ML20209B176

From kanterella
Revision as of 18:48, 6 December 2024 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Draft Commission Paper Recommending That Commission Approve Proposed Response to Congressmen Dingell & Ottinger
ML20209B176
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 11/25/1981
From: Dircks W
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
Shared Package
ML16340C148 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-86-151 NUDOCS 8201060280
Download: ML20209B176 (3)


Text

s * ('

_f.

{,

./

s

'I

~

y rh /

~

NOV 2 5 331 FOR:

The Ccw.:issioners.

FRLM:

William J. Dircks, Executive Utrector for Operations

SUBJECT:

RESPONSE TO C0iGRE55ciEN DlhGELL'S A::D OTTIhGER'S LETTER OF HOVElsER 13, 1981 PURP6SE:-

To obtain Cotuission approval of the subject response for trans-mittal to Congresst.>en Dingell and Ottinger.

DISC' SSI0li:

In a letter, dated'l ovember 13,1961 (Attachment 1), Cen5ressren J

Dingell and Ottinger requested answers to four questions regarding the recently detected seistaic ctesign errors at Diablo Can. yon, Unit 1.

  • provides the proposeo response.

FiCuiME!iUATICN: That the Co:::nission approve the proposed response for trans=ittal to Con 5ressman Dingell and Congressr.an Ottinger.

ged) William 1.DIMD William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations Attachtaents:

(1)

Ltr., utd. 11/13/81 fra. Congressman Dingell and Ottinger (2) Proposed Response ltr.

Contact:

i B. Buckley X28379

- 2 <$1 > 6$2s - M37>.

rk rhv-I

~

o me n >..D..L...E...f. M.........

....D..L..:.

/

......,..b(.D./.L....

.. %......:.D..I.R.......

.D..........DD.......

....1..R..Q. 5. 5..R...

.......).

^^

..B..B u t.tf ey/.w..tr m la o

esco lDEisenhut ECase HD6rtn h 1't

  • su:nue >

.1.1./.1.n.......

g :'f"........7/.81.... i..1.1.g.h.8.1....

..nzas.za.1..... 33zg.za.1..

. 22z......ts.1...

...122p.L e.81.

..............................v.........

t cm>

~.

...;;;;;.;j '

' ~~ =~r =.: :.;..:. e==.a.:.'-... =~ i. ~ ' -. ---.

_ - - ~..... -. -.

6

+-

Dear Congressmen:

This is in response to your November 13, 1981 letter which expressed your concern over the implications of the recent seismic design errors detected at the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant.

I share your concern and can assure you that the implications of these errors have been and will be thoughtfully,

~

considered by the Commission.

The timing of the. detection of these errors, so soon aft'er authorization for low-poder operation, was indeed unfortunate and it is quite understandable that the' Congress' anc the pub'lic's perception of our licensing process has

'b'een adversely affected.

Had this information been known to the Commission

~

on or prior to September 22, 1981, the facility license woula not have been-issued until the questions raised by these disclosures had been resolved.

l 3ased on staff review and Comission consideration of these design errors, t

the Commission on November 19, 1981 suspended PG&E's license to load fuel and conouct tests at up to 5% of rated power pending satisfactory completion of j

certain actions, ordered by the Comission (CLI-81-30 enclosed). These actions l

l include i

1.

The conduct of an inoependent design review program of all safety-1 related activities performed ~ prior to June 1,1978 under all seismic-l relatea service contracts used in the design of safety-related l

structures, systems and components.

~

2.

A technical report that fully assesses the basic cause of all l

design errors identified by this program, the significance of the errors found and their impact on facility design.

l l

ATTACH.2NT 2 l

l l

-3_

. Prior to authorization to proceed with fuel loacing, the Nr.C must be satisfied :

witn the results of the, seismic design verification program referred to in paragraph 1, and with any plant mocification resulting from that program that may be necessary prior to fuel loading. The NRC may impose ' additional, require:ents prior to fuel loading necessary to procect health ano safety based upon its '

review of the program or any of the information providea by PG&E pursuant *w paragraph 4.

This may include some or all of tne requiremenits specifiec in the 1,etter to PG&E, dated November 19, 1981.

Responses to each"of the four questions in your letter are encloseo in (Enclosure 2).

~

'i assure you that our decision to permit PG&E 'o proceea with fuel loacing t

will not be made until all th'e actions containea in the Co=sission's November 19, 1981 Orcer are fully 'satisfiec.

Sincerely, i

l Nunzio J. Pilladino Chairman

Enclosures:

1.

CLI-81-30 datec November 19, 1981 2.

Responses to Questions in November 13, 1981 Letter 4

4

- - ~ - - - -

rr

~

^

. g..

e et =

i..

n..v.. h. t ra 8 ".g'pr-6 i

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l

NUCT u REGULATORY CO.Ti!SSION

'31 N.0V 19' P6E

~

CO.WLISSIC&..-G :

.e... - A7.y -

a c or.::

Nuncio J. Palladino, Ch=4-- n

'! * *.35Nhg"EE*VICE Victc Gilinsky,.

~"

Peter A. 3:adfcr,d Themas M. Roberts idiVFJ gM/2U W

- -l '

John F.; Ahearne -

2

-w7

. s

)

In the Matter of

)

}

v. -

n-PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY.

)

' Docket No " 50-275 ' of

~

r

)

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear

)

Power Plant, Unit'1)

)

3 s

ORDER SUS?ENDING LICINSE CLI 3 0 8

1.-

On Septe=ber 21,.1981, the Nuclear Reculatcry'

~

~

~

Cc==ission ("Cc= mission" or "NRC") authori ed the NRC s aff to issue a license to Pacific Gas and Ilectric Cc pany

("PG&E") for fuel leading and the cohduct of tests at u$ to

~

5% of.ra'ed power at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1, CLI-81-22, 14 NRC On Septa =he: 22, 1981, the NRC staff issued such a license.

License No. DPR-76.

In taking these acticns the Cc= mission found that.it was in the public interest to allow effectiveness, a.-.d the NRC staff i

fodnd that the applicant was in compliance with NRC re,gulations and construction permit recuirements celeva.kt tc :

the licensed activity.

J ~im,-

.T 7l 3

,,* ' g"*

"N

.em.*..*==aee.

,g

,,.m..

J m.

.s

g.,

n-- _

~

' n late Septe=bar 1981, in the cource of responding to p.

I

2.

in the 7 a special NRC. request for infc:satics, an er:c:

~.

seismic design of. equipment and piping in the conta' ant annulus of Diablo Canyon, Unit 1.was detected by '? GEE and '

q.

repe=ted to the NRC.

PG&E ce ". tted to costoon.,e..loadinc of

...,y fuel until the matter was resolved satisfactorily e'nd in!tiated.a reanalysis of portions of the seis=ic; design of a nu=ber of different additional the facility.

As,a result, Based upon informatics supplied..by ?GEEf err. ors were found.

and recent NRC staff ins.pections conducte,d at the officies.of

? GEE and URS/ John A. Blume and Associates -("3lume"), in San :

59-275/81-29 and 50-323/,1-18, $hel 8

7:ancisco, Report.Nos.

NRC staff identified serious ~ weaknesse's in PGEI's quality-More so.ecifically:

~

7-assurance crocram.

the PG&E quality assurance program 'did $c.

t~. appear

~

a.

to effectively exercise control over the review

.and approval of design 'infor=ation passed to and

~

received f c= 31ume, the ? GEE quality assurance program did not appea b.

to adequately control the distribution of design info =ation f cm Blume within affected isternal PG&E design groups, and the PG&E quality assurance program did not appear c.

to define and ir.plement adequate quality assu~rance c.rocedures and controls over other service-relat I

' contracts.

        • me..

g M em.

e r--

'...y.

g N.

m v

i..

3.

This new infor=ation indicates that, contra _i to statements =adeinPG&.d'scperatinclicensea:clicatica, c

certain structures, systems, and cc=cenents' i=mortant to

. safety at the clant nav not be croperly designe'd to

~

withstzsd th'e effects of earthena'<es, and further. indicates

.,.e that violaticus od NRC's ' regulatiens in 10 C5R Part 50,

~

t Had this info==ation been knch Appendix 3 have occurred.

t o. t h's C c - 4 ssion 'on or prior to Septenber~2"!, 1981, Facility License No. D?R-76 would not have'been'iss'$ed 'Intil' d

the c.uestions raised had been resolved..

4.

Accordingly, the Co=nissica suspends PGEZ'.s license tic lead fuel and conduct tests at to. to 5% of rated :cwer *, -

  1. 4 d

..cending satisfactorv cc=pletion of the actions spec " a, in attach =ent 1 to this Order.

In funerance of this, PG&Z is hereby ordered to show cause pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202 and 50.100, why Facility License No. DP'R-76 should not be

, suspended pending. satisfactory cc=pletien of the actions

~

specified in *atta'ch=ent 1, insofar as it authorizes fuel loading and other operation cf Diablo Canyon Nucla=-,, 2owa-Plant Unit 1.

Further, the Cc=nission' fi,ds pursuant to 10 1

CFR 2.20 2'(f) that, because it is now uncertain as to the.

extent which ' structures, systens, and cc=ponents i=pertant.

to safety of fuel loading and testing at up to 5% of rated

.ecuer will in f act withstand the effects of ea-thquakes, and because cf the sericesness of the viciatienis, the public health, safety and interest recuire that this C der he

=.. =. *

    • .e,=*
  • *P,#
        • u.*

Wg*em. A e.

.w

.o g

e i==ediately effective.

Within 20 days of the date of this :

Order, PG&E =ay, file a written answer to the Order under cath or af'i =ati.cn an....

~

s.

d may de=and a hearing"...

The issues to s.

s.

be addressed in any answe: c

, hearing shall'be whether th_e*

r.atters specified in paragraphs,2 aid 3 are true and 1.

whether, as a echsequenc'e/ the lican'ss should have been g

sus' pended as provided in this pa ag aph.

~

. z.

.. ~.

~.

A sepa ate stateme:it by C':=..issioner' Rebe-ts"is' -

'N t '

c attached.

. ?..

It is so ORDERID.

i.,.

.Ec= the C: -%sicn*

&.t*3 __; V.

~.:s

.s

,.3

,c. n

. s.

.a, i..

. p...

,l 1:

.m.

.~

r...

p l..-

SAMUEL W CHILE

' 1;7 :'

.y.

Secretary cf 2 e C=-4ssics l

..:. g.,

I Dated at Wash 5ngton, D.C.,

this 1"thday of No'vember,1981.

S

.F 8

hisi m.'

- i

-r----

.i'

~'

1

?

i November 19, 1981

.s

    • _ ?

. :.; y.% :

a

~

SEPjpytt DISSENTING OPINION OF C0yMISSIO Efnthis

~

I agree with'the reveHfication pro' gram imposed o ti taken by the '

Order.,1 disa' gree, however., with two aspects of the

~

without the opper-maj'ority of the Comission today.

the Diablo Canyon fuel load and low power license, hre provi i

to c tunity for a prior hearing and the opportun ty d the Comis -

l threat t6 the.

  • sion's regulations, is unwarranted in light of the min and in lig:nt of the -

i public health and safety.that exists at this t me wer;s responsibly.

l Ccmission's duty to exercis.e its emerg i

O der calling for ification '

.the coments of adversary parties to the-ope (1) the companies proposed by PG&E to undertak f the proposed revefifi-l

'.e program and (2) the scope aTid acceptability oComiss dently and impartially cation, program evidence an abnegation of the d

to use its technical expertise to assess,in epen l

ility.

any errors that may have occurred at the fac l

p nd a While there is no question that the Comission ma l

i or for a vio-l license for false statements in the license applicat o the Comission has, in' the past, f exercising its emergency powers c

..lation of the Comission's regulations,

. held itself to a standard o a'nd with due regard for taking action comensuraaffect This is so because ft

~,

the risk posed to the public health and sa e y.

depend on their il emergency actions "can radically and sumar y h

interests of others,. including licensees and Strateoic_

CL1-77-3, 5 NRC 16, 20 (19 activities'."

- Quantities of 30ecial Nuclear Material, l

Thus, in the past, "tne Comission has s h ir magnitude and take are 1.dentified, the Comission must determine t e s acceo). V1olation o l

accrocritte remedial action."

Action, CLF-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 403 09/8) (empnas1in a a regulation does not, by itself, result l

be suspended. J d.,.

h C: mission.

In this case, the Co=ission could h ized by its license untii h

wri-ten coe: nit =ent not to take actions aut ori f ction-th

- PG&E had complet.ed to the Staff's sat s a

,,_e.,.,-..-y--

,_,...___._-.,_.-..-,,_,,.____r_._,_,_mv,m__%,_,%,,,

  1. ,._-_,._,_m.-,,_,-__m,,._,-,-#.g_,.

3,

.L 2

5

/

s

~

the Staff.II Alternativ technical specificatiorfply, the Comission eculd have inserted a or a license condition into the license to i

prevent fuel load.

Finally, the Cemission could have provided PG&E an opportunity for a prior hearing and an opportunity to cure before'de-

~

ciding whether to suspend the license.

In order to illustrate the severe and precipitous nature of the Cemission's decision to suspend, it is important to note some of the facts before the Comission but omitted from the majority opinion.~..An-underpinning of the Comission's September 21 Order authorizing issuance of the fuel load and low power license is the low risk that would be entailed by activities under this license.

At present, fuel ha's not yet.

been loaded into the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 core and PG&E has cemitted in writing not to cocehce fuel load until it has received the concurrence

..of the Comission's Staff. Additionally, the Comission has two resi dent inspectors assigned t'o the site to monitor PG&E's activitiesW As.

the fuel intended for Unit I has not been loaded into the core and as,

assurance exists that it will.not be loaded until satisfactdry resolu-4 tion of the present issues, minimal risk to the public exists at the.

present time.

,=

1/ It is not the Comissien's experience that licensees have taken action contrary to. a written cominitment'such' as that involved here..,,-

This is due, in part, to the Ccmission's extensive power to.take.

su=ary action if a licensee rescinds its comitment. To i1Tustrate,.

this, I note that the tcmiss. ion recently filed a motien opposing a recuest for an injunction of the Diablo Canyon low-power license in s

Jaffer v. Brown, No. 81-5878 (9th Cir., filed Nove:.ber 4,1981) which statec:

ine oiscovery of a series of errors in portiens of the en-cineering analysis has forced deferral of the'i,mplementation of the low-power license by Pacific Gas and Electric.

No action under the license will be undertaken until problems at the facility are resolved to the NRC's satisfaction." Thus, as a practical matter, the Ccmis -

sion's reliance on' PG&E's written ecmitment is not unreasonable and the Comission has so stated ~in court as recently as November 10.

i 2/ To the extent that the Comission needs to take any legal action, it Ts important to note that under the present technical specifications and I

license, the risk to the public is minimal because PGLE can load fuel l

but cannot change the plant status to above a cold shutdown condition (Mode 5). This is because of Section 1.19 of the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Technical Specifications which provides the following defin.ition.of OPERABLE-OPERASILITY:

~

j A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable,of pericrming its specified function (s) and when all n'ecessary attendant i

instrumentttion, controls, electric power, cooling and seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function (s) are also capable of perfoming their related supportfunction(s).

(fcotnotecontinued)

\\

l l

3

.7

^

4'ith regard to my seccnd paint of disagre. ament, the Ccmission has decided to request the com,ents.of adversary parties to the operating

~

license proceeding on (1) the ccmpanies proposed by PEE to implement the reverification. program and (2) the scope i!nd acceptability of.the reverification program.

The Cor:nission is under a duty as an indepen-dent regulatory agency to identify any errors which may have been nade,.

to assess what risk, if any,. to the public health and safety' exists, and' to detemine. what measures need to be taken so that the Comission ha's reasonable assurance that.the public health and safety is protected.

Incorporation of adversary parties into this reverification process is an abnegation of the Cc=.ission's responsibility to fulfill its duties ',

r independently and impartially.

. l?

.:.?.'-

t Tn v(continued) 2/

iew of the abov'e defi61 tion and references to it throughout the Limiting Conditions For Operation in the Unit 1 Diablo Canyon Technical.

t Specifications, the licensee is legally precluded from entering into operational modes above cold shutdown (Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) because i

systems technically affected by the seismic design error would not niet l

the definition for OPERABLE-OpEP. ABILITY.

For example, the supports for

.the containment fan coolers which may be affected by the n..rror image error are addressed in section 3.6.2.3 " Con.tainment Cooling System."

This section reads as follows:

At least two independent groups of contair. ment f'an coolant units shall be OPERABLE with a minimum of two units to one group and one unit to the other group.

Since, in view of the known potential design errors, the C:ntain-ment Cooling System might not be capatile of perfoming its specified i

function.- Therefore, the licensee wculd be legally obliged to remain t

in a cold shutdown condition.

l

. ~.......

L

f.' -

r.

~

Attrichn7nt 1 1.

Provide th.e fo11cwing infor=ation for NRC review:

1 For All Seis=ic Service-Related.7

,.J -if

. [.

.s-Centracts Prior *to June 1978

.~

s (a). The' :.esults of an independent design...

~

I verificatiien program on all safety dated '~ 2

.~

activities perfor=ed prio:.to June ;1;.1978,

' under all seismic.-related s.e:vice centracts

.. utili=ed..in.tha' design. croc~ess for..... v..

.y safety-related structures, systa=s a:id ce=cenents.

,s..

Infe'r=ation. conf.e..ning this progr.

a= sheul.d, address ecality assurance p:ocedure.s,,

a.

centrols and practices conce==ing the develegnent, accuracy, transmittal, anf use I

of all. ' safety-related infc:=ation bcth withi PG&E and within each coht: actor's organization, as well as the trans=ittal of infer =ation between PG&I 'and each centract::.

I

~

It should also include perfor=ance cf a J

suitable nu=ber of sa=ple calculaticas related.to each contract to verify th,e l

adecuacy and accuracy of the design p:ccess for affected safety-related structn=es, systems and cespenents.

Th.e'informaticste' be p cvided concerning this design g

..-.... d 1.

,.":.',i*

2

~.

verificatich p cgra= should be based en and -

include the fo11cwing pregra= e'-- "s.-

'c 1

(1). A review of al1[. quality assurance procedures and controls us.ed by each',.. -

pre-June 1978 seismic se=vice related 1 T-se:vice contractor. and bv PGE with ' -

regard to that centract; a ec=parison cf.

.. r..

e.

these procedures 'and centrols with the',. :..

related criteria of Appendii 3 to 10 cn

~

50; and an identificatics of any.

5

. deficiencies or w&aknesses i:-the t s

quality assurance procedures and in-..

2 g.

centrols of the contracter and ?GE.

(2). Develcpment cf a netwe:k fe: the design chain for all safety-related structures, systa=s, and ce=penents invclved.

This shculd include all interfaces' where design infermation was trans=itted betwe'en ?G&I internal design 7: cups and each contractor.

(3). A review of the i=ple entatien of quality assurance precedures and centrols used by and fe$:

7,.

~ g.

3*..

e PGEZ internal design g cups, each centractor internal design.

~... g:CCp {S) r T

~

..!. r.' '.ad. k...!

s

...e

z. *.

transnittil.of infc:=atica between.'

1 PG&E and each centract==, -

a, o.

a.

-~.

transmittal :of..contracter.develc.oed

..w

. informaf. ion withis PG&E; and identificati. on of any deficiencies',c:

r weaknesses is the impin. men.tatien of '.

quality assurance p ccedures e.nd e

s controls hv each cent acte': an'd b 'PG&I.

(4). Development of criteria for the cenduct cf this desig ve.rificatien. tree. am.

should consider the relevant guideli=es centained in J.NSI N45.2.11 r* Sectica 6.3.1.

r (5). Develc.oment of criteria for selectics of a suitable nu.ber and tv.e.n of sanele calculations related to the design cf safetv. -related structures, svstems and 1

ce=penents invo;!.ved.

The.=ur ese of r

these,sa.:ple cale 1r.tions she:1d he to l

- ~ - - - - - - - - - - - -

-- = - - - r 4 -

v,,,

verify the design process, particularly.

~

in the areas of any identi.fied i

contracts or PC&E quality a5s Ence'

,1 weaknesses c:- deficiencias as dete

  1. ed f cm the proemdure and i=ple=entatied ~

reviews dis..u.ssed in steps 1.threugh 3 -

1 above.

Criteria' fc espasii:;; the

. sample size when preble=s is

. u. :. : '.

verification a.re es:en=tured" should ' elso~

t be developed.

(b)

A technical report that fully assesses the -

basic cause of all design er==:s idantiii.ud -

s by this program, the sipifican:n t:f damitn erects found, and their impact c= facility design.

(c)

PG&I's conclusiens en the effe:tivsness of this design verificatica preger in assuring the adequacy of facility design.

I

.(d)

A schedu.le fe: c:mpleting any ::difications to the facility that are required as c result of this p cgram.

Ic

dificati::s that y u i
c. cse not cce leting. trier t: feel lead,

[

the bases fer proceeding shed1d be p::'ri.ded.

l l

l i

I

=.

n 2.

The folleving infer =htion shall be pecvided for N7.0 review and.apppcval.

NP.C will :.de.it; decision en these p cposed c:=pt.nies 0.fter p.:evidinb tie Ocve no:

~. -

of Calife..nf a and Joint I:?.Erveners in the needi:ie.

j operating. license p:ccaedi=g 15 days fe;. cc = r_nt.

e..

.s.

i i

Qqall.ficatiens of Cc:panies ?:cp'csed Te Cen6tet inde endest P.ev.ievs*

..p -

a and discus.sica of the cery=:ats A descri.utic.

~.

c.ualifications.of the ect.an.y or ccce. e' e: tha.t

(

PG&E would propeso to carry put the intEe.nend'ent'.

design verificati:n ::cgra.:a discuc~^ ;- ' E.boye.,

1 includine. inic:matica that dem:nstrate.s'.the.

i.ndependene's of these ec pa-l.as.

~

6 3.

As socn as practicable fc11owl.ng hRC app:cval ef the a

c pany c: cc pa.niss te c:nduct the independent design verification..progra:n, the fellowi=g hfc: r.atich shall be p:cvided for N7C review and app: oval.

N?.*.: will ena.%e its dr. isica en the acceptability' cf ths pr::grrs p' an I

after p cviding the coverac: of Calife:mia and Scint

. Interveners in the ponding operating license proceeding 15 dav. s ic: c:n:nant.

t 7:ce as 71an Fer _The Desien ve-ificatien Fr: ra s A detailed program plan fer c=nh= ting the design ve:ificatien pr:s 0. s discussed in 1 ah:ve.-

The 4

g i.for=atien p cviced should inclede the -bases for.

i i

the criteria prepesed to be used fc selectien cf a suitable nt=Ser a=d type of. sa=ple calenlatiens....

to be.cerfc__ed.under.these ::oc ra=s and the bases.

.r for the criteria = omosed to be used fer ex:an ' g.'

e

. ~.

g

..m~

r the san. ele slee based upen' the results' cf the ' i g

initimi sa=.cles.

4.

status Recc-ts

., r Str. ting on 'riday, Novec+ber-27, 1981, and i:cf.ti=:i=g' -

while the. sus.mensien is in.effect, a.sa *-=enthlv.

s a

.,s _epc

c..s.e s._ces4.a.d.*. -- ': N 'e___av c_

=__=ck 3

=enth., en all cf the engeing reanalyses effects and I

desie.n verification pro :a=s bein3 ccnducted by and fer

_3 G..r,

_4.,.c 3., 4 e.,

w..- no.

4,:..a

&_o se __. _,_ -._e.__.a u

t'o in ' paragraph 1, should be sdb=itted to the Regicnal n d _:., 4,_ A a 4.,,

.,.e y e.n V a.:.

he D_2 ec. _, O.:::,. c_e Ucc1*ar 7.eactc Regulaticn.

\\

5.

NRC Review

.e

_._ o a... s.. c _ _ _ g. : c.._ o, e e.._ c y.e. s. _e _._ _, c a d.'.g,

1

._5.e F.:."

s.'.a.'. _' h e s a* _* _e '_ _' a_ d w_' '._5 e e s~_ ' s

' "-e scis=ic design verificatica progra:. referred to in Parac:ach 1, and with anv. e.lant :.edifica ic re s.ultine s

__.o "ue'

'. c= .a

,. e 3_ a.

.5a'

...a.v. b e..e c e s s a-v_,_ _3 - -

_._ _ _, e a g a _z._ _...

.. _ _. _ _ e_. _ _ s

-u.,_

s

,e.

ny

,,_.ng_

s..

,. _ _' c _ '.. '...e '. l e a '.g

.e c = s s a-v_ 'e,. c.=. '.

'.a_=_.'.'.5. a..d d

s.'..'. e.": _ a s a_ '.~,.~~.s-=~._'_u__"=_-_,'_~~~.'. ~ _'

o

.e o.

s 4.

w e _ _e _., _ a _.. n

_ c v-. c by. P C.

e.

p.. _... _.,.,.

o..

f

_m

.m paragraph A.

This ay inelude..scue c: ail ef the ci.'e

-o. e. : - __.e.n's et a r_' " 4_ e 6 4 n. ' S e. ' e'..'.a

'o'.o G.- r,

a o.

2 Nova-?a-19

-.98'

~

=....

y x

.... g..

.-.. ?..,

e e

.d e

e Cnclosure J

~~

kesponses 1.c Questioqs in November 13, 1981 Letter to Chairman ?alladir.o frcrr C3ngressmen DinSali and Ottinger.

_ uestien 1:

Flec:e provide, prior to the. issuance of the 50.5d(f) letter, the-Q

~

definition of the terms (1) "in:fependent," (ii) *cempetent," (iii)

" integrity," ano (i't) " complete."

Response: Although One of the options unde 7 considerction by the Cc::uissior.

was a 50.54(f) letter, the Commission deciced to suspend. PC&E's license to load fuel and conduct tests up to 3*., power by hemoranct:m and Orcer dated Hovetter 19, 1981, pencing satisfactory ccmp'serion of c.ertaih actions, inclutiing the' conduct of a design vhrfication program.

Also, e. staff letter of the same cate requirea ' PRE to eter,y en other desis'.i verification prcgrams prior to issuance of'any license authorizing operation tbove E'. power.

The Est important factor $n NHE,'s evaluation of the ir.divicuaks cr companies prcposec by Pecif*.c Gas & Electric to.cceplete tha

. eq.11 ec'cesign verification pmgram is tneir coapetence..This ccmcetence must de basec cn knowltoge ano exoerience in the matters un;e* review.

Tnese indivicuals or compa!.i.es should also be indepencent.

Incepencence meant, that the 1:1div'oualf, or companies sele:ted must i

l be able to provide an otaedtive, dispassionate technical' Juegment, i

proviced solely on the tasis of scientific merit.

Indepencence r

~

l also means that the destgn verification progre;: aust.tst concoctec sy cc:rpanies or incivicual.11not prc.'io'isly involvec in any way witr the acti,vities at Diablo tanyon that they will now be reviewing.

Their inte;rity must be such that taey are regarcec as rel:utable companies or incividuals. The wora "cenplete" appites tu the l

., Encl.osure' 2 (Cont.'d) ~

Nr.C requirecent fcr review of all quality assurance pro'cedures and -

controls used by ecch pre-Jur.e 1978 seismic ana non-seismic service related contractor anc by PGaE with regara to tn' t contract. A re a

comparison of these procedures and centrols witil the related criteria of Appenoix 6 to 10 CFx 50 is also required.

Any deficieccies or seaknesses in the qJality assurance procecures and* controls of the contractor anc PG4E will be investigated in more detail. For example, numerical calculations fer whl:h the original basis cannot bk determined will be recalculatec to verify i

the initial design input.

Ouestion 2: Pleas 6 provide tne criteria to be. used in assuring that the-proposed audit will be "ingfependent."

Rescense: While cc petence of the inciviauals or companies is the nest i. por. ant facto" in the selection of an auditor, the following facters vill h consicered in evalualiing the question cf inaeocncance.:

~'

' 1) Whether or not thi companies or incisicuals hec any previcusly involv:r,ent in any way with the acti.vities at Diatic Canycn that s

they will now be reviewing i

2) Whetner or not the incividuals or comptnies involvec nac been previously hired by PG&E to do any seismic design work.
3) Whether or not any inoividual involved had oeen previously employec Dy PG5E.
4) Whether or not the incividual owns or controls significant acouats 4

of PG4E stock.

5) khether or not ncmbers of the present hcusehoic of incividuais l

invo',ved are employea by PG&I.

i l

l

-m,.-,.,-,____m.--_m.,,__,_ _ _..,.-.. ~.... _

.-m.

c

.w.c.__,.____.-.m..-,._,___m.___...

\\

.2 En:losure 2 (Cont'd) '

6) khsther or not any relatives are employed by PGAE in a manage-

~

ment capacity.

In addition to the.above con'siderations, the following' procedural guidelirre's will be dsed to assure independence:

1) No priot editorial control of interim or final reports.

2)

All reports sent to all parties in the proceeding simult'anicusly.

3) Any party has opportunity'to observe additing process.

_0uestien 3:

In view of the licensen's past perfomance, and that of its i

subcontractors, whr.t procedures will be utilized to ensurs that there are no conflicts-of, interests in the perfemance of any-required audits?

{

Response

We are requiring that PG&E provide the NRC with a description and a discussion of the corporate qualifications of the ccr.panies proposed to carry out the varicus design verification programs, including infomation that demonstrates the independence of these companies.

This information will be provided to the Governor of California and the Joint Intervenors for coment. Based upon revies of the infcma:icn provided by PG&E and the comments of the Governor and Joint Intervencrs; the Comission will decide on the acceptability of the companies with I

respect to their " independence" and "cospetence".

In addition, app.$cval will not be g'iven by NRC if we determine that a pote.tial conflict of i

interest exists in the performance of any required audits that cannot

)

be adequately addressed by precedural, safeguards.

t i

Question 4:

khat plans does the NRC have to ensure that a similar situation will not arise at other plants now under c nstruction? What,if L

any, additional quality control procedures does the NRC prepose to institute in its inspection program?

I l

l

\\

t

.2

....___m

. (Cont'd) 4-Ressonse:

To redu:e the likelihood of a similar situation arising at other plands under constuction, the Con:nission intends to ha've the top levels of management of the involv'ed licensees informed of the recent QA p'reblems encountered at certain plants, and to impress them with the proven cost-effectiveness and absolute regulatory necessity for a rigorous,QA progre.

Every effort will be made to assure that each licensee is ante of the need for a strong positive attitude emanating from the top organizati:r.a eledents down to every other level.

Tne Cesaission has made or is considering a number of changes of its:

inspection and enforcement progra:n to improve the effectivebess of QA progress.

Specific activities include:

1.

IIRC Reside'nt Inspectors have been or will be stationed at all construction sites where active construction is presently under wey

,and the project is at least 15 percent ecmplete. Based on our experien:e with the Resident Insgection program to date, we know that Resident Inspectors enhance the NRC's ability to m:nitor qualit.

assurance activities and identify the sy::1ptcins of breakdown in mant; control.

2.

There has been a toughening of the NRC's enforcement posture over th past few years and the NRC's revised enfer:ement policy has pia:ed emphasis on dealing with poor regulatory performance i,n the c:nstr:::'

areas.

3.

We have completed a trial program of team ins;:ections whereby sever!

1 I

NRC Inspectors go to a construction site for two to three weeks :: e O

m

\\

.. ~..

~ '...

~

(Cont'd) -

s broad, intensive inspection of the QJality Assurance Program for ongo work. This approach enables NRC to gain a total project perspective to a greater, extent than past practice. The advantage "of thhs deta'iled " snapshot" is an enhanced ability to evaluate management effectiveness. The use of such inspection teams i.s limited by the availability of inspectors and funds for this purpose.

.~

4.

The NRC Construction Inspection Program is und.er revision to.

~

accomplish several objectives. We are recasting inspection procedure to delete inspection activities of lesser importance and to reduce duplication of effort by Resident and Regional-Based Specialist Inspectors. "In situations where inspector resource limitatier.s pre-clude empleting the entire Inspection Program, we are ordering our priorities so that the most important inspections will be ccmpletet!.

The need to place additional uphasis on the design interfact areas is beir., tvaluated as part of their revision.

5.

Fomalized perfomance appraisals of licensee regulatory perfeman:e are being conducted annually by the NRC (Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfomance Program). The appraisals, which review the collective NRC experience with each power reactor, bring the broad issues of perfomance_ effectiveness to the attention of senior licensee officials.

6.

We are now using our own mobile laboratory for nondestru:tive examination (NDE) at construction sites. This NDE van has multiple capabilities that include radiograph development,

r

+

~

p.

_ (Cont' d) 6-meta 116rgical analysis, and hardness, ultrasonic, dye penetrant I

and m,agnetic particle testing. The examinations that we perform

are intended to confim quality based on a selective sampling approach.

e W

N g

O 9

e 6

e e

9

).

g 9

?

e e

8 e

g e

e 4

e l

e e

g 4

i i

j e

i s

4 m

e G*

l i

e 1

4 t

{

l l

l 8

[

e-+

. e gp.

em..

e