ML20133C748

Insp Repts 50-269/85-27,50-270/85-27 & 50-287/85-27 on 850903-06.Violations Noted:Failure to Use Qualified Weld Procedures & to Obtain Final QA Approval on Reactor Coolant Pump Replacement Bolts Prior to Startup

ML20133C748
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	09/24/1985
From:	Blake J, Economos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133C725	List: ML20133C722 ML20133C735 ML20133C748
References
50-269-85-27, 50-270-85-27, 50-287-85-27, NUDOCS 8510070500
Download: ML20133C748 (8)

See also: IR 05000269/1985027

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Report Nos.: 50-269/85-27, 50-270/85-27, and 50-287/85-27

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

' Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and

OPR-55

Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2, and 3

Inspection ~

e d.- September 3-6, 1985

Inspec]tr:

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a N. os Date Signed

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Appro d by: _

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J y'.'Blake, Section Chief [Jate Signed

ngfineering Branch

ivision of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 32 inspector-hours in the

areas of Unit 3 inservice inspection (ISI), work observation, main feedwater

flow-nozzle ' modification, closing of open items, and high pressure injection

(HPI) thermal sleeve examination, and reactor -coolant pump bearing house bolt

failures.

Results: Three violations were identified - Failure to use properly qualified

weld procedure, paragraph 5.b; Failure to obtain final QA approval ' on RC pump

replacement bolts prior to Unit 2 startup, paragraph 5.a; Use of the filler metal

which had not been tested per requirements of the requisition, paragraph 5.c.

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8510070500 851001

7R ADOCK 05000269

PDR

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager

• T. B. Owen, Superintendent, Maintenance

J. N. Pope, Superintendent, Operations

• R. J. Brackett, Senior Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer

B. Millsaps, Mechanical Technical Support Engineer

W. R. Hunt, ISI (Inservice Inspection) Coordinator

B. Carneff, Mechanical Technical Support Engineer

C. R. Hensen, Welding /NDE (Nondestructive Examination) Inspector QC

(Quality Control)

"T. C. Matthews, Compliance

E. Few, Engineering Speciali,st

Other Organization

Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), Special Products and Integrated Field Services

H. E. Stopplemann, ISI Coordinator

NRC Resident Inspectors

• J. C. Bryant, Senior Resident Inspector

• K. Sasser, Resident Inspector

• L. King, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 6,1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed

below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

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(0 pen) Violation 269, 270, 287/85-27-01, Failure to use properly qualified '

welding procedure, paragraph 5b.

(0 pen) Violation 269, 270, 287/85-27-02, Use of filler metal which had not

been tested per code requirements, paragraph Sc.

(0 pen) Violation 270/85-27-03, Failure to obtain QA approval on RC pump

replacement studs, prior to Unit 2 startup, paragraph Sa.

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(0 pen) Unresolved Item 287/85-27-04, ISI Radiographs, area of interest

coverage, paragraph 7.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

(Closed) Violation 270/85-06-01, Failure to implement design specification

requirements.

The licensee's letter of response dated May 23, 1985, has been reviewed and

determined acceptable by Region II. The inspector held discussions with the

Technical Support Engineer and examined the corrective actions as stated in

the letter of response. The inspector concluded that the licensee had

determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance, performed the

necessary followup actions to correct the present conditions, and developed

the necessary corrective conditions. The corrective actions identified in

the letter of response have been implemented.

(Closed) UNR 270/85-10-03: Documentation concerning reactor coolant pump

studs. This item is closed as a result of being upgraded to violation as

discussed in paragraph Sa of this report. ,

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or

deviations. A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is

discussed in paragraph 7.

5. _ Independent Inspection Effort (92706, 62700)

a. Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Stud Procurement

Report 270/85-10 described in detail the concerns over the completeness

and accuracy of quality records associated with certain replacement

studs procured from Rocky Mountain Nuclear (RMN) of Salt Lake City,

Utah for the Unit 2 reactor coolant pump (s).

The course of events, as described in the aforementioned report,

indicate that on March 15, 1985, the licensee's general office (GO)

vendor QA section gave Oconee site QA a verbal release for use of the

RCP studs, event though a documentation problem had been identified in

which the QA paperwork did not contain the required statement that weld

repair had not been done on the stud material. The GO had verified

with RMN that the documents could be corrected. Oconee QA then

released the studs for installation after completion of visual and UT

examination.

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Discussion with the site senior QA Engineer disclosed that on March 13,

1985, General Office (GO) QA released the studs on a conditional basis.

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Following this action, the report states that on April 17, GO QA

notified site QA of a continuing problem with RMN paperwork and that

a GO vendor audit of RMN would be conducted on April 22. Since the

problem appeared to be in the paperwork, the QA department decided not

to delay Unit 2 startup and returned it to power on April 20, 1985,

even though QA had not issued a final approval on the quality records.

Based on results of the April 22 audit of RMN, the QA department

initiated a nonconforming item report (NCIR) to document what then

appeared to be problems of a more serious nature than previously

thought (See Report 270/85-10 paragraph 14). On April 24, 1985, the

apparent QA records problem was resolved through a Duke engineering

evaluation which determined the studs to be acceptable. This is being

documented in a Duke evaluation report.

The decision to declare the RC pump operable prior to final QA approval

appears to be in violation of Duke Power Company's QA Manual, Duke-1,

as implemented by the 'QA Department Quality Control (QC) procedures

manual, procedure QCG-1, step 4.4.1.c, which states, items shall be

verbally released when the required documents are not present on-site,

but are located within the Duke system.

Also paragraph 4.5, of the same procedure, states that items

conditionally released shall be tagged with a " hold" tag and may be

installed, but shall not be declared operable until the conditional

release is cleared.

This failure to accomplish activities in accordance with prescribed

procedures is in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V as

implemented by Duke-1-A Section 17.2.5. This violation was identified

as 270/85-27-03. Failure to obtain QA approval on RC pump replacement

studs prior to Unit 2 startup.

b. Main Feedwater Flow Nozzle Installation, Unit 3

At the time of this inspection welding of the new main feedwater flow

nozzle was complete. The inspector observed the completed welds 1A and

IB on ISO-46 and, 1C and ID on 150-48. This portion of the system has

been designated as Class G ANSI B31.1. These four pipe welds,

measuring 24" diameter by 1.218 " thickness, were visually examined to

ascertain whether they conformed to applicable code and procedural

specification requirements including: weld surface finish and

appearance, weld reinforcement shape and size, removal of temporary

. attachments, arc strikes and spatter, absence of wall thinning because

of finish grinding and presence of rejectable surface defects

associated with fabrication. In addition, the inspector reviewed

related weld cards for: completeness and accuracy, assignment of Field

Weld Data Sheets, welder and QC inspector identification, filler metal

used, preheat /interpass temperature requirements and documentation.

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The welds were scheduled for postweld heat treatment as required by the

applicable code. This review disclosed the following:

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(1) The welds were fabricated by using the Tungsten Arc Inert Gas

(TIG) process for the root portion of the weld and the Shield

Metal Arc (SMA) process to weld out the remainder of the joint.

The Field Weld Data Sheets, which identify the parameters of the

applicable weld procedure, qualified to ASME Code Section IX

requirements, were L-246 Rev. 2 for the TIG portion and L-318,

Rev. 8 for the SMA portion of the welds. ANSI B31.1 paragraph

133.1 requires that weld procedures be qualified in accordance

with all applicable ASME Code Section IX requirements including

conditions of post weld heat treatment.Section IX of the code

paragraph QW-407.2 requires that the procedure qualification test

shall be subjected to heat treatment . essentially equivalent to

that encountered in the heat treatment of base metals and in the

fabrication of the weldments. Contrary to these requirements,

Field Weld Data Sheets L-246, Rev. 2 used to deposit the root

portion of these welds showed that no post weld heat treatment had

been applied to the weld procedure qualification test.

In a previous inspection documented in Report 270/85-06, a similar

problem was identifled. At that time a failure to , implement

inspections, required by the invoked code, resulted in violation

270/85-06-01.

This failure to implement quality as required by the applicable

code (s) and regulatory requirements is in violation of 10 CFR

50.55a and the applicable ANSI /ASME Codes. This violation was

identified as 269, 270, 287/85-27-01, Failure to use properly

qualified weld procedure.

c. Review of Filler Metal Quality Records Unit 3.

Quality records of filler metal wire and weld electrodes used to

fabricate the main feedwater flow nozzles welds discussed in paragraph

5.b. of this report were reviewed for conformance with applicable

ASME/SFA and procurement requirements. Applicable requirements for

this material included ASME Section II Specifications SFA 5.1 and SFA

5.18 and ASME Section III, Subsection NB paragraph NB-2400 Weld Metal

Tests. This work effort was performed for the following materials.

Purchase

Heat No. Type Size Order No.

2B504A002 E7018 3/32 M19116

2K103Y01 E7018 1/8 H6300

F-5512 ER-702-S 1/8 852205

47402 ER-702-S 3/32 K32056

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Within these areas the inspector noted that material received on

requisition number 852205 did not conform to requirements stipulated by

the requisition. These requirements stated that this material must

meet the requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NB, paragraph

2400 ...and shall meet the tests specified therein ... mechanical test

coupons should be tested in the as welded condition and after postweld

heat treatment (PWHT) at 1150 F . . . NB-2431.1(c) states that weld test

coupons shall be tested in the applicable PWHT condition when the

production welds are to be postweld heat treated. The inspector noted

4 that the material was transferred to Oconee from the Catawba Nuclear

Plant - Construction where the licensee stated that it had been used in

non PWHT applications.

Contrary to the above, the inspector determined that filler metal in

question, had been receipt inspected, QA approved and issued to the

field for PWHT applications without meeting NB-2400 requirements in

that no weld coupons had been tested in the heat treated condition.

Moreover this material had been used to fabricate the welds discussed

in paragraph 5.b. of this report, which were schedule for PWHT.

A similar situation was identified during an earlier inspection. The

finding was discussed with the licensee's representative who issued

nonconforming report 0-730 dated 2/3/82 to investigate and take

appropriate corrective action. This failure to accomplish activities

in accordance with prescribed procedures is in violation of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion V as implemented by Duke-1-A Section 17.2-5.

This violation was identified as 269, 270, 287/85-27-02. Use of filler

metal which had not been tested per Code requirements.

d. Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing House Bolt Failure, Unit 3

During this outage, the licensee performed the scheduled overhaul of

reactor coolant pump (RCP) 3A2. Coincident with this work effort, the

licensee inspected the bearing house bolts to determine whether bolt

failures experienced at the Rancho Seco plant had occurred here also.

The inspection determined that all the heads of the 16 bolts on the

upper half of the bearing housing had broken off, while on the lower

half, five of the sixteen bolt heads had broken off in the same

location. The broken bolt heads were found as small round balls

trapped in the small annulus between the thermal barrier and the

stuffing box. The downward force from the circulating coolant water

kept the loose heads confined to this locating and tumbling action

changed their morphology to balls / spheres. The dimensions of the upper

bolts were 3/8" x 3 1/2" and those of the lower were 1/2" x 1 1/2" the

bolts were made of either 304 or 316 stainless steel material.

Discussions with the licensee disclosed the failed bolts were the

originals and, that this was the first time this section of the pump

had been disassembled. Also the licensee indicated that a number of

these bolts had been sent to B&W's Lynchburg Research Center for

failure analysis. Although the bearing surface of the bearing housing

assembly (BHA) showed only slight wear e.g. 0.001," the BHA was sent to

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Bingham for reboring and redesigning of existing bolt holes to permit

the use' of recessed,1/2" socket head bolts. The licensee expects to

use new bolts made of SA-453 high strength material. The licensee

indicated that because the original stuffing box showed considerable

-wear which could not be repaired prior to startup, it was decided to

replace it with a new one purchased from the Three Mile Island (TMI)

plant. The licensee has agreed to issue a report on this matter, which

will describe in detail the reason for not disassembling and repairing

the other RCP in this unit before returning to power. More details on

this matter is discussed in Region II report 50-287/85-26.

Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.

6. Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work Activities (Unit 3)

The inspector observed the ISI activities described below to determine

whether these activities were being performed in accordance with regulatory

requirements and licensee procedures. The applicable code for the ISI is

the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,1980 Edition, with

Addenda through the Winter of 1980.

The inspector observed UT examination of the following welds:

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Pressurizer

B02.011.005 Upper Head to Shell 35 scan and calibration

802.012.001 Longitudinal 35 scan and calibration

Once through Steam Generator "B"

CO2.021.003 Outlet Nozzle W-X Axis 45 and 60 scan

C02.022.003 Outlet Nozzle W-X Axis 45 and 60 scan

The inspections were compared with applicable procedures in the following

areas:

(1) Availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedures

(2) Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel

(3) Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level *

(4) Recording of inspection results

(5) Type of apparatus used

(6) Extent of coverage of volume

(7) Calibration requirements

(8) Search units

(9) Beam angles

(10) DAC curves

(11) Reference level for monitoring discontinuities

(12) Method for demonstrating penetration

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(13) Limits for evaluating and recording indications

(14) Recording significant indications

(15) Acceptance limits

Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.

7. Inservice Inspection, Data Review and Evaluation, Unit 3 (73755)

Records of completed nondestructive examinations were selected and reviewed

to ascertain whether the methods technique and extent of the examination

complied with the ISI plant and applicable NDE procedures; findings were

properly recorded and evaluated by qualified personnel; programmatic

deviations were recorded as required; personnel instruments, calibrations

blocks and NDE material s (penetrants, couplets) were designated and

qualifications / certifications were on file. The. applicable code for this

activity was discussed in the paragraph above. Records selected for this

review were as follows:

Radiographs

C05.021.354 3-01A-23-01 36" x 1.164" pipe to Ell

C05.021.384 3-01A-9-16 12" x 0.562" Pipe to Valve

C05.021.367 3-01A-13-18 12.75" x 0.562" Pipe to, Ell

C05.021.301 3-03-31-16A 24" x 1.218" Pipe to Valve

C05.021.374 3-01A-24-08 24" x 0.969" Reducer to Pipe

C05.021.356 3-01A-23-09 24" x 0.969 Reducer to Pipe

• E04.001.004 3PD B2-47 3 1/2 x .75 Thermal Sleeve

• E04-001.003 3PD B1-47 3 1/2 x .75 Thermal Sleeve

• E04-001.001A 3PD A1-47 3 1/2 x .75 Thermal Sleeve

• Radiographs showed both thermal sleeves were in position.

Within these areas, the inspector noted the following:

The area of interest did not appear to be adequately covered in welds

C05.021-301 and C05.021.374. In this situation, the applicable code

requires the volumetric examination to include the base metal adjacent to

the weld for a distance of 1/2 inch beyond the edge of the weld joint.

However, the film review showed that weld locations 0-1, 4-5 and 5-0 on weld

C05.021.301 did not appear to meet this requirement. The same appeared to

be true for locations 0-1 and 2-3 on weld C05.021.374. Following this

inspection, the licensee telephoned the inspector to report that field

measurements showed the locations in question had been adequately covered.

The apparent discrepancy resulted from the inability to accurately locate

the edge of the weld on the radiograph. The inspector informed the licensee

that this matter would be identified as unresolved item 287/85-27-04, ISI

Radiographs, Area of Interest Coverage, until the aforementioned measure-

ments can be verified on a future inspection.

Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.

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