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Insp Repts 50-269/85-26,50-270/85-26 & 50-287/85-26 on 850813-0909.Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Procedures for E-bar Determination
	ML20132C282
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	09/13/1985
From:	Bryant J, Dance H, King L, Sasser M; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20132C268	List: IR 05000813/2009009; ML20132C264; ML20132C282;
References
	50-269-85-26, 50-270-85-26, 50-287-85-26, NUDOCS 8509260522
	Download: ML20132C282 (8)
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UNITED STATES

/p3 KEcoq'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ T 'n REGION 11

gs j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

' '_ t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 3o323

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Report I!cs: 50-269/85-26, 50-270/85-26, and 50-287/85-26 l

Licenset Duke Power Ccmpany

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, N.C. 2S242

Facility lame: Oconee Nuclear Station l

Docket Nos.. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287

License Nos.: DPR-33, DPR-47, and DPR-55

Inspection' Conducted: August 13 - September 9, 1985

Inspectors:

J.~C. Bryant

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e Signed

W >1. ADal_1 Y[

M. K. Sasser

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e 5 gned

N G" 9 L3 Xf

L. P. Kiny '

Date S gned

Approved by: T & 4 jj f[_

H. C. Danch, Section Chief Da e S gned

Division of Reactor. Projects

St>MMARY

Scope: This routine, announced inspection entailed 195 inspector hours on site

in the areas of operations, surveillance, maintenance, refueling activities,

followup of events, c~emistry,

n and station modifications.

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations

were identified in six areas; one area of noncompliance was found in one area

(Violation: Failure to follow procedure for E-bar determination).

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8509260522 850916

PDR ADOCK 05000269

0 PDR

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees

Persons Contacted

M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager

J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations

T. Barr, Superintendent of Technical Services

T. Owen, Superintendent of Maintenance

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"R. Bond, Compliance Engineer

, *T. C. Matthews, Technical Specialist

Other licensee employees contacted included t3chnicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and staff engireers.

Resident Inspectors

J. C. Bryant '

M. K. Sasser

L. P. King

Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September,1985, with

, those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee had no specific -

comment about the proposed violation. The licensee did not identify as

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proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors

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during this inspection.

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3. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified on this inspection.

4. Plant Operations

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to

verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications

(TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift turnover

records and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed

routinely. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance,

chemistry, health physics and performance personnel.

Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basis.

Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during week da.ys and

on weekends. Some inspections were made during shif t change in order to

evaluate shift turnover performance. Actions observed were conducted as

required by Operations Management Procedure 2-1. The complement of licensed

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personnel on each shif t inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS.

Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of

plant conditions.

Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis.

The areas toured included the following:

Turbine Building

Auxiliary Building

Units.1, 2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms

Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms

Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area

Unit 3 Reactor Building

During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,

equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.

, Unit 1 operated at essentially full power throughout the reporting period.

Unit 2 operated at 95% power throughout the reporting period, with power

reduced due to high water levels in "B" steam generator.

Unit 3 remained.in the End of Cycle 8 refueling outage throughout the

reporting period. The shutdown is discussed in paragraphs 10 and 11.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Surveillance Activities

The surveillance tests listed below were reviewed and/or witnessed by the

inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed

tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequi' sites, instructions,

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acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data

collection, independent -verification where required, handling of

deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in

whole or-in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were

available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were

i conducted according to procedure, tests were acceptable and systems

restoration was completed.

Surveillances witnessed in whole or in part:

pT/1/A/600/12 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater pump Performance

Test Calibration Check of BWST Level Transmitt'er, Unit 3

Completed Surveillances reviewed: I

WR 56842 Perform Keowee underground breaker, interlock test on ACB3

and ACB4

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WR 55012A RPS Channel on line test required by Technical

Specification (TS) 4.1-1

WR 55049A Perform RPS Channel B reactor building pressure instrument

calibration required by TS 4.1-1

WR 55009A Perform source range intermediate rance channel test

required by TS 4.1-1

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WR 90607C Calibrate P-432 (Flow) gauge and foward calibrttion date ,.

sheets to performance "

No violations of deviations were identified.

6. Maintenance Activities

Maintenance activities, including station design modifications, were

observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was

performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use

adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trade.

Activities, procedures and work requests were exanired to verify proper

authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, c~ ear.liness, and exposure

control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions

j for operation were met. Observation of the Unit 3 outage related design

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modifications will continue into the next reporting period.

Maintenance work witnessed in whole or in part:

1 WR 51800C Disassembly, Maintenance, and Reassembly of RCP 3A2

WR 24427B Troubleshoot and find cause of CT-3 transformer lockout,

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repair

Station Design Modifications reviewed or witnessed in whole or in part:

NSM 2159 Modify HPI pu .p emergency cooling water supply

NSM 1282 Hydrogen recombiner Auxiliary Building piping and hangers

NSM 2288 Automatic RPS actuation of-shunt trip on CRD circuit

breakers

NSM 2432 Replace SSF Reactor Building transmitters with environ-

mentally qualified transmitters.

NSM 2422 Replace RIA-56

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Completed maintenance work requests reviewed:

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WR 90612C Investigate and repair HVAC system due to low flow and

high discharge pressure.

WR 22S188 Repair / replace CBI DC CRD.

WR 90544C U-2 SSF - RC makeup pump L.0. temperature reaches trip set

point (180F) during performance test.

WR 20966B Repack inboard and outboard stuffing boxes on LPSW pump

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Unit 3 Unusual Event

At 3:40 a.m. on August 28, 1985, with Unit 3 in refueling shutdown, the unit

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startup transformer, CT-3, became deenergized when the fault pressure relay

sensed an internal transformer fault. The startup transformer provides

offsite AC power to Unit 3 during shutdown conditions. When CT-3

deenergized, both Keowee hydro units auto started on undervoltage to the

4160 voit main feeder buses. The Keowee units provided power to the main

feeder buses through standby transformer CT-4. At the time of the event, .

the reactor core was defueled to the spent fuel pool (SFP). SFP cooling was

lost during the initial loss of CT-3, but was restored by Operations

personnel within 10 minutes with only a one degree temperature rise recorded

for the SFP.

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In accordance with station emergency procedures, an Unusual Event was

. declared at 4:30 a.m., based on deenergization of the main feeder buses and

auto start of the Keowee units. At 5:05 a.m., the AC power from offsite was

restored through transformer CT-5 from the 100 kV Central transmission line.

The Unusual Event was -terminated at 5:43 a.m. following restoration of AC

power.

During the Unusual Event the licensee's staff was unable to make the

required notification to the State of South Carolina as there was no

response when called The State officials were contacted later during

normal office hours and steps were taken to resolve.this problem for the

future.

Troubleshooting on the CT-3 transformer indicated a fault in the internal

windings. Because of the unavailability of a spare transformer, the

licensee is continuing to evaluate the feasibility of repairing the

installed transformer or temporary replacement with transformers of a

different design. At the end of the report period it appeared that the

maintenance efforts might have been effective in returning the transformer

to serviceability.

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At 8:55 p.m. on September 7, 1985, a mechanic collapsed from heat exhaustion

in the change room after working on a valve in containment. He had been

wearing anti C's, rain gear, and a mask. The medical emergency team was

activated and the victim treated and surveyed. After the victim was placed

in an ambulance, contamination of 220 counts per minute was discovered on

one knee. Background levels in the change room masked the contamination.

The local hospital was notified that a contaminated victim was in transport.

An Unusual Event was declared at 9:25 p.m. in accordance with station

emergency procedures and all required notifications were made. At 9:55 p.m.

the Unusual Event was terminated. At last report the victim's condition was

s ati s f a cto ry.

8. Unit 2 - Unusual Event

An unusual event on Unit 2 was declared at 2:02 a.m. on Reptember 4,1985

due to indicated primary system leakage into containmant of approximately

two gallons per minute (gpm). Personnel entry into containment at 4:50 a.m.

determined that the leak was into a funnel from a collection line which

received miscellaneous root valve packing leakoffs. The specific root valve

with the packing leak could not be determined at the time. Leakage.was

determined to be 1.7 gpm. A safety evaluation determined that contirsed

reactor operati,on for the present was justified since the root valve packing

did not constitute a strength boundary of the reactor coolant system. The

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unusual event was terminated at 9:55 a.m.

First indication of the leak was at 12:15 a.m.- on September 4, when control

operators noted increases in the reactor building normal sump filling rate

and in the let down storage tank decrease rate. Reactor building radiation

instrument alarms (RIA's) showed increasing levels of iodine and

particulutes. Analysis of the reactor building sump showed short lived

activity and a boron concentration of 1170 ppm. At the end of the report

period, Unit 2 is operating and reactor building activity is not increasing.

A decision on a planned shutdown for repairs has not been reached.

9. Determination of Reactor Coolant E-bar

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for. the determination of

E-bar, the average beta gamma energy per disintegration in the reactor

coolant system (RCS), which is used to determine the maximum allowable RCS

radioactivity levels per Technical Specification 3.1.4. The Chemistry

Department performs the semi-annual determination of E-bar using procedure

CP/0/A/2005/6A. Only those nuclides with a half life greater than 30

minutes are used in the calculation. The referenced precedure requires

liquid and gas samples to be counted 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after the initial RCS

sample has been collected, with a recount of the same samples 5 days later

to obtain the activities of any nuclides which did not show up on the first

count.

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The inspectors initial review of the licensee's records found the following

apparent discrepancies. For Units 1 and 2 E-bar procedures, dated 1/4/85

and 5/21/85 respectively, the documentation did not show a 5 day sample

recount. For Unit 3, dated 6/25/85, the recount was performed 4 days after

initial sampling rather than 5 days as reauired. Also, the Unit 2 E-bar

calculation was based on the initial sample count with only a 45 minute

elapsed time.

At the inspectors request, the licensee staff further researched these

discrepancies. For Units 1 and 2, the 5 day recount was performed but the

documentation was not retained as no new nuclides were found. The Unit 3

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recount was mistakenly performed with 4 days elapsed time rather than 5 days

as required. For the Unit 2 initial sample count, the licensee determined

that E-bar was i

ncorrectly calculated. The time that the initial sample was

collected was incorrectly entered into the computer, resulting in calcula-

tions based on 45 minutes elapsed time rather that an actual elapsed time of

3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 15 minutes. The licensee agreed to correct the Unit 2 E-bar

results.

In summary, the above discrepancies resulted from the licensee's failure to

adhere to p; ocedure requirements and, also, from improper documentation.

Failure to follow procedures is an apparent violation of Technical

Specifications and Station Directives; Violation - Failure to follow

procedures for E-bar determination (50-269,270,287/85-26-01).

10. Unit 3 Broken Cap Screws On Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing Housing

During scheduled overhaul of a' reactor coolant pump, manufactured by

Bingham-Williamett Company, 21 of 32 cap screws in a bearing housing were

found to have the heads broken off from the shank. The heads had

disintegrated into small pieces due to having moved around in the bearing

cavity over an extended period. The RCP had been in service about 11 years.

At Oconee, one RCP is overhauled during each refueling shutdown. However,

the impeller is not removed during these routine overhauls and the bearing

housing cannot be seen with the impeller in place. There had been no

increased vibration or runout detected to indicate a problem.

An evaluation by Bingham stated that the ' pump should continue to operate

satisfactorily for the life of the plant; that any further degredation would

be indicated by increased vibration and shaft runout which would occur over

a period of time; and that seal performance would not be affected rapidly.

Bingham added that any change in performance would occur over a period of

time adequate to allow a normal shut down for planned maintenance.

Unit 3 has four Bingham RCP's as has Unit 2. Unit I has Westinghouse pumps.

The licensee is preparing an engineering evaluation to justify continued

operation of Unit 2 and startup of Unit 3.

The bearing is held in place, not only by cap screws, but also by' the

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thermal barrier and is held in centered position by four radial keys.

Vertical movement is limited in both directions. The bearing and housing

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did not rotate but there was some wear due to vibration on the housing and

the surface. of the pump stuffing box. The bearing housing was returned to

Bingham to be built up and machined slightly oversized. Duke planned to

rebore the stuffing box slightly over sized, but found that Duke was not

equipped to perform the job with the required precision. Subsequently, a

spare stuffing box was purchased from another site and has been received on

site. The sellers QA program has been examined by Duke.

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The licensee will develop a program for examination of the remaining pumps

during scheduled shutdowns.- Problems with the RCP have been examined by a

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Regional inspector and will be reported in more detail in Report No.

50-287/85-27.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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11. Unit 3 Fefueling Shutdown

The Unit 3 end of cycle 8 refueling outage has remained essentially on

schedule; the major problems encountered are dicussed in paragraphs 7 and

10. The reactor coolant pump problem is not expected to delay startup. The

control transfomer remain's a question. Refueling was completed on

September 6.

The steam genefators were eddy current tested and sludge lanced during the

shutdown. In steem gaierator A, 2192 tubes were tested and 4 were plugged.

Steam generator B had 3699 tested and 10 plugged. One of the 10 was plugged

due to a bubble test performed prior to the eddy current test. Sludge

lancing removed 84 pounds total from the 2 generators. The licensee

estimates 90*.'of the sludge on the lower tube sheet was removed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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ML20132C282

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