDITORS INTERPRETATION WOULD REQUIRE A STEPPED DISCHARGE CURRENT l-HOUR PROFILE IN LIEU OF CONSTANT CURRENT l-HOUR TEST PRESENTLY USED BY DUK BACKGROUND

• DUKE'S INTENT WAS TO VERIFY BATTERY CAPABILITY BY DEMON-STRATING ADEQUATE STORED ENERGY CAPACITY (AMPERE-HOURS).

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• TECH SPECS ARE COMPLICATED BY DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENT '

CAPACITY CATEGORIE * TECH SPEC 3.7 BASES LISTS DC SYSTEM CAPACITIES UNDER TWO CATEGORIES:

(A) WITH AC POWER (IN AMPS)

(B) WITHOUT AC POWER (IN AMPERE-HOURS)

• FSAR CHAPTER 8 (SECTION 8.3.2.2) REITERATES TEST INTEN ASSESSMENT

• WE BELIEVE OUR TESTING PROGRAM INTENT IS SUPPORTED IN OUR LICENSING DOCUMENTATIO /> WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT USING A STEPPED DISCHARGE CURRENT l-HOUR PROFILE IS A TECHNICALLY SUPERIOR TEST METHO PLANNED ACTIONS

• WE PLAN TO REVIEW OUR TEST PROGRAM, TECH SPECS, AND RECENT INP0 GUIDANCE TO IDENTIFY DESIRABLE CHANGES TO OUR PRESENT TEST METHODS AND TECH SPEC .

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4.6.10 Annually, a one hour discharge service test at the required maximum load shall be made on the instrument and control botteries, the Keowee batteries, and the switching station batterie .6.11 Monthly, the operability of the individual diode monitors in the Instru-ment and Control Power System shall be verified by imposing a simulated diode failure signal on the monito .6.12 Semiannually, the peak inverse voltage capability of.each auctioneering diode in the 125 VDC Instrument and Control Power System shall be measured and recorde Bases The Keowee Hydro units, in addition to serving as the emergency power sources for the Oconee Nuclear Station, are power generating sources for the Duke system requirements. As power generating units, they are operated frequently, normally on a daily basis at loads equal to or greater than required by Table 8.5 of the FSAR for ESF bus loads. Normal as well as emergency startup and operation of these units will be from the Oconee Unit I and 2 Control Roo The frequent starting and loading of these units to meet Duke syntem power requirements assures the continuous availability for emergency power for the Oconee auxiliaries and engineered safety features equipment. It will be verified that these units will carry the equipment of the maximum safeguards load within 25 seconds, including instrumentation lag, after a simulated re-quirement for engineered safety features. To further assure the rel~iability of these units as emergency power sources, they will be, as specified, tested for automatic start on a monthly basis from the Oconee control room. These tests will include verification that each unit can be synchronized to the 230 kV bus and that each unit can energize the 13.8 kV underground feede The interval specified for testing of transfer to emergency power sources is based on maintaining maximum availability of redundant power source Starting a Lee Station gas turbine, separation of the 100 kV line from the remainder of the system, and charging of the 4160 volt main feeder buses are specified to assure the continuity and operability of this equipment. The one hour time limit is considered the absolute maximum time limit that would be required to accomplish thi REFERENCE FSAR Section 8

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' if furnished by the underground circuit or 30 .Wa (limited by CTI or C 2) if furnished through the 230 kV off-stte transmission lines. Capacity availacie from the backup 100 kV off-site transmission line (Lee Station Gas Turo ne Generator) is 20 .Wa (limited by CTS).

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Thus, the minimum available capacity from any one of the multiple sources of

AC power, 20 .Wa, is adequat .

The adequacy of the Oconee electrical distribution system voltages has been evaluated. Under the conservative assumptions of the analysis, it has been established that at single startup transformer should not be snarea between i two operating units. In he event a startup transformer becomes inoperable, it effectively causes one onsite emergency power path to the affected unit

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to become inoperable. The time frames for the degraded mode of an inoperable startup transformer are thus consistent with those for an inoperable onsite emergency power path. Because the preferred mode of unit shutdown is with

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reactor coolant pumps providing forced circulation and because of the low likelihood of an accident during a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period, the unit which is being shut down is allowed to share a startup transformer with another unit unt:.l .

i the unit is in cold shutdown with loads being powered from the standby buses, i

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Canacity of DC Systems

! Normally, for each unit AC power is rec'tified and supplies the DC system bus'es as well as keeping the storage batteries on these buses in a enarged state. Upon9

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~ loss of this normal AC source of power, each unit's DC auxiliary systeem important to reactor safety have adequate stored capacity (ampere-hours) to indepencently L., supply their required emergency loads for at least one hour. One nour is consideTed to be conservative since there are redundant sources of AC power providing energy to these DC auxiliary systems. The loss of all AC power to any DC system is ex .

pected to occur very infrequently, and for very short periods of ti=e. *hefollcwin{

tabulation demonstrates the margin of installed battery charger rating and bacte-capacity when compared to one hour of operation (a) with AC power (in amos) and k I without Ac power (in ampere hours) for each of the three safety-related DC systems J l ' installed at acones;

_ VDC Instrumentation and Control Power System Charger XCA, IC3, or ICS amos each Battery XCA or XCB Capacity Cb . 600 ampere-coursesen]

(X = 1, 2, or 3)

Combined total connected loads Inrush (2 see) - 1160 amps on both 125 VDC I & C buses XDCA and IDC3 next 59 :nin. - 506 amps during ist hour of LOCA Q.~516.9 ampere-hour

. . - - (x = 1, 2, or 3) VDC Switching Station Power System Charger S'T-1, ST-2, or ST-s Rating amps each I

Battery ST-1 or SY-2 Capacity { .4ampeie-hours]

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Active load per battery Inrush (2 seconds) - 130 sep:

during ist hour of LOCA next 59 min. - 10 smos 3.7-8 A 127/127/124 3/2/84

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{ j VDC Keowee Station Power System Charger No. 1, No. 2 or Standby Rating ===s each

- Battery No. 1 or No. 2 Capacity ( ampere

Active load per battery Inrush (14 seconds) - 1031 amps during ist hour of LOCA n=vt 59 min. .179.4 amps l

Q 193.6 ampere-nouu Redundancy of AC Systems .

There are three 4160 V engineered safety feature switchgear buses p'er unit. Each.

bus can receive power from either of the two 4160 V main feeder buses per unit.

1 Each feeder bus in turn can receive power from the 230 kV switchyard enrougn the startup transformers, through the unit auxiliary transformer by' bacxfeeding through the sain step-up transformer, or from the 4160V standby bus. Another unit's start-

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,up transformer serving as an alternate supply can be placed in service in one hou The standby bus can receive power from the hydro station through *the underground

- feeder circuit or from a combustion turbine generator at the Lee Steam Station

over an isolated 100 kV transmission line. The 230 kV switchyard can receive power from the on-site Keovee hydro station or free several off-site sources -via transmission lines which connect the Oconee Station with the Duke Power system power distribution networ ,

! Redundancy of DC System

< VDC Instrumentation and Contr,ol Power System-L I The 125 VDC Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Power System consists of two

batteries, three battery chargers, and two I&C distribution centers per unit. All reactor protection and engineered safety features loads on this system can be powered from either the Unit 1 and Unit 2 or Unit 2 and i Unit 3 or Unit 3 and Unit 1 125 VDC I&C distribution centers. The 125 VDC I&C distribution centers are normally supplied fros ,their associated battery and charger. For one unit, in the event that only one of its bat-

teries and associated chargers are operable, both I&C distribution centers

will be tied together allowing operation of the DC loads from the unit's j operable battery and charger. As shown above, one IEC battery (e.g., ICA)

i can supply both I&C distribution centers (e.g. , IDCA and IDC3) and .their

associated panelboard loads. Also, one of the three battery chargers for I each unit can supply all connected EST.and reactor protection loads,

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i In order to find and correct a DC ground on the 125 VDC Instrumentation and Control systes each unit's DC system must be separated from the other

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two units. This is due to the interconnected design of the syste With the backup function disabled the units would be in a degraded mode but l

would in fact have all of its own DC system available if needed. Each unit's batteries either CA or CB is capable of carrying all tne 125 VDC Instrumentation and Control loads on that uni ,

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i A 127/127/124 3.7-9 3/2/84

- . .- . - . _ . _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _

- . - . . . - _ _ _ - ._- ._ *

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- Each battery is sized to carry the continuous emergency load for a period of one hour in addition to supplying power for the operation of momentary loads during the one hour perio In normal operation the batteries are floated on the buses, and assume load without interruption on loss of a battery charger or ac power sourc _

_

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([The lead-acid batteries are tested to prove their ampere-hour capacit Inservice periodic checks of the status of each cell is made through battery

,

hydrometer log readings and cell voltage. Temp.rature readings are used to .

adjust hydrometer readings.

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8.3.2. Single Failure Analysis of the 125 Volt DC Instrumentation and

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Control Power System

,

i As shown in Table 8.3-3, the 125 Volt DC Instrumentation and Control Power System is arranged such that a single fault within either system does not

! preclude the Reactor Protective System, Engineered Safeguards Protective

! System, and the engineered safeguards equipment from performing their safety function .3.2. Single Failure Analyses of the 125 Volt DC Keowee Station Power System The 125 Volt DC Keowee Station Power System is arranged such that a single fault within either unit's system does not preclude the other unit from perform-l ing its intended function of supplying emergency powe .3.2. Single Failure Analysis of the 120 Volt Vital Power Buses The 120 Volt Vital Power System is arranged such that any type of single failure or fault will not preclude the Reactor Protective System, Engineered Safeguards Protective System, and engineered safeguards equipment from perform-ing their safety function There are four independent buses available to each unit, and single failure within the system can involve only one bus. A single failure analysis is presented in Table 8.3- .3-29

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INOPERABLE KE0 WEE BATTERIES UNRESOLVED ITEM 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-13 SSFI REFERENCE PARAGRAPHS 2.1.7(:2)/3.4.2(1)

SUMMARY OF FINDING-

• KE0 WEE BATTERIES WERE REPLACED IN FALL OF 1985 WITH NEW GHB BRAND BATTERIE * GNB SEISMIC QUALIFICATION REQUIRES THE END CELL TO END STRINGER SPACING TO BE LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 1/4" OR SPACER MATERIAL TO BE ADDED cr0 REDUCE THE FREE GAP TO'

LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 1/4". '

• KE0 WEE BATTERIES HAD FREE GAP SPACING GREATER THAN 1/4" WITH NO SPACER MATERIAL INSTALLE BACKGROUND

,

• GNB ORIGINAL DRAWINGS HAD NO END CELL TO END STRINGER FREE GAP REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIE * DUE TO MCGUIRE AND CATAWBA EXPERIENCE, THIS WAS QUESTIONED BY DUKE AND A DRAWING REVISION WAS MADE BY GN * SPACER MATERIAL WAS NOT ADDED IN THE FIELD DUE TO DUKE PERSONNEL ERROR IN TRANSMITTING THE DRAWING FOR IMPLEMENTA-TIO ASSESSMENT

• AN ANALYSIS OF THE BATTERY SEISMIC CAPABILITY WITHOUT THE SPACER MATERIAL INSTALLED WAS PERFORMED BY DUKE WHICH DE-TERMINED THE INSTALLATION WAS ADEQUATE TO WITHSTAND A MAXIMUM HYPOTHETICAL EARTHQUAKE WITHOUT LOSS OF FUNCTIONJ

• THE TRANSMITTAL ERROR WAS DETERMINED TO BE AN ISOLATED INCIDEN ACTION TAKEN

• UPON DISCOVERY, PROMPT ACTION WAS TAKEN BY DUKE TO INSTALL THE SPACER MATERIA _ _ _ . _ .

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CHECK VALVE TESTING ITEMS 3. AND 3. UNRESOLVED ITEMS 50-269, 270, 287/86-16-07 & 08 ASME SECTION XI IWV REQUIREMENT: TO VERIFY OPERATIONAL READI-NESS FOR VALVES WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO PERFORM A SPECIFIC FUNCTION IN SHUT-TING DOWN A REACTOR TO COLD SHUTDOWN OR IN MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN *

ACCIDEN

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CHECK VALVE TESTING C-568 NRC CONCERN: FULL CYCLING AND FLOW VERIFICATION OF CHECK VALVES 2C-568 AND 3C-568 WERE NOT PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVI-SIONS OF ASME CODE, SECTION X SUBSECTION IWV AS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4. NO RELIEF FOR THESE VALVES WAS REQUESTED IN THE OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRA I-i l

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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4 372> 373 FE-153 315 317

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> FEEDWATER 313 v l CCW-269 C-153 k (C-160 {NjCW

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AUX. SERVICE WATER

$,[C-163 I h93 PUNP (SHARED)

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UNii 2 2 3 (- \/95 + EMERGENCY FEE '

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UPPER SURGE *FEEDWATERf332 TO N N hI- g g_ 318 TANK 8 SYSTEN 442 g 346 347 233 96 314n' I (SSF)

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PRIOR TO INSTALLATION OF EXTENDED MDEFWP SUCTION LINE

-

C-568 WAS NOT ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT

- WHEN ADDED IT WAS NOT CONSIDERED A PART OF THE IIP

-

UNDESIRABLE FLOW PATH

. LOSS OF VACUUM

. SMALL VOLUME OF WATER AVAILABLE

. POTENTIAL PUMP DAMAGE

-

PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE TO AVOID USING THIS PAT PROCEDURE PREFERS TDEFWP FOR HOTWELL SUCTIO DUE TO THE HIGH PROBABILITY OF PUMP DAMAGE DUE TO LOSS OF SUCTION WHILE TESTING, A CONSCIOUS DECISION WAS MADE NOT TO PERFORM FLOW VERIFICA-TION ON C-568.

,  !-

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POST INSTALLATION TESTING

- MODIFICATION TO THE MDEFW PUMP SUCTION FROM THE HOTWELL

. #1, MARCH 1986

. #2, SEPTEMBER 1986

. #3, OCTOBER 1986 l -

C-568 WAS TESTED FOLLOWING MODI-FICATIONS

'

. #1, APRIL 9

. #2, OCTOBER 12

. #3, OCTOBER 15

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POST INSTALLATION TESTING (CONTINUED)  ;

1

-

C-568 ADDED TO IIP FOLLOWING TEST-ING AS REQUIRED BY THE INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM WITHIN 60 DAYS OF THE END OF THE REFUELING OUTAGE CONCLUSION

-

AT THE TIME OF SSFI, UNIT 1 C-568 HAD BEEN TESTED AND ADDED TO IIP

-

PLANS WERE IN PLACE TO ADD 2C-568 AND 3C-568 TO IIP WHEN MODIFICATION WAS COMPLETE

-

OCONEE HAS BEEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF IWV FOR VALVES C-568

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CHECK VALVE TESTING MS-83 AND MS-85 NRC CONCERN: MS-83 AND MS-85 ARE NOT PERIODICALLY TESTED IN THE REVERSE FLOW DIREC-TIO LOW . STEAM FLOWS HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO CAUSE

.

DEGRADATION OF CHECK VALVES IN SIMILAR APPLI-CATIONS (IEN 86-09).

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PUMP TURBINE N

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EXHAUST TO CONDENSER LEGEND

C><3 NORMALLY OPEN

> 4 NORHALLY CLOSED FLOW INDICATOR l ELECTRIC

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[>lTILTING DISC CHECK VALVE t

[X] SHUT 0FF VALVE LEVEL INDICATOR

'

N SWING CHECK VALVE FIGURE 1,.

I STFAM SilPPIY FOR TURRINE DRIVEN EFW PUMP (UNI T 1. )

'

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PROVISIONS FOR REVERSE FLOW TESTING WERE NOT PROVIDED IN ORIGINAL DESIG IE INFORMATION NOTICE 86-09 WAS REVIEWED BY DESIGN ENGINEERING AND FOUND NOT TO BE A SIGNIFICANT CONCERN AT OCONE MS-83 AND MS-85 ARE TESTED (FORWARD FLOW) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE I INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM.

' -

COST OF MODIFICATION REQUIRED FOR REVERSE FLOW TESTING IS NOT WARRANTED COMPARED TO BENEFITS GAINED BY THE ABILITY TO TEST FOR BACK FLO l-

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