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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y*
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JUL 2 21983 MEMORANDUM FOR:
0." Parr, Chief, Auxiliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration FROM:
F. Rosa, Chief, Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR DIABLO CANYON IDVP eggs Enclosed is our SER for the instrumentation and control systems design review of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and the Control Room Ventilation and Pressur-ization System included in the Diablo Canyon IDVP.
Section numbers correspond to those provided by J. Wemiel. In a few places, reference is made to Sections of the Power Systems Branch evaluation. These section reference numbers will need revision when' integrated into the DSI SER to be provided to DL based on these inputs.
The enclosed SER found the IDVP to be acceptable in all but two areas.' These are addressed under E01 files 8018 and 8047 in Section 5.2.1.6.
In these two files the conclusions of the IDVP could not be confirmed to be acceptable.
Submittal of the DSI SER to DL should note that the IDVP raised issues which had not previously been recognized and that action will be required to con-clude this aspect of the review of the IDVP. Since the conclusions of the IDVP in these two cases were based primarily upon statements made by PG&E in response to these concerns, the licensee should be notified that these items remain open and need to be resolved prior to further licensing action.
f.4 wt.-
l Faust Rosa, Chief l
Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration f
Enclosure:
As stated i
cc:
R. Mattson I
R. Houston i
L. Rubenstein M. Srinivasan J. Wemiel l
J. Knox
Contact:
T. Dunning, ICSB i
X29457 n9%p9rnyA % )0
'. JUL.121983 i
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAN 5.2.1.6 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS DESIGN OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM A review was performed for the safety related instrumenta-tion and controls for the Aux 1Liary Feedwater (AFW) Sys-tea.
This aspect of the IDVP was conducted by the Stone and. Webster Engineering Corporation.
The review covered three major areas: (1) envi ronmental qualifi cation, (2) system design conformance to Licensing requirements, and (3) field verification of installed systems.
The design and installation of safety related instrumenta-tion and controls for the AFW system were reviewed to con-firm compliance with the Licensing commitments for these systems.
The Licensing documents include the FSAR, PG8E Letters to NRC on Licensing criteria and responses to questions, and design documents including logic diagrams, instrument and electrical schematics, and wiring diagrams.
l Concerns identified in the review were addressed in Interim Technical Report 27, Rev. 1, " Verification i
of the Instrument and Control Design of the Auxiliary l
Feedwater System".
The fot Lowing Error or Open Items l
(E01) files were established during this review.
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EDI File 8018 i
The concern identified was that valve operators for the isolation valves which provide the steam supply to the
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turbine driven auxiliary feed pump from two of the four 4
main steam generator headers were not~ classified.and pro-cured as safety related components.
The basis for this concern was that these valves may not be operable in a harsh environment associated with a steam Line break in the steam supply to the turbine driven pump.
Therefore these valves would not be capable of being closed to mitigate the consequences of such an event.
PG8E p ro-vided an analysis performed by Westinghouse indicating that the steam flow from the postulated break would not trip the unit when operating at power Levels of 10, 30, 60 or 100%.
Therefore, according to FSAR Appendix 3.6, the assumption of Loss offsite power need not be con-sidered as a consequence of this event.
Thus the normal i
feedwater system would be assumed to be available.
Westinghouse stated that for this case the blowdown of i
l the two steam generators would be acceptable as Long as j
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the other two were intact.
The IDVP concluded that while it is desirable to isolate the break, the Licensing commitment to maintain safe shutdown capability was I
shown by the analysis.
Further the IDVP considered i
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3-this to be adequate in that feedwater flow can be main-
- i tained to the steam generators to mitigate the effects l
of a steam Line break and these valves are not required to perform a safety function.
On this basis the file was closed.
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F 8ased the staff's rev ew of t.his matter it has res vations on the dequacy'of the basis set forth by s'
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e IDVP in reso ing this matter.
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-e fo -.....hegostulated event, the Lant perator w6uld
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p take p opt action to shutdown yhe reac or and t t such acti n would probably include manua re a c to r/t ri p.
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L Load conditions this would res Lt in a I
rator trip and increases' the pot ntial fo the loss of'
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offsite powe[.
Further, the at ff is no aware of any/
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analysis which has been perfo med whic would assu
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i that envi ronmental cons tiuences f the post 'ated steam dine break would not have a trimental effect I
on nonsafety related con rol syst as requi r d to main-
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normal 'feedwater Low.
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nor haf it evaluat'ed the consequences if it were not.
ditio e staff notes that the subject valves are v&--w--yy--,e-e-m
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y E0I File 8032 The concern identified was that a fire in the main con-trol room may cause damage which could preclude transfer of the control of the Level control valves from the con-trol room to the hot shutdown panel.
These control valves are used to control steam generator Level by regulating the auxiliary f eedwater ( AFW) flow supplied by the motor driven AFW pumps.
The basis for the concern was a commit-ment by PGSE, made in response to NRC fire protection review l
questions, that the control of these valves would be operable from the hot shutdown panet in the event of a fire in the main control room.
Inherent with this commitment is the implication that fire damage would not preclude the transfer of these controls and that subsequently the control of l
steam generator Level could be carried out at the hot shut-down panet by having had made this transfer.
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- However, PG8E committed to make modifications to eliminate this concern.
The IDVP has verified the implementation of these modifications and has found them to be acceptable.
1 Based on this action the item was closed.
The staff con-curs with the IDVP resolution of this matter.
E02 File 8047 The concern identified'was that a single failure of an auxiliary relay would prevent automatic closure of the redundant steam generator blowdown isolation valves on l
automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater system.
l The basis for this concern was that sufficient decay heat removat may not be provided under Limiting conditions postulated for accidents if team generator blowdown is
.f not terminated.
PG8E - - : rrid that the single relay identified is not safety related, however, PG8E noted that steam generator blowdown is terminated by safety re-Lated signals, namely safety injection and/or Phase A containment isolation, thereby preventing the loss of steam generator inventory for atL but two accjdents cases 1
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addressed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.
The two cases under which steam generator blowdown would not be termin-
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ated by safety related signals are Loss of normal feed-
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water and Loss of offsite power.
In its investigation of this matter the IDVP reviewed the Westinghouse anaty-ses, included in correspondence from PG8E to the NRC, on the adequacy of the AFW system design to provide suffi-cient flow consistent with the FSAR safety analysis.
These analyses performed by Westinghouse included the assumption that steam generator blowdown flow is termin-5 ated for loss of main feedwater or offsite power.
There-fore to resolve the conflict that steam generator blow-down may not be terminated for these events (i.e., the failure of the single relay which initiates this action) l PG8E provided documentation to the IDVP indicating that l
for these events where blowdown is not terminated, ade-I, quate feedwater or AFW flow exists assuming the Loss of one AFW train.
On this basis the IDVP determined that there is no violation of Licensing commitments.
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While the staff does not tutus =tssovivith the PGSE con-cLusion that adequate AFW flow wilL be available for c
I safe shutdown, it does find that the use of a single relay to isolate steam generator blowdown on automatic initiation of the AFW systems is in conflict with the l
design as described on FSAR figure 7.2-1, sheet 15.
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Further, the redundancy as shown by 44te. figure which j
is typical for ELL Westinghouse plants is consistent y
with the Westinghouse analysis noted above which assumes J
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that steam generator hLowdown is terminated for those associated with safety injection.,2m b.pe )
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the staff concludes that
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'r does represent a deviation from the intent of material provided by Westinghouse as inter-face requirements to be implemented by the balance of hM'C'M j O, :.f TL h. :& hY'd t- t :
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E01 F1Le 8051
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The concern identified was that the pressure transmitter i
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pump is not powered from a safety related power source.
The basis for this concern was that FSAR Appendix 3.6 4
r identified this transmitter as essential equipment.
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responded to this concern by stating that this transmit-l ter performs no safety related function and that the i
w FSAR would be revised to reflect this fact.
The IDVP concluded that this action resolved this concern and
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classified this item as a deviation.
The staff concurs with the conclusions of the IDVP on this matter.
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EDI File 8052 The concern identified was that flow transmitter FT-78 and flow control valve FCV-95 in the AFW system may not be environmentally qualified for harsh environments j
associated with high energy Line breaks.
The basis l
for this concern was that these items were not Listed Located in harsh environments in the PG5E environ-as mental qualification report of safety related components located in harsh environments.
PG8E responded to these concerns by noting that the flow transmitter was identi-i fied under a different identification number, FT-200.
The environmental qu'alification of this item has not been completed however the vendor's report provided justification for interim operation pending completion of this program.
The flow control valve was condition-atLy qualified, subject to an on going maintenance surveillance program but was erroneously Listed as a component not subject to a harsh environment.
PG8E wilL correct clerical errors in the qualification report tables.
On the basis of the PG8E response, the IDVP withdrew its concern on this matter.
The staff concurs with the ISVP resolution of this matter.
l E01 Files 8054, and 8055 l
These items are addressed in Section (PSB section 5.2.1.2) of this safety evaluation report.
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9 EDI File 8057 i
This item is addressed in Section (Pss section 5.2.1.3) of this safety evaluation report.
E02 File 8058 The concern identified was that the steam generator Level control valves (LCV-110, -111, -113, and -115) may 4
not be environmentally qualified for harsh environments associated with high energy Line breaks.
The basis for this concern was that the environmental qualification report identified an unqualified motor capacitor as an outstanding item to be completed.
The report provided a justification for interia operation with replacement of this component folLowing 20,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> operation.
PG8E responded to this concern noting that an analysis to determine the qualified Life of this component is being conducted.
The IOVP concluded that the PG8E re-sponse resolved this concern.
The staf f concurs with the conclusions of the IDVP on this matter.
E01 File 8059 i
Thir item is addressed in section (Pss section 5.2.1.2) of this safety evaluation report.
4 to! File 8060 l
This item is addressed in Section 5.2.1.4 of this safety evaluation report.
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. EDI File 8064 This item is addressed in section (Pss section 5.2.1.2) of this safety evaluation report.
Based on the review of the E0I files established in the review of the AFW instrumentation and control systems and resolution of concerns identified herein, with the ex-ception of pending staff actions for E0I files 8018 and 8047, the staff concludes that the 20VP has confirmed that the Licensing commitments for the design of this system have been satisfied and that no generic concerns were identified which alter the staff's prior conclusion stated in its safety evaluation report for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
5.2.1.7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS DESIGN OF THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AND PRES $URIZATION SYSTEM i
A review was performed for the safety related instrumenta-tion and controls for the Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization (CRVP) System.
This aspect of the IOVP was conducted by the Stone and Webster Engineering Corpor-l ation.
The review covered three major areas: (1) environ-mental qualification, (2) system design conformance to Licensing requirements, and (3) field verification of in-stalled systems.
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The design and installation of safety related instru-monts and controls for the CRVP system were reviewed to confirm compliance with Licensing commitments for these i
systems.
The Licensing documents include the FSAR, PGSE Letters to NRC on Licensing criteria and response to questions, and design documents including logic diagrams, instrument and electrical schematics, and wiring diagrams.
Concerns identified.in the review were addressed in Interim Technical Report 28, Rev. 1, " Verification of the Instrumentation and Control Design of the Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System".
The f o t Lowi ng Error or Open Item (EDI) files were establish-ed during this review.
E01 File 8017 This item is addressed in Section (PSB section 5.3.1) i of this safety evaluation report.
E01 File 8046 The concerns raised by this item was transf erred by the IDVP to E01 file 8012 and is addressed in Section (PSB section 5.2.1.3) of this safety evaluation report.
E01 File 8053 The concern identified was that radiation monitors RE-51,
-52, -53, and -54 were identified as nonsafety related
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on the instrument schematic drawing.
PS8E provided a response to this concern noting that this identification was a drafting error only and that these instruments were purchased and installed to safety related require-ments.
The IDVP concurred with this response and re-classified this ites as a deviation.
The staff concurs with the IDVP on the resolution of this matter.
E0! File 8056 The concern identified was that portions of the CRVP systems were omitted f rom PG8E's environmental qualifi-cation report.
The basis of this concern was that some equipment may not be environmentally qualified for normal l
l and abnormal environmental conditions postulated for the Location of this equipment.
PG8E provided a response indicating that the classification of CRYP components as safety related electrical equipment located outside con-f' tainment and not subject to a severe environment did not include some components since the compilation of the Listed components was made before the system design was j
completed.
Further the environmental qualification re-port wilL be updated to include the non-Listed components 1
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, of the CRVP system.
The IDVP confirmed that no safety related components of the CRVP system are subject to harsh environments and that components were designed for expected service conditions.
On this basis the file was reclassified a closed ites.
The staff concurs with the IDVP resolution of this matter.
E01 File 8057 This item is addressed in section (PSB section 5.2.1.3) of this safety evaluation report.
E01 File 8059 This item is addressed in section (PSB section 5.2.1.2) of this safety evaluation report.
l Based on the review of the ECI files established in the l
review of the CRVP instrumentation and control systems 1
and resolution of concerns identified herein, the staf f concludes that the IDVP confirmed that the Licensing commitments for the design of this system have been satis-fled and that no generic concerns were identified which alter the staff's prior conclusions stated in its safety l
j evaluation report for DiabLo Canyon Unit 1.
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