Text

Byron June 2006 Examination Outline Submittal
	ML063110334
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	11/06/2006
From:	Palagi B B; NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:	;
Shared Package
ML062260233	List: BYRON 2006-0013, Byron June 2006 Examination Outline Submittal; ML063110334; ML063110429; ML063110437; ML063110453; ML063110472; ML063110492; ML070230570;
References
	BYRON 2006-0013
	Download: ML063110334 (50)
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BYRON JUNE 2006 EXAMINATION OUTLINE SUBMITTAL January 24, 2006 LTR: BYRON 2006-0013 File: 1.10.0101 James Caldwell, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I11 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210 Lisle, IL 60532-4352 Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455

Subject:

Submittal of Initial Operator Licensing Examination Outline Enclosed are the examination outlines, supporting the Initial License examination scheduled for the weeks of June 19, 2006 through June 30, 2006 at Byron Station. - This submittal includes all appropriate Examination Standard forms and outlines in accordance with NUREG-1021 "Operator Licensing Examination Standards", Revision 9. In accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Section ES-201, "Initial Operator Licensing Examination Process," please ensure that these materials are withheld from public disclosure until after the examinations are complete.

Should you have any questions Concerning this letter, please contact Mr. W. Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at 815-406-2800.

For questions concerning examination materials, please contact Marty Jorgensen at 815-406-3111.

Respedfu I l y, 2078 (~iiL.& Dd.fJ Stephen E. Kuczynski Site Vice President Byron Nuclear Generating Station SEK/MJ/TLF/ra h

Enclosures listed below will be hand delivered to Bruce Palagi, Chief Examiner, NRC Region 111 - - - - - - Scenario Outlines (Form ES-D-1) - - Completed Checklists:

o Examination Outline quality Checklist (Form ES-201-2) o Transient and Event Checklist (Form ES-301-5)

Examination Security Agreements (Form ES-201-3)

Administrative Topics Outline(s) (Form ES-301-1)

Control Room/n-Plant Systems Outline (Form ES-301-2)

PWR Examination Outline (Form ES-401-2)

Generic Knowledge and abilities Outline (Tier 3) (Form ES-401-3)

Record of Rejected K/As (Form ES-401-4) v

/ Exel nl January 17,2006 LTR: BYRON 2006-001 1 File: 1.10.0101 James Caldwell, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region Ill 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 21 0 Lisle, IL 60532-4352 Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos.

NPF-37 and NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50455

Subject:

Submittal of Knowledge and Abilities (WA) statements that will be suppressed from the random exam generation process It is our intent to develop the upcoming initial license exam scheduled for June 19-30, 2006 in accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 9, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for L Power Reactors." In accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 9, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors", Byron Station is submitting for your review the list of WA statements that will be suppressed from the random exam generation process in support of our June 19-30, 2006 license exam.

Byron Station has reviewed all the WA's in the catalog that have importance ratings less than 2.5 and have suppressed these WA's from random selection. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. W. Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at 81 5406-2800.

Respectfully, Stephen E. Kuczynski Site Vice President Byron Nuclear Generating Station SEWM J/TLF/rah

Enclosures:

Byron Station Suppressed K/A Statements Byron Suppressed KAs Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 00000 I AK1.14 Continuous Rod Withrlrciwcil Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal emergency task: Dropped Control Rod Ability to operate and

/ or monitor the following as they apply the Dropped Control Rod: Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod emergency task: Knowledge of the following components:

Knowledge of the reasons for the following Responses as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Knowledge of the reasons for the following Responses as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following: lnoperable/Stuck Control Rod Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to determine or interpret:

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the inoperable/stuck control rod emergency task:

Knowledge of the following components:

3.7 Not applicable to BraidwocdByron.

Interaction of ICs control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICs 3.4 3.4' 3.2 3.1 3.5' 3.4' 3.8 3.4 2.5 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.6 000003 AA1.04 Control rod drive safety rod out limit bypass switch or key Interaction of ICs control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICs 3.3 3.6 Not applicable to Braidwocd/Byron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

AK1.13 AK2.03 AK3.01 Metroscope 3.2 3.9' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron. Not applicable to BraidwocdlByron.

When ICs logic has failed on a dropped rod, the load must be reduced until flux is within specified target Bank Turbine automatic runback with reactor in order to balance power output AK3.03 3.7' AK3.04 000005 AA1.03 AA2.02 AK1.04 Actions contained in EOP for dropped control rod 4.1 Not applicable to BraidwaxVByron.

Metroscope 3.4 3.0 3.4 Not applicable to BraidWByron. Not applicable to BraidwdByron. Not applicable to BraidwdByron.

Difference between jog and run rod speeds, effect on CRDM of stuck rod Definitions of axial imbalance, neutron error, power demand, actual power tracking mode, ICs AK2.03 Metroscope 3.3 Not applicable to BraidwdByron.

000008 AA2.04 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Vulve Stuck Open) Ability to determine or interpret:

High-temperature computer alarm and alarm type 3.4 3.7 Not applicable to Bra id wood/B yron . Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

AA2.09 Ability to determine or interpret:

PZR spray block valve controls and indicators p" Page I

i Viewed KA 000009 EA1.03 EA1.18 EA2.09 EA2.22 EA2.35 EK3.25 EK3.27 00001 I EA1.02 EA1.09 EA1.16 EA2.11 EM. 12 EK3.07 0000 I 5/17 AA1.04 AA1.19 AA2.09 Category Statement KA Statement Sinal1 Brccik LOCA Ability to operate and monitor the following: Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to determine or interpret: Ability to determine or interpret: Ability to determine or interpret:

Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following: sustained high pressure Large Break LOCA Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following: Ability to determine or interpret:

Ability to determine or interpret:

Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following: Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Maljknctions Ability to operate and monitor the following: Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to determine or interpret:

Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Balancing of HPI loop flows Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Charging flow trend recorder Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling Monitoring of in-core T-cold Manual depressurization or HPI recirculation for spray Reflux boiling sump level indicators Core flood tank initiation Balancing of HPI loop flows Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling spray Stopping charging pump bypass flow RCP ventilation cooling fan run indicators Power transfer confirm lamp When to secure RCPs on high stator temperatures RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 3.2 3.4 2.8 3.0' 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.3 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.5 2.5 2.9 3.4 AK1.03 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the RCP malfunctions emergency task: Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following: power-to-flow limit Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

flow The basis for operating at a reduced power level when one RCP is out of service Reduction of power to below the steady state 3.0 AK3.04 AK3.05 3.1 2.8' Shift of T-ave sensors to the loop with the highest 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3' 4.1 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.3 3.5 4.3 3.8 3.6 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.2 3.0' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwdByron.

Not applicable to BraidwWByron. Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

Not applicable to BraidwdByron. Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to BraidwoodByron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to BraidwdByron.

Braidwood and Byron have no procedural requirement to stop RCPs based on Stator Temperature. Not applicable to BraidwodByron. Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron. Not applicable to BraidwodByron.

Puge 2 I /

Vie wed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 000024 AAl.01 Eniergrnc y Boratiori Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Use of spent fuel pool as backup to BWST Pump speed controlled to protect pump seals 2.7' 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.4' Not applicable to BraidwdByron.

3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.1 Not applicable to BraidwocWByron.

AAl.08 AA1.ll AA1.24 Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following: BIT suction and recirculation valves BIT inlet and outlet valve switches and indicators 000025 AA1.05 Loss of Residual Heut Removal System (RHRS) Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Raw water or sea water pumps 2.7 2.6' 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. 2.4' Not applicable to BraidwodByron.

2.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.5 Not applicable to BraidwdByron.

2.4 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

AA1.19 Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to determine or interpret:

Knowledge of the following components:

Block orifice bypass valve controllers and indicators Obtaining of water from BWST for LPI system Limitations on LPI flow and temperature rates of change Raw water or sea water pumps AA1.22 AA2.05 AK2.04 000026 AA1.03 Lnss oj Component Cooling Wuter (CC W) Ability to operate and monitor the following:

SWS as a backup to the CCWS 3.6' 2.7 3.2 3.6' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoociByron.

3.5 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

AA1.04 AK3.01 Ability to operate and monitor the following:

CRDM high-temperature alarm system Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

Pressiirizer Pressitre Coritrol System (PZR PCS) Malfitnctioii Ability to operate and monitor the following: The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and closing of the SWS isolation valves to the CCWlnuclear service water coolers Pressure recovery, using emergency-only heaters 00002 7 AAl.04 3.9' 3.3' 2.8 3.6' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron 3.2' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron 2.9 Seal Return flow not impacted by PZR pressure changes BraidwodByron.

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Transfer of heaters to backup power supply AA1.05 AA2.13 Ability to determine or interpret:

Seal return flow 000028 Pressrtrizer (PZR) Level Coritrol Malfunction AK1.05 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions:

Change in PZR level with power change, even though RCS T-ave. constant, due to loop size difference 2.9 3.0 Not applicable to BraidwWB yron. AA2.13 Ability to determine or interpret:

The actual PZR level, given uncompensated level With an appropriate graph 2.9 3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

y" Vie wed KA 000028 AK3.04 Category Statement KA Statement Pressiirixr (PZK) Level C'otitrd Muifirriction (Coritiiiued)

RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 2.9 3.9 3.7 3.1 3.7 3.1 3.4 Knowledge of the basis or reasons for the Following:

Anticipteil Triinsient Without Scrcitn (A TWS) Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Change in PZR level with power change, even though T-ave constant, due to loop size difference BIT inlet valve switches BIT outlet valve switches 3.0 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

000029 EA1.04 EA1.05 EA2.10 EK3.03 EK3.04 EK3.05 3.8 Not applicable to BradwWByron.

3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodfByron.

3.4 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodtByron.

3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.5 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

Ability to determine or interpret:

Positive displacement charging pumps Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following: Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

valves Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:

valve Opening BIT inlet and outlet valves Closing the normal charging header isolation Closing the centrifugal charging pump recirculation 000032 AA2.03 AA2.09 LAXY of Source R~~ige Nuclear I~istrunieritcitioti Ability to determine or interpret:

Ability to determine or interpret:

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts:

Expected values of source range indication when High voltage is automatically removed Effects of improper HV setting Effects of voltage changes on performance 2.8 2.5 2.5 3.1 Not applicable to 2.9 Not applicable to 3.1 Not applicable to Byron SR instruments.

Byron SR instruments.

Byron SR instruments i AK1.01 000.33 AA2.11 AK1.O1 Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instruntentation 3.1 2.5 Ability to determine or interpret:

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts:

Loss of compensating voltage Effects of voltage changes on performance 3.4 Not applicable to 3.1 Not applicable to Byron IR instruments. Byron instruments.

000037 AA1.03 Stearn Generator (S/G) Tube Leak Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak:

Knowledge of the reasons tor the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: Stearn Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the SGTR Loop isolation valves 3.0' 2.3 2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron 2.6 Not applicable to Braidwoodl6 yron AK3.01 Collection of Condensate in air ejector monitor due to its failure AK3.04 Use of "feed and bleed" process 2.5 2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron 0000.38 EK3.07 RCS loop isolation valves 3.4' 3.8 Not applicable to BraidwoWB yron Viewed KA 000040 Cateaorv Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Sten% Line Rupture Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: Loss of Ofi~ite Power Ability to operate and monitor the following: Vibration alarm Load sequencer status lights Service water booster pump Al.21 Al.22 2.3' 2.5 3.0' 3.0' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

000056 AA1.15 AA1.20 AA2.02 AA2.11 AA2.29 AA2.38 2.7' 2.9' 3.0 3.0 3.5' 3.6' 2.9' 2.9' 3.0' 3.2' 3.7' 3.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Speed switch room ventilation fan Ability to determine or interpret:

ESF load sequencer status lights Ability to determine or interpret:

Operational status of service water booster pump Ability to determine or interpret: Service water booster pump ammeter and flowmeter Ability to determine or interpret: Load sequencer status lights 00005 7 AA2.02 Loss of' Vitd AC Elrctr-icd Iiistriinicwt this Ability to determine or interpret:

Core flood tank pressure and level indicators 3.7 3.8 3.4' 3.5' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

AA2.08 Ability to determine or interpret: Reactor power digital display and remote flux meter 000062 AA1.04 Loss of Nuclear Service Wuter Ability to operate and monitor the following:

CRDM high-temperature alarm system 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoWByron.

3.5' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.7 3.6' 3.2' AA1.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following:

SWS as a backup to the CCWS Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses:

Loss of Iiistrunient Air Ability to determine or interpret:

The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and closing of the SWS isolation valves to the nuclear nuclear service water coolers Relationship of flow readings to system operation AK3.01 000065 AA2.02 2.4' 2.6' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

00006 7 AK3.04 Plaiit Fire on Site Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses:

Ability to determine or interpret:

Actions contained in EOP for plant fire on site Time limit of long-term breathing air system for control room 3.3 2.9' 4.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.6' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

AA2.10 ) Page 5 Viewed KA UU0~~8 AA1.09 AA1.20 AK3.04 AK3.05 AK3.16 0000 74 EA1.03 EA1.08 EA1.14 000076 AK3.02 001 000 Al.08 A1.10 Al.ll A1.13 Category Statement Control Koorri Eiwxntiori Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses:

Imdequcite Core Cooling Ability to operate and monitor the following:

Ability to operate and monitor the following:

High Renctor Coolwit Activity Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses:

Control Rod Drive System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CRDS controls including:

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CRDS controls including:

KA Statement Synchroscope key Indicators for operation of startup transformer Filling the feedwater system and closing the AM pump discharge valve Repositioning valves to isolate and drain the AMI pump turbine and steam supply header Fail-open of the control room doors for personnel evacuation The alternate control station for turbine bypass valve operation HPI System Alarm for loss of subcooling margin Increased CCW flow Verification that CRDS temperatures are within limits before starting Location and operation of controls and indications for CRDS component cooling water Required primary system subcooling during shutdown; location of indication "Prepower dependent insertion limit" and power dependent insertion limit, determined with metroscope RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 3.1' 3.2 3.0' 3.5 2.8 3.9 4.2 4.1 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.7 4.0? 2.7' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.2' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

3.3 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

4.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.0 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

2.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron.

3.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

4.2? Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. ) Page 6 Vie wed KA 00 IO00 A2.04 Category Statement Coritrol Rod Drive System(Coritiniied Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CRDS and the following systems: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CRDS and the following systems: Knowledge of CROS design feature@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS: KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 3.2' 3.8' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Positioning of axial shaping rods and their effect on SDM 2.9 3.3 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron A2.08 Loss of CCW to CRDS Isolation of Left coil on affected rod to prevent coil burnout 2.6 3.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

A2.20 A4.01 A4.04 A4.07 A4.09 A4.12 A4.13 A4.14 A4.15 K1.O1 Controls for CCWS 3.1 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.9' 2.7' 3.0 3.1' 3.0 2.9 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.9' 3.4 3.1' 3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron. Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron. Not applicable to Braidwood/B yron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

Part-length rod position Power source transfer check ccws Stopping T/G load changes; only make minor adjustments to prevent coil burnout Stopping other changes in plant, e.g., turbine, S/G, SDBCS, boration, before adjusting rods Resetting rod control logic while recovering from misaligned rod, using instrument Tech-Specs . Stopping boratioddilution or other means of reactivity change while adjusting either rod position or T-ave .* ccw CCWS must be cut in before energizing CRDS 2.8 3.1 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

K1.09 K4.04 K5.11 Circuitry and principle of operation for LVDT or reed switch Reason for maintaining cross-tie breaker between between rod drive M/G sets: reliability of control rod drive trip breakers during operation of one M/G set Effects on power of insetting axial shaping rods 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.9 Not applicable to BraidwodByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron.

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS: Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS: 3.4 3.1 4.1 3.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to Braidwmd/Byron.

K5.12 K5.71 Relationship between reactivity worth of power-shaping control rod group and other control rod groups (power-shaping, or part-length, rods have much less reactivity than full-length control ) Page 7 Vie wed KA 00 IO00 Category Statement Control Rod Drive System(Continued)

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS: Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS: Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CRDS components:

KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis K5.76 K5.79 K5.98 K6.09 Effects on power of inserting axial shaping rods Effects of positioning of axial shape rods on SDM 3.3' 3.0' 3.4 2.9' 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.7' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.6' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.9' Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Effect of adding high or low boron concentration to maintain T-ave.

equal to T-ref Purpose and operation of neutron flux recorder at high speed concentration 002000 A3.02 A4.04 A4.05 K5.16 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCS, including:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the RCS: Containment sound-monitoring system The fillingdraining of LPI pumps during refueling 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron. 2.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

2.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

4.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

The HPI system when it is used to refill the refueling cavity Reason for automatic features of the Feedwater control system during total loss of reactor coolant flow 003000 K3.05 Recictor Coohit Pimp SySteFn (RCPS) Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the RCPS will have on the following:

ICs 3.6 3.0 3.7 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

004000 A2.08 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control,or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control,or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Loss of heat tracing 3.7 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

A2.24 Isolation of both letdown filters at one time: down-stream relief lifts 2.8 2.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

A2.33 Fact that isolating cation demineralizer stops boron dilution and enables restoration of normal boron concentration 2.7 3.3 Not applicable to BraidwWByron, 2.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

A4.20 Deborating demineralizer selector valve and selector valve control switch 2.6 K4.22 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room: Boronometer chart recorder 2.5' 2.5' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Kl.09 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems: Relationship between CVCS and RPlS 2.2 2.7 Not applicable to BraidwodByron.

Page 8 Viewed KA 004000 Category Statement KA Statement Cheiiiiccil (id Volme Coritrol Systerit (CVCS)(Contiriued)

RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems: Knowledge of the operational implications of:

the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS Knowledge of the operational implications of: the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS Knowledge of the operational implications of:

the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS components:

Interface between HPI flow path and excess letdown flow path K1.25 2.7' 3.2' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

K5.31 K5.32 K5.33 K6.12 3.4 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.4 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.4 Not applicable to BraidwoocUByron.

Purpose of flow path around boric acid storage tank 3.0' 3.1 2.3' 3.1 Purpose and control of heat tracing (prevent crystallization)

Use of a boronometer Principle of recirculation valve: (permit emergency flow even if valve is blocked by crystallized boric acid) 00.Fooo K4.12 Residucil Hecit Removal System { RHRs) Knowledge of RHRS design feature@)

and/or n interlock(s) which provide or the following:

Lineup for piggyback mode with CSS 3.1

3.7' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

006000 A2.07 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Loss of heat tracing 2.8 3.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the 2.6 3.2' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

A2.09 Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere A4.03 K1.07 Transfer from boron storage tank to boron injection tank MFW System 3.5 2.9 3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.3 Not applicable to BraidWByron.

K1.10 Safety injection tank heating system 2.6 2.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

K2.03 K4.19 K4.20 K4.29 Heat tracing Interlocks to storage tank makeup valve Automatic closure of common drain line and fill valves to accumulator BIT recirculation 2.3 3.0 3.2' 2.5' 2.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodIB yron.

3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

3.5' Not applicable to BraidwoocUByron. 2.9' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Knowledge of ECCS design features(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of ECCS design features(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Knowledge of ECCS design features@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

i Page 9 Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement 007000 Pressiiriier Relief TnnUQuench Tank System (PRTS) Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

A2.07 Heat tracing A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: PZR vent valve 008000 Conponetit Coolirig Water System { CC WS) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: control switch Knowledge of the effect that a loss of malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following Pressirrizer Pressicre Control System (PZR PCS) Knowledge of PZR PCS design feature@)

and/or interlock@)

which provide for the following:

A4.11 K3.02 CCW pump recirculation valve and its three-way CRDS 01 0000 K4.02 Prevention of uncovering PZR heaters 01 1000 A2.08 K1.05 K4.03 K6.01 01 2000 K6.07 K6.08 K6.09 0 I3000 Al.03 K4.05 RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 2.7 3.2 Not applicable to Braidwocd/Byron. 2.6 2.6 Not applicable to BraidwoWByron.

3.0' 2.9' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. 2.9 3.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.0 2.6 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

cause-eff ect relationships between the PZR LCS and the following systems: Knowledge of the PZR LCS design feature(s) Density compensation of PZR level and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on: Reasons for starting charging pump while increasing the following will have on the PZR LCS: letdown flow rate Loss of level compensation Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Reactor regulating system 3.4 2.6 2.8' Reuctor Protection System Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following RPS components: design attributes of the following RPS components:

Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following RPS components:

Engineered Scgety Features Actuatiori System {ESFAS) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits)

Associated with operating the ESFAS controls Including:

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Core protection calculator COLSS CEAC Knowledge of the applicable performance and Feedwater header differential Core spray actuation signal reset 2.9 3.6' 3.6 2.6 4.0 3.4 prevention of uncovering pressurizer heaters is covered by level control circuitry and is addressed by WA 01 1000K4.01 2.8 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.5 2.9 3.2' 3.2 3.7' 3.7 2.6 4.2 Not applicable to BraidwdByron. Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to Braid wood/B yron .

Vie wed KA 01.3000 Category Statement KA Statement Engineered Sgfety Fecitures Actuation System (ESFAS)(Continuecl)

RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Upper head injection accumulator isolation Reason for disabling of BIT so it will not function during ESF sequencer test 3.7 4.0 3.0 3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of ESFAS design feature@) and/or interlock@)

which provide for the following:

Rod Position lntliccition System (RPIS) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RPlS controls including:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPlS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to manual operate and/or monitor in the control room: Knowledge of RPlS design feature(s) and/or Interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of RPlS design feature@)

and/or Interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of RPlS design feature($

and/or Interlock@)

which provide for the following: Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following RPlS components:

Nuclear lnstriti~ientcition Sys terrl Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems: Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the NIS will have on the following: Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the NIS will have on the following: Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) and/or 1nterlock)s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of NIS design feature@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or Malfunction on the following will have on the NIS: K4.14 K4.24 014000 Al.01 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron Metroscope reed switch display 2.9 3.1 2.6 3.0 Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron.

Loss of LVDT A2.06 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Loss of reed switch 2.6 2.9 A2.07 2.6' 2.5 2.5 3.1 2.1 2.7' 2.7 2.7 3.3 2.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron. Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron. Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron.

A4.03 K4.01 K4.02 K4.05 K6.03 Primary coil voltage measurement Upper electrical limit Lower electrical limit Rod hold interlocks Metroscope 01 5000 K1.05 ICs 3.9 3.9 3.4 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron.

K1.06 Reactor regulating system ICs Reactor regulating system Source-range detector shutoff at high powers Slow response time of SPNDs Discriminator/compensation circuits 3.4 2.9 3.1 3.4 2.6 4.0 3.2 3.3 3.6 2.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to Byron SR instruments.

Not applicable to Braid wood/Byron. Not applicable to Byron instruments.

K3.04 K3.06 K4.01 K4.04 K6.02 Page II i i Vie wed KA 0,32000 K1.02 K4.04 K4.05 025000 Al.01 Al.02 Al.03 A2.01 A2.02 A2.03 A2.04 A2.05 Category Statement Contninment Cooling System (CCS) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CCS and the following systems: Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Ice C'ondenser System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Ice Condenser System controls including:

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Ice Condenser System controls including:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

KA Statement SEChemote monitoring systems Cooling of control rod drive motors Containment cooling after LOCA destroys ventilation ducts Temperature chart recorders Glycol expansion tank level Glycol flow to ice condenser air handling units Trip of glycol circulation pumps HigMow floor cooling temperature Opening of ice condenser doors Containment isolation Abnormal glycol expansion tank level RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 3.7 3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.1 Not applicable to 2.8 Braidwood/Byron.

2.6' 2.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

3.0 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

2.2 Braidwood

and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

2.5 Braidwood

and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

2.7 Braidwood

and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

2.5 Braidwood

and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

3.2 Braidwood

and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

3.2 Braidwood

and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

2.7 Braidwood

and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 706 Page 12 i Viewed KA Cate ory Statement KA Statement 025000 Ice tondenser Systern(Continued)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfuxtions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Ice Condenser System, including:

A2.06 Decreasing ice condenser temperature A3.01 Refrigerant system RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 2.5 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Ice Condenser System, including:

Isolation valves A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Ice condenser isolation valves A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Containment vent fans A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Glycol circulation pumps K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Containment ventilation cause-effect relationships between the Ice Condenser System and the following systems: cause-effect relationships between the Ice Condenser System and the following systems: cause-effect relationships between the Ice Condenser System and the following systems: K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Refrigerant systems K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Containment sump system K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Containment ventilation fans and dampers 2.2 3.0 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.7 2.7 3.2 K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Refrigerant systems 2.0 K2.03 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Isolation valves 2.0 K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the Ice Condenser System will have on the following:

Containment 3.8 K4.01 Knowledge of Ice Condenser System design Glycol expansion tank levels and ice condenser 2.2 K4.02 Knowledge of Ice Condenser System design System control 2.8 feature(s) and/or interlock@)

which provide for the following: feature@) andlor interlock@)

which provide for the following: as they apply to the Ice Condenser System:

system containment isolation valves K5.01 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts Relationships between pressure and temperature 3.0 3.0 3.4 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2 3.8 2.5 3.0 3.4 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers

Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 306 Vie wed KA 025000 K5.02 KA Statement Heat transfer RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.4 3.6 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Ice Condenser System:

Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Ice Condenser System:

K5.03 K6.01 Gas laws Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following Ice Condenser System components:

Cimtairiment Sprtry Svstetii (CSS) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSSS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems: Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser 026000 A2.09 2.5' Radiation hazard potential of BWST 2.9' Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

K1.02 Cooling water 4.1 4.1 Containment Spray pumps have no cooling water at BraidwWByron Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron Recirculation spray system 3.9 K3.02 028000 K1.01 Ki .02 K2.01 K3.01 K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CSS will have on the following:

4.1 Hydrogen

Recombiner arid Purge Cotitrol System (HRPS) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the HRPS and the following systems: Knowledge of the physical connections andlo4r Cause-effect relationships between the HRPS And the following systems: Knowledge of the power supplies to the following:

2.5 2.2 2.8' 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.6' 3.2? Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners

no longer in use. Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Containment annulus ventilation system (including pressure limits)

Air supply system Hydrogen Recombiners Hydrogen concentration in containment Explosive hydrogen concentration Flammable hydrogen concentration Sources of hydrogen within containment The selective removal of hydrogen 2.5' 2.0 2.5' 3.3 3.4 3.4 2.9 2.6? Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the HRPS will have on the following:

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the HRPS: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the HRPS: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the HRPS: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the HRPS: Pnge 14 \ 1 Viewed KA 028000 Category Statement KA Statement Hvdrogen Recombiner arid Purge Control System (HRPS)(Continued)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the HRPS: Hydrogen Recombiners RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis K6.01 Al.01 Al.02 A2.01 2.6 3.1 Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use 3.4 3.8 Braidwood and Byron 3.4' 3.7' Braidwood and Byron 3.4' 3.6' Braidwood and Byron Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameter (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the HRPS controls including:

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameter (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the HRPS controls including: Hydrogen concentration Containment pressure Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the HRPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the HRPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the HRPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Hydrogen recombiner power setting, determined by using plant data book A2.02 LOCA condition and related concern over hydrogen 3.5 3.9 Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use 3.6' Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use The hydrogen air concentration in excess of limit flame propagation or detonation with resulting equipment damage in containment 3.4' A2.03 A4.01 HRPS controls 4.0' 4.0' Braidwood and Byron Hydrogen Recombiners no longer in use 033000 A4.02 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS) SFPCS valves 2.4 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Stearn Generator Svstern (S/GS) Knowledge of S/GS design feature@) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS) Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room: Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the MRSS will have on the following:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the MRSS and the following systems:

Knowledge of MRSS design feature@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

2.8 Not applicable to Braidwood and Byron 035000 K4.04 Radiation high-level isolation while draining S/G 2.8' secondary to main condenser 3.1* Not applicable to BraidwoodJByron.

039000 A4.04 3.8 3.2 3.4' Not applicable to BraidwmdlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwodByron Not applicable to BraidwmdByron. Emergency feedwater pump turbines AFW pumps AFW 3.9 3.5 3.4' K3.03 K1.07 3.7 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron K4.07 Reactor building isolation 3.4 Pqe 1.5 . 906 Vie wed KA 04 1000 A4.01 A4.07 K2.01 K2.02 K4.01 K4.15 045000 K4.08 K4.44 0.55000 A3.03 0.59000 Al.07 A3.07 A4.10 K1.07 K4.02 K4.17 Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Steam Dunip System (SDS) and TicrDirie Bypciss Control Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

Knowledge of SDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Mciiii Turbine Generator (MT/G) Svsteni Knowledge of MT/G System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of MT/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Condenser Air Rerriovul System (CARS) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CARS, including: Main Feedwater (MFW) System Ability to (a) predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design Limits) associated with operating the MFW Controls including:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW System, including:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW System and the following systems:

Knowledge of MFW System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

ICs voltage inverter Remote gagging of stuck open relief valves ICs, normal and alternate power supply ICs inverter breakers RRGllCS system "Measured variable" readings on ICs hand-automatic stations and required action if reading is out of the acceptable band The reactor bailey station and reactor diamond station in integrated control circuitry impulse pressure mode control of steam dumps Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust Feed pump speed, including normal control speed for ICs ICs ICs ICs Automatic turbineheactor trip runback Increased feedwater flow following a reactor trip 2.9' 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.9' 2.9' 2.6 2.5' 2.5* 2.5' 3.4 3.9 3.2 3.3 2.5 3.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

2.6 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.3' Not applicable to BraidwoWByron 2.9' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron 3.0 2.8' 2.7' 2.6' 3.5 3.8 3.2 3.5 2.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwWByron Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidWByron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

306 J 1 Page 16 Viewed KA 06 1000 Al.03 A2.02 A3.04 K1.09 K1.ll K4.07 K4.09 K4.11 K4.14 K5.04 068000 A2.03 A3.01 A4.01 Category Statement KA Statement Auxilinp / Erriergency Feedwriter (AFW) System Ability to (a) predict and/or monitor changes In parameters (to prevent exceeding design Limits) associated with operating the AFW Controls including:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AFW System, including:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the AFW and the following systems:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the AFW and the following systems: Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of AFW System design feature@)

and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the AFW System: Liquid Radwaste System (LRS) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Liquid Radwaste System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Ability to monitor automatic operation of theLiquid Radwaste System, including:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Interactions when multi unit systems are cross tied 3.1' 3.6' Loss of air to steam supply valve Automatic AFW isolation PRMS AFW turbine exhaust drains Turbine trip, including overspeed Cross-ties between multi-unit station Automatic level control AFW automatic isolation Reason for warming up turbine prior to turbine startup 3.2 4.1 2.6' 2.7 3.1 3.7 2.7 3.5 2.3 lnsuff icient sampling frequency of the boric acid 2.5' in the evaporator bottoms Evaporator pressure control Control board for boron recovery 2.5' 2.7' 3.6 4.2 2.8' 2.8' 3.3 3.3 2.9 3.7 2.5 2.6' 2.4' 2.4' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodfByron. Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodByron. Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to BraidwdByron. Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron. Not applicable to BraidwdByron. Not applicable to BraidwdByron.

Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

Pr1ge 17 Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 071000 Waste Gas Disposcd Svsrerii ( WGDS) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the A4.05 Gas decay tanks, including valves, indicators, and sample2.W 2.6' control room: line 2.4' 2.5' A4.10 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: WGDS sampling A4.11 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: WGDS startup and shutdown 2.5 A4.13 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Recovery from automatic termination of gas release due to PRM system alarm 3.0 A4.14 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: WGDS status alarms A4.16 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Waste gas decay tank shifts 2.8 2.5 A4.17 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Stopping transfer of radioactive liquids to WGDS tank 2.6 A4.30 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Water drainage from WGDS decay tanks 2.9 2.3 3.1 3.0 2.2 2.5 2.6 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts. Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts. Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts. Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.

Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts. Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts. Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts. Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts. ! 706 Page I8 I Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement Wuste Gas Disposal System ( WGDS) (Continued)

Knowledge of design feature@)

and/or interlocks which provide for the following:

Process Rcidiutioii Monitoring (PRM) System Tank loop seals RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 071000 K4.03 2.5' 2.6' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron 073000 K4.02 Knowledge of PRM System design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following:

Service Wuter System (SWS) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits):

associated with operating the SWS controls including:

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the SWS will have on the following:

Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) andor interlock@) which provide for the following:

Letdown isolation on high-RCS activity 3.3' 3.9' Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron 076000 Al.02 2.5' Reactor and turbine building closed cooling water temperatures.

2.3 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.6' Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

K1.07 Secondary closed cooling water 2.6' Reactor building closed cooling water 3.0 3.1 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

K1.09 2.6 Not applicable to BraidwWByron.

3.9 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

2.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.4' Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

K2.04 K3.03 K4.01 K4.03 Reactor building closed cooling water 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.9' Reactor building closed cooling water Conditions initiating automatic closure of closed cooling water auxiliary building header supply and Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCS heat exchangers 078000 K1.05 Iiistritmet~r Air System (IAS) Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the 3.4 3.3 MSlV air 3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodByron.

Emergency air compressor 3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodIByron.

K2.02 086000 Al.02 Fire Protection System (FPS) Ability to predict andor monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the FPS controls including:

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the FPS and the following systems: 3.0 Fire water storage tank level 3.2 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

A4.04 K1.01 Fire water storage tank makeup pumps High-pressure service water 3.4 3.0 3.3 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.4 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

r 706 Puge 19 I i Vie wed KA Category Statement I O.?OOO Cot I tcr it1 tiieii t Systern KA Statement A4 09 K1 03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Containment System and the following systems Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Containment System and the following systems feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following Containment vacuum system Shield building vent system K1 07 Containment vacuum system K4 01 Knowledge of Containment System design Vacuum breaker protection By -2vGL on Facility Representative By P=/ on Facility Representative- RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 3.1 3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.1 3.5 Not applicable to BraidwoodfByron.

3.5 3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.

3.0 3 7 Not applicable to BraidwoodlByron.

I i ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility:

Date of Examination: - Item 1. W R I T T E N 2. S I M U L A T 0 R - 3. W I T - 4. G E N E R A L ~~ Task Description Initials h t. ?Ad 84 a. Venfy that the outline(s) ffi(s) the appropriate model.

in accordance with ES-401. b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all WA categories are appropriately sampled.

c. Assess whether the outline overemphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.

d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected WA statements are appropriate.

a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major transients.

b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number >:j3 1 and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using Md flp - LY at least one-w or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated from the applicants' audit test@), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days. c. To the extent possible.

assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specifd on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D. a. Venfy that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2: (1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specikd on the form (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s)

(4) the number of new or modi tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specifed on he form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria

~ c ' I on the form. 1 b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specifed on Form ES-301-1: (1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations I c Determine If there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are du

a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.

b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41143 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.

c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.

d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.

e Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.

a. Author b. Facility Reviewer r) I/;ZS/# w d. NRC Supervisor u3/oG c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) ES-201, Page 25 of 27 4- W ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Date of Examination:

6/19/06 Operating Test Number: 2006-301 Administrative Topic (See Note) Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Equipment Control Radiation Control Emergency Plan Type Code* M, S or R N, S or R N, S or R Describe activity to be performed

~ ~ ~~ Shutdown Margin for a Stuck Rod WA 2.1.25 Imp Factor 2.8 Establish Clearance Boundaries for CS Pump WA 2.2.13 Imp Factor 3.6 RWP and Stay Time for a Clearance Job WA 2.3.10 Imp Factor 2.9 1 #MS .. WA 2.4.43 Imp Factor 2.8 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required. ~~~ ~~ ~ ~~~ *Type Codes & Criteria (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (I 3 for ROs; I4 for SROs & RO retakes) (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (2 1) (P)revious 2 exams (I 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ~ ~ ~ Date of Examination:

6/19/06 Operating Test Number: 2006-301 Examination Level (circle one): RO Facility:

Bvron Administrative Topic (See Note) Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Equipment Control Radiation Control Emergency Plan Type Code* M, S or R N, S or R N, S or R N, Sor R N, S or R Describe activity to be performed Shutdown Margin for a Stuck Rod WA 2.1.25 Imp Factor 3.1 Minimum Shift Staffing WA 2.1.5 Imp Factor 3.4 Establish Clearance Boundaries for CS Pump WA 2.2.13 Imp Factor 3.8 RWP and Stay Time for a Clearance Job WA 2.3.10 Imp Factor

3.3 Emergency

Dose Authorization WA 2.4.38 Imp Factor 4.0 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

Type Codes & Criteria (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, 01 Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (I 3 for Ros; s 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (2 1) (P)revious 2 exams (I 1; randomly selected)

ES-30 1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 ES-301 Control Room/ln-Plant Svstems Outline Form ES-301-2 System / JPM Title a. Remove Excess Letdown from service WA 004A4.06 Imp Factor 3.6 WA 013K1.13 Imp Factor 2.8 b. Main Control Room HVAC Makeup Filter and Charcoal Facility:

Bvron Date of Examination:

6/19/Of3 Exam Level (circle one)

SRO(I) / SRO(U) Operating Test Number: 2006-301 Type Code* Safety Function S, D 1 S, A, M 2 d. Respond to High RCP Seal Leakoff flow e. Respond to Main Generator Field Forcing KIA 003A2.01 Imp Factor 3.5 WA 045K3.01 Imp Factor 2.9 WA 007A1.01 Imp Factor 2.9 f. Drain the PRT due to inadvertent PORV opening c. Filling the RWST WA 006A4.03 ~~ s, D 4P Sl D 4s S, A, M 5 I S,D 1 3 Imp Factor 3.5 g. Parallel DG to SAT and load DG WA 0064A4.06 imp Factor 3.9 WA 072A4.01 ImD Factor 3.0 h. Refueling Setpoint Change for AROll and AROl2 S, M, A 6 S, A, M, L 7 i. Open SX Suction Valve for -AF Pump WA 061 K1.07 Imp Factor 3.6 j. Align FP for cooling -CV Pump WA 086K1.02 Imp Factor 2.7 A, E, M. R 4s Dl El L, R 8 k. Start up DC ESF Battery Charger WA 063A3.01 Imp Factor 2.7 lDlS ~ ~ ~ ~ Type Codes: Criteria for RO I SRO-l I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 I 4-6 I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank sgisa114 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 21/21/>1 (L)ow Power (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (P)reviuos 2 exams (R)CA 21 I2ll2t 22/52 I21 s 3 I 5 3 I I 2 (randomly selected) 21 I2 1 I2 1 (S)imulator ES-301 NUREG-1021, Revision ES-301 Control Roodln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 i. WA 061 K1.07 Imp Factor 3.8 j. Align FP for cooling -CV Pump WA 086K1.02 imp Factor 3.2 WA 063A3.01 Imp Factor 3.1 Open SX Suction Valve for -AF Pump k. Start up DC ESF Battery Charger Facility:

Bvron Date of Examination:

6/19/06 Exam Level (circle one): RO Control Room Systems (8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, 2 or 3 for SRO-U) Operating Test Number: 2006-301 A, E, M. R 4s D, E, L, R 8 D 6 System I JPM Title Typecode*

Safety Function a. Remove Excess Letdown from service WA 004A4.06 ImD Factor 3.1 1 I S,D I b. Main Control Room HVAC Makeup Filter and Charcoal S, A, M 2 c. Filling the RWST s, D 3 d. Respond to High RCP Seal Leakoff flow s, D 4P WA 013K1.13 Imp Factor 3.1 WA 006A4.03 Imp Factor 3.5 WA 003A2.01 Imp Factor 3.9 e. f. Drain the PRT due to inadvertent PORV opening WA 007A1.01 ImD Factor 3.1 g. Parallel DG to SAT and load DG WA 0064A4.06 Imp Factor 3.9 h. Refueling Setpoint Change for ARO11 and AR012 WA 072A4.01 Imp Factor 3.3 In-Plant Svstems (3 for RO. 3 for SRO-I. 2 or 3 for SRO-Ul (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 2 112 1121 (L)ow Power (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (P)reviuos 2 exams (WCA 21 IS1 121 22/22 I21 5 3 IS 3 I I 2 (randomly selected) 21 I21 I21 jS)imulator ES-301 NUREG-1 021, Revision ES-301 7 ransient and tvent Checklist I-orm ES-301-5 M I N I M 'acility: Byron Date of Exam: 611 9/06 Operating Test Number:

2006-301 1 I ins: 1. Check the a licant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event ty e fg are not ap licable for RO applicants.

ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and 'bakkce-of-plant (B8P)" positions. Instant SROs must do one scenario, including at least two instrument or component (K) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. Reactivi manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section 8.5.d) but must be significant.per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. *) Reactivity and normal Whenever practical both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that.provide insight. to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns. 2. evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component mal I unctions on a 1 -for-1 basis.

3. ES-301 v ES-401 PWR Examinatlon Outline FORM ES-401-2 -acility Name:Byron ~ ~ ~ Date of Exarn:6/1@/06

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories tote: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.' 8. 9. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable WA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (Le., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tir Totals' in each K/A category shall not be less than two). The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by tl from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The finc RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points. Systemdevolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operatione& important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment

2. for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possibk; sample every system or evduti in the group before selectim a second topic for any system or evolution.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those WAS having an hportance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-onty portions, respectively.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and WA categories. The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. On the following pages, enter the WA numbers, a brief chcdptbn of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals

(#) for each system and category.

Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling eqUipnent is sampled in other than Category A2 or G' on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #I does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the WA catalog, and enter the WA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals

(#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO SeleCtioM to WAS that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline F~nn ES-401- -- Emeraencv and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier l/Grouo I 0301

ES-401 4 Form ES-401 Form ES-401- v 59 Main Feedwater d ES-401, Page 24 of 33 ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 I1 ~~ FWR Examination Outline FOITI ES-401- 14 Rod Position Indication ES-401, Page 25 of 33 ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 F~rm ES401- 0007 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 ES-401,22 of 33 ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 4 ES-401,23 of 33

--.- ES-401 4 Form ES-401 03 Reactor Coolant Pum I ES-401, Page 24 of 33 ES-401 5 Form ES401-2 ES-401, Page 25 of 33

-- -- ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-4014 :acility Name:Byron Date of Exarn:6/19/06 ES-401, Page 26 of 33 ADDendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Fac i 1 it y : Byron Scenario No.: 06-1 Op-Test No.: 2006-301 Examiners: Operators:

SRO Initial Conditions:

IC- 16; 56% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 1 B Diesel Generator OOS, 1 C HD pump 00s. Turnover:

The plant is at 56% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 1025 ppm boron concentration. The 1 B Diesel Generator is 00s for Turbo Charger work. The DG has been 00s for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. LCOAR for Tech Spec

3.8.1 Condition

B has been entered; I BOSR 8. I. I - 1 was performed 30 minutes prior to shift turnover. Electric Operations has notified Byron Unit 1 to raise to 1250 MWe at 5 MW/Min to accommodate an outage from another power source. QNE was notified of the 5MWfMin ramp quest and after evaluation has recommended that the current administrative limits be I to raise power at 5MWh Event Malf. IOR ZLO 1 HSDG020 I OFF IMF SIOlA MRF RP30 OUT 1 2 IMFCV16 100 3 IMFRXOIKO laxed to allow-the

&quested ramp up to occur. The SM has given the direction

n. Descrintion 1BDGOOS 1B DG STOP Lite Turbine fails to Auto trip from reactor trip Prevent 1A SI pump start Fails K607 (Phase A) on Train A Direct the Unit ramp to 1250 MWe power. R RO Perform Reactivity calculation for ramp to 1250 MWe Ramp the Unit to 1250 MWe power N BOP Ramp the Unit to 1250 MWe power I RO Volume Control Tank (VCT) level channel 1 LT-CV 1 12 fails low Demanding Auto Makeup to VCT. I BOP Steam Generator 1D controlling Steam Pressure channel fails high requiring Manual control of ID SG Main Feed Reg Valve. US us RO BOP Enter Tech S&c 3.3.2 for actions. required shutdown within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . 4 ED1 ID C US Loss of Instrument Bus 114 due to a bus fault. Tech Spec 3.8.9 I6R ZDIBKSEL AUTO IMF RX 17 -4.25 6 I IMFTC03 7 IMF PN0630 ON IMFTH17D IMF TH04D 1 600 800 C RO M ALL per 1 BOA ROD-1.

C BOP M ALL Uncontrolled inward rod motion requiring a manual reactor trip Turbine fails to Auto trip from reactor trip - Manual Turbine Trip quid Indication of RCP ID Lower Oil Reservoir Level Low RCP 1D Locked Rotor Loop 1D Hot Leg Leak I (N)ormal. (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient Byron Demo 06- 1 nrc Page 1 I 12412006 SCENARIO 2006-1 OVERVIEW The scenario will begin at 56% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state. The 1B Diesel Generator is 00s for Turbo Charger work. The DG has been 00s for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. LCOAR for Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B has been entered; lBOSR 8.1.1-1 has been completed in last 30 minutes. Electric Operations requires a Byron Unit 1 ramp to 1250 MWe power at 5 MW/Min to accommodate an outage from another power source. - The RO will be required to perform a reactivity calculation and coordinate with the BOP and commence the ramp to 1250 MWe power.

After a 510% Unit ramp, Volume Control Tank (VC") level channel 1LT-CVl12 will fail low resulting in Auto Makeup to the VCT. The failure will require placing makeup level control in Manual for the VCT . Tech Spec LCO 3.3.9 for BDPS includes this VCT level channel, however applicability is only for Modes 3,4,5. The SRO should place this on the Degraded Equipment List (DEL) After the crew recognizes the repercussions of 1LT-CV112, the 1D SG controlling steam pressure channel, 1PT 545A, will fail high requiring manual control of the 1D SG main feedwater regulating valve. The SRO will enter lBOA INST-2, for the failed SG Steam pressure channel and direct actions to restore the ID main feedwater regulating valve to automatic control.

Tech Spec 3.3.2, Condition D applies. Following the required actions for the SG pressure channel failure, a loss of Instrument Bus 114 will occur due to a fault on the Instrument Bus.

This will require performance of lBOA ELEC-2 and lBOA INST-1 to stabilize and recover the plant.

The US will address Tech Spec

3.8.9 which

requires a shutdown to Hot Standby within 8 Hours. Several actions will be required as a result of not being able to restore power to the Instrument Bus.

-- After actions have been taken to stabilize the plant, the rods will begin to insert requiring a manual Reactor Trip per IBOA ROD-1. The Turbine will not trip from the Reactor Trip signal and will require manual action to trip. Following immediate actions of 1BEP-0 and transition to lBEP ES-0.1, an RCP oil problem develops for the 1D RCP leading to a degraded rotor, trip of 1 D RCP, and a small LOCA on the 1D RCS Loop Hot Leg. This will require reentry into 1 BEP-0 upon SI actuation.

The IA SI pump will fail to start and the 1B SI pump will have to be manually started. Phase A Train A (K607) failure, along with the Instrument Bus 114 failure, will require manual valve operation of numerous containment isolation valves. The scenario will continue with 1 BEP-0 and transiton to IBEP-I to stabilize and recover the plant. The scenario ends with the IBCA-3. I directed plant cooldown.

ERG Based Critical Tasks: 1. E-0-D: Manually Trip the Main Turbine prior to performing step 3 of EP-0. 2. E-0-J: Manually start 1B SI pump prior to transition out of 1BEP-0. 3. E-0-0: Manually close Phase A valves before transition out of IBEP-0.. Byron Demo 06- I nrc Page 2 1 /24/2006 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D Facility:

Bvron Scenario No.: 06-2 Op-Test No.: 2006-30 1 Examiners: Operators:

SRO Initial Conditions:

IC-2 1 ; 100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 1 B Diesel Generator OOS, 1 C HD pump 00s. Turnover:

The plant is at 100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 1250 ppm boron concentration. The 1 B Diesel Generator is 00s for Turbo Charger work. The DG has been 00s for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. LCOAR for Tech Spec

3.8.1 Condition

B has been entered; 1 BOSR 8.1.1 - 1 was performed 30 minutes prior to shift turnover.

1 A MFP is 00s for work on the speed increaser and not expected back for 2 more days. Electric Operations has just notified Byron Unit 1 that power needs to be reduced to loo0 MWe within 75 minutes to accommodate an outage on a portion of the grid.

Malf. Event Event No. I No. Event DescriDtion Preload MRF EGO9 MAINT-0 1BDGOOS Preload MRF FW024 0 1A FW Pump suction isol valve IOR ZLO 1 HSDG020 1 OFF MRF FW027 0 MRF ED09 1 C OPEN IMFFWOI 1A FW Pump trip IOR ZDI 1 HDO 1 PC PTL 1B DG STOP Lite 1A FW Pump recirc isol valve Deenergize 1FW002A, 1A FW Pump discharge valve 1c HD pp 00s 1 US Direct the Unit ramp down to lo00 MWe power. R RO Perform Reactivity calculation for downpower to 1000 MWe Ramp down the Unit to 1000 MWe power N BOP Ramp down the Unit to lo00 MWe power 2 IMF TH03C 30 100 C ALL SG Tube Leak in IC SG at 30 gpm requiring plant shutdown per lBOA SEC-8 and Tech Spec 3.4.13 application.

3 IMF RX13A 0 10 I RO Controlling PZR level channel lLT-459 fails to 0 causing a loss of Letdown. This requires use of lBOA INST-2 and addressing us Tech Spec 3.3.1 for actions. 4 IMF CV05 600 C RO FCV-131 controller fails closed in AUTO. This will be identified during Letdown restoration requiring Manual control to maintain Letdown backpressure.

5 IMF RXOS I BOP MS Header PT, 1FT-507, fails low requiring manual MFP speed control to stabilize the secondary plant.

6,7 IMFFW02A C BOP 1B FW Pump trips, followed shortly (-20 seconds) by 1C FW IMF FW06B M ALL Pump speed ramping to minimum, resulting in no FW flow IMF FW08B requiring a manual reactor trip.

8 MMF TH03C 350 60 M ALL Increases 1C SG Tube Leak to a 350 gpm SGTR. (N)ormal, ~ (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient Byron Demo 06-2 nrc Page 1 I /25/2006 SCENARIO 2006-2 OVERVIEW The scenario will begin at 100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state. The 1 B Diesel Generator is 00s for Turbo Charger work. The DG has been 00s for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. LCOAR for Tech Spec

3.8.1 Condition

B has been entered; lBOSR 8.1.1-1 has been completed in last 30 minutes. 1 A MFP is 00s for work on the speed increaser and not expected back for 2 more days . Electric Operations requires a Byron Unit 1 ramp down to lo00 MWe power within the next 75 minutes to accommodate an outage on a portion of the grid.

-- The RO will be required to perform a reactivity calculation and coordinate with the BOP and commence the ramp down to 1000 MWe power. After a 510% Unit ramp down, a 30 gpm tube leak will be initiated in the 1C SG. The crew must identify primary to secondary leakage based on SJAE/GS condenser and main steam line Radiation Monitors.This will require actions in 1 BOA SEC-8 and actions in Tech Spec 3.4.13 requiring plant shutdown to Hot Standby within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . After the crew has taken actions for the SG tube leak, the controlling channel for PZR level, lLT-459, will fail low requiring manual control to maintain PZR level and restoration of Letdown. The SRO will enter lBOA INST-2, for the failed PZR level channel and direct actions to restore control to Auto,including restore Letdown flow and return PZR level to program. Tech Spec 3.3.1, Condition K applies. The crew will take actions to place bistables in trip for the failed channel and notify maintenance for repairs. During the time that Letdown is lost, PCV-131, UD backpressure control valve Auto control will fail closed. This should be identified during Letdown restoration when attempting to restore the controller to Auto. This will cause the UD line relief to lift if left in Auto. Following the required actions for the PZR level channel failure, the Main Steam Pressure transmitter, 1PT-507, fails low causing the Master Feed Pump Speed controller to lower MFp's speed, which results in loss of FW flow to all SGs. Action is required to take Manual control of MFP speed to restore and maintain SG levels at program level for the remainder of the scenario. This failure is not addressed in a BOA or in Tech Specs. Maintenance should be notifed and specific directions should be given to the BOP for controlling MFP speed in Manual to maintain SG levels and proper MFP to SG delta pressure.

-. Once SG level control and MFP delta P maintenance bas been directed, the IB MFP will trip requiring actions in 1 BOA SEC- 1 to runback the turbine to maintain SG levels with only 1 MFP running. Once the initial actions for the runback have been taken and turbine load is dropping, boration is commenced andor rod insertion, the 1C MFP speed control will fail to minimum speed resulting in no feed to the SGs requiring in a Manual Reactor trip and entry into IBEP-0. The crew should transition to lBEP ES-0.1. Following transition to lBEP ES-0.1, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur requiring a Safety Injection and reentry into IBEP-0.

The crew will diagnose the SGTR and transition to 1BEP-3. The scenario ends with termination of high head ECCS and establishing charging flow per IBEP-3. ERG Based Critical Tasks: I. E-SA: Identify the 1 C Steam Generator as the ruptured SG and isolate prior to transition to IBCA-3.1.

2. E-3----B:

Cooldown to establish RCS subcooling margin, but prevent entry into 1 BFR-P. I. 3. E-3-4: Depressurize RCS to restore RCS inventory prior to 1C SG PORV or Safety valve water release. Byron Demo 06-2 nrc Page 2 1/25/2006 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Fac i 1 it y : Byron Scenario No.: 06-3 Op-Test No.: 2006-301 Examiners: Operators:

SRO Initial Conditions:

IC-18; 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, IA CS Pump has been removed from service for one hour due to high vibration. Engineering is investigating.

IC HD Pump 00s for seal replacement and not expected back until the end of shift. Turnover:

The plant is at 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 980 ppm boron concentration.

The 1A CS Pump has been 00s for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and Engineering is investigating.

LCOAR for Tech Spec 3.6.6 Condition A has been entered. IC Heater Drain Pump is 00s for mechanical seal replacement.

Electric Operations has just notified Byron Unit 1 that power needs to be raised to 1250 MWe as soon as possible and requests a 5 MW/Min ramp.

QNE was notified of the SMW/Min ramp request and after evaluation ha recommended that the current administrative limits be relaxed to allow the requested ramp up to occur. The SM has given the direction to raise power at 5MWMin. IOR ZZDIIHDOIPC PTL 1c HD Pump 00s Preload IMF RP02A Reactor trip breaker RTA fails to open IMF RP02B Reactor trip breaker RTB fails to open 1 US Direct the Unit ramp to 1250 MWe power.

R RO Perform Reactivity calculation for ramp to 1250 MWe Ramp up the Unit to 1250 MWe power N BOP Ramp up the Unit to 1250 MWe power 2 IMF RX2 1 A 2500 30 I RO 1PT-455 Controlling PZR Pressure Channel fails high over 30 seconds causing PORV and Sprays to open. Enter Tech Specs us 3.3.1/2 for actions.

3 IMF RX29A 0 10 I BOP Steam Generator 1A FW Reg Valve will fail closed in automatic requiring manual control and restoration of 1A SG level to us program. Auto control will not be restored.

4 IMF FW02A C BOP 1B MFP trips requiring lBOA SEC-1 action to recover and DMF RP 1 OA after 5 seconds :N)ormal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient Byron Demo 06-3 nrc Page 1 1 /24/2006 SCENARIO 2006-3 OVERVIEW The scenario will begin at 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state.

The 1A CS pump has been 00s for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months due to failure of the monthly surveillance and is being investigated by Engineering for corrective actions.

LCOAR for Tech Spec 3.6.6 Condition A has been entered. 1C Heater Drain Pump is 00s for mechanical seal replacement and is not expected back until the end of this shift. Electric Operations requires a Byron Unit 1 ramp up to 1250 MWe power as soon as possible and requests a 5 MW/Min ramp. u The RO will be required to perform a reactivity calculation and coordinate with the BOP and commence the ramp up to 1250 MWe power. After a 510% Unit ramp up, 1PT-455, Controlling PZR Pressure Channel, fails high over 30 seconds causing PORV ( 1 RY-455A) and PZR Spray valves to open, causing RCS pressure to drop. The RO will diagnose the malfunction from alarms, meter indications, and dropping PZR pressure. Manual action must be taken to close the PORV or PORV block valve and the PZR Spray valves to stop the pressure drop. The US will enter lBOA INST-2 to ensure manual actions are taken, select an operable control channel, restore automatic PZR pressure control, trip bistables, and identify appropriate Tech Specs 3.3.1/2,3.3.4, and 3.4.1 for applicable actions. The most limiting Tech Spec is 3.4.1, DNB Limits Condition A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to restore pressure to at or above 2209 psig. The remainder of the Tech Spec most limiting requires tripping bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support. After the crew has taken actions for failure of 1FT-455, the 1A SG FW Reg Valve will fail closed in automatic requiring BOP to manually control the 1A SG main feedwater regulating valve to recover IA SG level. The US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support. This will require manual level control of 1A SG for the remainder of this scenario.

_-. Following the required actions for the SG pressure channel failure, the 1B MFP will trip requiring BOP action to recognize the malfunction from alarms and pump speed indication and take action to close the recirc valve on the tripped MFP, start the IA MFP and restore FW flow to all SGs. The US will enter lBOA SEC-1 for these actions and actions to stabilize the FW system for continued operation.

US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support. Once the plant has stabilized, an Inadvertent Phase A on A Train will occur requiring entry into lBOA PRI-13. The crew will recognize the event from alarms and valve closure indications.

The RO will take manual control of charging and PZR pressure.

Upon reset of the Phase A, IA will be restored to Cnmt, WD and normal charging must be restored, normal PZR pressure control established, normal RCP seal return flow, restart of Cnmt chiller, an restoration of SG Bldn. The actuation will appear to be spurious.

US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support. During restoration of L/D, the 1 B CV pump will trip and will require a manual start of the 1A CV Pump for recovery. This will also require entry into Tech Spec 3.5.2 Condition A for ECCS Operability (7 Day action). US will notify the SM and WEC for maintenance support. Once the plant has recovered from the Inadvertent Phase A and normal charging and L/D are restored, a Main Steam line break will occur inside Cnmt on the 1A SG. The reactor will not trip from the MCR and IBFR-S.1 will be entered to locally trip the reactor.

This will occur -1 minute after the NLO is dispatched to open the reactor trip breakers locally.

RO ensures rods are being inserted at max rate, emergency boration is in progress, PORV are operating as required; BOP ensures turbine is tripped, AF Pumps are running, Cnmt Vent Is0 has occurred; Crew directs NLO to trip Rx locally. After Rx is tripped crew exits 1BFR-S.1 and enters IBEP-0.

US will transition to IBEP-2, then to 1BEP-1. Transition will be made to lBEPES-1.1 to terminate SI. The scenario ends after transition to 1 BEP ES- 1.1 Byron Demo 06-3 nrc Page 2 1/25/2006 ERG Based Critical Tasks: I. FR-S.1-C:

Insert negative reactivity into the core by initiating emergency boration before completing step 4 of 1 BFR-S. 1. 2. E-SA: Isolate the faulted S/G before transition out of 1BFR-S.1. - .. . Byron Demo 06-3 nrc Page 3 1 /24/2006 Amendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 c Faci I i t y : Bvron Scenario No.: 06-4 Op-Test No.: 2006-301 Examiners:

Operators

- SRO Initial Conditions:

IC-] 8; 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, following maintenance activities on 1C low pressure heater string.

1B SX Pump has been removed for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to replace the aux oil pump and is expected back in service by the end of this shift.

LCOAR lBOL 7.8 has been initiated.

1C HD Pump 00s for seal replacement and not expected back until the end of shift. The plant is at 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 780 ppm boron concentration, following maintenance activities on 1C low pressure heater string.

IB SX Pump has been removed for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to replace the aux oil pump and is expected back in service by the end of this shift.

LCOAR lBOL 7.8 has been initiated..

IC Heater Drain Pump is 00s for mechanical seal replacement. Electric Operations has just notified Byron Unit 1 that power needs to be raised to 1250 MWe as soon as possible and requests a 5 MW/Min ramp. QNE was notified of the SMWMin ramp request and after evaluation has recommended that the current administrative limits be relaxed to allow the requested ramp up to occur. The SM has given the direction to raise power at 5MWfMin. Turnover:

Event I Malf. Event No. No. Description Preload IOR ZDI I SXO I PB ITL 1B SX Pump 00s I 1B SX aux oil pump 00s I 1c HD PumD 00s IORZO I SXO I PBC OFF IOR ZZDI 1 HDO I PC PTL , MRF SI25 OVER R RO 5 IMF RX 18M 650 1B AFW Pump fails to stadtrips 1SI8801A fails to open on SI signal 1SI8801B fails to open on SI signal Direct the Unit ramp to 1250 MWe power. Perform Reactivity calculation for ramp to 1250 MWe Ramp up the Unit to 1250 MWe power Ramp up the Unit to 1250 MWe power RCS Loop 1A Thot RTD (lTD411) fails high. This will require entry into lBOA INST-2 for stabilization and recovery. Tech Spec 3.3.1/2 actions. Steam Generator 1B level channel fails low (08, 120 seconds)

Enter lBOA INST-2 for actions and Tech Specs 3.3.1/2 for actions. 1MS018D, ID SG PORV fails open which requires action to close or isolate. Tech Spec 3.7.4 may be addressed.

PZR PORV 1RY455A fails open at 50% requiring the block valve 1RY 8000A to be closed to limit RCS depressurization.

Tech Spec 3.4.1 1 will be addressed.

1FW009B fails closed requiring a manual Reactor trip.

I Preload IMF w44 I MRF SI24 OVER IMF RX06G IMF MS04D 100 C BOP 5 &IF THl IA 50 6 1 IOR ZDIlFW009B IM ALL 7,8 IMFTH03B M ALL lBSGTRat450gpm Preloaded C RO Following SI actuation, lS18801A and 1SI8801B must be 9 IMF MS03B 100 M ALL After the MSJY is closed in 1BEP-3, the pressure surge in the 1B ~ - :N)ormal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient manually opened to initiate High Head ECCS flow SG muses a safety to open and stick open.

-~- Byron Demo 06-4 nrc Page 1 1/25/2006 SCENARIO 2006-4 OVERVIEW The scenario will begin at 75% power, MOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state following maintenance on IC low pressure heater string. The 1B SX Pump has been removed from service for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to replace the aux oil pump and is expected back in service by the end of the shift. LCOAR lBOL 7.8 has been initiated.

1 C Heater Drain Pump is 00s for seal replacement and not expected back until the end of shift. Electric Operations requires a Byron Unit 1 ramp up to 1250 We power as soon as possible and requests a 5 MW/Min ramp. L The RO will be required to perform a reactivity calculation and coordinate with the BOP and commence the ramp up to 1250 MWe power. After a 510% Unit ramp up, RCS Loop 1 A Thot RTD fails high requiring entry into 1 BOA INST-2, which directs ensuring rod control in manual, possibly restoring Tave to Tref, addressing Tech Spec 3.3.1/2 actions and tripping failed channel bistables.

US will direct restoration for plant conditions, notify the SM of conditions and the WEC for maintenance support. After the crew has taken actions for the failed PR N-44, the 1B SG level control channel fails low requiring manual control to stabilize and control 1B SG level. The US will enter lBOA INST-2 to verify actions and select a new controlling channel to restore 1B SG level control to automatic.

The US will address Tech Specs 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3, for tripping the appropriate bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The US will notify the SM of conditions and the WEC for maintenance support. Following the required actions for the SG level channel failure, the 1D SG PORV, 1MSOI 8D fails open causing a small reactivity transient requiring manual action to close or isolate the PORV. Operability should be addressed in Tech Spec 3.7.4 with no action required. The US will notify the SM of conditions and the WEC for maintenance support. Once the SG PORV is closed or isolated, the PZR PORV 1RY455A fails to 50% open requiring RO action to close the PORV block valve lRY8OOOA to stop the RCS depressurization.

Tech Spec 3.4.

I1 will be addressed for operability with no additional action required.

If RCS pressure falls below 2209 psig, a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months action will be required to restore RCS pressure per Tech Spec 3.4.1. The US will notify the SM of conditions and the WEC for maintenance support. Following actions for PZR PORV 1RY455A failure, 1FWWB will close causing FW to be lost to the I B SG requiring a manual reactor trip and entry into IBEP-O. Immediately following the trip, a SGTR will occur in the 1B SG at 450 gpm will be initiated resulting in an SI actuation.

The SI may be manually initiated upon recognition of the SI being required. The RO will be expected to recognize lSI88OlA and 1S18801B did not open as required on the SI and is expected to manually open them for high head injection flow. The crew will take required actions in 1 BEP-0 and transition to 1BEP-3 where they will isolate the ruptured 1B SG causing a safety to open and stick open, then transition to 1BCA-3.1 to cooldown the RCS and depressurize the RCS to equalize RCS pressure with the ruptured SG to control RCS inventory loss.

The scenario ends with the transition to 1 BCA-3.1. ERG Based Critical Tasks: 1. E-0-1: Manually initiate high head injection via lSI8801AA3 before exiting IBEP-0. 2. E-%A: Isolate IB SG before transition out of 1BEP-2. 3. E-3-A: Identify the 1 B SG as the ruptured SG and isolate prior to transition to 1 BCA-3.1. ._ Byron Demo 06-4 nrc Page 2 I /25/2006 Comments on Byron 2006 Examination Outline Comment 1 On Form ES-301-1 for the RO examination the JPM title is listed for the Emergency Plan Topic does not match the KA. KA 2.4.43 involves emergency communications, the JPM title listed is "Emergency Dose Authorization".

Resolution This was a transcription error the actual JPM for the examination will involve a NARS notification.

Comment 2 Should any of the manual reactor trips called for in Scenario 06-1, 2, and 4 be critical tasks? Resolution The author stated that for Scenario 06-2, and 4 these were anticipatory trips. However, the trip in Scenario 06-1 is necessary to prevent fuel damage and should be critical.

Comment 3 In Scenario 06-2 Event 6,7 will there be enough observable operator action by the BOP to evaluate him on the component failure?

Resolution The author stated that there will be a number of action to be taken by the BOP between the trip of the first feedpump and the need to trip the reactor.

BYRON 2006-0013, Byron June 2006 Examination Outline Submittal

Contents

Text

Subject:

Subject:

Enclosures:

2.2 Braidwood

2.5 Braidwood

2.7 Braidwood

2.5 Braidwood

3.2 Braidwood

3.2 Braidwood

2.7 Braidwood

4.1 Hydrogen

3.3 Emergency

3.8.1 Condition

3.8.9 which

3.8.1 Condition

3.8.1 Condition

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BYRON 2006-0013, Byron June 2006 Examination Outline Submittal

Text

Subject:

Subject:

Enclosures:

2.2 Braidwood

2.5 Braidwood

2.7 Braidwood

2.5 Braidwood

3.2 Braidwood

3.2 Braidwood

2.7 Braidwood

4.1 Hydrogen

3.3 Emergency

3.8.1 Condition

3.8.9 which

3.8.1 Condition

3.8.1 Condition

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