IR 05000498/1989033

Insp Repts 50-498/89-33 & 50-499/89-33 on 890821-25. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Steam Generator Primary Manway Bolting Removal Problems & Inservice Insp Activities

ML20248C624
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	09/22/1989
From:	Barnes I, Mcneill W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20248C614	List: IR 05000498/1989033 ML20248C610
References
50-498-89-33, 50-499-89-33, NUDOCS 8910030527
Download: ML20248C624 (10)

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APPENDIX l

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O.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/89-33 Operating Licenses: NPF-76 50-499/89-33 NPF-80 Dockets: 50-498 l 50-499 Licens'ee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project (STP)', Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: STP, Matagorda, Texas Inspection Conducted: August 21-25, 1989 Inspector: 8% 9 2 tm feW.M.McNeill,ReactorInspector, Materials Date and Quality Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety

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Approved: ITw 1. Barnes, Chief, Materials and Quality 9 - 2 2.- n Date l

l Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety i

I Inspection Summary i i

Inspection Conducted August 21-25, 1989 (Report 50-498/89-33) I i

Areas Inspected: Routine and reactive, unannounced inspection of inservice I inspection (151) activities and followup on steam generator primary manway bolting removal problem )

Results: Review of infonnation pertaining to problems encountered in )

removal of steam generator primary manway bolting identified that occurrences  !

of seized bolts in primary and secondary closure systems have been experienced i at a number of plants. This subject has been under active study by the nuclear j steam system supplier (NSSS) and has resulted in augmented guidance to l utilities. The results of this inspection indicated that HL&P did not fully i implement current NSSS recommendations with respect to initial detensioning l

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practices, which may potentially have increased the scope of the' galling problems that were encountered. A possible increased incidence of galling with .

a particular heat of, bolts could not be definitely confirmed from the information available to the inspecto Review of ISI activities found a well organized and written'ISI plan, .

appropriate administrative controls' for repair and replacement activities, and satisfactory performance and documentation of ISI examinations. :A noncited violation was identified regarding-the failure to.obtain a quality review'of <

ISI contractor special process procedure . Inspection Conducted August'21-25, 1989 (Report'50-499/89-33) -

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No inspection of Unit 2 conducte Results: Not applicable,

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i DETAILS ' Persons Contacted i HL&P j

• A. Ayala, Licensing Supervisor

• L. Baker, Project Mechanical Design Engineering Supervisor

• W. Bergendahl, Health Physics (HP) Division Manager

• L. Beverly, Supervising Engineer 1

• J. P. Blenn, HP Operations General Supervisor 1

• N. Brown, Support Construction Department Manager !

• E. Cawthorn, Technical Services, Mechanical Supervisor !

• W. Dannbardt, Mechanical Activities Outage Lead

• M. Dew, Nuclear Purchasing and Materials Management Manager i

• J. E. Geiger, Nuclear Assurance General Manager i

• J. D. Green, Inspection and Surveillance Department Manage *R. R. Hernandez, Principle Engineer i

• T. J. Jordan, Plant Engineering Manager i

• W. J. Jump, Maintenance Department Manager l

• A. K. Khoala, Licensing Engineer l

• D. A. Leazar, Reactor Support Division Manager

• J. W. Loeach, Plant Operations Department Manager

• J. M. MacKay, Staff Engineer ,

• J. T. Minor, Construction Engineering Division Manager l

• R. C. Munter, Principle Engineer  ;

• J. Neeley, Chemical Operations & Analysis Division Manager l

• W. C. Parish, HP Technical Support, General Supervisor !

• G. L. Parkey, Integrated Planning & Scheduling Department Manager

• S. D. Phillips, Licensing Engineer

• G. E. Schinzel, Balance of Plant Engineering Supervisor

• P. Sieben, Mechanical Maintenance Division Manager ;

• K. W. Silverthorne, Construction. Welding Engineer -

• V. A. Simonis. Operations Support Division Manager

• C. M. Sist, Quality Control Inspector i

• R. Stewart, Inservice Inspection (ISI) Engineer ;

• S. Timmaraju, Senior Consulting Engineer

• G. E. Vaughn, Nuclear Operations Vice President

• P. L. Walker, Senior Licensing Engineer

• M. R. Wisenburg, Nuclear Safety Review Board General. Manager

• C. R. Younger, Staff Engineer ,

Central Power & Light

• S. M. Shropshire, Site Representative i

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Southwest Research Institute (SWRI)

M. R. Ehnstroo, Quality Assurance Representative R. A. Fougeresse, project Engineer C. R. Littlefield, Level II C. R. McKee, Level I C. A. Minor, Level II'

V. Morton,1 Team Supervisor R. A. Riddles Level II C. D. Schler, Level 11 State of Texas Department of Labor & Standards R. L. Bryan, Inspection Specialist Kemper Group B. R. Russell, Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector NRC

• J. E. Bess, Senior Resident Inspector, Unit 1

• R. J. Evans, Resident Inspector, Unit 1

• J. I. Tapia, Senior Resident Inipector, Unit 2

• D. L. Garrison, Resident Inspector Unit 2

• Denotes those perseas that attended the exit l interview on August 25,'198 The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the inspectio . Followup on Steam Generator Primary Manway Bolting Removal Troblems (92701)

A review was detensioning made and during removal this inspection of. steam generator of p(roblems encountered inSG) primary A significant incidence of bolt gelling occurred.during detensioning activities which resulted in maintenance mechanics being unable to remove l 40 out of a total of 128 primary manway bolts present in the 4 SGs. In'

order to remove the manway covers the licensee had to drill out and to remove the heads'from the seized bolts. It was anticipated that repair of manway bolt holes using helicoils would be needed after drilling out and removal of the remnant bolt shank .1 Bolt Installation Criteria The inspector reviewed primary manway bolting installation records from1 the startup phase for each SG in order to determine the installation '

criteria used for _ final manway closure ~ and to ascertain whether . gallin problems had been encountered prior to commencement of power operation *

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This review did not indicate any installation or removal problems of note had occurred. It was additionally observed that the torque criteria and thread lubricant specified by Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSID-TB-87-01, j

" Steam Generator and Pressurizer Closure Recommendations," dated January 20, !

1987, had been used to accomplish this activity. This bulletin identified that occurrences of seized bolts in primary and secondary system closures have been experienced at a number of site It was additionally ascertained that Westinghouse transmitted to HL&P on l September 30, 1988 Revision 1 to Westinghouse Technical Bulletin l NSID-TB-87-01. This revision, which was received after commencement of j Unit 1 commercial power operations, significantly augmented the previous '

guidance for installation and removal of boltin Included in this revision were a change in recommended thread lubricant, more explicit inspection acceptance criteria for bolt holes, more detailed torque instructions, and a recommendation that utilities consider replacement of bolted closures with a system utilizing stud 3 and nuts and spherical washers. It was additionally noted that the guidance for closure removal l contained a specific recommendation that slugging wrenches or impact wrenches be used to initially loosen fasteners. Tooling, such as hydraulic ]

wrenches, was not recommended for use in the initial loosening, based on a concept that such tooling can apply a bending moment to fasteners. Review of Maintenance Procedure OPMPO4-RC-0004, " Steam Generator Primary Manway Cover Removal and Reinstallation," Revision 4, effective date May 16, 1989, did not indicate that HL&P had adopted this particular recommendation for initial detensioning. The inspector also reviewed a maintenance log that was maintained for this work activit It was ascertained from this review that maintenance mechanics had utilized, at least in part, hydraulic wrenches for initial loosening operations. It would thus appear that initial detensioning practices may potentially have contributed.to the scope of observed galling problem ,

i 2.2 Correlation of Fastener Identity With Incidence of Seizure j A review was made of closure inspection ~ records to establish the identity )

of fasteners used in each SG primary manway. The results of this review i were then compared against incidence of seizure to establish whether specific heats of fasteners showed a higher incidence of galling than others. This review was performed in an attempt to determine whether there was any evidence to indicate that bolt thread variations could have been a contributory factor to the observed incidence of gallin ,

2. Vendor Certification

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The applicable vendor certified material test reports (CMTRs) were obtained for all but one of the fasteners that had been used in the SG primary manway closure Review of the CMTRs showed that two vendors had supplied the installed bolts. The bolts from one vendor !

originated from a single heat of materials, with the bolts from the i other vendor originating from two heats of material. The CMTRs showed that both vendors had manufactured bolts in accordance with i

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-6-the same Westinghouse material specification; i.e., 2655A05

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Revision 5. The data contained in the CMTRs was consistent with the requirements of the ASME material specification and-ASME Section III, ,

Subsection N . SGs 1A and 3D  !

With the exception of one bolt in SG'1D which was not reviewed, the installed bolts in the SG 1A and SG'1D heat of material (STP Identity TO 6339) primary

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manways This heat was from came the from'one i vendor for which two heats of material were applicable. For SG 1A, a l total.of 7 (hot leg side) and 13 (cold leg side) bolts seized during

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detensioning and removal activities. For SG 10, a total of 2-(hot leg side) and 5 (cold leg side) bolts seized during detensioning and removal activitie . SG IC The second heat of bolts (STP Identity TO'6076) from the vendor l identified in 2.2.2 above was utilized for the hot leg primary manway, with one bolt seizing during detensioning and removal activities. The cold leg primary manway utilized a combination of TO 6339 and TO 6076 bolts, with a total of ten bolts seizing during detensioning and removal activities. The available inspection records did not, however, allow determination of the incidence of seizure for each of the two heat ]

2. SG 1B The installed bolts in the primary manways all came from the second vendor who had supplied a single heat of material (STP Identity .

TO 8713). One bolt seized in both the hot leg' side.and the cold leg side during detensioning and removal activitie . Summary I

The above data suggests a possible increased incidence of galling 2 occurred with TO 6339 bolts. The absence of specific infonnation on ~l the identity of the seized bolts in the cold leg. primary manway of i SG IC, coupled with uncertainties regarding whether detensioning '

practices were completely uniform for each SG, precluded the  ;

inspector from making.a definite judgment in this regar )

No violations or deviations were identified within this area of the inspectio ;

l Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program and Procedures Re' view (73051 and 73062) '

The objectives of this inspection were_to ascertain whether (a) the ISI program .;

was in conformance with regulatory. requirements and licensee commitments, i and (b) procedures adequately covered requirements of the ISI progra ;

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-7-3.1 Review of ISI Program 3. Program Approval and Organization The inspector reviewed the program contents of the "First 10-Year Interval Long-Term Inservice Examination Plan for the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Unit 1," issue dated February 1988, for conformance to Technical Specifications (TS) and ASME Section XI Code requirements. The inspector additionally verified that the ISI plan had been reviewed by the Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) and filed with NRR (for approval)

and the state of Texas. A comparison was made of this plan with the following plans which were applicable to the 1989 outage:

Inservice Inspection Plan for the First Inspection Interval of the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station - Unit 1, issue dated February 1988 Combustion Engineering (CE) 1989 Outage Plan for the Inservice Inspection of Steam Generator Tubing at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Unit 1 The inspector determined from these review activities that the ISI program was well organized and written, clearly described the planned inspection scope and supporting bases, and overall appeared consistent with ASME Section_XI Code and TS requirements. During the review, the inspector noted that the CE SG tubing examination plan referenced the use of ASME Code Cases N-402, " Eddy Current Calibration Standard Material Section XI, Division 1," and N-424

" Qualification of Visual Examination Personnel Section XI, Division 1." These Code Cases were not referenced in the HL&P ISI plan as being utilized. The inspector verified that the two Code Cases were endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.147 and had been incorporated in a pending revision to the HL&P ISI plan. Only two relief requests were included in the ISI plan. The inspector determined that the relief requests appeared appropriate and ascertained that hRR had previously approved the requests as part of the preservice inspection pla . Quality Assurance (OA)

The inspector verified that Nuclear Assurance had audited and approved the QA programs of the two organizations providing ISI contractor services in the 1989 outage; i.e., CE and Southwest Research Institute. From review of Interdepartmental Procedure (IP) IP-3.04Q, Revision 1, effective date September 30, 1988, "Preservice and Inservice Inspection Program." the inspector detennined that contractors were required to give written notification of potentially nonconforming conditions to HL&P. The inspector was informed that nonconformances were identified by HL&P

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-8-personnel in accordance with existing program requirements, but did not note any specific requirements in IP-3.04Q relative to evaluation and documentation of contractor identified potential nonconformance The inspectcr believes that the ISI program controls would be improved if this subject was more explicitly addressed in procedural guidanc . Repair and Replacement Program The inspector reviewed the administrative ccntrols' contained in the following procedures for conformance to ASME Section XI Code repair and replacement requirements:

IP-3.07Q, Revision 4, ASME Section XI Repair / Replacement Program

Station Procedure OPGP03-ZE-0025, Revision 4, ASME Section XI Repair and Replacement Procedure

Standard Work Procedure SWP-CC-02Q, Revision 0, ASME-Code Section XI Repairs / Replacements

Operations Quality Assurance Plan, Section 17.0, Revision 3 ASME Section XI - Repairs and Replacements The inspector determined from this review that appropriate administrative controls had been established for accomplishment of repair / replacement activities in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Section XI Cod No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspectio .2 Review of ISI Procedures The inspector reviewed the following sample of Southwest Research Institute procedures to ascertain their conformance to ASME Code Sections V and XI requirements: 1

SwRI-NDT-200-1/71, Solvent-Removable Liquid Penetrant Color Contrast Examination for the South Texas Project

SwRI-NDT-300-1/36, Dry Powder Magnetic Particle Examination '

SwRI-KDT-600-41/19 Dev. 2. Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic :

Pressure Piping Welds

• SwRI-NDT-600-15/73, Manual Ultrasonic Examination of. Pressure Vessel Welds i No discrepancies were noted during this review activity. The inspector verified that the ANII and Support Engineering staff had reviewed and

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. approved the ISI procedure It was ascertained, however, after the exit -

interview that QA had not performed a review of contractor ISI special process procedures. Section 17.2.9.3 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) commits, as part of the HL&P Criterion IX of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 special process controls, to a quality review of contractor special process procedures by QA personnel. Nuclear Assurance identified this matter on Deficiency Report 89074 and instituted a review of the circumstances pertaining to this problem. NRC staff were informed subsequent to the inspection that a QA review will be performed of contractor ISI special process procedures, and that Nuclear Assurance review had identified that the problem had occurred as a result of the deletion during revision of IP-3.04Q of a-requirement for QA review / approval. The licensee's failure to follow the requirements of the approved Quality Assurance Plan is a violation of Criterion XI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix Since this the licensee promptly initiated corrective action, a Notice of Violation is not being issued because the criteria.of Section V.A. of the NRC's Enforcement Policy have been me . ISI-Work Activities and Data Review (73753 and 73755)

The objectives of this' inspection were to ascertain whether performance and documentation of ISI examinations were in accordance with regulatory end ASME Code requirements. In this regard, the NRC inspector review TS, the Inservice Inspection Plan for the First Inspection Interval of the STP Electric Generating Station, Revision 0, February 1988, and the Examination Plan of the 1989 Inservice Examination of the STP Electric Generating Station, Unit The inspector witnessed the performance of the following examinations:

Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Pressurizer Nozzles N3 and !;4A Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) of Reactor Coolant Pipe Welds 8, 9, and 14 On Line 6-RC-1015

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) of the No.1 Pressurizer Skirt Weld

Visual Inspection (VT-4) of No. 11 Diesel Generator Starting Air Tank Support Skirt and Essential Service Water Supports EW-1101-HL5001 and-HL5002 I It was noted by the inspector that examination personnel appropriately complied with the examination, calibration, and documentation requirements of the approved procedures. Use of the correct UT calibration blocks was

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verified by the inspector. The inspector also checked personnel l certifications to verify that they were appropriately qualified for the l examinations performed. The equipment and materials used (MT yokes, MT powders, PT penetrant, PT developer, PT cleaner, UT search units. UT I

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-10-scopes and UT gels) were found to be appropriately certified and;the instruments calibrated.as required.-

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In the VT-4 examination of the essential service water supports, license personnel correctly identified that the corrosion present on embedment-plate.to support welds required removal for the inspection to b performed. HL&P not only cleaned these welds for inspection purposes (WA 81508, Unit 1 and_81516. Unit.2) but also' issued work requests:

(WA.81517. Unit 1 and'81518, Unit"2) to inspect, clean,:and recoat all -

similar welds in other trains in both unit The ISI examination reports that had been generated during;the outage;as of this inspection were reviewed; i.e., approximately:70 weld examination and 18 component. support examination reports. .Two reportable indications ,

were identified-in the reports, both of.which had been identified _ .

previously during preservice examination. ,In review of the UT reports, it was noted that the batch number of the UT- gel was not recorded. Although -

there is no requirement to record such information. it would seem prudent for traceability purposes to do so. If subsequent information questioned -

the UT suitability of the material, then where it was used'could be clearly establishe No' violations or deviations were identifie'd within'this area of inspectio i 5. Exit Meeting

l An exit meeting was held on August 25, 1989, with those individuals-denoted in paragraph 1 of this. report. At this meeting,'the scope of the inspection and the findings were sumarized. The resident inspectors also 1 attended. -The. licensee did not identify as proprieta'y r any of the .j information provided to or reviewed by the inspector '

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