ML20209C274
| ML20209C274 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1983 |
| From: | Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340C148 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-151 TAC-48045, NUDOCS 8307220568 | |
| Download: ML20209C274 (54) | |
Text
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j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 JUL 141r43 p, fA)Le RANDUM FOR: ThanagJ Jievet, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Licensing, NRR FROM:
L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems, Division of Systems Integration, NRR
SUBJECT:
DIABLOCANYONVERIFICATIONPROGRAM-SERSUPPLEMENT(TAC 48045)
As requested in DL menorandums dated June 22 and 23,1983, enclosed is the DSI supplemental safety evaluation report (SSER) input regarding the Diablo Canyon verification program. This SSER concerns Phase II of the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) which involved verification of the adequacy of the applicant's design approach and philosophy for safety-related systems. The SSER is based on the IDVP interim technical reports IDVP final report and the applicant's final Phase II report.
The enclosed SSER incorporates inputs from ASB, PSB (memorandum to 0. Parr dated July 11,1983) and ICSB (memorandum to 0. Parr dated July 12,1983) and should be included in Section 5.0 of the SSER as indicated in the DL outline.
These are the DSI branches specifically identified as having review respon-sibility in the areas included in the IDVP Phase II scope. DSI concludes that the IDVP has satisfactorily fulfilled the objective of the Phase II program which was to confinn that the Diablo Canyon safety-related system's design in our review areas meets the licensing criteria and connitments for assuring safety functions. However, two exceptions to the above are noted in the enclosed ICSB input. The concerns raised by the IDVP in the instrument and controls review were not previously identified in the staff review of Diablo Canyon, and further discussion of the applicant's resolution of them is required in order to confirm their acceptability prior to further licensing a ction.
It should also be noted that our SER discusses two review areas undergoing continued design verification by the applicant. The applicant has comitted during the IDVP to review the areas in question, to identify the need for modifications, and to revise documentation based on this effort.
We concur with this approach.
The DSI review branches are available to discuss the enclosed SSER input and provide additional assistance you may require in order to complete the Diablo Canyon design verification SSER. With the exceptions noted, this completes DSI action on TAC 48045.
M Q
L. S. R enstein Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration
Enclosure:
As Stated cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
Contact:
J. Wenniel, X29462
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R. Mattson R. Capra O. Eisenhut R. W. Houston W. V. Johnston J. P. Knight G. Knighton
- 0. Parr F. Rosa M. Srinivasan T. Dunning A. Ungaro J. Knox H. Schierling J. Wermiel l
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s DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT INPUT INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM DIVISION OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 5.0 inuo 0s...
tv 5.1 In* red"a+4aa In order to verif y the adequacy of the Diablo Canyon design MS and compliance with applicable Licensing criteria and commit-g ments, the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP)
We3 anderfa.kew i,o examCwo end:rter' :- e r 2 ; ; i ;.- ;f the engineering design approach and philosophy for safety related systems.
The scope ct this review, IDVP Phase II, included the selection of three repre-sentative safety related systems for design analysis of the work performed by the applicant and their cont ractors.
The systems selected were:
the auxiliary feedwater systems con-trol room ventilation and pressurization systemyand 4160 volt 1pVP safety-related electric system.
The review involved develop-ment of the design chain for sample activities, and perfor-mance of.ndependent calculations or review of applicant catculations for the purpose of design process verification.
The verification program review considered design require-ments in the following areas for the above three systems:
peaer fluid, electrical, instrumentation and control, fire protec-
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- :;;;:... equipment environmental (radiationi pressure, temperature and humidity) qualification and seismics structural and mechanical aspects y
of piping, pipe supports, components and component supports.
Seismic considerations in the IDVP Phase II program concerned seismic design r,equirements other than those identified in the Phase I scope for verification of Hosgri qualification.
A separate const ruct ion quality assurance' program verification review was also included in Phase II.
To begin the task identified, the applicant provided the unk M <~s% repran TL.
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O a.bevt were me$. W criteria and commitments for the areas indicated '
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.. tem. (E'cI%les ay As the review progressed and concerns were identified 4 the C e or-ed applicant urutd respond by providing additional documentations ed ma.$ crs el Ae,oncepw.priate commit to appro changes recalculation and analyses, or at hee.ets* y a,we(
t o reso ve the open i temsg The IDVP verified the accept-ability of the design of proposed modificationse or reanalysis including review of applicable catculations.
The results of the IDVP review and evaluations were documented in Interim i
Technical Report (ITRs) each of which dealt with a specific design aspect under review.
The ITRs were updated as addi-tional information 'and resolution of open items were obtained.
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The design verification results are discussed and evaluated i
further in this SER.
Five identified areas of consideration fr:- th; ' - i t i ; '....i;; resulted in the need~for additional generic evaluation as the concerns involved requirements and 1
design approaches applicable to other saf ety-related systems.
j These areas were (1) redundancy of equipment and power supplies in shared safety-related systems, (2) selection of system design pressurer temperature and differential pressure across valvesi (3) environmental consequences of postulated pipe breaks outside containments (4) jet impingement effects due to postulated pipe breaks inside containment, and (5) c i r c u.i t 4
separation and single failure capability for safety-related electrical components.
The IDVP review of the additional verification was comparable to that of the initial sample.
i Acceptance criteria are the same as indicated previously.
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Of. NM Ba s e d o n t h e above, concludesthat the IDVP review adequately I
considered the desigi approach and philosophy for implement-ing licensing criteria and commitments employed by the appli-i l
cant for safety-related systems in accordance with the scope W hic h W et prev >$ly approved.
of the Phase II programg Details of the verification reviews da.N results, corrective actions and conclusions for each y
review area are provided subsequently in this SER.
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t 5.2 Evaluation of IDVP Phase II Review 5.2.1 Initiat samnt*
5.2.1.1 Verification of the Pressures Temperature, Humidity, and Subneccence Environments Used for Safetv-Related Eeuie-St.
ment Specification Outside Containment for.Auxiliars
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ikt Feedwater Eve +em (AFWE) and centrol Reem Ventilation and A
Pressurization System (ERVPM1-ITA PI dside te8enismss't In order to verify that bounding environments specified for operation of safety-related equipment in the AFWS and CRVPS had been property determined, the ItVP reviewed samples of the pressures temperaturer humidity and sub-mergence analyses for selected plant areas (,peaformedby Nuclear Service Corporation (WSi) fortheapplicant},
The turbine buitd!ng and areas GE and GW of the auxiliary dret$
building were selected as the sampted outside contain-g Cssfd be ment because they 444 subjected to a harsh environment h
A.s4 Aanddder' caused by postulated high energy pipe (main steam line) breaks and contain sdfety-related equipment for the AFWS and CRVPS.
thepostulatedrelatfdhumi-IDVP review determined that dity value of 100% throughout the original NEC subcompars-ment analysis was conservative and bounding.
The review sqjkergence (internal flood) levels was based on of
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' selecting the design basis feedwater Line break in areas GE and GW as a representative of the design approach for this concern.
The IDVP initially questioned the flood Levels determined in the original catculations performed by NCS as being too low due to an imprope consideration (601 fee $ and 8046 of available water inventoryg Subsequen {_..
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- 'ded 5; the applicant detail y the assumptions and 4I Base a o s A ]s sif methodology of the original analysis.
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gg,,4, determined that the analysis results and flood Levels established are conservative and in compliance with the Licensing design basis and commitments.
Furthere since the same submergence analysis method was employed through-id%Yidied &s '6Zs ares. Tke.
out the plants no generic concern was &"?' r;:d_
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However, the IDVP review determined that the pressure and temperature transients calculated by NSC were too Low (nonconservative) and thus did not identify the worst (bounding) environment which can be postulated from the pipe break as. identified in Licensing commitments.
This is primarity because the CONTEMPT computer program used by NSC in their analyses can not affectively model adja-cent compartments and their ventipg effect on the equiti-(E01 tool and 7034.-),
brium temperature 4 Furthers credit for Liquid entrainment I
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in the NSC massiand energy release data lead to nonconser-ideitiSieof b
- s.TbvP Specific concerns ^regardi g the initial vative results.
e temperature assumed in the subcompartments and limiting break configurations were resolved by the applicant based udedsraficsh'es on a verification t; +" """ o f t h e i n i t i a l Licensing A
commitments (E01 002 and pod. At JYsN cosew.s WMA the abort
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The basis for the above findings regarding the computer si calculation method was an independent analysis performed g
by the IDVP utilizing the THREED computer code.
Input to the IDVP analysis was the same -as that for the NSC work in order to examine the sensitivity of the input assumptions, compare the CONTEMPT and THREED outputs and thereby determine the differences in pressure / tem-
-trat=s Ctd perature calculations attributable solely to the computer p.ogram itsetf.
Because of the problems identified with the use of CONTEMPT in determining environmental condi-M tions outside containment and the fact this computer program had been used extensively by NSC f or this purposes tne above concern was determined to be generic in nature y and thus required additional verification.
In response to this concerns the applicant reanalyzed atL subcompartment environmental conditions resulting from
7 postulated high energy line breaks outside containments The reanalyses also incorporated IDVP concerns regarding assumptions on door positions, mass and energy release i
catculationse proper documentation of the turbine buildino (E01 ho3 @*G s4 8033),
area and use of appropriate enthalpy v,aluesg vent The FLUD computer program was used in this work.
Results obtained from this reanalyzed of areas GE/GW were deter-mined to be consistent with the,JDVP analyses using
"[hojfa.tf Cohesses wM %c rege/a;6*m ag THREED as discussed in a subsequent SER section.
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newly determined temperature / pressure conditions in osi6(de ced4C%At d4/CE.
w h a.r compartments are being used by the applicant to verify that compartment walls are adequate and previous safety-related equipment environmental,, qualification is not affected.
Modifications to areas GE/GW of the sud are bes% s% lemae$td.
auxiliary building'have been found necessary hese g
include strengthening compartment doors and blockout s, installation of flow limiters at the main steam Line containment penetrations and modification to vent open-ings for pressure retief in order to maintain safety-related equipment qualification temperature within the area environmental envelope.
Further discussion of the additional verification and reanalysis of consequences due to pipe ruptures outside containment is contained in a subsequent SER section.
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_ AdditionalLyr because of the nature of the above concern, and the staff's continuing generic effort in the area of equipment qualifications the staff undertook an
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independent evaluation of the pressure /temqerature tran-(mais fYea.s //nt break) sients due to pipe ruptures utilizing the COBREE computer program developed by Pacific Northwest Laboratories for
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the staff The staff has analysed the GE/GW compartments g
using the same input data provided to the IDVP and has obtained results consistent with the applicant's FLUD reanal ysis.
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Based on the IDVP, judgements and our independent analys i
we clude that the applicant has demonstrated sa s-factory c Liance with the criteria and Lic sing commit-ments regarding ermination of envir ental effects in the turbine building nd in ar s GE and GW of the auxiliary building resulting om postulated rupture of piping outside contai'nm t used in fety-related equip-ment specification Discussion of addit at verification of environme al consequences of postulated pi ruptures elsewh e outside containment is conteined in a sub nt SER section.
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_9 5.2.1.2 Verification of the Mechanical /Nuctear Design of the Control Room Ventitation and Pressurization System ACRVPSJ-ITA 20 In order to verify the adequacy of the mechanical / nuclear design of the CRVPS, the IDVP reviewed the system cool-ing Load, air flow rates, app icable codes, standards and FjMor[pessM M83> 85 8s'*1 A N
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pressu contror room habitability, technical s p e c i f i ca -
A tions, redundancy;and field installation.
The IDVP review of the CRVPS cooling capability consisted of an independent cooling load catculation for the four design operating modes based on actual vendor and name-plate data for equipment heat rejection into the control room and outside air conditions identified in the FSAR.
The results of this calculation were compared to capacity of the CRVPS cooling equipment.
It was determined that the IDVP calculated results were comparable to the appli-cants, and the catculated cooling load is within the nameplate rating of the equipment.
The IDVP review of CRVP S air flow rates consisted of an exmination of the Certified Air Balance Test Report and
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,. sta rtup test results.
Recorded air flow rates were within acceptable limits when compared with the assumed design vatues.
The actual air flow rates were used in the above 4k2 mentioned independent calculation for verifying the design control room temperature and the calculated tem-perature was,Below the maximum attowable design value.
An examination of fan brake horsepowers against the fan motor' nameplate ratings indicated that this equip-ment was adequate to accommodate system design air, flows.
The review of the startp test results verified the capability of the system to maintain the assumed design.
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The IDVP review confirmed that applicabte codesi. standards and regulatory guides as identified in the FSAR were included in the CRVPS equipment purchase specifications.
W ktq ftaint 4 4kt. CM PS quipmm4 furekast, sftcC4Centcms verified that the design of he ducts fans refrigerant equipmenti piping and valves are within the specific design temperatures and pressures and are adequate for the actual
- recorded test conditions.
A review of the plant technical specifications for the CRPVS confirmed that they satisfied the guidetines of Regulatory Guide 4 4.
1.52 and FSAR commitments.
In additions a watkdown of the system confirmed that the as-built configuration agreed with the design drawings used in the IDVP revit
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. The IDVP review of control room habitability. included examination of the radiation dose calculation and chtorine concent rat ion calculation to verif ycthat correct inputs (damper closure timer air flow rates, control room volumer filter efficiencies, detector response time and infiltration rate) including an assumed single failure were used.
It was determined that the radiation dose calculation agreed with the FSAR commitments.
- However, differences were noted in some of the inputs to the chlorine concentration calculatien when compared to the FTAR.
Thereferer an independent calculation was per-formed using actual test data and newly calculated values
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for damper elosing time and chtorine detector response time.
The catculated results were within the limits of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
Further, the IDVP verified that the specified sensitivities and response times for the chtorine and radiation monitors agreed with the FSAR kield commitment, and a walkdown confirmed that these monitors were property located in the air intakes.
The purchase specifications for the HEPA/ charcoal filter units were l
ed reviewed to verify that specifigfilterefficiencies and air flow capacities agreed with the FSAR habitibility analysis and actual test results.
Satisfactory results were obtained and compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 was shown.
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Yht The IDVP, review of CRVPS flow diagram and duct drawings verified that redundant equipment was incorporated in the system design.
Howevers the review of the CRVPS A5 io kIkdkte electrical power suppty design identified concernsj+het adequate power suppty redundancy is ++4 provided to meet (nee 4; fed the single failure 4 [rit erion a s id....:'-:;d in the FSARr because of the power suppty sharing design between the Units 1 and 2 vital buses.
The specific concerns were thet ortions of the CRVPS required to maintain Unit 1 control room habitability that are shared between Units 1 and 2 are provided power from the Unit 2 vital power and a5 54ck 3 supptiess j[ith Unit 2 not available such as during long term outagese system power suppty redundancy'is not pro-vided.
Furthere Unit 1 technical specifications permit plant power operation with onty Unit 1 vital electrical
( G O Z t b lJ ); e sud3h buses availablek 04 ;..- d ' y - @ortions of the CRVPS which y
are shared between units are provided power from both Units 1 and 2 vital buses.
Under the design basis case of postulated LOCA in one unit and emergency shutdown of the othere the Licensing commitment required assuming a simultaneous single failure in a vital bus in each unit.
Because the swing diesel generator would be aligned to
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. 1 the LOCA unite the IDVP determined that inadequate power supply redundancy is available to meet the single failure criterion for assuring the CRVPS habitability and equip-(EioI F0/4,).
ment cooling safety function.f The applicant provided 4
resolution of the above concerns by modifying the CRVPS i
power supply design to include power to each equipment train from both a Unit 1 and 2 power supply with redundant trains powered from different vital buses.
The IDVP performed an independent failure mode and a.ffects reanalysis which verified the acceptability of the new design against HosJenera the single failure criterion.
ecause other systems at Diablo Canyon may share power supplies, a generic evalua-omd addition *I VerJOtatiew.
tion in this review area was undertaken ty the IDVP.
This concern is discussed further in this SER. D E $I* N CancurJ wth ne.a.6.vt resota+ cow.
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t v e r i f i c a t i o n +4 $ 4Atd, C4m.te(n. 6(@fic( g)(d res d to in shared safety pe redqndancy of power TA45')
related systemgig provided subsequently in this SER.
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, a 5.2.1.3 Verification of the Effects of Mich Enerav Line tracks and Moderate Energy Line Breaks for the Auxiliary Fe M-water System (AFWS) and Control Room Ventitation and Pressurization System (CRVPS)-Ifg 2,(
In order to verify that the effects of postulated high energy line cracks and moderate energy line breaks were property considered in the design of the AFWS and CRVPS, the IDVP reviewed the applicant's analysis of high energy Line crack effects (prepared for PG&E by Nuclear (vsc)
Services Corporationgandmoderateenergy Line breaks against the FSAR Licensing commitments specific to the AFWS and CRVPS.
In addition the IDVP performed a field y
inspection of potential AFWS and CRVPS target Locations 4
and high energy piping system sources in order to do an independent analysis of high energy pipe crack effects.
The above independent analysis examined the blowdown jet R
from high energy piping sources using the FSA%sLicensing A
criteria to determine-if a target was hit.
The blowdown temperature was galculated using the FSAR methodology.
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Determinarions were made for those targets hit if their failure would adversely affect the CRVPS or AFWS safety functions.
The blowdown jet temperature calculation methodology and assumptions utilized by the applicant in the FSAR were determined to be conservative and there-fore acceptable based on a compa rison of the applicant 's approach to the method identified in American Nuclear Stsudard So'ciety CANS) 58.2.
The results of the above independent analysis indicated that the FSAR had not identified alL potential targets in the AFWS and CRVPS whose-failure could adversely affect safety functions.
Those not identified included the motor driven AFW) pumps, toro (201' to2 tytoL?swd toso),
hAFWS presAure transmittershand AFWS va l ve s(601 tost).
level control Further, cable / wire used in the Po*Jer rigop/ce) Was M A 4'pe ht AFWS and CRVPS other than t.
indicated in the FSAR
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and as qualified for elevated. temperatures is subject to fluid jet environments gs are some cable splices not identified (601 Tcil),
in the FSARg Other than the cable / wire and cable sptices, no other CRVPS equipment is subject to high energy line crack blowdown jet effects and thus the CRVPS was deter-mineysks1D4P b
to be adequately protected.
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- In response to the above concerns, the applicant reevaluaed the high energy Line crack analysis against the FSAR com-mitments (G ia mb u s s o Letter dated December 18, 1972).
It was determined that the line established in the IDVP analysis as a source affecting thetmotor driven AFW pumps dee ted en ike kuc and pressure, transmitters (steam supply to the turbine g
driven AFW pump downstream of the flow cont rol valve) was not subject to cracks since it is not pressurized during any normal' plant operating conditions including st art up and shutdown.
The applicant committed to revise the n3 reed FSAR to indicate the above point.
The IDVP ca-"
..d with the above r e s ol ut ion. The d=# also cou.rs wi4A tke resel.4%.
Regarding the AFWS Level control valves, the applicant per-formed a reanalysis of the blowdown jet temperature from the postulated ergy line crack source affecting these valves using the ANS 58.2 methodology in lieu of the NSC method documented in the FSAR.
The results of this reanalysis show a jet temperature below the quali-fication temperature for the valves.
The applicant com-mitted to revise the FSAR to incorporate this reanalysis.
l The IDVP concurred with the above jet temperature calcu-T Ae sfa.#.lso Lation method and the reanalysis results.
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. j With respect to cables / wires and splices identified as targets, the applicant responded by providing documenta-tion which indicated that the affected cables and wires were environmentally qualified for the resulting high energy line crack blowdown jet environment and further Mo%8wYa.Nm.
committed to update environmental qualif icat ion --
The additional documentation atso indicated that the cable splices were environmentally qualified for the jet environment and were located spatially to assure that the qualification temperature was not exceeded.
A sub-sequent field verification by the IDVP confirmed the design Location of the splices in conformance with the qu a l i f i c a t i o n c r i t e r i a. The sfa.# concar s environnental wNA m a.6en ruolah.
The IDVP review of' moderate energy pipe break effects on
,the AFWS and CRVPS consisted of examining Licensing docu-ments against the commitments identified in Letters from the applicant dated September 14, 1979 and December 28, 1979.
Further, a field verification was performed of iivt design modifications committed to for protection of safety-related equipment from moderate energy Line breaks
.+
and the adequacy of these modifications.
In addition, an evaluation was performed to determine if additional mode-rate energy line break sources could affect CRVPS and AFWS targets.
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t Th,e IDVP review conformed that all committed to modifica-
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tions for protection of AFWS equipment from moderate energy pipe breaks were implemented and adequate for pro-tection with the exception of those for two flow control (601 toI4.).
valvesg Further, the licensing commitment regarding br&S energy pipe trea' gwas not fully complied with moderate e
since it Jtates that alL equipment required for safe shut-bee't down was evaluated b; --
CRVPS equipments which i s y
identified in the FSAR as necessary to maintain control room habitability during shutdown, was not evaluated am.s(
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In response to the above concernsi the applicant indicated that the flow control valves (suction supply valves from the alternate AFWS water sources the raw water storage
-reservoir) are not required to operate to assure AFWS safety function fotLowing the postulated moderate energy l
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line breaks and therefore, are not required to be pro-l tected from the pipe' break effects.
The applicant will revise the Licensing commitment to delete the need for Ayreld wc'R protective shields for these valves.
.The IDVP 4;..:;-
rd A
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<mlu a>k u Regarding the fa'ilure to include the CRvPs in the original moderate energy Line break analysis, the applicant pro-vided an analysis indicating that only one CRVPS electi-(de-t4ed 6yw zot/P.
cat train is affected by the postulated break When tom-bined with a s' ingle failure in the redundant electrical
~
trains a loss of the CRVPS would occur resulting in degradation of control room habitability.
However, safe shutdown can be provided from the remote shutdown panel
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event the control room becomes uninhabitable.
The IDVP concurred with this analysis.
The staff believes the above evaluation to be more conservative than required by the moderate energy pipe break criteria.
Standard Review Plan Section 3.6.1 criteria indicate that a single failure is not postulated concurrent with a mode-rate energy Line breaks and theref ore one t rain of the CRVPS would be available following the moderate energy identified above. The da.$ ecwsiders ecs mde<-
line break retolde.d.
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- ;' _r; Li Based on t'
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th the
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.6w criteria and Licensing commitments regarding protection of safety related equipment from the effects of high energy line cracks and moderate energy Line breaks out-side containmentw ka&t, baA MCsfid %f g f g,
f ue veetfce.it.~ of & <.ffe.fs of kche<wer3y kwe.
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-ze-w m t. Th IDVP =Ned wM n' ****D* At-e concur m W L n e r**I*h 'a-(sfeff also 5.2.1.4 Verification of Mechanical /Nuclese Design of the Au x i l i a ry Feedwater System ( A F W S I - 2 7412.
In order to verify the adequacy of the mechanical / nuclear E
design of the AFWS, the IDVP reviewed the system techni-cal specifications, redundancy, hydraulic design, design i
pressure and temperature, regulatory requirements and field installation.
The IDVP review of AFWS technical specifications consisted of comparing the AFWS design to the technical specifica-tion requirements including the AFWS water supplies, pump performance, area temperature limits and power suppty and load timer setpoints.
The IDVP performed an indepen-dent catculation which confirmed that the condensate storage tank (primary AFWS water suppty) capacity met the Westinghouse and technical specification criteria.
The IDVP compared.AFWS flow requirements to the AFW pump
(
vendor performance information and determined that the pumps can be tested in accordance with the tech.nical Th of area tempera-
{
specification requirements.4 e review ture monitoring for AFWS equipment verified that appro-priate instrumentation is provided for assuring con-formance with area temperature limit technical specifications.
M. A eg a.c.. w ~ no s (de~Tcfied by ne.IDVP ree ud4 y.fs4 tkJ hr$5 t*<A.aesA stmsiw4 tea ac4 set D m
sure m.wt of AN p p ft.w d.ocw
. fed 3
, g,.
. The Ank%fs rss peue cmJi.c4 4 4
(601 toIS)W a.pp row 4 AWs teAsca4 spe=:
st @
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In additions a review of the design for the electrical and cont rol circuits for the power suppty and Load timer as welL as the minimum time for AFWS operation confirmed compliance with the technical specifications.
The IDVP reviewed the AFWS drawings and postulated various single failures with concurrent loss of offsite power and confirmed that the Licensing criteria concerning redundancy in the AFWS is met for assuring the system's i
i safety function.
The IDVP hydraulically modeled the AFWS independently with a computer program using the latest appticant documentar tion.
The computer program compared favorabty with actual test date. -Calculated AFWS flowrates and NPSH available were verified to meet the values i ndicated in the FSAR and as specified by the vendor.
A review of piping drawings versus piping schematics resulted i n onty minor discrepancies which have no affect'on the hydrautic analysise safetyr or licensing commitments.
The motor and turbine driven pump characteristics were verified to compty with vendor and FSAR requirements.
The review of AFWS initiation and diesel generator Ok Loading Logic diagrams verified full system ftow wilL
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be available within the FSAR committed time and that steam generator blowdown and sampling Line isolation valves receive a closure signal on AFWS start.
N The computer hydraulic analysis performvet using the AFWS A
runout control setpoints indicated that less than mini-mum required flow may be provided under certain condi-tions.
The concern involved the design of the flow Limiting control scheme for preventing motor-driven AFW
((@1 TOGO pump runout when a steam generator is depressurized s
SpecificalLye the steam generator level control valves in the AFW supply lines which normalLy respond to steam generator level are also required by the runout c ont rol system to respond to low pump discharge pressure.
These valves wilL close when the Low pump discharge pressure setpoint is reached.
Thus, conflicting Level and pressure control signals may at times
'?
d' ;;;' ; thevalvpstodice4eg reeni t i A beiw perform opposite funct' ions simultaneously.
The analysis indicated that the pressure control setpoints may not be Low enough to permit minimum required flow to the steam I
generators when onty one motor-driven AFW pump is operating.
In response to this concerns the applicant changed the
. ~, -... -.. -,. -......
Low pump ddscharge pressure setpoints and committed to A
perform a startup test of the runout control system to confirm dynareic stability.
The IDVP review of the new setpoints and startup test commitment indicated th'at the resolution was acceptable. N 4 Si tohCar) we'd proposed l
ncs res. late.~
The IDVP review of the AFWS design pressure for piping and components consisted of independent catculations which determined that applicable codes requiring that the system be designed for the most severe operating condi-tion were not met.
System design pressures were deter-mined to be exceeded -in various oper)ating modes includ-(Go1 Fooi..
ing low ftow and recirculation Static head and pres-sure s rges were also not properly accounted for in the design.
In responses the applicant recalculated system design pressurer Lowered the turbine overspeed trip setpoint and committed to replace system components which are rated below the new design pressure.
The IDVP per-i formed independent catculations which confirmed that the new design pressure is code acceptable.
A review of manufacturers data for system components against the new pressure indicated that 42 valves required replace-ment.
The IDVP field-verified that the modifications were made. Tht fYed[ c.osanu.1 Wkk (LCS T4okI(es.
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t e
, The IDVP review of the protection of Lpw pressure por-tions of the AFWS from high pressure portions indicated that the applicable design code was not met.
The speci-fic concern i nvolved a throttle valve in the AFW pump turbine bearing cooling Line which acts as a high to low pressure division valver but pressure protection).is not (Eos tolo.
provided downstream as required by the codeg High AFWS discharge pressure can occur in a number of operating fysie w o treft*A ed6%
modes including sect on supply from the reservoir (backup water source), turbine overspeed, recirculation, Low 1' Low, and inadvertent valve operation.
In response, the applicant modified the turbine-driven pump recir-
-(kt culation Line configuration to reduce discharge pressure.
The IDVP verified that the modification is code accept-able and field-verified the in st a lla t ion. ho da.k Comours Win N5 reseDeN The IDVP review of valve actuator sizing determineo that maximum differential pressure was not specified for assuring valve operability in atL cases.
The specific was a.et=4t.cs Ar dv.
e d k h der v lve.
concern 4e with the flow c ont ro l(EDI feh, t h e st e am valves on k
k supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump In response, the applicant modified the gear ratio on the steam supply header valve actuator in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations.
The IDVP reviewed the documentation ++-a.ww(
verifk'edcom'pletion of this modification.
The IDVP verified A
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en.
e to e e.=e e eeuwgre* em a-emm e*
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s flew castr I that the :t'.;.kvalves did not require modification a s they were not required to operate for safe shutdown since h assurist ied8iy b#fims adequate redundancy is available during i s t e a nf. L in e break eyent. 'The. 5 Wturaaddk O4 *bW4 ftlelewifew, e
Verification of system temperature design determined that accepta5Le temperature conditions were incorporated.
In addition, the AFW pump suction Line from the condensate storage tank was determined not to be susceptibte to freezing based on its location and site temperature data.
The above concerns regarding system design pressure deter-mination, protection of Low /high pressure interconnec-tions, and valve actuator differential pressure specifi-cation were determined by the IDVP to have generic con-sequences, and thus required further verification.
The are results of that additional v e r i f i ca t io n weve-d i s c u s s e d subsequentty in this SER.
The IDVP reviewed applicant correspondence with the
\\
staff to verify compliance with Licensing commitments including (thosemadeinresponsetotheTMIshd% -o accident requirementsg,ghe backfit review confirmed that a commitments regarding the AFWS have been imptemented.
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sk src.c conclucers as rer.r9:
for Ocael' Ca* yow bctl ar t nei a44* red.
The IDVP concluded its AFWS review with a field walkdown to verify compliance of the as-built installation with the design documents.
The as-built installation was con-
- fkai, as firmed to meet design drawings with the exception wre v steam trap on the turbine-driven AFW pump steam suppty sJa$ het yreViA*4
~
lineanddiscrepanc$es in the arrangement of the long-A "'
(Eo1 Tot.7 awd t'o4Fj.
term cooling water supply line In response to the steam trap discrepancy, the applicant indicated that the design drawings would be revised to delete the steam trap on the steam suppty Line as satisfactory turbine-driven pump testing was completed without the need for the trap.
Regarding the Long term cooling water supply Line discrepancies, the applicant indicated that drawings were mistakenly revised but that the actual field installation was acceptabte and in accordance with previous design ARoS changes.
The IDVP confirmed that the actual installation was acceptable and no technical c on c e rn e x ist ed. The lia.h cowers sotik, ik< ahede res.Iat(*w, sb.44 regt a e4'4ks 601 Siles est.Misksd is. +kt revleu
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Nte'(dow of s%8the, wit-utde.rds(sp:e}.f.(g o f -(ktheri
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commitments regarding(kt.
AFWS j
cr.iteria and licensing hen 4. bee % f*7645fitM. ftWikoryO.C st M Cow.bM*5I mechanical / nuclear design $=cer~scussion of the additional Di e
idAWies(
of ike gewen't.
ver if icat ion regreding selection of design pressure and temperature,and differential pressure across power operated valves g s c)ontained (ITA 46 i
in a subsequent SER section.
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5.2.1.5 Verification of High Energy Line Break and Internalty Generated Missile Review outside containment far eh.
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS) and content anee Ventitation and Pressuriration System (cRVPS)" ITM 2Cl In order to verify that adequate separation (distance, mA barriers, restraints)kwwbbexistsinthedesign for protection of the AFWS and CRVPS from the effects of and high energy pipe breaks (pipe whip 4 fluid jet M
and internally generated missiless the IDVP performed an analysis of potential AFWS and CRVPS targets using the FSAR commitments regarding postulated high energy pipe break locations and internally generated missile sources.
A field verification of the above analysis results was performed to confirm the a.c.ceptability of protection provided.
The above IDVP analysis for high energy line breaks consistgof identifying potential targets (system com-j ponents) in each system, identifying high energy lines and postulated break Locations using the FSAR analysis for the various high tiergy systems, identifying pipe rupture restraint locations, identifying potential interaction zones between the system components and postulated pipe breaksi and confirming interactions
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identified by performing a field verification.
The field verification consisted of visually confirming WyJO the as-built arrangement to the FSAR drawings, con-firming location and configuration of pipe rupture restraints, confirming Locations of target components, and verifying that proper protection was afforded equipment n,ecessary to assure the safety functions of the AFWS and CRVPS.
The above review resulted in identifying onty one concern regarding'AFWS protection fr* d two condrns regarding f m P**Pe W hif-a
i* # * *
- an CRVPS protection ert A
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The concern in the high energy Line break analysis for the AFWS was that a conduit providing power to com-ponents providing AFW flow could be damaged by jet impingement from a. postulated longitudinal high energy (Eo1 fofTJ.
Line break The applicant's response to this item consisted of an additional analysis of the effects of I
the blowdown thrust force and temperature on the conduit.
The revised analysis utilizes the ANS 58.2 calculational method for establishing blowdown jet temperature.
The IDVP has reviewed this method and w IDVP Atker e..dtmed M tke. cadmi.+ is not verified that it provides acceptabte resutts.
Th e 7 e,4.ded by & jet-i9c
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ahr*
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29-e applicant's analysis also confir
~
force (pressure) med the jet impingement was below the attowable for conduit.
Thus, the IDVP verified that the break witL not the postulated adversely affect the concern has been satisfathe AFWS conduits and wcurs wikk 'thes reselsthw.ctoriLy resolved.10gg (fg,jh?
The concerns in the high ener the CRVP were potential dam line break analysis gy for tricalconduit(duetopipe age to a CRVPS elec-whip f circumferential pipe breaksg InMoi 7007 ** rom o
response cant the appli-provided a reanalysis of the (in the main postulated breaks
+
^
steam relief valve headers).
indicated that interpretation of The response the high break criteria (A.
energy line Giambusso letter da.2ed Decemb 1972) does not er 18, the dead ended see' tion of threquire postula in insufficient e main steam header as internal energy exists to produce pi whip because of the pe limited reservoir,emW steam blowdown
- rther, from the opposite break represents an energy so end of the postulated ended header section and urce external to the dead-therefore need not sidered for pipe whip be con-of the dead ended section.
above interpretation was applied The in designing existing restraints on the main st the addition to the above applicant eam headers.
In responser the IOVP
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s performed a further evaluation.
The IDVP confirmed that the cables in the conduit in question do not provide power to equipment e'sential for reactor shut-s down under conditions associated with the above postu-Lated main steam line breaks.
T'herefore, these concerns e satisfactorily r e s olv ed. The da.# e.wcare ess'R
.s u ruo w c.~.
e a
Since onty three concerns resulted from the high energy line break review out of a total of-over seven hundred postulated break locations affecting the two systems, e, q Aerc t, testeem di4 no t A elf 4.) E ks(
Jno additional verification in this area was determined o be necessary. Ikt. da.h concurs M 4kt twN Amber e f des utenec+s (x 4kt fefa/ rep /t stre ca+ 4c em tkst Sur4kk ** M i 4 (*k W ** M't teyesd.
gTheaboveIDVP analysis for internally generated missiles consisted of identifying potential missile sources using the FSAR analysisi identifying AFWS and CRVPS equipment in the postulated missile trajectory, identi-fying barriers and their relationship to missile trajec-tories, and determining whether judgments made regarding protection provided against potential missile damage were adequate.
The above was also confirmed in a field verification.
The field verification consisted of visually Locating internally generated missile sourcesi I
system targets and barriers (structures or shistds).
F F
- - - ~.---
+
31 The above review resulted in identiifying no etncerns for protection of the AFWS or CRVPS from internally qAttle *.sheere. f* *Tdrinq generated missiless-end thus, M( additionalbi ne IDVP.
n verifi-J ect 6Id cation in this area was r'--d*tn h-
- ,f.
sed on the DV judgmentse conc ude that thy
/
appl cant h s diemon trated 3 tis f actory rempliInce with iny/
e71a and Licen commitments rGg dirig pro-the er t e c t i on /o s a f e t y-r e l a t 'd quipment from ostt, ated
/
high nergy L e brea s and ternally generated miss Les outside o tainment.
be. sed on tke stal-(s ruccw s4 & Col (cles e-l t %. ve x fn itew of estabic.s ked tw -tke revcew kgk. ewe g kwoou,G de. cow'tstwm*~t A[ r.
breaki W l.dcrWI wsde r e.v c w ARoS i
ed ce VPS, a resol.cttow a f <,st.eea cdMliftet k w sc y ~tL<
sta.N cesdud*> 4kJ % 1DVP As e.dtemed 4kd & c<tfere* 4
- cwtw.
ped (* cites fr.- ke [
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- Icot, be ks stss l.3 k n b ~ 544s fc 4, 4 fid a
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j perce c x c u-5 conclusews a,s sY,f.4 is tk<.
tha.ffs prior tka.
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L.2.2
_ Areas Requiring Additional IDVP Verification 5.2.2.1 Additional Verification of Redundancy of Eouirment and Power Supolies in Shared Safe _ty-Related S y s t em s - ITR 43I As a result of the concerns regarding failure of the shared control room ventilation and pressurization system (CRVPS) to meet the Licensing commitment for eN redundancy 'and the single failure criterike the IDVP A
determined that all other shared safety-related systems should be reviewed for this potential design deficiency.
This review verified that the only other shared safety-related system was the diesel fuel oil transfer system (DFOTS).
The applicant perforced an analysis of the DFOTS to determine if similar power supply redundancy concerns to those identified in the CRVPS design applied.
The analysis assumed single failures with and without Unit 2 available.
No single failure affecting the DFQTS safety function was identified.
The IDVP reviewed the above applicant single failure analysis and performed an independent failure analysis utilizing the applicant's design documentation.
The IDVP verified that the applicant's analysis properly 1
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assumed DFOTS operation with only Unit i vital power available and both Units.1 and 2 vital power supplies available.
Individual component failures were also assumed.
The IDVP verified that a single failure wilL result in loss of onty one train of the DFOTS.
Thereforer the DFOTS has adequate power and component redundancy to meet the single failure criterion and perform i ts safety function.
C& vtMieQ ek OS-Based on the MN."
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re4 m M y *4.uf;st<arme d sudpowersypit
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additional verification of shaFed safet -related M SY4.
eewclat465 M systems "
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at Diablo Canyo3 r-t':'::*-
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$t IDN N3 Cow ErsAS4 Ud %k C(sfBri A. AAd e
4"':d t': Licensing commitmentsregarding redundancy i
k in Skaree( 5%em.s i
in order to assure Ot Z safety functions when assuming a single failure 4 k4ve b A f4M5hk awd j
-tkers 4.<t., prcee sts M ce~olusie~s a.s st 4 4 g 4ke ssMy evduk rye't.for bisblo Canyon U.u tI ars u t rit ved.
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e 5.2.2.2 Additional Verification of the Selection of System Desion Pressure and T meerature and Different4nt i
Pressure Access Pen r-Omerated V a l v e s - 17A TC As a result of concerns regarding compliance with applicable design codes for the selection of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) design pressurey Jawk isolat, ion of low pressure portions of the system from high pressure portions, and m4th the specification of Low differential pressure for the motor operated steam supply. valves to the AFW turbine driven pump, the IDVP determined that additional sampling in these areas was required.
The applicant undertook a review of the above concerns for alL safety-related systems within their design scope.
Although system design temperature was not identified as a concern in the' initial sampler component design is a function of both pressure and temperature.
Thus, changes in the pressure specification may affect the allowable tem-4)aa peratures and therefore design temperature a&&6 also
-be considered.
l The applicant *'s review included confirming design pressure and temperature for alL ten safety-related and safety-related portions of nonsafety-related 1
I
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systems within their design responsibility.
Calcu-Lations were performed to document code compliance for each system specification.
System component design specifications were compared to the calculated pressures and temperatures to determine if they are compatible.for the design conditions.
Those that did meet the new conditions were resolved by ar,alysis or design change.
The applicant's review of differential pressure across power-operated valves consisted of developing a List of valves in the above ten systems and establishing the specified maximum differential pressure from the valve data sheets or vendor information.
This value was compared to the design maximum differential pressure at which each valve is required to operate in order to verify the accept' ability of the valve.
A conservative value of 80% of actual voltage was he terL4 ty v&e operaticly.
7 used in the reanalysis The IDVP additional review in this area consisted of selecting a sample from two safety-related systems within the applicant's design scope and independently determining system design pressure and ter-peratures and differential pressure across power operated valves.
.36-a The component cooling water system (CCWS) and safety-related portions of the main steam system (MSS) were selected for this review.
Applicant specified design values were compared to th'e IDVP calculated valuess and compliance with code requirements for design conditions and Low /high pressure interconnections were verif,ied.
The above IDVP review determined that the applicant's reanalysis method for the CCWS and MSS was satis-factory, and met the intent of the code for selection of the most severe system pressure and temperature.
Furthere the IDVP determined'that the applicant prope,rly established differential pressure across power-operated valves.
The IDVP concurred with the.
4 results of the applicant's reanalysis.
In additions the IDVP reviewed the CCWS and MSS arrangement drawings j
to determine code compliance for protection of low l
pressure portions;of the system.
The'IDVP verified code compliance in this area.
The results of the' reanalysis indicated that system l
l design pressure and temperature conditions were higher than originally specified for the MSS and CCWS, and l
l I
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37-thus similar. concerns to those in the initial AFWS h/ert bwd M sample review exist.
The applicant compared com-ponent design rat.ings to the new conditions and determined that the MSS satisfies the code criteria 1
~~
with the exception of system steam traps.
The steam traps wilL be modified.
No low pressure inter-connections exist in the safety-related portions of the MSS.-
AlL MSS safety-related valve actuators are capable of operation against the newty calculated differential pressure with the exception.of the AFW turbine-driven pump steam supply valve identified in the. initial sample.
The applicant wilL rereview this valve against the recalculated MSS design conditions.
The CCWS components were compared to the new design conditions and it was determined that the system l
satisfies the code criteria with the exception of the reactor coolant pump upper and Lower bearing oil coolers, the CCW; pump Lube oil coolers, the excess'Let-down heat exchanger, certain relief valves, and the reactor coolant pump thermal barriers.
The applicant wilL reanalyze and modify the above components as necessary.
High/ Low pressure interconnections in the CCWS are acceptabty protected and isolated.
AlL CCWS valve actuators with four exceptions are capable of
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g operation against the calculated maximum differential pressure.
The above four valves are under review by the applicant.
Because the IDVP's concern was selection of system design pressure and temperaturer and differential pressure across power operated valves and its use in equipment specification rather than the engineering process for determining equipment-accept-ability, the IDVP wi t L not verify specific changes made by the applicant as a result of the reanalyses in this area.
The IDVP has verified acceptablity of the applicant's approach to resolving these concerns.
den P4ystW ed 'fkt Based on the n"^
- _d;
- :rt.
- a na e l "^
rt
- 6 A
additional verification of the selection of system design pressure and temperature and different at 4k* s+'. c*kckd*s pressure across power-operated valve
~M; ::ti M dt 10 # ha$ u fismed
-tkt.
eM+r't,
.;r:d
- i
- :r.:: c ' t 'Acode requirements
.a.md. L i c e n s i n g commitments and criteria for assuring y
safety-related system functions = g*,w -("kl3 ftVi%i area k =ve be+~ M is fc 4 W % f* $ fre.c si d 4 comobc.ws as s%f=4 A fi< safe 47evsIn.fr,ew r<fert er Di.b/.
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,gcpg,2(g, sr4d -rsisted systns L ss4ctf rgarsi in f
f rah ~3 ss4 fewteop.rgh k das f res.s w<.
yah< efwakt.IHy a.s4ee-c ~dHcan s see pr dif4ew~tc4 fesssare MIr +'t ui.
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5.2.2.3 Additional Verification of Environmental Consecuences of Postulated Pipe Ruotures outside of C on t a i nm e n t - ][TA 47 As a result of the concerns regarding the adequacy of the determination of environmental consequences resulting from postulated pipe ruptures outside con-tainments the applicant undertook a reanalysis of atL pressure and temperature transients for pipe ruptures outside containment.
The IDVP performed a detailed review of the applicant's reanalysis for areas GE and GW of the auxiliary building and the turbine building, and also reviewed the environmental conditions established in the reanalyses for other areas outside containment.
The IDVP review of the applicant's calculational method consisted of a sensitivity study which compared the IDVP THREED computer program results to the applicant's l
l FLUD computer program reanalysis using identical inputs.
l The sensitivity study was undertaken to identify differences in the calculational results attributable solely to the computer program itself.
The comparison analysis was for a postulated main steam pipe rupture in area GW of the auxiliary building and its effects j
on area GE of the auxiliary building.
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The IDVP also performed independent calculations using THREED for pressure / temperature transients from a postu-Lated main steam Line rupture in areas GE and GW of the auxiliary building and the turbine building.
The results t
l of these calculations were compared to the applicant's FLUD computer calculations.
The IDVP determined that the applicant has used a computer program which property models-the multiple nodes representing areas GE, GW and the turbine buildings properly determined input data, utilized appropriate mass and energy release data and break sizes, and conservatively assumed i
door positions to maximize the pressure and tempera-ture transients in the above areas.
Certain doors were assumed to remain closed based on their design capability.
Others were assumed to open once their design pressure was exceeded.
These assumptions wilL l
be verified in the applicant's continuing pressure /
temperature transient reanalysis program.
The results of the above FLUD/THREED comparison indi-cated slight differences in the calculated peak pressures and temperatures.
The applicant's results Ik Nih 3
hiiWC-generally more' conservative than the IDVP's due to b
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minor variations in Westinghouse supplied mass and energy input data and area dimensional inputs.
The
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IDVP confirmed that the applicant's reanalysis established appropriate pressure and temperature transients in area'GE of the auxiliary building and the turbine building.
The IDVP also reviewed the applicant's reanalyses of pressure and temperature transients in the remaining areas of the auxiliary building.
This review was performed to verify.that the calculational method found acceptable above was being employed by the applicant for atL reanalyses.
The IDVP verified that the appli-cant's procedure for identifying high energy Liness break locations, compartments containing safety-related equipment, and the models utilized were accep-
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table.
The IDVP determined that break ~ types were in I
accordance with the Giambusso letter dated December 18, 1972 (staff criteria) as committed in the FSAR.
It was also determined that the hand calculations and computer program calculations (RELAP 4 MOD 5) provided appropriate mass and energy release data for the postu-l Lated pipe breaks.
Input assumptions (such as door positions)* were also consistent with those in the previous calculations.
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The IDVP revieweo Ine resutting pressure eno tempera-ture transient conditions, and determined that the reanalyses methodology for the remaining auxiliary buildin,g areas was consistent with that used in areas GE, GW and in the turbine building.
The applicant indicated that results obtained,are conservative for the break compartment.
The applicant's continuing reanalysis 'of pressure and temperature transients wiLL include effects of ventilation system operation in order to enhance the results obtained for compartments Tk< Artccs* k*s * ~ltid te " k <
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concluded that the The IOVP reanalyses satisfactorily resolved.the IDVP concerns.
Because of this conclusions the IDVP determined that a further verification of the applicant's continuing effort in the selection of pressure and temperature A M Aflo tCed eal Of 5'a.
-rM*M ]p c ondi ti on s 4ee envi ronmenta l qua li fi ca tion wa s n t
necessary.
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e PSB SSER DIABLO CANYON VERIFICATION PROGRAM 5.2 Safety Related Systems - Initial Samole 5.2.1 Electrical Desian The safety related electric design f o r-t h e 4160 v o lt distributions auxiliary' feedwater, and control room ventilation and pressurization systems were selected for review by the Independent Design Verification Program.(IDVP).
The purpose of the IDVP review was to verify, that the selected safety related electric system designs, satisfy alL commitments and design criteria specified in the~ Licensing documents for the Diablo Canyon Plant.
Based on the IDVP review and verification, the staff concludes that the Diablo Canyon safety'related electrical design, f or the above systems, meet s the requirements of (1)
Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 with respect to capacity and capability of onsite and of f site power systems to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety and (2) the independence and redundancy of onsite. power systems to perf orm their safety function assuming a single failure.
In addition, the staff concludes that the Diablo Canyon design meets the requirements of Criterion 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 with respect to compatibility of electric equipment and components l
with the harsh environmental conditions associated with postulated accidents.
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5.2.1.1 4160 Volt Distribution System The IDVP review of the electrical design for the 4160 volt distribution system is reported inknterimTechnicalReport (ITR) - 24 and Section 4.7.4 of the IDVP final report.
The review included the 4160 volt safety-related buses and their interconnection with offsite and onsite power sources and Lower voltage distribution system buses.
The major elements reviewed.
were (1) the capacity and capability of the offsite and onsite power sources to supply the required voltage and frequency to the 4160 volt buses, (2) capacity and capability of 4160 volt circuit protective devices, and (3) independence and redundancy of the onsite power sources and power circuits between the onsite power source and the 4160 volt buses.
Seven areas of concern were identified by the IDVP during their review of the 4160 volt distribution system.
Each of these concerns was assigned an EDI file number in order for the IDVP to keep track of the concern and its resolution.
These concernse identified by their assigned EDI file numbers are summarized in Section 5 of ITR 24.
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In regard to concerns identified by EDI numbers 8013, 8022, and 8045, the Licensee (PG&E) provided to the IDVP additional information or analysis.
Based on the IDVP review, the staff concludes that each of these concerns has been acceptably resolved and that plant modifications or additional verification
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are not required.
The remaining concerns, identified by EDI numbers 8023, 8024, 8025, and 8026, address the capability of the offsite power sources to supply adequate voltage to the 4160 volt distribution
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system and to safety Loads.
The licensee (PG&E) changed voltage tap settings on the offsite power systems 230 kv startup transformer and provided to the IDVP an analysis based on the new tap setting.
Based on the IDVP review, the staff concludes that each of these concerns has been acceptably resolved and that plant modifications or additional verification are not required.
4 5.2.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System The IDVP review of the electrical design for the auxiliary feedwater system is reported in Interim Technical Report (ITR)-25 and Section 4.7.2.2 of the IDVP final report.
The review included auxiliary feedwater system electrical equipment and their interconnection with the electrical distribution system.
The major elements reviewed were (1) the capacity and capability of the electric distribution system to suppty the required power, (2) capability of electrical equipment, (3) independence and redundancy of electrical power sources and their associated circuits, and (4) qualification of electrical equipment and their circuits for harsh environments.
In addition, independence of instrumentation and control circuits were reviewed and reported in ITR 27.
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Eleven areas of concern were identified by the IDVP during their review of the electrical design of the auxiliary feedwater
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system.
Each of these concerns was assigned an EDI file number in order for the IDVP to keep track of the concern and its resolution.
These concerns, identified by their assigned EDI file number, are summarized in Section 5 of ITR 25 and 27.
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In regard to concerns identified by EDI numbers 8011, 8042, 8043,
)
8044, 8054, 8055, 8059, 8061, 8063, and 8064, the Licensee (PGSE) provided to the IDVP additional information, proposed changes to i
licensing documents, or analysis.
Based on the IDVP review, the staf f concludes that each of these concerns has been acceptably resolved and that plant modifications or additional verification are not required.
1 i
The remaining concern, identified by EDI file number 8057, i
addresses independence of redundant electric power system components.
This concern is evaluated below with similar concerns identified by the IDVP in their review of the control room i
ventilation and pressurization system.
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5.2.1.3 Control Room Ventitation and Pressurization System The IDVP review of the electrical design for the control room ventitation and pressurization system is reported in Interim t
l Technical Report (ITR)-26 and Section 4.7.3.2 of the IDVP final report.
The review included control room ventilation and i
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o pressurization system electrical equipment and their interconnection with the electrical distribution system.
The major elements reviewed were. (1) the capacity and capability of i
the electric distribution system to supply the required powere (2) capability of electrical equipments (3) independence and redundancy of electrical power sources and their associated circuitse and (4) qualification of electrical equipment and their circuits for harsh environments.
In addition, independence of instrumentation and control circuits were i
reviewed and reported in ITR 28.
El ven areas of concern were identified by the IDVP during their review of the electrical design of the control room ventitation and pressurization system.
Each of these concerna was assigned an EDI file number in order for the IDVP to keep track of the concern and its resolution.
These concerns, identified by their assigned EDI file number, are summarized in Section 5 of ITR 20, 26, and 28.
The concerne identified by EDI file numbers 8012, 8016, and 8046, i
addresses redundancy of components or sharing of components between Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 to meet the redundancy and single failure requirement.
This concern is evaluated with the i
4 mechanical / nuclear design of the control room ventilation and pressurization system.
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The r e m a i n in g concerns, identified by EDI file numers 8017, 8041, and 8057, address, independence of redundant safety related components and compliance with the requirements of Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
Criterion 17 requires, in part, that onsite power distribution systems have sufficient independence to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure.
a.
The concern, identified by EDI file number 8017, was issued by the IDVP because redundant control power sources are interconnected through a single control switch.
The IDVP concern was that single failure may cause loss of power to redundent divisions of safety related systems.
The licensee (PGSE) indicated to the IDVP that modifications would be made l
to eliminate the concern.
IDVP resolution of this concern was documented in Section 4.8.6.2 of IDVP review, the staff concludes that the modifications proposed are acceptable and that this concern has been acceptably resolved.
The generic concern related to independence of redunda t safety syst ems, is discussed in ITR's 34 and 49.
The staff evaluation of this generic concern is presented below.
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b.
The concerne identified by EDI file number 8041, was issued by the IDVP because redundant electric power divisions or trains were electrically interconnected through two circuit breakers and a single power transfer switch.
The IDVP 1
concern was that a single failure may cause loss of
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redundant power divisions.
The Licensee (PGSE) issued an operating order to document their standard practice for keeping open the circuit breaker used for supplying an alternate power source.
The IDVP concluded that this practice satisfies the independence and single failure j.
l requirement.
Based on the IDVP review, the staff concludes that this concern has been acceptably resolved and that plant modifications or additional verification is not required.
4 c.
The concern, i dentified by EDI file number 8057, was issued by the IDVP because control cables located in panels were not separated in accordance with Licensing commitments.
The IDVP concern was that single failure may caus.e, loss of redundant divisions of safety related systems.
The Licensee (PGSG) indicated to the IDVP that a complete review of alL j
safety related circuits would be conducted and that modifications would be made as required to meet the Diabto Canyon Licensing commitments.
The IDVP resolution of this l
concern is documented in section 4.8.6.2 of the IDVP final i
i report (revision 0). Based on the IDVP reviews the staff concludes that the modifications proposed are acceptable and that this concern has been acceptably resolved.
l The generic concerne related to independence of redundant
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safety systems, is discussed in ITR's 34 and 49.
The staff evaluation of this generic concern is presented below.
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Concerns, identified by EDI file numbers 8011, 8042, 8044, 8059, an d 8061, a r e t h e same concerns identified and evaluated above for the auxiliary feedwater system.
Based on the IDVP reviews the staff concludes that each of these concerns has been acceptably resolved and that plant modifications or additional verification are not required.
5.3 Additional Verification - Generic C on e s.Ina.
The fotLowing generic concern, identified by the IDVP in their initial sample review, required additional verification, as recommended by the IDVPr to assure that similar concerns did not exist for other safety related systems.
5.3.1 circuit Semaration and sinate Faiture The IDVP initial sample review of the auxiliary feedwater system and the control room ventilation and pressurization system identified electrical circuits and components that did not meet separation or single failure requirements in accordance with commitments and design criteria specified in the Licensing documents for the Diablo Canyon plant.
In EDI 8017 the IDVP identified redundant control power sources that come together in a single device separated only by the mechanical and electrical features of the device.
In EDI 8057 the IDVP identified redundant cabli.ig (routed to instruments or devices located in panels) that came together in a common cable bundle with the mechanical and electrical properties of each cables insulation l
providing separation.
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1 i The Licenseer as a result of the above identified items of noncompliancer performed a review and made modifications or performed analysis as needed.to ensure that alL safety related circuits and components meet design separation and single failure requirements.
The IDVP verified the results of the Licensee's reviews modifications, and analysis on a sampling basis.
The IDVP concluded, based on th1s sampling as reported in ITR 49, that the design (subsequent to the Licensee's reviews modifications and analyses) meets the separation and single failure requirements specified in the Licensing documents for the Diablo Canyon Plant.
Based on the IDVP reviews the staff concludes.that this concern has been acceptabt'y resolved and that additional verification is not required.
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, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N y
g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 k
JUL 121983 MEMORANDUM FOR:
0.Parr, Chief Auxiliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration FROM:
F. Rosa, Chief, Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration l
SUBJECT:
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR DIABLO CANYON IDVP Enclosed is our SER for the instrumentation and control systems design review of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and the Control Room Ventilation and Pressur-ization System included in the Diablo Canyon IDVP.
Section numbers correspond to those provided by J. Wermiel.
In a few placcs, reference is made to Sections of the Power Systems Branch evaluation. These 8
section reference numbers will need revision when integrated into the DSI SER to be provided to Db based on these inputs.
i The enclosed SER found the IDVP to be acceptable in all but two areas. These are addressed under E01 files 8018 and 8047 in Section 5.2.1.6.
In these l
two files the conclusions of the IDVP could not be confirmed to be acceptable.
Submittal of the DSI SER to DL should note that the IDVP raised issues which had not previously been recognized and that action will be required to con-clude this aspect of the review of the IDVP. Since the conclusions of the IDVP in these two cases were based primarily upon statements made by PG8E in response to these concerns, the licensee should be notified that these items remain open and need to be resolved prior to further licensing action.
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-et t u t-Faust Rosa, Chief Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch i
Division of Systems Integration
Enclosure:
As stated i
i cc:
R. Mattson 1
R. Houston L. Rubenstein M. Srinivasan J. Wermiel J. Knox l
Contact:
I T. Dunning, ICSB X29457 a
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JUL 12 583 I'
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM 5.2.1.6 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS DESIGN OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM A review was performed for the safety related instrumenta-tion and controls for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Sys-tem.
This aspect of the IDVP was conducted by the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation.
The review covered three major areas: (1) envi ronmental qualification, (2) system design conformance to Licensing requirements, and (3) field verification of installed systems.
The design and installation of safety related instrumenta-tion and controls for the AFW system were reviewed to con-firm compliance with the Licensing commitments for these systems.
The Licensing documents include the FSAR, PG8E Letters to NRC on Licensing criteria and responses to questions, and design documents including logic diagrams, instrument and electrical schematics, and wiring diagrams.
l l
Concerns identified in the review were addressed in i
Interim Technical Report 27, Rev. 1, " Verification i
of the Instrument and Control Design of the Auxiliary Feedwater System".
The fotLowing Error or Open Items (E01) files were established during this review.
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e 2-E01 File 8018 Th'e concern identified was that valve operators for the isolation valves which provide the steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump from two of the four main steam generator headers were not classified and pro-i cured as safety related components.
The basis for this concern was that these valves may not be operable in a harsh environment associated with a steam Line break in the steam supply to the turbine driven pump.
Therefore these valves would not be capable of being closed to J
mitigate the consequences of such an event.
PGSE pro-vided an analysis performed by Westinghouse indicating that the steam flow from the postulated break would not trip the unit when operating at power Levels of 10, 30, 60 or 100%.
Therefore, according to FSAR Appendix 3.6, the assumption of loss offsite power need not be con-sidered as a consequence of this event.
Thus the normal l
feedwater system would be assumed to be available.
l Westinghouse stated that for this case the blowdown of the two steam generators would be acceptable as Long as the other two were intact.
The IDVP concluded that while it is desirable to isolate the break, the Licensing commitment to maintain safe shutdown capability was shown by the analysis.
Further the IDVP considered l
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. 4 this to be adequate in that feedwater flow can be main-tained to the steam generators to mitigate the effects of a steam Line break and these valves are not required to perform a safety function.
On this basis the file was closed.
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Faased the staff's re ow of t is matter it has res vations on the dequacy of the basis set forth by s'
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e IDVP in reso ing t,his matter.
hest.a'hbelievhl
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'uld
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l take p apt action to shutdown the reac or and t t such i
acti n would probably include's manua reactor rip.
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1 L Load conditi.ons this.would res Lt in a urbine gen-rator trip and increases' the pot ntial fo the Loss of' awareofanyj offsite power'.
Further, the et ff is no
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analysis which has been perfo med whic would.
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ass /ure environmental cons uences f the post ated that
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steamjtine brea,k would not have a trimental ffect
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t on nonsafety related con rol syst as requir d to main-
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l i tain normal feedwater Low.
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ystem wo Ldbeav/ilableisv[ Lid, the mai 2feedwater
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In addition -the staff t.otes that the subject valves are
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teria of Appendix A to Part 5 0 -' ' - -
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The 44eff has not twHy evaluated the u e g
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m.7.n, et E01 File 8032 The concern identified was that a fire in the main con-trol room may cause damage which could preclude transfer I
of the control of the Level centrol valves from the con-trol room to the hot shutdcun panet.
These control valves are used to control steam generator Level by regulating the auxiliary feedwater (A1W) flow supplied by the motor driven AFW pumps.
The basis for the concern was a commit-ment by PGSE, made in response to NRC fire protection review questions, that the control of these valves wout,d be operable from the hot shutdown panel in the event of a fi're in the main control cons.
Inherent with this commitment is the l
implication that fire damage would not preclude the transfer i
l of these controls and that subsequently the control of steam generator level could be carried out at the hot shut-down panel by having had made this transfer.
In defense
e.
3 that this concern did not in itself create a safety l
significant issue, PG8E noted that the Level control valves could be operated manually. Further, such action had been described as an action which would be taken in i
the event of a fire at the remote shutdown panet,
- Nowever, PG8E committed to make modifications to eliminate this concern.
The IDVP has verified the isolementation of these modifications and has found them to be acceptable.
Based on this action the item was closed.
The staff con-curs with the IDVP resolution of this matter.
E02 File 8047 The concern identified was that a single failure of an auxiliary relay would prevent autountic e.Losure of the redundant steen generator bL-awdown isolation valves on automatic initiation of the auxiliary f eedwater system.
The basis for this concern was that sufficient decay heat removat may not be provided under Limiting cond1tions postulated for accidents if team generator blowdown is
.f not terminated.
PG8E 9:n rid that the single relay identified is not safety related, however, P64E noted that steam generator blowdown is termina'ted by safety re-Lated signals, namely safety injection and/or Phase A containment isolation, thereby preventing the loss of steam generator inventory for all but two accidents casta r
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- 6-addressed in Chapter 15 cf the FSAR.
The two, cases under whfch steam generator blowdown would not be termine sted by safety related signets are Loss of normal feed-water and Loss of offuite power.
In its investigation of this mJtter the IDVP reiewed the Westinghouse anaty-ses, included in correspondence from PGEE to the NPC, on the adequacy of the AFW system design to provide suffi-cient flow consistent with the FSAR safety analysis.
These analyses performed by Westinghouse included the assumption that steam generator blowdown flow is termin-ated for loss of main feedwater or offsite power.
There-fore to resolve the conflict that steam generator blow-down may not be terminated f or these events (i.e., the f ailure of the single relay which initiates this action)
PGSE provided documentation to the IRVP indicating that for these events where blowdown is not terminated, ade-quate feedwater or AFW flow exists assuming the loss of one AFW train.
On this basis the 10VP determined that there is no v-lotation of Licensing commitments.
4 AWo 2 4.
While the staff does not with the PG8E con-clusion that adequate AFW flow witL be available for safe shutdedn, it does find that the use of a single relay to isolate staan generator blowdown on automatic initiation of the AFW systems is in conftfet with the design as described on FSAR figure 7.2-1, sheet 15.
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Further, t he redundancy as shown by h figure which j
is typic 6L for aLL Westinghouse. plants is consistent j
with the Westinghouse analysis noted above which assumes that steam generator blowdown is terminated for those associatedwithsafetyinjection.,Therfye events not
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E01 File 8051 I7
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The concern identified was that the pressure transmitter 9q l
l on the discharge of the turbine driven auxiliary feed q,
pump is not powered from a safety related power source.
l cs The basis for this con.:ern was that FSAft Appendia 3.6 J,
e identified this transmitter as essential equipment.
PG4E
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responded to this concern by stating that this transmit-
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l ter performs no saf ety related fufst, tion ar.d that the t
FSAR would be revised to reflect this fact.
The.tDVP concluded that this actien resolved this concern and
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classified this item as a devittion.
The staff concurs with the conclusions of the.IDVP on this matter.
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-3 E0I File 8052 The concern identified was that flow
- transmitter FT-78 and flow control valve FCV-95 in the AFW system 'aay not be environmentally qualified for harsh environments associated with high energy Line breaks.
The basis for this concern was that these items were not listed as located in harsh environments in the PGEE environ-mental qualification report of safety related components Located in harsh environments.
PGSE responded to these cencerns by noting that the flow transmitter was identi-tied under a different identification number, FT-200.
The environmental qu'alification of this item has not been completed however the vendor's report provided justification for interin operation pending completion of this program.
The flow control valve was condition-atLy qualified, subject to an on going maintenance surveillance program but was erroneously Listed as a component not subject to a harsh environment.
PGSE wilL correct clerical errors in the qualification ' report l
tables.
On the basis of the PG8E response, the IOVP j
withdrew its concern on this matter.
The staff concurs with the IDVP resolution of this matter.
E01 Files 8054, and 8055 These items are addressed in Section (PSB section 5.2.1.2) of this safety evaluation report.
.s 9
E0I File 3057 This item is addressed in section (PSB section 5.2.1.3) of-this safety evaluation report.
E01 File 8058 The concern identified was that the steam generator Level control valves (LCV-110, -111, -113, and -115) may not be environmentally qualified for harsh environments 1
associated with high energy Line breaks.
The basis for this concern was that the environmental qualification report i dentified an unqualified motor capacitor as ar.
outstanding i tes to be completed.
The report provided i
a justification for interim operation with replacement of this component fotLowing 20,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> operation.
PGSE responded to this concern noting that an analysis i
to determine the qualified Life of this component is being conducted.
The IDVP concluded that the PG8E re-sponse resolved this concern.
The staff concurs with the conclusions of the IDVP on this matter.
E01 File 8059 This item is addressed in section (Psa section 5.2.1.2) of this safety evaluation report.
l E01 File 8060 This item is addressed in section 5.2.1.4 of this safety evaluation report.
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- E01 FILE 8064 This item is addressed in Section (PS8 Section 5.2.1.2) of this safety evaluation report.
l Based on the review of the EDI files established in the review of the AFW instrumentation and control systems and resolution of concerns identified herein, with the ex-ception of pending staff actions for E0I files 8018 and 8047, the staff concludes that the IDVP has confirmed that the Licensing commitments for the design of this system have been satisfied and that no generic concerns were identified which alter the staff's prior conclusion stated in its safety evaluation report for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
5.2.1.7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS DESIGN OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AND PRES $URIZATION SYSTEM A review was performed for the safety related instrumenta-tion and controls for the Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization (CRVP) System.
This aspect of the IDVP was conducted by the Stone and Webster Engineering Corpor-ation.
The review covered three major areas (1) environ-mental qualification, (2) system design conformance to j
Licensing requirements, and (3) field verification of in-stalled systems.
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. e The design and installation of safety related instru-ments and controls for the CRVP system were reviewed to confirm compliance with Licensing commitments for these systems..The Licensing documents include the FSAR, PG8E Letters to NRC on Licensing criteria and response to questions, and design documents including Logic diagrams, instrument and electrical schematics, and wiring diagrams.
Con erns identified in the review were addressed in Interim Technical Report 28, Rev. 1, " Verification of the Instrumentation and Control Design of the Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System".
The folLowing Error or Open Item (E0I) files were establish-4 ed during this review.
1 E01 File 8017 This item is addressed in Section (PSB section 5.3.1) of this safety evaluation' report.
E01 File 8046 j
The concerns raised by this item was transferred by the IDVP to E01 file 8012 and is addressed in Section (PSB section 5.2.1.3) of this safety evaluation report.
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E0I File 8053 The concern identified was that radiation monitors RE-51, 1
-52, -53, and'-54 were identified'as nonsafety related y -
on the instrument schematic drewing.
PGSE provided a response to this concern noting that this identification was a drafting error only and that these instruments were purchased and installed to safety related require-ments.
The IDVP concurred with this response and re-classified this item as a deviation.
The staff concurs with the IDVP on the resolution of this matter.
9 E0I Fi t ? 8056 The concern identified was that portions of the CRVP systems were omitted f rom PG8E's envi ronmental qualifi-cation report. 'The basis of this concern was that some equipment may not be envi ronmentalLy qualified for normal and abnormal environmental conditions postulated for the location of this equipment.
PGSE providad a rssponse indicating that the classification of CRVP components as e
safety related electrical equipment' Located outside con-tainment and not subject to a severe environment did not includa some components since the compilation of the Listed components was made before the system design was completed.
Further the environmental qualification re-port wilL be updated to include the non-Listed components
t of the CRVP system.
The IDVP confirmed that no safety related components of the CRVP system are subject to harsh environments and that components were designed for expected service conditions.
On this basis the file was
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reclassified a closed item.
The staff concurs with the IDVP resolution of this matter.
E0I File 8057 This item is addressed in Section (PSB section 5.2.1.3) of this safety evaluation report.
E0I File 8059 This item is addressed in Section (PSB section 5.2.1.2) of this safety evaluation report.
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Based on the review of the E0I files established in the review of the CRVP instrumentation and control systems and resolution of concerns identified herein, the staf f ~
concludes that-the IDVP confirmed that the. Licensing l
commitments for the design of this system have been satis-fied and that no generic concerns were identified which alter the staff's prior conclusions stated in its safety evaluation report for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
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