ML20236Q261
| ML20236Q261 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1996 |
| From: | Bush K, Kewalramani M, Mckernan J PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342E167 | List: |
| References | |
| DCP-M-050284, DCP-M-050284-R00, DCP-M-50284, DCP-M-50284-R, NUDOCS 9807200112 | |
| Download: ML20236Q261 (160) | |
Text
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Attachment B 4
PG&E Letter DCL-98-096 O
DCP M-050284, REVISION 0, INSTALLATION OF CCW SURGE TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM FOR UNIT 1 I
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1 9907200112 990709 PDR ADOCK 05000275 p
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)~
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE COVER L
DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 1 of 58 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE l
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM During a Large Break LOCA coincident with loss of offsite power, the potential exists for CCW to flash inside the containment fan coolers due to insufficient system static head and elevated containment temperature. In order to preclude flashing and subsequent water hammer, the CCW surge tank needs to be pressurized to increase the static head on the l
system.
SOLUTION AND JUSTIFICATION j
The CCW is to be pressurized to raise its saturation temperature in order to prevent flashing during the postulated scenario.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DESIGN CHANGE t
The CCW surge tank will be pressurized using a nitrogen source via the plant low pressure rdtrogen header and backed up via a dedicated class I localized bottle source.
l Additionally this design will install a new CCW surge tank pressure and plant nitrogen l
header alarm in the control room.
RELATIONSHIP TO OPEN DCPs DCP M-49284/DCN 1-SE-49284
- IfDCN 1-SE-49284 has not been implemented, the ponien of the Electrical DCN concerning the low pressure alarm for the N supply header will need to be implemented 2
- under a panial closure. - Otherwise, the Unit 2 low pressure alarm will not function.
EFFECT ON PLANT OPERATION 4
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Date: 04/15/96
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(DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE COVER DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 2 of 58 This design change will result in new and/or revised plant operation procedures and actions with respect to the CCW & plant nitrogen systems.
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE COVER DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 3 of 58 TABLE OF CONTENTS DCS INSTRUCTIONS: As the DCP is assembled, indicate all attachments by marking the appropriate boxes in ink.
DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION PT KICKOFF MEETING MINUTES
[p DCN NUMBER CURRENT Attached PREVIOUSLY ISSUED PER REVISION DCP REV.
2-SE-050284 0
hrJ M-050284 Rev. Da 2-SJ-050284 0
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M-050284 Rev. Da 2-SP-050284 0
[g M-050284 Rev. On LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION SCREEN M
LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION
[f]
ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS:
A: DCN Review for Appendix R Changes B: Fuse Change Request Forms i
C: Electrical Design Verification Review Checklist D: Intentionally Left Blank E: Intentionally Left Blank F: IDCMC for DCM S-14 G: IDCMC for DCM S-25A H: IDCMC for DCM T-9 1
I: IDCM, Rev 1.7 for DCM S-25B J: FSAR Update change request for sections 9.22,3.3.2.3.2.2,9.4.5, Tables 3.3-i 1
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v Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Wrsion 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE COVER DCP M-050284 Rev. 0 Page 4 of 58 l
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE COVER DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 5 of 58 APPROVALS NES Discipline Engineer Date Director Approval Date Architecture Civil Communications Electrical Keith B Bush 04/15/ %
Patrick R Colbert 04/15/ %
HVAC I&C John A McKernan 04/15/ %
Sid Bowen 04/15/96 Mechanical Robert A Waltos 04/15/96-Nuclear Piping Mohan C Kewalramani 04/15/ %
Richard L 04/15/96 Klimczak Tech Support Coordination Org.
Approval Date Mechanical Coordinator Jeffery B Abramson 04/15/ %
Piping Coordinator Kersi J Dalal 04/15/96 Civil Coordinator L Jearl Strickland 04/15/ %
Tech Support Coordinator Vinod K Juneja 04/11/96 i
Nuclear Coordinator William D Ellis 04/15/ %
Other Coordinator Bruce L Fulbright 04/15/96 L_____._._-__________
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l Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE COVER DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 6 of 58 i
Other Coordinator James A Gregerson 04/15/ %
i Other Coordinator Michael J Peterson 04/15/96 Other Coordinator Raymond C Hom 04/15/ %
Other Members of the Project Team Brian Steen-Larsen 04/13/96 Jim M Fauria 04/15/96 John A McKernan 04/15/96 Keith B Bush 04/15/96 Lawrence B Pulley 04/14/96 Michael Jensen 04/14/96 Mohan C Kewalramani 04/15/96 l Project Team Leader Loren E Lemons 04/15/ %
PSRC Review Date:
4 /15/9L Plant Manager de t,/v)pg r
Package Closure (After Implementation)
Note 1:
Only disciplines which have a DCN included as a part of the DCP must sign in the NES Discipline Engineer / Approval section.
l Note.2:
Approvals documented in the LBIE Screen, LBIE and Independent Verification need not I
be repeated in this approval section..
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- Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE COVER DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 7 of 58 i
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 8 of 58 i
DESIGN BASES / REQUIREMENTS
SUMMARY
Summarizes the design bases and design inputs applicable to this design change.
a)
Design Criteria Memoranda Requires Revision a (Including Interim DCM Changes)
(Y/N)
M-71 N
S-14 Component Cooling Water System Y
S-16 Makeup Water System N
S-25B Backup Air System Y
S-4 Turbine steam supply N
T-10 Equipment qualification analysis N
T-12 Flooding, Missles, HELB, hELB N
T-16 Containment Function N
T-22 Electrical Cable. Termination and Raceway N
T-24 Design Criteria for DCPP Instrumentation & Controls N
T-25 Stress analysis N
T-26 Pipe supoort analysis N
T-38 Tubing 'naj vsis N
T-9 Wind Tornado & Tsunami Y
- (If Yes, complete and attach Interim DCM Change form in accordance with NECS-E3.2) b)
Specifications Requires Rev*sion
- a (Y/N)
Instrument valve specifications, drawing 053479 N
Piping spec. 8179 N
"(If Yes, initiate Request for Revision to Specification in accordance with procedure DLAP CF3.NE4) c)
Design Calculations (see prpcedure NEMP 3.3)
. _ _ = _ _
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 9 of 58 Calc. No. /Rev.
Check box if revised as Final revision Required If "Y" AR/AE that part of timis Package (Y/N) tracks completion H-079-01 Rev. 8 15 N
2S-289 Rev.
li5 N
2S-443 Rev.
ti5 N
2S-88 Rev.
li5 N
IS-35 Rev. 50, li5 N
3 IS-71 Rev. 4 N
IS-74 Rev.10 li5 N
J-105 Rev.
li5 N
M-272 Rev. O N
M-410 Rev. 3 li5 Y
A0398539 M-416 Rev. O li5 Y
A0398543 M-57.2 Rev. I N
M-857 Rev. I N
M-914 Rev. 2 N
M-979 Rev.1 N
M-998 Rev. O N
M-999 Rev. O N
MH-079-01 Rev. 2 li5 N
NSP-1-14-850A Rev.
li5 N
NSP-1-14-850B Rev.
li5 N
P-I&C-82 Rev. O li5 N
l SQE-22 Rev. 4 li5 N
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d)
Design inputs such as materials,.ioads, forces, environmental conditions, etc.
Explain and reference sources During normal plant operation, this design change will utilize design class 11 nitrogen (N2) from the plant low pressure nitrogen header @ around 85 PSIG as a primary source of pressure to the CCW surge tank. The design will tap into the plant N2 header at an upstream point from where it is being used as a class II backup supply to 10% steam dump i
valves, PCV's 21 & 22. The 85 PSIG N2 supply will be dropped to 20 PSIG by a regulator installed near the CCW surge tank. A160 ugh nitrogen is the preferred gas to
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pressurize the surge tank, an additional backup source from the plant instrument air system (which will be normally isolated from the pressurization system) will be provided for the same regulator. In the event of a loss of the class Il plant N2 system, an instrument class ID back-up nitrogen source set at 75 PSIG will be provided via a i
dedicated N2 bottle supply source.
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5) l l
l TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION
. DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 10 of 58 The passive control system which will be used to control pressure in the CCW surge tank is designed to (1) maintain minimum pressure in the tank at or above 17 PSIG to prevent CCW flashing and subsequent water hammer at the CFCUs during a LBLOCA with LOOP scenario and (2) control upper tank pressure at less than 30 PSIG to prevent overpressurization of CCW system components by not challenging the actuation of the CCW surge tt ik relief valve, RV-45. (Note: Calculation M-998 hr.s established the design value of17 PSIG).
f Control of over pressure in the tank will be main *=ined by a back pressure regulator
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manufactured by Fisher, Mdl # 98L-30. The new plant tag number associated with this regulator is PCV-2022. PCV-2022 will be set to relieve pressure at 25 PSIG. The i
setting tolerance and acceptable as foun i conditions associated with this regulator setpoint has been established by engineering and is documented in calculation J-105. The CCW system (and RV-45 relief capacity) is designed to handle a maximum in-leakage of 250 gpm, Ref DCM S-14 section 4.3.3.30. Under this scenario the tank pressure will increase and PCV-2022 will have the capacity to relieve prior to a RV-45 lift which is set at 30 psig. PCV-2022 is capable of maintaining surge tank pressure @ 29 psig, if the in-leakage to the tank does not exceed approx. 335 gpm ( REF. Calculation M-999 ). Furthermore PCV-2022 is seismically qualified to maintain the pressure boundary for DCPI' design basis seismic events. It should be noted that a high pressure alarm has been provided in order to ensure that the operators are alerted on increasing surge tank pressure before the relief valve, RV-45, is challenged.
l The CCW surge tank will be maintained at or above 17 PSIG via an air regulator manufactured by Fisher, Mdl # 95L-18. This design will install two regulators in parallel with one regulator normally isolated. This will accommodate any maintenance and/or repairs needed during normal plant operation modes. The new plant tag number's associated with these regulators are PCV-2020A & PCV-2020B. The manufacturer rated i
raaximum flow capacity associated with PCV-2020A/B is 25 SCFM @ 75 PSIG inlet -
pressure. PCV-2020A/B is to ensure that the CCW surge tank pressure can be maintained at 20 PSIG in the event of an out leakage of approx. 79 GPM, which is sufficient to address normal surge tank level changes plus maximum expected N2 leakage from tank valves and fittings. Refer to calculation M-999. The setting tolerance and acceptable as found conditions associated with this regulator setpoint has been established by engineering and is documented in calculation J-105. Funhermore, this regulator is
- seismically qualified to maintain the pressure boundary for DCPP design basis seismic events. It should be noted that a low surge tank pressure alarm has been provided in order to ensure that the operators are alened on decreasing surge tank pressure before the
' design low pressure limit of 17 PSIG is reached. A reliefvalve, RV-2030 ( set at 100
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 11 of 58 PSIG ), will be installed up stream of this regulator in order to protect against failure of
' the intregal relief device associated with 2000 psig N2 bottle regulator, PCV-2021 A/B.
The design specifies that two safety related, Instrument Class ID compressed nitrogen bottles shall be used as a backup in the event that the Class II plant low pressure nitrogen header should fail to provide an adequate pressure supply to the CCW surge tank. The two bottles, each having the capacity of 200 cubic FT @ 2000 PSIG, will have an adequate supply to maintain the CCW surge tank at or above 17 PSIG for approximately 20 minutes (assuming maximum surge tank N2 leakage of 8 scfm) as long as the bottles maintain a minimum pressure of approx.1000 PSIG. Refer to calculation M-999. A local pressure gauge installed near the N2 bottles will provide operators with information associated with the N2 bottle supply pressure. The compressed nitrogen bottles will be installed per seismically qualified design details provided in the I&C DCN The backup N bottles will be regulated down to 75 PSIG via an air regulator 2
manufactured by Matheson, Mdl # 8H. This design will install two regulators in parallel with one regulator isolated, in order to' accommodate any maintenance and/or repairs needed during normal plant operation modes. The new plant tag number's associated with these regulators are PCV-2021 A & PCV-2021B. The setting tolerance and acceptable as found condition associated with this regulator setpoint has been established by engineering and is documented in calculation J-105. Furthermore, this regulator is seismically qualified to maintain the pressure boundary for DCPP design basis seismic events. It should be noted that the number of bottles, 2, required for this design is based on an assumed nitrogen leakage of approx. 8 scfm from various surge tank valves, connections
& fittings. This assumed value will be verified by a PMT subsequent to declaring the system operable. If the PMT concludes that the leakage is in excess o'8 scfm, additional N2 bottles will be added accordingly.
Given the new design low limit of 17 PSIG associated with the CCW system, calculation M-175 Rev. 2 has determined that a vacuum approx.1.5 PSI (13.2 PSIA) will exist in the CCW system due to a 200 GPM CCW outleakage for 20 minutes. System 14 instrumentation that senses a direct pressure off the CCW surge tank has been reviewed regarding anyimpacts associated with a 1.5 PSI vacuum. It was concluded that a 1.5 PSI vacuum will not impair any operating characteristics associated with any System 14 instrument that senses pressure off the surge tank. Additionally, the addition of approx.
30 PSIG to the CCW system will not impair any System 14 instruments.
Under the above referenced 200 GPM outleakage scenario, the pressure in the surge tank will go down to approx.13.2 PSIA (1.5 psi vacuum) because the nitrogen makeup a_______----__-_-_.
Date: 04/15/%
(DCS Version 1.5) l l
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 12 of 58 capabilty via PCV-2020AJ2020B is less than the outleakage rate; however the NPSHA under this condition has been verified to be adequate (REF. calc. M-175, Rev.2).
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- All components installed per this design are installed per seismically qualified installation criteria in order to preclude an seismic interaction concerns The specified pressure transmitter, (Rosemount Mdl 1151, new plant tag number, PT-850) supplying the high and low alarm to the control room annunciator PK window has been L
calculated to have an overall channel uncertainty of 0.87 PSIG. The nominal setpoints L
associated with the high & low alarms have been established by engineering as a control basis category B type setpoint, refer to NSP-2-14-850A & B.
l' Loss of the low pressure nitrogen system (used as the primary source of nitrogen to the surge tank) will initiate a control room alarm indicating low nitrogen supply pressure. The back-up nitrogen bottles will maintain surge tank pressure until operators can restore the l
primary source of nitrogen. The bottles are sized to maintain approximately 20 minutes of l
nitrogen supply at an assumed nitrogen leakage rate in the tank of 8 scfm and minimum L
bottle pressure of 1000 psig. In the event that low pressure nitrogen system cannot be restored in 20 minutes, bottles can be mplaced accordingly in order to maintain the P
minimum design pressure of 17 psig in the tank. One spare, normally valved out N2 bottle j
is provided and an isolation valve is provided to add more bottles if required..
This design specifies stainless steel 3/4" x.065" wall thickness instrument tubing. Per
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published manufacturer data, this tubing has an associated pressure rating of approx. 3300 psig. This far exceeds the service conditions associated with this design.
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It should be noted that FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.2.3 identifies that the CCW surge tank volume was sized based on a non-mechanistic leak of 200 gpm from the system. The proposed modification will not adversely affect the pressure boundary integrity of any existing CCW components. Additionally, the proposed modification meets the design, material, and constmetion standards applicable to the CCW System and does not create a l
new failure mode which could increase the probability for CCW System leakage. All installed tubing, valves, regulators, bottles, and instruments which are part of the surge j
tank pressure boundary will be Design Class I. All tank pressure boundary components to j
be added by this modification will be seismically qualified and installed to Seismic Category I requirements. Because the basis for the 200 gpm for 20 minutes out-leakage was a non-mechanistic failure and operator action is credited in FSAR Update Table 9.2-
- 7(5) to establish Class I makeup to the surge tank within 10 minutes, pressurization of the surge tank will not affect the licensing requirement as specified in SSER 16 for minimum j
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS VGrsion 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. 0 l
Page 13 of 58 l
surge tank volume based on system out-leakage. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an out-leakage event is not increased e) '
Describe briefly the impact of this design change on vendor information, including vendor manuals, separately recorded vendor drawings, new vendor information being added to the drawing system, what is being superseded, etc. A search in RMS and PIMS should be conducted to identify all affected vendor documents.
All new and affected vendor documents shall be listed on the DDLs in the individual DCNs.
The following vendor documentation will be revised per this design change:
6006471-15, 663168-412,& -471, 663185-2 and 663225-2.
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No new vendor documentation will be added per this design change.
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l Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 14 of 58 l
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TECHNICAL REVIEW l
l 1.
Is there a change in classification, or new items being classified?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No a)
Classification
[ E ] Yes [ ] No Comments:
The piping classification boundary, piping code class C to E will be relocated just L
downstream of the new back pressure regulator, PCV-2022. This piping code class i
boundary existed just downstream of valve RCV-16 prior to this design change. All new L
piping and associated components will be installed and seismically qualified IAW PG&E piping code class C requirements. The electrical portion of allinstalled components are design class II, nonsafety-related, b)
Required Revisions to Q-List? Review the classification of components affected by the design change. List all applicable sections of the Q-List. If a revision to the Q-List is required, describe the change or addition needed below, complete Attachment B of procedure CF3.NEl, and send to Nuclear Systems Engineering.
Comments:
[ B j Yes [ ] No Q-List sections II.H.I.2.1, II.H.3 & III.G.4.1 are applicable however no changes to these
. sections are required.
Q-List Section V.F.14.3 indicates that the highest classification priority associated with i
Component Cooling Water (CCW) system pressure instrument systems is Instrument Class IC. This design change will install instrument class ID CCW pressure l
l instrumentation. In regards to this design, the primary ID function will be the same as an instrument class IC function, i.e., the primary function associated with the ID instrumentation per this design is to maintain the PBI of the nitrogen to the CCW surge tank at certain pressures. Therefore this Q-List section does not require any changes.
2.
Does the change affect non-safety related systems and components ? [ E ] Yes [ ] No a)
For non-safety related modifications, does the design resulting from the modifications affect any SSCs which are safety-related or associated with a Graded QA program 7
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Comments:
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[ E ] Yes [ ]No The Electrical and I&C DCN's will attach conduit and instrument tubing to the safety-related walls (or existing supports) of the Aux Building. Anchor bolts installed in these walls will be performed as an safety-related activity, such that engineering approval is required before any rebar may be cut or nicked. In addition, any fire penetration or stop 14 t _ __ _
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 15 of 58 affected by the electrical DCN will be repaired or replaced to assure its effectiveness.
Therefore the results of the electrical and IAC design changes will not adversely affect the safety-related structures or the components of the Graded QA program.
I The primary source of nitrogen for this design will be tied in to a source downstream of
- one of the non-safety related sources feeding 10% steam dump. valves, PCV-21 & 22.
This will result in a negligible pressure drop that will not impact the functionality of PCV-21 and/or 22. In addition, the 10% steam dump valves have dedicated class I backup compressed air supply in the event that the plant N2 header is unavailable.
b)
Isolauon/separauon from safety-related SSCs?
C1
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[ ] Yes l El] No The alarm portion of the CCW Surge Tank Pressurization instrumentation is functionally Design Class II (nonsafety-related). The power supply for this instrument loop is from a non-vital source. In addition, the interfacing components (i.e., Instrument Rack, Main Annunciator, Plant Computer) are Design Class II. Therefore, electrical isolation and separation from safety-related system and components is provided by the interfacing components. All physicr.1 installations of the instrument tubing, components and electrical conduit will be installed in accordance with seismically qualified installation criteria.
3.
Does the change affect safety-related SSCs 7
[ El] Yes [ l No a)
P~8aad-y/ Separation / Isolation
[ El] Yes [ ] No Comments:
Because the proposed modification will maintain CCW surge tank pressure before the LBLOCA occurs, the components added by this modification have no active safety function to perform once the accident has occurred. Therefore, the only safety-related function of the components added by this modification is to maintain pressure boundary i
integrity and thus, failure of these components is not postulated within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following a LOCA per FSAR Update Section 3.1.1.
However, the design does incorporate the use of two normally isolated CCW tank and j
bottle supply regulators. These back-up regulators can be used in the event the primary regulators require repair and/or maintenance. Furthermore, this design provides a tie to the plant instrument air system. Instrument air can be used as a pressure source for the tank in the event the N2 header and/or back-up bottle supply is unavailable. This design will not impact existing redundancy, isolation and or separation criteria associated with any other SSC.
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 16 of 58 b)
Safety-Related Valve
[ E ] Yes [ ] No C--ts:
This design change will not involve any modifications to any existing AOV and/or MOV.
The existing AOV, RCV-16, functionality will not be impacted by this design change.
This design change will install several manual piping code class C valves and Instrument Class ID & IC instrument class instrumentation valves. These valves will be dedicated for use as appropriate.
Additionally, the proposed modification will not adversely affect any CCW System AOV or MOV design differential pressures as speci6ed in Calculation M-573 Rev.1.
The pressurization scheme in this design will have a negligible effect on CCW system motor-operated valve performance. Boosting the system prer,sure by 30 psig will not affect differential pressure across the valves. There is no stem ejection force effect in the butterfly valve sizing. The only rising stem motor operated valves.in the CCW system are j
FCV-357 and FCV-750. These valves are designed and setup based on isolating the CCW system from a RCP thermal barrier leak. As such, the design DP based on RCS pressure is well in excess of the CCW system. Therefore, GL 89-10 DP test results and switch setting
- calculations will remain valid.
4.
Does the change involve any work / activity inside the containment? ' [ ] Yes i E ] No a)
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity
[ ] Yes [ B ] No Comments:
Plant modifications will be performed outside containment.
b)
Equipmentinside Containment
[ ] Yes [ E ] No Comments:
Plant modifications will be performed outside containment.
[
c).
Aluminum Inventory Inside Contamment
[ ] Yes [ E ] No C=-ts:
Plant modifications will be performed outside containment.
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Date: 04/15/96 -
(DCS VGrsion 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 17 of 58 d)
Paint laside Containment
[ ] Yes [ E ] No Comments:
Plant modifications will be performed outside containment.
c)
Thermal Insulabon Used luside Containment
[ ] Yes [ B ] No Comments:
Plant modifications will be performed outside containment.
5.
Does the change involve any work / activity inside the radsation controlled area?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No a)
Radwaste System
[ ] Yes l E ] No Comments:
' Radwaste SSC's are not impacted by this design change, b)
ALARA Review Does the change modify system components that contain radioactive materials?
[ ] Yes [ E ] No A portion of the design change will be a modification to line 2555. Normally this line has been vented to atmosphere and does not contain any radioactive material. A high rad signal via the CCW system header elements, RE-17A or B, will isolate this line via the closure of valve RCV-16. This function will not be impacted by this design change.
Does the change require modification in an area that has 2.5 mrem /hr or higher dose rate?
[ ] Yes [ E ] No Electrical and I&C DCN's will install conduit, circuits and instrument tubing in Area GW, above elevation 124', This area is less than 2.5 mrem /hr, and will not require the breach of any system or component that contains radwaste.
The remaining portions of this design change will be located at the CCW surge tank, outside area H elev 164' and outside area GE elev 140'. These area are less than 2.5 mrem /hr Does the change modify any portion of the HVAC system, including doors and/or walls i
which may change air flow patterns, that is within the RCA7
[ ] Yes l E ] No 17
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Vcrsion 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 18 of 58 l
This design change will not modify any portion ofHVAC SSC's.
Does the change modify any ponion of the Radiation Monitoring System?
[ ] Yes [ E ] No This design change does not modify any radiation monitoring system components. RCV-16 which isolates the CCW surge tank on high rad signals via RE-17A and/or B will not beimpacted by this design change.
Does the change introduce new potential source term material into the RCS or CVCS flow streams? (e.g., alloys containing Cobalt, Nickel, etc.)
[ ] Yes [ E I No No material will be installed containing cobalt, nickel and/or alloys that have the possibility ofbecoming source material.
If any of the answers to the above questions are "Yes", complete an ALARA Design Review contained in the ALARA Design Manual 6.
Does the change involve any work / activity inside the protected area? (including items "outside the fence" but within security boundaries such as the Auxiliary Saltwater Vacuum Breakers near the Met Tower or the Intake Structure)
[ E ] Yes [ ] No a)
Environmental Qualification
[ ] Yes [ E ] No Comments:
This design change does not add, delete or modify equipment subject to EQ or result in 3
any change to environmental conditions.
The installation location for the instrument class ID portion of the design change is designated an EQ mild area.
b) laservice Inspection / Pump and Valve Testing
[ E ] Yes [ ] No Comments:
The installation of the 3" manual gate valve, the 3/4" N2,ie in to the existing 3" line and the modification of the line to accommodate the new back pressure regulator will be accomplished inside an existing ISI ASME Section III boundary. ISI system drawings have been identified as requiring revision in the I&C DCN.
c) -
Restricted Use of Mercury or Other Low Melting Point Metals ?
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ E ] No z
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Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 19 of 58 This design change does not add mercury or any other low melting point metal in any plant area.
. d)
Restricted Components
[ ] Yes l E ] No c-ts:
The inventory control module in PIMS has veri 6ed that the components and material I
specified by this design change do not have any restrictions that would prevent their installation for this design change.
c)
[ ] Yes [ E ] No Comments:
The RPE's that provide the appropriate dedication activities associated with the new components installed per this design provide the appropriate NPRDS reviews and justifications if necessary.
f)
Accident Analyses (FSAR Chapters 6 and 15)
[ ] Yes [ E ] No Comments:
Accident analysis as identified in chapters 6 & 15 of the UFSAR, i.e., LOCA, MSLB,
]
Loss of main feedwater, uncontrolled red withdrawl, will not be impacted by this design change. It should be noted that this design change will mitigate the consequence of a large break LOCA coincident with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) scenario.
I The Nitrogen and CCW Systems are not associated with the cause of any accidents evaluated in Chapter 15. The CCW System is an accident mitigating system. This modification does not affect any accident analyses in Chapters 6 or 15.
g)
Seismic Qualification /Long Term Seismic Program (LTSP) [ E ] Yes [ ] No Comments:
All instrument tubing, instrument valves / fittings, electrical conduit and piping components will be installed per existing and new design class I seismically qualified installation criteria and details provided by this design. This will preclude any seismic interaction potential.
This design will provide three new types of seismically qualified air pressure regulators, PCV-2020A/B,2021 A/B & 2022.
PCV-2022 will be located down stream ofRCV-16 on 1" code class C piping. This is a 1" back pressure regulator valve manufactured by Fisher, model 98L-30. The valve is 19 i
L
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 20 of 58 modeled in piping analysis 4-117. The valve is a diaphragm type regulator, it is designed rugged with a compact body construction. There are no credible failure modes associated with the assembly due to seismic a event. Qualification of the piping for seismic design l
criteria demonstrates qualification of the valve as the valves are designed to be at least 10% stronger than the pipe in which it is installed.
PCV-2021 A & B are 1/2" regulators manufactured by Matheson, model 8H. These l
regulators were previously evaluated under RPE J-6701. Judgments documented under this RPE remain applicable and valid for this design. Calculation IS-71, Rev. 4 performed to incorporate RPE J-6701 documents the conclusions.
l
- PCV-2020A & B are 1/2" regulators manufactured by Fisher, model 95L-18. Similar valves were evaluated in calculation IS-71, Rev. 4 and indicated no credible failure modes associated with seismic events with very conservative assumptions. The conclusions and
. judgments documented per IS-71, Rev. 4 remain valid for this design.
Conduit installed in the Cable Spreading Room will be seismically supported, and all affected hangers have been analyzed and approved for construction. Similarly, all affected cable tray supports have been analyzed for the added weight.
==
Conclusions:==
Due to the inherent compact design and rugged construction of these assemblies, coupled i
with the fact that there are no credible failure modes regarding the seismic loads and
, qualification of the associated piping / tubing, these valves are considered to meet the seismic qualification requirements of specification 8!79 for the procurement of valves.
It is concluded that the CCW surge tank will maintain the minimum design pressure (17 i
PSIG) during a design basis seismic event. This is based on the fact that the maximum flow capacity associated with the back pressure regulator, PCV-2022 is 8.3 SCFM @
approx. 20 PSIG.
l h)
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
[ ] Yes [ ElINo Comments:
H This design change modifies the CCW system to eliminate a failure mode that had not L
. been previously postulated and therefore was not included in the PRA model. This design change will make the plant configuration consistent with the current PRA model.
L i)
Controlof Heavy Loads
[ ] Yes [ Eli No L
Comments:
l Heavy loading is not an issue that requires analysis per this design change. The modifications specified per this design will not impact any heavy load path.
j)
Containment Integrity
[ ] Yes i El] No Comments:
1 20
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
- TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 21 of 58 The modifications performed by this design change involve the installation ofinstrument tubing from plant nitrogen & instrument air sources to pressurize the CCW surge tank and providing a new alarm circuit to the control room. These modifications are outside the containment structure and thus do not impact containment integrity.
k)
Refuehng Operations
[ ] Yes [ E ] No c;
_u.
Not applicable. This design change is not related to refueling operations and/or procedures.
- 1)
HVAC Design Considerations
[ ] Yes [ E ] No Comments:
Not applicable. This design change does not add and/or revise components which may require specific ventilation / cooling and does not affect any heat load to the existing HVAC system.
m)
Diesel Fuel OilInventory
[ ] Yes [ E ] No
- Comments:
This design change does not result in an increase or decrease in diesel ge rator loading because vital bus loading is not affected.
n)
FMEA Evaluation
[ E ] Yes [ ] No Comments:
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for this DCP considers the following:
The design change uses nitrogen from the plant design class II nitrogen system as the primary source of pressurization for the CCW surge tank. Failure of this system or low nitrogen supply header pressure will automatically activate the backup supply of nitrogen from design class I high pressure nitrogen backup bottles via seismically analyzed nitrogen supply tubing. Additionahy, the plant nitrogen system pressure " LOW" alarm will be activated in the main control room for operator action. This alarm's actuation is received form the repeater section of the Unit 1 Main Annunciator, which receives it signal directly from pressure switch PS-309 via relay PS309X. As a minimum, this will include isolation of the leak and close watch on the backup nitrogen bottles pressure to assure adequate supply of nitrogen is available for makeup to surge tank to keep its pressure at 17 psig or 21 l'
i
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 22 of 58 more. Spare replacement nitrogen bottles will be stored in the vicinity of the installation.
This design provides a tie in to plant instrument air. In an emergency situation where surge tank pressure is decreasing and Class I nitrogen bottle availability is limited, Operations can use instmment air in place of Class I nitrogen bottles to pressurize the surge tank. Compressed air will not adversely affect the CCW system, however, nitrogen is the preferred gas from a system biofouling/ corrosion perspective.
- Failure of the newly installed backpressure regulator PCV-2022 in the open position will result in nitrogen outleakage from the surge tank. The sizing ofPCV-2022 limits the outleakage to less than 8.3 sefm at 20 prig surge tank pressure. Because the nitrogen makeup capability via PCV-2020A/2020B is more than this outleakage, the surge tank pressure will be maintained at its setpoint until the operator notices the leak during rounds.
It should be noted, the plant nitrogen system generation capacity (scfm) is more than sufficient to handle the above referenced leak along with normal usage (sefm) of plant nitrogen without creating low pressure alarm situation. If required, nitrogen outleakage from the surge tank as a result of failure of PCV-2022 in the open position can be isolated remotely from the control room via RCV-16 actuation.
Failure of surge tank nitrogen supply control valve PCV-2020A/2020B in the open position will not adversely affect the CCW system operation, as the RV-45 setpoint at 30 psig will lift to relieve excess pressure. The relieving capacity of RV-45t(scfm) is significantly higher than the maximum flow that can pass through the new 3/4 inch S.S.
nitrogen supply tubing under the referenced failure mode. Under this failure condition surge tank "HIGH" pressure alarm will sound in the main control room to alert the.
operators ofimpending RV-45 lift.
- Failure of high pressure nitrogen backup bottles pressure reducing regulator PCV-2021 A/2021B in the open position will overpressurize the downstream components. RV-2030 provided downstream of the regulators provides protection against this overpressurization.
o)
Egh and Moderate Energy Line Break i El] Yes l l No Conunents:
This design will install a compressed nitrogen source as a safety related backup supply to the CCW surge tank. The compressed nitrogen will be at approx. 2000 psig up to the downstream regulator (with a built in relief device) which will reduce the pressure to approx. 75 psig. The 2000 psig portion of this design will be contained in a dedicated 22
/
b
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 23 of 58 l
l compressed nitrogen bottle w/CGA fitting,1/2" OD flexible instrument tubing, 3/4" SS -
L
.065" wall tubing and several 3/4" instrument valves prior to entering the regulator. All components specified have design pressure ratings exceeding 2000 psig. Furthermore, evaluation of breaks in nitrogen systems is not required 6 nominal pipe sizes ofless that
- 1", RefDCM T-12 Section 4.3.1.1.
l A portion of the class I nitrogen backup supply and tubing, including the compressed l
bottles, will be located in close proximity to a main steam lead at Elev 140' area GE. In the event of a main steam break in this area, the resultant forces will render the safety y
related backup nitrogen supply useless. Loss of surge tank pressurization will not
. adversely affect the ability of the CCW System to mitigate a design basis MSLB. The CCW system will be operable without the.17 psig minimum design pressure subsequent to a turbine trip and resultant reactor trip upon a main steam line break, i.e., the plant will be in a condition where a LBLOCA is not a credible accident scenario where a 17 psig minimum CCW system design pressure is required.
7.
Does the change involve a fluid system?
[ El] Yes [ ] No a)
Hydraulic Desige Considerations
[ El1 Yes [ ] No Conunents:
This change does not adversely affect the CCW system flow, velocity, pressure, 4
temperature, pipe pressure drops or available CCW pump NPSH under various modes of system operation. In fact, per this change, the head on the CCW pump suction would increase during normal operation, which in turn will provide additional margin to keep the pressure in the pump suction pipe always greater than the vapor pressure of the liquid l_
handled and thus prevent liquid from flashing. Available NPSH, which is a function of i
pump suction head, friction head, and the vapor pressure of the liquid handled, after this modification, will increase. For the 200 GPM outleakage accident scenario, the pressure in the surge tank will go down to 13.2 PSIA (1.5 PSI vacuum) because the nitrogen makeup capability via PCV-2020A/2020B is less than the outleakage rate; however, the NPSHA under this condition has been verified to be adequate (REF. AR A0396830, AE 08, Calc.
M-175, Rev.2 ).
- ReliefValves Most of the relief valves in the CCW system are designed to relieve back to the CCW
~
System. Because these relief valves are set based on differential pressure across the valve, i
the proposed modification will have no affect on their setpoints. Additionally, Calculation M-416 Rev. O verified that the psid setpoints of these thermal relief valves are acceptable to maintain pressure below the design pressure for each isolated component during concurrent lifting ofRV-45 at 30 psig. The RV-45 setpoint envelopes the proposed 23 l
Date: 04/15/96' (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page24 of 58 normal operating pressures on the CCW System as a result of pressurization of the surge tank and, therefore, the thermal relief valve setpoints are not impacted by this modification.
There are several reliefvalves in the CCW system that are designed to relieve directly to i
containment, including those for the reactor vessel support coolers, RCP thermal barriers, and excess letdown heat exchanger. The setpoints for these relief valves have been evaluated and an increase in CCW System pressure of up to 30 psig will not cause these reliefvalves to lift during normal system operation. Additionally, the ability of these relief valves to maintain pressure below the design pressure for each isolated component is not affected by the proposed modification.
4 The CCW surge tank relief valve, RV-45, is set at 30 +/-2 psig. RV-45 is an ASME Section VIII certified relief valve for steam, air, gas, and liquid service. RV-45 is not expected to be challenged during normal operation because the backpressure regulator limits high tank pressure prior to the surge tank reaching the RV-45 setpoint. However, in the event that RV-45 is challenged, a high probability of reliable service and mininial blowdown will be expected based on recent bench testing, discussion with the vendor, and ASME Section VIII certification.
Discharges from RV-45 are routed under the surge tank where they enter a drain line to i
the Auxiliary Building sump. The area under the surge tank has a skirting to prevent rain water from entering the Auxiliary Building sump, but the skirting is not air tight.
i Therefore, any nitrogen that would be relieved through RV-45 would not be forced into the Auxiliary Building or pressurize the area under the surge tank.
1 The tank isolation function ofRCV-16 and RE-17A and 17B has not changed as a result of this modification. FSAR Update Chapters 9,11,12, and 15 were reviewed to determine the licensing basis for this radiological event. The inleakage discussions in 1
Section 9.2.2.2 and 9.2.2.3 are to assure CCW System design provides for adequate leak detection and overpressure protection for worst case inleakage into the system.' This possible inleakage for system design basis does not, however, form the licensing basis for dose calculations. Chapters 11 a'id 15 do not contain dose consequence evaluations for inleakage except for the normal, minor quantities described in Table 11.2-5. The DCP changes do not affect these small quantities. There is, otherwise, no dose consequence to evaluate for the types ofinleakage sources described above in Chapter 9.
' As part of this modification, a new relief valve, RV-2030, will be installed downstream of the high pressure nitrogen bottle regulators to protect downnream regulators and 24
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 25 of 58 components in the event that the intregal relief device associated with the high pressure bottle regulator (PCV-2021 A/2021B) fails.
CCW Pumps The proposed modification will not adversely affect the ability of the CCW pumps to deliver the required cooling water flow to mitigate design basis accidents. CCW pump recirculation valves are controlled by motor amps and will not be affected by the proposed modification.
Although degassification of the compressed gas within the CCW System in the event of rapid depressurization could occur and potentially affect heat transfer capability and CCW pump NPSH, failure of the proposed modification is not postulated concurrent with a LBLOCA due to the passive safety function of the modification. Venting of the tank during Modes 5 or 6 to perform system maintenance may cause degassification, but CCW pumps have significant NPSH margin in these modes to preclude the possibility of cavitation. Additionally, the volume ofgas produced by depressurization from 25 psig to atmosphere is not expected to cause gas binding of the CCW pumps.
Regulator and Bottle Sizing The criteria for sizing the capacity of the compressed gas supply regulator was based on normal level changes in the CCW surge tank as well as assumed maximum compressed gas leakage through fittings and valve packing. Historically, the level in the surge tank remains relatively constant and rapid drops in level do not occur. Because the safety function of the regulator is to maintain pressure on the surge tank for the first minute of a LBLOCA with LOOP, there is no requirement to design the regulator for a simultaneous accident of system out-leakage at 200 gpm for 20 minutes concurrent with a LBLOCA with LOOP. (Ref. A0396830 - E03) In order to optimize the design and accurately control tank pressure during normal operation, a maximum capacity of25 scfm was chosen, which equates to approximately 80 gpm out-leakage from the surge tank
. (assuming no gas leaks). Therefore, in the event of a design basis out-leakage event of 200 gpm for 20 minutes, the compressed gas regulator may not be able to maintain tank pressure greater than 17 psig, but will be adequate to restore pressure to greater than 17 psig within a reasonable time after the event.
The criteria for sizing the capacity of the backpressure regulator was based on normal increases in surge tank level as well as optimizing the design given the narrow pressure control band between the supply regulator setpoint and the RV-45 setpoint. Makeup to the surge tank through LCV-69 and LCV-70 is normally supplied at approximately 250 gpm. However, makeup to the surge tank is rarely required and surge tank level variations usually only occur during unit outages when tank pressurization is not required 25
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP - M-050284 Rev. O Page 26 of 58 for CCW System operability. Additionally, there is no requirement to design the backpressure regulator for in-leakage to CCW simultaneous with a LBLOCA with LOOP.
(Ref. A0396830 - E03) Therefore, a backpressure regulator was chosen that will relieve approximately 8 scfm (23 gpm) at 25 psig, 97 scfm (255 gpm) at 27 psig, and 133 scfm
' (335 gpm) at 29 psig; Although the primary function of the backpressure regulator is to prevent challenges to RV-45, it may not be able to relieve tank pressure fast enough during rapid surge tank level increases to prevent RV-45 from opening The reliability of RV-45 to lift and rescat to maintain surge tank pressure at approximately 30 psig was addressed above.
The criteria for sizing the bottle volume and minimum bottle pressure was based on: 1) assumed maximum gas leakage through fittings and valve p-Wg, and 2) allowance for operator action within 20 minutes to restore a plant compressed gas source or repiace N 2 bottles to maintain surge tank pressure. Because the pressurization system has a passive safety function to maintain pressure boundary integrity, failure of the system is not assumed during the first minute of a LBLOCA with LOOP. However, from a plant availability perspective, loss of the common Class II N System and surge tank gas leaks 2
could reduce the pressure of the surge tank to less than 17 psig and challenge system operability on both units simultaneously. For this reason, the proposed modification will add a low pressure alarm to alert operato'rs of a degraded plant nitrogen system.
Assuming a normal gas leakage through fittings and valve packing of 8 scfm, two bottles of N at a minimum of 800 psig each will provide approximately 20 minutes for operators 2
to restore a plant compressed gas source or replace bottles in the event that the plant nitrogen low pressure alarm annunciated in the control room.
b)
Erosion /conosion
[ El J Yes [ ] No Conunents:
Use of compressed air or nitrogen to pressurize the surge tank will not adversely affect CCW chemistry ; in fact,' nitrogen may improve CCW system resistance to corrosion.
System flow, velocity, and temperature remain unchanged and an increase in static head of approximately 17-25 psig on the system components per this change is not expected to increase the susceptibility to erosion.
a 8.
Does the change involve or affect an electrical or J&C system?
[ El] Yes i l No a) __
- Relay Settings
[ ] Yes [ El] No Comments:
i.
26 L
L i
E-
1 l
'Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION
=
DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 27 of 58 This design change does not involve load changes on any of the power supply feeders, including those for the motors and, therefore, does not affect existing relay settings.
b)
Vital Bus Loading
[ ] Yes [ El] No C - ts:
The new power sources applicable to this design change will be fed from a non vital bus.
c)
I&C Design Consulerauons
[ El] Yes [ ] No.
Conunents DOES THE DESIGN PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INSTRUMENTS FOR OPERATORS TO MONITOR THE PROCESS 7 The design will incorporate local pressure gauges at the nitrogen bottles, the inlet and outlet to the CCW tank regulator and at the process connection for the new local pressure transmitter. The local gauge at the nitrogen bottles will provide assurance that the bottles are not leaking and have an acceptable nitrogen supply. The gauges at the CCW tank regulator inlet and outlet will provide operators with local monitoring capabilities of the CCW tank nitrogen supply pressure and allow maintenance personnel to properly set the 7egulator. The gauge at the new pressure transmitter process connection will provide operators with a local source ofindication regarding actual CCW tank pressure.
~ additionally this design will install a local pressure transmitter to send an alarm signal to A
the control room and a signal to the plant process computer. The alarm will annunciate a new control room PK window corresponding to a high and a low pressure signal. A new plant process computer point will provide continuous monitoring and archive capabilities regarding CCW surge tank pressure.
The low pressure nitroEen system is common to both units. Loss of the low pressure nitrogen system (used as the primary source of nitrogen to the surge tank) will initiate a control room alarm indicating low niaogen supply pressure via low signal from PS-309 through Unit 1. PS-309 currently alarms on the Aux control board, a new relay (DCN 1-SE-49284) will be installed in panel PM129 (Unit 1) to split the alarm signal to the Main Annunciator in Unit 1. The repeater section of the Unit 1 Main Annunciator will then p
actuate an input to the Unit 2 Main Annunciator for Unit 2 Control Room Alarm. It should be noted that the back-up nitrogen bottles will maintain surge tank pressure until operators can restore the primary source of nitrogen. The bottles are sized to maintain
.approximately 20 minutes of nitrogen supply at an assumed nitrogen leakage rate in the tank of 8 scfm and minimum bottle pressure of 1000 psig. In the event that low pressure 27 m_=
____x__
- - _ _ _ _ _ ____--_j
Date: 04/15/ %
(DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. 0 Page 28 of 58 nitrogen system cannot be restored in 20 minutes, bottles can be replaced accordingly in order to maintain the minimum design pressure of 17 psig in the tank or instrument air can be valved in to maintain pressudzation.
DOES THE DESIGN PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SCALES, RANGES AND ACCURACY'S FOR THE PROCESS, INCLUDING CONSIDERATION FOR R.G.
1.97 INSTRUMENT RANGE REQUIREMENTS?
The specified instrumentation; pressure gauges, electronic pressure transmitter and pressure regulators, are appropriately sized to meet their application requirements. The set pressures and tolerances for the regulators are specified in the I&C DCN.
Consideration fbr post accident monitodng capabilities, R.G.1.97 requirements, is not a requirement for this design change. Based on nommal setpoint calculations NSP-2 850A & B the specified Rosemount transmitter associated with the new high and low level control roem pressure alarm is adequate for its intended application. Additionally, calculation J-105 has established the setting tolerance and acceptable as found conditions associated with the pressure regulating valves thereby ensuring the overall accuracy i
associated with the specified pressure regulator setpoints are acceptable for their intended applications.
WILL THE DESIGN LOCATE INSTRUMENTS, CONTROL SWITCHES, AND INDICATING DEVICES APPROPRIATELY FOR HUMAN FACTORS (BOTH FOR OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE).
The location for the pressure local gauges, transmitter and the new PK annunciator i
window has been discussed with maintenance and operation dept. personnel and determined to be acceptable from a human factors perspective. All devices installed that require any manual functions have been located such that they are easily accessible without the use ofladders and/or scaffolding.
DOES THE DESIGN PROVIDE ALARMS FOR OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS?
The design will provide a N2 low pressure and high / low CCW surge tank pressure control room annunciator alarm.
~
DOES THE DESIGN ADDRESS PROVISION OF, OR REQUIREMENTS FOR REMOTE AND/OR AUTOMATIC OPERATIONS?
The design incorporates devices (i.e., pressure regulators and gauges) with passive safety functions. The only new automatic feature is the alarm circuit to the control room 28
Datei 04/15/96 (DCS VGrsion 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 29 of 58 l
annunciator. It should be noted that valve RCV-16 located on the CCW surge tank vent
' line will remain as a ATO/FC device. RCV-16 has remote capabilities of closing from the control room, i.e., energizing SV-225 to vent, thus closing RCV-16. RCV-16 can also be utilized to isolate the CCW surge tank vent line if the new downstream back pressure regulator fails to adequately control pressure, i.e., fails open. The new back pressure regulator will automatically control the CCW surge tank pressure due to changes in tank liquid level between the new pre-determined low pressure limit of 17 psig and the high 3
l pressure limit of 30 psig. This regulator has been sized to maintain a backpressure of 25 psig. The maximum flow capabilities ofPCV-2022 at a CCW surge tank pressure of 29 PSIG is 335 GPM. Refer to calculation M-999.
DOES THE DESIGN ADDRESS PROVISION OF OR REQUIREMENTS FOR MANUAL OPERATION?
This design will provide operators with both local and control room indication regarding CCW surge tank pressure. Furthermore, this design provides the capabilities ofisolating cenain components either manually via isolation valves or automatically from the control room, such as RCV-16, in order to maintain the CCW surge tank at or above its new pre-determined low pressure limit of 17 psig. It should be noted that the CCW surge tank currently incorporates the use of a relief valve, RV-45, set at 30 psig to protect CCW system components from over pressurization.
~
DOES THE DESIGN PROVIDE CALIBRATION AND MAINTENANCE l
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INSTRUMENTS SPECIFIED?
The design specifies the set pressures associated with the new PCV's (Regulators). There -
- are no unique maintenance and/or calibration practices or requirements associated with instrumentation specified by this design. The new pressure transmitter loop associated
)
with the low & high alarms is classified as instrument class II QA Class B. A request to i
revise procedure OM4.IDI1 to include this system 14 instrument in attachment 6.1 has been requested. (Ref AR A0396844 AE 9). Note attachment 6.1 is provided for information only. The alarms will correspond to a specific operator response therefore they will be calibrated and maintained as a graded QA type ofinstrument loop. The pressure gauges that provide the local indication at the N2 bottles, PI-2032, and the CCW tank, PI-2031, and the CCW surge tank delivery pressure, PI-2030 will provide indication to the operators regarding operability limits associated with the CCW system. Therefore l
~
these gauges will be calibrated and maintained as MATE type devices and be included and controlled in the PME program.
.I 29
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 30 of 58 DOES THE DESIGN PROVIDE "INFORMATION ONLY" GUIDANCE FOR THE INITIAL SETTING OF NON-ENGINEERING CONTROLLED SETPOINTS? DOES
- THE DESIGN ALSO ADDRESS VALUES, DESIGN BASIS AND SEISMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL INACCURACIES FOR THE ENGINEERING CONTROLLED SETPOINTS7 The setpoints associated with the new regulators and the comparitor switches are specified in the I&C DCN as engineering controlled setpoints. The installation location will be in a
- mild area, therefore inaccuracies due to harsh environments need not be considered for this design. Conventional methodology and valid engineeringjudgments were utilized to establish the overall channel uncertainties, inaccuracies, tolerances and acceptable as found conditions associated with the engineering controlled setpoints. Refer to nominal setpoint calculations NSP-2-14-850A & B and calculation J-105.
WILL THE DESIGN CHANGE AFFECT THE RESPONSE TIMES ASSUMED IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS?
This design will increase the CCW system saturation temperature in order to prevent
' potential CCW system flashing and subsequent water hammer from potentially occurring following a LBLOCA coincident _ with a LOOP accident scenario. Response times assumed in the accident analysis identified in UFSAR chapters 6 & 15 will not be impacted.
It 1.hould be noted that FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.2.3 identifies that the CCW surge tank volume was sized based on a non-mechanistic leak of 200 gpm from the system. The r
proposed modification will not adversely affect the pressure boundary integrity of any existing CCW components. Additionally, the proposed modification meets the design, material, and construction standards applicable to the CCW System and does not create a new failure mode which could increase the probability for CCW System leakage. All installed tubing, valves, regulators, bottles, and instruments which are part of the surge tank pressure boundary will be Design Class I. All tank pressure boundary components to be added by this modification will be seismically qualified and installed to Seismic Category I requirements. Because the basis for the 200 gpm for 20 minutes out-leakage was a non-mechanistic failure and operator action is credited in FSAR Update Table 9.2-7(5) to establish Class I makeup to the surge tank within 10 minutes, pressurization of the surge tank will not affect the licensing requirement as specified in SSER 16 for minimum
'~
surge tank volume based on system out-leakage. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an out-leakage event is not increased 30
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 31 of 58 DOES THE DESIGN CHANGE THE RESPONSE CHARACTERISTICS OF ANY EXISTING SENSOR, INSTRUMENTATION OR CONTROL SYSTEM 7 The new pressure transmitter and a local pressure gauge will share a common reference with the existing level transmitter LT-Il7. This will not impact the functionality ofLT-117. Additionally this design will tap into the plant low pressure nitrogen header at the point where it feeds into one of the supplies for the 10% steam dump valves PCV-21 &
- 22. A review of the plant low pressure header has determined that this will not impact the functionality of the air supply to PCV-21 and/or 22.
The pressure transmitters and indicators that measure direct pressure will be affected by this modification in that their outputs will include the surge tank N2 pressure. The only automatic control function based on sensing direct system pressure is the CCW pump autostart function on low discharge header pressure, (PS-190A/B,191 A/B) This is a design class II function that is not required to mitigate any design basis accidents. These autostart setpoints will be reset to account for increased system static head, Ref A0398225. All CCW system instmmentation is qualified to maintain pressure boundary integrity up to 150 psig and is ranged to include up to an additional 30 psig static head on the system. Additionally, surge tank instmmentation will not be adversely affected by a
. vacuum of 1.5 psi (13.2 psia) in the surge tank which results from a 200 gpm out-leakage for 20 minutes.
DOES THE DESIGN SPECIFY WHETHER CONDUIT SEALS, LOCA SPLICES OR 1
OTHER FEATURES ARE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT ENVIRONMENTAL l
QUALIFICATION 7 l
The installation location is a mild environment and the new alarm circuit is classified as instrument class II. Therefore, EQ is not required to be considered as a design requirement for this design.
WILL THE DESIGN AFFECT OTHER DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS, (i.e.
AVAILABILITY, RELIABILITY, ETC.)?
- The instrumentation specified by this design have a historical reputation as highly reliable components. They are currently in use in many different applications throughout the industry. It should be noted that the design incorporates the use of redundant pressure regulators. The redundant devices can be valved in for use if maintenance and/or repair is required for the primary device. Additionally, this design provides for an additional pressure source via the plant instrument air system in the event the N2 header and bottle supply becomes unavailable.
31
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 32 of 58 DOES THE DESIGN CONSIDER STANDARD INSTALLATION DETAIL DRAWINGS,049090 SERIES?
Several new 049094 and 054174 installation details have been prepared to support this design, they are included in the IAC DCN Additionally this design will utilize existing installation details provided by drawing 049238.
DOES THE DESIGN AFFECT INSTRUMENTATION USED BY OPERATIONS IN THE EOP'S/AOP'S?
This design will not impact any existing instrument that the operations dept. currently relies upon for use associated with existing EOP's and/or AOP's. The new annunciator
. alarm will warn operators of high and/or low CCW surge tank pressure conditions. This design does not address the appropriate and/or specific operator action associated with this alarm, d)
Electrical Design Considerations
[ El] Yes [ ] No Conunents:
' Summary:
The I&C DCN will install a new Pressure Switch (PS-850) in panel M and pressure transmitter (PT-850) at the CCW Surge Tank. The pressure switch, pressure transmitter, and plant computer (P250) will be connected in series to a spare instrument loop power supply in panel M to drive the 4-20 MA instrument loop. The Pressure Switch provides two (2) dry contacts for high and low pressure alarm, and the electrical DCN will connect these contacts to two (2) inputs into the Main Annunciator. Lastly, the instrument loop will be connected to the plant computer (P250), where the electrical DCN will provide a circuit between panel M and cabinet PCIB The electrical design change utilizes spared circuits located in panel M when available. Spare Circuits utilized are between M and PM141, and M and PClB The circuit to PM141 will be rerouted to the CCW Surge Tank for connection to pressure transmitter. The end locations of the other spare circuit L
will not change. A new conduit and circuits will be routed in the Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room between M and PK005 The most significant of these spared circuits is the 2/C 16 AWG circuit (10159FIO2) that runs from Panel M to Panel PM141 (Elevation 115', Area GW). This circuit has been walk'ed down and verified as spare. During re-routing of this cable, it will be decided by the installer how much of the circuit.will be removed from its existing raceway. The removed portion will then be installed in existing raceway up to the CCW Surge Tank to 32-
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5) 1 TITLE DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION l
DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 33 of 58 box XLO116. The cable fill for the Class II raceway utihzed is less than 8% full, therefore, cable pull-by or pull-out 'and pull-back is acceptable during cable installation.
l
. The design change also provides annunciation for Common Nitrogen Header Pressure in the Unit 2 Main Annunciator. PS309 is currently wired to the Auxiliary Annunciator (panel POEC); the pressure switch is located in PM129, which is in Unit 1 Area "K",
elevation 100' The pressure switch is wired into the Unit 1 Main Annunciator, and connected to the Unit 2 Main Annunciator via a repeater relay.
l
System Design
Load Change: The addition ofpressure switch PS-850 in panel RI results m an merease m I
load to panel PYNM, breaker 52-PYNM-12 of 5. watts (ref. 6000784-115). An Electrical Load Change Request (ELCR) and a Panel Load Change form is not required for the new
-load addition, since the increase in load is insufficient with respect to the significant digits i
of the drawing's panel load table. Since the drawing load table controls the electrical loading, no calculations are affected.'
Fuse List: The power supply to pressure switch PS-850 will be fused to provide protection coordination with the other devices powered from the circuit NM12. The fuse size is adequate for the application.
Voltage Drop: The transmitter PT-850 maximum load is determined form the equation:
Load =50*(Power Supply Voltage - 12) ohms (ref. 6000748-115). A 24 Volt supply voltage will result in a maximum load of 600 Ohms. The electrical load placed on this transmitter is the combined impedance from the Pressure Switch (PS-850) and twice the impedance of the 16 AWG conductor from cabinet El to PT-850. The conductor impedance of a 16 AWG conductor is less than 6 ohms per 1000 feet (NEC Chapter 9, Table 8, Conductor Properties). The pressure switch PS-8,50 has an input impedance of approximately 50 Ohms @ 4-40 MA(ref. 6006472-108). The Plant Computerinput impedance is 250 ohms (impedance ofPD-850). Therefore, this instrument loop impedance is well below the allowed transmitter impedance, and voltage drop is n
insignificant.
Fed From List: The FFL has been incorporated into the electrical DCN. Both sorts of the FFL have been included in the DCN.
~'
Grounding: Allinstrument circuits are 2/C shielded. Each conductor shield is grounded y
at on termination location to prevent induces currents, and provide maximum shielding for the 4-20 MA signal. In addition, all instruments provided with a ground will be grounded 33
Date: 04/15/%
(DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION
\\
DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page34 of 58 in accordance with the man $acturers recommendations. The instrument loops are ungrounded.
i This design is electrically Design Class II (nonsafety-related). The circuits used are designated nonsafety-related, with black colorjacketing. There is no interface with safety-related circuits.' Panel M, Cabinet PK005, Cabinet PCIB, and all the pressure transmitter j
located at the CCW Surge Tank are electrically Design Class II.
Raceway: A minimal amount of raceway will be installed by the electrical DCN. Existing raceway will be utilized for all circuits except between cabinets M and PK005 and the new t
pressure transmitter PT-850 and box XLO116. The raceway fill of all the utilized cable tray and conduit were reviewed using Set Route. All of the affected raceways were determined to be significantly below the maximum allowed fill of 40% after the installation of any cable by the electrical DCN. Therefore, this design change is within tk daign requirement ofraceway fill. Installed raceway will be nonsafety-related, and will be j
supported in accordance with drawing 050030 Details to assure structural integrity, or Civil Engineered raceway supports included in DCN 2-SE-50284. The affected cable trays are design class II. The added weight has been coordinated with Civil Engineering.
EMI & RFI: The instrument cables for this design change are shielded, with the shield grounded. This will minimize the effects form EMI and RFI sources. Therefore, EMI and RFI should not adversely affect the instrument signal. The instruments installed by this change as well as the current loop design are inherently resistant to the effects of EMI/RFI.
i General: The electrical design change is design Class II, with the potential for Graded Quality if Fire Stops are affected by the installation or re-route of cable in existing raceway. Any fire stops affected will be repaired to assure their integrity as Graded 4
Quality. However, this design change will not affect any fire penetration between different fire areas. The safety-related portion ofthis design involves the structural support of p
raceway.
The pressure switch installed by DCN 2-SJ-50284 initiates both the high and low Main Annunciator Alarms. The contacts change state only when they exceed their respective setpoint for closure (e.g., below setpoint for low pressure contact, above setpoint for high pressure contact). Any loss of power to the pressure switch, will prevent the Annunciation of an alarm condition. Engineering does not view this as a significant problem, since the pressure switch power supply is backed by an inverter for a reliable power source. PS309 is the initiating device for N2 header low pressure alarm in both units. The Aux Relay PS309X has been designed " fail safe" such that loss of AC power to 34
D^te: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE, DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 35 of 58 the relay will result in an alarm, similar to that oflow pressure. This is a preferred method of operation since the power supply is not highly reliable (i.e., not backed by an inverter).
9.
Does the change involve a civil structure or attachment?
[ B ] Yes [ ] No a)
Floor or Wall Loading i ] Yes [ E ] No Comments:
Compressed nitrogen bottles, instrument tubing / valves and electrical conduit will be -
mounted to safety related walls and floors. The weight added by these new components will have insignificant impact to the control room roof (3'-4" thick concrete slab). This aspect of the design has been coordinated with the Civil Engmeenng group.
i b)
Masonry Block Walls
[ ] Yes [ E ] No Comments:
Not applicable to the scope of this design change.
i-c)
Core Drilling Impact
[ E ] Yes [ ] No L
Conunents:
The Electrical and I&C DCN's will install conduit, compressed nitrogen bottles, instrument support stands and instrument tubing on the Aux Building Walls and the control room roof, elev.154'. This will require the installation of anchor bolts for the support configurations. The drilling of anchor bolt holes will be petformed in accordance j
with approved procedures, and will not require the cutting or nicking of rebar, without prior Engineering approval. In addition, none of the holes drilled will penetrate the entire width of the wall and/or roof. Therefore, this design change will not adversely affect any safety-related structure.
d)
Penetration Scaling
[ ] Yes l E ] No Comments:
This design does not affect penetrations. All cable between different fire areas, are installed spares, and will not affect associated penetrations.
10, Does the change affect the control room or involve any control panels?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No a)
Simulator
[ E ] Yes [ ] No.
Comments:
35
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5) l TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION i
DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 36 of 58 g
This design change will send a new alarm circuits to a new annunciator PK window. This design will not require any modifications to existing control board configurations.
Therefore, a separate simulator design change is not required. The new simulator annunciator window and required software is controlled outside the scope of this design change.
b)
Does the design change affect the operation, habitability, or appearance of the control room?
[ li5 ] Yet [ ] No Comments:
The new alarm circuits to the new PK window will alarm on a high and a low pressure signal associated with the CCW surge tank and/or :ow plant N2 header pressure. The new window will be located in close proximity to the other CCW PK alarm windows.
Appropriate human factors considerations regarding the location of the new PK window has been coordinated with the operations dept. The wording for the PK window is appropriate for the application. Refer to the electrical DCN for the PK window wording.
This alarm will require an appropriate operator response, i.e., dispatch an operator to the CCW surge tank and/or to the backup compressed nitrogen bottles in order to diagnose and/or repair any problems. Continous monitoring of the CCW surge tank pressure will be provided via the plant process computer, (PPC point ID PO710A). Therefore, a dedicated control board indicator will not be required for this design.
I 1.
Does the change meet the SISI Exclusion Criteria?
l J Yes l 121 ] No ifYes Explain:
No, this design wP install new targets.
Obtain Coordination Signatures from NES Nuclear Engineering as nHfication to update the SISI Manual if the target scope or information is affected. Proside mark ups of the SISI Manual pages to NES Nuclear Engineering.
a) is an SISI evaluation for sources necessary ?
[ ] Yes [ 12Il No Describe sources installed or modified by this design change.
This deisgn will install new targets.
For sources installed or modified by this design change, specify what measures will be taken to ensure the sources will not create seismically induced systems interactions:
36
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 37 of 58
[E]
Sources will be seiemmally supported and their seismic deflections arejudged to not create SISI concerns Specify support criteria:
[]
Pre-inmallation inspection to identify suitable locanon and post-installation mspection to confir.n installation does not create interacuans using the SISI Field I==~h Gautalmac Initiate an AR or AE to document the SISI anspecuan.
Trackar AR/AE:
. []
Other, describe b) Is an SISI evaluauon for targets necessary ?
[ B] Yes [ ] No i
Describe the Targets 1 usallad or modified by this design change All of the components (with the exception of electrical components) installed per this design change are SISI targets that will be installed in accordance with approved seismically qualified installation criteria. A prewalkdown inspection will be performed to ensure that no interactions exist and that the configuration will be installed as proposed and no post installation inspection will be necessary.
Specify what man =res will be taken to ensure the targets installed or modified by this 6esign change will not be impaired by seismically induced systems interactions:
[B]
Pre-instalianon inspection to identify / resolve potential interactions and post-installation inspection to confirm no interacuens exist using the SISI Field lanpection Guadclines. Initiate an AR or AE to document the SISI inspection.
Tracking AR/AE: A0396830 / AE 17 l]
Other, describe:
A pre-installation SISI walkdown is tracked by AR A0396830 AE 17, In addition, the SISI target list has been marked up and forwarded to R&DS Licensing and Design Bases Management for inclusion in a SISI Manual Update. This update is tracked by AR A0396830 AE 18.
i I
12.
For d design changes i,
i a)
General Design Criteria (GDCs)
[ E ] Yes [ ] No c.
-w l
37 l
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION 1
DCP M-030284 Rev. O Page 38 of 58 This design change is in accordance with the applicable GDC as identified in UFSAR section 3.1.
Specifically this design addresses UFSAR section 3.1.4.2, Instrumentation & Control Systems by providing the required instrumentation to monitor and maintain the CCW serge tank pressurized to support the operability of the CCW system.
. This design does not provide redundancy for the CCW pressurization system. Rather, this design is considered a passive system since no components are required to chuge state as a result of an accident. A LOCA, LOOP, and a passive failure of a component of this system can be postulated; however, the passive failure is not postulated until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the accident (LOCA/ LOOP). At that time the CCW pressurization system installed per this design does not need to function. Hence, this design meets the intent of single
' failure criteria UFSAR Section 3.1.1.
i Other applicable GDC:
Critta ion 12, Section 3.1.4.2, Instrumentation & Control Systems
)
j Criterion 21, Section 3.1.5.3, Single Failure Definition Criterion 37, Section 3.1.8.1, Rapa-ed Safety Features Basis for Design Criterion 38, Section 3.1.8.2, Reliability and Testability ofEngineered Safety Features Criterion 40, Section 3.1.8.4, Missile Protection Criterion 41, Section 3.1.8.5 Rapa-ed Safety Features Performance Capability Citrerion 42, Section 3.1.8.6 EnpraM Safety Features Components Capability Criterion 52, Section 3.1.8.16, Containment Heat Removal Systems b)
. Regulatory Cnudes
[ l Yes [ El] No Comments:
This design change will not alter or modify the level of compliance of any existing R.G.
c)
Industry Codes and Standards
[ ] Yes [ El J No Conunents:
' Applicable codes and standards are referenced in the associated DCM's.
d)
Licensing Review i
The following Licensing documents are relevant to this change and have been reviewed as indicated below. When regulatory agency noti 5 cation is required, or when a revision to a lxansing document is aanamanry, inform NRS.
j Dae====8 Emedam Reviewed
% ires Reviseen j
FSAR Update Emedam 3.1 N
FSAR Update Emeda= 3.3.2.3.2.2 Y
FSAR Update Secties 6.2.2.3.3A N
i 38 ih jy i
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE. DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 39 of 58 FSAR Update Section 6.3.3.2.7 N
FSAR Update Secties 9.2.2 Y
FSAR Update Sections 8 and 9.5 N
)
FSAR Update Table 3.3-2 & Section 3.1 N
FSAR Update Table 3.3-3 Y
FSAR Update Table 9.2-7 Y
FSAR Update Table 9.3-7 Y
Tech Specs 3/4.0,3/4.3.3,3/4.7.3.1,3/4.7.12 N
Tech Specs 3/4.6.3 N
NRC SER/SSER N/A N/A Environssental Pernaits N/A N
Other(NRCletters )
If the FSAR is affected, attach copies of the required FSAR Update Ui'.ange Requests.
e)
Fire Protection
[ Ed ) Yes [ ] No Comments:
Electrical DCN 2-S3-50284 installs new circuits between panel El and PK005 These new circuits are enclosed in raceway their entire length; therefore, they will not contribute to area combustible loading. All other installed spare circuits are similcrly enclosed in conduit, such that they also do not affect area combustible loading. Therefore, the DCPP tire protection plan is not adversely affected.
1 f)
Secunty
[ ] Yes [ li5 ] No Comments:
This design change is in a vital area however, it does not require work near a security barrier or security fence and it does not affect safeguards equipment, documentation and/or access control.
g)
Missiles
[ li5 ] Yes [ ] No Comments:
The instal':. tion of the new compressed nitrogen bottles are a potential source of missiles.
The bottle design is in accordance with applicable OSHA and DOT safety guidelines and standards. Additionally the hold down brackets have been adequately analyzed per UFSAR section 3.5.1.2, Missiles generated outside the containment criteria. Ref calculation IS-1.20.
h)
Flooding
[ ] Yes l El] No comments:
39 l-L __ _ _ ____ ___
i Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 40 of 58 Not applicable to the scope of this design change. The new components are not in an identified flood plane.
i)
Explosive Chemicals
[ ] Yes l E ] No Comments Not applicable to the scope of this design change.
l j)
Toxic Chemicals
[ ] Yes l E ] No Comments:
i Not applicable to the scope of this design change.
k)
Chemistry FKocts
[ B ] Yes [ ] No Comments:
Nitrogen has been specified as the cover gas instead of air in order to minimize the corrosive affects of dissolved oxygen in the CCW system. The chemistry dept. has coordinated with this design change and has determined that nitrogen is an acceptable cover gas for the CCW system. The nitrogen gas will not adversely affect the ability of the molybdate based corrosion inhibitor from preventing corrosion in the CCW System.
- In the event of an emergency where surge tank pressure is drepping and Class I nitrogen bottles are unavailable, Operations can use the plant instrument air in place of Class I nitrogen bottles. This design has provided a tap into the plant instrument air if needed.
Although nitrogen is the preferred blanket gas from a system biofoulir.g/ corrosion perspective, air is also acceptable for surge tank pressurization if needed for a short time duration, i.e., four weeks. (Ref. AR A03%844).
4 i.
1)
Material Compatibility
[ W ] Yc:: l ] No l
l Comments:
1 All material specified by this design change is compatible with the existing system material and is suitable for its intended installation location, i.e., outdoor service and system i
operating conditions (pressure /temperatu' e/ flow).
r 1
m)
Ease of Operation
[ B ] Yes l l No Cgnantenft I
i 40
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 41 of 58 The installation locations for the manual devices and direct reading pressure indicators have been specified and located such that accessibility by operations and unintenance dept. personnel can be maintained without the use ofladders and or scaffolding.
Furthermore, this design change will not adversely impact the functional operability of CCW SSC's under any plant operating condition and does not change plant operating conditions.
n)
Maintamability/ Accessibility.
[ E ] Yes [ ] No Comments:
The locations for the new components will be accessible by maintenance and/or operations dept. personnel without the use ofladders and/or scaffolding. The direct reading pressure indicators will be located such that they can be easily read.
o)
ControlRoom Enclosure
[ ] Yes [ B 1 No Comments:
The new alarm circuits will not impact the safety related functionality of the control room enclosure.
p)
Personnel Safety
. [ E l Yes [ ] No Comments:
Not affected. This design change does not impair personnel safety or violate OSHA requirements in that it:
A) Creates no personnel hazards, high pressure nitrogen bottles are seismically supported.
B) Introduces no hazardous material C) Does not affect evacuation routes D) Does not create equipment access problems E) Does not affect cquipment grouriding The compressed nitrogen bottles are designed per OSHA / DOT safety guidelines and criteria.' The components and materials associated with the high pressure (2000 psig)
. ponion of the design have design manufacturer ratings exceeding 2000 psig. The N2 bottles and the 2000 psig portion of the design will be supported in accordance with seismically qualified installation criteria. Additionally, the N2 bottle supports have been analyzed per UFSAR section 3.5.1.2, Missile Generated Outside Containment, criteria.
q)
Environmental Quality
[ ] Yes l B ] No mme.
l
-41 O__
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION i
i I
DCP M-050284 Rev. 0 l
Page 42 of 58 This change does not adversely impact air, water or terrestrial quality during construction l
or plant operation. The design does not cause a disturbance to the SLO-2 archaeological site.
r)
Multi-Unit Impact
[ E ] Yes [ ] No t'annsnents
. This design change is applicable to Unit 2 only.
-l However:
i The areas where CCW Header C components are common between Unit I and Unit 2 are l
at the Waste Gas Concentrator, the Waste Gas Compressors, and the Auxiliary Steam l
drain receiver. In the event that one of the units is pressurized and common valves leak, i
inventory in the pressurized CCW System could be lost to the non-pressurized unit.
l Because there are unit supply and return valves for each component, leakage past any one l
of these valves could be isolated by closing the opposite unit's supply / return valves. in the
]
case of the Waste Gas Compresor, RV-303 relieves back to Unit 1. If there is leakage through the reliefvalve, the compressor can be isolated.
The low pressure nitrogen system is common to both units. Loss of the low pressure nitrogen system (used as the primary source of nitrogen to the surge tank) will initiate a control room alarm indicating low nitrogen supply pressure. The back-up nitrogen bottles.
will maintain surge tank pressure until operators can restore the primary source of nitrogen. The bottles are sized to maintain approximately 20 minutes ofnitrogen supply at an assumed nitrogen leakage rate in the tank of 8 scfm and minimum bottle pressure of 1000 psig. In the event that low pressure nitrogen system cannot be restored in 20 l
minutes, bottles can be replaced accordingly in order to maintain the minimum design pressure of 17 psig in the tank or instrument air can be valved in to maintain pressurization.
The annunciation oflow pressure in the nitrogen header is com'non to both units. This alarm will be actuated in both units (always) This common alarm is initiated in Unit I by relay PS309X. The Unit 2 altem is initiated by the repeater portion of the Unit l's Main Annunciator. A connection to between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Annunciator allows the Unit 1 Main Annunciator to activate an alarm input causing the Unit 2 alarm. This common alarm method is the same used of all common alarms associated with the Main Annunciator.
s)
Arc funcuonal tests and m-- " cntena requiral?
[ B ] Yes [ ] No ii Cosements:
l-42 Io N ___
___._ x --
Datei 04/15/96 '
(DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 43 of 58 Functional tests acceptance criteria are required to demonstrate that the critical design basis functions of this modi 6 cation have been met Refer to the PMT section of the I&C DCN t)
Water Fa==er
[ ] Yes [ E ] No I
Conunents:
This modi 6 cation will provide sufficient static head on the CFCUs to prevent CCW flashing and consequent occurrence ofwater hammer during a postulated LBLOCA coincident with a Loss of Offsite Power.
u)
Proco.
c.r.t ofMaterials
[ ] Yes [ El] No Conunents:
i i
This is controlled outside the scope of the design change. Applicable RPE's have been generated and revised in order to specify appropriate dedication and procurement requirements for the safety related material associated with this design change. Refer to the general notes section of the associated DCN's for specific RPE to component cross i
references.
v)
Other:
[ El] Yes [ ] No Comments:
j External Missile hazard:
Portions of the CCW surge tank nitrogen pressurization system are potentially subject to tornado generated missiles. However, failure of this portion of the CCW system does not have an effect on the normal operation of the CCW system or the ability to place the plant in a safe condition following a tornado due to the fact that a LBLOCA accident is not considered with a tornado. Ref. DCM T-9, Section 4.3.4.5.
43 l
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : -DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 44 of 58 INDEPENDEbrT VERIFICATION Discipline: Electrical Answer the following questions for this discipline's design change. For those questions that are answered l
Yes, desenbe actions taken to establish the adequacy of this discipline's portion of the design change.
1.
Are the design bases and design inputs correctly established and met by the design change?
Conunents:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A 1
This design provides electrical support for the installation of new pressure instrument loop P-850 which is being added by I&C DCN 2-SJ-50294. The electrical design will provide a non safety power source for the loop plus all associated cable and conduit. All the electrical equipment added by this design is also non safety related. As part of this design, non safety related conduit will be installed on existing Class I conduit suppons in the cable spreading room.
The basis for por; ions of the electrical design (i.e. design class II) was provided by I&C DCN 2-SJ-50284. The design bases for the pressure instrument loops (i.e. power
. requirements, cable sizing, etc.) was based on standard practices for instrument circuits.
- These design bases and inputs are acceptable for this application.
2.
Are the design and safety issues properly considered, adequately addressed, and correctly resolved?
Comments:
I li!!l Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Per I&C design 2-SJ-50284, the new instrument loop is non safety related. This electrical design correctly provides non safety related power for the loop and provides appropriately colored (black) wire for the circuitry. Some non safety related conduit, added by this design, will be supponed with Class I conduit suppons in the cable spreading room.
The electrical ponion of this design has no effect on Tech Specs and no change is made to the FSAR.- There are no unresolved design or safety issues associated with this design.
3.
Have the design change activities for this design change been accomplished in accordance with applic41e pines? '
[ B ] Yes [ ] No lJN/A Ca-ts:
All activities associated with this design have been performed in accordance with applicable sections ofCF3.ID9.
I 44
~ Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Wrsion 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 45 of 58 4.
Has adequate coordination of the design change with other disciplines been accomplished?
Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No I]N/A
' This design has been properly coordinated with the Instrumentation, Mechanical, Civil, and Seismic Quahfication departments.
l l
I 5.
Arc the nere==ary supportsag documents for the design change properly prepared / revised and
~ issued " Final" or tracked 7 a)
Environmental Quahfication Files (Issued " Final" or tracked via AR)
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [E]N/A No EQ equipment is instal ed or affected by this design change.
j l
b)
Seismic Quahfication Files (Issued " Final" or tracked via AR)
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No i El] N/A No equipment installed by this design is seismically qualified. In addition, no existing seismically quali6ed components are affected.
c)
DCMs (Issued " Final" or IDCMC approved)
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ El] N/A No existing DCMs are affected and no new DCMs are added by the electrical portion of i
this design.
6.
Identify the category that describes this design change:
[]
Non-safety related (without Graded QA) and no affected components are listed in NEP-001.
i i
[]
Non-safety related (without Graded QA) attachment to a safety-related structure which does not aflect the safety-related structure design.
l
[ El }
Pipe support or raceway support 1
i l ],
Incorporates a consultant prepared design where the consultant has previously verified
' the design under the consuhant's approved QA program and the verification is
?--
nted elsewhere.
j j
i, 45 l
L__
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
~ TITLE : : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 46 of 58
[- ]
- None of the above.- (if this box is clmr+ad complete the Design Review Questions 7 through 25. If an alternate verification method is used in lieu of questions 7 through 25, the verification is to be comple*ed in accordance with CF3.NE3 " Design Verification").
Description of the verification actions 7.
a)
Are assumptions mar *enary to perform the design activity adequately described and reasonable?
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
b)
Where aarwenary, are assumptions identified for subsequent revenfications when the detailed design activities are completed?
[ ] Yes - [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
8.
Are the appropriate quality control and quality assurance requirements prm,i?
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A 9.
Are applicable codes, an==dards, and regulatory requirernents, including issue and addenda, properly identified and are their requirements for design snet ?
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A 10.'
Have applicable construction and operating experience been considered?
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No : [ ] N/A 11.
Have design interface requirements been satisfied?
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
12.
Was appropriate design method used?
[ j Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A
. Comments:
13.
l Is output reasonable compared to input?
- [ ] Yes [ ] No - [ ] N/A Comments:
14.
Are specific parts, equipment, and processes suitable for requirtxt application /
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A 15.
Are specific materials compatible with each other and with the design environmental conditions to which materials willbe exposed?
[ ] Yes [ ] No - [ ] N/A a
Comments:
o p
16.
Have adequate maineenmarv features and mquirernents been specified?
)
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A i
l' 46 L _ _____- _
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. 0 l
Page 47 of 58 17.
Are accessibility and other design paisions adequate for performance of needed maintenance and repair?
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A C - ~ ts:
18.
Has adequate accessibility been provided to perform in-service inspections expected to be required during plant life?
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
19.
Has design properly considered radiation exposure to public and plant personnel?
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [lN/A 20.
- Arc &a~ criteria incorporated into de gn & 2 - =ts sufHeient to allow verification that design requirements have been satisfactorily accomplished? [ ] Yes [ ] No I]N/A 3
Comments:
' 21.
Have adequate post-modsficatation test requirements been appropriately specified?
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A 22.
Are adequa?e k-~nina storage, cleamng, and shipping requirements specified?*
Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No []N/A 23.
Are adequate identification requirements specified?*
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
24.
. Are requirements for remrd preparation, review, approval, retention, etc. adequately specified?'
Comments:
[ ] Yes l ] No [ ] N/A 25.
If a component, has overall system design been verified?
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments i
Verification Complete Doualas Park 04/15/96 l
Verifier (NES Discipline Engineer)"
Date l
1
- Mark N/A if controlled outside the scope of the DCE
" Must be countersigned by next higher level supenisor if verifier is preparer's direct supenisor.
47 e-_________-
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Vctsion 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION l
DCP M-050284 Rev. 0 Page 48 of 58 INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION Discipline: IAC Answer the following questions for this discipline's design change. For those questions that are answered Yes, describe actions taken to establish the adequacy of this discipline's portion of the design change.
Are the design bases and design inputs correctly established and met by the design change?
i.
- Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A This design change involves the installation of Class I D pneumatic nitrogen supply to the CCW surge tank. The design bases and design inputs were reviewed and found to be i
adequate to define the requirements to be met by this design change. The I&C design was verified and all necessary calculations including seismic cdculations have been listed in the DCP.
~
2.
Are the design and safety issues properly considered, adequately addressed. and correctly resolved?
Comments:
[ E ] Yes - [ ] No []N/A The design was verified to be consistent with design bases. The safety related portion of the design involves the installation of pneumatic nitrogen supply to the CCW surge tank and the installation of Class IC devices. All presuure regulators and tubings are Class I D.
PCV 2022 is Design Class I. All alarm circuits are Class II. All verification comments were correctly resolved.
l 3.
Have the design change activities for this design change been accomplished in accordance with l
applicable procedures?
[ B ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
The design change activities for this design have been accomplished in accordance with the Procedure CF3.ID9.
9 4.
Has adequate cw.d stion of the design change with other disciplines been accomplished?
)
Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No []N/A This design change has been properly coordinated with Electrical, Mechanical, Civil and
. Piping Departments ( includes seisnde ).
i 48
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 49 of 58 5.
Are the necessary supporting documents for the design change properly prepared / revised and
)
issued " Final" or tracked ?
d Environmental Qualification Files (lisued " Final" or tracked via AR) l Commen's:
[ ] Yes [ ] No I E l N/A No EQ equipment is installed or affected by this design.
b)
Seismic Qualification Files (Issued Final" or tracked via AR)
Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No []N/A Seismic qualification has been adequately addressed in Seismic files IS-35, IS-71 and IS-74 and are final.
c)
DCMs (Issued " Final" or IDCMC approved)
Comments:
( E ] Yes [ ] No l ] N/A Mc liC DCivis are arrecrea and no usw DC% os.JJ J. Reviewed DCMs S-14, S-25B S-25A and other DCMs. HoTE TH G ATTAc MM*W Sec'Ti o N AS5oc8 ATE h W /THE bc6 Sip eciGI ' Th e
~C b c m c.'S Assoc i(AT E b wiTH THi.s
'bESI 6 rd.
6.
Identifv the category that describes this design change:
[]
Non-safety related (without Gradd QA) and no affected components arc listed in NEP-001.
[]
Non-safety related (withcut Graded QA) attachment to a safety-related structure which does not affect the safety-related structure design.
[]
Pipe support or raceway support.
l]
Incorporates a consultant prepared design where the consultant has previously verified the derign under the consultant's approved QA program and the verification is doc unented elsewhera.
I
{E]
None of the above. (If this box is checked complete the Design Resiew Questions 7 through 25. If an alternate verification method is used in lieu of questions 7 through 25, the verification is to be completed in accordance with CF3.NE3 " Design Verification").
Description of the verification actions:
l 49 l
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 50 of 58 7.
a)
Are assumptions nacaeamry to perform the design activity %*1y described and reasonable?
. [ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A C==ts:
- All assumptions made are adequately addressed in calculations. These assumptions are i
reasonable and adequately described.
i b)
Where nac====ry, are assumptions identified for subsequent revenfications when the detailed design activities are completed?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No I]N/A Inmenentc; Assumptions made are reasonable and reverification is not required.
i 8.
Are the appropnate quality control and quality assurance requirements specified?
Comments:
[ B ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A The Class I portion of the design change requires QC inspection during implementation of the design.
i 9.
Are apphcable codes, standards, and regulatory requirements, inchading issue and addenda, properly identified and are their requirements for design met ?
Comments:
[ E ] Yes ~ [ ] No l]N/A Design uses applicable codes and standards as referenced in associated DCMs.
i 10.
Have applicable construcuan and operating experience been considered?
Comments:
[ B ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Installation of the instrument tubing shall conform to details provided in drawing 049238.
Details have been provided in Sketches 16 and 17. All installation is within the expertise of the construction organization.
This design provides additional annunciator and computer points so operators can determine the status of CCW surge tank and nitrogen header pressure.
11.
Have design interface requirements been satisfied?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No []N/A Comments:
The design has been interfaced with affected engineering disciplines and with other departments through coordination meetings.
4 12.
Was appropnate design method used?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A 50 i
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION
. DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 51 of 58 Comments:
The design is consistent with design bases and inputs.
13.
Is output ressonable compared to input?
[ E ] Yes - l } No [ ] N/A Comments:
The design change meets the design intent to pressurize CCW surge tank.
14.
Are specific pans, equipment, and processes suitable for required application?
Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No []N/A All components are properly chosen and are qualified for the application.
Are specific materials compatible with each other and with the design environmental conditions to which materials will be enosed?
[ E ] Yes j ] No llN/A Comments:
The components chosen are suitable to interface with each other and operate in mild environment. Components are compatible with the environment requirements.'
16.
Have adequate maintenance features and requirements been specified?
Comments:
[ B ] Yes _ [ ] No [ ] N/A Maintenance features and r< 1uirements are specified in Vendor manuals. Vendor manuals have been listed in the DCP.
I
)
17.
Are accessibility and other design provisions adequate for performance of needed maintenance and repair?
[ E ] Yes l ] No [ ] N/A Comrnents:
The instruments are easily accessible for maintenance / repair as necessary.
18.
Has adequate accessibility been provided to perform in-service inspections expected to be required during plantlife?
[ E ] Yes l } No 1]N/A Comments:
Adequate accessibility has been provided to perforrtin-service inspection.
l._
~ 19.
Has design properly considered radiation expowse 80 public and plant personnel?
L Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No llN/A
)
~Alara review has been performed and design has properly considered radiation exposure, f
I 51 l'
j L
1
Datt: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
(.
1-TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 52 of 58 i
20.
Are eW-* criteria incorporated into design documents sufficient to allow verification that design requirements have been satisfactorily accomplished? [ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
Acceptance criteria have been included in design calculations and will allow verification of design requirements. Post modification functional test has been specified to validate the systems capability to maintain pressure.
21.
Have adequate post-modificatation test requirements been appropriately spcified?
l Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Post modification test has been included to verify that maximum nitrogen leakage rate of 8 scfm is not exceeded with the installed configuration.
I 22.
' Are adequate handling, storage, c>amnf and shipping requirements==~ hi?*
Conunents:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [EIN/A Controlled outside the scope of DCE. The information is provided in RPEs.
l j
23.
Are adequate identification requirements specified?*
[ ] Yes [ ] No [EiN/A I
Comments:
I Controlled outside the scope of this DCE.
l 24.
Are requirements for record preparation, review, approval, retention, etc. adequately specified?'
Comments:-
[ ] Yes [ ] No [E]N/A Controlled outside the scope of this DCE.'
25.
If a component, has overall system design been verified?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A
. Comments:
Verified overall design by review ofDCP, I&C DCN and applicable DCMs ans Calculations. Verified adequate coordination has been performed.
Verification Complete Pat K Ramana
_ 04/15/96 Veri *ier (NES Disciplina, Fneinmar)**
Date
- Mark N/A if controlled outside the scope of the DCE 52
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION 1
DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 53 of 58 I
l
- Must be countersigned by next higher level supervisor if verifier is preparer's direct supervisor.
l l
I 1
4 l
i
~
53
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Vtrsion 1.5)
TITLE : ~ DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 54 of 58 INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION Discipline: Piping Answer the following questions for this discipline's design change. For those questions that are answered Yes, desenbe actions taken to establish the adequacy of this discipline's portion of the design change.
l 1.
. Are the design bases and design inputs correctly established and met by the design change?
Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No I ] N/A l
Yes, this design change meets the design criteria ofDCMs T-10,T-25 and T-26.
2.
Are the design and safety issues properly considered, adequately addressed, and correctly
{
. resolved?
]
Comments:
[ El] Yes [ ] No I]N/A l
l All the design and safety issues are considered and resoved per calculations H-079-01,
(
MH-079-01 and SQE-22. Pipe is seismically qualified per above calculations and material i
specification K is compatible with existing piping on the system.
3.
Have the design change activities for this design change been accomplished in accordance with.
applicable procedures?
[ El] Yes [ ] No [jN/A Comments:
This' design change is being issued in accordance with procedure CF3.ID9.
I 4
Has adequate coordination of the design change with other disciplines been accomplished?
Comments:
l El] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A l
This design change has been coordinated with affected disciplines.
5.
Are the manry supporting documents for the design change properly prepared / revised and issued " Final" or tracked 7 a)
Environmental Qualification Files (Issued " Final" or tracked via AR)
O - =*ats:
l ] Yes [ ] No [ El] N/A
+
This change is being performed in the area with mild environment.
b)
Seismic Qualification Files (le=wl " Final" or tracked via AR) 1 54
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 55 of 58 Comments
[ E ] Yes [ ] No llN/A Seismic calculation H-079-01, MH-079-01 and SQE-22 are fmal.
c)
DCMs Ossued " Final" or IDCMC approved)
Conunents
[ E ] Yes [ ] No 1JN/A Piping DCMs T-10,T-25, T-26 and T-38 are issued final.
6.
Identify the category that desenbes this design change
[]
Non-safety related (without Graded QA) and no affected components are listed in NEP-
.001
[]
Non-safety related '(without Graded QA) attachment to a safety-related structure which does not affect the safety-related structure design.
[]
Pipe suppon or raceway support.
ll Incorporates a consultant prepared design where the consultant has previously verified
' the design under the consultant's approved QA proptm and the verification is documented elsewhere.
[B]
None of the above. (If this box is checked complete the Design Review Questions 7
- through 25. If an alternate verification method is used in lieu of questions 7 through 25, the verification is to be completed in acconiance with CF3.NE3 " Design Verification").
Description of the venfication actions This DCN adds a 3" manual isolation valve and a 3/4" root valve assembly for
' instrumentation connection on line 2-K-2555-3" C.
. Code break is moved from its existing position of downstream of RCV-16 to downstream of new Pcv-2022on line 2-K-6168-1" C.
This change is seismially qualified per calculations H-079-01, MH-079-01 and SQE-22 in accordance with applicable DCMs.
i Portion of existing pipe being upgraded will be verified by following dedicated activties.
I Material of existing pipe, elbow and accessible welds shall be verifid to be equivalent to K
- spec pipe / weld.
_ isual and MT (or PT) examination of accessible portion of accessible existing weld to v
Code Class C requirements.
i ASME Section XI pressure test between RCV-16 and PCV-2022 at 33 psig.
Ihave concluded that this design change is tu.hnically adequate.
l 55
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5) 1 TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION '
DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 56 of 58 7.
a)
Are assumpuons necessary to perfonn the design activity adequately described and reasonable?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments Assumptions are adequately described and are reasonable.
j I
b)
Where =manry, are assurnptions identified for subsequent reverification when the detaded design activities are completed?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A C = - ts:
. Applicable DCM identify assumptions for reverification ifrequired.
8.
Are the appropriate quality control and quality assurance requuements specified?
Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A
)
Constmetion notes specify dedication activities and pressure test for quality assurance.
1 i
9.
Are applicable codes, standards, and regulatory requirements, including issue and adde =da properly identified and are their requirements for design met ?
Comments:
[ E] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Applicable codes, standards and regulatory requirements are identified in appliable DCMs.
10.
Have applicable construction and operating experience been considered?
Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A This change has been coordinated with construction and operations.
i 11.
Have design interface requirements been satisfied?
[ B ] Yes [ ] No []N/A Comments:
There are two other DCNs which are part of this DCP and this change has been coordinated with other disciplines.
12.
Was appropnate design method used?
[ E] Yes [ ] No I]N/A Comments:
Design method used is appropriate 56
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5) l TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 57 of 58 13.
Is output reasonable compared to input?
[E]Yss [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
Output isreasonble and expected compared to input.
14.
Are specific parts, equipment, and processes suitable for required application?
Comments:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A This design is the result of various inter-discipline coordination, valves and pipe sizes aresuitable 'and adequate.
l 15.
Are specific materials compatible with each other and with the design environmental conditions to which materials willbe exposed?
[ B ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
Specified material is compatible with existing material for this system.
16.
Have adequate maintenance features and requirements been specified?
Comments:
[ B ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Existing maintenance procedures are adequate.
j 17.
Are accessibility and other design provisions adequate for performance of needed maintenance and repatr?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
This area is open and accessible.
18.
Has adequate accessibility been provided to perform in-senice inspections expected to be required during plant life?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
This area is open and accessible.
19.
Has design properly considered radiation exposure to public and plant personnel?
Comments:
[ E ] Yes i j No []N/A This design change is not in radiation area.
20.
Are Wa-e criteria iiwipo.W4 into design -f-:-
=ts sufficient to allow verification that i'
design requirements have been===f=*arily accomplished? [ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A.
Comments:
57 l
I Date: 04/15/%
(DCS Version 1.5)
TITLE : DESIGN CHANGE EVALUATION DCP M-050284 Rev. O Page 58 of 58 ASME Sectioni XI pressure test and other dedication activities are specified in the construction notes.
21.
Have adequate post modificatation test requirements been appropriately specified?
' Ca===ts:
[ E ] Yes [ ] No I ] N/A 22.
Are adequate handling, storage, cleaning, and shipping requirements specified?'
Commets:
[ B ] Yes [ ] No [jN/A Existing procedures are adequate.
23.
Are adequate identification requirements specified?'
[ ] Yes [ ] No [ B ] N/A Comments:
24 Are requirements for record preparation, review, approval, retention, etc. adequately spectfied?*
' Comments:
[ ] Yes [ ] No [B]N/A.
25.
If a component, has overall system design been verified?
[ E ] Yes [ ] No [ ] N/A Comments:
This change h' as been coordinated with system engineering.
Verification Complete Gardial S Sandhu 04/15/96 Venfier (NES Discipline Engineer)**
Date
- Mark N/A if controlled outside the scope of the DCE
- Must be countersigned by next higher level supenisor if verifier is preparer's direct supenisor.
58
bCP M-Sco84 he A k 1 /t a L
Rev A Meeting minutes for DCP M-49284/50284 Pressurize CCW Surge Tank t
Meeting Date: 04/11/96
- 1. Changes to the overall design were discussed since the last meeting held on 04/05.
- 2. Setpoint issues were discussed:
The following direct reading pressure gauges will be considered M&TE type of gauges:
PI-2032 & 2031 The remaining gauges will be calibrated as non-M&TE type gauges.
The PT-850 instrument loop is design instrument class II, however it will be considered l
graded QA due to the operator response associated with the alarms. Therefore the PS-850A/B setpoints are engineering controlled, category B type setpoints.
The N2 alarm will not be tied to any engineermg controlled setpoints.
The PCV regulator setpoints were established by engineering, however they are specified per existing setting tolerance criteria.
The design will establish one new main annunciator PK window at PK01-14. This window will alarm @ surge tank high & low pressure and low plant nitrogen header pressure. The annunciator printer will distinguish the alarms specifically.
- 3. For PMT purposes, two new test valve tees have been added They will be incorporated into the sketches. The I&C DCN will specify the 8 SCFM maximum leakage rate as the acceptance criteria in the PMT section of the DCN. This is the only special test required for this design. All other post modification activities such as regulator /
instmment settings and installation leak checks will be performed per existing post modification procedures.
- 4. The design is at a critical stage when all comments and misc. activities are coming to completion. It is very important that all comments, et. al., filter to one source, either to John McKernan on days or Loren Lemons on nights. This will keep the design package in control and manageable.
- 5. Misc items that remain to be completed:
RPE's: Appropriate cross reference is provided in the design for the new components.
FSAR changes: Appropriate references are made and all necessary sections have been identified for revisions.
DCM's: Appropriate references are made and all necessary sections have l
been identified for revisions.
~
i Calculations: Appropriate references are made and all necessary cale's have been identified for revisions and or tracked via an AR for completion if necessary.
Appropriate Unit-1 Vs Unit-2 cales have been flagged in the design package.
i U_
--y_m
%
- d 3 Gk 9
- 6. Schedule The design package for Unit-2 is currently scheduled for issuance by no later than Monday 04/15. The unit-1 package will be issued shonly after. It was noted that the current rumor mill has put more imponance on the Unit-1 implementation, stay tuned for further information.
- 7. Questions
- Will the pressurized CCW impact the 200 gpm @ 20 minutes criteria currently set per SER-167 Answer: This is addressed in the LBIE as a non-mechanistic type of f allure in which we are not per our existing licensing basis, however the 20 minutes could increase as result of the pressure increase. This will be addressed in the LBIE.
- Is this design applicable in modes 1 - 4, or can we limit it to a specific power level and/or plant operational mode.
Answer: Current design practice dictates we use plant conditions based on worst case conditions, i.e., mode 1,100% power close to end of core life. Design change packages typically DCP's do not address mode applicable requirements. We will look into putting some words regarding this.
- Has RV-45 been analyzed for gas service?
Answer: Don't know, will have to verify. The valve group has analyzed this valve and certified its reliability etc., we will have to check if they have evaluated for gas service conditions.
- RV-45 drains into the Aux bldg sump exactly where?
Answer: This issue will be better addressed in the technical review section of the DCE.
- Has N2 been analyzed for its effects on molybdated CCW water?
Answer: This issue will be better addressed in the technical review section of the DCE.
- Can OP's use regular compressed gas if need for emergency purposes?:
Answer: The use of N2 is used to minimize the corrosive effects of dissolved oxygen in the CCW. In the event of emergencies any compressed gas such as air can be used. This can be spelled out in the new operation procedures. This is current stated in the DCE but we will add more words to bolster.
i t
- Date: 04/15/96 (IAS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 1 of 19 REFERENCE DOCUMENT No. M-050284 Doc. Rev. No. 0 (i.e., indicate the Procedure Number, DCP Number or other m,L-ce document for which the Screen is done, includung the docummt revision number or date).
i Reference Document Title Pressurmation of the Unit 2 CCW Surne Tank Sponsorung Orgn== tion Maa==ical Enzineerina Sponsor Michael W Hicks (Print)
DESCRIPTION Summanze the proposed activity, CTE or existing problem and how it differs from the presently l
approved condition. 'Ihe reason for the proposed activity or CTE should also be described. Cite applicable drawings and other he as - - y to describe the current condition. Briefly describe how the issue may interface with the licensmg basis (&-: ----- x).
I L
This LBIE addresses a modi 6 cation to DCPP Unit 2 to pressurize the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system using a N2 or air blanket on the CCW surge tank. Presently, the surge tank is vented to atmosphere through RCV-16, which is designed to close and isolate the tank in the event of radioactive in-leakage to the CCW System to prevent any radiological release to the environment.
The purpose for this modification is to provide suf5cient static head on the Containment -
Fan Cooler Units (CFCUs) in order to prevent CCW flashing during a postulated Large j.
Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) coincident with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). Although FSAR Update Sections 6.2.2.3.l(2) and 9.2.2.2.7 state that CCW fluid is not expected to flash in a post-LOCA environment due to sufficient dynamic head provided by the CCW pumps, recent investigations into the potential for CFCU flashing
- 1. -
- have preliminarily shown that flashing may occur during the first minute following a l
i
. LBLOCA with LOOP. The analysis which predicts flashing of the CCW fluid is based on L
the timing and coastdown of the CCW pumps and CFCUs as they are stripped from the 4-kV bus and reloaded to the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), peak containment temperatures for a LBLOCA, initial CCW supply temperature, and static head on the CCW fluid in the CFCUs during the period when CCW System flow stops. As the CCW pumps are restarted on the EDGs and cold water reaches the potential steam space in the CFCU lines, a severe water hammer could occur and cause loss of pressure boundary integrity of the CCW System. By pressurizing the CCW System to at least 17 psig (Ref.
Calculation M-998 Rev. 0), the CCW fluid in the CFCUs will stay subcooled during a A
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE) i Page 2 of 19 l
LBLOCA with LOOP, which will prevent the potential for a CCW water hammer from j
occurring.
The proposed modification will use nitrogen (N2) from the plant N2 system as the primary source of pressure. The N2 supply line to the CCW surge tank (through drain valve CCW-1-89) will be seismically qualified and will tie into the N2 header which supplies the Design Class II backup N2 supply for PCV-21 and PCV-22. The 85 psig N supply from 2
the header will be dropped to nominally 20 psig by a regulator near the surge tank. In the event of foss of the Design Class II N2 System, a backup system comprised of Design Class I N bottles and a regulator (to drop high bottle pressure to approximately 75 psig) 2 will supply backup N through the same 20 psig (nominal) regulator. An additional 2
backup source from the plant instrument air system will also be provided for the same regulator.
In order to limit pressure in the surge tank given variations in surge tank level, a backpressure regulator is being installed in the existing atmospheric vent line downstream I
l ofRCV-16 to maintain tank high pressure at less than approximately 25 psig and to l
prevent unnecessary challenging ofRV-45 which is set at a nominal 30 psig. The backpressure regulator will normally be closed and effectively serve to isolate the CCW surge tank from the atmosphere. The RCV-16 valve and control circuit will remain intact to isolate the tank in the event of radioactive in-leakage to CCW, where RE-17A or 17B will initiate closure ofRCV-16. RV-45, as the Code reliefvalve, will lift to relieve pressure, the flow from which is _ directed to the auxiliary building sump as is currently j
stated in the DCM S-14 and FS AR Update Section 9.2.2.2.3.
j The proposed modification meets all CCW System design requirements. The safety function of the compressed gas is to maintain CCW pressure at or above 17 psig for only the first minute following a LBLOCA with simultaneous LOOP. Because the proposed modification will maintain CCW surge tank pressure before the LBLOCA occurs, the components added by this modification have no active function to perform once the L
accident has occurred. Therefore, the only safety-related function of the components added by this modification is to maintain pressure boundary integrity and, thus, failure of these components is not postulated within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following a LOCA per FSAR l:
Update Section 3.1.1. All components used to pressurize the surge tank will be seismically qualified and installed, and will meet piping and instrumentation codes and standards for Design Class I equipment / installation in order to maintain pressure boundary integrity. Additionally, the design includes check valves, isolation valves, instrument alarms, redundant regulators (with one normally valved out), and bottle / instrument locations to maintain reliability, maintainability, and accessibility of the pressurization system as well as assuring control room cognizance of the surge tank pressure condition.
Because it is an inert gas, use ofN2 to pressurize the surge tank will not adversely affect CCW chemistry or heat transfer capability. Although N is the preferred gas for surge tank 2
I
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
I l
Page 3 of 19 pressurization, the design change allows for compressed air as a pressurization source.
Similarly, no adverse effects are postulated with the use of compressed air (including the initial pressunzation of the tank) since: 1) the system is already open to atmosphere, and
- 2) 1ong term corrosion in the system will not increase with only intermittent use of the backup air (Ref. AR A0396844, E8).
This Design Change Package is a contingency plant modification until the analysis that determines if surge tank pressurization is required for operability of the CCW System is completed. Completion of the analysis is being tracked by A0393068-E06.
SCREENING FOR DETERMINING THE NEED FOR PRIOR REGULATORY AGENCY APPROVAL l
Yes No Does this activity, CTE or problem involve a change to the Facility Operstmg
()*
( El)
- License (OL), including OL An= '==4 (Technical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan and Antitrust Conditions)?
- If"Yes", submit an LAR to the NRC and contmue this Screen subject to the l
approval of the contents of the LAR. LAR#
. Do not release the Reference Document above for use, constructed, etc., until the LA is received. The originator of the Reference Document should provide a reconciliation beta, the LA and LAR to the PSRC tojustify release for j,
use, constmetion, etc.
Is the Reference Document a procedure?
()
( El)
(If"No", skip the next question.)
L Does the Procedure Comrmtment Database (PCD) contain any commitment to a
( )" ()
Regulatory Agency that must be changed and which would either:
a) Require notification to that agency, or b) Require prior approval from that agency?
" Follow the requirements ofIDAP XI4.ID2, C= + =; Change Process. Continue this Screen subject to the contents of the request for prior regulatory approval.
Requestag isw=; #
. If no prior appmval is required, contmue the Screen.
SCREENING FOR DETERMINING THE NEED FOR A SPECIFIC EVALUATION
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 4 of 19 For the activity, CTE or problem under consideration answer the following questions. Any "Yes" response (except the answers for items 3.a and 4.a below) requires the appropriate sectmns of Form 69-10431 (LBIE) to be completed.
- SECTION 1.10 CFR 50.59.10 CFR 50.54(a)(3) and OL C=&iaa Yes No 2.C15)b12.C14)b Screen a) Does it involve a change to the facahty design, function or method of (121) ()
gJun..h.,, the functon as described in the SAR, including text, tables and Sgures and includag the Fire Protocuan Program (FSAR Update, Section 9.5) and Quahty Assurance Program (FSAR Update, Chapter 17)?
b) Does it involve a change to procedures, system operation or
( E!I) ()
admuustrative control over plant activities as described in the SAR, includmg procedures related to the Fire Protection Program (FSAR Update, Section 9.5) and the Quality Assurance Program (FSAR Update, Chapter 17)?
c) Does it result in a test, e%. L condition or configuration that might
()
(li!!)
affect safe operation of the plant but was not anticipated, described or evaluated in the SAR?
SECTION 2. Envir ---- z 1 Preian Screen a) Does it involve changes to or new effluents discharged to air, fiesh water, sea
()
( E!I)
-water orland?
b) Does it involve a change in quantity or use or storage of materials classified
()
(li!!)
as hazardous (includmg oils) or the generation of hazardous wastes?
c) Does it result in disturbance of any previously undisturbed land?
()
(li!!)
d) Does it alter surface water runoff patterns or amounts?
()
(li!I) e) Does it involve work within the SLO-2 archeological site boundary?
()
(li!I)
SECTION 3. Emeraency Plan Screen a) Does the Emergency Plan (EP) require review on the basis of Appendix "1.17
()
( E!I)
If"No," skip the next question and signature.
~
b) If"Yes," does the activity, CTE or problem result in a change to the EP?
()
()
/
C-_
_ _ _ _ ' ____i__ _.. _ _ _ _. _
Date: 04/15/96.
(DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 5 of 19 E.w.sy Plan Reviewer Signature
/
Date SECTION 4. Security Placs' Screen Yes No a) Do any of the security plans (PSP, SCP, STQP) require review on the
()
( Ef )
basis of Appendix 7.2?
If"No," skip the next question and signature.
b) If"Yes," does the activity, CTE or problem result in a change
()
()
to a security plan?
If so, which plan (s)?
/
Security Plan Reviewer Signature
/
Date REMARKS For each Screen Section above having all "No" answers, provide the logic for the "No" answers if clarificatum is required.
. Note: Items in this section correspond to the screening questions:
' 2. Environmental Protection Screen a,b,c,d,e) Increasing the normal CCW System pressure by about 20 psi will tend to increase miacanes leakage from the system. Any possible increase in liquid leakage will continue to be contained and controlled inside the Power Block. Any nitrogen or air leaking from the tank will have a benign effect in the atmosphere.
Therefore, there is no impact on the air, water, or terrestrial quality. This change
. does not affect the usage of hazardous materials or disposal of hazardous waste.
Appendix 7.3 of TS3.ID2 has been reviewed, an Environmental Evaluation is not required as a result of this design change.
3, Emergency Plan Screen a) The CCW surge tank pressurization system does not impact any of the equipment or issues identified in Appendix 7.1 ofTS3.ID2 An Emergency Plan Evaluation is not required.
- 4. Security Plans' Screen
D:te: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 6 of 19 m) There are no aspects of this change which have the potential for affecting the i
DCPP Security Plan or equipment described in the Security Plans. Appendix 7.2 j
of TS3.ID2 has been reviewed.
l REFERENCES /A'ITACHMENTS:
Instrument Schematic's 108033 Sht.19,108034 Sht. IM; P4ing Schematics 108026 Sht.
3,108014 Sht 5; Installation details provided by 049238,054174, 049093,049096 &
049094; FS AR Update Sections 3.1, 3.3.2.3.2.2, 6.2.2.3.3.4, 6.3.3.2.7, 9.2.2; FSAR Update Tables 3.3-2,3.3-3,9.2-7,9.3-7; Tech Specs 3/4.0,3/4.3.3,3/4.7.3.1,3/4.7.12, 3/4.6.3.
Licensing Requirements for the proposed modification are addressed in A0396830-E03,
-E05, -E13, and -E14.
Based upon the above criteria, I have determined that an LBIE is li5 is not._. required.
Loren E Lemons 04/15/96 Preparer Signature Date Based upon my independent technical review, I concur with the above conclusion.
H. Jeff Hodges 04/15/96 Independent Technical Reviewer Signature Date l
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Date: 04/15/96.
(DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVAL,UATION (LBIE)
Page 7 of 19 l
REFERENCE DOCUMENT No. M-050284 Doc. Rev. No. 0 (i.e., indicate the Procedure Number, DCP Number or other.1-ce &-> --mt for which the l
Screen is done, including the document revision nurrher or date).
Reference Document Title Pressurization of the Unit 2 CCW Surge Tank Sponsormg Orgamzation Mechanical Engineering Sponsor Michael W hks (Print)
As a resuk of the LBIE Screen (Fonn 69-10430), indicate wiuch sectaans of this LBIE have been i'
completed and are nerschad Refer to TS3.ID2 to complete each evahmtum l
[El] SECTION 1 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluataan (including 10 CFR 50.54(a)(3) and OL Condition 2.C.(5)b/2.C.(4)b. Evaluations)
[]SECTION 2
. Enviroommtal Protection Evaluation
[]SECTION 3 E.wism.cy Plan Evaluation - 10 CFR 50.54(q)
[]SECTION 4 Security Plans' Evaluation - 10 CFR 50.54(p) t Explain why this LBIE is bemg performed (i.e., Why were Screen questions r.rsucM "Yes"?)
This design change modifies certain licensing basis features associated with the CCW System as described in the FSAR Update. Pressurization of the surge tank will affect operation of the CCW system and additional administrative controls are placed on the system to ensure CCW System operability, l
Yes No l
PSRC REVIEW: MEETING NO.
DATE VMSsRECOMMEND APPROVAL 04 ( )
Le[si,f4f APPROVED (PLANT MANAGER) 44 DATE i
.n 1
N_:-_-_____________-____-____-__________-_______________________________________________________________________________________-____,
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
. DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 8 of 19 SECTION 1. 10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION For the issue under considerat on, provule an explanaten jusufymg each of the Yes/No answers. 'Ihe detail provuled shall be commensurate with the nuclear safety significance of the proposed actisity or CTE or existing problem.
Yes No
- 1. May the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the
()
( El)
SAR beincreased?
Justificat on The CCW System is not associated with the cause of any accidents evaluated in FSAR Update Chapter 15; the CCW System is an accident mitigating system. However, there are several events relating explicitly to the CCW System that are described in FSAR Update Section 9.2.2, including radioactive in-leakage to the CCW System, non-
. mechanistic out-leakage from the CCW System of 200 gpm for 20 minutes, and prevention of CCW boiling during peak CCW exit temperatures at the CFCUs.
FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.3.2 identifies that radioactive in-leakage into the CCW System can come from leakage in any heat exchanger tube or tube sheet in any component with a single barrier between the CCW System and reactor coolant water. However, the proposed modification will not adversely affect the pressure boundary integrity of any CCW components. The CCW System design pressure of 150 psig is assured by the surge tank relief valve (RV-45) lifting at 30 psig (nominal), and operation of the CCW System with the surge tank pressurized to 17 psig is within previously analyzed conditions.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an in-leakage event is not increased.
FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.2.3 identifies that the CCW surge tank volume was sized based on a non-mechanistic leak of 200 gpm from the system. The proposed modification will not adversely affect the pressure boundary integrity of any existing CCW components.
Additionally, the proposed modification meets the design, material, and construction standards applicable to the CCW System and does not create a new failure mode which could increase the probability for CCW System leakage. All installed tubing, valves, regulators, bottles, and instruments which are part of the surge tank pressure boundary will be Design Class I. All tank pressure boundary components to be added by this modification will be seismically qualified and installed to Seismic Category I requirements.
Because the basis for the 200 gpm for 20 minutes out-leakage was a non-mechanistic failure and operator action is credited in FSAR Update Table 9.2-7(5) to establish Class 1 makeup to the surge tank within 10 minutes, pressurization of the surge tank will not affect the licensing requirement as specified in SSER 16 for minimum surge tank volume based on system out-leakage. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an out-leakage i
event is not increased.
1 l
E__________________________________-_________
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 9 of 19 FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.2.7 identifies that CCW System pressure on the cooling water exiting the CFCUs is sufficient to prevent local CCW boiling even during accident conditions. Maintaining pressurization of the CCW surge tank to above 17 psig will prevent the possibility of CCW fluid flashing and subsequent water hammer in the CFCUs during a LBLOCA with LOOP by maintaining suf5cient subcooled margin for the CFCUs water for the first minute following a LBLOCA. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of CCW boiling at the CFCU is not increased The analyses determining the need for 17 psig overpressure on the surge tank also evaluated the MSLB inside containment. The MSLB effects on CCW water in the CFCUs are bounded by the LBLOCA effects.
Based on the above, the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased
- 2. May the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR be
()
( El) increased?
Justification:
The only specific CCW event with radiological consequences evaluated in the SAR is described in FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.2.3 and SER 16 Section 9.3.2.1 and is described as a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier rupture which causes radioactive in-leakage to the CCW System. These references state that the CCW System has redundant radiation monitors (RE-17A & 17B) for detecting radioactive in-leakage to the CCW System. The purpose of these radiation monitors is to isolate the CCW System from the atmosphere by closing RCV-16. Design Code overpressure protection is provided by relying on RV-45 to lift and relieve to the auxiliary building sump.
This design maintains the controls necessary to reduce the potential fbr a radiological release to the environment.- The proposed modification maintains RCV-16 and its current function to close on a radiation signal from RE-17A or 17B. Because RCV-16 is in series
{
with the backpressure regulator which maintains surge tank pressure less than approximately 25 psig, it will override the relieving capacity of the regulator if tank l
pressure is increasing due to radioactive in-leakage to CCW.
~
Overall, the CCW System is designed to provide cooling water to vital and nonvital components during both normal and accident conditions, including LBLOCA as discussed in FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.2. Because the proposed modification will not impact 4 l
CCW System heat transfer capability, the ability of the CCW System to provide cooling to safety-related components and mitigate a LBLOCA is not adversely impacted.
I a
Date: 04/15/96
-(DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. 0 TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 10 of 19 Therefore, because this modification does not change the radiological consequences of any event evaluated in the SAR, it does not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.
- 3. May the probability of occurrence of a==1 bion of equipment important to
()
( El) safety previously evaluated in the SAR be increased?
Justification:
The 3 nportant to safety equipment which is impacted by this proposed modification is all of the CCW pressure boundary components as well as PCV-21 and PCV-22, the 10%
steam dump valves.
For the CCW System, FSAR Update Table 9.2-7 evaluates various CCW System malfunctions and their consequences, including: 1) CCW pump casing rupture, 2) failure of a CCW pump to start, 3) closed manual valves at pump suction or discharge or stuck closed check valve, 4) CCW heat exchanger tube or shell rupture, and 5) CCW System leakage. Pressurization of the CCW surge tank will not have an impact on the probability of failure of a CCW pump to start or closure of manual pump suction or discharge valves j
or a stuck closed check valve.
The direct irroact of this modification on the CCW components is that their normal operating pre.sure will be increased to between about 20 and 25 psi above current working pressures. Operation of the CCW System with the surge tank pressurized to 25 psig (nominal) will not adversely affect the integrity or operation of the CCW surge tank,-
pumps, piping, or components because the system is qualified to the RV-45 setpoint of 30 psig (nominal) at the surge tank. Therefore, this modification will not increase the probability of CCW pump casing rupture or CCW heat exchanger tube or shell rupture as discussed above.
The only safety-related function of the components added by this modification is to maintain pressure boundary integrity. All components used to pressurize the surge tank will be seismically qualified and installed, and will meet piping and instrumentation codes and standards for Class I equipment / installation in order to maintain pressure boundary integrity. Additionally, the design includes check valves, isolation valves, instrument
~
alarms, redundant regulators (with one normally valved out), and bottle / instrument locations to muintain reliability, maintainability, and accessibility of the system. Based on f_
the above discussion, installation of additional equipment to maintain CCW surge tank J
. pressure between 20 and 25 psig (nominal) will not increase the probability of CCW System leakage or the consequences of the malfunction as described in FSAR Update j
L l
)
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
.... _. ~ _ _. - _ -. _
Page 11 of 19 Table 9.2-7. Any failure of new components which may result in a tank pressure ofless than 17 psig will be detected in the control room through the instrumentation provided by the design and Tech Spec 3.0.3 will govern.
FSAR Update Table 3.3-3 evaluates tornado failure analysis for the CCW surge tank and related instrumentation. The proposed modification installs compressed gas lines in the vicinity of the surge tank which are, therefore, susceptible to tornado failure. Although not previously analyzed in Table 3.3-3, failure of the passive pressurization system would cause loss ofpressure on the surge tank. However, the safety function of the compressed gas is to maintain CCW pressure at or above 17 psig for only the first minute of a LBLOCA with simultaneous LOOP. Per DCM T-9 Section 4.3.4.5, a simultaraous accident such as a LBLOCA does not need to be considered with a tornado.
Pressurization of the surge tank does not increase the probability of any other component failure by tornado as described in FSAR Update Table 3.3-3. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of CCW due to failure by a tornado is not increased.
The criteria for sizing the capacity of the compressed gas supply regulator was based on normal level changes in the CCW surge tank as well as assumed maximum compressed gas leakage through fittings and valve packing. Historically, the level in the surge tank remains relatively constant and rapid drops in level do not occur. Because the safety function of the regulator is to maintain pressure on the surge tank for the first minute of a LBLOCA with LOOP, there is no requirement to design the regulator for a simultaneous
{
accident of system out-leakage at 200 gpm for 20 minutes concurrent with a LBLOCA j
with LOOP. (Ref. A0396830 - E03) In order to optimize the design and accurately control tank pressure during normal operation, a maximum capacity of 25 scfm was chosen, which equates to approximately 80 gpm out-leakage from the surge tank j
(assuming no gas leaks) Therefore, in the event of a design basis out-leakage event of 200 gpm for 20 minutes, the compressed gas regulator may not be able to maintain tank pressure greater than 17 psig, but will be adequate to restore pressure to greater than 17 psig within a reasonable time after the event.
The criteria for sizing the capacity of the backpressure regulator was based on normal increases in surge tank level as well as optimizing the design given the narrow pressure control band between the supply regulator setpoint and the RV-45 setpoint. Makeup to the surge tank through LCV-69 and LCV-70 is normally supplied at approximately 250 gpm. However, makeup to the surge tank is rarely required and surge tank level variations usually only occur during unit outages when tank pressurization is not required for CCW System operability. Additionally, there is no requirement to design the backpressure regulator for in-leakage to CCW simultaneous with a LBLOCA with LOOP.
(Ref. A0396830 - E03) Therefore, a backpressure regulator was chosen that will relieve approximately 8 scfm (23 gpm) at 25 psig,97 scfm (255 gpm) at 27 psig, and 133 scfm (335 gpm) at 29 psig. Although the primary function of the backpressure regulator is to l
p Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
' DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
L Page 12 of 19 prevent challenges to RV-45, it may not be able to relieve tank pressure fast enough during rapid surge tank level increases to prevent RV-45 from opening The reliability of RV-45 to lift and rescat to maintain surge tank pressure at approximately 30 psig is addressed in Question 6.
The criteria for sizing the bottle volume and minimum bottle pressure was based on: 1) assumed maximum gas leakage through fittings and valve packing, and 2) allowance for operator action within 20 minutes to restore a plant compressei gas source or replace N2 bottles to maintain surge tank pressure. Because the pressurization system has a passive safety function to maintain pressure boundary integrity, failure of the system is not -
assumed during the first minute of a LBLOCA with LOOP. However, from a plant availability perspective, loss of the common Class II N2 System and surge tank gas leaks could reduce the pressure of the surge tank to less than 17 psig and challenge system operability on both units simultaneously. For this reason, the proposed modification will l-add a low pressure alarm to alert operators of a degraded plant nitrogen system. -
l Assuming a normal gas leakage through fittings and valve pacmg of 8 scfm, two bottles l
ofN2 at a minimum of 800 psig each will provide approximately 20 minutes for operators to restore a plant compressed gas source or replace bottles in the event that the plant
[
nitrogen low pressure alarm annunciated in the control room.
The direct impact of this modification on PCV-21 and PCV-22 is that the N supply to 2
these valves will also supply N to maintain surge tank pressure during normal operation.
2 N at nominally 85 psig is the backup supply to normal instrument air, which is delivered 2
to the supply regulator for PCV-21 and PCV-22 at 100 psig(nominal). Since both instrument air and N2 are Cla s II systems, PCV-21 and PCV-22 have Class I bottled backup air to provide sufficient capacity to meet their safety-related function. Therefore, the proposed modification will not affect the ability ofPCV-21 and PCV-22 to perform their safety function.
)
l Since CCW System components and PCV-21 and PCV-22 are not adversely affected by the proposed modification, the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased 7
The loss of the plant instmment air system can result in a plant trip. The loss of this air
. system is no more likely than previously since: 1) the instmment air supply is normally valved out (, < cept for initial fill and backup pressure maintenance on the tank) and 2) no i.
credible failure in the surge tank can result in backflow of CCW water into the air system.
Therefore, loss of air and a plant trip are no more likely. It is acceptable to pressurize the tank with instrument air if the normal N2 supply is unavailable.
- 4. May the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety
()
(li!I)
L
Date: 04/15/96 (uCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE :. LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE) l Page 13 of 19 previously evaluated in the SAR be increased?
JuanA=han
[
The only specific radiological event postulated in the FSAR Update for CCW is l
~ radioactive in-!eakage to the system The tank isolation function ofRCV-16 and RE-17A and 17B has not changed as a result of this modi 6 cation. FSAR Update Chapters 9,11, 12, and 15 were reviewed to determine the licensing basis for this radiological event. The inleakage discussions in Section 9.2.2.2 and 9.2.2.3 are to assure CCW System design provides for adequate leak detection and overpressure protection for worst case inleakage into the system. This possible inleakage for system design basis does not, however, form l
the licensing basis for dose calculations. Chapters 11 and 15 do not contain dose l
consequence evaluations for inleakage except for the normal, minor quantities described in Table 11.2-5. The DCP changes do not affect these small quantities. There is, otherwise,
[
no dose consequence to evaluate for the types ofinleakage sources described above in Chapter 9.
l There may be a period of time associated with the implementation of this design that requires temporarily breachmg the pressure boundary integrity (PBI) of the surge tank l
vent line upstream of or including RCV-16.' To assure that the isolation normally I
provided by RE-17A/B and RCV-16 can be accomplished (Ref. FSAR Update Section 11.4.2.2.1), compensatory measures, as follows, will be used:
l Immediately prior to and during the time PBI of the vent line is breached in Modes r
110 4:
-close valve RCV-16
-assure that there is NO alarm condition with RE-17A or B l
-monitor the surge tank level to assure there is no level increase P
-maintain direct contact between the maintenance / construction location and
)
the control room for system and PBI status updating j
-at the breach location, maintain the ability to reclose the open vent line l
immediately after notification from the control room with a tempora:y l-closure having a pressure capability of 40 psig
)
l
-minimize the time the breach exists.
l These measures assure that the surge tank's PBI can be restored within a few minutes of the initiation ofin-leakage. The seismic integrity of the vent line is maintained if RCV-16 is temporarily removed and replaced with an upstream blind flange.
l
~~
Overall, the CCW System is designed to provide cooling water to vital and nonvital components during both normal and accident conditions, including LBLOCA as discussed in FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.2. By pressurizing the CCW System to at least 17 psig, the CCW fluid in the CFCUs will stay subcooled during a LBLOCA with LOOP and will not flash, thus preventing the possibility of a CCW water h.reer occurring in the CFCUs.
e a
Date: 04/15/96 (uCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 14 of 19 The proposed modification ensures CCW System pressure boundary integrity and will not impact system heat transfer capability. The ability of the CCW System to provide cooling to safety-related components and to mitigate a LBLOCA is not adversely impacted.
Therefore, because this modification does not change the radiological consequences of any event previously evaluated in the SAR, it does not increase the consequences of a malfunction previously evaluated in the SAR.
- 5. May the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously
()
(li!!)
evaluated in the SAR be created?
Justification:
The only accident related to the proposed modification as evaluated in the FSAR Update Chapter 15 is a Condition IV Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Rupture, which assumes Loss of Offsite Power at the beginning of the LOCA per Section 15.4.1.1.1.2.
The purpose of pressurizing the CCW surge tank is to prevent loss of accident mitigation capability that would increase the consequences of a LBLOCA with LOOP or any other accident previously evaluated in FSAR Update Chapter 15. Pressurization of the CCW L
System will eliminate the potential for CCW flashing and water hammer at the CFCUs and, thus, eliminate the potential for loss of CCW pressure boundary during the LBLOCA with LOOP accident.
As described previously, the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created by the proposed modification.
- 6. May the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a
()
(li!I) different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR be en:ated?
Justification:
The important to safety equipment which is impacted by this proposed modification is all l
of the CCW pressure boundary components as well as PCV-21 and PCV-22, the 10%
steam dump valves.
l The impact of the proposed modification on the design and operation of various CCW System components has been reviewed as follows:
a) Instrumentation Instrumentation in the CCW System which operates based on differential pressurc, such as level or flow instrumentation, will not be affected by pressurization of the surge tank.
L i
La
Date: 04/15/96 (DLS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE. LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 15 of 19 However, pressure transmitters and indicators that measure direct pressure will be affected
. by this moddication in that their outputs will include the surge tank compressed gas pressure. The only automatic control function based on sensing direct system pressure is the CCW pump autostart function on low discharge header pressure, but this is a Design Class II function that is not required to mitigate any design basis accidents. These autostart setpoints will be reset to account for increased system static head (Ref A0398225). All CCW instruments are qualified to maintain pressure boundary integrity up to 150 psig and are ranged to include up to an additional 30 psig static head on the system. Additionally, surge tank instrumentation will not be adversely affected by a vacuum pressure of 2 psig in the surge tank which results from a 200 gpm out-leakage for 20 minutes as described below under "CCW Surge Tank".
[
b) ReliefValves Most of the thermal relief valves in the CCW System are designed to relieve back to the CCW System. Because these relief valves are set based on differential pressure across the valve, the proposed modi 6 cation will have no affect on their setpoints. Additionally, calculation M-416 Rev. O verified that the psid setpoints of these thermal reliefvalves are acceptable to maintain pressure below the design pressure for each isolated component during concurrent lifting ofRV-45 at 30 psig (nominal). The RV-45 setpoint envelopes l
the proposed normal operating pressures on the CCW System as a result of pressurization j
of the surge tank and, therefore, the themial reliefvalve setpoints are not impacted by this modification.
l l
There are several relief valves in the CCW System that are designed to relieve directly to l-containment, including those for the reactor vessel support coolers, RCP thermal barriers,
(
and excess letdown heat exchanger. The setpoints for these relief valves have been evaluated and an increase in CCW System pressure of up to 30 psig will not cause these relief valves to lift during normal system operation. Additionally, the ability of these relief valves to maintain pressure below the design pressure for each isolated component is not affected by the proposed modification.
The CCW surge tank relief valve, RV-45, is set at 30 +/-2 psig. RV-45 is an ASME Section VIII certified reliefvalve for steam, air, gas, and liquid service. RV-45 is not expected to be challenged during normal operation because the backpressure regulator i
limits high tank pressure prior to t$ surge tank reaching the RV-45 setpoint. However, in l
j the event that RV-45 is challenged, a high probability ofreliable service and minimal blowdown will be expected based on recent bench testing, discussion with the vendor, and l
j
-=
ASME Section VIII certification.
Per FSAR Update Section 3.3.2.3.2.2, discharges from RV-45 are routed under the sutge tank where they enter a drain line to the auxiliary building sump. The area under the surge tank has a skirting to prevent rain water from entenng the auxiliary building sump, but the f
s.
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DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : ' LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 16 of 19 skirting is not air tight. Therefore, any compressed gas that would be relieved through RV-45 would not be forced into the auxihary building or pressurize the area under the D
surge tank.
c) Air and Motor Operated Valves The proposed modification will not adversely affect any CCW System Air or Motor Operated Valve (AOV or MOV) design differential pressures. Only AOVs and MOVs that function as containment isolation valves or surge tank makeup water valves are potentially affected by surge tank pressunzation because all other valves are exposed to the CCW System static head both upstream and downstream in all system modes.
- Calculation M-320 Rev. 4 evaluated maximum differential pressures across CCW System containment isolation valves and surge tank makeup valves using conservative system assumptions. For containment isolation valves, the CCW pressure inside containment is l
assumed to be at the specific component thermal reliefvalve lift pressure minus the static head due to the surge tank low level. This is conservative considering that system static l-L head will be increased by the proposed modification and therefore maximum differential pressure across the MOVs will be reduced. Similarly, the maximum differential pressure across the make-up valves LCV-69 and LCV-70 was determined based on the surge tank being at atmospheric pressure. This is conservative considering that the proposed modification increases surge tank pressure and thus decreases the expected differential l
pressure across these valves. Therefore, pressurizing the CCW surge tank does not i
adversely affect any CCW System valve design differential pressures.
d) CCWPumps The proposed modification will not adversely affect the ability of the CCW pumps to deliver the required cooling water flow to mitigate design basis accidents. CCW pump recirculation valves are controlled by motor amps and will not be affected by the proposed
. modification. Pressurizing the surge tank will not adversely affect pump NPSH.
e) CCW Surge Tank j
Existing surge tank level control setpoints, which actuate makeup valves LCV-69 or i
. LCV-70 to maintain sufficient volume in the surge tank to mitigate a non-mechanistic system leak of 200 gpm for 20 minutes, will be maintained by this modification. In the event of an out-leakage event as postulated in FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.2.3 with surge tank volume at the high alarm setpoint, pressurization of the surge tank will create a vacuum (-2 psig) in the tank at the end of the twenty minute event (Calculation M-175 Rev. 2). As specified in DCM S-14 Section 4.3.3.4(c), the surge tank is capable of
. withstanding a total vacuum of 0 psia. In the event of a failure of the 20 psig regulator, w
the compressed gas relief capability through RV-45 is sufficient to prevent surge tank overpressurization. Potential failure of the high pressure regulator will have no affect on the surge tank because a reliefvalve immediately downstream of the high pressure regulator will protect the remainder of the pressurization system.
l
Date: 04/15/96 ~
(IAS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. 0 TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 17 of 19 f) CCW System Chemistry Use ofN2 to pressurize the surge tank will not adversely affect CCW chemiary because it is an inert gas. In fact, N2 may improve CCW System resistance to biological growth and reduce system corrosion. Although N2 is the preferred gas for surge tank pressurization, the design change allows for compressed air as a pressurization source. No adverse affects are postulated with the use of compressed air since: 1) the system is already open
. to atmosphere, and 2) long term corrosion in the system will not increase with only l internuttant use of the backup air (Ref. AR A03%830 E20 and A03%844 E8).
l Pressurization of the CCW surge tank will not adversely affect the heat transfer capability l
of the CCW System and components. The impact ofincreased dissolved gas within the cooling watcr at increased system pressure has been reviewed and determined to not significantly impact CCW thermal conductivity. Although degassification within the CCW System in the event of rapid surge tank depressurization could occur and affect heat transfer capability and CCW pump NPSH, failure of the proposed modification is not
- postulated concurrent with a LBLOCA due to the passive safety function of the modification. Venting of the tank during Modes 5 or 6 to perform system maintenance may cause degassification, but CCW pumps have significant NPSH margin in these modes i
to preclude the possibility of cavitation.
- 7) Common CCW Headers The areas where CCW header C components are common between Unit I and Unit 2 are at the Waste Gas Concentrator, the Waste Gas Compressors, and the Auxiliary Steam drain receiver, In the event that only one of the units is pressurized and common valves leak, inventory in the pressurized CCW System could be lost to the non-pressurized unit.
Because there are unit supply and return valves for.each component, leakage past any one of these valves could be isolated by closing the opposite unit's supply / return valves.- In the case of the, waste gas compressor, RV-303 relieves back to Unit 1. If there is leakage through the relief valve, the compressor can be isolated.
The direct impact of this modification on PCV-21 and PCV-22 is that the N2 supply to these valves will also supply N2 to maintain surge tank pressure during normal operation.
N at nominally 85 psig is the backup supply to normal instrument air, which is delivered 2
i to the supply regulator for PCV-21 and PCV-22 at 100 psig (nominal). Since both instrument air and N2 are Class II systems, PCV-21 and PCV-22 have independent Class I bottled backup air to provide sufficient capacity to meet their safety-related function.
Therefore, the proposed modification will not affect the ability ofPCV-21 and PCV-22 to l
- perform their safety function.
I Since CCW System components and PCV-21 and PCV-22 are not adversely affected by
' the proposed modification, the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.
h I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. - - - _ _ - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ - - - - -
- - ^ - - - - - - - " - - -
Date: 04/15/96 (1x.;S_ Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 18 of 19 J
, 7. Is there a reducuan in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any
()
( El)
Tanhai=1 Specificatan?
L Jusuficanon-The Technical Specifications that apply to this modification are 3.6.2.3 " Containment Cooling System", 3.7.3.1 "Compenent Cooling Water System", and 3.7.12 " Ultimate Heat Sink".
L i
l:
. Technical Specification Bases 3/4.6.2, "Depressurization and Cooling Systems", does not specifically address a margin of safety for the CFCUs. However, pressurizing the surge l-tank has no adverse affect on the ability of the CFCUs to maintain containment cooling during normal and post-LOCA conditions. The proposed modification prevents potential L
CCW flashing in the CFCUs during a LBLOCA with LOOP and, therefore, maintains the i
margin of safety. Additionally, the CFCUs are quali6ed for the maximum 30 psi increase in static pressure over current operating conditions.
Technical Specification Bases 3/4.7.3, " Vital Component Cooling Water System", does not speci6cally address a margin of safety for the CCW System The Bases do state that L
"the redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with L
the assumptions used in the safety analysis." Because the proposed modification is a -
l completely passive, seismically qualified system (i.e., single failure assumption is not L-
- required for design) whose only safety function is to maintain CCW surge tank pressure for the first minute of a LBLOCA with LOOP, the design is consistent with assumptions l
used in the safety analysis.
L Technical Specification Bases 3/4.7.12, " Ultimate Heat Sink", only defines a margin of
. safety with respect to CCW and Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) system peak temperatures.
The proposed modification has no impact on either CCW or ASW system performance and, therefore, will not impact resuhing temperatures.
L
-FSAR Update Section 9.2.2.2.7 is revised to more clearly present the design assumptions / conditions for CCW in the CFCUs. These revisions were compared to the acceptance criteria described in NRC SSER 16, pages 9-5 and -6 (i.e., compliance with GDC 44). It is concluded that pressurizing the CCW surge tank assures that no boiling occurs, that the system performs as previously evaluated, and that margins of safety are not reduced.
Based on the above, there is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications as a resuh of the proposed modification.
L
\\
_A
Date: 04/15/96 (DCS Version 1.5)
DCP M-050284 Rev. O TITLE : LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION (LBIE)
Page 19 of 19
()t
( El)
Section 9.5, includmg tables, figures and appendices)?
()t
( El)
Chapter 17)?
tComplete and attach the next form sheet to this 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation.
Based upon the above criteria andjustification, I have h...M that an unreviewed safety question is*
is not _E_ involved. A charige to the DCPP Technical Speci6 cations is' is not El involved. Further, any resulting changes to the FPP or QA Program are documented as being withm the hcensing basis.
Loren E Lemons 04/15/ %
Preparer Signature Date REVIEWED: Based upon my iPt technical review, I concur with the above conclusion.
H. JeffHodges 04/15/ %
IPt Technical Reviewer Signature Date
- If an unreviewed safety quesuon, change to DCPP Technical Specifications or other license a==4===t is involved, NRC approval is required prior to implanenting the activity or CTE.
Any LAR which forms part of the basis for this evaluation must be approved by the NRC before implementing the activity or CTE.-
l l
I
FROCEDURE No. EE.2 PACIFIC CAS AND E12CMIC COMPANY FACE 1 CF 3 l
NUCIJAR DIGINEERIM SERVICES REVISIOlt NO. 2 EIECTRICAL ENCINEERIM PROCEDURE VCP M.50299-KD ATTACHNDIT 3 ATC "A "
Dat REVIm roan scR ArrENDII 'R' CuaNcES S KT'. I O F 3 l
22-se-so2g#.vmED.1 A i h L/m b., f // z / S t DCN...
1)
Safe shutdown equipment affected by DCII:
EDUIPMENT ID ggg i
2)
The following new safe shutdown circuits have been identified (Highli hted Schematic / loop diagram attached):
E SYSTEM EQUIPMENT ID SCHEMATICa nn* DIACRAM
$$D CIRCUIT g'
l 3)
The following safe shutdown. circuits have been deleted (Highlighted Schemati=/ loop diagram attached):
SYSTEM EQUIPMENT ID SCHEMATIC /IDOP DIACRAM SSD CIRCUIT 9
0 XHW051E/1
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTEIC COMPANY FROCEDURR NO. EE-2 NUCLEAR ENGI!1ERING SERVICES PAGE 2 CF 3 E12CTRICAL ENGINEERING PROCEDURE REVISION NO. 2 OCf M~502B+ RO AW b "
ATTACISIENT 3 DCN REVIEW FORM FOR APPENDIX
'R' CHANGES SHT. 2 O F 3 4)
The following safe shutdown circuits have been rerouted (now circuit routing input sheet attached):
l 3I31 3 EDUIPMEllT ID SSD CIRCUIT t
l l
5)
The following raceways containing power circuits require fire barrier to
(
meet Appendix 'R' separation requirement:
i FIRE BARRIER CABLE DERATING l
FIRE AREA RACEWAY RATIMC FOUER CIRCUIT
]Ag (YES/MO)
(*.
1--
m(
6)
The following blocked conduits / boxes (as listed in Calculation 134-DC, l have new/ modified circuits:
BLDCKED CONDUITS /BGEES NEV/ MODIFIED CIRCUITS k
l 7)
The following nonsafe shutdown circuits have been added to safn shutdown i
power source (Highlighted Schematic / loop diagram attached):
NON SSD SSD ISOIATI0tt BY COORDINATION CIRCUIT F0WER SotRCE FUSE /BREARER YES/MG fAA16
~
XNUO51E/2 I
PACIFIC GAS AND EIECTRIC CXMPANY PROCEDURE NO. EE-2 PAGE 3 CF 3 NUC12AR ENGINEERING SERVICES ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING ynnernner RgVISION No. 2 DCP M-50284-RO ~
ATT. "$"
ATTACHKENT 3 DCN REVIEU FCEN FOR ' APPENDIX 'R' CHANGES ENT.S OF3, 8)'
The following ^;;: 'i= 'R' emergency lights are being relocated / removed or their circuits modified / rerouted (emergency light no. to be obtained from Calculation 335-DC, Reference 8.2):
Emergency Light Lighting Drawing 9)_
The following communication devices / circuits credited for Appendix 'R' have been modified.
Device / Circuit Tyne of Modification
~
CONKENTS l
XNWO51E/3 I
rmet. Proc. No. EE-7, Rev.1 Attach = ant Ns. 7.1 Sheet 1 of 3 intermediate Caie.
DIABLO CANYON PROJECT pcp M-60284 RO l
FUSE CHANGE REQUEST A59mu,g p (A) Fuse Deta:
New Valmas Old Values T I #I (1) n.ea h ID:
- 2-RI-FU 02 (2)
Current Rating:
- 1A l
(3)
Voltage Rating:
- 250V (4)
M-=f=em>w:
Ih>=====
i (5)
Model / Catalog Number.
- ABC-1 (6)
Class / Interrupting Rating:
- 10kA 0125Vac (7)
Ambient Temperature:
- 25'C (8)
Temperature at fuse locatma:
- 25*C l
.(B)
Reference Drawings:
- 452791, 6006472-108 l
(C)
- Non-1E (D) Fuse Field Data:
1 (E)
Fuse Catagory / Applianhan-
- Control Circuit (F)
Min Wire Size / Ampacity Rating:
(G)
- 1. cad Data:
DESCRIPHON CONT. IDAD (VA / WATTS) INRUSH (VA) cann.ee.,1Imed
- 5W TUTAL Mariamm steady State Imad
- 5W I
I I
mmet. Proc. Nr. EE-7. Rev.1 Attachusset No. 7.1 Sbset 2 of 3 Issennsdise. case.
DIABLO CANYON PROJECT FUSE CHANGE REQUEST WP M-5o2.89 40 ATIMM6MTh "
00 cucaitc s g5 g,,4 3
r - - - - - - - - - 7 000
- 2T8631------- 7
- ris m as - UNO 1
l l 2T5 5 30 - (Xal 2 8 Elli - 2T8 5 32 l
1-UNC 3
9 0 00 I
l AOC
/.
10 l
AC 5
11
- -2T84344 I
I GND 8 12 lN I
L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _278538____J N
__5 n
Fu'- oa.
1A V
u x
i I
0) circuit Review:
This fuse is used in a control circuit at RI. 'Ihe purpose of the fuse is to car and to provide circuit protection. The fuse can also serve as a local clear
'Ibe load on the 1A fuse is one Moore Industrica Direct Current Alarm Mod which has a nomind load of 5 W. This is within the operating characteristic of fuse. As the fuse is used in a non-1E circuit, W R review and cociMon with the upstream protection device is not required.
l l
Requested By:
d D [__M_
g gl-)l g (Requestor's Nanne, Discipline, or 'ntie)
cJect. Proc. No. sE-7, Rev.1 Attachenant No. 7.1 Sheet 3 cf 3 nnw.m.n Case.
n mABLO CANYON PROJECT FUSE CHANGE REQUEST kP M-Sozs.4 RO krmenmesr ~s" (J)
Adequacy Analysis:
6b I *f 3 j
De minimum fuse size is 1.25 x 1.04 x 5/120 = 0.05 amps Based on the load of 0.05 amps, the fuse selected is adequate. Also, this fuse has an interrupting rating of 10,000A.
i l
l i
l I
l l
(K)
Acceptability and Recomman<tatinn:
i T*ne fuse selected, Bussmann ABC-1, is acceptable. It will cany the load and protect the control l
cin:uit.
I t
l l
Reviewed By:
N h//3/94 Date:
(Fuse Coordinator)
'/
Checked By:
N4 Date:
(T=%t Reveiwer)
Approved By:
- A Date:
(D_to,, siectecal en,meceng) l
(
Attachment C Page1of6, p.w 1
DCPNo. $060284 Rev0 m
EE DESIGN VERIFICATION CHECKLIST Description of Change:
Provide electrical apport (i.e. condet, cables, &
pewer murcel for instaletion of new CCW tank pressure loop PT 860. This BLINo.
meludes providing Hi & Low pressure eierms in the control room. In additwn, Responsible Engineer K. Bush this design provides CR anuncation of Unit 1& 2 nitrogen heeder pressure.
Contractor involved N/A
- 1. DE81BN ADEGUACY A. POWER SUPPLY: This design wil utilize a Class 11 Power apply.
- 1. h% to redundant power sources? NlA, Non afety related power apply used. No redundancy required.
- 2. Redundancy consistent with fluid system? N/A, no association with this design.
- 3. Avedalulity when required? Yes
- 4. Electrical system cepecity and capabilty? Yes,loed within cepecity of esisting power panels.
- 5. Proper classification of essened control power?
Yes,Non safety related
- 6. R.G.1.97 inst. power supply per DCMs, mcludeg T 24 and T 347 NlA, no association with this design.
l B. LOAD FLOW STUDY j
- 1. Electrical Lead Change Request (ELCR) Form ettsched? N/A for insignificant instrument loads l-
- 2. Lead flow, including system voltage drop and short circuit calc. update requesd? NlA V.D.isinsignificent.
t C. CABLE SYSTEM DESIGN:
- 1. Cable sizing 1 esed on empecity, voltage drop and short circuit current? Ampecity
- 2. Derating considered for fire wrapistop, higher eminent, het spot stees, solid tray covers? NIA. Power cables are not run in high temp areas or in cable trays with solid covers.
- 3. Cable meets vertical troy flems test regarement? Yes
- 4. Slueldag requirement for MV cable and low signallevelinstrwnent cable considered?
Yes, sheikling provided
- 5. Color coding of cable jocket OK? Yes, Black l
. 6. Containment elec. penet conductor sizing OK7 NIA,no association with this demon
- 7. Compatibility of thermocouple cable with assoc. thermocouple? NIA, no thermocouple effected.
B. Source date for load Icetslogue or instruction booksi? Drewing 8000784 116 l.
- 9. Worst case BNP value ifrom Mech. gr.) used? NlA,no meterloads
[
- 10. Voltage drop during motor starting DK7 NIA,No motorloads
- 11. Device min.imes. evsilable voltage lateady stets and transient) within rated voltage range? N/A, No device effected l-
- 12. Thermal OL relay hoster VD and Contact VD incialed lesome 0.3 volticentact)?
NlA. VD is insignificant.
- 13. Cable summary attached? Yes D. RACEWAY SYSTEM DESIGN:
l
- 1. Raceway % fin per DCM T 227 Yes 1
- 2. Racewey unit weight leading luistfoot) OK7 Yes, Civil reviewlcoordination provided
- 3. Physical separation of redundant receways per DCM T.197 No redundancy reemrements j
- 4. Reasonable distence between receway and heat source? Yes
- 5. SISI requirements for NSR receways? _NSR receways apported with Class I apports.
- 6. Updated circuitiraceway schedule?
Yes
- 7. R.G.1.97 instr. receway per DCds, mciming T 24 and T 347 N/A, no association with this design change.
- 8. Raceway design OK for mes. Pugini, tension, mes side wel presure and min. bendmg radius? Yes
Attachment C Page 2 of 5 DCP No. /bg O284 Rev 0 i
M EE DESIGN VERIFICATION CHECKLIST E. CIRCUIT DESIGN:
- 1. Redundant components clearly identified and physical separated per DCM T 19? NIA, no component related redundancy associated with this design.
- 2. Qualified isolation devices used, where required, per DCM T 19? No association involved.
- 3. Redundant component circuits electrically independent? No redundancy requirement:
- 4. Mutually redundant circuits physically separated per DCM T 197 No redundancy requirements
- 5. Approved separation method used inside panels per DCM T 19? No Separation requirements.
- 6. Different classification loads sharing same power tource isolated to ensure single f ailure proofness per DCMs T 19, T 24,and T 347 No change
- 7. MOV control circuit requirements correctly incorporated (auto, manual, jog, seal-in, reversible, torqueswitch seating, limitswitch seating)? N/A, no operating valves are affected.
- 8. Proper surge protection provided (diode, surge capacitance, lighting arrestor)? No change
- 9. EMIlRFI protection provided Itwisted shielded pair, shield ground at one end, buffer circuit, RF shielding, RFI free zone)?
Twisted sheilded pair cable used for instrument loops
- 10. R.G.1.97 inst. circuits separated and isolated per DCMs, including T 24 and T.347 NIA.no association with this design.
- 11. Annunciatorinput module requires N0 or NC contact?
Yes, N.O. (i.e. closes to alarm)
- 12. Component sizing (Standard or by calc.)?
Fuse analysis performed No formalcale required
- 13. Design suitable for on-line testing where required? Not applicable to electrical portion of design
- 14. Component temperature rating compatible with max. arnbient? Components located in mild environment.
- 15. PIMS component data screen update and attached? Yes
- 16. Basis for non conformance to RG1.75 (where applicable) documented?
N/A, no association with this design.
- 17. Electrical Circuit Change Request (ECCR) from attached? (Applicable to 125VDC only)
No Vital 125VDC Loads F. PROTECTION DEVICES AND COORDINATION:
- 1. Device interrupting rating sufficient for fault duty? No existing devices (bkrs or Olt relays) affected and no new devices added.
- 2. Device setting based on worst case condition (min voltage)?
N/A No devices (i.e.ckt bkrs of Olt relays affected
- 3. Devicelist tolerancesidentified?
N/A
- 4. Device properly coordinated and coordination documented? _ N/A
- 5. Indicationlalarm for device actuation provided,if required? N/A, no changes to alarms or indication associated with electricaldevices.
No association involved.
- 7. Containment electrical penetration backup overcurrent protection provided and properly coordinated?
No association involved.
- 8. Breaker, fuse, thermal Olt rating o.k. with changed loading? _ Fuses added for instumenent circuits are accep
- 9. Qualified isolation device properly coordinate with upstream device? No change G. MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS:
- 1. System and equipment grounding systems affected? No change
- 2. Site fire emergency alarm provided,if required? No association with this design
- 3. Freeze protectionthenting tracing required? No association with this design.
- 4. Cathodic protection required? No underground components involved.
- 5. Heat load change involved (attach HVAC form letterif > 1000W)? N!A no addition to heatloading.
- 6. is statement about the drilling, welding of Cists I structures included,if applicable? _ N/A No core drilling
r--
l Attachment C Page 3 of 5
,.g y DCPNo. f0$0284 Rev 0
}
M l
EE DESIGN VERIFICATION CHECKLIST l
l H. PROGRAMMATIC REQUIREMENTS:
l
- 1. Fire protection (FP) l
- s. Appendix R analysis (cele 134 DC) affected bttach DCN Review Form)? No' Appendix R equipment affacted, and no effect to the Appendix R analysis occurred,
- b. Addition of combustibles (ettach form)?
No combustibles added by electrical design
- c. Fire Hazard Analysis Report (FHAR) affected?
No impact by this design.
- 2. Seismic Qualification (S0)
- a. Differences from tested device? N/A, no safety related components instnHad.
- b. Device mounting and orientation same as tested device? N/A, no safety-related devices aff ected.
- c. Contact orientation same as test position? No safety re!sted relays added.
- d. Contact chatter acceptable? No safety related raisys added.
- e. Total weight of rack or panelincreased? N/A noload added to seismic panels
- f. Increase in floorloading which ecuid affect spectra? No electrical equipment instsBed on floors.
- g. SQ provided for Graded QA Class G, R, S, T, as required? Not associated with this design.
- h. SQ provided for eiect. Penetration backup protection per DCM T 187 No association wlthis design
- i. SQ previded for electricalisolation devices? No change in equipment
- j. SQ provided for SISIPNSR(source) devices?
N/A, no association evith this design change.
- k. 80 provided for R.G.1.97 devices as required by DCMs, including T 24 and T 347 N/A
- 1. SQ provided for devices listed in NEP-001? No change in equipment associated with electrical design.
- m. SQ of LTSP component (per table 1 of tech reviewitem Bg or Appendix 7.2 of CF3.lD9) addressed?
N/A
- n. Seismic file (s) revised (exiting)lcreated (new)?
NIA No seismic files affacted
- 3. Environmental 0 qualification (EQ)
- a. EQ device interface required (EQ splice, EQ seal, T&B cast copper lug crack, etc.)? No safety-related components offacted.
- b. Electronic device exposed to TID of 10 Rads or more Isress other than "A" all evaluations and "H" at and above 3
100 ft.) acceptable? No association with this design
- d. EQ file EH 100 revision required for "EQ-exempt" SR devices in harsh environment?
No association with design
- e. " Spare" cable, when used, has proper EQ,if required (Per Chron.184477)? _No spare EQ cable used.
- f. EQ file (s) tevised (existing)lcreated (new)? No association with this design,
- 4. Sisi
- s. ARIAE cut for prelpost instalstion inspection,if required?
No association with this design
- 5. ALARA
- a. ALARA Design Review Checklist from attached,if Not required. Work performed in eres with less than applicable 7 2.5 mremlhr.
- 6. Environmental Quality
- a. Environmentalimpact review per Chron #177801 checklist?
No association with this design.
L OVERALL DESIGN:
- 1. Design reliabihty OK7 Yes, design meets standards applicable to general services.
- 2. AH failure modes censidered?
Yes seeFMEA
- 3. Aulicensing commitments met?
NIA, not required by the electrical design.
- 4. AD design bases covered and met?
Yes
- 5. AR coder and standards requirements met? _ Yes, design meets applicable standards.
. Attachment C
' Page 4 of 5 c.gm DCPNc. [060284 Rev 0 i
M EE DESIGN VERIFICATION CHECKIlST
- 11. DENDN PROCE88 A. GENERAL:
- 1. Al design documents per oppbceblo precedures?
Yes
- 2. DCN reseen snelysis sheet,if requwed, etteched plot applicable to Rev. 0 DCNI?
NlA
- 3. Constructionlinstaletion notes identified es such?
Yes i
i-B. DESIGN CONSISTENCY:
- 1. Demon cenastant with Pal schematics, logic and functionelloop 6egrams, purchese specifications and calculations?
Yes, Demon Matches new I&C loop disgrams 2.~ Despn cenastent with vomier dwes. and manuel:7 Yes vender drawins: revised accordmely.
3.- Elect. design documents consistent amongst themesives and with other 6scipline DCNs?
Yes l
C. DEMBN CALCULAT10N8: No Formal electrical celes are effected by this demen. Hewever, civil & soumic celes are effected
- 1. Calculationsin proper formet?
Yes, approved civi & somnac celos listed in DCE are in proper format.
- 2. Objective (s), design input source (s), denen and acceptance criteria clearly statedlidentified? No electrical calculations effected by this deman chenes W.
l
- 3. Assumptons validfjustified?. No assumptons reeuwed for this design chenes.
' 4. Assumptions requweg later venhostion identified?
No assumptions teamre venhcotion.
l
- 5. Engmeering judgments reasonable and documented?
No electrical calculations effected by this DCP.
l~
- 6. Correct method and approach used? N/A, no calculations effected by this DCP.
b
_ 7. Constant VA vs constant impedance load cherectoristics used to determine worst loadag? NIA,no electricalceles
- 8. Worst case slac. equip. and cable comiuctor temperature used?
No Electrical Calculation effected.
l-
- 9. Evolustion of impact en other calc (s) done?
NlA b
- 10. 5060 safety evolustion,if required done?
Not appbceble to sisetrical portion of design.
- 11. References properly stated and attached? N/A, no electrical ceiculations revised by DCP.
Ove e
procedurely)? No Electrical calculations in design pockene.
D. PURCHASE SPECIFICATIONS:
b
- 1. Codes, standards, regulatory requwements specified? No specul electrical purchese specifications requwed
- 2. Design conditions (such as min.imes. voltage, etc.) specified? No association with electrical design.
- 3. E0 and 80 regarements specified?
No association with electrcial design
- 4. Factory inspectionlocceptance tests specified? No association with electrciel denen
- 6. EMilRFIrequwements speahed? Ils association with electrical demen.
- 8. GA requirements specifed? No essecution with electricaldeman
. 7. Overal, purchase specshcotions adequete (techacety and g - ' Z,;7 No essecution with electrical design w
- 8. Meterial specified is eveilable and not absolete? No esenciation with electrical design
' E. DE81BN DRAWRIBS:
1.100% checking of Sll, logic ding., schematics, and functionelleep ding done? Yes
- 2. " Fed From" list, accurate, complete, and included?
Yes
- 3. " Fuse List",if effected, and FCR form, acinded and coordinated? Calc. 333 DC affected? Fuse list updated 333-DCnjo effected.
g
Attachment C Page 5 of 5 p..m DCP No.
050284 Rev0 EE DESIGN VERIMCATION CHECKUST
- 4. Spot checking of connection / wiring ding, C&R schedule to verify 100% checking done? Yes.100% verification of drawings was performed
- 5. Spot checking of physical and egepment layout, put cards, location codes, BOM, etc. to verify 100% checking done?
Yes
- 6. " Vendor Drewings" requiring update included (e.g. nemeplete dets change on MCC vender dwg, when new load is fed from e spore breaker Chron 215816)?
Yes
- 7. DDI. complete? Yes
- 8. Appropriate "By"," Checked", " Approved" signetwes in piece?
Yes
- 9. Verify necessory F8AR changes are mode?
No esenciation with this design.
111. DESIGN NtTERFACES A. EXTERNAL
- 1. Design interface with Westinghouse covered and documented?
NlA, Westinghouse not involved.
- 2. Design interface with other vendors covered and documented?
N/A, no vendors involved.
i B. INTERNAL
- 1. Intre discipline interfaces covered?
Yes
- 2. Inter discipline interf aces covered?
Yes
- 3. Inter-Departmentelinterfaces covered lettsch advance coordination meeting minutes or waiver)?
Yes
- 4. Advance coordination meeting action items resolvedlincorporated? Rev. A meeting notesincorporated.
IV. NOTES A. VERIFIER'S NOTES:
- 1. Response to su items marked with esterisk (').
- 2. Arrange DCP/DCN section in a sequence given in " Table of Contents" in Attachment 8.2 of 10AP CF3.lD9.
3.
4.
5.
j i
ruuv
'{lI5 9(a
[
Verifier Date B. DE'S J.ESPONSES TO VERIFIERS NOTES:
4 DE Date A
DCP M-50284 ATTACHMENT D SHEET 1 OF 1 l
I i
I l
I:STE:STIOXALLY LEFT BLAXK
DCP M-50284 ATTACHMENT E SHEET I OF 1 i
ISTE:STIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1
1
=
3 3 y emy
~'
tATTACHMEw s' NO. P j;
N l
OF 30 P.,e i $r i Ou26/96 REGULATORY AND DESIGN SERVk.u CF3.NE2 ATTACHMENT 8.2 i n t.E:
INTERIM CDM CHANGE GDCMC) FORM DCM No.S-I4 Revision 4 Date 4/KMG File No.18 l&c.f7 414096f DIABIA CANYON POWER PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 DmanfM DCM (WANGE (IDCMC)
)
l b
MhM NA f
System or Topic:
Prepared by:
IN[
/5As f4r44 twat _N Date 4//sl9Z
/ 34VA D IdBAf3 Date
/ /[C Y TL= b A Checked by:
b.Ae/ N
[Jkr#6Y /. SET #sy) Date O/S/16 ES Approval:
2 lP V Interfarine NFS Sacetaa Anurovals (as t=dtemtedh N
U IDirector f
Date T* F* Fattav% -Lawe l a z ec,3 Date 4tel.%
EIDirector t.A.L3,* C l
t.
z.4 w s - Ms = mca u sera Date D Director
/b. M 14 +72.
4 1, te. & lry Registered Engineer Approv
@.rt CersHhV!M-3 Responsible NTS Director Approval:
R.A.t M.a+
- Date i
>lgh (Clam E) :
Tkh sgs G )"Ak 6
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to 4 csw a chir & p sgst;>n A
- 66) sc,um-g.3~n. Ifg AhD Mt bh6 C 3m th }re-Muw'[ ih p
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ccuJ sup ru DCM C.,
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DCM No. 5-14 D System: Component Cooling Water System Revision 1 O
k Pace 27 of 112 tc) fyyl n)
The CCWS is designed to allow periodic inspection and gg
.q_
maintenance of it major components [Ref. GDC-38).
f G
q)
The CCWS is designed to allow periodic testing to assure h
i 3
system integrity and operability (Ref. GDC-38).
E T l' g,
i f
t r)
The CCWS is designed to cienform to the fire protection lb f N criteria of BTP APCS 8 9.5.1 and the appropriate sections 2
3 10CFR50 Appendix R [Ref. GDC-3) (Ref. DCM T-13).
O
!L a
t}
5 u,5 3ML$
s)
The CCWS is designed considering requirements for protection v
3 from natural phenotsena, such as flooding, wind, tornado, j
tsunami, missile, environmental, and earthquake [Ref. GCD-2, GDC-40, and Sections 4.4) i A} -
]
t)
The CCWS has been designed to function as a separate system
(
for each of the units, with the exception of some common
.I e
equipment on Header "C". This common equipment does have a
<Ij j
provision through a cross tie between.the Unit 1 and 2 CCW d
"C" headers to be supplied cooling flow from either unit if d$N one of the units is unavailable.
In addition, cooling water t-r-to the CCWS heat exchangers can be supplied by the other unit's ASW pumps through a cross tie if required. [Ref. GDC-M' 4, DCM S-63).
hI i
g g
u)
The CCWS has been reviewed in accordance with the aO requirements of the Seismically Induced System Interaction Program (SISIP) [Ref. NUREG-0675, Supplement 9 and 11, and 41 W j the Seismically Induced System Interaction Program - Final m
~~
Report, dated April 1984 and Rev. I dated April 1985).
A f; 1
v)
The CCWS has been designed with a protection system to l
t 4.c_.
mitigate the consequences of a thermal barrier rupture [Ref.
PGE-1723]
y b*/
l I 3s w)
The CCWS is designed to support a minimum 20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> cold M v g
shutdown based on two pumps and one heat exchanger operating
,y Q
(Ref. PG&E Calc M-305)
~ k hY. b M a
F-x)
The CCWS.is designed during post LOCA recirculation to be
)m aligned into two separate vital loops through manual TQ manipulation of the various system valves. This provides totally redundant and separate vital loops that ensure that no single failure can cause loss of CCWS flow [Ref.
Westinghouse letter RFS-N-2320).
4.3.2 Mechanical System Configuration There are separate CCWS for both Units 1 and 2 each of which consists of three full capacity pumps which supply water to two w oou m L
owv wm
.TACHMENT NO. f euc n,eu s _n / W -
SHEET 5
OF y 4 e p g,9 l Q.y DCM No. 5-14
,i1 g V.a System: Component Cooling Water System Revision 1 Pace 33 of 112 gW
- 10) NSSS sample heat exchangers, which are Design Class II.
~
I 7 00
.j
- 11) Seal Water heat exchanger, which is Design Class I.
I
$MN g 4
- 12) Letdown heat exchanger, which is Design Class I.
f ')
0
- 13) Steam Generator Blowilown Sample coolers for radiation Q tg
=.f f
monitors, which are Design Class II.
e j
- 14) Spent Fuel pool heat exchanger, which is Design Class I.
S
- 15) Excess Letdown heat exchanger; which is Design Class I.
i P
g.fj$)h. f) follows; The "B" loop feeds the number 1 CCWS pump, the' 'C" m4 The return headers for the three loops are configured as LygbH loop feeds the number 2 CCWS pump and the "A" loop feeds the
- S gl number 3 CCWS pump. Between the three headers there are
[C 4
o k ],s g 3.A d.__ ?
the three loops can flow to the operating pump (s). On the l
k crossties with normally open manual valves, so that any of 3
v return headers for loops "A" and "B' there are connections to
.d t
ht g3y N the CCWS surge tank. The manual isolation valves on the pump W
8 suction and crossties are also used to isolate any loop that I
'f$ {dg might have leakage.
4 D--
44 d a. g)
The CCWS surge tank is designed to accommodate expansion or J
-c -
contraction of the CCWS either due to temperature changes, iD w
13 b.s
- 3.5 in-leakage or out-leakage. The surge tank is the highest f
l
'ggu i.f: >
point of the CCWS. This will assure that the CCWS pumps have adequate NPSH for operation by maintaining a minimum surge Ej
~ } f
tank leveljThe surge tank has a design pressure of 150 psig A
w s at a temperature of 300*F. The surge tank is a horizontal
}w j]d cylindrical tank with a divider plate to provide two separate n
)
s a
1 yb sources of water, which assures that the two vital loops are g N.
lf 'e l-4 4 7 l
separated, so that a single passive failure after a LOCA will l
(
b7
- - 3 dw p =3
=
s not affect both loops.
yW The divider plate does not extend to the top of the tank so wh S
,. g L 4
that only one vent and overflow is required."h:rf:; ::. A I
J
- -- ti-- th-t;;i =:t d :=rf!= ;rc pr;vid:d thr4 gd j
- =115.:;= :ir ;;;r;ted " feil ine vaive (RCV-16)4did?
j i
n.te t; th: :*
- h
- ; =d ; pill; te the mihy ha w
l g
N g
-coef-dre4nF< Tht: Y: % closes on detection of radiation in l
\\l the CCWS, which is monito-py Kt.-uA and RE-178. "his
{*
M jL RCV.16 1
g d,g prevents radioactive material from being released to the r=
atmosphere. (Ref. Setpoint Dwg. 060836 and 061236)
/
The over pressure protection for the surge tank with the
~~~
7 normal vent valve closed (RCV-16) is a spring operated relief t,
i 1p h4 which is connected to the auxiliary building valve (RV-45)in any radioactive material. The surge tank, its sump to conta awoowss
sw evelo 4e &-t %= APM p.es s- +.h.dt w e.,, n.
h h is 92 4 hh -
4% %
w.- %
- p a wd*. cacv-ic). s w_ pe a wk. e eq ct-s ad. &,emeu w a k Ma. nev-sc a e u
om m y e a pe4.pi% A. E Ah,y % eh. 8
- A.41 <
4 Loge, e h w g W" AjMA Q
%g g
.I t*
. =
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l IzacMc.
EM S-14-[% tJo.
WS *F 'A
3;aG-i+/c%. ee -
[;
w e.c, w 2s LCK No. S-14 kf{
System: Component Cooling Water System Revision 1 Pace 37 of 112 is equal to 100% of the heat removal capacity required duri LL normal operation and for plant shutdown from an accident and with an ASW temperature of 64*F maximum., pump running)Mh condition based on normal ASW flows (one ASW This heat O
p removal capacity will assure that the CCWS peak temperature D Z
will not exceed 132*F.
[Ref. PG&E Calc M-305) f P-4.3.3.3 CCWS Chemical Addition Tanks 1-1 and 1-2 (2-1 and 2-2) g 'O a)
The CCWS Chemical Tanks are Design Class II and are not M
seismically qualified.
b)
The Design Class II equipment is isolated from the Class I equipment by a normally closed code break isolation valve
[Ref. Reg. Guide 1.26).
c)
The design pressure of the tanks is 200 psig.
4.3.3.4 CCWS Surge Tank 1-1 (2-1) a)
The CCWS Surge Tank is design Class I [SSER-16 and GDC-2).
b)
The surge tank has a minimum design volume of 10750 gallons with a partition plate providing separate volumes for each of the vital headers. Two separate surge volume are provided to assure that after a LOCA when the CCWS vital loops are
(
' separated in the recirculation mode that a single passive failure will not affect both loops. The low level alarm and makeup addition point is approximately 4000 gallons total for the tank. This is to provide adequate NPSH for the CCWS pumps and to allow sufficient time for operator action to find and isolate any source of CCWS out la'akage. The design out leakage is 200 gpm, providing 20 minutes for operator action l
[Ref.SSER16).
c)
The surge tank is protected from over pressurization with a code relief valve set below the tank design pressure, to tion,_gtvaiogcompor,entsintheCCWSfromoverpressuriza-prote g
- phe
...-s..-
..... i. m.-._
surge tank design conditions are 150 p ig atlWt7 The surge tank is capable of withstanding a tota vacuum of 0 psia 4
[Ref. PG&E. Calc. M-272 and PG&t Spec 8776).
4.3.3.5 CCWS Pump Stuffing Box Coolers 1-1,1-2, and 1-3 (2-1, 2-2 and 2-3).
a)
The CCWS pump stuffing box coolers are Design Class I [Ref.
RWP00M/s7 8
f
"YEIW.W" DCM No. 5-14 System: Component Cooling Watcr System Revisicn 1 Q
Paoe 47 of 112 F) are based on a minimum level of 4000 gallons total for the LL b surge Tank. The bases of the 4000 gallo'ns is that the w
postulated out leakage rate of any break is 200 gps. With 2
4000 gallons in storage and at 200 gpa out leakage this rg allows operators 20 minutes to identify, locate and isolate Q$"l the source of leakage, or isolate the affected vital loop i
Wl$
[Ref. SSER 16).
g 0
D
- h w C
c)
These valves are designed to provide 250 gym flow from a Design Class I source of makeup water.
A g
d)
These valves are designed to operate with a differential pressure of 165 ps'id [Ref. pG&E Calc. M-320).
e)
These valves are air operated plug valves, air to open, fail closed. The valves also have mechanical counters to record flow.
The controls and indication logic for this valve is discussed in Section 4.3.9.1.
V 4.3.3.25 CCWS Surge Tank VentC NQ Valve 1/2-RCV-16 a)
This valve is Design Class I [Ref. GDC-2) 3 b)
This valve is normally open.QF_-- P.--[=^iA g
Qgtst2-sBP. This valve closes automatically based on detection of radioactivity in_the CCW system by RE-17A and RE-178. This valve can be operated manually from the control room.
c)
This is an air operated ball valve, air to open, fail close.
The controls and indication logic for this valve is ~ discussed in Section 4.3.g.l.
4.3.3.26 Containment Fan Coolers 1,2 and 5 CCWS Return Valve 1/2-TCV-27 a)
This valve is Design Class I [Ref. GDC-2).
b)
This valve is designed to automatically control CCWS flow to the Containment Fan Coolers based on return flow temperature TC-20. The set point of TC-20 is to provide a maximum allowable containment temperature which provides the maximum output of the plant, by reducing heat loses inside
. containment. (Ref. 01 1)),
c)
This valve is designed to operate in a flow range from 2400 gpa (minimum) to 6000 gpa (maximum).
awoown
89@Q %
D CPA F1
.ha$e No.
g Ps3t_.@ af lT_
e O
A<
4 fr)
L
- D L
g k.
O M
DCM No. 5-14 Q) System:Component Cooling Water Systen Revision 1 D
h pace 49 of 112 y
k4.3.3.29 Steam Generator Blowdown Ttnk Vent RE-27 Condenser CCWS Supply g
we L
Valve 1/2-FCV-1429 v
2 M
a)
This valve is Design Class I [Ref. GDC-2).
$w N
b)
This valve is designed to isolate the Design Class II Steam 4
d Generator Blowdown Tank Vent Condenser from the Design Class I CCWS. The valve autseatically, closes on high flow to prevent out leakage la the case of a failure of the downstream Class II piping. The set point is approximately
}
12 gpe. (Ref. 0! 23) c)
This valve is a self contained excess flow check valve.
I
.3.3.30 4
CCWS Surge Tank Relief Valve 1/2-RV-45 a)
This valve is Design Class I [Ref. DCM T-27 and GDC-2).
l k
b)
This is a relief valve designed to relieve pressure that (d
could develop in the Lurge tank due to thermal expansion or 2"_~Iegagey the CCWJinto the surge tank,@C-M i
Q c)
This valve is designed with a set pressure of 30 psig and 105 accumulation, and a flow rate of 250 gpa (Ref. Of 17) which is based on the flow rate of a RCP thermal barrier seal rupture [Ref. PG&E Spec 8736).
p 4.3.3.
Reactor Coolant Pump Lube 011 Coolers CCWS, Pressure Relief Valve
/2-RV-51 2
a)
This valve is Design Class I [Ref. GDC-2).
l b)
This is a pressure relief valve that is designed to relieve l
Dp A
pressure in the RCP themal barrier discharge line due to failure of the thermal barrier and leakage from the upstream i
check valve. The valve is sized to allow a flow rate equal l
to the in leakage in one RCP thermal barrier. It protects j
the piping upstream of the RCPs from overpressurization in case of leakage ~thr' the first check valve upstreas of the l*
s RCPs.
c)
The set point of this valve is 150 psig with no back pressure
[
and a flow rate of 200 gpa (Ref. OI 18) and 105 accumulation.
~
4.3.3.h Thermal Relief Valves Several thermal relief valves are provided throughout the CCWS to 3
protect equipment. The following provides a listing of these gp9 valves and their design bases.
nwoow4e
r F
l l
IDCMC j
DCM S-14 / Change Ns O
Fage Q of uf M
l l l5 4.3.3.31 CCWS Surge Tank Backpressure Regulator 1/2-PCV-2022 Q
d (a) This valve is Design Class I [Ref. GDC-2].
"5' ~O (b) This backpressure regulator is designed to relieve pressure from the surge 4
x tank that could develop in the tank due to thermal expansion or in-leakage V O
,hy of the CCWS surge tank, with the normal vent (RCV-16) open. This M
l regulator is to prevent challenging the reliefvalve 4
mi kc) This valveis set and worksin conjunction gg l
with regulators PCV-2020A/20 0 to==ia*=ia CCWS surge tank gg t[-
pressure. Thevalvehis a D i ' ' : ef 9-- --*c-
.=u g<-n w w p.-re *
- 2 9 pp"' 497.c 24 :d ["cjjl J
1
- Lr dig ng a e=
"-a-i
~ o p
sx-J{
c.
nsMMat h
- H pemr4 y.g.g _m 3 7
'M m
i i
4
- ~ - - - - - - " '
IDCMC DCM S.W /Cha9 No.
Tshe 10 of *L9 n.
Loc h
DCM No. 5-14 C4 System: Component Cooling Water System Revision 1 O
g Paoe 50 of 112 D
Z Z
a) ~ Valve Listing and Locations 1)
Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier on CCWS return line hk Reitef Valve 1/2-RV-41. 42', 43, and 44 p
%< z (c
2)
Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger I and 2 CCWS l
Thermal Relief Valves 1/2-RV-46 and 47 3)
Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1 CCWS Thermal Relief Valve 1/2-RV-49 4)
Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger CCWS Thermal Relief Valve 1/2-RV-52 5)
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger CCWS Thermal Relief Valve i
1/2-RV-55 1
6)
CCWS Return Header C Relief Valves 1/2-RV-186,187,188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 302, 303, 304, 305 7)
Reactor Vessel Support Coolers 1, 2, 3 and 4 CCWS Return p
line Relief Valves 1/2-RV-307, 30g, 311 and 313 b)
Design Bases 1)
These valves are Design Class I [Ref. GDC-2).
2)
These are thermal relief valves designed to relieve any pressure _that would develop due to thermal expar.sion of a closed (isolated) system.
4.3.3. j Restriction Orifices a)
These restriction orifices are Design Class I [Ref. GDC-2).
i' b)
The following restricting orifices are designed to limit flow thru the affected heat exchanger, to protect the heat exchangers from high velocities. The orifices are sized to provide the maximum following flows [Ref PG&E Calc M-ll).
l c
RS-208, Seal Water Heat Exchanger outlet, 420 gps.
L l-o R0-209, Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet, 2000 gps.
o R0-210, Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger outlet, 4500 gpm..
c)
The restricting orifices on the CCWS pump lube oil heat exchangers (R0-303, R0-304, and R0-305) are designed to protect the heat exchangers from high pressure. The orifices swoowse l
l
bcp p-Smget IDCMC ATTACHMENT NO. F wk s.mcmange No.
SHEET l)
OF 30 Page &_d_Li.,
f The CCWS surge tank also has a pressurization system which maintains a..T.~... tank presare of 17 psig. 'Ibe surge tank pressurization system normally uses nitrogen from the class II plant Na system. Aninstrument class backup nitrogen source is provided by dedicated Na bottles t
l i
Annunciations provided S surge tank low and high pressure. In addition, the tank pressure,is sent to the PPC.
5iyd
^I I
/
f
~ n-Q ~( f g y g Js. x. M )
t.m.h*,,
a N5T
, p w, r. Set a
+
f l
l l
tPCr4 Dcto S 14/C%e No.
rw. t2. m 4
u.
- e.
Lt. o DCM No. 5-14 00 h
System: Component Cooling Water System Revision 1 O
Pace 56 of 112 maximum flow.under accident conditions. Under normal operating W
n conditions the design provides flow control of the CCWS return I
2
-(--)
W flow based on temperature of the return flow and then modulating 4
@w w
valves TCV-23 and 28. On a safety injection signal ("S" signal) g W
he bypass valves FCV-360 and 366 around TCV-27 and 28, go to the open p
y W
position to assure full flow to the CFCDs.
e b.
L It should be-noted that this containment fan cooler flow control k
scheme is not:.in use and is scheduled to be permanently removed.
h(
g (Ref. 0I 15)
The CCWS surge tank has a level control and an automatic make up g
W control system. This control system consists of level controllers su qD on each side-of the partition surge tank, that automatically controls makeup to the tank thru LCV-69 and 70 based on the level controller set points.
q The CCWS has a radiation monitoring system that isolates the system from the environment. Two radiation monitors are provided to detect the presence of radioactivity in the CCWS. If radiation is detected above the set point, the CCWS surge tank vent valve RCV-16 is closed. This is the only direct path between the CCWS and the atmosphere.
The CCWS return lines from the Reactor Coolant pump thermal barrier labyrinth seal have an automatic isolation control scheme to isolate the system in case of a seal failure. This scheme consists of a flow element, FE-90, and a flow switch, FS-91, which closes the outside containment CCWS return valve, FCV-357, on high-high flow. High flow indicates that there has been a failure of the labyrinth seal and that there is reactor coolant flowing into the CCWS. The isolation of FCV-357 is required to isolate the downstream piping from reactor coolant pressure, and to isolate the radioactivity.
4.3.9 Instrument and Control Ca=aonent Desian Bases This section provides a list of instruments and control components of the CCWScIt includes the quality classification of the control circuits, instrumentation 7tnd indications for each based on DCM T-24 and the Q-list. In addition the location of the control switches and. indication are provided, along with a statement of the purpose of the components. The general requirement and descriptionssof these types of components are contained in DCM T-24.
- M 4.3.9.1 CCWS Valve Control and Indication a)
Boric Acid Condenser CCWS Outlet Valve 1/2-FCV-307
IDCMC DCM S-14/ Change N.
Page G of ti g
Lt. O w
40 e:
The CCWS mage tank also has a presmuization system which mairamina a minimum tank presare en M
of 17 ' sig. The surge tank pressurization system normally uses nitrogen from the class Il plant N j p
F system. An instrument class backup nitrogen source is provided by dedicated N2 bottles.
5 1,
]y Annunciations provided for S mage tank low and high presare In addition, the tank E
pressare.is sent to the PPC.
gohy A
sig,J
/
m r
g,w yus.r.M 3 t
awhn, M n
a p La.m r. pet N' T
/
l l
~
i i
f I
w s-4 m.
Pa4eAaF d DCM No. S-14
. System: Component Cooling Water System Revision 1 0
Pace 62 of 112 to 6)
Actuation signal - input from FT-1307/FE-1307 from waste (8 evap distl Pp disch p)
CCWS Surge Tank Makeup Valves l'/2-LCV-69 and 70
$ O 1)
Control circuits - Instrument Class II Valve not m
w '"~
required to operate for safe shutdown, fails in the safe
- 2 condition.)
I I
g S$h p< Wi 2)
Valve actuator control - level controllers LC-59 & 60 0
b are Instrument Class IC(required to maintain pressure A
boundary) and valve positioners PO-164 & 165 are
=
Instrument Class II(not required for safe shutdown) 3)
Backup air supply - No 4)
Actuation signal - input from LC-59 & 60 N
5)
Valve annunciation - Alarms on any opening i
i f
k\\
q)
CCWS Surge Tank Vent *. ".'-13 Valve 1/2-RCV-16 1)
Control circuits - Instrument Class II(Valve normally open and fails close on loss of signal or loss of air l
which is the safe position) 2)
Indication - Instrument Class II 3)
Location - Control Room (control switch and indication) 4)
Valve actuator control - Solenoid valve SV-225 -
Instrument Class II 5)
Backup air supply - No 6)
Actuation signal - input from RM-17A & B r)
Containment Fan Cooler 1,2 and 5 CCWS Return Valve 1/2-TCV-27 (Ref. O! 15)
Containment Fan Cooler 3 and 4 CCWS Return Valve 1/2-TCV-28 (Ref. 0! 15) 1)
Control circuits - Instrument Class II (Valves are not required for safe shutdown. Valve fails open which is the safe position.)
2)
Indication - None 3)
Location - Local RWP006A/62 l
l j
ATTACHMENT NO SHEET l4 OF 30 DCMC I
!X:M S 14 i'
CHNG PageJLof13 A61the knowingparagsphs to DChiS 14, Coniponent Cookg %Mer System 4.3.9.1 CCW Surgo Tank Na Pressurization Controla and indications f) CCW Suge Tank N,8upply Control Valves,14 PCV-2020A and 20208 f
- 1) Control Valves - instrument Class ID (Valves provide Na supply to CCW surge tank in order to maintain system pressure, greater tien or equal to 17 peig). The mounting for these valves require seismic quamiassion.
- 2) Location - East side of CCW swge tank
- 3) Valve Actuator Control-Contmis are intomal to the valve
- 4) Control Signal-Pressure downstream of PCV-2020A/20208.
u) CCW Surge Tank Pressure Backuo Pressure Control Valves,12-PCV-2022
- 1) Control Valves -t draatai Claw IC (Valve opens on surge tank pressure increase.)
- 2) Location - East side of CCW surge tank
- 3) Valve Actuator Control-Controls are infomal to the valve
- 4) Control Signal-Pressure upstream of the PCV-2022 valve.
v) Backup N Bottle Pressure Reducing Regulator,1/2-PCV-2021A/20218 2
- 1) Control Valves - Instrument Class ID (Valves provide Nasupply to downstream 1/2-PCV-2020A/B in order to maintain system pressure, greater than or equal to 17psig).1hese valves are seismically supported by the inlet and outlet tubing L
which is seismically installed per dwg. 043238.
- 2) Valve Acsustor control - controis are intemal to the valve.
- 3) Controlsignal-Pressure downstream of PCV-2021/2021B w) Backup Nasupply for CCW Surge Tank Relief Valve,1/2-RV-2030
- 1) Control valve - Instrument Class ID (Valve acts as an integral relief device downstream of 1/2-PCV 2021A/B.) ~
This valve is seismically supported by the inlet and outlet tubing / piping which is seismically installed per dwg. 04323s.
- 2) location - Local
DcP M-Fo 2M ATTACHMENT NO.
F l SHEET 17 OF 30 IDCMC DCM S-14 CHNG Page_/fof 19 4.3.9.11 Pressure Indications e) CCW Surge Tank N Supply Pressure,1/2-PI-2030 2
- 1) Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only)
- 2) Indication - CCW surge tank N supply. pressure.
2
- 3) Location-Local f) CCW Surge Tank Pressure,1/2-Pi-2031
- 1) instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only)
- 2) Indication - CCW surge tank pressure.
- 3) Location-Local g) N Bottle Pressure,1/2-Pl-2032 2
- 1) Instrument - Instrument Class IC.(required to maintain pressure boundary only)
- 2) Indication - N Bottle Pressure.
2
- 3) Location-Local h) Inlet Pressure indicator for PCV-2020A/2020B,1/2-PI-2033
- 1) instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only)
- 2) indication - PCV-2020A/20208 Inlet Pressure.
- 3) Location - Local 4.3.9.12 Pressure Switches c) CCW Surge Tank Hi/ Low Pressure Switches,1/2-PS-850A and 1/2-PS-850B
- 1) Instrument - Instrument Class 11 (not required to maintain pressure integrity, provides input to the annunciator and PPC)
- 2) Indication - Hi/ Low CCW surge tank pressure
- 3) Location - Cable Spreading' Room, IR cabinet
oi m'
bb-IDCMC 4
DCM S-14 O
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B5 4.3.9.13 Pressure Transmitters A
h a) CCW Surge Tank Pressure Transmitter,1/2-PT 450
- 1) Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only)
- 2) input Signal - Provides input to CCW surge tank hillow pressure switches
- 3) Location-local
)
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0 2)
Indication - Pump suction pressure (1
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3)
Location - Local 4.3.9.12 Pressure Switches a)
CCWS Vital Service Headers - 1/2-PS-1904 & 191A 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only) 2)
Input signal - Provides input for low pressure alars in CCVS headers A and 8 l
3)
Location - Local l
CCVS Vital Servics Headers - 1/2-PS-1908 & 1918 b) l 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only, their function is to start the l
standby CCWS pump on low exchanger discharge pressure) 2)
Input signal - Provides input for automatic start signal to standby CCWS PP on low header pressure from either h{ickC f
CCWS header A and 8 3L Location - Local k
A~26 cacsw.,,. 9 5 7__+ gas,fyavdwo h.,
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4.3.9 essure test Connections '
~
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These items.are local testing taps with a normally cloud local l
J l
sanval isolation valves. The taps and valves are Class IC to provide pressure boundary integrity. The instruments used in these Laps are Class II.
M a)
CCWS Punp. Discharges - 1/2-PX-47,151 & 263 b)
CCWS Pump.-Sections - 1/2-Pxlilo;- 211 1.21 l
c)
Reactor VessaleSupport Clrs CCWS Ret La -1/2-PX-397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402,-403 & 404 d)
CCWS Pp L.0. Clrs CCWS Supply - 1/2-PX-405, 407 & 409 e)
CCWS Pp L.0. Clrs CCVS Return - 1/2-PX-406, 408 & 410 f)
Charge Pp Lube 011 Clrs CCWS Supply - 1/2-PX-426 & 430 s#
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Charge Pp Lube 011 Cirs Return - 1/2-PX-427 & 431 D.
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h) 51 Pp L.0. C1rs CCWS Supply - 1./2-PX-428 & 432
/Q gg 1)
SI Pp L.0. Clrs CCWS Return - 1/2-PX-429 & 433
[$
hO v) 4.3.g Radiation Sensors RE-17A and 8 a)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only)
Input signal - Provides Class !! input to RM-17A & 8 which b) monitor radiation in CCWS headers A & 8 and closes RCV-16 upon high radiation U
c) location - Local Dedc4.3.9 Temperature Controllers a)
CCWS Ret Headers A & 8 - 1/2-TC-20 & 21 (Ref. Of 151 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class II (not required to maintain pressure integrity, failure of the instruments will fall the valves in their safe position) 2)
Input signal - Provides control signal to TCV-27 and 28 3) location - Local (panel)-
4.3.9 Temperature Elements a)
Ht Exch 1-1/2-1 & 1-2/2-2 CCWS In - 1/2-TE-4 & 5 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC/II (thernoveld is Class
/
It and is required to maintain pressure integrity, the 7 f instrument is Class II) 2)
Input signal - Input to computer 3)
Location - 1.ocal (RTD) b)
Ht Exch 1-1/2-1 CCWS Outlet - 1/2-TE-6 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IB (Post accident indication required) 2)
Input signal - Provides input signal to temperature indicator TI-181 and high & low temperature alam 3) location - Local (RTO)
N
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Ht Exch 1-2/2-2 CCWS Outlet - 1/2-TE-7 g
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Instrument - Instrument Class IB (Post accident o,
V o
indication required)
A
- C Indication - Provides input signal to temperature p
tuz 2) et v) indicator TI-182 and'high & low temperature alarms 3)
Location - Local (RID)
)
d)
CCWS Ret Headers A, 8 & C - 1/2-TE-18,19 & 22 Instrument - Instrument Class IC/II (thernoweld is Class 1)
IC and is required to maintain pressure integrity. the 33l thIg instrument is Class II) 2)
Input signal - Input to computer 3) location - Local (RTD) 4.3.9.
Temperature Indications A,
a)
Ht Exch 1-1/2-1 & 1-2/2-2 CCWS Outlets -1/2-TI-181 & 182 h
TO /
1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IB (Post accident I
l-MClC indication required) 2)
Indication - Temperature in CCWS Ht Exch outlet 3)
Location - Control Room (indication) 4)
EPIDS tr.dtcation - Yes b)
CCWS Header Ret A, B & C - 1/2-TI-530, 531 & 532 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only) 2)
Indication - Temperature in CCWS headers 3) location - Local (gauge) c)
Content Fan Cirs CCWS Ret - 1/2-TI-817, 818, 819, 1011 & 1021 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only) 2)
Indication - Temperature in headers 3) location - Local (gauge) woown
~
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Ht Exch 1-2/2-2 CCWS Outlet - 1/2-TE-7 Tt w e6
!g 1)
Instrument - lastrument Class 18 (Post accident 4v o#
l indication required)
A 2)
Indication - Provides i signal to temperature pk at indicator TI-182 and'hi
& low temperature alams 3)
Location - Local (RTD) 1 d)
CCWS Ret Headers A, B & C - 1/2-TE-18, 19 & 22
\\
Instrument - Instrument Class IC/II (thernoweld is Class l
1)
IC and is required to maintain pressure integrity...the
& lgl instrument is Class II) a p
2)
Input signal - Input to computer f
3) location - Local (RTD) 4.3.9 Temperature Indications d' a)
Ht Exch 1-1/2-1 & 1-2/2-2 CCv5 Outlets -1/2-TI-1811182 Ts {C g 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class 18 (Post accident l
l f
indication required)
VC 2)
Indication - Temperature in CCWS Nt Exch outlet 3)
Location - Control Room (indication) 4)
ERF05 indication - Yes b)
CCWS Header Ret A, 8 & C - 1/2-TI-530, 531 & 532 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only) 2)
Indicat[ ion - Temperature in CCWS headers
~
l 3) location - Local (gauge)
Content Fan Cirs CCWS Ret - 1/2-TI-817, 818, 81g,1011 & 1021 c) 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain i
~
pressureboundaryonly) 2)
Indication - Temperature in headers 3)
Location - Local (gauge)
~
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CCWS Nt Exch 1-1/2-1 1 1-2/2-2 Outlets - 1/2-TI-895 & 898 g !g 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain O.
pressure boundary only) y o
2)
Indication - Temperature at outlets
[<
to 3)
Location - Local (gauge) e)
RCP Themal Barrier CCWS Ret Header - 1/2-TI-1004 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only) 2)
Indication - Temperature in header 3) location - Local (gauge) f)
RCP Barring 011 Clr CCWS Ret Header - 1/2-TI-1131 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only) 2)
Indication - Temperature in header 3)
Location - Local (gauge) g)
Reactor Vessel Supt Cirs CCWS Return Line - 1/2-TI-1147, 1148, 1149 & 1150 l'l 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IC (required to maintain pressure boundary only)
AJJ 2)
Indication - Input.to computer 3) location - Local (themocouples) 4.3.9 Temperature Switches;..
a)
Ht Exch 1-1/2-1 1 1-2/2-2 CCWS Outlet -1/2-TS-181A, & 182A g
1)
Instrument - Instrument Class IB (Post accident indication required)
)g CM 2)
Input signal - Provides signal for high temperature
~
, alara 3)
Location - Local (panel) 4)
Interlocks - No alars w/FC1' 430, 431 closed m
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Ht Exch 1-1/2-1 & 1-2/2-2 CCVS outlet -1/2-TS-1818 & 1828 bg hl 1)
Instrument - Instrument Class 18 (Post accident A <w indication required) b 2)
Input signal - Input to TI-181 and 182 3)
Location - Local (panel) 4.3.9.f Temperature Test Connections These test connections consist of thernovelds that are Class IC and are required to maintain pressure boundary integrity. The instruments used in these thennowelds are Class !! and read locally.
a)
RHR Pp Seal Wtr Clr - 1/2-TX-201 gg b), Waste Gas Comp 1-1 & 0-1 CCWS Ret - TX-202 & 203 c) 'Charg
,011.C1r CCWS Ret - 1/2-TX-204 d) 8 A Conc Distl Clr CCWS Ret - 1/2-TX-209 e) 8 A ConclVent Cir CCWS Ret - 1/2-TX-210 f)
Aux Sta Drn Vent Clr 0-1 CCWS Ret - TX-211 9)
B A Thers CCWS Ret - 1/2-TX-212 h)
Waste Conc 01stl CCWS Ret - TX-213 1)
Waste Conc Vent CCWS Ret - TX-214 j)
Waste Cone CCWS Ret - TX-215 k)
Sample C1r CCWS Ret Headers - 1/2-TX-2161217 1)
Seal Wtr Ht Exch CCWS Rat - 1/2-TX-218 m)
Letdown Ht Exch 1-1 CCWS Ret - 1/2-TX-219 n)
Spent Fuel Pool Ht Exch CCWS Ret - 1/2-TX-220 c)
Excess Letdown Ht Exch 1-1 CCWS Ret - 1/2-TX-221 p)
RHR Pp 1-1/2-1 Ht Exch CCWS Ret - 1/2-TX-222
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pc.N $ W-l+/W 33KcfWC i
a-A=ac.23 or'I 7 DCM No. 3-14
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Revision 1 g
System: Component Cooling Water System Pace 78 of 112 TORNADO, MISSILES, FLOODING AND TSUNAMI REQUIREMENTS
- y u.
cp LL O
l 4.4 4.4.1 Wind and Tornado g
d The CCWS was evaluated for the affects of wind and tornados as T *g 7 required in GDC-2. The majority of the CCWS is contained within g
z W
G and is protected by Design Class I structures that have been evaluated for wind and tornados loads. The design criteria and D
gi bases for these structures are discussed in the related structural p o<
DCM's [Ref. DCM T-IA, T-2, T-9 and C-42]._
h w*
I 4
The CCWS surge tank is the only component that is exposed directly to potential wind and tornados loads. It has been evaluated for the requirements of GDC-2 [Ref. DCM T-9].
The CCWS surge tank is exposed to the potential impact of tornado generated missiles. The effect of these missiles has been evaluated by a probabilistic analysis and found acceptable [Ref.
{
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nt grM?uT rnM2*AD oA suenT24(Alegy@
4.4.2
=
In conformance with 10CFR50 Appendix A, GDC-2 and 40, the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 were analyzed for the affects of potential missiles on the ability of the plant to operate and/or to shutdown safely. Missiles can be created from various sources, such as, equipment malfunctions (i.e. turbine failures) or natural i.e. tornado or wind). The potential missiles created phenomena (l phenomena and their affects are evaluated as from natura discussed in Section 4.4.1. The potential missiles created from equipment malfunctions are discussed below.
The CCWS is designed to provide separation from missile sources.
The CCWS pumps are in separate rooms to protect them from internally generated missiles. The piping is routed away from high energy lines to protect them from missiles. See DCM T-12 for more detail on the affects of missiles.
4.4.3 Floodina The CCWS has been designed to withstand the effects of any potential flooding conditions as required by GDC-2 and 4. It has been determined that Diablo Creek is capable of handling any postulated site flooding, and the yard and roof drainage are designed such that it is not possible to develop sufficient ponding to flood safety-related buildings. As a result, the depth of the probable maximum flood is effectively zero (Ref FSAR Sections 2.4 and 3.4.1).
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P::".6 of11 DCM No. 5-14 System: Component Cooling Water System Revision 1 pace 85 of 112 bypass circuit is operable. (Cat f
I)
Waste Concentrator Condensor Verify FCV-1307 controls flow o
CCW Outlet Valve FCV-1307 automatically to the condensor to based on input from FE-1307 g
g (Ref. OI 21)(Cat III) g (o et CCW Surge Tank Makeup Valves Verify valves provide make up to o
ci LCV-69 and 70 the CCW Surge Tank automatically th 2 4000 gals. in the tank. (Cat I u$ a maintaining a minimum level of 8
a q I&III) g j CCW Surge Tank Vent M Verify RCV-16 closes 4 kb
(.W$ssppeggyValveRCV-li automatically on detection of fE f radioactivity in the CCW system.
< co (Cati) i containment Fan Cooler 1, 2 Verify TCV-27 automatically and 5 CCW Return Valve TCV-controls CCW flow based on 27 signals from TC-20.
(Ref. OI 15)
(Cati &III)
Containment Fan Cooler 3 and Verify TCV-28 automatically h
4 CCW Return Valve TCV-28 controls CCW flow based on signals from TC-21. (Ref. Of 15)
(Cati &III)
Letdown Heat Exchanger 1-1 Verify TCV-130 automatically CCW Return Valve TCV-130 controls CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger based on input from TC-130.(Cat III)
Steam Generator Blowdown Verify FCV-1429 closes Tank Vent RE-27 Condenser automatically on high flow CCW Supply Valve FCV-1429 (approximately 12 gps)
(Ref. 01-
- 21) (Cat I&III)
CCW Surge Tank Relief Valve Verf Fy RV-45 performs its RV-45 function at its setpoint pressure. (Cat I&III)
Thermal Relief Valves -
Verify valves open at their capable of providing their design setpoints (Cat I&III) function Manual Valves - capable of Verify valves can be fully providing their function stroked (CatIII)
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VG'LW90CtFJ ATTActiMENT NO. [
OT OF 30 T
ocu s i4 /cnange no.
SHEET Page 26 of M M the following to section 5.2:
CCW Surge Tank Back Pressure Regulator Verify regulator controls tank pressure PCV-2022 within s#M limits (Cat IH).
{
ADD the following to section 5.3:
CCW Surge Tank Pressudzation Back-up Verify regulator controls back-up N2 regulator PCV-2021 A/B pressure and delivers N2(Cat IH).
CCW Surge Tank Pressurization N2 Verify regulator controls pressure and regulator PCV-2020A/B delivers N2 (Cat IH).
CCW Surge Tank Pressure Transmitter Verify transmitter functions and meets PT-850 requirements. Verify readmg on PPC for accuracy (Cat. IH).
CCW Surge Tank Pressure Switches Verify each switch, low and high, PS-850N850B' functions and alarms the appropriate l
annunciator (Cat III).
CCW Surge Tank Pressure Verify indication function is accurate and PI-203I within design parameters (Cat. III).
N2 Bottle Pressure Verify indication function is accurate and PI-2032 within design parameters (Cat. III).
l ll
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kAr Tl eF A DCN No. 5-14 System: Component Cooling Water System Revision 1 l
Pace 81 of 112 DCM T-10 Seismic Qualification of Equipment 1
IL DCM T-16 Containment Function kO M
h 4.6.6 Pine Break rg g i $ 90 H
DCM T-12 Flooding, Missiles, HELB, MELB DCM T"29 Pipe Whip Restraints
(! 3 %
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4.6.7 J,[3]P 4; f w$
V O
i DCM T-14 Seismically Induced System Interaction 4.6.8 Instrumentation DCM S-38A Plant Protection System
'DCM S-39 Radiation Monitoring System DCM T-24 Design Criteria for DCPP Instrumentation and Controls DCM T-33 Remote Shutdown Criteria l
DCM T-34 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 4.6.9 Mechanical Systems DCM S-3A Feedwater System DCM S-4 Turbine Steam Supply System DCM S-6 Auxiliary Steam System DCM S-7 Reactor Coolant System DCM S-8 Chemical and Volume Control System DCM S-9 Safety Injection System DCM S-10 Residual Heat Removal System DCM S-Il Nuclear Steam Supply Sample System DCM S-13 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System DCM S-16 Makeup Water system A
>^ II.].
DCM S-17B Auxiliary Salt Water System r
DCM S-29 Liauid Radwaste Sistem DCM S-20 Lube Oil Distribution and Purification System DCM S-24 Gaseous Radwaste System DCM T-17 Lono-Term Cooli = Sater Suppl g'
[De645-33 CAMM )NQ om S-Mgg M[dt 4.6.10 environmental ouaitrication,
p g. g tdiIvof DCM T-20 Environmental Qualification 4.6.11 Fire Protection DCM S-18 Fire Protection System 1
DCM T-13 Appendix R Fire Protection J ycvi}f~~
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A's i ACHMENT NO. F TDcmc SHEET 30 OF 36 Ocm S IS/ change go, "O' -
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01/26/96 Page1of REGULATORY AND DESIGN SERVICES DcP m-sow CF3.NE2 ATTACHbGNT 8.2 ATTACHMENT NO. G 11TLE:
INTERIM CDM CHANGE GDCMC) FORM DCM NoS_sEARevision _j_,
Due s./tr/94 File No. m.tce DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 DirERIM DCM CHANGE (IDCMC)
System or Topic:
Cow 4vecc J AG S4 h E
(hm reEACN Date M/r/S4 Prepared by:
Checked by: XMM-(fan S*awAa.waQ Date k.//h/94 ES Approval Ob/$$W
{ O f1 k del. Po 2 r m 3 D=e i hs/1 f I ['
Interfacing NTS Section Aporovals (as indicatedh IDirector R A WAIJoA! CL l L3 DAmu Date
- Walet, O Director Date O Director Date i
No. M I9477 Registered Engineer Appewal/ Stamp:
g'r+' t/3*$
l
[S.4 SfrattWAL*-3 4,/ rr/tt, Responsible NTS Director Approval:
- 1. ILhh 6 Date Page[4hroustr i
attached describes the change.
Reason for change: AlU S J.dt' h b %dza N & h d CcA) bye. M.
n v
v Pending DCPP Implementation (Y/N7): Y Impending Change Document:M-M- 492N/S0s8+.
Safety Evaluation Screen / Evaluation: Attached: Yes __ No X, or Ref:3cP_u-49ss4.hD284..
CF301500. Doc 21 37
ATTACHMENT NO. G g e.,
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DCM S-25A System or Topic: Compressed Air System Revision 1 q
Pace 14 of 97 2.3.9 Residual Heat Removal System (DCM S-10) h l
The CA System supplies instrument air to the system air operated valves as well as to their control instrumentation described on the Instrument Schematic drawings.
2.3.10 Nuclear Steam Sunoly System (DCM S-11) 1 The CA System provides the normal instrument air supply to the l
system air operated valves as well as to their control
{M l-instrumentation. Several valves are also supplied from the Backup l
l Air / Nitrogen Supply Systems upon loss of IA pressure.
Instrument air is also provided to the Chemistry Analysis Panel (Unit 1/2).
I 2.3.11 Soent Fuel Pool Coolino System (DCM S-13)
The CA System supplies instrument air as the normal air supply to f F
.l Air / Nitrogen Supply System upon loss of IA pressure.
h bd{"
Spent Fuel Pool gate seal. Air is also provided by the Backup y,
L 2.3.12 Comoonent Coolina Water System (DCM S-14) pa<
The CA System provides the normal instrument air supply to the Several valves are also supplied from the Bac system air operated valves as well as to their control l
l instrumentation.
~
l Air / Nitrogen Supply. Systems upon loss of IA pressure. J y
[ V k
l 2.3.13 Service Coolina Water System (DCM S-15) l Vs I
The CA System supplies instrument air to the system air operated l
valves as well as to their control instrumentation. SCW provides l
cooling water for heat removal from the following CA System p W components:
[Q 1)
Air Compressors 0-1, 0-2, 0-3, 0-4, 0-5, and 0-6.
2)
Aftercoolers 0-1. 0-2, 0-3, 0-4, and 0-5.
O 3)
Plant Air Dryer Cooler 0-1.
Temperature switches TS-74, 75, 76, and 77 located at the SCW outlet of Air Compressors 0-1, 0-2, 0-3, and 0-4 provide input to CA-System annunciation at PK 80.
2.3.14 Makeup Water System (DCM S-16)
The CA System provides the normal instrument air supply to the system air operated valves as well as to their control instrumentation. Several valves are also supplied from the Backup l-Air / Nitrogen Supply Systems upon loss of IA pressure.
Additionally, instrument air is supplied to the pneumatic devices riar spannnTiou
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180A8 Hle Pa JL ATTACHMENT NO. [ N DIABLO CANYON POWCR PLANT - UNTT5 t Aht P f
sTimm ncascsumet.Incegu SHEET
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Proposesspy:
Herman O.hensowegu b E.
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___ Date:
Catodifwl tur.
Eric M. Pujssaki J
4 D
Desen System Essysneer Approval; _,
._ Dule.
Russert S Cahn l
l Insertactne IEE &astian Amarevais Jas indicatedL
/2/f[s tmh Dois:
F hn! Director.,,
O. Owedes I
l 11ElecincelDirector.
_ Date:
Deste:
~ 1 & C Director
'N h kahahC fWe: Y' l2 *$-~~
Medanknl Dirador:
yJWcdsMarn 3 NurenerDheter Detc:
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SHEET 2
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not S or 9G4 No. T-4 ~
tysten er topic Wind. Torneded and Teenaeri nortstem o Page 53 of e7 4.3.5.6.6 t.rterter geslea Class 1 mesewers and last most panels As diocessed la section 4.3.5.5.2. Desten C14ss ! racemeys attecated to the pipesay strusterg setside the coetatement have les tornade resistles cepeM11ttes and are volserabia to daange. Time recautys carry esstrol virtag to actesta vertees aucheelcal cessements of the stemt, feedwater, and nestitary feedseter systems, la additten, sees asseclated eastgeset leanted to
)
lastressetettaa pemens en h amtstes of tee eestatsment is aise i
velnerable to d e Thaea 2lll1e a and panels.were.rsLtand by the lett a.s.,
n for s.t.
er y of 6ei.g ste
- a. 3.s..nha missile is easil enceph to me repitettle (See lection toese Even though the preliebtitty of a missile strikte0 the racosays is negligible, a fatlene analysis ens perfetised to deterslew the consessences of damage. The analysts esaanstrated that the causessences of tornado eamage would met caeyreense safe seutduen.
and eseld not predese radteactive releasa lev 61s greater than 3
l locFIllesguidelinesq Refer to got 5-3A, liain foudwetar $ystes, 808 S-as, Aaer111ery Feeduster System, 005 5 3C. Ilata Feedbeter and Steam Dump Centrol systems, and BOL 5-4, lerttee steam ampply nysten ter esdtttenal dotatis.
j l
4.3.5.5.7 Piplag and Instruentatten en the Campement Caeltog Heter System Surge lenk i
in Seckten 4.3.5.5.1. the (tal teak. empported
,h"g Mo,,M} on the reef of the east 11ery betidtag, is capa le of withstanding tormede effects. lensever, the serge Ittes, the reitef valve MMM f
header time atmospheric vest med valve, the tuo sets of ltente level Instreestatten en the west side of the tank. aad the onside 4a H d i Q3 esterter portten et the ru.amey from tho tank to W control reen, j
are voleerable to danese ter tornede ests.tles.A Caneesusaces of 0*f 8h sech desage are es tsessortaud helee, and ere discussed to more
.detall te got 5-14 rW Coe)1eg Water System.
y
/W
- Termede danese to the velasrable piptag. valves. and instrementattee oflthe campement aseltag water system (COf5) weeld
,(
not prevent & system figs senttestep to aparate satisfactertly, and seeld est essprsetse safe sketdown. Such dammes ess14 reseit
..N in the rolesse of radioactivity er threested seter to the s
41scharve structore, but weeld set produce radioactive release levels greater then 10CFR100 yetdellee5.
Dett meceeggist gewama13es 548e09/$3 I
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001flo. T-9 System er Topic:
Vlad. Tomaeo, and Tsunast heetsien 0 i
Paec 56 of 97 I
Analysts of potenstel water less from h peel shows the reasinsne h
l mater cover rumeistiq, e,rr the feel prov-des adeguate protectism D
asalast both fuel desage and peel lleer sonstretten from tornado O
N miselles. A more estatied descrtettes of tornado effects es the Lg)
O g
pen) is g3sen la 801 3-4tA. Feel handlints System.
e, 2
4.4 DE8101110 WITilETAfD T5Mlffit LORE $
k l
A tamment is a less period seena wave. that eseid be commed by k h$
submarine setselc evi volcante activity or Iqr submertec land U
y slides.
Q g
Tsunast leadtas conettiens. as used to this SQt. teclude the 4
411 cadined effects of a tsunam1. windwted stars weves. stem Z
surge (*pillas up" of water near b ahore due to a stem), and CD times. The costostles of these effects results in a rise and fall of the ocean surface level relative to same entus level. In this DGI the reference datus is the maan lemmr law mater level (HLLW). At DCPP. IILLW ts 2.6 feet below the mean sea level (ItSL) which is used as a reference dates for plant elevattens. Values of meter level rise and fall pfven in tbs n01 are empressed relative to IE.Lif. Refemeces to elevatim la this UQt are 4
expressed relative to itSL.
In this Dol. whosi castdaring saamast ottocts alone, the rise in water level is termed tsumant runseEffects of both lwally-and the fell of the water level is terned tsunami draudessi.
i genereted (neer-shame) ismast and dister.tly-generated tsunaal are considered. Tsenastirenus and drauteen nlmes gtvan for locally-generated tsanami (Iter. Sectlen 4.4.1.2) inclads the effects of sesidence at the plast site that is cearidered te occur as a result of naar-shore earthgestes.
4 When considering tsumasi leading canditites including the cambined effects of tsenast, stare, store surge. I.ed tide the risc in meter level is termed cambined nauphand runup includes both ame the fall of the water level is termed eseMaed draudemo.
the palenged t<tse in water level, and tie addittenal acre tramsttery. rise in meter level assectated with wave splash. The omfanged rise is terend cambined unve riaup. h greater and tranattery rise is termed cauMaed splaal-runes.
The rise in t,eter lowel may resul't in salmersian. asmsmiated twertelle leedtag effects, and any result in fleeding effects, en structures and systaar seaponsets located in the zone of lofluence.
1he fall in water level may rwsuit in Ll+ espesum of normally suluereed structores and components to air. and any reduce the supply of water to pumps editch drant watet fue the oceaa.
e4na suan assumnem I
L__.____________________________________.___________________
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. _ o _ w-w w t>cp /V)- SoMPI ATTACHMENT NO. N SHEET k OFk INSERT 4.3.6.4 4.3 A 4 h Geoime Water Systemmurgo Tank Neocon Presounannon Nitrogen presounambon is added et uw CCW oyusem surge td to trehgate the canesquences of a LOCA. As dhszeesd in Sochon 4.3.4.5, 4 tomeOo cannes r=== wth en acendent, and such en accelent is not ceneidsred to ocxau swnuteneously with a tomado.The added altsagen swassunasaan tuteng. valves. a W inokumentaucm are vuirearable to damese by temedo anissBoe. Such damago wtauld not prevent the CCW ovenom inen monunuma a opense enouemorer, and wown eos osmpreense snee shutsowrL For more esteil, referto DCM S 14.
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8 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMP!MV NUCLEAR ENGINEERING SERVICE 5 DLAP CF3.NE2 ATTACHMENT NO. "Z.
ATTACHMENT 8.2 SHEET l
op lg TITLE:
INTERIM CDM CNANGE (IDCMC) FORM j
DCMNof' evision /*
Date File No.
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 INTERIM DCM CHANGE (IDCMC)
System or Topic: MUV hlP~/ NITlW-A_4.4eMEVN Mfas]
Prepared by: MN MM
/
M Date IS Checked by:
1.4.LoboLo
.C-Date Y 4 %
Design System Engineer Approval:
tiSFM /2 & /Mf-Date
(
~ Interfacing NES Section Annrovals (as indicated):
O C;!M N rector
/
_ htc O Electrical Director Date l
O I & C Director Date O Mechanical Director Date O Nuclear Director Date O Piping Director
[
Date'
/
W 9 60-ff X
O Director
./
a' Date om
=
mm Registered Engineer Approval / Stamp:
,,py..,-
\\
F c Responsible NES Director Approval:
Date #df /9 6 Page 2 through
((
attached describes the change.
M on// d b " " 8 M N N.MC &,. M, 70 Ndd I
ReasoD for change:
SvME 73wk %cn*E ONrpet
~
Pending DCPP Implementation (Y/N?):
V Impending Chang /e Documents Safety Evaluation Screen / Evaluation: Attached: Yes _ No _, or Ref:
i N'
ap M -50 %
CF301500.SF 431I
~
i
y mm7 IDCML 25B CHG /*7 ATTACHMEidNO. I PAGESOFiS j
SHEET A
op
)@
DCM S-25B System or Topic: Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System Revision I l
Paae 21 of 115 List of Tables I.Ahlt lilla Entt 3.1-1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS. 1967. APPLICABLE TO THE BACKUP AIR /NITR0 GEN SUPPLY SYSTEM AND SUPPORTED lYSTEMS 76 4.1-1 BACKUP AIR / NITROGEN SUPPLY INSTRUMENTATION CLASS FICATION 78 4.3-1 ACCUMULATOR DESIGN CYCLE AND DURATION RE0UIREMEN'$
82 List of Fiaures l
-Fiaure lilla EAgg 1.2-1 105 ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE PCV-19 84 1.2-2 105 ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE PCV-20 85 1.2-3 105 ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE PCV-21 86 1.2-4 105 ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE PCV-22 87 1.2-5 PRESSURIZER PORY PCV-455C 88 1.2-6 PRESSURIZER PORY PCV-456 89 1.2-7 CHARGING HEADER FLOW CONTROL VALVE HCV-142 90 1.2-8 PRESSURIZER AUXILIARY SPRAY VALVE 8145 l
RCS LOOP 4 COLD LEG CHARGING VALVE 8146 l
RCS LOOP 3 COLD LEG CHARGING VALVE 8147 91 1.2-9 PRESSURIZER AUXILIARY SPRAY BYPASS VALVE 8148 92 i
1.2-10 RCS NOT LEGS 1 AND 4 SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVES 9351A & 9351B 93 1.2-11 RCS SAMPLE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 9356A 94 1.2-12 RCS SAMPLE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 93565 95 l.2-13 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL. HEAT EXCHANGER COMPONENT COOLING WATER OUTLET FCV-364 & 365 96 l
1.2-14 COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER AUXILIARY SALTWATER INLET VALVES FCV-602 & 603 97 1.2-15' FIRE WATER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE FCV-633 98 1.2-16 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE FCV-41 99 1.2-17 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE FCV-42 100 1.2-18 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE FCV-43 101 l
1.2-19 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE FCV-44 102 1.2-20 UNIT ONE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN VALVE PCV-797 103 l
1.2-21 UNIT TWO STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN VALVE PCV-797 104 1.2-22 LETD06N INLET VALVE LCV-459 105 1.2-23 LETD0lN INLET VALVE LCV-460 106 1.2-24.
LETDOWN ORIFICE OUTLET VAHtS 8149A. 8149B AND 81fE 107 1.2-25 LETDOWN CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 8152 108 1.2-26 POST-LOCA SAMPLING SYSTEM VALVES FCV-692. 693.
1410 THROUGH 1425 109 1.2-27 SPENT FUEL P0OL GATE SEAL 110 1.2-28 SEAWATER DISTILLATE DEMINERALIZED VALVES FCV-876 THROUGH 899 (ABANDONED IN PLACE) 111
' l.2-29 SCREEN WASH PUMP OVERBOARD DISCHARGE VALVE PCV-152 112 1.2-30 CONDENSATE MAKE-UP VALVE LCV-8 113 1.2-31 CONDENSATE REJECTION VALVE LCV-12 114
'~
1.2-32 POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP SPEED CONTROLLER INSTRUMENTS YM-459 AND P0-459 115
~~~
- y
~ ~
IDCMC 5
.8 CHG /,7 SHEET 6
op Q PAGE 3 OFJg.
DCM S-258 System or Topic: Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System Revision 1 Paae 26 ef 111,
1.2.1.4 Nuclear Steam Supply Sampling System RCS Hot leas 1 and 4 S=le Isolation Valves - 9351A and 93518 (See Figure 1.2-10)
The Backup Afr/ Nitrogen Supply System supplies backup air from seismically qualified accumulators to operate RCS Hot Leg 1 and 4 Sample Isolation Valves, 9351A and 93518, to facilitate taking the plant from hot standby to cold shutdown in the event of loss of the normal instrumernt air supply. Valves 9351A and 9351B help to provide the capability for RCS sampling to assure adequate boron concentration for cold shutdown.
l In the event of loss of all air to the RCS Hot Legs I and 4 Valves, the valves will fall closed.
RCS Samole Containment Isolation Valves - 9356A and 9356B (See Figures 1.2-11 and 1.2-12)
The Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System supplies backup air from seismically qualified accumulators to operate RCS Sample Containment Isolation Valves, 9356A and 93568, to facilitate taking the plant from hot standby to cold shutdown in the event of loss cf the normal instrument air supply. Valves 9356A and 93568 help to provide the capability for RCS sampling to assure adequate boron concentration for cold shutdown.
In the event of loss of r.11 air to the RCS Sample Containment Isolatisn Valves, the valves will fail closed.
1.2.1.5 Component Cooling Water System l
Residual Heat Removal Heat Exch-er CCWS Outlet Valves - FCV-364
~and 365 (See Figure 1.2-13)
In the event of loss of the normal instrument air supply, the Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System supplies backup air from seismically qualified accumulators to RHR Heat Exchanger CCWS Outlet Valves. FCV-364 and FCV-365, to help maintain isolation of CCW to the RHR heat exchanger (s) until the heat exchanger (s) is/are required to be placed in service.
In the event of loss of all air to the RHR Heat Exchanger CCWS Outlet Valves, the valves _will fall oosa 1
" COMPONENT Cont TNG WAMR Sr mm TANK PPFCCURE CONI 1tOL (SEE FIGURE 1.2 33) l I
The Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System supplies the compressed gas to pressurize the Component p
Cooling Water Surga Tank Pressure Control System The compressed gas is used to mitigate the I
1, consequence of a CCW system overtemperstwe condition to prevent flashing and subsequent water I,
hammer at the Containment Fan Cooler Units during a Large Break LOCA coincident with the less of I
OEsite Power. The backup air /mtrogen funcuan is accomplished unGer the following two conditions.
(1) la the event ofloss of normal nitrogen supply to the CCW Surge Tank, the backup mtrogen supply will be the primary backup source to restore pressure to the CCW Surge Tank if required.
l (2)
An instrument air supply is avadsbie and can be used as an ahernate backup source to assist pressuruauon of the CCW Si23e Tank if regered The instrument air supply is normally w
a m w.
,-aty (ggg jo 7 -
v SHEET 4,
OF l3 PAGE 4 OF&
DCM S-25B System or Topic: Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System Revision 1 Pace 34 of 115 (TechSpec3/4.9.8.1)
Mode 6 when the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange is at least 23 feet - At least one RHR train I
must be operable to perform its RHR function.
This requires that at least one of the valves, FCV-364 or FCV-365 must be operable.
(TechSpec3/4.9.8.2)
Mode 6 when the water level above the top of_ the reactor vessel flange is less than 23 feet - Both RHR trains must be operable to perform their RHR function. This requires that
~
both valves, FCV-364 and FCV-365 must be operable.
Operability of valves FCV-364 and FCV-365 requires that the g
associated backup air supply for these valves must be operable.
2.2.6 Auxiliary Saltwater System Ih o
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Saltwater inlet
="
Valves - FCV-602 and 603 bb8 l
$UW (Tech Specs 3/4.7.3.1 and 3/4.7.4.1) i H
ssE Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 - At least two vital component cooling g5
.9 % {
water loops and at least two auxiliary saltwater trains must wI be operable to perform their ECCS function. This requires 7
7j=a that both valves, FCV-602 and FCV-603 must be operable.
f" o& h k9O j
(Tech Spec 3/4.4.1.4.1)
A I ci m.
Mode 5 with reactor coolant loops filled - At least one RHR N.
N j 2 train is required to be operable and in operation and either Q.$
L an additional RHR train shall be operable or else the 5g3 q secondary side water level of at least two steam generators 8b Uug shall be greater than 15%, to perform their RHR function.
g E$5 This requires that at least one valve, FCV-602 or FCV-603,
-j 8[jj and if both RHR trains are required to be operable then both 6
g:
valves, FCV-602 and FCV-603, must be operable.
li 2 8 q.@
E 3g (Tech Spec 3/4.4.1.4.2)
Lg$ Tog Mode 5 with the raactor coolant loops not filled - Both RHR s
j j E' trains must be operable to perform their RHR function. This g
ueg requires that both valves, FCV-602 and FCV-603, must be g
.E $. g I
<83 4
k
.*g (Tech Spec 3/4.9.8.1)
=5 yay Mode 6 when the water level above the top of the reactor 3
agg vessel flange is at least 23 feet - At least one RHR train i
f3 ag=
must be operable to perform its RHR function. This requires I
I g
- I1 g0f.gj that at least one of the valves, FCV-602 or FCV-603, must be j
perable.
e 0
- 2 li A E <
i l
l ko-
mu y-w,
m ATTACHMENT NO. 1 IDCMC S-25] CHG/ 7 SHEET 6 OF j).
PAGE 8 OF /2 DCM S-25B System or Topic:
Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System Revision 1 Paae 37 of 115 2.3.7 Comoonent Coolina Water System (DCM S-14)
Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Component Cooling Water o
Outlet Valves - FCV-364 and 365 The Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System interfaces directly with the Compressed Air System to supply valves FCV-364 and 365, of the Component Cooling Water System with compressed air.
u 2.3.8 Make-Up Water System (DCM S-16) kD E
Seawater Distillate Demineralized - FCV-876 through FCV-899 y
o Seawater Distillate Demineralized Valves, FCV-876 through fo FCV-899, are Abandoned In Place.
Jz 2.3.9 Auxiliary Saltwater System (DCM S-17B) 5 o
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Saltwater Inlet
[.
Valves - FCV-602 and 603 gj
[ fm*h The Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System interfaces directly with the Compressed Air System to supply valves FCV-602 and e
603 of the Auxiliary Saltwater System with compressed gas.
'a 3&
j
.E o 2.3.10 Saltwater System (DCH S-17A) 5{
9 Screen Wash Pump Overboard Discharge Valve - PCV-152 f
o ti
&D The Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System interfaces with the a a.
Compressed Air System to supply valve PCV-152 of the 2
8 8
8 Saltwater System with compressed gas.
E
=jf E I h
2.3.11 Fire Protection Systems (DCM S-18)
!.=
o Fire Water Containment Isolation Valve - FCV-633 j {.i g
The Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System interfaces directly E
"$i with the Compressed Air System to supply valve FCV-633 of 0
N0 the Fire Protection System with compressed gas.
~ 2.3.12 Comoressed Air System (DCM S-25A) o The Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System interfaces directly with the Compressed Air System to supply the above valves and Spent Fuel Pool Gate Seal with compressed gas.
l i
PG&E PROPRIETARY INFORMATION l
RWP011.R1/37 l
SHEET
[o Op]2 53Q[ ops-DCM S-25B System or Topic: Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System Revisien I
~
Pace 54 of 115 RCS Sample Containment Isolation Valves - 9356A and 93568 l
o The accumulator for each valve is to contain sufficient pressure to operate each valve for ten cycles and a six hour duration.
[DCL 88-236 and DCL 89-041]
Component Coolina Water System o
Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Component Cooling Water l
Outlet Yalves - FCV-364 and 365 The accumulator for each valve is to contain sufficient pressure to operate each valve for one cycle and a 4.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> duration.
[DCL 88-236, DCL 89-041, DCM S-14, and PG&E Chron i 132699]
l Auxiliary Saltwater System g
Component Cooling Water Haat Exchanger Auxiliary Saltwater f.f o
Inlet Valves - FCV-602 end 603 3o E
The accumulator for each valve is to contain sufficient lp{g pressure to operate each valve for one cycle and hold the valve closed for a minimum period of eight hours.
[DCL 88-236, DCL 89-041 and DCM S-178) p Fire Protection Systems eS l
o Fire Water Containment Isolation Valve - FCV-633 gE The accumulator for this valve is to contain sufficient pressure to operate the valve for two cycles and a three g
Ay g
l hour duration.
[DCMS-18)
(OPEN ITEM 9.21) 0, gg 4.4 TORNADO, MISSILE, FLOODING AND TSUNAMI REQUIREMENTS l
$mh a
u Tornado, missile, flooding and Tsunami requirements of the systems j 3$
?u the instrumentation and controls of the Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply F
& a$
System supports, are given in the DCMs of the systems supplied the 3 #l -
compressed gas.
ti 4.5 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS j
,e u
n2<
E This precautions and limitations section is not intended to be a hj<
comprehensive listing of all precautions and limitations contained in the various procedures or other documents related to the Backup u
{
,$ ~ :
M Air / Nitrogen Supply System. Only those precautions and c
limitations that, if not considered, could lead to a potential h {i
=-
(
deviation from the design bases are identified. These precautions u
and limitations include potential pitfalls, lessons learned or previously identified system or component concerns.
o ggim turonmucu
IDCMC S-25] CHG PAGE 7 OF /2, g b.
Car = r: r'aalia-Water Suree T=ak PH=e Caa%1 i
1 Surveillance / Maintenance Arra**= Criteria Backup nitrogen supply for the Verify that the nitrogen pressure for the CCW Surge Tank boules in service is equal to or greater (Category) than 1000 psig when the CCW Surge Tank i LD q
~
Pressure Control system is required to be I
bo g
We [ Calculation-999) q e j
Nitrogen bottle pressure inslesnan Verify / Calibrate the pressure indicator r
2 p
(Category))
for the nitrogen bottles
- Q g,
A Air / Nitrogen supply pressure devins Verify / Calibrate the pressure (Catego@
regulator and relief valve settings.
2gg OC,,,-.
System or Topic: Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply Systes Revision 1 tu Pane 63 of 115 I
L_ <
CO done with the upstrean side of the supply check valves depressurized and vented to i
the atmosphere, h,
i Air supply pressure devices.
Verify / calibrate the pressure I
(Category 1) regulator and relief valve settings.
5.6 AUXILIARY SALT WATER SYSTDI 4
a.
CCW Heat Exchanaer Auri11arv Saltwater Inlet Valves - FCV-602 l
and FCV-603
)
Surveillance / Maintenance Accentance Criteria Backup air supply for CCW Heat With the normal air supply Exchanger Aux 111ary Saltwater isolated, verify by using the Inlet Valves, FCV-602 and normal controls that the FCV-603, stored air in each group of (Category 1) accumulators will close the respective valve from the open position and then maintain the valve in the closed position for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. This is to be done with the upstress side of the supply check valves depressurtzed and vented to the atmosphere.
Air supply pressure.
Verify / calibrate the pressure (Category 1) regulator settings.
l 5.7 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM l
]
Fire Water Containment Isolation Valve - FCV-653 a.
surveillance / Maintenance l Accentance Criteria Backup air supply for Fire With the normal air supply Water Containment isolation isolated, verify by using the Valve,FCV-633. (OPEN ITEM normal controls that the 9.21) stored air in the accumulator (Category 2) will operate valve FCV-633 for 2 cycles after the normal air supply has been isolated for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. This is to be done with the upstream side of the j
supply check valve depres-surtzed and vented to atmos-PC&f PROPfl!IARY INF0anat:Cu
ATTACHME9 11 9 Md S/2 SHEET OF l2 I)CP M - 6 0 2 S h DCM No. S-25B System or Topic: Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System Revision 1 Pace 79 of 115 TABLE 4.1-1 (continued)
BACKUP AIR / NITROGEN SUPPLY INSTRUMENTATION CLASSIFICATION Component Description B/U Air /Nitrocen Sunoly Nuclear Steam Supply Sampling System FCV-692 RCS Hot Leg Sample Isolation Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-693 Pressurizer Liquid Sample Isolation Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1410 Mixed Bed Demin Sample Isolation Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1411 Mixed Bed Demin Sample Isolation Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1412 VCT Liquid Sample Isolation Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1413 RHR PP Discharge Sample Isolation Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1414 EDR Sample Isolation Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1415 FDR Sample Isolation Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1416 RCS Hot Leg Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1417 Pressurizer Liquid Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1418 Pressurizer Gas Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1419 RHR PP Discharge Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1420 VCT Liquid Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1421 Mixed Bed Demin Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1422 Mixed Bed Demin Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1423 Reactor Cavity Sump Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1424 EDR Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator FCV-1425 FDR Sample Flush Valve Class II Air Accumulator 9351A RCS Hot Leg 1 Sample Isolation Valve Class IB Air Accumulator Type D.
Cat. 3 9351B RCS Hot Leg 4 Sample Isolation Valve Class IB Air Accumulator Type D, Cat. 3 9356A RCS Sample Containment Isolation Valve Class IA Air Accumulator 9356B RCS Sample Containment Isolation Valve Class IA Air Accumulator Spent Fuel Pool System Spent Fuel Pool Gate Seal Class II Nitrogen Bottle
~
Component Cooling Water System FCV-364 RHR HX CCW Outlet Valve Class IA Air Accumulator FCV-365 RHR HX CCW Outlet Valve Class IA Air Accumulator CCW Surgelank Pressure Control
~
- Two Class ID Nitrogen Bodes
- Note: De inctrument Class ID requirement is to a.aintain adequate nitrogen storage capacity and pressure bm.ndary integnty. ne snounting Of the nitrogen boules shall be seismically qualifi
" ~ ~
~~
/ AGE 9 OF /2.
O OF b SHEET y M 5og$p DCM No. S-25B System or Topic: Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System Revision 1 Pace 82 of 115 TABLE 4.3-1 ACCUMULATOR DESIGN CYCLE AND DURATION REQUIREMENTS Component Description Cycles Duration Turbine Steam Supply System FCV-41 Main Steam Isolation Valve Hold Open 30 min.
FCV-42 Main Steam Isolation Valve Hold Open 30 min.
FCV-43 Main Steam Isolation Valve Hold Open 30 min.
FCV-44 Main Steam Isolation Valve Hold Open 30 min.
PCV-19 10% Atmospheric Dump Valve 10 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> PCV-20 10% Atinospheric Dump Valve 10 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> PCV-21 10% Atmospheric Dump Valve 10 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> PCV-22 10% Atmospheric Dump Valve 10 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />
/ '
Reactor Coolant System PCV-455C Pressurizer PORY 30 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> PCV-456 Pressurizer PORY 30 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Chemical and Volume Control System HCV-142 Charging Header Flow Control Valve 1
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 8145 Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Valve 2
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 8146 RCS Loop 4 Cold Leg Charging Valve
- 2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 8147 RCS Loop 3 Cold Leg Charging Valve
- 2 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 8148 Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Bypass 2
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Nuclear Steam Supply Sampling System 9351A RCS Hot Leg 1 Sample Isolation 10 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 1
9351B RCS Hot leg 4 Sample Isolation 10 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 9356A RCS Sample Containment Isolation 10 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> i
9356B RCS Sample Containment Isolation 10 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> l
Component Cooling Water System
~
i l
FCV-364 RHR HX CCW Outlet Valve 1
4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> l
(%
FCV-365 RHR HX CCW Outlet Valve 1
4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />
_ s_}
ccw s
_ c
D C" 6GJ-5028df ATTACHMENT NO..1 IDCMC S-25B CHG /e 7 PAGE /OOF_ff, SHEET
)b OF Q DCM No. S-258 System or Topic: Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System Revision 1 Paae 83 of 115 TABLE 4.3-1 (continued)
Component Description Cveles Duration Auxiliary Saltwater System
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Fire Protection System FCV-633 Fire Water Containment Isolation 2
3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> The 2 cycle requirement is for valve 8146 or 8147 with the other valve held closed for the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> duration. See Chron i 203946 for details.
The I cycle requirement is for valves FCV-602 and FCV-603 to be closed from the open position and held closed for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> using the stored air in each group of accumulators.
See DCM S-178 for details.
w v
t Here are no cycle requirements sina the CCW Surge Tank Pressure Control is a passive design.
[
j De 20 minute duration is based on maintaining pressure at or above 17 psig to the CCW Surge Tank.
w 1
P OPRIETART IW ORMATION
AD HMENT NO. I.
mv vvo w n wy usCMC S-25B CBG /.7 EE,gh3,3,33 y$
PAGE // OF /2 7
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SURGE TANK PRESSURE CONTROL INST. CLASS IC w-+ INST. CLASS ID G
INST. CLASS ID++ PIPING CODE CLASS C J L
/
/
/
lW.~~~~
/
L---
,t--C4Q I I RCV-16 f
3 PCV-2020A PCV-20208 g
INST.
INST.
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/CCW CLASS IC +yCLASS ID I k (SURGEI y
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llNST. AIR,ha:) W PCV-2021A RV-2030 INST. CLASS ID+ + INST. CLASS IC p
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CLASS 11 *--+ CLASS ID w
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INST.
INST.
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LEGEND NOTE:
BACK-UP NITROGEN SUPPLY INSTRUMENTVALVE NUMBERS OTHER COMPONENT / SYSTEM -----
ARE DCPP CONTROLLED.
REFERENCE OVID'S 106725 AND 107725
2es Hee EuS
- rt 96. e ese 12/20/9a Pagehof i
PACIFIC GAS AND ELEC1RIC CDMPANY l
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING SERVICE 3 DLAP CF3.NC2 N
ATTADMENT 3.2 i
O L:.
i TITLE: INTERIM CIM CHANGE (IDOC) flMN OgO DCM MoINedston Y Q
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DIABLO QUff0N PONER PLANT - UNITS 1 AMD 2 w
INTERDI apt Chnfulf f100C1 g
System or Topic: NF-OP AIA/MITRW4/ ^MV =Wevo A
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Prepared by: MNMM
/74
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Date 74 l
w C wcked by: - L A L '8*' * / N#0M Date 4 4 4 6 f
b Dest,n system Engineer Approval:J.J. arry[Mb Date Y'9"%
/
Interfacial NES Section Amorovals (as indicated);
QGt': ti e Ger _
?ste I
i C Electrical Director Date D 1 & C Director Date O Mechantcal Director NM Date O Nuclear Director --
Date O Pfping Director Date' O
Director
-- Date Registered Engineer Approval / Stamp:
Responsible hES Director Approval:
Date Pa9e 2 through - M _ attached aestribes the change.
Reason for change: Sanf/b6' S M'?h{f W W.6gsn43 *)O T 19)
C G C T M L W n g [g w T R L Peding DCPP lapimetatim (Y/X?): Y Impeding Dan
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[AP ACHMENT NO. 7 ID A n AC m s.1 SHEET
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OF M TITLE FSAR UPDATE CHANGE REQUEST DGP M 5cES.4 FSAR UPDATE CHANGE REQUEST I stiator CA 9, S'AsHM2.W Ad---
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Discipii, or uo.
REVIEW AND APPROVAL:
Groun Leader /Supy Di=I 'I='Or=ai='k Anproval Qag huS cI Noweskie r 65-bop A bhge>L[u L//ld4(
FSAR UPDATE
REFERENCE:
Secuan 4'2/2.
3 '3*2'3 2 2.) T W 9 Y-3r Rowl81M Page(s) 4,2-G Tabic (s) 4*3-3 Figure (s)
- 373_fo 1 2.- 74 4 2-7 3 3 - 11 9 1 -/o 7
7 DESCRIPT1Nb#F CHANGE: (seg_. yrAcnum(A" (,15 Sherls) l Pw d, c<ua em m.erm M d absbud besim. Pu u vpw.1 LOW. 4Ae lyeM uM Le A'7 J 44, Wvu' m et(7h.
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JUSTIFICATION / REFERENCE.
l "be.D M - 49 284,lM-So2B4 s?e h w s. L R1E_
1 FOR LBM USE ONLY Change Request Received and Logged.
Date i
Assigned Change Number Change implemented in Rev.
Date X1200101.!NIC lA 13 IV L
de p m ScM 4
/
DCPP t*ITS 1 & 2 FSAR UPDATE ATTACHMENT NO. 7 (3)
Loss-of-coolant Accident (entire section rewritten)
SHEET 7
OF M In the event of a LOCA, three pumps are placed in service to provide protection against an active failure. The high-high containment pressure (containment Phase 5 isolation) initiates an automatic start signal for the standby CCW pump ano generates a signal to close the non-vital header (header *C") isolation valve. The por ion of the non-vital header which serves the reactor cociant pumps and vessel support coolers located within the reactor primary shield wall is independently isolated from the C header to assure isolation due to its vulnerability during a LOCA. The "C" header is not re4utred for post accident cooling. The "C" header increases the CCV flow rate to the CFCUs.
The design basis for CCVS performance following a LOCA assumes the f ailure of vital Bus 6 to energize. Additionally, it was conservatively assumed that all ECCS pumps remain operating (including pumps associated with the un-energized bas) which maximizes the containment peak pressure predicted by the accident analysis code. The increased ECC5 fisw results in a greater core energy release to containment which tneresses the peak containment pressure. The design basis case requires a minimum of 2000 ppm to'each of the CFCU cooling coils.
Other single failure cases have been evaluated to demonstrate that they are less limiting for containment than the design basis case. The H-bus fatture case, which provides a minimum of 1600 ppa to the CFCU cooling coils due to the failure of the non-vital header to isolate, results in containment conditions that are less limiting than the design basis case.
Additional analyses have been performed to ensure adequate CCVS performance considering other single failures which maxtette heat input to the CCV5. The evaluations of other single failures were performed to identify the limiting CCW peak temperature case and to verify that the peak containment conditions were att11 bound by the design basis accident evaluation.
For the limiting CCVS maximum heat input case, the single failure of one ASW pump results in the highest CCW temperature following a LDCA Under these conditions, the peak CCW temperature is 132'F and does not exceed 120*F for more than twenty minutes.
This assumes 64'F ocean water and a single CCW heat exchanger in service.
4)
Post Acctdent Rectreulation Phase
~
Following the post LOCA injectica phase, the CCW system is realigned for the recirculation phase by valving in the RHR heat exchangers to remove heat energy f rom the containment sump. Additionally, if the C header does not automatically isolate during the injection phase, it is manually isolated prior to realignment to 9.2-5 hovember 1993 Revtston 9
ATTACHMENT NO.
."I bee m-sozs4 SHEET 3
OF cQ oCpr un TS 1 s 2 m R upoRit rectreulation. The additional heat load on the CCVS is controlled by plant operators by Itatting the heat input eestpoent (operating CFCUs and RHR heat exchangers) based on the avellable heat removal equipment (operating CCW heat exchangers and ASW pumps) to prevent the CCW system supply temperature from exceeding 120*F.
The CCWS is eventually altened for a long-tere post accident rectreulation by manually reallyning the vital headers into two redundant trains. This long-tere post accident alignment eliminates the possibility of disab11ag the entire CCW system due to a passive failure.
Cooling water for the component cooling water heat exchangers is supplied from the ASW5 which also functions as an engineered safety system, thereby ensuring a continuous source of cooling. The CCWS, therefore, serves as an intermediate system between th6 RCS and A5VS, ensuring that any leakage of radioactive fluid from the components being cooled is contained within the plant.
Desten data for some major CCVS equipment are Itsted in Table 9.2-6.
The CCWS consists of the following major pieces of equipment:
9.7.2.2.1 Comnonent Cooline Water Pumas The three component cooling. water pumps that circulate component cooling water through the CCWS are horizontal, double suction, centrifugal units. The pumps operate on electric power f ree the vital 4.16 kV t,uses that can be supplied free either normal or emergency sources.
9.f.2.2.2 Commonent tooline Water Heat Exchaneses The two component cooling water heat exchangers are shell and tube type. Seawater circulates through the tube side. The shell is carbon steel, and the tubes are 90-10 Cu-N1.
9.2.2.2.3 Commenent Cooline Water Sures Tank The component cooling water serpe tank, which is connected to the pump suction vital headers, is constructed of carbon steel. The tank is internally divided into two compartments to hold two separate volumes of water. This arrangement provides redundancy for a failure during the rectreulation phase following a LOCA.
The surge tank acceaunodates thermal supansion and contraction, and in-or out-leakage of water fra the systasjtecaus the ne lly ts t he a spher radt longitors r
ded t
c nt c ing ter di rpe
- eders, he itorgetuate an 41 and oses su e ta vent alve n
iph ra atton vel i detep/ din cool wat cult.
In the event of a low level in the surge tank, enkeup water is automatically added to the system through control valves from the NWS (Section 9.2.3).
f)d's YN=
9.2-6 how g r 1993 Revteion 9 a % As.*w #.r.gbAj d I" g
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l OCPp CIT 51 & 2 F5AR UPDATE 9.2.2.2.4 heal Addition Tanks J
P M 50Z8%
The two onesteal addition tanks for supplytag selybdete based solutten to the eesponerr4 coeltas unter are l
l
~
eenetructed of carbon steel.
ATTACHMENTS 10. 7 g.2.2.2.5 cassenant Ceeltver Water Cerrosien Monitor SHEET 5
OF 37 i
A Cerfesten test leap is provided to sentter the effectiveness of the serresten inhibiter used in the CCW5.
The test leap eenetsts of four coupon 1ecettene and tuo opere eennections for future use. Test coupone of representative seterials are exposed to CCW5 condittens for a specified amount of time and then analyzed te deteretne the overell eerresten rates, g.2.2.2.8 Restesal Heat Reenval Mast Eenhansers l
l Centrol room operated air-actuated valves sentrol the sempenent cooling water flew to the algt heat enchangers (described in Chapter 5) in order to place thmes camponents in servies during plant coeldom er after a 1.0CA. The valves, open en less of air, are provided with a Desip Class I bacup air supply to allow posttive operater control after less of the plant compressed air systas.
I 9.2.1.2.7 Containment Fan caelers Caepenent cooling unter is supp1ted to the aantainment fan coolers (described in Chapter 6) by the tuo vital leeps. Tue fan coolers are en leap *A" and three en leap "S".
Drain and toelatten valves are provided on l
J each side of the fan coolers allowing each cooler to be toelated individually for leakage testing. During
)
I normal plant operations, flow through the fan coolers is thesttled (positten f tmed) by a manual valve downstream of each fan cooler to pass the desty basis accident fleus. Containment fan coolers cooling water flew modulatten by air-acteated temperature sentrol valves te limit total system flew during norms) operation and conserve en pumping power is ne longer required and has been deleted. The above valve alignment assures full flow through each fan eeeler under accident condittens without any automatic or operetten action. The cooling mater fleurate, the design inlet and outlet temperatures, and the etniense pressure for each containment fan cooler for both nennel and accident condittens are as follows:
Nonnel M
Flowrote for each cooler, som 2000 (nominal) 2000 (1)
Inlet temperature. *F 95 125 Outlet tesserature. *F 98 216(2)
Minianse pressure, psia 20 20 i
Notes:
~
(1) 2000 ppm ts required to the CFCU cooling cet1s for the Itatting design basis accident. For less 1 tatting accident configurattens (H-bus fatture) flows to the CFCU cooling cells as law as 1600 gas are acceptable.
9.2-7 May 1g95 Revisten 10 l
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The Ilmit doelen is accident its in CFCU evtlet ture 21g*F. A evtlet temper of 22 occurs for assismed failure due to decreased ecol ng unter flem The avat le static p at t CFCU evtlet s suffici to prevent I laed beillas a
eleva tempera if both statte and c
sentributi are idered the subosol margin at CFCU euti ie apprest
- 1y 50*F based a sinimum availab pressure peig.
T entire
, includt the cooll sells of the inment f aeolere, is rized by the tic of t osmponent Itag we surge tank.
1smest 1 of water in the z : ese water j
surge is 11 f above the ghost point the fan emel eenling estis.
n additlan, discharge /
head the ese11 ter pump wt add to the ting pressure the emeling 11s of the f
- Cly, aperating in the tag coils of the an ecolore w I be 20 pela P
ero.
- ter, saturett temperature water at this is 223*F Stace the Ing water tempo at the et of the f coster dose no exceed 21g*F.
during acci t conditi
, no local bot will take ace in the ling cells.
9 2.2.2.8 Raaetor Vamant C===a-tm i
Cooling water is also provided to the reactor vessel supports (described in Chapter 3) to prevent overheating and dehydretten of the concrete for the reacter vessel support shoes. This is acco glished by l
the use of water-cooled steel blocks ' etween each of the four vessel support pede and its support shes.
l s
Camponent cooling water flows in labyrteth flow passages in the blocks providing heat reseval sufflctent to I
I prevent the concrete free dehydrating.
9.2.2.2.9 Valves The valves in the CCW5 are standard commercial valves constructed of carbon steel with bronze er stainless steel trie. Stace the component cooling water is nornelly not radioactive, special features to prevent leakage to the atmosphere are not provided. Self-actuated spring-leaded relief valves are provided for lines and components that may be pressurized to above their design pressure by improper operation er malfunction.
In the event of in-leakage of reacter coolant into the CCWS from a rupture of a thereal barrier en one of the reacter coolant pumps, the design is to contain the in-leakage to the CCW5 within the containment structure. The autheard containment isolatten valve returning component cooling water from all reacter coolant pise therust barriers will close en a high flow signal indicating in-leakage from the higher pressure RC3. All piping and valves required to contain this in-leakage are designed for an RCS design pressure of 2445 psig. The four relief valves en the component coollas water returns from therust barriers I
are sized to relieve veluestric expansion and are set to relieve at RCS ensign pressure.
The relief valves on the component cooling water lines downstream of the sample, letdown, seal water, spent fuel pool, and Rm heat J-
,_.. are stred to relieve the volumetric ampension 9.2-7A May 1995 Revisten 10
w
{
,g " ATTACHMENT NO. 7 7
SHEET 7
op y l
tcP m-sozM i
~
Modify ote (2) toiend'as Eollows:
1 (2)
The limiting design basis accident results in a CFCU outlet temperature of 216 F. A peak outlet temperature of 226 F occurs for an assumed H bus failure case due to the decreased cooling water flow rate.
Insert below Note (2h The outlet temperatures shown above are for steady state system operation and are based
)
on different assumed cooling water flow rates, bus failures, initial CCW inlet temperature, CFCU fouling factor, etc. Different assumptions would result in different steady state outlet temperatures. Following a LOCA, and prior to the CCW pumps loading on the emergency diesels, the CCW inventory within the CFCUs can reach temperatures significantly higher than shown above. The entire CCW system, including the cooling j
coils of the containment fan coolers, is pressunzed by the static head of the CCW surge
{
tank which is pressurized with nitrogen. The minimum tank pressure is sufficient to assure i
that flashing of the cooling water in the fan cooler will not occur following an accident, based on static pressure alone. When the CCW pumps are in operation, the dynamic head j
is sufficient to prevent flashing without the added benefit of the pressurization system.
i
)
I' I
DCpp UNITS 1 & 2 FSAR UPDATE bet m 5'orp Flooding of the component cooling water heat exchangers is highly improbable because of their location on the turbine building ground level where there are large door openings to allow water to run out, several floor drains, sumps, and a large condenser *'s pelow the elevation l
of the heat exchangers. In addition, operation of the heat exche@rs would not be impaired h
by flooding.
S h8 Each component cooling water pump is located in a separate compartment in the auxiliary building. A raised curb is provided in the doorway to prevent water in the rest of the O
Z auxiliary but1 ding from entering the compartment of a vital component. Failure of one l
component cooling water pump by rupture would not affect the continued operation of the other Do pumps. Check valves are provided on each pump discharge to prevent back leakage into a compartment from an operating pimip.
g LLi Redundant piping loops supply cooling water to the containment fan coolers, the RNR heat exchangers, and each redundant set of ESF pumps, namely: component cooling water, safety injection, centrifugal charging, and RHR. The component cooling water pump motors are on separate vital 4.16 kV buses that have diesel generator standby power sources. Hence, a supply of component cooling water is always available to the ESF pumps and heat exchangers.
The direct use of seawater in the CCWS as an emergency backup is not required since the ASW$
(shown on Figure 3.2-17) provides redundant facilities for supplying seawater to the l
component cooling water heat exchangers. During long-tern postaccident recirculation operation, the CCWS aligns and operates as two separate redundant loops. Each loop has a pump and a heat exchanger and is capable of fulfilling the minimum long-term cooling requirements. This provides protection against a passive failure in one loop. Should one loop fail, the other loop is unaffected, and the ESF components that it serves remain operative.
9.2.2.3.2 Leakage Detection Leaks in components being cooled are detected by surge tank level instrumentation and alarms, as well as radiation monitors located in the two component cooling water pump discharge headers. Since the discharge of all three component cooling water pumps is into these two headers, the flow from any combination of pumps placed in operation is monitored continuously. During normal plant operations, the inservice component cooling water pump discharge header is determined by which of the two component cooling water heat exchangers is operating (see Figure g.2-16).
A single failure in the radiation monitoring system on the discherpe header in operation ala'us in the control room. The operator can take action to correct the problem or to put l
into operation the redundant heat exchangers ard Wader. The latter action places the
~
redundant radiation monitoring system into og. atios During operation with both heat exchangers in service, both radiation mor%
re a service continuously.
l 9.t-g September 1965 Revision 1
__'-'""'v----
SHEET 9
OF @
DCPP UNITS 1 & 2 F5AK UPDAT[
tcp m-So?$'i (6)
Rental makeup water system Makeup water transfer pumps (600 ppm) can supply water to Two 250 ppm pumps CCWS directly or via other storage tenets (consensate storspe, primary Primary water makeup pumps water storage and fire water tanks)
Four 150 ppo pumps Flowpaths 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are not completely Design Class I, but the number of methods sees
" provide considerable redundancy in backup provisions for makeup water to the CCWS.
9.2.2.3.4 Functional Analysis Equipment within the containment served by the CCW5 includes the reactor coolant pumps, the excess letdown heat exchanger, the containment fan cooler coils and fan cooler motor coolers, and the reactor vessel support coolers. The isolation valve arrangements for the CCVS containment penetrations are shown in Chapter 6.
The lines supplying component cooling water to and f rom the reactor coolant pumos and the reactor vessel support coolers, can be isolated remotely f rom the control room. The line f rom the excess letdown heat exchanger can also be isolated remotely from tne control room. The manual valves in the lines serving the f an cooler calls are accessible at all times following an accioent.
Except for normally closed makeup lines and equipment vent and drain lines, there is no di ect connection between the CCW5 and other systems. The equipment vent and drain lines, except for
- he surge tank went valve, have manual valves which are normally closed unless the equipment is beteg vented or drained for maintenance or repair operations.
9.2.2.3.5 Malfunction Analysis A malfunction analysis of pumps, heat exch6ngoes, and valves is presented in Table 9.2-7.
C.2.2.4 Tests and Insoactions l
The active components of the CCWS are in either continuous or intermittent use during normal plant operation, and no additional periodic tests are reoutred, periodic visual inspectier.s and preventive maintenance are conducted in accordance with normal plant operating practtee.
9.2.?.5 Instrumentation Aeolications The operation of the system is monitored with the following major or vital instrumentation:
l (1)
Temperature detectors at the inlet and at the outlet of each component cooling water l
1 j
heat exchanger, with control room temperature indication and alarm for heat exenapper l
outlet i
(2)
A control room flow indicator and alarm for each loop (3)
Low-pressure switches with alarms and auto pump start in each system supply hesoer i
9.2-13 l
November 1993 Revision 9 l
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t ATTACHMENT NO. [
t
(
SHEET ll OP y 7 '
m a. 3-7
~
Supply phf %~hp1Qy
- Pressure, Supply Flow, feuineant esin sefe Comments Nitrogen layup 400 lb of nitrogen gas system for steam required to purge 4 main generators stese lines and provide tattial charge of nitrogen en steam generators at 5 pois Nitrogen layup Same requirement as for for 12 feedwater steam generater except heatare of nitrogen cw sww.ht v=
m Pnw'& Jm da
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Skast % oFlf ATTACHMENT NO. ]
DCPP U811T51 & 2 F5AR UPDATE SHEET 1)
OF %
3.3.2.3.7 Detailed aesults of the Tornado ar.alvs,,
DCf [b5C W 3.3.2.3.2.1 aurtliary Buildine The major portion of the auxiliary building, except for doors and louvers, is capable of withstanding a 300 mph tornado. The rooms housing the ventilation supply f ans are capable of withstanding a 250 mph tornado. All Design Class 1 equipment within the building is benind concrete walls or within concrete enclosures.
Venting to limit ef fects of atmospheric pressure drop was not included in the design of the auxiliary building, nor assumed in the subseovent analysis of the structure. With the assumption of no venting and the selection of corresponding internal pressure coef ficients, the building is conservatively shown to be capable of sustaining at least a 3 psi pressure drop at a rate of 1 psi per second. These values are associated with a 300 mph tornado. If venting through openings and louvers were assumed, the capability would exceed 200 mph.
Lcuvers in the auxiliary building are associated with two heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems: (a) the main auxiliary building (see Section g.4.2), and (b) the control room (see Section g 4.1).
Three types of louvers are part of the control room HVAC (see Figure 9.4.1): (a) inlet louvers tied by ductwork to dampers and inlet filter banks. (b) exhaust louvers tied by ductwork.to dampers, and (c) inlet and outlet louvers associated with the aircooled condensers.
At a winc speed of about 100 mph, the louver yields in bending, or the louver attachment to the louver frame yields. A deformed louver assembly could be blown inward at a higher wind speed and could damage related components, such as filters and dampers,.or buckle attached ductwort. The recuncant supply f ans are not considered vulnerable to such damage because of their physical location in relation to the inlet and exhaust louvers, and because of the number of components (daspers, filters, etc.) in the ductwork between the louvers and the fans. Complete blockage of the ducts by the damaged louvers is highly unlikely. As a result, the control room HVAC is most likely to continue operation in Mode 1 following a tornado.
Without a simultaneous control room fire or accident, operation of other components is not reoutred to maintain adeguate temperature conditions for personnel or instrumentation in the control room during post-tornado shutdown. The redundant aircooled condensers are not considered vulnerable to damage f rom being hit by displaced louvers. A condenser could be camaged by a hypothetical missile penetrating through the louvers.
Os 3.3-g i
I L_____________
I
ATTACHMENT NO. 7 DCpP UNITS 1 & 2 FSAR ApDATC SHEET l3 OF 11 considerable protection in the postulated path of the tornses, parncusaray se instrumentation taps located below the operating lievid level of the tank. An esposed raceway carries the common vital conduit from the suree tank to the control room.
(if E WP/aA. pr=-se+b c.M9 Failures qf the raceway, or Tne liquid level instrumentation,9and of pipes and valves, are analyzed in Table 3.3-3.
This analysis demonstrates that the CCW5 would continue to operate satisfactorily even with postulated tornadic damage. The CCWS s, urge tank is readily accessible from the control room, so iamediate assessment of any damage following a tornado is possible.
l Release of radioactivity to the discharge structure can result only if the operating portion of the CCWS is radioactively contaminated and if an instrumentation line breaks below the norms) lieutd level in the surge tank at a point not close to the tank.
1 Release o- "
_. J:
ter to the discharge structure could result if a surge line were ruptured by a tornado missile outside of the ausiliary building.
3.3.2.3.2.3 Fuel Handline Area Analysis of the basic structure of the fuel handling area, with partial loss of siding, provides a conservative estimate of capability to withstand a wind velocity in excess of 250 mph. Under combined wind and missile load, the worst case analysis, based on elastic behavior, shows resistance to at least 150 mph. Because of the conservatism inherent in the assumptions for these calculations, the resistance to tornado-induced missiles is believed to be considerably higher.
Purlins, girts, siding, roofing, doors, and louvers are damaged at lower wind velocities.
They are not essential to the overall struct9ral integrity of the fuel handling area and do not produce missiles more severe than the hypothetical missiles.
3.3.2.3.2.4 Containment Structure
{
The containment structure, including eeuipment, personnel, and escape hatches, is capable of
-l withstandiv>g the cambined effect of a 300 mph wind velocity and a hypothetical missile.
I 3.3.2.3.2.5 plant vent-The containment exhaust vent (plant vent) is anchored securely to the containment and can withstand loads from a wind velocity of greater than 300 mph. The internal framing i
supporting the duct will yield at a wind velocity of about 125 mph, but the duct remains functional to higher wind velocities. The plant vent (Figure g.4 4) handles exhaust from the
. auxiliary building and fuel handling area ventilation fans, steam air ejector and gland steam
.* m gg a e w y.:., w u Lc t c ccu>s w & '*
f M T:
l 3.3-11
ATTACHMEN. 40. 3
$Q f oFW f1.
SHEET
]%
OF M DCPP UNITS 1 & 2 FSAR UPDATE tycp ty)-5C)?-M TABLE 3.3-3 Sheet 1 of 4 TORNADO FAILURE ANALYSIS - COMPONENT COOLING WATER SURGE TANK l
AND RELATED INSTRUMENTATION Component & Failure Consequences (1) Loss of vital (a) Loss of liquid level indication and conduit to annunciators in control room. Any control room makeup to CCWS still indicated by annunciator on supply valves (LCV-69 and LCV-70)
(b) Loss of automatic and manual actuation to, and position indication from, 4
hgventvalve(RCV-16). Valve fails closed and any overflow from CCWS discharges through relief valve to auxiliary building sump.
(2) Loss of air supply (a) Normally closed valve fails closed, to makeup valve Makeup to CCWS through redundant valve.
(LCV-60 or LCV-70)
(b) Manual makeup valves may be used.
I (3) Loss of air supply Makeup valve opens and annunciated in l
to level controller control room. High liquid level l
~
I
I ATTACHME NO.
((
7{
TABLE 3.3-3 Pdheet3of4M 4o289 swn w= a m m no-r KE ^.#$ #
&: : : H-7.; W. M A 4 4 L f s (6) Break.in relief (a) u_...-..
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_ % uih (7) Break in one (a) A maximum of 3,000 gallons of liqu Q *rrjJ o i redundant surge line discharged to the auxiliary building sump and floor, or to the discharge structure.
(b) Manually isolate that compartment of l
the surge tank.
(c) Operate with the redundant side of the surge tank and makeup water system.
(/> PereJJ les g dt.o~pma tyb A 3EU*> !
(8) Break in two (a) A maximum of 5,000 gallons of liquid redundant Surge Lines discharged to the auxiliary building sump and floor, or to the discharge structure.
l (b) System may be maintained in normal operating mode until surge lines have been repaired.
(c) Exkessmakeupwaterwillbe discharged. Manual adjustment wi)1 minimize rate of discharge.
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OCPP 131175 1 & 2 FSAR IPDATE bce m-so294 The normal operettenal deelen requirse that four out of the five fan emelere posin in sporetten, eMeh The total heat lead for the nuclear alleus for the estimated host ressval capactty given in Table 9.4-12.
steem ogply eyotes (ES$$) te given in Table p.4-11.
The fan coolers will reduos the meter spwd from 1200 to 600 rpm. drew the high density stem thrsgh q
The g
cooling solle, and provide 81 x 1g5 Stu/hr cooling capacity per cooler during accident sendittene.
safety evoluetten to described in Sectlen 6.t.2.
b Evalustlan of the ventilatten prortetene for the primary shield, neutron detectors and cables, and (IDNe indleates that the present designs are adequate to ensure plant safety during eerusi plant operating Lose of air emeling sharing noren1 plant operetten would he tedicated by temperature
$AM b condittene.
instruentatten provided for this purpose. In genere), the effecte of elevated temperate.m en tiu above 1
equipment take place gradually over a perted of hours, se that sufficient time umuld be available to takeo e
., prop,1.t. es,r.ctive actim. lacluding.n.r.ori,,i.nt si.t
- m. t..we,t m, tm 8.fet,,re.i..
l_U With respect to accident condittene, none of thle equipment to required to function durlap the poetaccident -a
,e. eve,,,e,1.d.
g.4.5.3.1 Evaluattan of Caeline Water Sunniv The neraal cooling unter requirements for all five fan coolers can he supplied by any two of the three l
l component cooling unter peque and in conjunction with one of the two auxillary saltuoter (ASW) peeps.
During normel plant sporetten, unter flew through the fan coolers to throttled for containment temperature control purpenes by a valve en the seamen discharge header from the esoling unite.
Fouling of the unterelde of the heat transfer ares to einletred with the use of buffered condensate in the b
If a r.omplete severanse of a fan cooler water tube to postulated, double-ended component cooling syst s.
atr:c'""
_ M'f:'t O^' #
flow must he seemed. L ' = x
..t r
^^.." "Me flow can be ahted by the trough under the fan
__--..rrr_.
coolers and to piped to the contalmeent susp. Instroentatten is provided in the drain Ilne from each fan I
cooler unit to indicate abneraally large flee.
i The fan coolers are supplied by indtytehaal lines free the CCW headers. Each emit inist and discharge Itne to provided with a manual shutoff valve and drain valve. This permits loslatten of each cooler for testing l
purposes.
The evaluetten of cooling water supply following accident sendittens le discussed in sectlen 6.2.2.
9.4-35 ilovember 1998 Revtelen 9 1
PCf M-502.c4 I
ATTACHMENT NO.
DCPP UIIITS 1 & 2 FSAR UPDA"E SHEET {h OF 2.2 TABLE 3.3-3 Sheet 4 of 4
..,..i
~
(8) Break in twi ~ redundant _
(d) - As an alternative, the surge lines may
. ' surge. lines (Cont 4). ~
be isolated and the system cross-tied to operate using the surge tank of other un'it.
r*- SA. I b U*)
- - ~. -
(,e.). f.QJ W Q t4s yt (g) Loss of all level ~.'(a) ILakeup valves fail closed.
v instrumentation
~
(h) Loss of liquid level indication and annunciators in the control room.
(c) Instrument tap breaks close to tank l
1eak to auxiliary building sump; other breaks leak to roof drains.
(d) Some inventory probably remains in surge tank. System continues to operate satisfactorily with no makeup
'~
require'd.
(e) Backup indication of adequate liquid l
1evel from pressure measurement at CCW pump discharge with low pressure annunciator in. control room.
(f) Alternate makeup through manual bypass L
valves around makeup valves.
(.$) kMd lag g Ns CWWp ** ~
su L um)
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DC P M-5 0 28 9 DCPP UNITS 1 & 2 FSAR UPDATE SHEET I 9 OF b 2 TABLE 3.3-3 sneet z or g 1
-(3) Loss of air Supply annunciated. Operator has about 20 i
to level controller minutes until tank is completely j
(Cont'd) full to isolate makeup valve and surge line manually, and operate on redundant j
components. An C verflow is l
through.
genttoaN11ary building roof drains; if vent closed, through relief to the auxiliary building sump.
(4) Loss of level (a) Makeup valve fails closed. Makeup to instrumentation CCWS through redundant valve, which (one set) annunciated in the control room.
(b) Loss of liquid level indication and annunciator on one compartment of CCWS surge tank.
(c) Any leakage from instrument taps close to tank flows to the auxiliary building sump; other breaks leak to roof drains.
(d) Operate on redundant system. Manually isolate compartment with damaged instrumentation, if possible.
1 (5) Break in vent (a) None under normal conditions (vent open) line or valve (b) None, if vent previously closed due to radiation alarm, because operating liquid level is well below vent.
u_________________
K-pcJ M-502.e4 ATTACHMENT NO. 7 05, DCPP UNITS 1 & 2 FSAR UpMTE SHEET '2.O op f,,2,,
Multiple missiles would be required to render inoperative inere seen www i t
condensers serving the control room HVAC systems of the two units. Even if all inlet ducts were blocked by damage or by less of air to the pneuestic deepers and if all aircooled condensers were rendered inoperative, operators would take appropriate action based on plant condition.
3.3.2.3.2.2 tonnenent Cooline Water Svstas iurae Tank The surge tank of the CCWS (Section g.2.2) is supported horizontally at the L-line on the roof of the auxiliary building (see Figures 1.2-21 and 1.2 25). A baffle at the tank's mid-length extends about 40K up the tank volume to divide it tato two compartannts. Each compartment has its own liquid level instrumentation (see Figure 3.2-14) and a 4-inch surge line to one of the two independent trains of.the CCW5. Each surge line is fed by a makeup line with an air-operated level control valve. This connection is made inside the auxiliary building. The redundant high-level alarms actuate just above the top of the tank divider.
htSSuvi ed.
M CJm64pk. hag (. W W h ]
t Theftank.admangenE K vent discharges through a % onto the roof of the auxiliary building. The roof is surrounded by a parapet and sloped toward a series of 4-inch roof drains. These drains feed into common 6-inch drain lines to the stora sewer and thence to the discharge structure.
In case of radioactivity in the CCWS, the vent valve closes. Any overflow from the CCWS l'
discharges through a relief valve at the top of the tank into a drain line to the auxiliary
!I building sump. The foundation under the surge tank is sloped toward two 4-inch drains j
feeding a common 4-inch drain line also to the auxiliary building sump. The tank has an aluminum skirt free its horizontal diameter to the foundation to prevent rain water from flowing into the au::111ary building sump.
I As shown in Table 3.3-2, the tank is capable of withstanding a 250 mph wind velocity, or a l
200 mph wind plus associated hypothetical missiles. The weakest element of the tank l
structure is the anchorage, which fails in bearing on concrete, resulting in only minor displacement of the tank. It is highly unlikely that such displacement would result in either rupture of the relief valve header or surge lines.
l The surge lines run from beneath the surge tank, along the auxiliary building roof, and down l
the outside wall to elevation 140 feet 4 inches, where the'y enter the auxiliary building.
These lines are exposed to hypothetical tornado missiles after they exit from beneath the surge tank untti they enter the auxiliary building. Thereliefvalveheader,the[-
. ?.. ]
vent aud valve, and the two sets of liquid level instrumentation are on the west side of the surge tank and are susceptible to damage by hypothetical missiles he tank does provide V
d5de thikhe'^"
^ 8bdM42 -[6/ %
f f
d.~yv.4krc% ar As. Amt Aue=4hW.4.
h W," " W 5eptesber 1930 Revision 6
/
f (ACHMENT NO.
SHEET
@I OF 3l)
DCPP UNITS 1 & 2 FSAR UPDATE tcp rn 307D'4 (4)
Radiation monitor and alarm in the two pump discharge headers (5)
Control room level inoicator and alarm for each half of the component cooling water surge tank (6)
Flow indication, temperature indication, or pressure indication on the equipment Q aturn lines.
^
[7)
S w ap., M M M h h NM j ik h C
De lowrotes for normal, loss of coolant, and cooldown conditions are listed in Table
- AM hM NN 9.2.3 Makeue Water $vstem gg%
The MWS, shown on Figure 9.2-18, supplies primary makeup water of the quality and quantity necessary for normal reactor coolant services, secondary system makeup, and miscellaneous plant vsss. The system has the capacity necessary to meet the water requirements of a cold plant shutdown and subsequent startup from cold conditions at a time late in core life. The MWs provid+s makeup to the component cooling water surge tank. The MWS also supplies water to the condensate storage tank which provides a supply of water for the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS). The following sections provide information on: (a) desten bases (b) syst'am description, (c) safety evaluation (d) tests and inspections, and (e) instrumentation applications.
9 7.3.1 Desion Bases The MVS has three sources of raw water supply, well water, Diablo Creek, and seawater. The creek water and the well water are filtered and then discharged to the reservoir by a rental retreatment system. The seawater is treated in the rental seawater reverse osmosis ($WRD) systems and then pumped to the reservoir.
The reservoir water is treated in the rental makeup water system which conststs of filters, a reverse osmosis system, a vacuum deserater, and mixed bed ion exchangers.
The seawater evaporators are not in service at this time.
The water cuality produced by the rental MWS meets the specification of various plant operating se'rvices which f all unoer the following categories:
(1)
Makeup water for the primary system (2)
Makeup water for the secondary system (3)
Makeup water for the CCVS and servtce cooling water system (4)
Water in adequate cuantity for fire fighting 1
(5)
Vater supply to the AFWS l
9.2-14 November 1993 Revision S 1
1 i
L
DCPP UNITS 1 4 2 FSAR UpDAu, p c,P m-50224 ATTACHMENT NO.
T The component cooling water may become contaminated with ret fonctive water from av of the SHEET
- 2. 1 op 21 fc11owing sourses:
(1) Leakage in av heat exchanger tube or tubesheet in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS), the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) sampling system, the residual heat removal system (RNRS), the spent fuel pool cooling system, the Ifgvid redweste system (LRS), or the gaseous redweste system (GRS).
4 (2) Leakage in a cooling coil for the thermal barrier cooler on a reacter coolant pump
.,m, l
n I
(3) Leakage in a containment fan cooler coil following an accident.,
1 Table 3.2-6 shows components in the CCWS with a single barrier between component cooling water and reactor coolant water.
l As can be seen from,the table, the pressure and temperstare design requirements of the barriers in the RHR heat exchangers, the letdown heat exchanger, and the seal water heat exchanger are less than the RCS pressure and temperature during full power operation. For the letdown heat exchanger and the seal water heat exchanger, this condition results because tha pressure and temperature of the twactor coolant water are reduced to the values shown in the table before the fler reaches the components.
In the case of the RMt heat exchangers and RHR pumps (seal coolers), the RCS pressure and temperature are reduced to approximately 400 psig and 350*F before the RMtS is brought into service to complete the cooldown of the reactor. The RHRS is protected from overpressurization as discussed in Section 5.5.7.
The controls and interlocks provided for
{
the isolation valves between the RCS and the RHR$ are described in Section 7.6.1.
The design temperature of the centrifugal charging pep seal cooler is leis than the RCS temperature during full power operation because the temperature of the reactor coolant water is reduced to less than the barrier design temperature before the flow reaches the pump.
Tube failure in components with design pressures and temperatures less than RCS design condition may initiate a leek into the CCWS. The radioactivity associated with the reactor coolant would actua adiationmongr. Tip,mapi,togjngg1ggQ
,j
' ; vent va Q y,.
ynd ansiORelate
,n tiii control room. Ine operator would then take the appropriate action to isolate the failed component. In addition to the radiation monitoring system, the operator would also recelg "7 h=1 in from the surge tank as 1.11111od. If the in-leakage continued after the vent valve closed, the p
^^2^. M [ J...-.': ? The relief valve on the surge tag::. m r........t3 entrt: :7: : r '- W !! $ f.
.... A n c ' :t M Relief valve discharge from the i
CCWS surge tank is routed to the auxiliary building sep. The maximum postulated in-leakage 3 Q X.
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p.2-10 September 1985 Revision 1
Attachm::nt C PG&E Letter DCL-98-096 SELECTED DCP SUPPORTING MECHANICAL AND NUCLEAR CALCULATIONS 1
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This attachment contains the pertinent mechanical and nuclear calculations used to I
support the design change package (DCP) for installation the component cooling water (CCW) surge tank pressurization system. Other calculations were also used to support the DCP (e.g., seismic calculations), but did not have a mejor impact on the design process for installing this system. The calculations included in this attachment are:
Calculation Type or Purpose J-105 CCW surge tank pressure control system tolerances M-175 Check net positive suction head for CCW pumps for temperatures of 100 F to 250 F and flows from 5,000 gpm to 20,000 gpm M-320 Maximum pressure differential across air and motor operated valves in the CCW system M-353 Maximum conditions in the CCW system due to relief valve lifting M-998 Determine the required overpressure in the CCW surge tank to hq ensure that flashing does not occur in the containment fan cooling units following a loss of coolant accident 4
M-999 CCW surge tank pressurization nitrogen system components (nitrogen bottles, pressure regulators, relief valve) capacities NSP-1-14-850A CCW surge tank low pressure setpoint uncertainty l
NSP-1-14-850B CCW surge tank high pressure setpoint uncertainty O
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