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UNITED STATES
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i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.. E WASHINGTON. D. C. 20656 5e JUN 2 21983 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Richard H. Vollmer, Director, Division of Engineering, NRR Roger J. Mattson, Director Divison of Systems Intergation, NRR James M. Taylor, Director, Divison of Quality Assurance, Safeguards and Inspection Programs, IE John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V
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FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, ONRR
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON VERIFICATION PROGRAM - SER SUPPLEMENT Enclosed is the outline of the SER Supplement (SSER) for the verification efforts for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
The lead organization responsible for the preparation of each section has been indicated. The outline supercedes an earlier draft sent to you December 3,1982.
The SSER will address the design verification effort by the IDVP and the PG&E internal technical program (ITP).
Regarding the scope, the Supplement will acd ess the Phase I activities (i.e. Comission Order CLI 81-30), Phase 11 activities (i.e. NRR letter of November 19, 1983) and other supporting efforts, for example construction QA evaluation. The Supplement will also incorporate into our evaluation the analyses performed by BNL.
The primary purpose of the Supplement is to provide the bases for our recomend-ation to the Comission regarding a fuel load decision (i.e. Step 1 of Comission approved licensing process) and criticality and low power testing (i.e. Step 2). The Supplement will also provide our evaluation of the design verification with respect to the issuance of a full power license (i.e. Step 3). We do not intend to issue additional Supplements on these matters except for the resolution
. of potential open items.
Ir3 ' addition, the Supplement will be used to the greatest extent possible to provide the bases for staff testimony for the recently reopened record on design quality assurance.
The Supplement should be based on documents and other information provided. This consists primarily of the following:
PG&E Phase I Final Report PG&E Phase II Final Report IDVP Final Report Interim Technical Reports (ITRs) and revisions PG&E Semi-Monthly Reports IDVP Semi-Monthly Reports t
Information obtained at meetings, audits and inspections should also be used, particularly if transcripts were taken.
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a2-i This safety evaluation for Diablo Canyon 'Jnit 1 with respect to the verificatten effert is different from the usual staff safety evalcation. In accordance with the Ccomission Order and t'ne NRR letter, a major portion of the detailed evalu4 tion was performed not by the NRC staff but for the NRC by independent and qusiified.
organizations (i.e. the IDYP). Tne final evaluation regarding safety of Diablo Cenycn Unit 1 must, of course, be a staff evaluation bcsed on the design verification 1
performed by the IDYP. Another difference frem the usual safety evaluation is that we must not only provide an evaluation.regarding the safety of the plant, but we must also identify those areas and issues that were fbund to be deficient er in error as a result of the vorification effort. The Commissisn Order spe::ifically requires that tne 'DVP determine tbe root cause(s) for su:h deficiencies and the staff must evaluate these rcot causes.
The format and style of the Su'pplement will also differ from our usual evaluations.
Tne folicwing is provided as guidance regarding the " flavor" of tne evaluation.
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As stated in the Ccmmission Order, a break-dewn in the quality assurance and its implementation for the transfer of informatien between PG&E and its contractors was a primary reason for thu Order. Therefore, this aspect must be addressed, in particular in Section 3.0.
However, to the extent that such a break-down resulted in antlysis or desigt. deficiences, this must be addressed in tho appropriate section also.
(2) Throughout the conduct cf the design verification program ne have stated that on!a of the obiectives of the effort is the identification of deficiences, if any, tnat have " eaten into the margin of safety", combined with the confinnation that an adequate margin cf saftty dces exist.
(3) Much has been made of the large number of "E01s" terror or Open Itensi that resulted from the IDVP. It is important to keep the IDVF definition of "Errces" in mind. We will address this aspect in Section 2 of the Supplement; however IDVP Errors of. Class A, B and A/B should be addressed in the appropriate section.
The Supplement must clearly state what the IDVP reviewed and evaluated, what was found and how deficiencies were resolved or corrected,and the final IDVP conclusion. To a large extent our evaluation will be based on cuf review of ITRs that have been issued and have already been evalcated. When possible, these evaluations should be included as appendices te the appropriate section of the Supplement.
e The f ollowing is the currently projected schedule for this effort. While we already have most sections of the final repcrts in house, this schedule is predicated on receiving the final installment fram the Diablo Canyon Project and the ICVP by June 30, 1983.
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- Final submittai from PG&E June 30 cad 1DVP SSER input to EL July 13 SSER sent Ccmmission July 22 Commission briefing on recommendation for fuel lead decision August 1 Because of the tight schedule your input should be provided as early as possible to Hans Schierling, Project Manager for the Diablo Canyon verification effort.
All staff ' effort asscciated with the Diablo Canyon verification program should be reported under TAC 4E045 with PA 1111.
7 RETT G.( ' El T (N (G/)/
en ut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
As stated
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H. Denton O. Par.r E. Case J. Wermiel J.' Knight J. Knox L. Rubenstein J. Ridgtly T. Novak G. Bagchi R. Bosnak B. Buckley G. Lear
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I DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGPAM 1.0 Introduction......................... DL issuance of low power license - Unit 1 (1981) initial errors and PG&E and NRC actions Comission Order and NRR letter (list Specific requirements) independence requirements and criteria IDVP and ITP (brief statement) role of other parties in licensing proceedings applicability of program to Unit 1 and Unit 2 list of acronyms (Appendix) 6 l
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h e 2.0 Design Verification Program 2.1 Independent Design Verification Program................ DL Bases and Definition Purpose Scope and Criteria Independence IDVP Participants / Consultants Major elements of program Phase !
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Phase II Design QA Construction QA Sample Selection Criteria to be applied
- ' Metholodogy and Procedures interaction with PG&E f. NRC and others, reporting (semimonthly, ITR's, Final Report, etc.),
identification and resolution of concerns qmlity assurance for IDVP list of ITR's (Appendix) 2.2 PG&E Internal Tecnnical Program and PG&E Corrective.......... DL Action Program Bases and Definition Purpose Scope and Criteria Major elements initial secpe expansion to corrective action program PG&E/Bechtel Diablo Canyon Project Organization Methodology and Procedures interation with IDVP, NRC ard others, reporting (semimonthly, stat s and final reports, etc.),
l identification and resolutici f cencerns, modifications l
QA look back report, QA during conduct of program 2.3 NRC Review.............................. OL Scope and methodology reliance on IDVP findings I
reliance on FG&E findings review and approval of programs use of BNL as NRC consultants (sumary statement only, not technical) r evaluation of participants in IDVP, regarding...........
Region V financial irdependence and professional qualifications, including RV audit of documentation i
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3-description of contents and requirements for Phase I and Phase II program, Step 1, Step 2.and Step 3 licensing process approval of DCP QA program chronology of Design Verification Program (major events - NRC approval of programs, Commission meetings, allegations, etc.)
audits and insp.vt.tions of design................. Region V and analysis (' forts inspections of modifications................... Region V a
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-4 3.0' Quality Assurance IE:QAB 3.1 Introduction D1 cuss QA with respect to Comission Order and NRR letter, development and applicability of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B with respect to Diablo Canyon design and construction; discuss IDVP procedure for QA audit.
3.2 QA Audit of Seismic Service RelatedContractors(PhaseI)
Deisgn Chain Audit of QA Program and Program Implementation (six contractors)
IDVP Results Staff Evaluation 3.3 QA Audit of Non-Seismic Service Related Contractors (Phase II)
Design Chain and PG&E "Look Back Report" Audit of QA Program and Program Implementation (4 contractors)
L IDVP Results Staff Evaluation 3.4 QA Audit o-? PG&E Activities (Pre-Design Verification Program)
Audit of QA Program and Implementation _
IDVP Results Staff Evaluation l
3.5 QA Audit of Construction Activities Background and Bases Audit of Activities (2 contractors)
IDVP Results Staff Evaluation 3.6 QA Audit of Design Verification Program (PG&E and IDVP) 3.7 Sumary Staff Evaluation I
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5-4.0 Sei smic Design Verification....................... DE 4.1 Introduction Discuss the following aspects in general introduction Bases (distinction between Phase I and Phase II requirements)
Scope, criteria and-metholodogy applied.to seismic design verification effort by PG&E and by IDVP URS/Blume Report of September 1982 Hosgri and non-Hosgri (DE and DDE) spectra PG&R Corrective Action Program Brookhaven Study Other 4.2 Structures For each of the following structures discuss the major elements of the PG&E analytical effort and the modifications resulting (if any); discuss the IDVP evaluation process, findings and conclusions; present staff evaluation of scope and effectiveness of analyses performed and of a adequacy of modifications Containment Annulus Steel Containment Interior Structures Containment Exterior Shell Auxiliary Building s Fuel Handling Buildiag; Intake Structure '
Outdoor Storage Tanks 4.3 Piping and Piping Supports i
-Do same as for Section 4.2 for the following Large Bore Piping and Supports Small Bore Piping and Supports 4.4 Equipment and Supports Do same as for Section 4.2 for the following Mechanical Equipment anc Supports (tanks, pumps, valves, heat exchangers)
HVAC Equipment and Supports Electric Equipment and Instruments and Supports Electric Raceways, Instrument Tubing and Supports Y
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4.5 Other Seismic Design Verification Topics i
- Soils Shake Table Testing Seismic Qualification Other 4.6 Brockhaven Analyses i
Purpose and Scope of Study Reporting and. Meetings
- Conclusions Applicability to Program Other BNL Participation 4.7 Major Findings Summary of Major Findings IDVP and PGAE Resolution (PG&E Open Items and IDVP E0I's)
NRC Evaluation
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7-5.0 Non Seismic Design Verification
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.... DSI 5.1 Introduction Relationship to Phase I and Phase II Requiredents Scope,-criteria and Methodology for Non-Seismic Design Verification Effort by IDVP and PG&E Difference in Approach for Soismic Verification Initial IDVP Sample PG&E Action Regarding IDVP Effort NRC Studies (P/T) 5.2 Safety Related Systems - Initial Sample For each for the following systems discuss the major elements of the IDVP review efforts, the PG&E response and resolution of issue and modification; present 4
staff evaluation of scope and effectiveness of analyses performed Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Control Room Ventilation and PressurizationSystem(CRVP) 4160 V Safety-Related Electric &1 System 5.3 Additonal Verification - Generic Concerns J
Identify issues of generic concerns resulting from design verification of systems in initial sample; discuss major elements of IDVP review efforts, PG&E analyses and modifications (if any) for each of the following generic concerns:
Redundancy of Equipment ana Power Supplies in Shared Systems (Units 1 and 2)
Selection of Design Pressure. Temperature, and Differential Pressure across Control Valves Environmental Consequences of Postulated Pipe Ru Outside Containment (Pressure and Temperature); ptures include results of NRC evaluations Jet Impigement Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture inside containment Circuit Separation and Single Failure Discuss Staff Evaluation of Generic Concerns i
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8-5.4 Major Findings Summary of Major Findings (PG&E Open Items and IDVP E0Is)
IDVP and PG&E Resolution
- - NRC Evaluation i
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9-6.0 Sumary and Conclusions................... DL/DSI/DE/ Region V conclusion statements on scope of IDVP scope of ITP sumary of major errors (class A, B, A/B) summary of modifications adequacy of plant design and construction prior to effort and after completion potential for further deficiencies at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 t
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