IR 05000269/1987009

Insp Repts 50-269/87-09,50-270/87-09 & 50-287/87-09 on 870209-13.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Review of Liquid & Gaseous Radwaste Programs & Review of TMI Action Items II.B.3 & II.F.1.2

ML20205N777
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	03/17/1987
From:	Adamovitz S, Kahle J, Marston R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205N697	List: IR 05000269/1987009 ML20205N693
References
TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-269-87-09, 50-269-87-9, 50-270-87-09, 50-270-87-9, 50-287-87-09, 50-287-87-9, IEIN-86-042, IEIN-86-076, IEIN-86-42, IEIN-86-76, NUDOCS 8704030102
Download: ML20205N777 (14)

Text

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r ' UNITED STATES O da f,#'b ' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g" 'n REGION ll y j 101 MARIETTA STREET. *I e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 s

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WD i 71987 Report Nos.: 50-269/87-09, 50-270/87-09, and 50-287/87-09 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47,-and DPR-55 Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted: February 9-13, 1987 Inspector: 2 R. R. Marston N7N7 Date Signed WWO S. S. Adamovitz Wn/r 7

'Date Signed Approved by: h/I J. B/K hTe, Section ' Chief q // 7 / F 7 Date 'Signdd Divij of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine unannounced inspection involved onsite review of the liquid and gaseous radwaste programs and a review of TMI action items II.B.3, Post-Accident Sampling; II.F.1.1, Post-Accident Noble Gas Effluent Monitoring; and II.F.1.2, Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluent Results: No violations or deviations were identifie ,

SQ4030102870317 ADOCK 05000269 G

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• L. V. Wilkie, Acting Station Manager

• J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Technical Services

• C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer

• J. J. Sevics Station Chemist C. T. Yongue, Station Health Physicist R. H. Ledford, Surveillance Supervisor

• S. A. Coy, Health Physics Coordinator

• L. J. Benge, Chemistry Staff Coordinator

• F. E. Owens, Compliance-Shift Supervisor M. M. Garrison, Primary Chemistry Supervisor

• 0. J. Berkshire, Associate Health Physicist L. Hawthorne, Associate Engineer K. F. Brown, Assistant Engineer M. A. Quarles, Health Physics Specialist

• E. T. Lampe, Junior Health Physicist J. D. Davis, Production Specialist Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• J. Bryant, Senior Resident Inspector L. Wert, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope ano findings were summarized on February 13, 1987, with those persons indicsted in Paragraph 1 abov The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and took no exceptions. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-269, 270, 287/86-24-01): Operability of the Post-Accident Liquid Sampling (PALS) System. The inspector verified that while there was a question on the reliability of the PALS sys'.em, a backup grab sampling capability existed with existing equipment and Cher.:istry Procedure CP/X/A/2002/04 i l

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2 Audits (84723,84724)

Technical Specification (TS) 6.1.3.4 requires audits of station activities to be conducted under the cognizance of the Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) encompassing the conformance of station operation to provisions contained within the Technical Specifications and applicable facility operating license conditions at least once per year, and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (0DCM) and implementing procedures at least once per 24 months. The inspectors reviewed the following audit reports:

• Departmental Audit NP-86-16 (ON), Station Chemistry Activities, conducted September 15 - October 10, 198 * Departmental Audit NP-86-2 (ON), Health Physics & Environmental Group Activities, conducted January 20 - February 11, 198 The inspectors also reviewed the following QA surveillances performed by the Station QA organization:

Surveillance 0-S85/19, Waste Disposal, conducted April 11-26, 198 Surveillance 0-S86-90, Waste Disposal, conducted October 17 -

November 6, 198 * Surveillance 0-S86-23, conducted May 22 - June 5,198 *

Surveillance 0-S86/20, New Radwaste Building, conducted on October 3 and 16, 198 *

Special Surveillance 0-S85/61, Reporting Requirements, conducted November 3, 1985 - January 24, 198 The inspectors discussed audit results with licensee representatives and noted the program areas were audited against Technical Specifications, procedural requirements, and Regulatory Guide 4.15, " Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal Operations): Effluent Streams i and the Environment." The inspectors reviewed corrective actions l scheduled and taken by the licensee to resolve items of concern and noted i that corrective actions were completed on a timely basis. The inspectors  !

also discussed technical training requirements for auditors with licensee representative No violations or deviations were identifie . Procedures (84723, 84724)

Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires the station to be operated and l maintained in accordance with approved written procedures with appropriate

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check-off lists and instructions for the following conditions: normal startup, operation, and shutdown of the complete facility and of all systems and components involving nuclear safety of the facility; emergency

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procedures involving potential or actual release of radioactivity; personnel radiation protection procedures; and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual implementatio The inspectors reviewed selected portions of procedures concerning post-accident sampling and analysis, in place filter testing, and gaseous and liquid radwaste systems. The inspectors noted that procedures were being reviewed, updated, and approved in accordance with administrative requirement No violations or deviations were identified.

6. -Semi-Annual Effluent Reports (84723, 84724)  ; Technical Specification 6.6.1.4 requires that routine Radioactive Effluent Release Reports covering the operation of the unit during i the previous six months of operation shall be submitted within i 60 days after January 1 and July 1 of each yea The inspectors I reviewed the Oconee Nuclear Station Semi-Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for 1985 and the first half of 1986. The effluent release data summarized in Table A was obtained from current and previous Semi-Annual Effluent Release Reports:

TABLF A

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Effluent Release dummary for Oconee ,

Units 1, 2 and 3

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Liquids (curies) l

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Calendar Fission and i Year Activation Products Tritium

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1984 1.58 E0 1.28 E+03 1985 4.16 E0 1.24 E+03 1986 (1st Half) 8.95 E-01 7.05 E+02 Gases (curies) 9 Calendar Year Noble Gases Halogens Tritium 1984 2.28 E+04 1.33 E-01 4.17 E+02 1985 2.35 E+04 4.95 E-03 4.28 E+01 1986 (1st Half) 1.11 E+04 8.73 E-03 2.14 E+01 The inspectors noted continuing difficulties concerning the timely submittal of these reports to the NR This problem was documented in a previous inspection report (50-269, 270, 287/85-18). The last four semi-annual effluent r' orts for second half 1984 through first half 1986 were submitted 30, 3, 5 and 30 days late, respectively. A memo dated October 28, 1986, from Licensing to various Oconee management personnel discussed problem areas concerning the

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Semi-Annual Effluent Release Reports .and possible solutions. In a telephone conversation with . the inspector on March 6, 1987, a licensee representative stated that the Semi-Annual Effluent Report for the second half of 1986 was transmitted on February 27, 1987, which was within the required time period. It was apparent that the licensee has taken corrective measures to ensure that reports are submitted within the required tim No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Radioactive Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Monitoring (84723, 84724)

Technical Specification 3. specifies the requirements for the operability of radioactive liquid effluent, gaseous effluent, and gaseous process monitoring instrumentatio The inspectors and licensee representatives ' examined selected effluent monitoring locations and verified the operability of selected control room monitor readout Additionally, records of the following liquid and gaseous effluent radiation monitor calibrations were reviewed:

RIA-32, Auxiliary Building Gas Monitor Unit 1, September 3, 1986 Unit 3, December 10, 1986 RIA-37, Waste Gas Disposal Monitor (Normal)

Units 1 and 2, January 6, 1986 Units 1 and 2, January 22, 1987 RIA-38, Waste Gas Disposal Monitor (High)

Units 1 and 2, February 6,1986 RIA-40, Air Ejector Vent Monitor Unit 2, January 5, 1986 RIA-43, Vent Particulate Monitor Unit 1, February 10, 1986 Unit 3, February 5, 1986 RIA-44, Vent Iodine Monitor Unit 1, December 10, 1985 Unit 2, January 8-9, 1986 i RIA-45, Vent Gas Monitor (Low) I Unit 1, May 5, 1986 Unit 3, January 28, 1986 RIA-46, Vent Gas Monitor (High)

Unit 2, January 5,1986 RIA-48, Reactor Building Gas Iodine Monitor  !

Unit 3, September 1, 1986 j

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RIA-49, Reactor Building Gas Monitor Unit 3, March 26, 1986 RIA-56, Vent Gross Gamma fianitor Unit 1, March 27 - April 16, 1986 The calibration records were reviewed for completeness, required calibration frequency and proper followup actions concerning inoperable monitor No violations or deviations were identifie . Reactor Coolant Chemistry (84723)

Technical Specification 3.1.4 specifies that the total activity of the reactor coolant due to nuclides with half lives longer than 30 minutes shall not exceed 224/E-bar microcuries per ml whenever the reactor is critica Technical Specification 3.1.5 establishes the maximum reactor coolant concentration limits for oxygen, chloride, and fluoride. The inspectors reviewed selected portions of plant chemi stry records including: Reactor Coolant System - Chemistry Results for Gross Beta, Chloride, Fluoride, Oxygen and Boro Unit 1, January - April 1986 Unit 2, April - August 1986 Unit 3, August - December 1986 Reactor Coolant System Radiochemistry Plots Unit 1, Xe-133, January - May 1986 I-131, August 1986 - February 1987 Co-58, January 1986 - January 1987 Gross Gamma, January 1986 - January 1987 Unit 2, I-131, January 1986 - January 1987 H-3, January 1986 - January 1987 Gross Gamma, January 1986 - January 1987

% Power, January 1986 - January 1987 j Unit 3, Gross Gamma, January - December 1986 i

% Power, January - December 1986 l

The inspectors noted no significant trends. Analytical results were I maintained via a computer tracking system which could list and plot l various reactor coolant and secondary chemistry parameter '

No violations or deviations were identifie l l

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1 Air Cleaning Systems.(84724)

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. Technical ' Specifications 4.12 and 4.14 provide requirements . for the

. testing of charcoal adsorber sample retention efficiency. for methyl iodide -

and for in place leak testing- of HEPA filtration and charcoal adsorption i : sections of exhaust and atmosphere cleanup filtration system The

. inspectors reviewed selected portions of the following records: Penetration Room Ventilation ~ System Filter Test -

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Unit 1, April 4-24, 1986 Unit 2, September 27-30, 1986'

Unit 3, September 26, 1985

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. Control Room Filter System Test

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1 . Unit 1, March 12-13, 1986 i Unit 3, August 5-6, 198 ; Reactor Building Hydrogen Purge System-

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Filter Test, August 6,1986

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' Gaseous Waste Disposal Filter Test Unit 3, June 24-26, 1986

)~ Reactor Building Purge Filter Test

Unit 1, March 10 - April 21, 1986

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Unit 2, September IS, August 11, and August 27, 1986 Unit 3, July 31, April 18, and January ;21,1986, and November 19,

September 26, and August 27 - September 30, 1985

Results of the record review were discussed with cognizant licensee

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, representative No violations or deviations were identifie . TMI Action Items (NUREG-0737,Section II.B.3, Post-Accident. Sampling)

i l Technical Specification 6.4.4 states, "The station shall have a program i that ensures the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant and

! containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions which includes training of personnel, procedures for sampling 'and analysis, and provisions for tasting and required maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment." Criteria to satisfy this requirement 'are' specified in j NUREG-0737,Section II.B.3.

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Post accident reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples were taken and analyzed for Units 1 and 2. ' Since Unit 3 had been shutdown and i defueled, samples were not taken, l

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7 Post-Accident Liquid Sample (PALS) System The inspector observed operation of the Unit 2 PALS syste The Reactor Coolant System (RCS)' sample was taken from one of the. RCS legs and routed to the sample panel. The sample and control panels were located on the first floor of the Auxiliary Buildin After flushing of the sample panel piping with demineralized water and drainage of the panel piping, the sample was collected. After sampling the system piping was flushed to the Reactor Building Sum The sample was depressurized, and the stripped gases were removed by a nitrogen purge. The coolant and stripped gas samples were removed for analysi However, it is important to note that during the sampling, contaminated water leaked onto the floor from the sample panel. The sampling process was discontinued while the spill was cleaned up. After the sampling was complete, it was discovered that the " stripped gas" sample volume was filled with liquid, which upon analysis, appeared to be reactor coolant. The " coolant" sample, upon analysis, appeared to be demineralized water. Licensee personnel-initiated repairs to the system, but were not able to collect another sample prior to the inspectors' completion of the inspection.

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However, during the week of the inspection, an inspector observed a

sample collected from the Unit 1 PALS. The results are tabulated in l the following table

Oconee Unit No. 1 Reactor Coolant Sample PALS Results i Ratio RCS Current PALS Test PALS / Normal Samples Data Samples Gross Gamma .9 0.86 Gas & Liquid (uC1/ml)

Boron Con .27 (ppm)

Chloride Con <.05 <.05 (ppm)

Hydrogen Con .073 (cc/kg) {

pH .9 0.86 The results met the criteria of accuracy (within a factor of 2) of NUREG-0737,Section II.B.3, Criterion (9), with the~ exception of Boro .

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The inspectors reviewed documentation of the training program implemented by the licensee for the PALS syste The inspector reviewed Lesson Plan #0CCH-010, " Post-Accident Liquid Sampling System (PALS)" (4.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />).

Licensee representatives stated that ten personnel were qualified to operate the system; this was supported by training record In addition, each individual performed hands-on operation of the system in order to qualify. Refresher classroom training and testing were performed annually, and operation of the system on each unit was scheduled to be performed quarterl The inspectors reviewed the PALS system operating procedures and a selection of sample analysis procedures. The procedures appeared to be adequat The inspectors discussed operability of the PALS systems with licensee representatives and reviewed documentation on the subjec Based upon:

(1) A letter, Duke Power Co. (H. B. Tucker) to Region II, Subject:

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Oconee Nuclear Station, dated August 13, 1986, which discussed system operability and reliability and proposed modification or replacement of the existing system; (2) A letter, Duke Power Co. (H. B. Tucker) to Region II, Subject:

Oconee Nuclear Station, dated January 2,1987, which referenced the commitments of letter (1), and described the upcoming modifications to the PALS system and scheduling of these modification (3) Unresolved Item 50-269, 270, 287/86-24-01, Operability of the Post-Accident Liquid Sampling System, which was opened by the Resident Inspector as a result of systems failure to meet acceptance criteria; and (4) The inspectors' observations of the inability to collect a valid sample on the Unit 2 PALS system; The inspector stated that a concern existed regarding the reliability of the PALS system. Since the licensee had a backup method for post-accident liquid sampling, and had identified the problem and was implementing corrective action, this will be tracked as an inspector followup ite Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-269, 270, 287/87-09-01:

Operability of the Post-Accident Liquid Sampling Syste No violations or deviations were identifie .

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b. Post-Accident Gaseous Samples (PAGS)

The inspectors observed operation of the Unit-1 post-accident containment air sampling system. The air sample was taken from the containment dome which was the area cf highest calculated radioactivity during an accident. The pAGS sample lines were heat traced and insulated to minimize iodine plateout, and the licensee had performed calibration studies to determine the extent of iodine and particulate losses due to deposition in the sample lines. The plateout correction factor was calculated for normal and accident conditions, and the factor was utilized in the isotopic concentration equatio The gaseous sample was circulated through a portion of the PAGS system and a known amount (approximately 1.3 cc) of containment air was trapped in a section of line. In calculating the final volume of the trapped sample, pressure and temperature were taken into accoun The trapped gaseous sample was passed once through 500 milliliters of thiosulfate solution to collect the iodines and particulates. The gaseous sample was then diluted with nitrogen and recirculated through three dilution tanks. The total dilution volume of the tank system had been calibrated to be 10,000:1. An aliquot of the gas was collected in a 100 ml gas bomb and the thiosulfate solution was drained into a shielded sample bottl Prior to the technician approaching the sampling panel, the panel was purged to minimize radiation dose. The gaseous and thiosulfate samples were collected and transported to the count room in a shielded containe During the initial cleaning flush of the thiosulfate portion of the system, the inspector noted leakage in a tygon sampling line. The tubing was replaced and the replacement time did not cause the licensee to exceed the three hour sampling and analysis time limi Initial analytical results showed possible contamination of the system with Co-58. The licensee determined that the thiosulfate solution, and not the system, had been contaminated. A new solution was prepared and an additional test of the PAGS system complete Subsequent samples showed no contamination. The inspectors discussed additional materials quality assurance with licensee representatives and informed them this matter would be considered a followup item:

IFI 50-269, 270, 287/87-09-02: Check quality assurance for sampling lines and thiosulfate solution for PAGS syste .

Due to the 10,000:1 dilution, no nuclides were detected in the PASS sample to compare with the normal sample, Following are PAGS system comparison to selected criteria:

Criterion 1: The licensee shall have the capability to promptly obtain containment atmosphere samples. The combined time

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allotted for sampling and analysis should be three hours or less

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from the time a decision is made to take a sample (NUREG-0737, Criterion 1).

The inspector observed that the licensee was able to take and analyze a sample within the time limi Criterion 2: Containment atmosphere sampling during post-accident conditions shall not. require an isolated auxiliary system to be placed in operation -in order to use the sampling system (NUREG-0737, Criterion 3).

The system drew a sample from the dome throJgh the hydrogen analyzer system. The sampling did not raquire an isolated auxiliary system to be placed in operatio Criterion 3: The design basis for plant equipment for containment atmosphere sampling and analysis must assume that it is possible to obtain and analyze a sample without radiation exposures to any individual exceeding 5 rem whole body and 75 rem extremities (NUREG-0737, Criterion 6). The system is installed as per the design and the system installation has no resulted in an unreviewed safety questio '

The system was designed in accordance with the above criteri In addition, Health Physics Procedure HP/X/A/1009/17, " Operating Procedure for Post-Accident Containment Air Sampling System,"

required that if radiation levels at the panel exceed 16 R/hr 4 and cannot be reduced by purging the system, the operation shall be secured, personnel shall move to a low background area, and contact a designated individual for further -instructions. The procedure also provided for an alternate method of securing a sample, using another procedure.

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Criterion 4a: The licensee shall establish an onsite radiological analysis capability to provide quantification of noble gases, iodines, and non-volatile radionuclides in ' the containment atmosphere, which may provide an indication of the ,

degree of core damage (NUREG-0737, Criterion 2a). The results of the gamma spectral measurements should be accurate within a factor of 2 across the entire range (NUREG-0737, Criterion 10 and Attachment No. 1 to Generic Letter).

Containment air samples were taken with the PAGS and with normal sampling systems. Comparisons could not be made since the results of the PAGS system were below detectable levels, probably due to the dilution of those sample Criterion 4b: The licensee shall establish an onsite chemical I analysis capability to provide quantification of hydrogen levels in the containment atmosphere (NUREG-0737, Criterion 2b).

Accuracy, range, and sensitivity shall be adequate to provide

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pertinent data to describe the chemical status of the reactor coolant system (NUREG-0737, Criterion 10).

Range: 0-10 volume %

0-30 volume % for inerted or ice container containments (Reg. Guide 1.97, Revision 3)

The licensee has installed equipment that has.the capability of measuring the hydrogen content of containment. Analysis was not done during this inspectio Criterion 4c: Not applicable to the containment atmosphere syste Criterion 4d: Not applicable to containment atmosphere syste Criterion 4e: Not applicable to containment atmosphere syste Criterion 4f: Not applicable to containment atmosphere syste Criterion 5: If in-line monitoring is used for any sampling and analytical capability specified in 4 above, the licensee shall provide backup sampling through grab samples and shall demonstrate the capability of analyzing the sample Established planning for analysis at offsite facilities - is acceptable (NUREG-0737, Criterion 8).

This criterion is not applicable to the PAGS syste Criterion 6: Provisions for purging sample lines, for reducing plateout in sample lines, for minimizing sample loss or distortion, for preventing blockage of sample lines by loose material in the containment, and for appropriate disposal of samples should be made. The ventilation exhaust from the sample station should be filtered at some point through charcoal ;

adsorbers and HEPA filters (NUREG-0737, Criterion 11). '

The sample lines were heat-traced to minimize plateout, and the licensee performed calibration studies to determine the amount of iodine and particulate losses due to deposition. The calculated correction factors for both normal and accident conditions were used in calculating isotope concentration Lines outside the sample volume were purged with nitrogen and remaining gas was exhausted to containmen Criterion 7: The licensee shall have a formalized training program, written lesson plans and documented hands-on trainin An adequate number of staff members are qualified to provide operation of the equipment under a protracted acciden ____

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The licensee has a formalized training program requiring PAGS requalification every 6 months. The inspectors reviewed lesson plans, tasks, and the Training and Qualification Guide. All of these items appeared to be adequat Criterion 6- The licensee has operating procedures that have been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with station requirement The licensee had operating procedures for the PAGS that have been prepared and approved in accordance with Station Directives and Administrative Manual Criterion 9: The licensee has a formal acceptance test for the equipment, appropriate calibration and recalibration requirements, and a periodic performance test for each analytical test required from the equipmen The inspector verified that procedures were available to meet the above criteria and that they had been performed at the required interval No violations or deviations were identifie . NUREG-0737 Items (TMI Action Plan, Units 1, 2, and 3)

The inspector reviewed licensee actions taken to meet the guidelines of NUREG-0737, Items II.F.1, Attachment 1, and II.F.1, Attachment 2, and of TMI Action Plan Items II.F.1., Subpart 1, " Procedures," II.F.1.,

Subpart 2a " Noble Gas Monitors," and II.F.1. , Subpart 2b " Iodine and Particulate Sampling."

The inspector reviewed documentation for RIA-43, the normal range particulate monitor for the Unit Vent, and reviewed plant procedures and facilities for collecting and evaluating high-range particulate samples from the Unit Vent. The inspector also reviewed documentation for RIA-44, the normal range iodine monitor for the Unit Vent, and reviewed procedures and facilities for collecting and evaluating high range radioiodine cartridges for determination of radioiodines in plant effluents from the Unit Vent. The inspector reviewed documentation for RIA-45, the normal range Unit Vent Gas Monitor; RIA-46, the high range Unit Vent Gas Monitor; and RIA-56, the accident range Unit Vent Gas Monitor. RIA-56 used an ion chamber detecto The inspector reviewed procedures for the operation, calibration, and maintenance of the monitors and samplers and for the analysis of high range sample Procedures were determined to be complete and had been reviewed and approved in accordance with facility and Technical Specification requirement . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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.13 The inspectors, accompanied by licensee representatives, went to several RIA locations and examined the installation of each RIA. The location and equipment appeared to be as described in the FSAR and in plant procedures and each unit appeared to be operating satisfactorily. On the. basis of the information provided by the licensee, on the inspectors' examination of the installed facilities, and on the inspectors' review of pertinent procedures, the inspectors concluded that the installed equipment and the procedures pertaining to the equipment, appeared to fulfill the design criteria of NUREG-0737, Items II.F.1, Attachments 1 and 2 and of II . F.1. 2. b . These items are considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . Information Notices (92703) IE Information Notice No. 86-42, " Improper Maintenance of Radiation Monitoring Systems." The inspectors reviewed IEN 86-42 dated June 9, 1986, with licensee representatives. This notice was issued to alert licensees to the potential for defeating the safety function associated with radiation monitoring systems by not properly adhering to established surveillance and maintenance procedure The licensee's Regulatory Compliance Section in a memo dated June 16, .

1986, had requested supervisors to evaluate the possible impact of this notice upon daily operations. .The evaluation included procedural and system review to identi fy potential problem Licensee management considered proper adherence and independent verification of procedural steps would prevent the bypass of radiation monitoring systems' safety function IE Information Notice No. 86-76, " Problems Noted in Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems." The inspectors reviewed IEN 86-76 dated August 28, 1986, with licensee representatives. The notice was issued to alert licensees to problems noted in the operation of control room emergency ventilation system The licensee's Regulatory Compliance Section issued a memo dated September 8,1986, concerning tb2 impact of this notic Management's actions in response to the memo included:

(1) An inspection was performed of the air handling unit drain lines to ensure air inleakage didn't occu (2) Testing procedures were reviewed including the Periodic Test Procedure Used to Verify Positive Control Room Pressur (3) An additional study of the Control room temperature monitoring was implemente Results of the study indicated the control room temperature should be limited to 90*F and should be measured adjacent to essential equipmen No violations or deviations were identified.