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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20207A7181999-05-13013 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 134 & 132 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20206H2861999-05-0303 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 133 & 131 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20206D5661999-04-29029 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 132 & 130 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20205B6061999-03-26026 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 131 & 129 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20249B6881998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 128 & 126 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20249B5961998-06-0505 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 127 & 125 to Licenses DPR-80 & 82,respectively ML20249B6041998-06-0505 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 126 & 124 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20248D4041998-05-28028 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 125 & 123 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20248L8761998-03-12012 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 124 & 122 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20197B7091998-02-27027 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 121 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203L4881998-02-17017 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122 & 120 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203L2981998-02-13013 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 121 & 119 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203M4321998-02-0303 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 120 & 118 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20149H4281997-07-17017 July 1997 Corrected SE Re Amends 119 & 117 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129G9351996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 117 & 115 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129G7771996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 116 & 114 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129J4311996-10-18018 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Approving Corporate Restructuring & Establishment of Holding Company Under Temporary Name PG&E Parent Co.,Inc of Which PG&E Would Become Wholly Owned Subsidiary ML20117E5541996-08-19019 August 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 115 & 113 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20117K4671996-05-28028 May 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 113 & 111 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20092F3411995-08-23023 August 1995 Corrected SE Supporting Amends 107 & 106 to Licenses DPR-82 & DPR-80,respectively ML20082H9121995-04-11011 April 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 99 & 98 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20063M1481994-03-0303 March 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 90 & 89 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively NUREG-0675, SER Concluding That Seismic Margins of Structures & Equipment/Components at Plant Reported in LTSP Final Rept Are Adequate Even After Considering Staff Estimate of Increased Seismic Ground Motions1992-04-17017 April 1992 SER Concluding That Seismic Margins of Structures & Equipment/Components at Plant Reported in LTSP Final Rept Are Adequate Even After Considering Staff Estimate of Increased Seismic Ground Motions ML20092E0021992-01-22022 January 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 67 & 66 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20082V1441991-09-0606 September 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 66 & 65 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20082V2621991-09-0505 September 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 65 & 64 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20081L3021991-06-27027 June 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 62 & 61 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20081F2021991-05-23023 May 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 61 & 60 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20070H1821991-03-0606 March 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 59 & 58 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20246K9501989-07-10010 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 42 & 41 to License DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20245F8371989-06-22022 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 41 & 40 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20244C8771989-06-0707 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 40 & 39 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20244C8551989-06-0707 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 39 & 38 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20247H9771989-05-23023 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 38 & 37 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20247B1201989-05-10010 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 37 & 36 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20245L2511989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 36 & 35 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20245H6991989-04-14014 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 34 & 35 to Licenses DPR-82 & DPR-80,respectively ML20247L2931989-03-27027 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 34 & 33 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20153E5331988-08-29029 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 31 & 30 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20196E4811987-12-28028 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 26 & 25 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20238C4611987-12-16016 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 24 & 23 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20238C6061987-12-16016 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 25 & 24 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20235G7671987-09-18018 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 21 & 20 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20238D3871987-09-0303 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 19 & 18 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20238D3931987-09-0303 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 20 & 19 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20237L5631987-08-31031 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 18 & 17 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20237G5541987-08-27027 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 17 & 16 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20236H3811987-07-27027 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 16 & 15 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20215C4341987-06-12012 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 14 & 13 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20214W2851987-06-0808 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 13 & 11 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively 1999-05-03
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20211A9981999-07-12012 July 1999 Draft,Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Risk Info Matrix, Risk Ranking of Systems by Importance Measure ML20207A7181999-05-13013 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 134 & 132 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20206H2861999-05-0303 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 133 & 131 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20206D5661999-04-29029 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 132 & 130 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20205B6061999-03-26026 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 131 & 129 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively DCL-99-045, 1998 Annual Financial Rept for PG&E Corp. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Financial Rept for PG&E Corp. with ML20249B6881998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 128 & 126 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20249B6041998-06-0505 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 126 & 124 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20249B5961998-06-0505 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 127 & 125 to Licenses DPR-80 & 82,respectively ML20248D4041998-05-28028 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 125 & 123 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20248L8761998-03-12012 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 124 & 122 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20197B7091998-02-27027 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 121 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203J5141998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-S02-00:on 980127,following Security Sys Failure Compensatory Measures Were Not Implemented within 10 Minutes Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Failed Disk Drive. Replaced Disk Drives,Reviewed Security Computer Maint Plans ML20203L4881998-02-17017 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122 & 120 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203L2981998-02-13013 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 121 & 119 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20203M4321998-02-0303 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 120 & 118 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20217G5151997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 PG&E Corp Annual Rept ML20205F5881997-07-24024 July 1997 Decommissioning Cost Estimate for Diablo Canyon Power Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20149H4281997-07-17017 July 1997 Corrected SE Re Amends 119 & 117 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML17264A9381997-07-10010 July 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Potential Safety Hazard Associated w/FM-Alco 251 Engin,High Pressure Fuel tube-catalog: 4401031-2 in Which Dual Failure Mode Exists.Caused by Incorrect Forming Process ML18102B6911997-01-31031 January 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1997 for Diablo Canyon Power Plant,Units 1 & 2.W/970218 Ltr ML17083C6231997-01-31031 January 1997 Rev 4 to WCAP-13705, W Setpoint Methodology for Protection Sys Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2,24 Month Fuel Cycle Evaluation. ML16343A4741997-01-31031 January 1997 WCAP-11595,Rev 2, W Improved Thermal Design Procedure Instrument Uncertainty Methodology Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2 24 Month Fuel Cycle Evaluation. ML16342D5351997-01-31031 January 1997 WCAP-14826, Instrumentation Calibr & Drift Evaluation Process for Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2,24 Month Fuel Cycle Evaluation. ML16342D5541996-12-31031 December 1996 Non-proprietary Nrc/Util Meeting on Model 51 SG Tube Integrity & ARC Methodology. DCL-97-045, Pacific Gas & Electric Co 1996 Annual Rept1996-12-31031 December 1996 Pacific Gas & Electric Co 1996 Annual Rept ML20129G9351996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 117 & 115 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129G7771996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 116 & 114 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20129J4311996-10-18018 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Approving Corporate Restructuring & Establishment of Holding Company Under Temporary Name PG&E Parent Co.,Inc of Which PG&E Would Become Wholly Owned Subsidiary ML20117E5541996-08-19019 August 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 115 & 113 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively DCL-96-155, Revised Special Rept SR 95-05:on 950806,EDG 1-2 to Achieve Rated Output Frequency within TS Limits.Caused by Degraded Electronic Governor Performance.Replaced Electronic Governor Motor Operated Potentiometer & Electronic Governor1996-07-22022 July 1996 Revised Special Rept SR 95-05:on 950806,EDG 1-2 to Achieve Rated Output Frequency within TS Limits.Caused by Degraded Electronic Governor Performance.Replaced Electronic Governor Motor Operated Potentiometer & Electronic Governor ML20116B8521996-07-22022 July 1996 Revised Special Rept SR 95-04:on 950718,EDG 1-2 Load Swings Occurred.Caused by Defective Electronic Governor Stability Potentiometer.Replaced Electronic Governor ML20116B8491996-07-22022 July 1996 Revised Special Rept SR 95-03:on 950621,EDG 1-2 Failed to Load During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Loose Fuse Holder Contact Clip.Retensioned Loose Fuse Holder Contact Clip & Tightened Loose Wire Connection ML20117K4671996-05-28028 May 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 113 & 111 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML20236Q2611996-04-15015 April 1996 Rev 0 to DCP M-050284, Design Change Package for Installation of CCW Surge Tank Pressurization Sys for Unit 1 ML20094M6251995-11-21021 November 1995 Final Part 21 Rept of Investigation & Analysis of Suspect Fasteners Event 29257.B&G-Cardinal Discontinued Using Heat Treatment Equipment at Cardinal Facility Until Such Time That Satisfactory Mods Made to Hardware & Procedures ML20092F3411995-08-23023 August 1995 Corrected SE Supporting Amends 107 & 106 to Licenses DPR-82 & DPR-80,respectively ML18064A8631995-08-14014 August 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950714,determined That Redundant DG Circuits Not Separated Per App R Due to Insufficient App R Program Documentation.Hourly Fire Tour Established in EDG 1-1 Room & Review of LERs for App R Completed ML20082H9121995-04-11011 April 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 99 & 98 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML18100B2981994-05-24024 May 1994 LER 94-014-00:on 940426,SG 1-2 Automatically Started When Two Indicating Light Sockets Shorted Together Due to Personnel Error.Description of Event & Lessons Learned Will Be Published in Operations Incident Summary.W/940524 Ltr ML20063M1481994-03-0303 March 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 90 & 89 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively ML16342C3091993-12-31031 December 1993 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1993 for Dcnpp Units 1 & 2 ML16342A3691993-08-31031 August 1993 Revised MOR for Aug 1993 for Dcnpp Unit 1 ML16342A3681993-07-31031 July 1993 Revised MOR for July 1993 for Dcnpp Unit 1 ML20046A6611993-07-21021 July 1993 Cycle 6 Startup Rept. ML20059G6811993-06-30030 June 1993 Revised MOR for June 1993 for Dcnpp Unit 1 ML16342A3671993-05-31031 May 1993 Revised MOR for May 1993 for Dcnpp Unit 1 ML20045D1731993-05-31031 May 1993 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1993 for Diablo Canyon,Units 1 & 2 ML20126J5961992-12-31031 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Loss of RHR Cooling During Nozzle Dam Removal.Nozzle Dams May Create Trapped Air Column Behind Cold Leg Nozzle Dam.Mod to Nozzle Dams Currently Underway. Ltrs to Affected Utils Encl 05000275/LER-1992-001, :on 920214,0608,19 & 25,plant Operated Outside of Design Basis Re App R Criteria.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Lack of Attention to Detail.Fire Watches Established, Operators Notified & Design Change Initiated1992-07-0808 July 1992
- on 920214,0608,19 & 25,plant Operated Outside of Design Basis Re App R Criteria.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Lack of Attention to Detail.Fire Watches Established, Operators Notified & Design Change Initiated
1999-07-12
[Table view] |
Text
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90 Cte j~.
UNITED STATES 3
,j-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
'2 horilNGTON, D.C. 20666 4001 Ug
' SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 115 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80 AND AMENDMENT NO.
113 TO FACILITY' OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated November 14, 1994, as supplemented by letters dated December 7, 1995, February 2, 1996, May 28, 1996, and July 30, 1996, Pacific
' Gas and Electric Company (or the licensee), as the lead plant, requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82) for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (DCPP).
The proposed changes, based on generic Westinghouse' Owners Group (WOG) topical reports, would revised the slave' relay test frequency from quarterly'(Q) to refueling (R). Currently at DCPP and other Westinghouse plants, slave relays for the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)'are tested quarterly with the exception of some relays which' were previously approved by the NRC to be tested every 18 months. The proposed changes to the TS would extend the test interval for all Potter and-
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Brumfield MDR slave relays in Westinghouse plant ESFAS to 18 months.
In order to justify these changes, PG&E provided generic Westinghouse Topical Reports, WCAP-13878, Rev. O, " Reliability & Assessment of Potter and Brumfield MDR Series Relays," dated June 1994, (proprietary version) (Ref. 1), WCAP-14117, i
Rev. O, dated June 1994, (non-proprietary version), (Ref. 2) and WCAP-13900, Rev. O, " Extension of Slave Relay Surveillance Test Intervals," dated April 1994 (Ref. 3).
Following review of the above topical ~ reports, the staff, by letter dated April 25,1995 (Ref. 4) requested additional information and PG&E responded by letters dated December 7, 1995 and February 2, 1996 (Refs. 5 and 6).
In addition, by letter dated April 12, 1996, the Westinghouse Owners j
Group submitted Revision 1 to WCAP-13878 and WCAP-14117 (Ref. 7).
By. letter dated May 31, 1996, the staff accepted and issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) to the WOG approving the above Topical Reports. The revision also removed table notation 4 from Table 4.3-2 and revised the appropriate associated. Bases.
The December 7, '1995, February 2,1996, May 28,1996, July 30,1996, supplemental-letters provided additional clarifying information and did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration noticed in the Federal Register on December 6, 1995 (60 FR 62495).
9608300059 960819 PDR ADOCK 05000275 P
PDR
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2.0 BACKGROUND
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The NRC staff formed a Task Group in August'1983 to investigate problems i
concerning surveillance testing required by TS and to recommend improvements.
i The results of the study were published in November 1983 (Ref. 8) in NUREG-1024,-" Technical Specifications - Enhancing the Safety Impact." NUREG-1024 recommended that the staff review the bases for TS test frequencies; ensure i
that the TS required tests promote safety and do not degrade equipment; and review surveillance tests.to ensure that they do not unnecessarily burden personnel.
l The Technical Specifications Improvement Program (TSIP) was established in December 1984 to provide the framework for addressing the NUREG-1024 i
recommendations, and for rewriting and improving the TS. As an element of the l
TSIP, TS surveillance requirements were comprehensively examined as recommended in NUREG-1024. The results of the TSIP effort are presented in NUREG-1366, " Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance i
Requirements".(Ref. 9). The study concluded that, while some testing at power is essential, safety can be improved, equipment degradation decreased, and unnecessary personnel burden prevented by reducing the amount of testing at power. These three conclusions formed the basis for the four criteria that justify changes to surveillance intervals as follows:
Criterion 1 - The surveillance could lead to a plant transient, Criterion 2 - The surveillance results in unnecessary wear to equipment, i
Criterion 3 - The surveillance results in radiation exposure to plant personnel that-is not justified by the safety significance of the surveillance, Criterion 4 - The surveillance places an unnecessary burden on plant personnel because the time required is not justified by the safety significance of the surveillance.
3.0 EVALUATION In the SER for the above Westinghouse Topical Reports, the staff requested each licensee to address the following concerns:
-1.
Confirm the applicability of the WCAP-13878, Rev. I analyses for their plant.
2.
Ensure that their procurement program for P&B MDR relays is adequate for i
detecting the types of failures that are discussed in References 10, 11, 12 and 13.
I 3.
Ensure that all pre-1992 P&B MDR relays which are used in either normally energized or a 20 percent duty cycle have been removed from ESFAS applications.
. 4.
Ensure that a contact loading analysis for P&B MDR relays has been perfomed to determine the acceptability of these relays.
The DCPP licensee in its submittal dated December 7,1995, addressed each of the above issues. The licensee's response to these issues is discussed below:
- 1.
Slave relays used at DCPP are P&B MDR Model 4102 (latching) and 4103 (non-latching) type. Although WCAP-13878 analyzed P&B MDR model 4121-1 (latching) and 4103 (non-latching) type relays, the DCPP relays are similar in design to those analyzed in the WCAP, and therefore, the analysis adequately covers the DCPP relays. The staff concurs with the licensee's statement on the similarity of relays.
2.
Based on Report S93-06 from the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00) (Ref. 10), Information Notice (IN) 90-57 and Supplement 1-to IN 90-57 (Refs. 11 and 12), and a 10 CFR Part 21 notification from San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (Ref.
13), PG&E has put in place an enhanced commercial grade dedication
. program to prevent substandard or refurbished relays from being installed in the plant. All existing relays in the warehouse will be re-inspected based on the enhanced dedication criteria. Only three relays procured as commercial grade were installed at DCPP and they have been verified to have passed sufficient dedication criteria and testing to assure.their acceptability.
Based on this, the staff finds that PG&E has an adequate commercial grade dedication program for P&B MDR relays for detecting potential failures.
3.
IN 92-04 (Ref.14) and AE00 Report S93-06. identified failures of normally energized or 20 percent duty cycle P&B MDR relays. At DCPP, there are 40 P&B MDR relays installed in each of the solid state protection system (SSPS) bays. Of these 40 relays, only 2 relays are normally energized at power, and neither relay performs a function covered by TS. Also at DCPP, none of the slave relays required by TS
{
are energized during an outage since the SSPS is removed from service at that time. Therefore, the concern for removing normally energized or 20 percent duty cycle relays from ESFAS applications does not apply to DCPP.
4.
IN 92-19 (Ref.15) and AE00 Report S93-06 reported contact failures due l
to misapplication of P&B MDR relays. WCAP-13878, Rev. O, considered contact failures to be beyond the scope of the report. However, PG&E completed a loading study covering each contact on every DCPP SSPS P&B IOR slave relay for Unit 1 and found the relays acceptable. The DCPP Unit 2 design and contact loading is similar to Unit 1 and hence was not reviewed. The licensee's analysis satisfactorily resolves the' staff's concern in this area.
Based'on the review of WCAP-13878, Rev. 1, WCAP-14117, Rev. 1, and WCAP-13900, Rev. 0,' and the licensee's srbeittals referencing these topical reports, the staff concludes that the proposed test interval extension to every refueling outage for P&B MDR slave relays is justified for DCPP. However, consistent j
i j
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_.m
. 1 with the staff SER for the above topical reports, the staff further concludes i
that if two or more P&B MDR ESFAS subgroup. relays fail in a 12-month period, the licensee should reevaluate the adequacy of-the extended surveillance interval. The reevaluation should consider design, maintenance and testing of
)
all P&B MDR ESFAS subgroup relays.
If the licensee determines that the surveillance interval is inadequate for detecting a single relay failure, the surveillance interval should be decreased. The revised surveillance interval should be such that the licensee can detect an ESFAS subgroup relay failure prior to the occurrence of a second failure.
By letter dated July 30, 1996, the licensee comitted to reevaluate the adequacy of the ' extended surveillance interval according to the criteria presented in the generic SER, 4.0-STATE CONSULTATION In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no coments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may. be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public coment on such finding (60 FR 62495). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for i
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
6.0 CONCLUSION
-The Commission has concluded, based.on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered Ly operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, j
and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
7.0 REFERENCES
1.
Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP-13878, " Reliability Assessment of Potter &'Brumfield MDR Series Relays," (proprietary version) dated June
~
1994, transmitted to NRC by Gregory M. Rueger (Pacific Gas and Electric Company for Diablo Canyon) letter DCL-94-254, dated November 14, 1994, i
2.
Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP-14117, " Reliability' Assessment of Potter & Brumfield MDR Service Relays," (non-proprietary version). dated
~
June 1994, transmitted to NRC by Gregory M. Rueger (Pacific Gas and i
Electric Company for Diablo Canyon) letter DCL-94-254, November 14, 1994.
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l 3.
Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP-13900, " Extension of Slave Rclay i
Surveillance Test Intervals," dated April 1994, transmitted to NRC by
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Gregory M. Rueger (Pacific Gas and Electric Company for Diablo Canyon)
{
letter DCL-94-254, dated November 14, 1994.
t i
i 4.
Melanie A. Miller (NRC) letter to Gregory M. Rueger (PG&E), dated i
April 27, 1995, " Request for Additional Information on Slave Relay Test j
Frequency Extension for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2."
5.
Gregory M. Rueger (PG&E) letter (DCL-95-268) to USNRC, dated December 7, 1995, " Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Slave Relay Test Frequency Relaxation Amendment."
E i
6.
Warren H. Fujimoto (PG&E) letter (DCL-96034) to USNRC, dated February 2, 1996, " Respond to NRC Request on Slavo Relay Test Frequency Relaxation Amendment."
7.
Lee Bush ~(WOG) letter (WOG-SRT-96-005) to USNRC, dated April 12, 1996,
" Transmittal of Page Revisions to WCAP-13878 (proprietary), to address j
NRC review issues.
8.
NUREG-1024, " Technical Specifications - Enhancing the Safety Impact,"
dated November 1983.
9.
NUREG-1366, " Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance 4
Requirements," dated December 1992.
l 10.
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data Special Study
(
Report AE0D/S93-06, " Potter & Brumfield Model MDR Rotary Relay Failures," dated December 1993.
Il' 11..
NRC Information Notice 90-57, " Substandard, Refurbished Potter &'
Brumfield Relays Misrepresented as New," dated September 5, 1990.
1 12.
NRC Information Notice 90-57, Supplement 1, " Substandard, Refurbished 3
Potter & Brumfield Relays Represented as New," dated November 27, 1991.
)
l 13.
10 CFR Part 21 Notification dated July 21, 1995 from San Onofre Nuclear Generating U.ation (SONGS) concerning relays,that were returned to SONGS with bent contact arms following PLB rework.
14.
NRC Information Notice 92-04, "Misapplications of Potter & Brumfield MDR Model MDR Rotary Relay Failures," dated January 6,1992.
15.
NRC Information Notice 92-19, "Misapplications of Potter & Brumfield MDR Rotary Relays," dated March 2, 1992, Principal Contributor:
H. Garg l
Date: August'19, 1996
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