ML20133C748
| ML20133C748 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1985 |
| From: | Blake J, Economos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133C725 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-85-27, 50-270-85-27, 50-287-85-27, NUDOCS 8510070500 | |
| Download: ML20133C748 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1985027
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.
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Report Nos.:
50-269/85-27, 50-270/85-27, and 50-287/85-27
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
' Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287
License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and
OPR-55
Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2, and 3
Inspection
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September 3-6, 1985
Inspec]tr:
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Date Signed
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Appro d by:
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J y'.'Blake, Section Chief
[Jate Signed
ngfineering Branch
ivision of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 32 inspector-hours in the
areas of Unit 3 inservice inspection (ISI), work observation, main feedwater
flow-nozzle ' modification, closing of open items, and high pressure injection
(HPI) thermal sleeve examination, and reactor -coolant pump bearing house bolt
failures.
Results:
Three violations were identified - Failure to use properly qualified
weld procedure, paragraph 5.b; Failure to obtain final QA approval ' on RC pump
replacement bolts prior to Unit 2 startup, paragraph 5.a; Use of the filler metal
which had not been tested per requirements of the requisition, paragraph 5.c.
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8510070500 851001
7R
ADOCK 05000269
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager
- T. B. Owen, Superintendent, Maintenance
J. N. Pope, Superintendent, Operations
- R. J. Brackett, Senior Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer
B. Millsaps, Mechanical Technical Support Engineer
W. R. Hunt, ISI (Inservice Inspection) Coordinator
B. Carneff, Mechanical Technical Support Engineer
C. R. Hensen, Welding /NDE (Nondestructive Examination) Inspector QC
(Quality Control)
"T. C. Matthews, Compliance
E. Few, Engineering Speciali,st
Other Organization
Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), Special Products and Integrated Field Services
H. E. Stopplemann, ISI Coordinator
NRC Resident Inspectors
- J. C. Bryant, Senior Resident Inspector
- K. Sasser, Resident Inspector
- L. King, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 6,1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
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(0 pen) Violation 269, 270, 287/85-27-01, Failure to use properly qualified
welding procedure, paragraph 5b.
(0 pen) Violation 269, 270, 287/85-27-02, Use of filler metal which had not
been tested per code requirements, paragraph Sc.
(0 pen) Violation 270/85-27-03, Failure to obtain QA approval on RC pump
replacement studs, prior to Unit 2 startup, paragraph Sa.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item 287/85-27-04, ISI Radiographs, area of interest
coverage, paragraph 7.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
(Closed) Violation 270/85-06-01, Failure to implement design specification
requirements.
The licensee's letter of response dated May 23, 1985, has been reviewed and
determined acceptable by Region II. The inspector held discussions with the
Technical Support Engineer and examined the corrective actions as stated in
the letter of response.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had
determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance, performed the
necessary followup actions to correct the present conditions, and developed
the necessary corrective conditions. The corrective actions identified in
the letter of response have been implemented.
(Closed) UNR 270/85-10-03:
Documentation concerning reactor coolant pump
studs. This item is closed as a result of being upgraded to violation as
discussed in paragraph Sa of this report.
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4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations.
A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is
discussed in paragraph 7.
5.
_ Independent Inspection Effort (92706, 62700)
a.
Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Stud Procurement
Report 270/85-10 described in detail the concerns over the completeness
and accuracy of quality records associated with certain replacement
studs procured from Rocky Mountain Nuclear (RMN) of Salt Lake City,
Utah for the Unit 2 reactor coolant pump (s).
The course of events, as described in the aforementioned report,
indicate that on March 15, 1985, the licensee's general office (GO)
vendor QA section gave Oconee site QA a verbal release for use of the
RCP studs, event though a documentation problem had been identified in
which the QA paperwork did not contain the required statement that weld
repair had not been done on the stud material.
The GO had verified
with RMN that the documents could be corrected.
Oconee QA then
released the studs for installation after completion of visual and UT
examination.
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Discussion with the site senior QA Engineer disclosed that on March 13,
1985, General Office (GO) QA released the studs on a conditional basis.
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Following this action, the report states that on April 17, GO QA
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notified site QA of a continuing problem with RMN paperwork and that
a GO vendor audit of RMN would be conducted on April 22.
Since the
problem appeared to be in the paperwork, the QA department decided not
to delay Unit 2 startup and returned it to power on April 20, 1985,
even though QA had not issued a final approval on the quality records.
Based on results of the April 22 audit of RMN, the QA department
initiated a nonconforming item report (NCIR) to document what then
appeared to be problems of a more serious nature than previously
thought (See Report 270/85-10 paragraph 14). On April 24, 1985, the
apparent QA records problem was resolved through a Duke engineering
evaluation which determined the studs to be acceptable. This is being
documented in a Duke evaluation report.
The decision to declare the RC pump operable prior to final QA approval
appears to be in violation of Duke Power Company's QA Manual, Duke-1,
as implemented by the 'QA Department Quality Control (QC) procedures
manual, procedure QCG-1, step 4.4.1.c, which states, items shall be
verbally released when the required documents are not present on-site,
but are located within the Duke system.
Also paragraph
4.5,
of the same procedure, states that items
conditionally released shall be tagged with a " hold" tag and may be
installed, but shall not be declared operable until the conditional
release is cleared.
This failure to accomplish activities in accordance with prescribed
procedures is in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V as
implemented by Duke-1-A Section 17.2.5.
This violation was identified
as 270/85-27-03. Failure to obtain QA approval on RC pump replacement
studs prior to Unit 2 startup.
b.
Main Feedwater Flow Nozzle Installation, Unit 3
At the time of this inspection welding of the new main feedwater flow
nozzle was complete. The inspector observed the completed welds 1A and
IB on ISO-46 and, 1C and ID on 150-48. This portion of the system has
been designated as Class G ANSI B31.1.
These four pipe welds,
measuring 24" diameter by 1.218 " thickness, were visually examined to
ascertain whether they conformed to applicable code and procedural
specification requirements
including:
weld surface finish and
appearance, weld reinforcement shape and size, removal of temporary
attachments, arc strikes and spatter, absence of wall thinning because
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of finish grinding and presence of rejectable surface defects
associated with fabrication.
In addition, the inspector reviewed
related weld cards for: completeness and accuracy, assignment of Field
Weld Data Sheets, welder and QC inspector identification, filler metal
used, preheat /interpass temperature requirements and documentation.
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The welds were scheduled for postweld heat treatment as required by the
applicable code.
This review disclosed the following:
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(1) The welds were fabricated by using the Tungsten Arc Inert Gas
(TIG) process for the root portion of the weld and the Shield
Metal Arc (SMA) process to weld out the remainder of the joint.
The Field Weld Data Sheets, which identify the parameters of the
applicable weld procedure, qualified to ASME Code Section IX
requirements, were L-246 Rev. 2 for the TIG portion and L-318,
Rev. 8 for the SMA portion of the welds.
ANSI B31.1 paragraph
133.1 requires that weld procedures be qualified in accordance
with all applicable ASME Code Section IX requirements including
conditions of post weld heat treatment.
Section IX of the code
paragraph QW-407.2 requires that the procedure qualification test
shall be subjected to heat treatment . essentially equivalent to
that encountered in the heat treatment of base metals and in the
fabrication of the weldments.
Contrary to these requirements,
Field Weld Data Sheets L-246, Rev. 2 used to deposit the root
portion of these welds showed that no post weld heat treatment had
been applied to the weld procedure qualification test.
In a previous inspection documented in Report 270/85-06, a similar
problem was identifled.
At that time a failure to , implement
inspections, required by the invoked code, resulted in violation
270/85-06-01.
This failure to implement quality as required by the applicable
code (s) and regulatory requirements is in violation of 10 CFR 50.55a and the applicable ANSI /ASME Codes. This violation was
identified as 269, 270, 287/85-27-01, Failure to use properly
qualified weld procedure.
c.
Review of Filler Metal Quality Records Unit 3.
Quality records of filler metal wire and weld electrodes used to
fabricate the main feedwater flow nozzles welds discussed in paragraph
5.b. of this report were reviewed for conformance with applicable
ASME/SFA and procurement requirements.
Applicable requirements for
this material included ASME Section II Specifications SFA 5.1 and SFA
5.18 and ASME Section III, Subsection NB paragraph NB-2400 Weld Metal
Tests. This work effort was performed for the following materials.
Purchase
Heat No.
Type
Size
Order No.
2B504A002
E7018
3/32
M19116
2K103Y01
E7018
1/8
H6300
F-5512
ER-702-S
1/8
852205
47402
ER-702-S
3/32
K32056
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Within these areas the inspector noted that material received on
requisition number 852205 did not conform to requirements stipulated by
the requisition.
These requirements stated that this material must
meet the requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NB, paragraph
2400 ...and shall meet the tests specified therein ... mechanical test
coupons should be tested in the as welded condition and after postweld
heat treatment (PWHT) at 1150 F . . . NB-2431.1(c) states that weld test
coupons shall be tested in the applicable PWHT condition when the
production welds are to be postweld heat treated. The inspector noted
that the material was transferred to Oconee from the Catawba Nuclear
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Plant - Construction where the licensee stated that it had been used in
non PWHT applications.
Contrary to the above, the inspector determined that filler metal in
question, had been receipt inspected, QA approved and issued to the
field for PWHT applications without meeting NB-2400 requirements in
that no weld coupons had been tested in the heat treated condition.
Moreover this material had been used to fabricate the welds discussed
in paragraph 5.b. of this report, which were schedule for PWHT.
A similar situation was identified during an earlier inspection. The
finding was discussed with the licensee's representative who issued
nonconforming report 0-730 dated 2/3/82 to investigate and take
appropriate corrective action. This failure to accomplish activities
in accordance with prescribed procedures is in violation of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V as implemented by Duke-1-A Section 17.2-5.
This violation was identified as 269, 270, 287/85-27-02. Use of filler
metal which had not been tested per Code requirements.
d.
Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing House Bolt Failure, Unit 3
During this outage, the licensee performed the scheduled overhaul of
reactor coolant pump (RCP) 3A2. Coincident with this work effort, the
licensee inspected the bearing house bolts to determine whether bolt
failures experienced at the Rancho Seco plant had occurred here also.
The inspection determined that all the heads of the 16 bolts on the
upper half of the bearing housing had broken off, while on the lower
half, five of the sixteen bolt heads had broken off in the same
location.
The broken bolt heads were found as small round balls
trapped in the small annulus between the thermal barrier and the
stuffing box. The downward force from the circulating coolant water
kept the loose heads confined to this locating and tumbling action
changed their morphology to balls / spheres. The dimensions of the upper
bolts were 3/8" x 3 1/2" and those of the lower were 1/2" x 1 1/2" the
bolts were made of either 304 or 316 stainless steel material.
Discussions with the licensee disclosed the failed bolts were the
originals and, that this was the first time this section of the pump
had been disassembled.
Also the licensee indicated that a number of
these bolts had been sent to B&W's Lynchburg Research Center for
failure analysis. Although the bearing surface of the bearing housing
assembly (BHA) showed only slight wear e.g. 0.001," the BHA was sent to
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Bingham for reboring and redesigning of existing bolt holes to permit
the use' of recessed,1/2" socket head bolts. The licensee expects to
use new bolts made of SA-453 high strength material.
The licensee
indicated that because the original stuffing box showed considerable
-wear which could not be repaired prior to startup, it was decided to
replace it with a new one purchased from the Three Mile Island (TMI)
plant. The licensee has agreed to issue a report on this matter, which
will describe in detail the reason for not disassembling and repairing
the other RCP in this unit before returning to power. More details on
this matter is discussed in Region II report 50-287/85-26.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work Activities (Unit 3)
The inspector observed the ISI activities described below to determine
whether these activities were being performed in accordance with regulatory
requirements and licensee procedures.
The applicable code for the ISI is
the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,1980 Edition, with
Addenda through the Winter of 1980.
The inspector observed UT examination of the following welds:
Pressurizer
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B02.011.005
Upper Head to Shell
35 scan and calibration
802.012.001
Longitudinal
35 scan and calibration
Once through Steam Generator "B"
CO2.021.003
Outlet Nozzle W-X Axis
45 and 60 scan
C02.022.003
Outlet Nozzle W-X Axis
45 and 60 scan
The inspections were compared with applicable procedures in the following
areas:
(1) Availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedures
(2) Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel
(3) Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level
(4) Recording of inspection results
(5) Type of apparatus used
(6) Extent of coverage of volume
(7) Calibration requirements
(8) Search units
(9) Beam angles
(10) DAC curves
(11) Reference level for monitoring discontinuities
(12) Method for demonstrating penetration
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(13) Limits for evaluating and recording indications
(14) Recording significant indications
(15) Acceptance limits
Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.
7.
Inservice Inspection, Data Review and Evaluation, Unit 3 (73755)
Records of completed nondestructive examinations were selected and reviewed
to ascertain whether the methods technique and extent of the examination
complied with the ISI plant and applicable NDE procedures; findings were
properly recorded and evaluated by qualified personnel; programmatic
deviations were recorded as required; personnel instruments, calibrations
blocks and NDE material s (penetrants, couplets) were designated and
qualifications / certifications were on file.
The. applicable code for this
activity was discussed in the paragraph above.
Records selected for this
review were as follows:
Radiographs
C05.021.354
3-01A-23-01
36" x 1.164" pipe to Ell
C05.021.384
3-01A-9-16
12" x 0.562" Pipe to Valve
C05.021.367
3-01A-13-18
12.75" x 0.562" Pipe to, Ell
C05.021.301
3-03-31-16A
24" x 1.218" Pipe to Valve
C05.021.374
3-01A-24-08
24" x 0.969" Reducer to Pipe
C05.021.356
3-01A-23-09
24" x 0.969 Reducer to Pipe
- E04.001.004
3PD B2-47
3 1/2 x .75 Thermal Sleeve
- E04-001.003
3PD B1-47
3 1/2 x .75 Thermal Sleeve
- E04-001.001A
3PD A1-47
3 1/2 x .75 Thermal Sleeve
- Radiographs showed both thermal sleeves were in position.
Within these areas, the inspector noted the following:
The area of interest did not appear to be adequately covered in welds
C05.021-301 and C05.021.374.
In this situation, the applicable code
requires the volumetric examination to include the base metal adjacent to
the weld for a distance of 1/2 inch beyond the edge of the weld joint.
However, the film review showed that weld locations 0-1, 4-5 and 5-0 on weld
C05.021.301 did not appear to meet this requirement. The same appeared to
be true for locations 0-1 and 2-3 on weld C05.021.374.
Following this
inspection, the licensee telephoned the inspector to report that field
measurements showed the locations in question had been adequately covered.
The apparent discrepancy resulted from the inability to accurately locate
the edge of the weld on the radiograph. The inspector informed the licensee
that this matter would be identified as unresolved item 287/85-27-04, ISI
Radiographs, Area of Interest Coverage, until the aforementioned measure-
ments can be verified on a future inspection.
Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.
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