ML063110334
| ML063110334 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2006 |
| From: | Palagi B NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML062260233 | List: |
| References | |
| BYRON 2006-0013 | |
| Download: ML063110334 (50) | |
Text
BYRON JUNE 2006 EXAMINATION OUTLINE SUBMITTAL
January 24, 2006 LTR: BYRON 2006-0013 File: 1.10.0101 James Caldwell, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I11 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210 Lisle, I L 60532-4352 Byron Station, Units 1and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455
Subject:
Submittal of Initial Operator Licensing Examination Outline
- Enclosed are the examination outlines, supporting the Initial License examination scheduled for the weeks of June 19, 2006 through June 30, 2006 at Byron Station.
This submittal includes all appropriate Examination Standard forms and outlines in accordance with NUREG-1021 "Operator Licensing Examination Standards", Revision 9.
I n accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Section ES-201, "Initial Operator Licensing Examination Process," please ensure that these materials are withheld from public disclosure until after the examinations are complete.
Should you have any questions Concerning this letter, please contact Mr. W. Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance Manager, a t 815-406-2800. For questions concerning examination materials, please contact Marty Jorgensen a t 815-406-3111.
2078 ( ~ i i L . & Dd.fJ RespedfuIly, Stephen E. Kuczynski Site Vice President Byron Nuclear Generating Station SEK/MJ/TLF/rah
Enclosures listed below will be hand delivered to Bruce Palagi, Chief Examiner, NRC Region 111
- Examination Security Agreements (Form ES-201-3) v - Administrative Topics Outline(s) (Form ES-301-1)
- Control Room/n-Plant Systems Outline (Form ES-301-2)
- PWR Examination Outline (Form ES-401-2)
- Generic Knowledge and abilities Outline (Tier 3) (Form ES-401-3)
- Scenario Outlines (Form ES-D-1)
- Record of Rejected K/As (Form ES-401-4)
- Completed Checklists:
o Examination Outline quality Checklist (Form ES-201-2) o Transient and Event Checklist (Form ES-301-5)
/
Exel nl January 17,2006 LTR: BYRON 2006-0011 File: 1.10.0101 James Caldwell, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region Ill 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210 Lisle, IL 60532-4352 Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50455
Subject:
Submittal of Knowledge and Abilities (WA) statements that will be suppressed from the random exam generation process It is our intent to develop the upcoming initial license exam scheduled for June 19-30, 2006 in accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 9, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for L Power Reactors."
In accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 9, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors", Byron Station is submitting for your review the list of WA statements that will be suppressed from the random exam generation process in support of our June 19-30, 2006 license exam. Byron Station has reviewed all the WA's in the catalog that have importance ratings less than 2.5 and have suppressed these WA's from random selection.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. W. Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at 815406-2800.
Respectfully, Stephen E. Kuczynski Site Vice President Byron Nuclear Generating Station SEWMJ/TLF/rah
Enclosures:
Byron Station Suppressed K/A Statements
Byron Suppressed KAs Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 00000 I Continuous Rod Withrlrciwcil AK1.14 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Interaction of ICs control stations as well as 3.4 3.7 Not applicable to as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICs BraidwocdByron.
emergency task:
000003 Dropped Control Rod AA1.04 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following Control rod drive safety rod out limit bypass switch 3.4' 3.3 Not applicable to as they apply the Dropped Control Rod: or key Braidwocd/Byron.
AK1.13 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Interaction of ICs control stations as well as 3.2 3.6 Not applicable to as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICs Braidwood/Byron.
emergency task:
AK2.03 Knowledge of the following components: Metroscope 3.1 3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following When ICs logic has failed on a dropped rod, the load 3.5' 3.9' Not applicable to Responses as they apply to the Dropped must be reduced until flux is within specified target BraidwoodIByron.
Control Rod: Bank AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Turbine automatic runback with reactor in order 3.4' 3.7' Not applicable to Responses as they apply to the Dropped to balance power output BraidwocdlByron.
Control Rod:
AK3.04 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Actions contained in EOP for dropped control rod 3.8 4.1 Not applicable to following: BraidwaxVByron.
000005 lnoperable/Stuck Control Rod AA1.03 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Metroscope 3.4 3.4 Not applicable to BraidWByron.
AA2.02 Ability to determine or interpret: Difference between jog and run rod speeds, 2.5 3.0 Not applicable to effect on CRDM of stuck rod BraidwdByron.
AK1.04 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Definitions of axial imbalance, neutron error, 3.0 3.4 Not applicable to as they apply to the inoperable/stuck control rod power demand, actual power tracking mode, ICs BraidwdByron.
emergency task:
AK2.03 Knowledge of the following components: Metroscope 3.1 3.3 Not applicable to BraidwdByron.
000008 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Vulve Stuck Open)
AA2.04 Ability to determine or interpret: High-temperaturecomputer alarm and alarm type 3.2 3.4 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA2.09 Ability to determine or interpret: PZR spray block valve controls and indicators 3.6 3.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.
Page I p"
- i
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 000009 Sinal1 Brccik LOCA EA1.03 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Low-pressure SWS activity monitor 3.2 3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.
EA1.18 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Balancing of HPI loop flows 3.4 3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
EA2.09 Ability to determine or interpret: Low-pressure SWS activity monitor 2.8 3.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.
EA2.22 Ability to determine or interpret: Charging flow trend recorder 3.0' 3.3' Not applicable to BraidwdByron.
EA2.35 Ability to determine or interpret: Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling 3.4 4.1 Not applicable to spray BraidwdByron.
EK3.25 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Monitoring of in-coreT-cold 3.6 3.9 Not applicable to following: BraidwWByron.
EK3.27 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Manual depressurization or HPI recirculation for 3.6 3.8 Not applicable to following: sustained high pressure BraidwWByron.
00001I Large Break LOCA EA1.02 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Reflux boiling sump level indicators 3.8 4.1 Not applicable to BraidwdByron.
EA1.09 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Core flood tank initiation 4.3 4.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.
EA1.16 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Balancing of HPI loop flows 3.5 3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
EA2.11 Ability to determine or interpret: Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI 3.9 4.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.
E M . 12 Ability to determine or interpret: Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling 3.6 3.8 Not applicable to spray Braidwood/Byron.
EK3.07 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Stopping charging pump bypass flow 3.5 3.6 Not applicable to following: Braidwood/Byron.
0000I 5/17 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Maljknctions AA1.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following: RCP ventilation cooling fan run indicators 2.5 2.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA1.19 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Power transfer confirm lamp 2.9 3.0 Not applicable to BraidwdByron.
AA2.09 Ability to determine or interpret: When to secure RCPs on high stator temperatures 3.4 3.5 Braidwood and Byron have no procedural requirement to stop RCPs based on Stator Temperature.
AK1.03 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts The basis for operating at a reduced power level 3.0 4.0 Not applicable to as they apply to the RCP malfunctions emergency when one RCP is out of service BraidwodByron.
task:
AK3.04 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Reduction of power to below the steady state 3.1 3.2 Not applicable to following: power-to-flow limit BraidwoodIByron.
AK3.05 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Shift of T-ave sensors to the loop with the highest 2.8' 3.0' Not applicable to following: flow BraidwodByron.
Puge 2 I
/
Viewed KA Category Statement K A Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 000024 Eniergrncy Boratiori AAl.01 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Use of spent fuel pool as backup to BWST 2.7' 3.4' Not applicable to BraidwdByron.
AAl.08 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Pump speed controlled to protect pump seals 2.7 3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA1.ll Ability to operate and monitor the following: BIT suction and recirculation valves 2.9 2.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.
AA1.24 Ability to operate and monitor the following: BIT inlet and outlet valve switches and indicators 3.2 3.1 Not applicable to BraidwocWByron.
000025 L o s s of Residual Heut Removal System (RHRS)
AA1.05 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Raw water or sea water pumps 2.7 2.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA1.19 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Block orifice bypass valve controllers and indicators 2.6' 2.4' Not applicable to BraidwodByron.
AA1.22 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Obtaining of water from BWST for LPI system 2.9 2.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA2.05 Ability to determine or interpret: Limitations on LPI flow and temperature rates of 3.1 3.5 Not applicable to change BraidwdByron.
AK2.04 Knowledge of the following components: Raw water or sea water pumps 2.4 2.4 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
000026 Lnss o j Component Cooling Wuter (CCW )
AA1.03 Ability to operate and monitor the following: SWS as a backup to the CCWS 3.6' 3.6' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA1.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following: CRDM high-temperature alarm system 2.7 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoociByron.
AK3.01 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the The conditions that will initiate the automatic 3.2 3.5 Not applicable to following: opening and closing of the SWS isolation valves to BraidwWByron.
the CCWlnuclear service water coolers 00002 7 Pressiirizer Pressitre Coritrol System (PZR PCS) Malfitnctioii AAl.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Pressure recovery, using emergency-only heaters 3.9' 3.6' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron AA1.05 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Transfer of heaters to backup power supply 3.3' 3.2' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron AA2.13 Ability to determine or interpret: Seal return flow 2.8 2.9 Seal Return flow not impacted by PZR pressure changes BraidwodByron.
000028 Pressrtrizer (PZR) Level Coritrol Malfunction AK1.05 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Change in PZR level with power change, even though 2.9 3.0 Not applicable to responses as they apply to the Pressurizer RCS T-ave. constant, due to loop size difference B r a i d w W Byron.
Level Control Malfunctions:
AA2.13 Ability to determine or interpret: The actual PZR level, given uncompensatedlevel 2.9 3.2 Not applicable to With an appropriate graph BraidwoodlByron.
y"
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 000028 Pressiirixr (PZK)Level C'otitrd Muifirriction (Coritiiiued)
AK3.04 Knowledge of the basis or reasons for the Change in PZR level with power change, even though 2.9 3.0 Not applicable to Following: T-ave constant, due to loop size difference BraidwoodlByron.
000029 Anticipteil Triinsient Without Scrcitn (A TWS)
EA1.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following: BIT inlet valve switches 3.9 3.8 Not applicable to BradwWByron.
EA1.05 Ability to operate and monitor the following: BIT outlet valve switches 3.7 3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodfByron.
EA2.10 Ability to determine or interpret: Positive displacement charging pumps 3.1 3.4 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.
EK3.03 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Opening BIT inlet and outlet valves 3.7 3.6 Not applicable to following: BraidwoodtByron.
EK3.04 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Closing the normal charging header isolation 3.1 3.1 Not applicable to following: valves BraidwoodlByron.
EK3.05 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Closing the centrifugal charging pump recirculation 3.4 3.5 Not applicable to following: valve BraidwWByron.
000032 LAXY of Source R ~ ~ i gNuclear e I~istrunieritcitioti AA2.03 Ability to determine or interpret: Expected values of source range indication when 2.8 3.1 Not applicable to i High voltage is automatically removed Byron SR instruments.
AA2.09 Ability to determine or interpret: Effects of improper HV setting 2.5 2.9 Not applicable to Byron SR instruments.
AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications Effects of voltage changes on performance 2.5 3.1 Not applicable to of the following concepts: Byron SR instruments 000.33 Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instruntentation AA2.11 Ability to determine or interpret: Loss of compensating voltage 3.1 3.4 Not applicable to Byron IR instruments.
AK1.O1 Knowledge of the operational implications Effects of voltage changes on performance 2.5 3.1 Not applicable to of the following concepts: Byron instruments.
000037 Stearn Generator (S/G) Tube Leak AA1.03 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as Loop isolation valves 3.0' 2.9 Not applicable to they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak BraidwoodByron AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Collection of Condensate in air ejector monitor 2.3 2.6 Not applicable to responses as they apply to the Steam Generator due to its failure Braidwoodl6yron Tube Leak:
AK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons tor the following Use of "feed and bleed" process 2.5 2.9 Not applicable to responses as they apply to the Steam Generator BraidwoodlByron Tube Leak:
0000.38 Stearn Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
EK3.07 Knowledge of the reasons for the following RCS loop isolation valves 3.4' 3.8 Not applicable to responses as they apply to the SGTR BraidwoWByron
Viewed KA Cateaorv Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 000040 Sten% Line Rupture Al.21 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following Vibration alarm 2.3' 2.5 Not applicable to as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: Braidwood/Byron.
Al.22 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following Load sequencer status lights 3.0' 3.0' Not applicable to as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: Braidwood/Byron.
000056 Loss of Ofi~itePower AA1.15 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Service water booster pump 2.7' 2.9' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA1.20 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Speed switch room ventilation fan 3.0 3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA2.02 Ability to determine or interpret: ESF load sequencer status lights 3.5' 3.6' Not applicable to BraidwWByron.
AA2.11 Ability to determine or interpret: Operational status of service water booster pump 2.9' 2.9' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA2.29 Ability to determine or interpret: Service water booster pump ammeter and flowmeter 3.0' 3.2' Not applicable to BraidwWByron.
AA2.38 Ability to determine or interpret: Load sequencer status lights 3.7' 3.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.
000057 Loss of' Vitd AC Elrctr-icd Iiistriinicwt this AA2.02 Ability to determine or interpret: Core flood tank pressure and level indicators 3.7 3.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
AA2.08 Ability to determine or interpret: Reactor power digital display and remote flux meter 3.4' 3.5' Not applicable to BraidwWByron.
000062 Loss of Nuclear Service Wuter AA1.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following: CRDM high-temperature alarm system 2.7 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.
AA1.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following: SWS as a backup to the CCWS 3.6' 3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoWByron.
AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening 3.2' 3.5' Not applicable to responses: and closing of the SWS isolation valves to the nuclear Braidwood/Byron.
nuclear service water coolers 000065 Loss of Iiistrunient Air AA2.02 Ability to determine or interpret: Relationship of flow readings to system operation 2.4' 2.6' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
00006 7 Plaiit Fire on Site AK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Actions contained in EOP for plant fire on site 3.3 4.1 Not applicable to responses: Braidwood/Byron.
AA2.10 Ability to determine or interpret: Time limit of long-term breathing air system for 2.9' 3.6' Not applicable to control room Braidwood/Byron.
Page 5
)
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis UU0~~8 Control Koorri Eiwxntiori AA1.09 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Synchroscope key 3.1' 2.7' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.
AA1.20 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Indicators for operation of startup transformer 3.2 3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.
AK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Filling the feedwater system and closing the A M 3.0' 3.2' Not applicable to responses: pump discharge valve Braidwood/Byron.
AK3.05 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Repositioning valves to isolate and drain the A M I 3.5 3.6 Not applicable to responses: pump turbine and steam supply header BraidwoodIByron.
AK3.16 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Fail-open of the control room doors for personnel 2.8 3.3 Not applicable to responses: evacuation Braidwood/Byron.
0000 74 Imdequcite Core Cooling EA1.03 Ability to operate and monitor the following: The alternate control station for turbine bypass 3.9 3.9 Not applicable to valve operation Braidwood/Byron.
EA1.08 Ability to operate and monitor the following: HPI System 4.2 4.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
EA1.14 Ability to operate and monitor the following: Alarm for loss of subcooling margin 4.1 4.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
000076 High Renctor Coolwit Activity AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Increased CCW flow 2.4 2.6 Not applicable to responses: BraidwoodlByron.
001000 Control Rod Drive System Al.08 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Verification that CRDS temperatures are within 2.6 3.0 Not applicable to parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) limits before starting BraidwWByron.
associated with operating the CRDS controls including:
A1.10 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Location and operation of controls and indications for 2.9 2.7 Not applicable to parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) CRDS component cooling water BraidwoodJByron.
associated with operating the CRDS controls including:
Al.ll Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Required primary system subcooling during shutdown; 3.7 3.9 Not applicable to parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) location of indication BraidwoodIByron.
associated with operating the CRDS controls including:
A1.13 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in "Prepower dependent insertion limit" and power 4.0? 4.2? Not applicable to parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) dependent insertion limit, determined with metroscope Braidwood/Byron.
associated with operating the CRDS controls including:
Page 6
)
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 00 IO00 Coritrol Rod Drive System(Coritiniied A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Positioning of axial shaping rods and their effect on 3.2' 3.8' Not applicable to malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) SDM BraidwoodlByron.
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.08 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Loss of CCW to CRDS 2.9 3.3 Not applicable to malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) Braidwood/Byron based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.20 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Isolation of Left coil on affected rod to prevent coil 2.6 3.6 Not applicable to malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) burnout Braidwood/Byron.
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Controls for CCWS 3.1 2.9 Not applicable to control room: BraidwoodlByron.
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Part-length rod position 3.9 3.6 Not applicable to control room: BraidwoodlByron.
A4.07 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Power source transfer check 3.3 3.3 Not applicable to control room: Braidwood/Byron.
A4.09 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the ccws 2.8 3.1 Not applicable to control room: BraidwoodlByron.
A4.12 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Stopping T/G load changes; only make minor 2.9' 2.9 Not applicable to control room: adjustments to prevent coil burnout BraidwoodlByron.
A4.13 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Stopping other changes in plant, e.g., turbine, S/G, 2.7' 2.9' Not applicable to control room: SDBCS, boration, before adjusting rods BraidwWByron.
A4.14 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Resetting rod control logic while recoveringfrom 3.0 3.4 Not applicable to control room: misaligned rod, using instrument Tech-Specs . Braidwood/Byron.
A4.15 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Stopping boratioddilutionor other means of reactivity 3.1' 3.1' Not applicable to control room: change while adjusting either rod position or T-ave .* Braidwood/Byron.
K1.O1 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or ccw 3.0 3.2 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the CRDS and BraidwWByron.
the following systems:
K1.09 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or CCWS must be cut in before energizing CRDS 2.8 3.1 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the CRDS and BraidwWByron.
the following systems:
K4.04 Knowledge of CROS design feature@)and/or Circuitry and principle of operation for LVDT or 2.5 2.8 Not applicable to interlock(s)which provide for the following: reed switch BraidwodByron.
K5.11 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Reason for maintaining cross-tie breaker between 2.4 2.9 Not applicable to as they apply to the CRDS: between rod drive M/G sets: reliability of control BraidwoodJByron.
rod drive trip breakers during operation of one M/G set K5.12 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Effects on power of insetting axial shaping rods 3.4 4.1 Not applicable to as they apply to the CRDS: Braidwood/Byron.
K5.71 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Relationship between reactivity worth of 3.1 3.6 Not applicable to as they apply to the CRDS: power-shaping control rod group and other control Braidwmd/Byron.
rod groups (power-shaping,or part-length, rods have much less reactivity than full-length control Page 7
)
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 00IO00 Control Rod Drive System(Continued)
K5.76 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Effects on power of inserting axial shaping rods 3.3' 3.7' Not applicable to as they apply to the CRDS: Braidwood/Byron.
K5.79 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Effects of positioning of axial shape rods on SDM 3.0' 3.6' Not applicable to as they apply to the CRDS: Braidwood/Byron.
K5.98 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Effect of adding high or low boron concentration to 3.4 3.8 Not applicable to as they apply to the CRDS: maintain T-ave. equal to T-ref Braidwood/Byron.
K6.09 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction Purpose and operation of neutron flux recorder 2.9' 2.9' Not applicable to on the following CRDS components: at high speed concentration BraidwoodIByron.
002000 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCS, Containment sound-monitoring system 2.6 2.8 Not applicable to including: BraidwoodByron.
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the The fillingdraining of LPI pumps during refueling 2.8 2.6 Not applicable to control room: BraidwoodByron.
A4.05 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the The HPI system when it is used to refill the 2.8 2.7 Not applicable to control room: refueling cavity Braidwood/Byron.
K5.16 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Reason for automatic features of the Feedwater 3.5 4.0 Not applicable to as they apply to the RCS: control system during total loss of reactor coolant Braidwood/Byron.
flow 003000 Recictor C o o h i t P i m p SySteFn (RCPS)
K3.05 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the RCPS ICs 3.6 3.7 Not applicable to will have on the following: BraidwWByron.
004000 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
A2.08 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Loss of heat tracing 3.0 3.7 Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and BraidwWByron.
(b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control,or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.24 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Isolation of both letdown filters at one time: 2.8 2.8 Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and down-stream relief lifts Braidwood/Byron.
(b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control,or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.33 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Fact that isolating cation demineralizer stops boron 2.7 3.3 Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and dilution and enables restoration of normal boron BraidwWByron, (b) based on those predictions, use procedures concentration to correct, control,or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A4.20 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Deborating demineralizer selector valve and selector 2.6 2.5 Not applicable to control room: valve control switch Braidwood/Byron.
K4.22 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the Boronometer chart recorder 2.5' 2.5' Not applicable to control room: Braidwood/Byron.
Kl.09 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Relationship between CVCS and RPlS 2.2 2.7 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and BraidwodByron.
the following systems:
Page 8
Viewed KA Category Statement K A Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 004000 Cheiiiiccil ( i d V o l m e Coritrol Systerit (CVCS)(Contiriued)
K1.25 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Interface between HPI flow path and excess 2.7' 3.2' Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and letdown flow path Braidwood/Byron.
the following systems:
K5.31 Knowledge of the operational implications of: Purpose of flow path around boric acid storage tank 3.0' 3.4 Not applicable to the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS Braidwood/Byron.
K5.32 Knowledge of the operational implications of: Purpose and control of heat tracing 3.1 3.4 Not applicable to the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS (prevent crystallization) BraidwoodlByron.
K5.33 Knowledge of the operational implications of: Use of a boronometer 2.3' 2.6 Not applicable to the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS BraidwoodlByron.
K6.12 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction Principle of recirculation valve: (permit emergency flow 3.1 3.4 Not applicable to on the following CVCS components: even ifvalve is blocked by crystallized boric acid) BraidwoocUByron.
00.Fooo Residucil Hecit Removal System { RHRs)
K4.12 Knowledge of RHRS design feature@)and/or n Lineup for piggyback mode with CSS 3.1
- 3.7' Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide or the following: BraidwoodlByron.
006000 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Loss of heat tracing 2.8 3.1 Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) Braidwood/Byron.
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.09 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere 2.6 3.2' Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) Braidwood/Byron.
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Transfer from boron storage tank to boron injection 3.5 3.5 Not applicable to control room: tank BraidwoodlByron.
K1.07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or MFW System 2.9 3.3 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and BraidWByron.
the following systems:
K1.10 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Safety injection tank heating system 2.6 2.8 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and Braidwood/Byron.
the following systems:
K2.03 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Heat tracing 2.3 2.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.
K4.19 Knowledge of ECCS design features(s) and/or Interlocks to storage tank makeup valve 3.0 3.1 Not applicable to interlock(s)which provide for the following: BraidwoodByron.
K4.20 Knowledge of ECCS design features(s) and/or Automatic closure of common drain line 3.2' 3.5' Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: and fill valves to accumulator BraidwoocUByron.
K4.29 Knowledge of ECCS design features@)and/or BIT recirculation 2.5' 2.9' Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwoodlByron.
Page 9 i
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 007000 Pressiiriier Relief TnnUQuench Tank System (PRTS)
A2.07 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Heat tracing 2.7 3.2 Not applicable to Braidwocd/Byron.
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the PZR vent valve 2.6 2.6 Not applicable to control room: BraidwoWByron.
008000 Conponetit Coolirig Water System { CC WS)
A4.11 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in CCW pump recirculation valve and its three-way 3.0' 2.9' Not applicable to the control room: control switch Braidwood/Byron.
K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of malfunction CRDS 2.9 3.1 Not applicable to of the CCWS will have on the following Braidwood/Byron.
010000 Pressirrizer Pressicre Control System (PZR PCS)
K4.02 Knowledge of PZR PCS design feature@)and/or Prevention of uncovering PZR heaters 3.0 3.4 prevention of interlock@)which provide for the following: uncovering pressurizer heaters is covered by level control circuitry and is addressed by WA 011000K4.01 01 1000 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)
A2.08 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Loss of level compensation 2.6 2.8 Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS and (b) BraidwoodlByron.
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Reactor regulating system 3.4 3.5 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the PZR LCS BraidwdByron.
and the following systems:
K4.03 Knowledge of the PZR LCS design feature(s) Density compensation of PZR level 2.6 2.9 Not applicable to and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwWByron.
K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on: Reasons for starting charging pump while increasing 2.8' 3.2' Not applicable to the following will have on the PZR LCS: letdown flow rate Braidwood/Byron.
012000 Reuctor Protection System K6.07 Knowledge of the applicable performance and Core protection calculator 2.9 3.2 Not applicable to design attributes of the following RPS components: BraidwoodlByron.
K6.08 Knowledge of the applicable performance and COLSS 3.6' 3.7' Not applicable to design attributes of the following RPS components: Braidwood/Byron.
K6.09 Knowledge of the applicable performance and CEAC 3.6 3.7 Not applicable to design attributes of the following RPS components: Braidwood/Byron.
0 I3000 Engineered Scgety Features Actuatiori System {ESFAS)
Al.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Feedwater header differential 2.6 2.6 Not applicable to Parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) Braidwood/Byron.
Associated with operating the ESFAS controls Including:
K4.05 Knowledge of ESFAS design feature@)and/or Core spray actuation signal reset 4.0 4.2 Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: Braidwood/Byron .
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 01.3000 Engineered Sgfety Fecitures Actuation System (ESFAS)(Continuecl)
K4.14 Knowledge of ESFAS design feature@)and/or Upper head injection accumulator isolation 3.7 4.0 Not applicable to interlock(s)which provide for the following: BraidwoodIByron.
K4.24 Knowledge of ESFAS design feature@)and/or Reason for disabling of BIT so it will not function 3.0 3.1 Not applicable to interlock@)which provide for the following: during ESF sequencer test Braidwood/Byron.
014000 Rod Position lntliccition System (RPIS)
Al.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Metroscope reed switch display 2.9 3.1 Not applicable to parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) Braidwood/Byron associated with operating the RPlS controls including:
A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Loss of LVDT 2.6 3.0 Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the RPlS and (b) BraidwoodJByron.
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Loss of reed switch 2.6 2.9 Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the RPlS and (b) BraidwoodlByron.
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A4.03 Ability to manual operate and/or monitor in the Primary coil voltage measurement 2.6' 2.7' Not applicable to control room: Braidwood/Byron.
K4.01 Knowledge of RPlS design feature(s) and/or Upper electrical limit 2.5 2.7 Not applicable to Interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwoodlByron.
K4.02 Knowledge of RPlS design feature@)and/or Lower electrical limit 2.5 2.7 Not applicable to Interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwoodJByron.
K4.05 Knowledge of RPlS design feature($ and/or Rod hold interlocks 3.1 3.3 Not applicable to Interlock@)which provide for the following: BraidwoodlByron.
K6.03 Knowledge of the applicable performance and Metroscope 2.1 2.6 Not applicable to design attributes of the following RPlS BraidwoodJByron.
components:
015000 Nuclear lnstriti~ientcitionSysterrl K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or ICs 3.9 3.9 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the NIS and Braidwood/Byron.
the following systems:
K1.06 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Reactor regulating system 3.1 3.4 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the NIS and BraidwoodJByron.
the following systems:
K3.04 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the NIS will ICs 3.4 4.0 Not applicable to have on the following: BraidwoodlByron.
K3.06 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the NIS will Reactor regulating system 2.9 3.2 Not applicable to have on the following: Braidwood/Byron.
K4.01 Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) and/or Source-range detector shutoff at high powers 3.1 3.3 Not applicable to 1nterlock)s) which provide for the following: Byron SR instruments.
K4.04 Knowledge of NIS design feature@)and/or Slow response time of SPNDs 3.4 3.6 Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: Braidwood/Byron.
K6.02 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or Discriminator/compensationcircuits 2.6 2.9 Not applicable to Malfunction on the following will have on the NIS: Byron instruments.
Page I I i i
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 0,32000 Contninment Cooling System (CCS)
K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or SEChemote monitoring systems 3.7 3.5 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the CCS and Braidwood/Byron.
the following systems:
K4.04 Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or Cooling of control rod drive motors 2.8 3.1 Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: Braidwood/Byron.
K4.05 Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or Containment cooling after LOCA destroys 2.6 2.7 Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: ventilation ducts BraidwoodlByron.
025000 Ice Condenser System Al.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Temperature chart recorders 3.0 3.0 Braidwood and Byron parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) do not have Ice associated with operating the Ice Condenser Condensers System controls including:
Al.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Glycol expansion tank level 2.5 2.2 Braidwood and Byron parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) do not have Ice associated with operating the Ice Condenser Condensers System controls including:
Al.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Glycol flow to ice condenser air handling units 2.5 2.5 Braidwood and Byron parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) do not have Ice associated with operating the Ice Condenser Condensers System controls including:
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Trip of glycol circulation pumps 2.2 2.7 Braidwood and Byron malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser do not have Ice System and (b) based on those predictions, use Condensers procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following HigMow floor cooling temperature 2.7 2.5 Braidwood and Byron malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser do not have Ice System and (b) based on those predictions, use Condensers procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Opening of ice condenser doors 3.0 3.2 Braidwood and Byron malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser do not have Ice System and (b) based on those predictions, use Condensers procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Containment isolation 3.0 3.2 Braidwood and Byron malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser do not have Ice System and (b) based on those predictions, use Condensers procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Abnormal glycol expansion tank level 2.5 2.7 Braidwood and Byron malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser do not have Ice System and (b) based on those predictions, use Condensers procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
706 Page 12 i
Viewed K A Cate ory Statement K A Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 025000 Ice tondenser Systern(Continued)
A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Decreasing ice condenser temperature 2.5 2.7 Braidwood and Byron malfuxtions or operations on the Ice Condenser do not have Ice System and (b) based on those predictions, use Condensers procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Ice Refrigerant system 3.0 3.0 Braidwood and Byron Condenser System, including: do not have Ice Condensers A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Ice Isolation valves 3.4 3.4 Braidwood and Byron Condenser System, including: do not have Ice Condensers A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Ice condenser isolation valves 3.0 2.7 Braidwood and Byron control room: do not have Ice Condensers A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Containment vent fans 2.7 2.5 Braidwood and Byron control room: do not have Ice Condensers A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Glycol circulation pumps 2.2 2.2 Braidwood and Byron control room: do not have Ice Condensers K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Containment ventilation 2.7 2.7 Braidwood and Byron cause-effect relationships between the Ice do not have Ice Condenser System and the following systems: Condensers K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Refrigerant systems 2.7 2.7 Braidwood and Byron cause-effect relationships between the Ice do not have Ice Condenser System and the following systems: Condensers K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Containment sump system 3.2 3.0 Braidwood and Byron cause-effect relationships between the Ice do not have Ice Condenser System and the following systems: Condensers K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Containment ventilation fans and dampers 2.2 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Refrigerant systems 2.0 2.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers K2.03 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Isolation valves 2.0 2.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the Ice Containment 3.8 3.8 Braidwood and Byron Condenser System will have on the following: do not have Ice Condensers K4.01 Knowledge of Ice Condenser System design Glycol expansion tank levels and ice condenser 2.2 2.5 Braidwood and Byron feature(s) and/or interlock@)which provide for system containment isolation valves do not have Ice the following: Condensers K4.02 Knowledge of Ice Condenser System design System control 2.8 3.0 Braidwood and Byron feature@) andlor interlock@)which provide for do not have Ice the following: Condensers K5.01 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Relationships between pressure and temperature 3.0 3.4 Braidwood and Byron as they apply to the Ice Condenser System: do not have Ice Condensers 306
Viewed KA KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 025000 K5.02 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Heat transfer 2.6 2.8 Braidwood and Byron as they apply to the Ice Condenser System: do not have Ice Condensers K5.03 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Gas laws 2.4 2.8 Braidwood and Byron as they apply to the Ice Condenser System: do not have Ice Condensers K6.01 Knowledge of the applicable performance and Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser 3.4 3.6 Braidwood and Byron design attributes of the following Ice Condenser do not have Ice System components: Condensers 026000 Cimtairiment Sprtry Svstetii (CSS)
A2.09 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Radiation hazard potential of BWST 2.5' 2.9' Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the CSSS and (b) BraidwoodIByron.
based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Cooling water 4.1 4.1 Containment Spray cause-effect relationships between the CSS and pumps have no the following systems: cooling water at BraidwWByron K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction Recirculation spray system 3.9 4.1 Not applicable to of the CSS will have on the following: BraidwoodJByron 028000 Hydrogen Recombiner arid Purge Cotitrol System (HRPS)
K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Containment annulus ventilation system (including 2.5' 2.5 Braidwood and Byron cause effect relationships between the HRPS pressure limits) Hydrogen Recombiners and the following systems: no longer in use K i .02 Knowledge of the physical connections andlo4r Air supply system 2.0 2.2 Braidwood and Byron Cause-effect relationships between the HRPS Hydrogen Recombiners And the following systems: no longer in use.
K2.01 Knowledge of the power supplies to the following: Hydrogen Recombiners 2.5' 2.8' Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction Hydrogen concentration in containment 3.3 4.0 Braidwood and Byron of the HRPS will have on the following: Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use K5.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of Explosive hydrogen concentration 3.4 3.9 Braidwood and Byron the following concepts as they apply to the Hydrogen Recombiners HRPS: no longer in use K5.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of Flammable hydrogen concentration 3.4 3.9 Braidwood and Byron the following concepts as they apply to the Hydrogen Recombiners HRPS: no longer in use K5.03 Knowledge of the operational implications of Sources of hydrogen within containment 2.9 3.6' Braidwood and Byron the following concepts as they apply to the Hydrogen Recombiners HRPS: no longer in use K5.04 Knowledge of the operational implications of The selective removal of hydrogen 2.6? 3.2? Braidwood and Byron the following concepts as they apply to the Hydrogen Recombiners HRPS: no longer in use
\
Pnge 14 1
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 028000 Hvdrogen Recombiner arid Purge Control System (HRPS)(Continued)
K6.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction Hydrogen Recombiners 2.6 3.1 Braidwood and Byron on the following will have on the HRPS: Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Al.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Hydrogen concentration 3.4 3.8 Braidwood and Byron parameter (to prevent exceeding design limits) Hydrogen Recombiners associated with operating the HRPS controls including: no longer in use Al.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Containment pressure 3.4' 3.7' Braidwood and Byron parameter (to prevent exceeding design limits) Hydrogen Recombiners associated with operating the HRPS controls including: no longer in use A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Hydrogen recombiner power setting, determined 3.4' 3.6' Braidwood and Byron malfunctions or operations on the HRPS; and by using plant data book Hydrogen Recombiners (b) based on those predictions, use no longer in use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following LOCA condition and related concern over hydrogen 3.5 3.9 Braidwood and Byron malfunctions or operations on the HRPS; and Hydrogen Recombiners (b) based on those predictions, use no longer in use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following The hydrogen air concentration in excess of limit flame 3.4' 3.6' Braidwood and Byron malfunctions or operations on the HRPS; and propagation or detonation with resulting equipment damage Hydrogen Recombiners (b) based on those predictions, use in containment no longer in use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the HRPS controls 4.0' 4.0' Braidwood and Byron control room: Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use 033000 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS)
A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the SFPCS valves 2.4 2.8 Not applicable to control room: Braidwood and Byron 035000 Stearn Generator Svstern (S/GS)
K4.04 Knowledge of S/GS design feature@)and/or Radiation high-level isolation while draining S/G 2.8' 3.1* Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: secondary to main condenser BraidwoodJByron.
039000 Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)
A4.04 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the Emergency feedwater pump turbines 3.8 3.9 Not applicable to control room: BraidwmdlByron.
K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the MRSS AFW pumps 3.2 3.5 Not applicable to will have on the following: BraidwodByron K1.07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or AFW 3.4' 3.4' Not applicable to cause effect relationships between the MRSS BraidwmdByron.
and the following systems:
K4.07 Knowledge of MRSS design feature@)and/or Reactor building isolation 3.4 3.7 Not applicable to interlock(s)which provide for the following: BraidwoodlByron
. 906 P q e 1.5
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 04 1000 Steam Dunip System (SDS) and TicrDirie Bypciss Control A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the ICs voltage inverter 2.9' 3.1 Not applicable to control room: Braidwood/Byron.
A4.07 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Remote gagging of stuck open relief valves 2.9 3.0 Not applicable to control room: Braidwood/Byron.
K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: ICs, normal and alternate power supply 2.5 2.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.
K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: ICs inverter breakers 2.8 2.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
K4.01 Knowledge of SDS design feature(s) and/or RRGllCS system 2.9' 3.3' Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwoWByron K4.15 Knowledge of SDS design feature(s) and/or "Measured variable" readings on ICs hand-automatic 2.9' 2.9' Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: stations and required action if reading is out Braidwood/Byron of the acceptable band 045000 Mciiii Turbine Generator (MT/G) Svsteni K4.08 Knowledge of MT/G System design feature(s) The reactor bailey station and reactor diamond 2.6 3.0 Not applicable to and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: station in integrated control circuitry Braidwood/Byron.
K4.44 Knowledge of MT/G system design feature(s) impulse pressure mode control of steam dumps 2.5' 2.8' Not applicable to and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwWByron 0.55000 Condenser Air Rerriovul System (CARS)
A3.03 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust 2.5* 2.7' Not applicable to CARS, including: BraidwoodlByron.
0.59000 Main Feedwater (MFW) System Al.07 Ability to (a) predict and/or monitor changes Feed pump speed, including normal control speed 2.5' 2.6' Not applicable to in parameters (to prevent exceeding design for ICs BraidWByron.
Limits) associated with operating the MFW Controls including:
A3.07 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW ICs 3.4 3.5 Not applicable to System, including: Braidwood/Byron.
A4.10 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the ICs 3.9 3.8 Not applicable to control room: Braidwood/Byron.
K1.07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or ICs 3.2 3.2 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the MFW Braidwood/Byron.
System and the following systems:
K4.02 Knowledge of MFW System design feature(s) Automatic turbineheactor trip runback 3.3 3.5 Not applicable to and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Braidwood/Byron.
K4.17 Knowledge of MFW System design feature(s) Increased feedwater flow following a reactor trip 2.5 2.8 Not applicable to and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Braidwood/Byron.
306 Page 16 J
1
Viewed K A Category Statement K A Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 06 1000 A u x i l i n p / Erriergency Feedwriter (AFW) System Al.03 Ability to (a) predict and/or monitor changes Interactions when multi unit systems are cross tied 3.1' 3.6' Not applicable to In parameters (to prevent exceeding design Braidwood/Byron.
Limits) associated with operating the AFW Controls including:
A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Loss of air to steam supply valve 3.2 3.6 Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the AFW System Braidwood/Byron.
and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A3.04 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AFW Automatic AFW isolation 4.1 4.2 Not applicable to System, including: BraidwoodfByron.
K1.09 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or PRMS 2.6' 2.8' Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the AFW and Braidwood/Byron.
the following systems:
K1.ll Knowledge of the physical connections and/or AFW turbine exhaust drains 2.7 2.8' Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the AFW and BraidwoodlByron.
the following systems:
K4.07 Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s) Turbine trip, including overspeed 3.1 3.3 Not applicable to and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwoodByron.
K4.09 Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s) Cross-ties between multi-unit station 3.7 3.3 Not applicable to and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwoodIByron.
K4.11 Knowledge of AFW System design feature@) Automatic level control 2.7 2.9 Not applicable to and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwdByron.
K4.14 Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s) AFW automatic isolation 3.5 3.7 Not applicable to and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: BraidwoodIByron.
K5.04 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Reason for warming up turbine prior to turbine 2.3 2.5 Not applicable to as they apply to the AFW System: startup Braidwood/Byron.
068000 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following lnsufficient sampling frequency of the boric acid 2.5' 2.6' Not applicable to malfunctions or operations on the Liquid Radwaste in the evaporator bottoms BraidwdByron.
System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of theLiquid Evaporator pressure control 2.5' 2.4' Not applicable to Radwaste System, including: BraidwdByron.
A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Control board for boron recovery 2.7' 2.4' Not applicable to control room: BraidwoodIByron.
Pr1ge 17
Viewed KA Category Statement K A Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 071000 Waste Gas Disposcd Svsrerii ( WGDS)
A4.05 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Gas decay tanks, including valves, indicators, and sample2.W 2.6' Braidwood and Byron control room: line control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentationto monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.
A4.10 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the WGDS sampling 2.5' 2.4' Braidwood and Byron control room: control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentationto monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.
A4.11 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the WGDS startup and shutdown 2.5 2.3 Braidwood and Byron control room: control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentationto monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.
A4.13 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Recovery from automatic termination of gas release 3.0 3.1 Braidwood and Byron control room: due to PRM system alarm control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentationto monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.
A4.14 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the WGDS status alarms 2.8 3.0 Braidwood and Byron control room: control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentationto monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.
A4.16 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Waste gas decay tank shifts 2.5 2.2 Braidwood and Byron control room: control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentationto monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.
A4.17 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Stopping transfer of radioactive liquids to WGDS tank 2.6 2.5 Braidwood and Byron control room: control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentationto monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.
A4.30 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Water drainage from WGDS decay tanks 2.9 2.6 Braidwood and Byron control room: control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentationto monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.
! 706 Page I8 I
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 071000 Wuste Gas Disposal System ( WGDS) (Continued)
K4.03 Knowledge of design feature@)and/or interlocks Tank loop seals 2.5' 2.6' Not applicable to which provide for the following: BraidwoodlByron 073000 Process Rcidiutioii Monitoring (PRM)System K4.02 Knowledge of PRM System design feature(s) Letdown isolation on high-RCS activity 3.3' 3.9' Not applicable to and/or interlocks which provide for the following: BraidwoodIByron 076000 Service Wuter System (SWS)
Al.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Reactor and turbine building closed cooling 2.5' 2.3 Not applicable to parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits): water temperatures. BraidwoodlByron.
associated with operating the SWS controls including:
K1.07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Secondary closed cooling water 2.6' 2.6' Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the SWS and BraidwoodlByron.
the following systems:
K1.09 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Reactor building closed cooling water 3.0 3.1 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the SWS and BraidwoodlByron.
the following systems:
K2.04 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Reactor building closed cooling water 2.5 2.6 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.
K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the SWS Reactor building closed cooling water 3.5 3.9 Not applicable to will have on the following: BraidwoodlByron.
K4.01 Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or Conditions initiating automatic closure of closed 2.5 2.9 Not applicable to interlock(s) which provide for the following: cooling water auxiliary building header supply and Braidwood/Byron.
K4.03 Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) andor Automatic opening features associated with SWS 2.9' 3.4' Not applicable to interlock@)which provide for the following: isolation valves to CCS heat exchangers Braidwood/Byron.
078000 Iiistritmet~rAir System (IAS)
K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections andlor MSlV air 3.4 3.5 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the IAS and BraidwoodByron.
the following systems:
K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Emergency air compressor 3.3 3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.
086000 Fire Protection System (FPS)
Al.02 Ability to predict andor monitor changes in Fire water storage tank level 3.0 3.2 Not applicable to parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) BraidwoodlByron.
associated with operating the FPS controls including:
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Fire water storage tank makeup pumps 3.4 3.3 Not applicable to control room: Braidwood/Byron.
K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or High-pressure service water 3.0 3.4 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the FPS and BraidwoodlByron.
the following systems:
r 706 Puge 19 I i
Viewed K A Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis I O.?OOO CotI tcr it1 t i i e i i t Systern A4 09 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Containment vacuum system 3.1 3.7 Not applicable to control room Braidwood/Byron.
K1 03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Shield building vent system 3.1 3.5 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the BraidwoodfByron.
Containment System and the following systems K1 07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Containment vacuum system 3.5 3.7 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the Braidwood/Byron.
Containment System and the following systems K4 01 Knowledge of Containment System design Vacuum breaker protection 3.0 37 Not applicable to feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for BraidwoodlByron.
the following
-P=/2vGL By on Facility Representative By on Facility Representative-i I
ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Date of Examination:
- ~~
Item Task Description h Initials 1.
W
- a. Venfy that the outline(s) ffi(s) the appropriate model. in accordance with ES-401.
- t. ? A d 84 R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all WA categories are appropriately sampled.
T
- c. Assess whether the outline overemphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
T E
N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected WA statements are appropriate.
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S and major transients. >:j3 I
M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number 1 U
L A
and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule without compromisingexam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using at least o n e - w or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated
~ M dflp
- L Y I T from the applicants' audit test@),and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
0 c. To the extent possible. assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative R and quantitative criteria specifd on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
- 3. a. Venfy that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form c' I (2) task repetitionfrom the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specikd on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or m o d i tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specifed on h e form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
I 1
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specifed on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations c Determine If there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix
- of applicants and ensure that no items are du
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.
G b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41143 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
E N c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities)are at least 2.5.
E R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.
A e Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
L
- a. Author
- b. Facility Reviewer r) I/;ZS/#
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
- d. NRC Supervisor w
u3/oG ES-201, Page 25 of 27
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 4-Date of Examination: 6/19/06 Operating Test Number: 2006-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note)
Code*
~ ~ ~~
Conduct of Operations M, S or R Shutdown Margin for a Stuck Rod WA 2.1.25 Imp Factor 2.8 Conduct of Operations Equipment Control N, S or R Establish Clearance Boundaries for CS Pump WA 2.2.13 Imp Factor 3.6 Radiation Control N, S or R RWP and Stay Time for a Clearance Job WA 2.3.10 Imp Factor 2.9 W
Emergency Plan 1 . . #MS WA 2.4.43 Imp Factor 2.8 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrativetopics, when 5 are required.
~~~ ~~ ~ ~~~
- Type Codes & Criteria (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( for ROs; I 4 for SROs & RO retakes) 3I (N)ew or (M)odifiedfrom bank (2 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; I randomly selected)
ES-301 NUREG-1021, Revision 9
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1
~ ~ ~
Facility: Bvron Date of Examination: 6/19/06 Examination Level (circle one): RO Operating Test Number: 2006-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note)
Code*
Conduct of Operations M, S or R Shutdown Margin for a Stuck Rod WA 2.1.25 Imp Factor 3.1 Conduct of Operations N, S or R Minimum Shift Staffing WA 2.1.5 Imp Factor 3.4 Equipment Control N, S or R Establish Clearance Boundaries for CS Pump WA 2.2.13 Imp Factor 3.8 Radiation Control N, Sor R RWP and Stay Time for a Clearance Job WA 2.3.10 Imp Factor 3.3 Emergency Plan N, S or R Emergency Dose Authorization WA 2.4.38 Imp Factor 4.0 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, 01Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank I( 3 for Ros; s 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odifiedfrom bank (21)
(P)revious 2 exams (I1; randomly selected)
ES-301 NUREG-1021, Revision 9
ES-301 Control Room/ln-Plant Svstems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Bvron Date of Examination: 6/19/Of3 Exam Level (circle one) SRO(I) / SRO(U) Operating Test Number: 2006-301 System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. Remove Excess Letdown from service S, D 1 WA 004A4.06 Imp Factor 3.6
- b. Main Control Room HVAC Makeup Filter and Charcoal S, A, M 2 WA 013K1.13 Imp Factor 2.8
- c. Filling the RWST WA 006A4.03 Imp Factor 3.5 I S,D
~~
1 3
- d. Respond to High RCP Seal Leakoff flow s, D 4P KIA 003A2.01 Imp Factor 3.5
- e. Respond to Main Generator Field Forcing Sl D 4s WA 045K3.01 Imp Factor 2.9
- h. Refueling Setpoint Change for AROll and AROl2 S, A, M, L 7 WA 072A4.01 ImD Factor 3.0
- i. Open SX Suction Valve for -AF Pump A, E, M. R 4s WA 061K1.07 Imp Factor 3.6
- j. Align FP for cooling -CV Pump Dl El L, R 8 WA 086K1.02 Imp Factor 2.7
Imp Factor 2.7 ~ ~
l D l S Criteria for RO I SRO-l I SRO-U
~ ~
(A)lternate path 4-6 I 4-6I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank sgisa114 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 21/21/>1 (L)ow Power 21 I 2 l l 2 t (N)ew or (M)odified from bank 22/52 I21 (P)reviuos 2 exams s 3 I 5 3 I I 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 2 1 I 2 1I 2 1 (S)imulator ES-301 NUREG-1021, Revision
ES-301 Control Roodln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Bvron Date of Examination: 6/19/06 Exam Level (circle one): RO Operating Test Number: 2006-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, 2 or 3 for SRO-U)
System I JPM Title Typecode* Safety Function
- a. Remove Excess Letdown from service WA 004A4.06 ImD Factor 3.1 I S,D I 1
- b. Main Control Room HVAC Makeup Filter and Charcoal S, A, M 2 WA 013K1.13 Imp Factor 3.1
- c. Filling the RWST s, D 3 WA 006A4.03 Imp Factor 3.5
- d. Respond to High RCP Seal Leakoff flow s, D 4P WA 003A2.01 Imp Factor 3.9 e.
- h. Refueling Setpoint Change for ARO11 and AR012 WA 072A4.01 Imp Factor 3.3 In-Plant Svstems (3 for RO. 3 for SRO-I. 2 or 3 for SRO-Ul
- i. Open SX Suction Valve for -AF Pump A, E, M. R 4s WA 061K1.07 Imp Factor 3.8
- j. Align FP for cooling -CV Pump D, E, L, R 8 WA 086K1.02 imp Factor 3.2
- k. Start up DC ESF Battery Charger D 6 WA 063A3.01 Imp Factor 3.1 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 2 112 1121 (L)ow Power 21 I S 1 121 (N)ew or (M)odifiedfrom bank 2 2 / 2 2 I21 (P)reviuos 2 exams 5 3 I S3 I I 2 (randomly selected)
(WCA 2 1 I 2 1 I21 jS)imulator ES-301 NUREG-1021,Revision
ES-301 7 ransient and tvent Checklist I-orm ES-301-5 acility: Byron Date of Exam: 6119/06 Operating Test Number: 2006-301 1 I
M I
N I
M ins:
- 1. Check the a licant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event ty e fg are not ap licable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and bakkce-of-plant (B8P) positions. Instant SROs must do one scenario, including at least two instrument or component ( K ) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivi manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to I
Section 8.5.d) but must be significant.per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. *) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component mal unctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
- 3. Whenever practical both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that.provide insight. to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
v ES-401 PWR Examinatlon Outline FORM ES-401-2
~ ~ ~
-acility Name:Byron Date of Exarn:6/1@/06
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories tote: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable WA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (Le., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the T i r Totals' in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by tl from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The finc RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3. Systemdevolutions within each group are identifiedon the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operatione& important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2. for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possibk; sample every system or e v d u t i in the group before selectim a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those WAS having an hportance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.
Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-onty portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and WA categories.
7.' The generic ( G ) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the WA numbers, a brief chcdptbn of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling eqUipnent is sampled in other than Category A2 or G' on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note # I does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the WA catalog, and enter the WA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO SeleCtioM to WAS that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
-- ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Emeraencv and Abnormal Plant Evolutions Tier l/Grouo I0301 ES-401-F~nn
- Form ES-401-v 59 Main Feedwater d
ES-401, Page 24 of 33
~~
1IES-401 FWR Examination Outline FOITI ES-401-14 Rod Position Indication ES-401, Page 25 of 33
ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 F~rmES401-0007 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 ES-401,22 of 33
ES-401,23 of 33
ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 03 Reactor Coolant Pum I
ES-401, Page 24 of 33
ES-401 5 Form ES401-2 ES-401, Page 25 of 33
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-4014
- acility Name:Byron Date of Exarn:6/19/06 ES-401, Page 26 of 33
ADDendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Fac i 1it y : Byron Scenario No.: 06-1 Op-Test No.: 2006-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO Initial Conditions: IC- 16; 56% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 1 B Diesel Generator OOS, 1 C HD pump 00s.
Turnover: The plant is at 56% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 1025 ppm boron concentration. The 1 B Diesel Generator is 00s for Turbo Charger work. The DG has been 00s for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. LCOAR for Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B has been entered; I BOSR 8. I . I - 1 was performed 30 minutes prior to shift turnover. Electric Operations has notified Byron Unit 1 to raise to 1250 MWe at 5 MW/Min to accommodate an outage from another power source.
QNE was notified of the 5MWfMin ramp q u e s t and after evaluation has recommended that the current administrative limits be I laxed to allow-the &quested ramp up to occur. The SM has given the direction to raise power at 5MWh n.
Event Malf.
Descrintion 1BDGOOS IOR ZLO 1 HSDG020I OFF 1B DG STOP Lite Turbine fails to Auto trip from reactor trip IMF SIOlA Prevent 1A SI pump start MRF RP30 OUT Fails K607 (Phase A) on Train A 1 US Direct the Unit ramp to 1250 MWe power.
R RO Perform Reactivity calculation for ramp to 1250 MWe Ramp the Unit to 1250 MWe power N BOP Ramp the Unit to 1250 MWe power 2 IMFCV16 100 I RO Volume Control Tank (VCT) level channel 1LT-CV 1 12 fails low Demanding Auto Makeup to VCT.
3 IMFRXOIKO I BOP Steam Generator 1D controlling Steam Pressure channel fails high requiring Manual control of ID SG Main Feed Reg Valve.
us Enter Tech S&c 3.3.2 for actions.
4 ED1 ID C US Loss of Instrument Bus 114 due to a bus fault. Tech Spec 3.8.9 RO required shutdown within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
BOP I 6 R ZDIBKSEL AUTO C RO Uncontrolled inward rod motion requiring a manual reactor trip IMF RX 17 -4.25 M ALL per 1BOA ROD-1.
6 I IMFTC03 C BOP Turbine fails to Auto trip from reactor trip - Manual Turbine Trip q u i d 7 IMF PN0630 ON M ALL Indication of RCP ID Lower Oil Reservoir Level Low IMFTH17D RCP 1D Locked Rotor IMF TH04D 1 600 800 Loop 1D Hot Leg Leak I
(N)ormal. (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient Byron Demo 06- 1 nrc Page 1 I 12412006
SCENARIO 2006-1 OVERVIEW The scenario will begin at 56% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state. The 1B Diesel Generator is 00s for
- Turbo Charger work. The DG has been 00s for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. LCOAR for Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B has been entered; lBOSR 8.1.1-1 has been completed in last 30 minutes. Electric Operations requires a Byron Unit 1 ramp to 1250 MWe power at 5 MW/Min to accommodate an outage from another power source.
The RO will be required to perform a reactivity calculation and coordinate with the BOP and commence the ramp to 1250 MWe power.
After a 510% Unit ramp, Volume Control Tank (VC") level channel 1LT-CVl12 will fail low resulting in Auto Makeup to the VCT. The failure will require placing makeup level control in Manual for the VCT . Tech Spec LCO 3.3.9 for BDPS includes this VCT level channel, however applicability is only for Modes 3,4,5. The SRO should place this on the Degraded Equipment List (DEL)
After the crew recognizes the repercussions of 1LT-CV112, the 1D SG controlling steam pressure channel, 1PT 545A, will fail high requiring manual control of the 1D SG main feedwater regulating valve. The SRO will enter lBOA INST-2, for the failed SG Steam pressure channel and direct actions to restore the ID main feedwater regulating valve to automatic control. Tech Spec 3.3.2, Condition D applies.
Following the required actions for the SG pressure channel failure, a loss of Instrument Bus 114 will occur due to a fault on the Instrument Bus. This will require performance of lBOA ELEC-2 and lBOA INST-1 to stabilize and recover the plant. The US will address Tech Spec 3.8.9 which requires a shutdown to Hot Standby within 8 Hours.
--Several actions will be required as a result of not being able to restore power to the Instrument Bus.
After actions have been taken to stabilize the plant, the rods will begin to insert requiring a manual Reactor Trip per IBOA ROD-1. The Turbine will not trip from the Reactor Trip signal and will require manual action to trip.
Following immediate actions of 1BEP-0 and transition to lBEP ES-0.1, an RCP oil problem develops for the 1D RCP leading to a degraded rotor, trip of 1 D RCP, and a small LOCA on the 1D RCS Loop Hot Leg. This will require reentry into 1 BEP-0 upon SI actuation. The IA SI pump will fail to start and the 1B SI pump will have to be manually started. Phase A Train A (K607) failure, along with the Instrument Bus 114 failure, will require manual valve operation of numerous containment isolation valves. The scenario will continue with 1 BEP-0 and transiton to IBEP-I to stabilize and recover the plant.
The scenario ends with the IBCA-3. I directed plant cooldown.
ERG Based Critical Tasks:
- 1. E-0-D: Manually Trip the Main Turbine prior to performing step 3 of EP-0.
- 3. E-0-0: Manually close Phase A valves before transition out of IBEP-0..
Byron Demo 06- I nrc Page 2 1/24/2006
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Bvron Scenario No.: 06-2 Op-Test No.: 2006-30 1 Examiners: Operators: SRO Initial Conditions: IC-2 1 ; 100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 1B Diesel Generator OOS, 1 C HD pump 00s.
Turnover: The plant is at 100%power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 1250 ppm boron concentration. The 1 B Diesel Generator is 00s for Turbo Charger work. The DG has been 00s for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. LCOAR for Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B has been entered; 1 BOSR 8.1.1- 1 was performed 30 minutes prior to shift turnover. 1 A MFP is 00s for work on the speed increaser and not expected back for 2 more days. Electric Operations has just notified Byron Unit 1 that power needs to be reduced to loo0 MWe within 75 minutes to accommodate an outage on a portion of the grid.
Event No.
Preload I Malf.
No.
MRF EGO9 MAINT-0 Event 1BDGOOS Event DescriDtion IOR ZLO 1 HSDG020 1 OFF 1B DG STOP Lite Preload MRF FW024 0 1A FW Pump suction isol valve MRF FW027 0 1A FW Pump recirc isol valve MRF ED09 1 C OPEN Deenergize 1FW002A, 1A F W Pump discharge valve IMFFWOI 1A FW Pump trip IOR ZDI 1HDO 1PC PTL 1c HD pp 00s 1 US Direct the Unit ramp down to lo00 MWe power.
R RO Perform Reactivity calculation for downpower to 1000 MWe Ramp down the Unit to 1000 MWe power N BOP Ramp down the Unit to lo00 MWe power 2 IMF TH03C 30 100 C ALL SG Tube Leak in IC SG at 30 gpm requiring plant shutdown per lBOA SEC-8 and Tech Spec 3.4.13 application.
3 IMF RX13A 0 10 I RO Controlling PZR level channel lLT-459 fails to 0 causing a loss of Letdown. This requires use of lBOA INST-2 and addressing us Tech Spec 3.3.1 for actions.
4 IMF CV05 600 C RO FCV-131 controller fails closed in AUTO. This will be identified during Letdown restoration requiring Manual control to maintain Letdown backpressure.
5 IMF RXOS I BOP MS Header PT,1FT-507, fails low requiring manual MFP speed control to stabilize the secondary plant.
6,7 IMFFW02A C BOP 1B FW Pump trips, followed shortly (-20 seconds) by 1C FW IMF FW06B M ALL Pump speed ramping to minimum, resulting in no F W flow IMF FW08B requiring a manual reactor trip.
8 MMF TH03C 350 60 M ALL Increases 1C SG Tube Leak to a 350 gpm SGTR.
(N)ormal, ~ (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient Byron Demo 06-2 nrc Page 1 I /25/2006
SCENARIO 2006-2 OVERVIEW The scenario will begin at 100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state. The 1B Diesel Generator is 0 0 s for
- Turbo Charger work. The DG has been 00s for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. LCOAR for Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B has been entered; lBOSR 8.1.1-1 has been completed in last 30 minutes. 1 A MFP is 00s for work on the speed increaser and not expected back for 2 more days .Electric Operations requires a Byron Unit 1 ramp down to lo00 MWe power within the next 75 minutes to accommodate an outage on a portion of the grid.
The RO will be required to perform a reactivity calculation and coordinate with the BOP and commence the ramp down to 1000 MWe power.
After a 510% Unit ramp down, a 30 gpm tube leak w ill be initiated in the 1C SG. The crew must identify primary to secondary leakage based on SJAE/GS condenser and main steam line Radiation Monitors.This will require actions in 1 BOA SEC-8 and actions in Tech Spec 3.4.13 requiring plant shutdown to Hot Standby within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
After the crew has taken actions for the SG tube leak, the controlling channel for PZR level, lLT-459, will fail low requiring manual control to maintain PZR level and restoration of Letdown. The SRO will enter lBOA INST-2, for the failed PZR level channel and direct actions to restore control to Auto,including restore Letdown flow and return PZR level to program. Tech Spec 3.3.1, Condition K applies. The crew will take actions to place bistables in trip for the failed channel and notify maintenance for repairs. During the time that Letdown is lost, PCV-131, UD backpressure control valve Auto control will fail closed. This should be identified during Letdown restoration when attempting to restore the controller to Auto. This will cause the UD line relief to lift if left in Auto.
Following the required actions for the PZR level channel failure, the Main Steam Pressure transmitter, 1PT-507, fails low causing the Master Feed Pump Speed controller to lower MFp's speed, which results in loss of FW flow to
-. all SGs. Action is required to take Manual control of MFP speed to restore and maintain SG levels at program level for the remainder of the scenario. This failure is not addressed in a BOA or in Tech Specs. Maintenance should be notifed and specific directions should be given to the BOP for controlling MFP speed in Manual to maintain SG levels and proper MFP to SG delta pressure.
Once SG level control and MFP delta P maintenance bas been directed, the IB MFP will trip requiring actions in 1BOA SEC- 1 to runback the turbine to maintain SG levels with only 1 MFP running. Once the initial actions for the runback have been taken and turbine load is dropping, boration is commenced andor r o d insertion, the 1C MFP speed control will fail to minimum speed resulting in no feed to the SGs requiring in a Manual Reactor trip and entry into IBEP-0. The crew should transition to lBEP ES-0.1.
Following transition to lBEP ES-0.1, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur requiring a Safety Injection and reentry into IBEP-0. The crew will diagnose the SGTR and transition to 1BEP-3.
The scenario ends with termination of high head ECCS and establishing charging flow per IBEP-3.
ERG Based Critical Tasks:
I . E - S A : Identify the 1C Steam Generator as the ruptured SG and isolate prior to transition to IBCA-3.1.
- 2. E-3----B: Cooldown to establish RCS subcooling margin, but prevent entry into 1 BFR-P. I.
- 3. E 4 : Depressurize RCS to restore RCS inventory prior to 1C SG PORV or Safety valve water release.
Byron Demo 06-2 nrc Page 2 1/25/2006
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Fac i 1it y : Byron Scenario No.: 06-3 Op-Test No.: 2006-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO Initial Conditions: IC-18; 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, IA CS Pump has been removed from service for one hour due to high vibration. Engineering is investigating. IC HD Pump 00s for seal replacement and not expected back until the end of shift.
Turnover: The plant is at 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 980 ppm boron concentration. The 1A CS Pump has been 00s for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and Engineering is investigating. LCOAR for Tech Spec 3.6.6 Condition A has been entered. IC Heater Drain Pump is 00s for mechanical seal replacement. Electric Operations has just notified Byron Unit 1 that power needs to be raised to 1250 MWe as soon as possible and requests a 5 MW/Min ramp. QNE was notified of the SMW/Min ramp request and after evaluation ha recommended that the current administrative limits be relaxed to allow the requested ramp up to occur.
The SM has given the direction to raise power at 5MWMin.
IOR ZZDIIHDOIPC PTL 1 c HD Pump 00s Preload IMF RP02A Reactor trip breaker RTA fails to open IMF RP02B Reactor trip breaker RTB fails to open 1 US Direct the Unit ramp to 1250 MWe power.
R RO Perform Reactivity calculation for ramp to 1250 MWe Ramp up the Unit to 1250 MWe power N BOP Ramp up the Unit to 1250 MWe power 2 IMF RX2 1 A 2500 30 I RO 1PT-455 Controlling PZR Pressure Channel fails high over 30 seconds causing PORV and Sprays to open. Enter Tech Specs us 3.3.1/2 for actions.
3 IMF RX29A 0 10 I BOP Steam Generator 1A FW Reg Valve will fail closed in automatic requiring manual control and restoration of 1A SG level to us program. Auto control will not be restored.
4 IMF FW02A C BOP 1B MFP trips requiring lBOA SEC-1 action to recover and DMF RP 1OA after 5 seconds
- N)ormal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient Byron Demo 06-3 nrc Page 1 1/24/2006
SCENARIO 2006-3OVERVIEW The scenario will begin at 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state. The 1A CS pump has been 00s for 1 u
hour due to failure of the monthly surveillance and is being investigated by Engineering for corrective actions.
LCOAR for Tech Spec 3.6.6 Condition A has been entered. 1C Heater Drain Pump is 00s for mechanical seal replacement and is not expected back until the end of this shift. Electric Operations requires a Byron Unit 1 ramp up to 1250 MWe power as soon as possible and requests a 5 MW/Min ramp.
The RO will be required to perform a reactivity calculation and coordinate with the BOP and commence the ramp up to 1250 MWe power.
After a 510% Unit ramp up, 1PT-455, Controlling PZR Pressure Channel, fails high over 30 seconds causing PORV ( 1 RY-455A) and PZR Spray valves to open, causing RCS pressure to drop. The RO will diagnose the malfunction from alarms, meter indications, and dropping PZR pressure. Manual action must be taken to close the PORV or PORV block valve and the PZR Spray valves to stop the pressure drop. The US will enter lBOA INST-2to ensure manual actions are taken, select an operable control channel, restore automatic PZR pressure control, trip bistables, and identify appropriate Tech Specs 3.3.1/2,3.3.4, and 3.4.1 for applicable actions. The most limiting Tech Spec is 3.4.1, DNB Limits Condition A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to restore pressure to at or above 2209 psig. The remainder of the Tech Spec most limiting requires tripping bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support.
After the crew has taken actions for failure of 1FT-455,the 1A SG FW Reg Valve will fail closed in automatic requiring BOP to manually control the 1A SG main feedwater regulating valve to recover IA SG level. The US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support. This will require manual level control of 1A SG for the remainder of this scenario.
_-. Following the required actions for the SG pressure channel failure, the 1B MFP will trip requiring BOP action to recognize the malfunction from alarms and pump speed indication and take action to close the recirc valve on the tripped MFP, start the IA MFP and restore FW flow to all SGs. The US will enter lBOA SEC-1 for these actions and actions to stabilize the FW system for continued operation. US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support.
Once the plant has stabilized, an Inadvertent Phase A on A Train will occur requiring entry into lBOA PRI-13. The crew will recognize the event from alarms and valve closure indications. The RO will take manual control of charging and PZR pressure. Upon reset of the Phase A, IA will be restored to Cnmt, WD and normal charging must be restored, normal PZR pressure control established, normal RCP seal return flow, restart of Cnmt chiller, an restoration of SG Bldn. The actuation will appear to be spurious. US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support. During restoration of L/D, the 1 B CV pump will trip and will require a manual start of the 1A CV Pump for recovery. This will also require entry into Tech Spec 3.5.2 Condition A for ECCS Operability (7 Day action). US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support.
Once the plant has recovered from the Inadvertent Phase A and normal charging and L/D are restored, a Main Steam line break will occur inside Cnmt on the 1A SG. The reactor will not trip from the MCR and IBFR-S.1 will be entered to locally trip the reactor. This will occur -1 minute after the NLO is dispatched to open the reactor trip breakers locally. RO ensures rods are being inserted at max rate, emergency boration is in progress, PORV are operating as required; BOP ensures turbine is tripped, AF Pumps are running, Cnmt Vent Is0 has occurred; Crew directs NLO to trip Rx locally. After Rx is tripped crew exits 1BFR-S.1 and enters IBEP-0. US will transition to IBEP-2, then to 1BEP-1. Transition will be made to lBEPES-1.1 to terminate SI.
The scenario ends after transition to 1 BEP ES- 1.1 Byron Demo 06-3 nrc Page 2 1/25/2006
ERG Based Critical Tasks:
I. FR-S.1-C: Insert negative reactivity into the core by initiating emergency boration before completing
- step 4 of 1BFR-S. 1 .
- 2. E - S A : Isolate the faulted S/G before transition out of 1BFR-S.1.
Byron Demo 06-3 nrc Page 3 1/24/2006
Amendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 c
Faci I i t y : Bvron Scenario No.: 06-4 Op-Test No.: 2006-301 Examiners: Operators: -
SRO Initial Conditions: IC-] 8; 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, following maintenance activities on 1C low pressure heater string. 1B SX Pump has been removed for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to replace the aux oil pump and is expected back in service by the end of this shift. LCOAR lBOL 7.8 has been initiated. 1C HD Pump 00s for seal replacement and not expected back until the end of shift.
Turnover: The plant is at 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 780 ppm boron concentration, following maintenance activities on 1C low pressure heater string. IB SX Pump has been removed for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to replace the aux oil pump and is expected back in service by the end of this shift. LCOAR lBOL 7.8 has been initiated.. IC Heater Drain Pump is 0 0 s for mechanical seal replacement. Electric Operations has just notified Byron Unit 1 that power needs to be raised to 1250 MWe as soon as possible and requests a 5 MW/Min ramp. QNE was notified of the SMWMin ramp request and after evaluation has recommended that the current administrative limits be relaxed to allow the requested ramp up to occur.
The SM has given the direction to raise power at 5MWfMin.
Event I Malf. Event No. No. Description Preload IOR ZDI I SXO I PB ITL 1B SX Pump 0 0 s IORZO I SXO I PBC OFF IOR ZZDI 1HDO I PC PTL I I 1B SX aux oil pump 0 0 s 1 c HD PumD 00s Preload I IMF w 4 4 MRF SI24 OVER MRF SI25 OVER I 1B AFW Pump fails to stadtrips 1SI8801A fails to open on SI signal 1SI8801B fails to open on SI signal Direct the Unit ramp to 1250 MWe power.
5 IMF RX 18M 650 IMF RX06G R RO Perform Reactivity calculation for ramp to 1250 MWe Ramp up the Unit to 1250 MWe power Ramp up the Unit to 1250 MWe power RCS Loop 1A Thot RTD (lTD411) fails high. This will require entry into lBOA INST-2 for stabilization and recovery. Tech Spec 3.3.1/2 actions.
Steam Generator 1B level channel fails low (08, 120 seconds)
Enter lBOA INST-2 for actions and Tech Specs 3.3.1/2 for actions.
IMF MS04D 100 C BOP 1MS018D, ID SG PORV fails open which requires action to close or isolate. Tech Spec 3.7.4 may be addressed.
5 &IF THl IA 50 PZR PORV 1RY455A fails open at 50% requiring the block valve 1RY 8000A to be closed to limit RCS depressurization.
Tech Spec 3.4.1 1 will be addressed.
6 1 IOR ZDIlFW009B I M ALL 1FW009B fails closed requiring a manual Reactor trip.
7,8 IMFTH03B M ALL lBSGTRat450gpm Preloaded C RO Following SI actuation, lS18801A and 1SI8801B must be manually opened to initiate High Head ECCS flow 9 IMF MS03B 100 M ALL After the MSJY is closed in 1BEP-3, the pressure surge in the 1B
~ - SG muses a safety to open and stick open.
-~-
- N)ormal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient Byron Demo 06-4 nrc Page 1 1/25/2006
SCENARIO 2006-4 OVERVIEW The scenario will begin at 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state following maintenance on IC low L
pressure heater string. The 1B SX Pump has been removed from service for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to replace the aux oil pump and is expected back in service by the end of the shift. LCOAR lBOL 7.8 has been initiated. 1C Heater Drain Pump is 00s for seal replacement and not expected back until the end of shift. Electric Operations requires a Byron Unit 1 ramp up to 1250 W e power as soon as possible and requests a 5 MW/Min ramp.
The RO will be required to perform a reactivity calculation and coordinate with the BOP and commence the ramp up to 1250 MWe power.
After a 510% Unit ramp up, RCS Loop 1A Thot RTD fails high requiring entry into 1 BOA INST-2, which directs ensuring rod control in manual, possibly restoring Tave to Tref, addressing Tech Spec 3.3.1/2 actions and tripping failed channel bistables. US will direct restoration for plant conditions, notify the SM of conditions and the WEC for maintenance support.
After the crew has taken actions for the failed PR N-44, the 1B SG level control channel fails low requiring manual control to stabilize and control 1B SG level. The US will enter lBOA INST-2 to verify actions and select a new controlling channel to restore 1B SG level control to automatic. The US will address Tech Specs 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3, for tripping the appropriate bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The US will notify the SM of conditions and the WEC for maintenance support.
Following the required actions for the SG level channel failure, the 1D SG PORV, 1MSOI8D fails open causing a small reactivity transient requiring manual action to close or isolate the PORV. Operability should be addressed in Tech Spec 3.7.4 with no action required. The US will notify the SM of conditions and the WEC for maintenance support.
Once the SG PORV is closed or isolated, the PZR PORV 1RY455A fails to 50% open requiring RO action to close the PORV block valve lRY8OOOA to stop the RCS depressurization. Tech Spec 3.4. I 1 will be addressed for operability with no additional action required. If RCS pressure falls below 2209 psig, a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> action will be required to restore RCS pressure per Tech Spec 3.4.1. The US will notify the SM of conditions and the WEC for maintenance support.
Following actions for PZR PORV 1RY455A failure, 1FWWB will close causing F W to be lost to the I B SG requiring a manual reactor trip and entry into IBEP-O. Immediately following the trip, a SGTR will occur in the 1B SG at 450 gpm will be initiated resulting in an SI actuation. The SI may be manually initiated upon recognition of the SI being required. The RO will be expected to recognize lSI88OlA and 1S18801B did not open as required on the SI and is expected to manually open them for high head injection flow. The crew will take required actions in 1BEP-0 and transition to 1BEP-3 where they will isolate the ruptured 1B SG causing a safety to open and stick open, then transition to 1BCA-3.1 to cooldown the RCS and depressurize the RCS to equalize RCS pressure with the ruptured SG to control RCS inventory loss.
The scenario ends with the transition to 1BCA-3.1.
ERG Based Critical Tasks:
- 1. E-0-1: Manually initiate high head injection via lSI8801AA3 before exiting IBEP-0.
._ 3. E-3-A: Identify the 1 B SG as the ruptured SG and isolate prior to transition to 1 BCA-3.1.
Byron Demo 06-4 nrc Page 2 I /25/2006
Comments on Byron 2006 Examination Outline Comment 1 On Form ES-301-1 for the RO examination the JPM title is listed for the Emergency Plan Topic does not match the KA. KA 2.4.43 involves emergency communications, the JPM title listed is Emergency Dose Authorization.
Resolution This was a transcription error the actual JPM for the examination will involve a NARS notification.
Comment 2 Should any of the manual reactor trips called for in Scenario 06-1, 2, and 4 be critical tasks?
Resolution The author stated that for Scenario 06-2, and 4 these were anticipatory trips. However, the trip in Scenario 06-1 is necessary to prevent fuel damage and should be critical.
Comment 3 In Scenario 06-2 Event 6,7 will there be enough observable operator action by the BOP to evaluate him on the component failure?
Resolution The author stated that there will be a number of action to be taken by the BOP between the trip of the first feedpump and the need to trip the reactor.