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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20207A7181999-05-13013 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 134 & 132 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20206H2861999-05-0303 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 133 & 131 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20206D5661999-04-29029 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 132 & 130 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20205B6061999-03-26026 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 131 & 129 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20249B6881998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 128 & 126 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20249B5961998-06-0505 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 127 & 125 to Licenses DPR-80 & 82,respectively ML20249B6041998-06-0505 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 126 & 124 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20248D4041998-05-28028 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 125 & 123 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20248L8761998-03-12012 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 124 & 122 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20197B7091998-02-27027 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 121 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203L4881998-02-17017 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122 & 120 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203L2981998-02-13013 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 121 & 119 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203M4321998-02-0303 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 120 & 118 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20149H4281997-07-17017 July 1997 Corrected SE Re Amends 119 & 117 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129G9351996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 117 & 115 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129G7771996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 116 & 114 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129J4311996-10-18018 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Approving Corporate Restructuring & Establishment of Holding Company Under Temporary Name PG&E Parent Co.,Inc of Which PG&E Would Become Wholly Owned Subsidiary ML20117E5541996-08-19019 August 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 115 & 113 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20117K4671996-05-28028 May 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 113 & 111 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20092F3411995-08-23023 August 1995 Corrected SE Supporting Amends 107 & 106 to Licenses DPR-82 & DPR-80,respectively ML20082H9121995-04-11011 April 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 99 & 98 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20063M1481994-03-0303 March 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 90 & 89 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively NUREG-0675, SER Concluding That Seismic Margins of Structures & Equipment/Components at Plant Reported in LTSP Final Rept Are Adequate Even After Considering Staff Estimate of Increased Seismic Ground Motions1992-04-17017 April 1992 SER Concluding That Seismic Margins of Structures & Equipment/Components at Plant Reported in LTSP Final Rept Are Adequate Even After Considering Staff Estimate of Increased Seismic Ground Motions ML20092E0021992-01-22022 January 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 67 & 66 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20082V1441991-09-0606 September 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 66 & 65 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20082V2621991-09-0505 September 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 65 & 64 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20081L3021991-06-27027 June 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 62 & 61 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20081F2021991-05-23023 May 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 61 & 60 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20070H1821991-03-0606 March 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 59 & 58 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20246K9501989-07-10010 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 42 & 41 to License DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20245F8371989-06-22022 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 41 & 40 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20244C8771989-06-0707 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 40 & 39 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20244C8551989-06-0707 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 39 & 38 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20247H9771989-05-23023 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 38 & 37 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20247B1201989-05-10010 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 37 & 36 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20245L2511989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 36 & 35 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20245H6991989-04-14014 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 34 & 35 to Licenses DPR-82 & DPR-80,respectively ML20247L2931989-03-27027 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 34 & 33 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20153E5331988-08-29029 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 31 & 30 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20196E4811987-12-28028 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 26 & 25 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20238C4611987-12-16016 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 24 & 23 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20238C6061987-12-16016 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 25 & 24 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20235G7671987-09-18018 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 21 & 20 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20238D3871987-09-0303 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 19 & 18 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20238D3931987-09-0303 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 20 & 19 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20237L5631987-08-31031 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 18 & 17 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20237G5541987-08-27027 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 17 & 16 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20236H3811987-07-27027 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 16 & 15 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20215C4341987-06-12012 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 14 & 13 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20214W2851987-06-0808 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 13 & 11 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively 1999-05-03
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20211A9981999-07-12012 July 1999 Draft,Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Risk Info Matrix, Risk Ranking of Systems by Importance Measure ML20207A7181999-05-13013 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 134 & 132 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20206H2861999-05-0303 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 133 & 131 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20206D5661999-04-29029 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 132 & 130 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20205B6061999-03-26026 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 131 & 129 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively DCL-99-045, 1998 Annual Financial Rept for PG&E Corp. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Financial Rept for PG&E Corp. with ML20249B6881998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 128 & 126 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20249B6041998-06-0505 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 126 & 124 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20249B5961998-06-0505 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 127 & 125 to Licenses DPR-80 & 82,respectively ML20248D4041998-05-28028 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 125 & 123 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20248L8761998-03-12012 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 124 & 122 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20197B7091998-02-27027 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 121 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203J5141998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-S02-00:on 980127,following Security Sys Failure Compensatory Measures Were Not Implemented within 10 Minutes Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Failed Disk Drive. Replaced Disk Drives,Reviewed Security Computer Maint Plans ML20203L4881998-02-17017 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122 & 120 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203L2981998-02-13013 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 121 & 119 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203M4321998-02-0303 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 120 & 118 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20217G5151997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 PG&E Corp Annual Rept ML20205F5881997-07-24024 July 1997 Decommissioning Cost Estimate for Diablo Canyon Power Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20149H4281997-07-17017 July 1997 Corrected SE Re Amends 119 & 117 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML17264A9381997-07-10010 July 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Potential Safety Hazard Associated w/FM-Alco 251 Engin,High Pressure Fuel tube-catalog: 4401031-2 in Which Dual Failure Mode Exists.Caused by Incorrect Forming Process ML18102B6911997-01-31031 January 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1997 for Diablo Canyon Power Plant,Units 1 & 2.W/970218 Ltr ML17083C6231997-01-31031 January 1997 Rev 4 to WCAP-13705, W Setpoint Methodology for Protection Sys Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2,24 Month Fuel Cycle Evaluation. ML16343A4741997-01-31031 January 1997 WCAP-11595,Rev 2, W Improved Thermal Design Procedure Instrument Uncertainty Methodology Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2 24 Month Fuel Cycle Evaluation. ML16342D5351997-01-31031 January 1997 WCAP-14826, Instrumentation Calibr & Drift Evaluation Process for Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2,24 Month Fuel Cycle Evaluation. ML16342D5541996-12-31031 December 1996 Non-proprietary Nrc/Util Meeting on Model 51 SG Tube Integrity & ARC Methodology. DCL-97-045, Pacific Gas & Electric Co 1996 Annual Rept1996-12-31031 December 1996 Pacific Gas & Electric Co 1996 Annual Rept ML20129G9351996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 117 & 115 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129G7771996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 116 & 114 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129J4311996-10-18018 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Approving Corporate Restructuring & Establishment of Holding Company Under Temporary Name PG&E Parent Co.,Inc of Which PG&E Would Become Wholly Owned Subsidiary ML20117E5541996-08-19019 August 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 115 & 113 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively DCL-96-155, Revised Special Rept SR 95-05:on 950806,EDG 1-2 to Achieve Rated Output Frequency within TS Limits.Caused by Degraded Electronic Governor Performance.Replaced Electronic Governor Motor Operated Potentiometer & Electronic Governor1996-07-22022 July 1996 Revised Special Rept SR 95-05:on 950806,EDG 1-2 to Achieve Rated Output Frequency within TS Limits.Caused by Degraded Electronic Governor Performance.Replaced Electronic Governor Motor Operated Potentiometer & Electronic Governor ML20116B8521996-07-22022 July 1996 Revised Special Rept SR 95-04:on 950718,EDG 1-2 Load Swings Occurred.Caused by Defective Electronic Governor Stability Potentiometer.Replaced Electronic Governor ML20116B8491996-07-22022 July 1996 Revised Special Rept SR 95-03:on 950621,EDG 1-2 Failed to Load During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Loose Fuse Holder Contact Clip.Retensioned Loose Fuse Holder Contact Clip & Tightened Loose Wire Connection ML20117K4671996-05-28028 May 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 113 & 111 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20236Q2611996-04-15015 April 1996 Rev 0 to DCP M-050284, Design Change Package for Installation of CCW Surge Tank Pressurization Sys for Unit 1 ML20094M6251995-11-21021 November 1995 Final Part 21 Rept of Investigation & Analysis of Suspect Fasteners Event 29257.B&G-Cardinal Discontinued Using Heat Treatment Equipment at Cardinal Facility Until Such Time That Satisfactory Mods Made to Hardware & Procedures ML20092F3411995-08-23023 August 1995 Corrected SE Supporting Amends 107 & 106 to Licenses DPR-82 & DPR-80,respectively ML18064A8631995-08-14014 August 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950714,determined That Redundant DG Circuits Not Separated Per App R Due to Insufficient App R Program Documentation.Hourly Fire Tour Established in EDG 1-1 Room & Review of LERs for App R Completed ML20082H9121995-04-11011 April 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 99 & 98 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML18100B2981994-05-24024 May 1994 LER 94-014-00:on 940426,SG 1-2 Automatically Started When Two Indicating Light Sockets Shorted Together Due to Personnel Error.Description of Event & Lessons Learned Will Be Published in Operations Incident Summary.W/940524 Ltr ML20063M1481994-03-0303 March 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 90 & 89 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML16342C3091993-12-31031 December 1993 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1993 for Dcnpp Units 1 & 2 ML16342A3691993-08-31031 August 1993 Revised MOR for Aug 1993 for Dcnpp Unit 1 ML16342A3681993-07-31031 July 1993 Revised MOR for July 1993 for Dcnpp Unit 1 ML20046A6611993-07-21021 July 1993 Cycle 6 Startup Rept. ML20059G6811993-06-30030 June 1993 Revised MOR for June 1993 for Dcnpp Unit 1 ML16342A3671993-05-31031 May 1993 Revised MOR for May 1993 for Dcnpp Unit 1 ML20045D1731993-05-31031 May 1993 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1993 for Diablo Canyon,Units 1 & 2 ML20126J5961992-12-31031 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Loss of RHR Cooling During Nozzle Dam Removal.Nozzle Dams May Create Trapped Air Column Behind Cold Leg Nozzle Dam.Mod to Nozzle Dams Currently Underway. Ltrs to Affected Utils Encl 05000275/LER-1992-001, :on 920214,0608,19 & 25,plant Operated Outside of Design Basis Re App R Criteria.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Lack of Attention to Detail.Fire Watches Established, Operators Notified & Design Change Initiated1992-07-0808 July 1992
- on 920214,0608,19 & 25,plant Operated Outside of Design Basis Re App R Criteria.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Lack of Attention to Detail.Fire Watches Established, Operators Notified & Design Change Initiated
1999-07-12
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UNITED STATES g
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2065!M001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATFD TO AMENDMENT NO. 113 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80 AND AMENDMENT NO. 111 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 j
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated April 3,1996, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (or the L
licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82) for the Diablo Canyon 4
Nuclear Power Plant (DCPP), Units 1 and 2.
The proposed changes revise the combined Technical Specifications (TS) for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. I and 2 to revise Technical Specifications 3/4.7.5, " Control Room Ventilation System;" 3/4.7.6, " Auxiliary Building Safeguards Air Filtration System;" and 3/4.9.12, " Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System" to clarify the testing methodology utilized by PG&E to determine the operability of:the charcoal and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters in the engineering safeguards features (ESF) air handling units at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant (DCPP).
2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 Charcoal Testing The current DCPP TS requirements for surveillance testing of charcoal samples from the ESF ventilation systems do not accurately reflect the actual testing being performed in the industry to determine methyl iodide penetration.
Rather than performing the surveillance to meet older industry standards and regulatory guidance, the licensee proposed to modify the TS to reflect the current testing being performed.
The proposed amendment changes the testing requirements in the TS used to determine the operability of the charcoal in the ESF air handling units. The charcoal is provided to remove iodine from the air as it passes through the e
air handling units.
There are no changes to the physical design or operation of the facility.
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) design basis are not affected.
The guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52, " Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2" and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N509-9606110283 960528 i
PDR ADOCK 05000275 p
PDR
- 1976, " Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units and Components," presently forms the licensing basis test requirements. The current TS references Regulatory i
Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, which j
requires testing in accordance with ANSI N509-1976, which requires that the testing be performed at 80*C.
The essential elements of the proposed TS change are those outlined by RG 1.52, Revision 2 and ANSI N509-1980 which refers to ASTM D 3803-1979,
" Standard Test Methods for Radiation Testing of Nuclear-Grade Gas-Phase Adsorbents." ASTM D 3803-1979 is updated guidance based on RDT M16-1T, " Gas Phase Adsorbents for Trapping Radioactive Iodine and Iodine Components."
The quantity of water retained by charcoal (carbon) is dependent on temperature.
Generally, the higher the temperature the less water retained.
The water retained by the carbon decreases the efficiency of the carbon to adsorb other contaminants. At 25'C and 95 percent relative humidity (RH),
carbon will retain about 40 weight percent water. At 80*C and 95 percent RH, carbon retains only about 2 to 3 weight percent water.
During an accident, the charcoal adsorber banks would not experience that high a temperature, therefore testing at higher temperatures produces non-conservative results.
ASTM D 3803-1979 specifies a test temperature of 30'C instead of 25'C for the pre-load and post-load sweep temperatures.
There is little difference in the adsorption behavior of carbon between these two temperatures. The 25'C parameter is more conservative.
Pre-test humidity equilibration is achieved by sweeping air of the appropriate humidity through the test carbon. This condition is for testing new carbon and until 1977 it also was applied for testing used carbon.
In 1977, RDT M16-1T-1977 was released stating that for testing used carbon, "the material shall not be pre-equilibrated before testing." NUREG/CR-0771, " Effects of Weathering on Impregnated Charcoal Performance," May 10, 1979, provides a basis by stating that, "it is thought that the elimination of the pre-humidification is a better simulation of accident conditions since a carbon filter must be ready at all times...."
It also states that, "several investigators do not recommend any pre-treatment (of the carbon) in order to prevent a partial regeneration of the carbon which would increase the measured trapping efficiency." Therefore, by the release of the ASTM D 3803-1979 standard, it was established that the better test method was not to pre-equilibrate the humidity of the carbon.
The present TS reference to N509-1976 (RDT M16-1T) requires the carbon tc be equilibrated to 25'C and 70 percent RH.
The methyl iodide test medium would then be instantaneously introduced at 80*C.
Carbon testing is not performed this way because this would cause condensation to form on the carbon (the dew point temperature of the test medium at these conditions is approximately 71*C.) Condensation on the carbon sample itself (" wetting the bed") results in the test being invalid. This is supported by paragraph 12.41. of ASTM D 3803-1979 which states with respect to relative humidity of the test medium that,
" tests at saturation or above give very erratic results." Because of this, the testing standards after 1976 (i.e., RDT M16-1T-1977, ASTM D 3803-1979, j
' N509-1980), have been changed to include pre-test thermal equilibration at the test temperature.
The proposed TS change to N510-1989, Appendix B, for the 30*C and 95 percent RH methyl iodine test is considered by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the NRC to be the most reliable test method. ASTM D 3803-1989, Annex A5 allows for humidity testing of the charcoal at various operating conditions as required by the facility, however, the testing temperature will be 30*C in all cases.
For the control room and auxiliary building ventilation system, the humidity of the exhaust air is controlled to 70 percent RH maximum. Therefore, the charcoal samples for the control room and auxiliary building are to be tested at 70 percent RH.
The post-test sweep of the carbon is performed to evaluate the ability of the carbon to hold the adsorbate once it is captured.
The current TS test specifies a two hour test at 25'C.
The requested changes revise TS 3/4.7.5, " Control Room Ventilation System;"
3/4.7.6, " Auxiliary Building Safeguards Air Filtration System;" and 3/4.9.12,
" Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System", and the associated TS Bases relating to surveillance requirements for charcoal filter laboratory testing, such that existing flawed test methodology in the TS will reflect the currently utilized acceptable test methodology in accordance with industry standards. The staff has evaluated this change and concludes that the testing methodology proposed by the licensee adequately demonstrates the operability
)
of the air handling units, and is therefore acceptable.
2.2 Other Testing The current DCPP TS requires that other filter testing, such as filter visual inspections and in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing of HEPA filters and adsorber banks, also be performed in accordance with RG 1.52.
RG 1.52 references ANSI N510-1975, and describes the requirements for the required testing.
The requested changes revise TS 3/4.7.5, " Control Room Ventilation System;"
3/4.7.6, " Auxiliary Building Safeguards Air Filtration System;" and 3/4.9.12,
" Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System", relating to surveillance requirements for filter visual inspections, in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing of HEPA filters and adsorber banks. The proposed TS will require that testing be performed in accordance with ANSI N510-1980, which encompasses the testing required by N510-1975. The staff has evaluated this change and concludes that the testing methodology proposed by the licensee adequately demonstrates the operability of the air handling ur.its, and is therefore acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments.
The State official had no comments.
1 i
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4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 18173). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statemeat or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
S. Bloom Date:
May 28, 1996 4