ML20209B277

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Comments on Facility Reverification Program for safety-related Valves as Proposed by Rl Cloud Associates. Review of Two Valves Out of 500 Inadequate
ML20209B277
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 02/12/1982
From: Bagchi G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Vollmer R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML16340C148 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-86-151 NUDOCS 8203030571
Download: ML20209B277 (2)


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fLBIP192 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard H. Vollmer Director Division of Engineering FROM:

Goutam Bagchi, Section Leader Equipment Qualification Branch Division of Engineering

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON REVERIFICATION PROGRAM I reviewed the reverification program as proposed by R. L. Cloud Associates (RLCA) in their Preliminary Report dated November 12, 1981, and also participated in the public meeting with Pacific Gas ~ and Electric Company on February 3,1982 to discuss the subject program.

My comments that follow are related to seismic qualification of safety related equipment.

Review of only two valves out of approximately 500 safety-related valves at the plant is inadequate.

Valve qualification is generally based on design assumptions about the flow direction, seismic supports, power supply and other accessories.

These assumptions need to be verified with equipment as installed. Many interfaces develop that can cause quality lapses.

Qualification of valves with their operators as assemblies should be looked at.

An oversized operator because of its interaction can damage the valve seat by exerting excessive pressure.

A mismatch between the operator and the valve could occur through various steps in the qualification process.

RLCA did not identify which two valves they would examine, they also did not provide any rationale for their choice.

My recommendation would be that they look at the' pressurizer spray valve, valves in the residual heat removal and aux-iliary feedwater systems, main stream line isolation valves, and selected power cperated relief valves in the primary and secondary systems.

Independent of the 2 valves and 4 pumps, RLCA will also perform analysis of selected piping review.

I suggest that they look at the results of their analysis at the locations where pumps and valves are nodeled, and verify by examining appropriate qualification documents that the input loads predicted by their analysis do not exceed those used for their qual i fica tion.

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Richard H. Vollmer RLCA proposes to perform independent verification by conducting ar,alyses.

It is highly desirable that they use " qualified" people knowledgeable about qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment to verify that equipment as installed correspond to the assumptions used in.their quali-fication and that " proper" Hosgri input was used. The term proper is used to mean the input the RLCA has convinced themselves to be correct.

When the equipment is qualified by a vendor, RLCA should verify that proper input was used in its qualification and that the vendor qualification document as provided to the Pacific Gas and Electric corroborates the input. There should be follow-up inspection by NRC.

Gout b Bagchi, Section Leader Equipment Qualification Branch Division of Engineering cc:

W. Johnston Z. Rosztoczy l

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