IR 05000269/1987001
| ML20211A144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1987 |
| From: | Blake J, Economos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211A067 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-87-01, 50-269-87-1, 50-270-87-01, 50-270-87-1, 50-287-87-01, 50-287-87-1, NUDOCS 8702190099 | |
| Download: ML20211A144 (9) | |
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s u4 UNITED STATES
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p NUCLEAR REHULATORY COMMISSION y
o REGION il
- t 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SulTE 2900
e ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323 o
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Report Nos.: 50-269/87-01, 50-270/87-01, and 50-287/87-01 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos.:
DPR-38 DPR-47, and
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Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Inspection C Ja ry 5-8,1987
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Inspect r:
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Date Signed Approved b :
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f.f.BTake,SectionChief Date Signed
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[EngineeringBranch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of licensee action on previous open items, Unit 3 inservice inspection (ISI) plan for this outage; Eddy Current (EC) examination of Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) tubes; inspection of damaged 38-1 reactor coolant pump (RCP) and dis-assembly and repair plans for the pump; and review of welding Quality Control (QC) inspection manual.
Results:
One violation was identified - Violation 269, 270, 287/87-01-01 Criteria for Cold Springing of Pipe During Field Installation, paragraph 8.
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
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- M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager
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- T. B. Owen, Superintendent Maintenance R. J. Brackett, Senior Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer B. K. Millsaps, Maintenance Services Engineer e
B. W. Carney, Jr., Mechanical Technical Support Engineer S. L. Batson, Assistant Engineer, Maintenance Services
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I. E. Few, Nuclear Production Specialist, Maintenance Services
- T. M. Hilderbrand, Eddy Current, ISI
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W. R. Hunt ISI Coordinator, Oconee G. L. Blubaugh, QA Technician, Welding / Nondestructive Testing F. E. Owens, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
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Other Organizations
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Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), Special Products and Integrated Field Services H. E. Stopplemann, ISI Coordinator, Oconee
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NRC Resident Inspector
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- J. C. Bryant, Senior Resident Inspector
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- Attended exit interview
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Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 8,~1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector; described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
Violation 269,270,287/87-01-01, Criteria for Cold Springing of Pipe During
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Field Installation - Paragraph 8a.
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 287/87-02, ISI Examination of 3RCP-Blicasing
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Paragraph 6b.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
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to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
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Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Unresolved Item (UNR) 287/85-33-01, Main Feedwater Nozzle Weld, Postweld Heat Treatment (PWHT) Documentation The licensee's cognizant engineer described the action taken by the licensee to rectify the problem.
More specifically, the licensee revised Section VIII, Heat Treatment of Welds, of the Oconee Maintenance Welding Program Manual.
By this revision, the Welding Technical Support group and QA are now responsible for reviewing the requirements for (PWHT), and preparing and approving the procedure for the applicable weld.
Provisions for calibrating thermocouples and recording instruments and maintaining appropriate records have been included.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Reactor Coolant Pump 3B-1 Failure (Unit 3) (62701)
On October 30, 1986, Oconee Unit 3 reduced power to 67% in order to remove reactor coolant pump (RCP) "3B"-1 from service because of high motor frame vibration, indicated flow degradation and indicated loose parts monitor (LPM) noise.
The plant continued operation at this power level while evaluating the described condition.
On or about November 17,1986, LPM monitoring showed an increased in the magnitude and frequency of recorded impacts.
Approximately a month later, or about December 17, 1986, instru-mentation on the RCPs indicated certain vibration changes in RCP "38"-2 and
"3A"-1, which prompted the licensee to shut down the unit on December 18, 1986. At the time of this inspection, the root cause for the pump's failure was unknown.
Following an investigation of the failed parts and an evalua-tion of events leading to the failure, the cause of the failure would probably be determined. Through discussions with the licensee's representa-tive, the inspector learned that RCP "3B"-1 had been disassembled and that the ensuing inspection had disclosed that the lower section of the impeller, wear ring and suction adapter had sustained severe wear, the root cause of which was unknown at this time.
Further discussions with the licensee's cognizant engineer disclosed that certain loose parts, e.g.
portions of the case rings, were located and removed from the volute region.
Also, it was disclosed that the RCP casing's inner surface had sustained some scoring and light galling.
In addition, it was stated that no large loose parts were found in the cold leg pipe below the pump. However, a more detailed inspection was being planned to investigate more fully the extent of the damage and to look further for more loose parts and/or damage in this area and inside the reactor vessel.
A video tape, showing the general condition of the pump casing, af ter disassembly, was viewed by the inspector.
The viewing confirmed the licensee's disclosures on the condition of the pumps internal surfaces. Repairs and replacement of parts
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f were being accomplished'under Work Request No. 545b2E.
Approved site maintenance procedures were being used to control and document specific activities associated with this work effort. Section 5.4.1.2 of the Oconee n
FSAR defines the RCPs in Units 2 and 3 as single suction, single stage, verti, cal, radially balanced, constant speed, centrifugal pumps manufactured by
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Bingham.. The pump casing design utilizes a quad-volute inner case which is permanently ~ welded to the pressure containing outer case.
The quad-volute inner casing consists of four volute passages spaced 90 apart which receive the discharge from the pump impeller and guide it into the outer casing where it flows to the discharge nozzle through a passage having a constantly increasing cross-sectional area.
The pump casing is welded into the piping system and the pump internals can be removed for inspection or maintenance without removing the casing from the piping.
The pump shaft is coupled to s
xthe motor with a spacer coupling which will pennit/ removal and replacement of the seals without removing the motor.
The RC Pump casings were fabricated in accordance with ASME Section III Class A, Summer 1967 Addencum, but are not code stamped.
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In anticipation of possible surface repairs to the casing's internal surfaces, the inspector discussed with the licensee applicable ASME Section XI requirements which would have to be observed for the repair.
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The inspector will review work plans and records of this activity on a routine basis during a future inspection.
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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Inservice Ins'pection - Observation Of Work Activities (Unit 3)
(73752,73753,73755)
Because of the plant coming off the line sooner.than planned, and the m
m emphasis placed on the effort to repair RCP
"3B"-1, preparations for inservice inspections (ISI) scheduled for this outage were delayed.
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However, discussions with the site ISE coordinator disclosed that the following components and/or welds would be examined during this outage.
ITEM EXAMINATION STATUS i
s s Once Through Steam Eddy Current In Progress Generators (OTSG), "A"
> and "B" Reactor Vessel Head Visual and Magnetic To be done lifting Lugs Particle Inspection (MT)
OTSG "A"-
Ultrasonic Examination Work to Start on
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Upper & Lower Circle.
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ITEM EXAMINATION STATUS OTSG "B"-
Ultrasonic Examination Work postponed to Upper & Lower Circle (UT) and MT next outage because Seams of RCP "B" problem and failure to receive auto:a. UT equipment to be used for examination RCPs - Flywheel, UT & Visual End of February Studs, and Nuts Inspection (VT)
Class 2 weld joints, Radiography (RT)
Work to Start during Reactor building, wk of January 12 auxiliary and turbine buildings Pipe Welds (Various)
UT/PT/MT January 10 Reactor Bldg.
The inspector examined the ISI activities described below to determine whether these activities were being performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and licensee procedures.
The applicable code for the ISI is
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ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,1980 Edition, with Addenda through the winter of 1980, a.
Eddy Current (EC) (OTSG) Tubes, Unit 3 ISI activities during this refueling outage included the eddy current (EC)
l examination of tubes in "A" and "B" OTSGsi Data acquisition and analysis l
were being performed by B&W.
The approved B&W procedure ISI-418, Rev. 2
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and related references such as, Regulatory Guide 1.83, July 1975 and Code Case N-401 were the governing documents.
l The examination was being performed with a multi-frequency technique and l
utilized the computerized MIZ-18 EC Examination System to analyze tube integrity.
Discussions with the licensee disclosed that approximately 8750 tubes would be examined in OTSG "A" and 9160 tubes in "B".
The status of f
the examination as of January 8,1987, was as follows:
i OTSG"A" 0TSG "B" Tubes Analyzed 368 786
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Tubes with >40%
through wall
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degradation
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OTSG"A" 0TSG "B" Tubes with 20%-39% through wall degradation
6 Tubes with <20%
through wall degradation
5 Tubes with indications having a signal noise (S/N)
sufficient to warrant tracking during future outages
35 During the inspection, the inspector observed the on going examination, discussed its various aspects with cognizant licensee and contractor personnel and reviewed personnel certifications, instrument / standards, calibration records and certifications.
The following procedures were reviewed for content.
ISI-416 Rev. 9 Multifrequency Eddy Current Examination of Tubing in 177 Steam Generator ISI-418 Rev. 2 Technical Procedure of Multifrequency Eddy Current Examination of 0TSG Tubing in 177 SGs using the MIZ-18 System 151-425 Rev. 10 Eddy Current Examination of 0TSG Tubing by Absolute Multicoil (8 x 1) Technique b.
Relative to RCP 38.1, the licensee's representative asked whether Region II would consider the possibility of performing an ASME
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Section XI inservice volumetric examination on 3RCP-B1-casing welds now that the pump was disassembled.
The licensee's contention was that the
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welds are now easily accessible which would improve RT film quality and help minimize radiation exposure.
A review of applicable code requirements and the inspection plan for Oconee Unit 3 revealed that the licensee had selected 3RCP-Al-casing welds for satisfying the code's ISI requirements and inspected them at the end of the first inspection interval in April 4,1984.
Results of the radiographic examination showed the welds contained no rejectable indication. With regards to successive inspections, IWB-2420 of the code states that, the sequence of component examinations established during the first inspection interval shall be repeated during each successive inspection interval to the extent practica __
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In view of these circumstances and requirements, the inspector stated that Region II would have no objections if the licensee proceeded with-the prcposed examination of 3RC-81-casing instead of the 3RCP-Al-casing. -This decision was based on the fact that:
(1) historically these welds, because of the material and -the relatively low stress area, have been relatively free of service induced defects and (2) other ' licensees have requested and received relief from the Commission for this code requirement, citing high radiation exposure to personnel, marginal test results and excessively high costs without and a. corresponding increase to the margin of safety and health to the general public.
The licensee indicated that steps would be taken to inform NRR of their intent and submit a request for code relief from IWB-2420 for these welds.
The inspector stated that an inspector-followup item (IFI) would be identified to assure that appropriate documentation and tracking of this issue is maintained (Inspector Followup Item 287/87-01-02, ISI examination of 3RCP-B1-casing).
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identi-fied.
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Review Of Quality Control Inspection Procedures - Welding (550508)
Inspections of field fabricated welding are performed by certified QA/QC personnel.in accordance with approved site procedures written to comply with applicable code and regulatory requirements.
Pipe welds are fabricated, inspected and tested in accordance with USAS B31.7-67 Nuclear Power Piping Code or USAS B31.1-67 Power Piping Code as applicable.
As part of the continued monitoring effort of activities and review of quality records and procedures'in this area, the inspector reviewed the following QC procedures for content and to ascertain whether they complied with requirements as stipulated in the above codes.
QCL-8 Procedure for the Inspection of QA Condition 2, 3, and 4 Field Fabricated Pipe Welds - Code B31.1 For welds in this pipe class, the procedure requires that before welding pipes be inspected for cleanliness, fitup and material identification.
Other inspections include inspec-tion of tack welds, joint geometry / weld prep and completed welds.
QCL-16 Rav. 2 Prc:sdure for Inspection of ASME Section XI Piping Welds This procedure addresses requirements for weld identification records, cleanliness, fitup, inspection of welding activi-ties, final visual, and nondestructive examinations.
The procedure also references procedure QCD-2 listed below.
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QCD-2 Cleanliness Control of QA Condition Piping System at Nuclear Stations.
NDE-60 Rev. 3 Visual Workmanship Standards for Welds...
This procedure references ASME Section V with Addenda through Winter 1981 and Articles 1 and 9.
Thickness of reinforcement for piping welds is one of the inspection attributes.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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Corrective Action On Inspector Followup Items, (IFI)(92701B)
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(Closed) IFI 269, 270, 287/86-03-01, Criteria for Cold Springing of Pipe During Field Installation During a review of procedures in the Maintenance Welding Manual for Oconee conducted during a RII inspection, February 18-21, 1986, the inspector noted that acceptance criteria for cold Spring of pipe during installation had not been addressed in the pipe specification.
The subject matter was discussed with the licensee's representative who agreed to refer the problem to Duke's Design Engineering Department for resolution.
At the time of the current inspection, January 5-8, 1987, the inspector asked the licensee to provide for review the actions taken to correct this problem.
In response, the licensee's representative stated that Engineering was notified and provided the inspector with copies of their memoranda.
The inspector reviewed the correspondence provided, and noted that in May of 1986, Design Engineering drafted a revision to Oconee's Pipe Specification No. OS-0243.00-00-0001, Section 4.4 covering cold springing.
The revision was accepted and subsequently placed on hold until some problems with a Cold Springing Procedure at the Catawba Nuclear Station were corrected. The problem was related to the spring force values developed.
It appears that the values in the Catawba Procedure are too small to be useful.
Thus, whenever cold springing becomes a problem, the station contacts Design Engineering, who deals with cold springing on a case-to-case basis. Presently, the licensee's position is that until problems with Catawba's procedures are resolved, the Cold Springing Procedure will not be incorporated into the Oconee Pipe Specification.
Following this review and discussion, the inspector informed the licensee that failure to provide appropriate acceptance criteria for cold springing of piping in erection in the applicable procedure and the Oconee piping specifica-tion is in violation of 10 CFR Appendix B Criterion V.
Therefore, the inspector stated that the previously identified IFI 269, 270, 287/86-03-01 would be closed and a violation opened.
The violation was identified as 269, 270, 287/87-01-01 Criteria of Cold Springing of Piping During Field Installatio k
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he g* sed) IFI, 269, 270, gg77g6~03-02 Use of Stress Relieved Filler
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The licensee has revised welding process specifications L-200 and L-300 to require that the filler metal used in the field would be as specified on the field weld data sheets. This means that if the filler metal identified on the field weld data sheet was post weld heat treated, then the filler metal used in the field would be in the same condition.
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