IR 05000269/1989009
| ML20245A143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1989 |
| From: | Cooper T, Jape F, Mellen L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16127A331 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-89-09, 50-269-89-9, 50-270-89-09, 50-270-89-9, 50-287-89-09, 50-287-89-9, NUDOCS 8904250073 | |
| Download: ML20245A143 (12) | |
Text
i..
. j
.s
-
.
98880u
,
4-
.
UNITED STATES
.3'
- -
- l
.[
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- REGION il
- [
101 .ARIETTA ST., N.W.
ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323
..,,,,
Report Nos:
50-269/89-09, 50-270/89-09, and 50-287/89-09 i
Licensee:
Duke Power Company-422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C.
28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55
,
Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: Ma rch. 6-10, 1989 Inspectors: dW
/-4-F9 L. S. Mellen, Reactor Inspector Date Signed
&&
Y-6 -89 T. A. Cooper, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
am [ j hy.nd Y//d /P[
F. Jape, Section Chief g
/
Date Signed Quality Performance Section Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY
' Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection involved on-site inspection in the areas of design control, modifications, and review of open items.
Results: Within the areas inspected, the following weaknesses or strengths were identified:
A weakness was noted in the data base used to prepare' computer
-
generated work requests. This is further discussed in Paragaraph 4.
A weakness was noted in the work recuests prepared by
-
Construction Maintenance Division (CMD? to support Nuclear Station Modifications (NSMs).
This is further discussed in So Paragraph 3.
Neaa 48'
-
A weakness was noted in the lack of attention to detail in g8 completing NSM packages. This is further discussed in mo Paragraph 3.
cr>x Q8
-
Improvements were noted in the completed work request oc documentation that was generated by plant staff.
This is
$"
further discussed in Paragraph 4.
.$
Improvements were noted in the qualit of 10CFR50.59 documentation prepared by the plant an[ design engineering
-
MAG staffs. This is further discussed in Paragraph 3.
i
L.
~~
.
l.
.
.
'
.
.
l
.
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. Tuckman,-Station Manager
- E. Anderson, Design Engineer
- S. Bensdale, Nuclear Production Engineer C. Boyd, Site Design Engineer Representative
- M. Carter, Design Engineer T. Glenn, Instrument and Electrical Support Engineer
- C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer R. Knoerr, Production Services Engineer E. Leggett, Assistant Engineer, Compliance
- D. Llewlyn, CMD Mechanical Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineers.
NRC Resident Inspectors:
- P.H. Skinner L.D. Wert
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
a.
(Closed)
Violation 269,270,287/88-13-01:
The inspectors reviewed the licensee response to this violation, the NRC acknowledgement letter, Licensee Event Report (LER) 269/88-07, Incident Investiga-tion Report (IIR) 088-17-4, and Problem Investigation Report (PIR)
088-0127 which were written to describe the fire watch events and to document their corrective actions.
The documentation of corrective actions and the changes in the programs appear to be adequate to prevent recurrence of the events.
The personnel actions taken by plant management to resolve the second item identified in this violation have been reviewed and are considered adequate. As stated in the licensee response to the violation, dated September 2,1988, actions were completed on the violation at the time of the response.
-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
- - - - -
_ _ _
.
.
q
.
.
.
.
.
,
b.
(Closed)
Violation 269,270,287/88-13-02:
The inspectors reviewed j
the Licensee Response to this violation, dated September 2,1988 and
'
the NRC acknowledgement letter, dated December 7, 1988 and determined that baseline data is being collected and all valves will be stroke time tested using the actuation-to-light method during the next scheduled refueling outage for each unit. The current revision
,
of PT/3/A/0150/22A includes changes in section 9.1 which direct the j
stroke time testing of valves to be completed actuation-to-light.
c.
(Closed)
Violation 269,270,287/88-13-03:
The inspectors reviewed
'
the licensee Response to this violation and the NRC acknowledgement letter and noted that Design engineering determined that valves LPSH-772, 773, and 774 need not be tested, as they are not required to meet any code requirements.
Valve HP-98, has been added to the test program by changes to PT/3/A/0150/228 and by these procedural requirements the valve will be full stroke exercised.
This satisfies the corrective actions detailed in the licensee response within the time frame specified in that response, d.
(0 pen)
Violation 269,270,287/88-13-04:
The inspectors reviewed the Licensee Response to this violation and the NRC acknowledgement letter and reviewed wveral additional work request packages with
^
similar problems noted in the reviewed packages.
The existence of errors in the computer data base indicates the licensee needs to place more effort in this area to resolve this problem.
This is further discussed in paragraph 4.
e.
(0 pen)
Violation 269,270,287/88-13-05:
The inspectors reviewed the Licensee Responses to this violation and the NRC acknowledgement letters and determined that the corrective actions for this violation are not completed.
This item will be further discussed in paragraph 4.
f.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 269/88-13-06:
1he licensee has completed corrective actions for the wiring configuration control for unit 1.
This item is further discussed in paragraph 5.
g.
(0 pen) URI 270/88-13-06:
The licensee plans to complete this item during the next refueling outage for unit 2.
3.
Design, Design Changes, and Modifications (37700)
The inspectors reviewed several recently completed modification packages, NSM 12640, NSM 32555, NSM 32735, NSM 32573, and NSM 12449, involving safety-related systems.
The inspectors verified that the modification packages were reviewed and approved by the appropriate on-site and off-site review organizations.
Procedures were created for the implementation of these modifications and were properly reviewed and approve __
_-_-
.
.
.
.
I
1 l
The inspectors noted several discrepancies between the procedurally required paperwork and the paperwork that was generated for the modification packages.
Examples of these discrepancies are as follows:
i NSM 12449 Procedure MP/0/A/1800/24 change 10 step 11 was-not completed.
Work Request (WR) 97000C the grout inspection was signed off but was not completed.
TN/1/A/2449/0/ALI/02, page 29, step 8.4.24 was not completed correctly.
WR 97164C did not have the procedurally required Functional Verification Test Requirements for Quality Assurance (QA)
condition 1.
WR 97163C part of the procedure is signed off December 12, 1989.
WR 97000C part of the procedure is signed off 13/01/89.
NSM Checklist, signature for all VNs involved is missing.
NSM Installation Package Checklist references a required form (QA Form 5068) which does not exist.
Various 10CFR50.59 analyses indicate different answers to the screening questions for the same work.
NSM 32555 The NSM Completed Package Review Checklist which indicates the package has been completed was not complete.
nSM 32735 NSM Installation Package Checklist references a required form (QA Form 5068) which no longer exists.
Various 10CFR50.59 analyses indicate different answers to the screening questions for the same work.
NSM 32573 l
l NSM Installation Package Checklist references a required form (QA Form 5068) which no longer exists.
'
NSM 12640 WR 96892C did not have the procedurally required Functional Verification Test Requirements for QA condition 1.
NSM Installation Package Checklist references a required form (QA Form 506B) which no longer exists.
These examples are not considered all inclusive.
l l
!
l
- _- --_-_-
___-__
__
.
-
.
,
These examples were discussed with plant personnel.
The licensee stated that the problem would be reviewed and corrective actions taken as necessary to correct the weaknesses that the inspector identified.
The inspectors reviewed the results of completed post modification tests and verified that the test results were within the acceptance criteria.
Operation's procedures were verified to have been revised and operator drawings were as-built changed p or to the system being released for operation.
The inspectors reviewed the 10CFR50.59 evaluations performed and determined that the evaluati9ns performed by the Design Engineering and the site personnel met the requirements for these evaluations.
The 10CFR50.59 evaluations performed by the CMD group, were not of the quality of the other groups, as noted by the remarks on the individual NSMs that the inspectors reviewed.
The inspectors reviewed three Exempt Modifications, 0E-7367, OE-2310, and OE-2315.
Exempt Modification generally do not recebe the level of review that a NSM does.
The inspectors verified that on all of these modifications, the appropriate evaluations were received, including
10CFR50.59 evaluations.
Required approvals were received prior to the implementation of the changes.
Post modification testing was performed l
acceptably before releasing the component to operations.
'
4.
InspectionofOpenItems(92700)
The following open items are being discussed based on review of licensee
reports, inspection, record review, and discussions with licensee i
personnel, as appropriate:
!
The inspectors reviewed a selected sample of work orders to determine if the work orders were in compliance with Station Directive 3.2.1.
While the actual work orders reviewed did not exhibit the number of discrepancies noted in NRC inspection report 88-13, the data base that generated the work requests was not completely accurate.
The following work orders required manual changes from the computer generated data base for functional testing and/or retest requirements:
57820A 571988 57740A 57735A 57200B 57859A 55170B 57816A 570118 57844A 57836A 57838A 57581A 57814A 57881A 553078 57839A 57842A The inspectors discussed the existing computer generated work request inaccuracies with plant management.
The licensee will investigate the computer data base and take corrective actions, if appropriate.
With the large number of changes required for the computer generated work requests, violation 269,270,287/88-13-04 will remain open until the data base for work requests accurately represents the actual testing requirement _ - _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _
_ _ _ - - - -.
- - _ _ _ -
-__
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee activities associated with Violation 269,270,287/88-13-05.
The licensee has not completed corrective actions; however, the licensee has revised the procedure requiring 10CFR50.59 evaluations for procedure revisions.
This will correct the deficiencies in alarm and setpoint changes, as they are handled under the procedure revision program.
This item will not be closed since corrective actions for the maintenance of design records for the 10CFR50.59 evaluations on the valve replacement program have not been fully implemented.
The inspectors reviewed the inensee actions for Inspector Followup Items (IFI) 269,270,287/88-13-07, Acc eptance criteria for freely moving valves, and reviewed revised proceorce PT/1/A/0150/22A, which has been changed to require that only manual valves will be checked for freedom of movement during the testing.
This removes the requirement for all valves to be verified for this, which was act performed on remotely operated valves. This item is closed.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee actions for IFI 269,270,287/88-13-08, Valve LP-21 concerns, and reviewed the PIR 1-088-0152 which was written to evaluate this concern.
The licensee has not completed the PIR and therefore this item will remain open.
5.
Unit 1 Electrical Configuration Control The inspectors reviewed the efforts of the I&E group to resolve the wiring configuration concerns for unit 2.
The licensee inspected approximately 11000 wiring terminations and identified 139 discrepancies which were classified as follows:
Test Panel
Transient Monitor
Shield Connections 17 Miscellaneous
Wiring Changes
Drawing Changes
Total 139 The following is a list of the wiring discrepancies identified during the licensee inspection of the configuration of each cabinet:
Reactor Protection System (RPS)
Drawing Number 0-781-B:
The drawing shows the shield connected to terminal 10, but the shield was connected to station ground.
This is the cable shield for channel C RTD.
The wiring was corrected to agree with the drawing.
.
I
_
- _ _ - _ _ _
-
--.
- - _ _ - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _--
--- - - _ _ _____ _
_
-
...
.
.
,
.
l
'
Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor Drawing Number 0-794-A:
Train A Cabinet A terminal block 116-has ' wires connected and the wires are not shown on the drawing.
The drawing will be corrected.
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Drawing' Number 0-769-D:
Terminal. block 3 terminals 21 and 23-are shown 'jumpered together with 3 wires on terminal 21 and I wire on terminal 23.
The field configuration is 2 wires on each terminal.
The circuit is electrically the same.
The drawing will be revised to reflect the field configuration.
Integrated Control System Drawing Number 0-785-A:
The drawing shows jumpers connected from terminal 1 -to 3 and 2 to 4.
These jumpers were not installed in the cabinet.
The jumpers provide a contact to provide. an alarm.
The jumpers were installed using a Work Request.
Terminals 14 and 15 are connected on the field side of the terminals,. but not connected,on the back olane.
These wires will be removed and tagged.
There were 54 Transient. Monitor connection points in the Integrated Control System Panels which were not shown on the connection drawings.
However, these points are listed on a Transient Monitor Tabulation sheet.
The connections will be added to the connection drawings.
There were 53 Test Panel connection points which do not appear in the connection drawings.
However, these points are listed on controlled tabulation lists 0-715-11.
The connection drawing will be revised to include these points.
A power connection for SASS was added under NSM-2730, but was not shown on the drawings.
The drawing will be revised'to show the connection.
A wire was installed by NSM-1531 to connect the OAC to the pressurizer heater low level interlock, but was not shown on the drawings.
No corrective actions were listed in the summary for this item.
I
l
_ - _ _ _ _ _
. _ - _
y.
.
l
.
.
.
Emergency Power Switching Logic For relays RTNb and RTNc, cabinet is wired with a jumper from contacts 4a to 3r to coil connection C1.
The connection -
drawing shows the jumpers from contacts 3r to 4r to coil connection C1.
This is electrically the same circuit and has no affect on operability.
The wiring will be changed to agree with the drawing.
Relay RTNa has an extra jumper installed across contacts 3r to coil connection C1.
This does no affect circuit operation since this same connection is supplied by other connections.
The jumper will be removed.
Relay STARb is shown on the drawing without the coil clearing contact connected, but the connection is in the field.
The drawing will be changed to show the connection.
Relays SBC2b and SBC2a are connected together by common wires.
These connections do not agree with the drawings, however the circuit is electrically correct.
The wiring will be changed to g ee with the drawing.
Relay RTEa has wires connected between terminals 4R to 3R to C1, but the drawing shows the wires connected to 3R to 4R to C1.
This is electrically the same circuit. The wiring will be changed to agree with the drawing.
Relays RTEb and RTEc have wires connected between terminals 3F
,
to 3R to C1, but the drawing shows the wires connected to 3R to
3F to C1.
This is electrically the same circuit.
The wiring will be changed to agree with the drawing.
On relay 27EYA2x, the wires on contacts 9a, lla, and 12a are not shown connected to the balance of the circuit on the drawing.
The drawing will be corrected to agree with the as-built configuration.
On Source
"B" Terminal Strip, computer cable 1EL702D is connected to terminals 4, 5, and the shield is on terminal 7..
The drawing shows the connections to terminals 5, 6, and the shield to terminal 7.
The wiring will be changed to agree with the drawing.
,
l On Source "C" Terminal Strip, the wiring connected to terminals
<
1, 2, and 3 are actually connected to terminals 2, 3, and 4
)
respectively.
Cable IMA102 shield is not connected to ground
!
and the jumper from terminal 11 to terminal 20 is not installed.
The wiring will be changed to agree with the drawing.
!
l
. - _ - - - - - - - - - - -
_ - - _ - _ _
-_.-_ _ _
-
- - - -
- _ - - - - -
- - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - - - - - -
l l'..
.
-
.
On Source
"C" Terminal Strip, Terminal Strip 12 is not connected in the cabinet.
The wiring from Terminal Strip 12 are actually connected to Terminal Strip 13.
The wiring will be changed to agree with the drawing.
Engineered Safeguards Terminal Cabinets Terminals R4-B1-T11 and R4-B2-T1 have a Transorb diode connected between the terminals.
This is the indicator lamp for the " Building Spray Outlet Valve".
This should have been connected between terminals T10 and T1. This is a wiring error and will be corrected.
This did not affect the operation of the circuit.
Terminal R6-B3-T11 has a Transorb diode connected which places the diode across the indicator lamp for the " Low Pressure Injection Valve"(LP-18).
This should have been connected to terminal T10. This is a wiring error and will be corrected.
Terminal R6-84-T2 has 1 wire connected, Terminal R6-B4-T2 has 3 wires connected.
The drawing shows 2 wires on each terminal.
This is electrically the same circuit.
This is a wiring error, and will be corrected.
As-built drawings show the wiring for NSM-1312, the NSM has not been implemented.
The drawings will be marked hold for implementation.
Terninals R8-B1-T5 and R8-B1-T6 are jumpered together (both labeled F50).
However, the wire for indicating lamp L12 on the cabinet door was connected to the left side cf T6. The drawing shows it connected to T5 on the left side.
The wire was moved to conform to the drawing and the link closed to complete the circuit.
The lamp worked properly as connected but did not agree with the drawing.
The link was open because no wire was connected on one side.
Terminal R9-85-T8 has only two wires connected in the cabinet while the drawing shows three.
Wire 4 (shown on the drawing on terminal 8 labeled AAS) is part of cable 1EWD204 going to 0-737-F.
However on 0-737-F wire 4 is labeled as AA7 (connected to terminal 10 on 0-757-C.
The cable does not have two wires labeled "4".
OEE-160-1 shows the connection as being AA7, not AA5 and AA7 is not connected to terminal 8.
This is a drawing error and the drawing will be corrected.
- _ _ _
_ - _ _-__ _-
_
_ _ - _ _
_.
._
_ - _.. _ -__________
_
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _
-
.
.
4
9 I
Terminal R4-B2-T3 is jumpered to R4-84-78, but no wire is connected to the other side of the term'.ral.
The equipment which used this connection has been deleted, but the wire was not removed.
This is a power tie point and has connections for other circuits which use the same power source.
The drawing will be changed to show this connection.
This circuit is part of the RZ module power for the Engineered Safeguards system.
The drawing will be changed to show the connection.
Connected wires for terminals R5-B3-T4 and RS-B3-T5 have been deleted from the drawing, but not removed from the cabinet.-
The wires will be removed to agree with the drawing.
Miscellaneous Terminal Cabinets On terminals RI-84-T4 and R1-84-T6, the cables shown on the right side of the drawing, which were labeled "for future use" are not installed in the cabinet.
The drawing will be changed to delete the cables.
Terminal R6-B1-T5 has five wires connected on the left side and two connected on the right.
The drawing only has one on the left and two on the right.
The extra wires supply power for relay timers CRIPX/AH, CRIPX/AM, CRIPX/BH, and CRIPX/BM, which are mounted remotely from the associated relay.
The drawing will be changed to show the extra wires.
On relays POLWD/A1, A2, B1, C1, C2, POL /AM, AH, BM, BH, 1PS236X, IPS237X, IPS238X, and IPS239X, the drawing shows jumpers connected from C1 of one relay to L1 of another and a jumper from L1 to C1 of the same relay.
In the cabinet the jumper goes from C1 of one and C1 of another and then jumpers from L1 to C1 of the same relay. This is electrically the same circuit.
The drawing will be changed to agree with the field wiring.
The drawing shows a wire connected to ICVPX 4R and 4Ra.
However, the cabinet has the connections on 4F and 4Fa.
The drawing will be changed to agree with the field wiring.
The drawing has connections from 1EP012Ra to 1EP0 2R and IEP01 2Fa.
The cabinet is wired EP01 2Ra to 1EP0 2R and then jumpered for 1EPO 2R to IEP012Fa.
This is electrically the same circuit.
The drawing will be changed to agree with the cabinet wiring.
The drawing shows C1 of relay ICVPX jumpered to L1 of IEP0, then jumpered to C1.
The cabinet has C1 of ICVPX jumpered to C1 of IEP0 and L1 jumpered to C1 of IEPO.
The drawing will be changed to agree with the cabinet wirin l
..
..:
.
.
,
.
.
Connection drawings show' 1PS259X contact 2F~ jumpered to relay 1PS260X contact 2F.
The jumper is not -installed in the field.
OEE-145-56 shows the circuit schematically and the ' jumper is
'not installed.
The relays are part of the F0W Pump discharge A:
& B pressure low circuit.
This ' circuit was installed by -
NSM-1584. The drawing will be corrected.
A.Transorb diode is connected across terminals R3-82-T1 and R3-B2-T5, which are connected across the coil of relay RV3X.
This is electrically correct, however, the diode is not shown connected to the relay coil.
Because of the close condition in the relay coil, the corrective action is to change the drawing to show the diode connected at the terminals.
Link R3-B3-T5 is~open.
The wiring went to the security trailer page equipment, which is no longer installed.
This was documented in the Open Link Inspection.
There is one wire connected to R3-B3-T12, but the print shows none.
This-is a connection point for a cable shield and will be added to the drawing.
The cabinet has one wire on each side of R3-84-T1 and R3-B4-T2, but the drawing shows two wires on the right side.
This is part of.the Office Area Page system and the two wires on the left should be on the right.
The drawing will be changed to show the wires as connected in the cabinet. This. configuration allows the circuit to be taken out of service without disabling other portions.
Cabinet has wire connected on the left side of R3-B4-T3, while the drawing shows the wire on the right side.
This is a shield connection, which is one end of a jumper to R3-B3-T12.
This was changed to agree with the drawing.
Cabinet wiring has two wires on the left side and one wire on the right side of R6-85-T9 and R6-B5-T10.
The drawing shows one wire on the left and one wire and a diode connection on the right.
The diode is not connected across the terminals as shown on the drawing.
It is however, mounted remotely under relay CRV3 and the extra wires on the right side of the terminals go to the diode.
This circuit provides power to the coil of relay CRV3.
The drawing will be changed to agree with the cabinet wiring.
L Ei__________----____________z_
j
-
- __ _ __
.
.
.
.,.
.
.
10. ExitInterview(30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on Februar.y 17, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The following items were discussed in detail:
Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph 269,270,287/88-13-01 Closed Failure to Provide Adequate IST and fire watches.
269,270,287/88-13-02 Closed Failure to measure full stroke time of section XI valves 269,270,287/88-13-03 Closed Failure to identify valves to be tested pursuant to ASME section XI requirements 269,270,287/88-13-04 Open Failure to correctly complete work requests 269,270,287/88-13-05 Open Failure to document the basis for 10CFR50.59 evaluations 269/88-13-06 Closed Failure to maintain electrical configuration control in the Engineered Safeguards (ES) and RPS cabinets 270/88-13-06 Open Failure to maintain electrical configuration control in the ES and RPS cabinets 269,270,287/88-13-07 Closed Acceptance criteria for freely moving valves 269,270,287/88-13-08 Open Valve LP-21 concerns The licensee provided no dissenting comments to the findings.
___ - __ ____-__ _