IR 05000269/1986012

Insp Repts 50-269/86-12,50-270/86-12 & 50-287/86-12 on 860331-0404.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20210N780
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	04/25/1986
From:	Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210N750	List: IR 05000269/1986012 ML20210N746
References
50-269-86-12, 50-270-86-12, 50-287-86-12, NUDOCS 8605050254
Download: ML20210N780 (12)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * 2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

.....* - APR 2 81986 Report Nos.: 50-269/86-12, 50-270/86-12, and 50-287/86-12 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422. South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55

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Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2, and 3-Inspection Conducted: March 31 - April 4,1986 Inspector: M' ///,d.$YGT A. L."Cunningham [ ' D6te St'gned Accompanying Personnel: B. C. Haagensen, R. T. Hadley, R. R. Marston, G. Wehmann, J. M. Will, Jr.

Approved by: 44__ of 2Odiis

'T. R. Decker, Section Chief ~Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was in the area of the annual emergency preparedness exercis Results: Of the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.

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8605050254 860428 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• M. Tuckman, Station Manager

• J. Vaughn, General Manager, Nuclear

• M. D. McIntosh, General Manager Nuclear Support

• A. Haller, Manager, Nuclear Technology

• J. T. McIntosh, Superintendent, Station Services

• T. S. Barr, Superintendent, Technical Services

• G. W. Hallman, Nuclear Maintenance Manager

• L. Lewis, Health Physics Superintendent

• R. E. Harris, System Emergency Planner Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• J. Bryant

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 4,1986, with those persons irdicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters No previous emergency preparedness enforcement matters remained outstandin . Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of .the -basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.N of NUREG-0654, Revision .

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The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed in detail with licensee representatives on February 14 and 19, 198 While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise. The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organizatio The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organizatio The scenario provided sufficient information to the State and local government agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercis The licensee made a large commitment to training and personnel through the use of controllers, evaluators, and required personnel participating in the exercise. Note, however, that additional training of the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) personnel and the health physicist accompanying the injured persons to the receiving hospital is require This item is discussed in paragraph 5, below. The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise; however, some minor prompting was noted by the inspector No violations or deviations were identifie . Medical Emergency Drill The Medical emergency drill was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.N of NUREG-0654, Revision The medical drill was observed by the inspectors during its commencement onsite and through its termination at the receiving hospital located in Seneca, South Carolina. The following findings were identified, namely:

(1) health physics practices and radiological contamination controls exhibited by the onsite Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) attending the injured persons were poor, and indicative of inadequate training; (2) the injured persons were permitted to remain within the contaminated area too long prior to removal to a safe zone; (3) contamination control exhibited by the attending HP Technician upon arrival of the injured persons at the emergency treatment room in the receiving hospital was exceedingly poo Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-269/86-12-01, 50-270/86-12-01, 50-287/86-12-01: Based on the above findings, licensee MERT and health physics personnel attending the injured persons both onsite and at the receiving hospital, require additional detailed training in health physics practices and required radiological contamination control. This item will be reviewed during subsequent medical emergency drill No violations or deviations were identifie _

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6. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.A of NUREG-0654, Revision The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long tenn or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not require Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that sufficient technical staff was available to provide for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if neede The inspecUors also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the TSC and OSC, and CM At each response center, the required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's approved procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),

Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654, Revision 1: (1) responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined; (2) adequate staffing was provided to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) onsite and offsite support organizational interactions were specifie The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personne The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Manage Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies appeared to be adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie .

4 Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and Section II.C of NUREG 0654, Revision 1, namely: (1) accommodation of a selected State emergency response representative at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; (2) organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identifie Representatives of the State of South Carolina, and Oconee and Pickens Counties were accommodated at the licensee's interim Crisis Management Center (CMC) and Emergency News Center (ENC). Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope of the exercise. Assistance resources from State and local agencies were available to the licensee consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section I.D of NUREG-0654, Revision An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify the emergency and escalate to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated accidnt sequence progressed. Licer.see actions in this area were timely and effectiv Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure The system appeared to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequence The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions implemented throughout the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established. This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.E of NUREG-0654, Revision . -. =-

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L An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response

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organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response

. organization. Notification of the State of South Carolina, and local

offsite organizations was completed v.ithin 15 minutes following declaration of each emergency classificatio Telephone notification of State and local response organizations was promptly followed by transmission of hard copies of the notification to

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these organization Such copies included prevailing meteorological information, average release rate (source terms in uCi/sec), site boundary integrated dose projections, and recommended protective actions when necessar , The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the

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plume exposure pathway was in place and operational. The system was actuated during the exercise to simulate warning the public of significant events occurring at the plant site. All sirens were operational except one unit, representing a response efficiency of 98%.

No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Communications (82301)

This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt

! communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654, Revision The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, interim CMC), between the licensee and offsite agencies, and between the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the interim CMC. The inspectors also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organizatio Notwithstanding malfunction of the TSC-CR intercom, communication with the remaining facilities was adequate.

i No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.

! The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency

response facilities and observed the use of equipment at the facilities.

l Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise

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included the Controi Room (CR), Operations Support Center (0SC), Technical-Support Center (TSC), and the Interim Crisis Management Center (CMC).

I Control Room - The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercise It was observed, however, that Control Room operators made only limited use of plant systems and electrical schematic This observation was discussed as an item for improvement during the critiqu Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.

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The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authoritie These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classificatio .

It was observed that the data and information provided as the scenario's initial accident sequence and conditions placed no demands

. upon the Emergency Director and the Control Room staff in comencing the exercise in a timely manner. The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess _the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions. It was noted that a bound log

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of the facility Emergency Coordinator's activities were maintained during the first day of the exercise. Use of the subject log, however, was discontinued when the Emergency Coordinator's functions were transferred to the TS Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classificatio The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities. Required operations at the facility

proceeded in an orderly manner. The facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff. TSC security was promptly established and maintained. Security maintained a log or otherwise accounted for all personnel entering and exiting the facili ty.

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Inspection disclosed the following additional findings, namely: (1)

engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into problem solving exercises; (2)

assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and firm;

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(3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the TSC to the interim CMC was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4)

briefings of the TSC staff were frequent and consistent with changes in plant status and related emergency conditions; (5) accountability, including identifying missing personnel, was readily implemented within the accepted time regime and was consistent with the scenario scop Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was promptly staffed following activation of the emergency plan by the Emergency Coordinator. An inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and dispatched. The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilitie During operation of tnis facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented prior to loss of offsite and onsite power. It was noted thereafter, however, that habitability surveys were discontinue Continuation of the subject survey following loss of onsite and offsite power was discussed during the critique as a recommended improvemen Interim Crisis Management Center (ICMC) - The ICMC is located in the plant training cente The facility was adequately equipped and staffed to support the required emergency response defined in the exercise scenari ICMC security was prompt ablished and was included as a routine requirement for prepara :d activation of the facilit Status boards and other related visual aids were strategically located and were readily accessible for viewing by the E0F staff. Dedicated comunications were assigned to the facility, and all required notifications were promptly mad It was observed by licensee representatives and NRC inspectors that the status boards required improvement, namely: trending of plant and radiological parameters and values; and frequent updating of plant status. The cited required improvements were documented by the licensee for required correctio The ICMC principal staff freely interacted with the State representative assigned to the facilit The State was routinely informed of plant status as well as recommended protective measures and actions. The Recovery Manager frequently consulted the ICMC technical support staf Licensee representatives and NRC inspectors noted that the interim CMC required additional telephones in the command center, dose assessment area, and the assigned NRC area. This item was fully discussed during the critiqu The licensee documented the subject item for required followup and correctio No violations or deviations were identifie .

13. Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654, Revision The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing plant status to provide recommendations to the Site Emergency Manager regarding mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, prevention of releases of radioactive materials, and termination of the emergency conditio Radiological assessment activities involved several groups. An inplant group was effective in estimating the radiological impact within the plant based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume. Radiological effluent data was received in the ICMC. The ICMC dose calculations were computed and compared on a timely basis with results received from the TSC and offsite monitoring group Dose assessments and projections were compared with the TSC. All resultant data agreed within acceptable limit Routine inventory and verification of the contents of monitoring kits issued to offsite radiation monitoring teams was conducted. It was observed that the contents of each kit were consistent with assigned inventorie No instrument or radio failures occurred during offsite surveys and monitorin It was noted, that teams were periodically updated regarding plant status,-

emergency classification, and related condition No violations or deviations were identifie . Protective Response (82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of non-essential personnel, were implemented promptly pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section I The prompt notification system in the 10-mile EPZ was actuated. The sirens were operational. Protective action recommendations regarding sheltering and evacuation of area occupants, where indicated, were promptly implemented as require Prompt notification of the public was successfully implemente . .

The protective measures decision making process was observed by the inspectors. Recommendations implemented by the ICMC staff were timel Protective measures recommendations were provided by the licensee to the State of South Carolina and designated counties and local offsite organizations consistent with procedural requirement No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determined that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654, Re An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and by conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response facilitie Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions, and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection was available and used as appropriat Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequat Health Physics Supervisors were observed to thoroughly brief survey teams prior to their deploymen Dosimetry was available and was use High range dosimeters were also available in case they were neede No violations or deviations were identifie . Public Education and Information (82301)

This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654, Rev. Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise. The information included details on how the public would be notified and the initial actions which should be taken in an emergency. A rumor control program was also in place.

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The licensee activated and fully staffed the Emergency News Center (ENC).

The facility was used by the licensee for preparation, coordination and dissemination of emergency news information. Written press releases were prepared and issued from the ENC. News releases were timely, and adequately reflected plant emergency conditions. A corporate spokesman was designated to conduct periodic press briefing The briefings were technically accurate and presented in a manner readily understood by laymen. Visual

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aids were provided and effectively used. Question and answer sessions were held after each briefin Interaction and direct cooperation of the licensee with the State and counties was effective. Representatives of State, counties and Federal agencies were accomodated at the ENC. The cited representatives fully participated in the composition and issuance of news release Similarly, State, Federal and county representatives assigned to the ENC, fully participated in planning and presentation of periodic press briefings held during the exercis Operation and management of the ENC was effectively implemented, and was consistent with the emergency plan requirements and approved procedure Both licensee representatives and the inspectors observed the need for the following required improvements, namely: (1) notwithstanding the loss of power, improved offsite communications; (2) additional telephones throughout the facility, including the NRC statio These items were documented by the licensee for required correctio No violations or deviations were identifie . Recovery Planning (82301)

This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.H, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted a recovery planning session prior to termination of the exercise consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercis Licensee planners discussed the need for administrative and logistical support, manpower needs, engineering service needs, radiological surveillance, and implementation of the recovery organization consistent with the scope of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E, 10 CFR 50, and the specific criteria promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section I A formal critique was held on April 2,1986, with exercise controller's and observers, licensee management, and NRC representative Required improvements identified during the exercise and plans for corrective action were discussed. Licensee action on such findings will be reviewed during subsequent inspections. The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive deficiencies and indicated improvement items. The conduct

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and content of the critique were consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited abov No violations or deviations were identifie . Closeout Items (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-269/85-15-01, 50-270/85-15-01 and 60-287/85-15-01: Required control of prompting and controller / player interaction. Inspection confirmed that excessive prompting and disruptive controller / player interaction was eliminate (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-269/85-24-01, 50-270/85-24-01, 50-287/85-24-01: Format specification of alternates for Shift Superviso Inspection disclosed that the line of succession for Shift Supervisor is clearly define _