ML20203L488

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122 & 120 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively
ML20203L488
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 02/17/1998
From:
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203L483 List:
References
NUDOCS 9803060091
Download: ML20203L488 (12)


Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. BeteHe01

%,*****/j' SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 1

RELATED TO AMENDMENT No.122 TO FAClllTY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 80 AND AMENDMENT NO. 120 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 82 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON-NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NDS. 50 <75 AND 50 323 i

i

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated December 9. 1996. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. OPR-80 and DPR 82) for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2.

The proposed changes revise the combined Technical Specifications (TS) for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Unit Nos. 1 and 2 to:

a.

Revise " Allowable Values" (AV) for the instrumentation of the reactor j

tri) system (RTS) and the engineered safety features actuation system (ES AS) functions, to implement results of new setpoint calculations performed to support extension of surveillance test intervals (STIs) of these functions from 18 to 24 months not to exceed 30 months, and revise the setpoint for the pressurizer water level high reactor trip function to provide adequate margin for the instrument loop uncertainties, b.

Extend STIs of TS surveillances including channel operational tests (C0Ts) and trip actuating device o>erational tests (TAD 0Ts) of instrument channels associated wit 1 several RTS and the ESFAS functions.

from at least once every 18 months to at least once per refueling interval of nominally 24 months, not to exceed 30 months.

I c'

Revise affected sections of the BASES to reflect changes in AVs and STIs of RTS and ESFAS Functional Units, d.

Incorporate editorial changes to clarify selected footnotes of TS Tables.

2,0 BACKGROUND The 11cen.ee recently conducted a feasibility study for increasing the fuel cycles length from the current 18 months to 24 months for both units of DCPP.

The results of this study indicated that a 2440 nth fuel cycle is not only feasible but also is beneficial because of fewer refuelings, improved outage scheduling and reduced personnel dose. Therefore, the-licensee has decided to implement the extended 24-month fuel cycles at both urrits of the DCPP.

extending the current refueling nterval from 18 months to 24 months.

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2-Current DCPP TS requires that surveillance tests for some functional units must be performed at least once per refueling interval, Therefore. STis for these functional units have been identified by a notation R" in an appropriate column of the current TS. With the extended fuel cycle. STI for t1ese functional units will be 24 months.

Therefore, for the 24 month (new refueling interval) STI. a new notation "R24" will be used. The licensee has-de.ded to retain the current 18 month STI for some functional units.

In their submittal, the licensee indicated that they would retain the existing notation "R" to indicate the 18 month STI.

This will allow clear differentiation between 24 month 6nd 18 month ST!s.

3.0 EVALUATION

-3.1 Allowable Values and Setooints i

Procosed TS chanae:

Revise allowable value (AV) and/or setpoint (SP) for functional units of the following TS Tables as noted.

TS 2,21. Tabi's 2.21 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Trip 1.

Functional Unit 2.a - Power Range. Neutron Flux. Low Setpoint.

revise AV from 5 27.1% of RATED THERMAL POWER to 5 26.2% of RATED THERMAL NWER.

2.

Functional Unit 2.b Power Range. Neutron Flux. High Setpoint.

revise AV from s 111.1% of RATED THERMAL POWER to 5 110.2% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

3.

Functional Unit 3 - Power Range. Neutron Flux High Positive Rate,

-revise AV from 5 6.5% of RATED THERMAL-POWER to 5 5.6%.of RATED THERMAL POWER.

-4.

Functional Unit 4 - Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative Rate, revise AV from 5 6.5% of RATED THERMAL POWER to 5_5.6% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

5.

Functional Unit 5 - Intermediate Range. Neutron Flux, revise-AV from 5 30.9% of RATED THERMAL POWER to 530.6% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

6.

Functional Unit 9 Pressurizer Prcssure Low, revise AV from t 1944.4 psig to n 1947.5 psig.

7.

Functional Unit 10 - Pressurizer Pressure High, revise AV from 5 2390.6 psig to 5 2387.5 psig.

8.

Functional Unit 11 - Pressurizer Water Level-High. revise AV from Yrom.5% to 5 90.2% of instrument span and revise trip setpoint

< 92 5 925 to 5 90% of instrument span.

4 T

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Functional Unit 12 Reactor Coolant Flow Low. revise AV from t 89.7% to E 89.8% of measured flow per loop.

10, Functional Unit 13 Steam Generator Water Level Low Low, revise AV from r

a 6.8% to 2 7.0% of narrow range instrument span each steam generator.

11.

Functional Unit 13.a and 13.b Steam Generator Water Level. Low Low.

RCS Loop Delta T equivalent to power > 50% RTP, revise AV from > 51.5%

to > 50.7% RTP.

12.

Funci.ional Unit 15 - Undervoltage Reactor Coolant Pumps, revise AV from E 7730 volts to a 7877 volts, t

Functional Unit 22.a Reactor Trip System Inte 13.

RangeNeutronFlux.P6,ieviseAVfromE6x10'glocks,Intgmediate to 3 8x10' amps.

14.

Functional Unit 22.b.1) - Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P 7. P-10 Input. revise AV from E 7.9% 5 12.1% to 2 8.8% 5 11.2% of RATED THERMAL POWER, 15.

Functional Unit 22.b.2)

Reactor Trip System Interlocks. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P 7. P 13 Input, revise AV from 5 12.1% to $10.2%

-RTP turbine impulse pressure equivalent.

16.

Functional Unit 22.c - Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Power Range Neutron Flux. P 8, revise AV from 5 37.1% to 5 36.2% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

17.

Functional Unit 22.d - Reactor Trip System Interlocks. Power Range

. Neutron Flux. P 9 revise AV from 5 52.1% to <. 51.2% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

18.

Functional Unit 22.e - Reactor Trip System Interlocks, Power Range

-Neutron Flux. P 10.~ revise AV from 2 7.9% $ 12.1% to E 8.8% $ 11.2% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

19.

Functional Unit 22.f - Reactor Trip System Interlocks. Turbine Imaulse Chamber Pressure. P-13. revise AV from 5 12.1% to s 10.2% RTP tur)ine impulse pressure equivalent, 20.

Functional Unit 23 - Seismic Trip, revise AV from 5 0.40g to 5 0,439 21.

Table 2.2-1. Over Temperature Delta T Note 2 revision.

Replace words "1.0% Delta T span" with words "0.46% Delta T span for hot leg or cold leg temperature inputs. 0.14% Delta T span for pressurizer pressure input, or 0.19% Delta T span for Delta I inputs".

~

22.

Table 2.2-1. Overpower Delta T Note 4 revision.

Replace words.

' 1.0%" with."0.46%", and add words "for hot leg or col _d leg temperature inputs". after the word " span".

4 i

TS 3/4.3.2 Table 3.3 4 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System t

instrumentation 1.

Functional Unit 1.c Safety injection, Containment Pressure

High, revise AV from 5 3.3 psig to 5 3.12 psig.

2.

Functional Unit 1.d Safety injection, Pressurizer Pressure -

Low, revise AV from t 1844.4 psig to 2 1847.5 psig.

4 3.

Functional Unit 1.f - Safety Injection, Steam Line Pressure

Low, revise AV from 1 594.6 psig to a 597.6 psig.

4.

Functional Unit 2.c Containment Spray, Containment Pressure -

High High. revise AV from 5 22.3 psig to 5 22.12 psig.

5.

Functional Unit 3.b.3)

Containment Isolation, Phase B Isolation, Containment Pressure High High, revise AV from 5 22.3 psig to 5 22.12 psig.

6.

Functional Unit 4.c - Steam Line Isolation, Containment Pressure -

High High, revise AV from 5 22.3 ps19 to 5 22.12 psig, 7.

Functional Unit 4.d - Steam Line Isolation, Steam Line Pressure Low, revise AV from t 594.6 psig to a 597.6 psig.

8.

Functional Unit 4.e - Steam Line Isolation Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate High, revise AV from 5 105.4 psi-to 5 102.4 psi, 9.

Functional Unit 5.b - Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation Steam Generator Water Level - High High, revise AV from 5 75.5% to 5 75.2%.

10.

Functional Unit 6.c - Auxiliary Feedwater, Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low, Initiation on Steam Generator Water Level -

Low Low, revise AV from E 6.8% to E 7.05.

11.

Functional-Unit 6.c.1) and 2) - Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low. RCS Loop Delta T equivalent to l

Power, revise AV from 5 51.5% RTP to 5 50.7% RTP.

12.

Functional Unit 6.d - Auxiliary Feedwater, Undervoltage - RCP, revise AV from t 7730 volts to E 7877 volts.

13.

Functional Unit 8.a - ESFAS Interlocks, Pressur" D essure, revise AV from i 1920.6 psig to 5 1917.5 psig.

3.1.2 Justification for the Chanae in their submittal. the licensee stated that their calculations to revise the AV and SP of functional units to support STI extensions were based on methodologies of WCAP-11082, Revision 5. " Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems, Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, 24 Month Fuel Cycle

5-Evaluation." and WCAP 14646. Revision 0. " Instrumentation Calibration and Drift Evaluation Process for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2. 24 Month fuel Cycle." The proposed TS format for the trit setpoints and allowable values is consistent with that currently used at DCPP and is also consistent with the two column format used in NUREG 1431. Revision 1. " Improved Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants."

In their submittal. the licensee stated that evaluations in WCAP 11082 were based on a methodology responsive to the guidance in Generic Letter (GL) 91 04 " Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24 month fuel Cycle" dated April 2. 1991 which states that:

l that uncertainty calculations should be performed in a manner which results in l

drift values at a 95% probability and a 95% confidence level. The licensee stated that-for the limiting safety system setting .SSS) of each function. a trip setpoint and its associated allowable v'lue have been established consistent with a 95/95 confidence level. Tne trip setpoint for each LSSS was selected such that adequate protection is provided when all uncertainties assoc 1ateo with the process, sensor, and rack are taken into account.

During surveillance, the as-found value of the SP is compared to its AV and if the SP was fot.nd outside of its AV. the SP is reset within its as left tolerance: if the SP could not be set within its as left tolerance, then the channel is declared inoperable, Therefore, the trip SP and its AV together ensure that safety limits will not be excceded. New values for most of the AVs have been 3roposed to support the calibration interval extension.

SPs were not revised

'etause of the adequacy of existing margins between the AVs and the SPs.

In their submittal, the licenset stated that uncertainties for several RTS channels were not recalculated using the 24 month fuel cycle algorithm. These channels are (1) the power range neutron flux high and low setpoints: (2) the power. range neutron flux high positive and-high negative rate setpoints: (3) the intermediate range neutron flux setpoints: and (4) the source range neutron flux setpoints. The channel statistical allowance (CSA) equation (algorithm) used for combining the uncertainty components for these channels is the same one used in Revision 2 of WCAP 11062. " Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems. Diablo Canyon Stations. Eagle 21 Version."

supporting the current DCPP TS setpoints for these channels. Thelicensee stated that the CSA equation results in more conservative treatment of uncertainties than would be obtained if these channels were reevaluated with the equation from WCAP 11082, Rev. 5. for the 24 month fuel cycle. The staff agrees with the licensee and finds the use of WCAP-11082. Rev. 2 for uncertainties to be acceptable.

For prescurizer level item numbers 8 and 36 of the submittal, the licensee stated that the results of the channel statistical calculations for pressurizer level show that the total channel incertainty was found to be 9.12 percent of s)an, which exceeds that which can be supported by the current TS setpoint for tie reactor tri) function. There is no explicit safety analysis limit identified for t11s function.

However in order to assure that a steam bubble.always exists within the pressurizer-for pressurizer pressure control, the total channel uncertainty must be accommodated between the trip setpoint and the top of the span. A pressurizer level setpoint change is D

  • e 6-proposed in order to support an extended surveillance of up to 30 months. The

{

allowable value is also proposed to be changed to be consistent with the new set >oint. These new values will be established in accordance with the above met 1odology which is acceptable to the staff.

For the RCS loss of flow low, proposed revision item numbers 9 and 37 of the submittal, the licensee stated that the 30 month CSA was larger than that previously calculated, and it approached the allowance between the TS setpoint and the safety. analysis limit. Westinghouse evaluated the safety analysis j

limit to determine whether it could be reduced so as to support the existing setpoint of greater than or equal to 90 percent on minimum measured flow (MMF) per loop. The existing DCPP safety analysic is based on an assumed RCS loss of flow low limit of 87 percent of MMF, RCS loss of flow low is credited in two analyzed accidents, the partial loss of forced reactor coolant flow and L

the single RCP locked rotor.

The Westinghouse evaluation concluded th1t the limit can be lowered to 85 percent of MMF, with no im)act on the DCPP safety analysis, and that the existing conclusions in the DC)P FSAR Update remain

valid, The lower safety limit of 85 percent of MMF provides sufficient allowance for tb.s RCS loss of flow low setpoint considering the new CSA (WCAP 11082, nev. 5), therefore no setpoint change is required, Due to the change in setpoint methodology, there is a change in the AV to greater than or equal to 89.8 percent of MMF in order to support an extended surveillance of up to 30 months. The AV change is in the more restrictive direction and is l

consistent with the WCAP 11082, Revision 5, methodology.

For the Undervolta of the submittal, ge RCP. proposed revision item numbers 11, 40, 59 and 72 the licensee stated that following replacement of the original Westinghouse undervolta n relays with new Basler Model bel 27 relays, they had a discussion with the vendor since the instruction manual does not provide a specific drift specification.

The vendor confirmed that the expected relay drop out and pick-up setting drift is less than 1.6 volts-between calibration, therefore, a 1 1.6 volt drift allowance was used for 30 months and will be verified based on future performance data. The licensee's evaluation to determine other channel uncertainties was based on the currently installed hardware as defined-by their calibration procedures. The total.

channel uncertainty for the RCP undervoltage channel was calculated to be 2.56 volts.

The safety analyses do not assume an explicit value, therefore a safety analysis limit does not a> ply and there are no TS setpoint changes or safety analysis limit changes.

or the undervoltage function, an AV change to greater than or equal to 7877 volts was pronosed, which is more restrictive than the existing value and is consistent ath WCAP-11082 Revision 5..

methodology.

Following the relay repl*,ement, the TADOT-and-the calibration-procedure were merged and are currently being performed quarterly.

Based on the results of the recent tests on the replacement relays, a review of the past tests on the original relays indicated no problems, along with the intention to continue performing the TAD 0T's quarterly, the relays are expected to perform satisfactorily over a 24 month fuel cycle,

. For the Underfrequency-RCP.- proposed revision item number -of-the-submittal, the licensee stated that the evaluation on the Basler bel-81.

underfrequency relays resulted in a 10.04 Hz; drift allowance for a 30 month 4

0*

7 4

calibration interval. The licensee's evaluation to determine other channel uncertainties was based on the currently installed hardware as defined by i

their calibration procedures.

The total channel uncertaint underfrequency reactor trip was calculated to be 0.091 Hz. y for the RCP The margin to the

-safety analysis limit is 0.009 Hz for the trip setpoint.

Therefore, no r.hanges in safety analysis limits. setpoints or allowable values are necessary.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's methodology for calculation of the AVs i

and SPs as described in WCAP 11082, kevision 5 and finds it consistent with i

the guidance _in Regulatory Guide 1.105 and, therefore acceptable.

i 3.2 Surveillance Test Interval ProDosed TS chanae: TS 3/4.3.1. Table 4.31, Reactor Trip System Instrunentation Surveillance Requirements and TS 3/4.3,2, Table 4.3.2.

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.

Revise surveillance test intervals as follows:

TS 3/4.3.1. Table 4.3-1. Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.

For the following functional units, revise channel calibration frequency from "R" to "R24".

l.-

Functional Unit i - Power Range, Neutron Flux High Setpoint 2.

Functional Unit 0 - Power Range, Neutron Flux Low Setpoint 3.

Functional Unit 3 - Power Range, Neutron Flux High Positive Rate 4.

Functional Unit 4 - Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate 5.

Functional Unit 5 Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux 6.

_ Functional Unit 6 - Source Range, Neutron Flux 7.

Functional Unit 7 - Over Temperature Delta T (OT Delta T) 8.

Functional Unit 8 - Overpower Delta T (OP Delta T) 9.

Functional Unit 9 Pressurizer Pressure, low 10.

Functional Unit Pressurizer Pressure. High 11.

Functional Unit 11 - Pressurizer Water Level High 12.

. Functional Unit 12 Reactor Coolant Flow. Low--

-13.

Functional Unit 13.a Steam Generator Water Level Low Low

-Reactor Trip

I a.

'.: -14.

Functional Unit 13.b Steam Generator Water Level. Low Low, RCS Loop Delta T input 15.

Functional Unit 15 Undervoltage Reacter Coolant Pumps 10.

Functional Unit 16 - Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pumps TS 3/4.3.2. Table 4.3.2. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.

For the following functional units, revise channel calibration frequency from "R" to "R24 1.

Functional Unit 1.c - Safety injection, Containment Pressure -

High

+

2.

Functional Unit 1.d - Safety Injection, Pressurizer Pressure - Low i

3.

Functional Unit 1.f Safety injection. Steam Line Pressure - Low 4.

Functional Unit 2.c - Containment Spray, Containment Pressure -

l High High 5.

Functional Unit 3.b.3)

Containment Isolation. Phase B Isolation, Containment Pressure - High High 6.

Functional Unit 4.c - Steam Line Isolation. Containment Pressure -

I High High t

- T.

Functional Unit 4.d Steam Line Isolation. Steam Line Pressure -

Low 8.

Functional Unit 4.e - Steam Line Isolation. Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate - High 9.

Functional Unit 5.b - Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation Steam Generator Water Level High High l

10.

Functional Unit 6.c.1) -Auxiliary Feedwater. Steam Generator Water Level - Low low. Initiation on Steam Generator Water Level.

Low Low 11.

Functional Unit 6.c.2)

Auxiliary Feedwater., Steam Generator Water Level Low Low, RCS Loop Delta T Input 12.

Functional Unit 8.a. - ESFAS Interlocks, Pressurizer Pressure.

P 11 TS 3/4.3.1. Table 4,3-1. Reactor Trip System Irstrumentation Surveillance Requirements.

For the following Functional Units, revise Channel Calibration and Channel Operational Test frequency from "R" to "R24".

1

c'.-

d 9

1.

Functional Unit 20.a - Reactor Trip System Interlocks.

l Intermediate Range Neutron Flux. P 6 2.

Functional Unit 20.b Reactor Trip System Interlocks. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P 7 3.

Functional Unit 20.c - Reactor Trip System Interlocks. Power Range Neutron Flux. P 8 4.

runctional Unit 20.d Reactor Trip System Interlocks. Power Range Neutron Flux P 9 5.

Functional Unit 20.e Reactor Trip System Interlocks. Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux P 10 6.

Functional Unit 20.f - Reactor Trip System Interlocks. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure. P-13 TS 3/4,3.1, Table 4.3 1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requircrents.

For Functional Unit 23 Seismic Trip, revise channel calibration and trip actuatireg device operational test frequency from "R" to "R24" and actuation logic test frequency from "R" to "M(7)" or at least once i

per month with footnote 7 applying.

1 TS 3/4.3.2. Table 4.3.2. Engineered Safety Fe6tures Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.

For Functional Unit 6.d. -

Auxiliary feedwater. Undervoltage - RCP. revise channel calibration frequency and trip actuating device operational test frequency from "R" to "R24.

Justification for the Chanae In its submittal the licensee stated that the proposed surveillance interval modifications are based on guidance provided in GL 9104 regarding how licensees'should evaluate the effects of a 24 month surveillance interval in order to confirm that such an extension has an insignificant impact on plant safety.

The licensee has performed analyses of all affected instrument loops in order to establish the effect of a 30 month (24 months + 25% allowable tolerance) call a tion frequency.

Us1 H the in ho m procedures and WCAP 14646. Revision 1. " Instrument Ca11 oration and Drift Evaluation Process for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2.

24 month fuel Cycle Evaluation." the analyses were performed to verify that tb surveillance interval extensions have an insignificant effect on plant safety and would not invalidate any assumptions in the plant licensing basis.

Statistically based drift values were determined for all instruments involved except where there was insufficient drift data due to recent instrument replacement.

In these cases, a 30 month drift was determined.through engineering judgment considering manufacturer specifications, drift exhibited by similar devices manufactured by the same manufacturer and employed in similar applications and Westinghouse experience with similar devices.

The t

licensee stated that such drift values will be validated through monitoring of n

. g.

t

'e: future instrument performance The above evaluation is consistent with GL 91 04 and, therefore, accep' G!. 9104 states that plant int eument drift should be revie

.'or consistency with setpoint uncertainty calet 3tions over the extended 24 month operating cycle.

The licensee in their submittal stated tha+. the plant specific drift data were stetistically analyzed to establish inst.'ument performance characteristics. The details of the statistical analysis of the DCPP calibration data were reported in WCAP 14646. Revision 1.

To address the need for a definitive basis for drift, function specific calculations were performed to determine appropriate drift values for the sensors ard process racks.

The staff reviewed WCAP-14646. Revision 1. and noted that the licensee has used a three tired " graded" approach to identify the probability and confidence levels to which the drift value should be determined / varied, based on the safety significance of the instrument channel's function (s).

All of the functions included in this license amenoment request for the 24-month fuel cycle fall into the RPS/ESFAS/ Critical Control Category.

Drift for these functions have been evaluated at a 95% probability at 95% confidence.

This is-consistent with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.105 and is, therefore, acceptable.

Since the remaining two tiers were not proposed for any of the functions associated with this license amendment, th staff did not review them.

In GL-91-04, the staff identified the issues pertaining to increasing the interval of instrument surveillance and identified specific actions that licensees should take to address these issues.

The staff evaluated the licensee's submittal to verify that the licensee has addressed these issues and provided an acceptable basis for increasing the calibration interval for instruments that are used to perform safety functions.

Based on our evaluation as described above, the staff concludes that the licensee has confirmed that safety limits t.nd safety analysis assumptions will not be exceeded when worst case drift has been taken into account.

3,3 fales The proposed changes to the Bases section support the proposed changes made for the allowable values and setpoints of the functional units of Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3 4.

Therefore, the changes are acceptable.

3.4 Administrative Chances EtQposed TS Chances Incorporate changes to the following footnotes of TS Tables 2,2-1 and 3.3 4 as noted and correct spelling of a functional unit description:

1.

Functional Unit 13.b. change spelling of the word "Equivalyent" to its correct spelling Equivalent.

i

- 1

'et 11 f

2.

Table 2.21 and Table 3.3 4, T Notes I r.J 3. rt$ ace word j

l

" controller" with " compensator "

3.

Table 2.2 1. Over temperature Delta T ana uverpower Delta T Notes 1 and 3 clarification.

Add words " loop specific" in front of word

" indicated" in note 1, and add words " loo between words Nominal and T., in note 3. p specific Indicated" 4.

- Table 2 2-1. Overpower Delta T Note 3 clarification. Add words,

" Nominal Loop specific" in front of the word " Indicated",

5.

TS 3/4.3.1. Table 4.31. Reactor Trip System Instrumentation i

Surveillance Requirements. Functional Unit 13.b - Steam Generator 4

Water Level, Low Low. RCS Loop Delta T input.

To clarify functional unit description add words " Equivalent to Power" after words Delta T.

6.

TS 3/4.3.2. Table 4.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, Functional Unit 6.c.2) - Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low._RCS Loop Delta T Input. To clarify functional unit description, add words

  • Equivalent to Power" after words Delta T.

Justification for the Chanae The proposed changes to the above footnotes involve a spelling correction, terminology change and clarifying language and have no safety significance.

In their submittal, the licensee stated that the term " compensator" is proposed in place of " controller" to better describe signal processing in the instrument racks. The term " loop specific" is used to better define the processing that occurs for each individual RCS loop. The term " equivalent to power" 1s added for two items to maintain consistency in the TS for all items which refer to RCS loop Delta T equivalent to power.

These changes are administrative and e11torial in nature, and do not affect the design.-

1 operation, or testing of the plant.

These changes are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations. the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as oefined in 10 CFR Part 20. ~ The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in.the amounts, and no significant change in the types.

of.any effluents that may be-released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or. cumulative occupational radiation 4

exposure.

The Commission has.previously issued a proposed finding that the r"@W't-P' T

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4 12 amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 6577). Accordingly, the amendments neet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact-statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

i

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above.

that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the i

public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner. (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations.

- and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal-Contributor:

S.V. Athavale S. Bloom T. Dunning Date:

February 17, 1998 l

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