ML20203L661

Forwards Ofc of Investigations & NRR Repts on Leak Rate Falsification W/Relevant Portions Deleted,Per Court Order. Related Correspondence

ML20203L661
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/27/1986
From:	Wagner M NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	Bright G, Kelley J, Kline J Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#386-522 LRP, NUDOCS 8608290041
Download: ML20203L661 (33)

Text

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.f  %,, UNITED STATES e'a 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 0 ([PC

• • • * -' August 27, 1985 86 AIXi 28 P3:56 .

James L. Kelley, Chairman Jerry R. Kline GFFICE 07 H . n t iM Y Presiding Board 00CKET mG E? VILf.

Presiding Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryYommission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Glenn O. Bright Presiding Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 In the Matter of INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 LEAK RATE DATA FALSIFICATION Docket No. LRP

Dear Judges:

The Staff has reviewed relevant portions of the OI and NRR Reports on leak rate falsification to identify any information which the NRC has been directed by court order not to disclose. . All such information has now been deleted , and I am enclosing three copies of the expurgated pages of the reports, as follows:

NRR Report, Enclosure 2, page 3 NRR Report, Enclosure 4 (in its entirety)

OI Report, page 21 OI Report, Exhibit 13, pages99-103.

Staff counsel has made every effort to retrieve all copies of the unexpurga-ted versions of the above pages; to the best of staff counsel's knowledge, all such pages have been retrieved, and they will be destroyed.

In order to avoid any possible misinterpretation of the court order, I asked counsel for the Numerous Employees to review the expurgated pages, and he advised me that the deletions appeared appropriate.

Sincerely, Marygl. Wagne Counsel for NRC Staff

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/encls:

Service List Edwin H. Stier, Esq.

Winthrop A. Rockwell, Esq.

kh82 041 860827 G OCK 05000320

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JOSEPH R. CONGDON

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Current Position: Shift Foreman (SRO). TMI-2. ____

Preaccident Position at TMI-2: Control Room Operator (RO) on Shift "C."

Other Individuals on Same Shift at TMI-2: .

Shift Supervisor: Brian Mehler Shift Foreman: Chuck Adams Control Room Operators: Marty Cooper Mark Phillippe (in training)

Past Involvement in Leak Rate Testing Irregularities:

During the period under investigation, Mr. Congdon was involved in actions -

that violated approved plant procedures and were contrary to the TMI-2 Technical Specifications. These actions included: failure to ensure that'^

- leak rate surveillance tests were conducted in accordance with the approved

.-. plant procedures; failure to properly review the results of leak rate

~7 surveillance tests; failure to properly record all leak rate tests in the i Control Room Log; failure to take the required followup action when the limiting conditions for operation, specified in the Technical Specifications.

were exceeded; and failure to retain test results that exceeded the limits of the Technical Specifications.

Mr. Congdon did not consider hydrogen additions to the makeup tank during l

leak rate tests tc be a violation of the procedure. He admitted adding hydrogen to the makeup tank during leak rate tests with the iatent af

- influencing test results.

Current Performance:

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Enclosure 4 )

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! c NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1

$ f WASHINGTON, D. C. ::0S$$

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May 30,1985 MEMORANDUhFOR: Harold R. Denton, Director -

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: William T. Russell, Acting Director

. Division of Human Factors Safety, NRR

SUBJECT:

RESULTS OF JOINT OI/NRR INVESTIGATION AND EVALUATION OF JOSEPH R. CONGDON

Reference:

1. Memorandum from 5. J. Chilk (SECY) to B. B. Hayes (OI) and W. J. Dircks (EDO) dated April 2, 1984,

Subject:

Staff Requirements-Discussion of Pending Investigation-TMI

2. Memorandum from H. R. Denton (NRR) to B. B. Hayes (01) dated May 3, 1984, Subject NRR Review of 01 Investi-gation Materials Concerning Hartman Allegations of Falsification of Leak Rate. Data at THI, Unit 2

3. Memorandum from W. T. Russell (DHFS) to H. R. Denton (NRR) dated January 24, 1985,

Subject:

Follow-up Action on Additional TMI-2 Operators The purpose of this memorandum is to document the results of the joint 01/NRR investigation and evaluation of Mr. Joseph R. Congdon, currently a Licensed Senior Reacter Operator (SRO) at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 assigned as Shift i

Foreman, and to provide a recomendation regarding whether his current SRO l

license should be revoked, modified, or suspended under 10 CFR 55.40 or other enforcement action taken under 10 CFR Part 55.50, due to his involvement in preaccident leak rate testing irregularities at TMI-2.

Backcround As a result of a Comission meeting on March 23, 1984, NRR was directed by Reference 1 to review OI investigative materials concerning falsification of reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate tests at THI-2 and refer back to 01 i

l NOTE: This memorandum and Enclosure 1 discusses information which is the subject of an ongoing 01 investigatier.. This memorandum and Enclosure 2 discusses information that is maintained in the NRC's Privacy Act System of Records (NRC-16). This metnorandum and enclosures may not be disseminated outside the NRC without ccordi-i nation wit.h NRR and the permissien of the EDO cr the Directer, 01.

Internal access and distribution shculd be on a "need to knew" basis.

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" Harold R. Denton 2- May 30,1985 those matters which required further investigation. The results of NRR's review was.provided in Reference 2. The review determined that follow-up investigation by OI and further evaluation by NRR was needed in the case of -

seven currently licensed operators. J. R. Congdon was one of these seven individuals. At a follow-up Comission meeting on May 23, 1984, NRR pro- ~

posed joint-01/NRR investigations and evaluations of these individuals.

Subsequently, NRR issued letters to these individuals under 10 CFR 55.10(b)

, requesting additional information regarding current performance. Based upon the joint investigation into the individuals' past involvement in improper activities at THI-2 and an evaluation of the individuals' subsequent per-formance, NRR would recomend what action, if any, should be taken against the identified operators. As a result of some of the early interviews with these individuals and further technical analysis, Reference 3 recommended that three additional currently licensed operators also be interviewed. NRR issued similar 1Ltters to these individuals under 10 CFR 55.10(b). Of the ten individuals. identified for investigation, seven are currently licensed at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, two are licensed at Waterford 3 and one is licensed at San Onofre 2 and 3.

Past Involvement in TMI-2 Leak Rate Testing Irregularities On January 29, 1985, a joint Office of Investigations (01)/ Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) interview of Joseph R. Congdon was held in the law office of Killian & Gephart Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The interview was conducted in the presence of Mr. Congdon's personal attorneys. The purpose of the interview was to determine Mr. Congdon's role, if any, in improper activities associated with RCS leak rate surveillance testing at THI-2 prior to the accident on March 28, 1979. At the time,-Mr. Congdon was a licensed Reactor Operator (RO) and served as a Control Room Operator (CRO) on Shift "C." A detailed evaluation of Mr. Congdon's interview is included as Enclosure 1 to this memorandum. . .

t Throughout Mr. Congdon's interview he appeared to answer questions in an honest, straightforward manner. His testimony was consistent with the information provided by many of the other Control Room Operators at TMI-2 who have been recently interviewed by 01/NRR. Mr. Congdon's statements were also consistent with the Department of Justice's Statement of Facts 37 and other evidence developed by 01 during its earlier TMI-2 Leak Rate Investigation. During the course of the interview, Mr. Congdon provided the following information: ,

1. Congdon's shift tried to run at least one leak rate test per watch. He stated they may have had to run two or three tests during a watch because it was sometimes difficult to get stable plant conditions.

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2. Mr. Congdon stated that when leak rate test results were greater than the limit allowed by the Technical Specifications, the,r would initiate the follow-up actions required by the procedure, including running M Statement Of Facts Submitted By The United States, United States v.

Metrecolitan Edison Ceccany (Criminal No. 83-00188), February 26, 1984.

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Harold R. Denton May 30,1985

' backup tests and looking for the source of the leakage; however, he

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stated that they did not enter the Action Statement of the Technical Specific'ations . -

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3. Once an acceptable leak rate test result was obtained, the unsatis- -

fact 5ry test results would be thrown away by either the operator or the Shift Foreman. He believed that his Shift Supervisor and the Supervisor of Operations were both aware of this practice.

4.

• Mr. Congdon believed that there were times when they had received a leak  !

rate test result that showed unidentified leakage was greater than the one gpm limit and they did not receive an acceptable result within the following four hours. He stated that as they approached the date of the accident, it became more difficult to get acceptable leak rate test results.

,, Note: The Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 requires:

If Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage is greater than one gpm, reduce the leakage rate within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

5. Mr. Congdon agreed with the statements of his fonner shift-mate, Mr. Cooper, that the operators had little faith in the RCS leak rate test calculations that were performed to show compliance with the

. Technical Specifications, and that test results were erratic even when tests were run back to back with the same stable plant conditions.

Mr. Congdon also stated that regardless of the results of the sur-veillance test, he believed that the operators knew whetter they had leakage or not from observing many of the other parameters in the plart.

6. Mr. Congdon stated that they routinely logged the completion time and ,

the results of the acceptable tests but did not log the unacceptable tests. He denied that they were not logging the start times of all tests in order to hide the fact they were running so many tests. He was never instructed by supervisory personnel not to log in the results of bad tests. Note: Administrative Procedure 1012 required that the test title, test number, and the start and completion times of all surveillance tests required by tlie Technical Specifications be logged in the CRO's Log.

7. Mr. Congdon stated that LER'78-62/1T did not have any impact on the way leak rate tests were conducted on his shift. Following issuance of the LER, Mr. Congdon did recall being told to ensure that bad leak rate test

. results were thrown away and not to leave them lying around the control room where the NRC could find them. Although he was not positive, he recalled that his Shift Supervisor, Brian Mehler was the individual who provided that instruction. He also believed that his Shift Foreman,

, Chuck Adams was present at the time that instruction was given. Note:

Mr. Congdon's recollection of this instruction is consistent with state-ments made by Mr. Cooper during his Ol/NRR interview on September 28 -

1984 Note: LER 78-62/1T stated that leak rate surveillance test problems were caused by a misinterpretation of the requirements of the Technical Spec.ifications and that appropriate personnel would be

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May 30,1985 i

Harold R. 02nten ,

instructed on the requirements of the applicable sections of the Technical Specifications and the requirement to immediately invoke the applicable. Action Statements when the provisions of the Limiting i Conditjons for Operation were not met.

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8. Mr. Corigdon stated that he did feel pressure to get a good leak rate.

He said that it would be brought to their attention at shift briefings l that they needed to get a good leak rate test. He said that they were l trying to comply With that direction and still get everything else done

that they had to completa on the shift.

i 9. Mr. Congdon said that the operators did not like having to operate the plant with high identified leakage, since it led to many other operational problems while they were on watch. He stated, however, that they considered it a situation that they could live with in a safe manner. When Mr. Congcon was asked if the operators on his shift believed that the plant should be shut down to ccrrect the problem.and not wait for the planned outage, Mr. Congdon stated "we shared that attitude to one degree or another." He also beliaved that this attitude was shared by his Shift Foreman and his Shift Supervisor.

i 10. Mr. Congdon stated that sometime around February 1979, he became aware.

l of the fact that hydrogen additions to the make-up tank (MUT) could influence MUT level and hence leak rate test results. He described an experiment that was run en his shift by the Shift Fcreman to determine if the hydrogen additions could influence MUT 1eveI and hence test results. ,

11. Mr. Congdon stated that at the time, he did not censider hydrogen additions during leak rate tests to be a violation of the procedure.

Yet, he admitted that he added hydrogen to the MUT durinq 1eak rate tests with the intent of influencing leak rate test results. He stated that adding hydrogen did not always produce the same effect. He believed that the other CR0s on his shift were aware that this was being done and that both his Shift Foreman and his Shift Supervisor were also aware that hydrogen was being added during tests for the purpose of j

manipulating test results. Although he could not provide any details, he did r.ot think that hydrogen additions were limited to just their shift.

12. Mr. Congdon stated that to the best of his knowledge, he did not intentionally add water to the MUT for the purpose of influencing leak rate test results. If water additions did occur and were not included in the calculation, he felt it may have been caused by miscommunication between the operator performing the test and the operator on the panel.

Mr. Congdon stated that while he did not consider hydrogen additions to the MUT during leak rate tests a procedural violation at the time, he .

would have considered an intentional, unaccounted for water addition during the leak rate test a blatant violation of the procedure.

13. Mr. Congdon was not aware until aft'er the accident that operators may have been adding water to the MUT in an attempt to influence leak rate tests. He did net recall any discussions with other cperators that they were making water additions for that purpose.

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. t Ny 30,1985

.. Harold R. Denton

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i Itisclea'rfromhistestimony,that while he was involved in activities that violated approved procedures and

( Technical Specifications, his actions were comon practice among operators at TMI-2 and that his first line supervision and possibly middle level manage-ment were aware of these practices and openly sanctioned these activities.

Current Performance -

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" Harold R. Denton May 30, 1985

' Conclusions .

During the period Mr. Congdon was licensed as a Control Room Operator at THI-2 prior to the accident, he admitted he was involved in activities

(- associated with reactor coolant system leak rate testing that were in violation of approved plant procedures and the TMI-2 Technical Specifications. These actions included attemsted manipulation of test results through the addition of hydrogen to tie make-up tank during periods when leak rate tests were being run. Mr. Congdon denied; however, that he ,

used other methods such as unaccounted for water additions to influence test results.

The results of the technical analysis shows that between September 30, 1978 and March 28, 1979, 20 of the 28 tests (71%) involving Mr. Congdon involved evolutions that were contrary to the precautions and limitations of the Surveillance Procedure (2301-3D1) used to conduct leak rate tests. These evolutions included: unstable plant conditions; use of an unstable make-up tank level transmitter to provide input to the plant computer; feed and bleed operations; water additions that were not properly included in the test -

calculation; and hydrogen additions to the make-up tank. Based upon the high

. number of questionable or invalid tests, coupled with Mr. Congdon's I

I testimony, it appears that tests were conducted so frequently that test

. results were accepted as valid as long as the result was less than the Technical Specification limit, regard ess of the evolutions in progress during the test and that some of these evolutions were performed with the intent of nanipulating or influencing the outcome of the test results.

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. narolo K. Uenton May 30, 1985

/BaseduponthetestimonyofthemajorityofotherCRO's

• interviewed to da~te, 't is clear that management's standards for procedural compliance were lax and permissive. In my opinion, this was created through negligence on the part of management. Lack of operator respect for the leak rate test procedure coupled with nanagement's failure to correct test procedure problems and to instill high standards for procedure compliance led to conditions that motivated some operators to falsify leak rate tests.

Mr. Congdon is now willing to admit his involvement in activities that were wrong. He recognizes the seriousness of these activities and is willing to accept responsibility for his actions. .

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William T. Russell, Acting Director Division of Human Factors Safety Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enclosures:

As stated

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cc: B. Hayes K. Christopher

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J e 8 NOTE: This enclosure discusses information which is the subject of an or. going OI investigation. This enclosure may not be disseminated outside the NRC without coordination with NRR and the permissicn of the_EDO or the Director, OI. Internal access and distribution should be on a "need to know" basis. _

Enclosure I PAST INVOLVEMENT IN TMI-2 LEAX RATE TESTING IRREGULARITIES I. Background ,

On January 29, 1985, a joint Office of Investigations (01)/ Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) interview of Joseph R. Congdon was held in the law office of Killian & Gephart, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The purpose of the

interview was to determine Mr. Congdon's role, if any, in improper activities

'- associated with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak rate surveillance testing at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (1MI-2) prior to the accident on March 28, 1979.

Present during the interview representing the NRC were: R. Keith Christopher, Director, Office of Investigations, Region I; William T. Russell, Deputy Director, Division of Human Factors Safety; and Robert Capra, Senior Program Manager, Staff of the Executive Director for Operations. Representing Mr. Congdon at the interview were his personal attorneys. Mr. Smith B.

Gephart of the law firm Killian & Geshart, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and

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Mr. Harry H. Voight of the law firm .eBoeuf Lamb, Leiby and MacRae, Washington, D.C. Mr. Congdon's April 30, 1979 interview with the NRC is included as Attachment 1. A copy of the transcript associated with this interview is provided as Attachment 2 to this enclosure.

Mr. Congdon is currently employed by General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation (GPUN) as a Shift Foreman at THI-2. Mr. Congdon holds a Senior Reactor Operator's (SRO) license for THI-2. Prior to joining Metropolitan Edison Company (Met-Ed) in January 1974, Mr. Congdon served as a Mechanical Operator in the U. S. Navy's nuclear submarine program. He was first hired 1

by Met-Ed as an Auxiliary Operator (AO) at TMI-1. He remained in that position for approximately three years after which he was placed in the cold licensing He received hisoper: tor training Reactor group)for Operator's (RO licenseControl Room Operators in October at THI-2.

1977 and served as a CR0 at TMI62 until approximately one year after the accident. Mr. Congdon

! next served in the Training Department for approximately three years during j which time he receiving his SRO license iri January 1982. Following his assignment to the Training Department, Mr. Congdon returned to TMI-2 as a

. Shift Foreman, the position that he currently holds.

The interview with Mr. Congdon concentrated on the period September 30, 1978 thrcugh March 28, 1979. During this time period, ne served as a CR0 at THI-2 assigned to Shift "C." At that time, Shift "C" consisted of the following licensed individuals:

m. SHIFT "C" .

Shift Supervisor Erian Mehler

Shift Foreman Chuck Adams

CR0 Marty Cooper CR0 Joe Ccngdon CR0 (in training) Mark Phillippe

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A sumary of the technical analysis of the leak rate tests involving Mr. Congdon is provided in Section II cf this enclosure. A summary of the interview'with Mr. Congdon is contained in Section III of this enclosure. -

The sumary of interview includes citations to the page numbers of the transcript from which the sumarized information was extracted. Overall _

l conclusions regarding Mr. Congdon's involvement in improper . activities l l

associated with TMI-2 leak rate surveillance testing are contained in l Section IV of this enclosure.

II. Sumary of the Technical Analysis In late 1983 and early 1984, a technical analysis of the leak rate sur-veillance tests performed during the last six months of operation of TMI-2 was performed by the NRC. This analysis was done as technical support to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in its criminal proceeding against Met-Ed. 'The results of this analysis were used in questioning Mr. Congdon during his interview. However, based upon information obtained during the 13 interviews

- of former TMI-2 CR0s conducted to date, a reanalysis was performed during February and March 1985. The summary of technical analysis provided in this section relies on the updated 1985 analysis. The major differences between the two analyses, with respect to Mr. Congdon's tests will be explained at the end of this section. While the complete 1985 evaluation of leak rate tests at TMI-2 is provided as Attachment 3 to this enclosure, a sumary of the conclusions regarding Mr. Congdon is provided here to help the reader understand the basis for the questions posed to him during his interview.

I The test records show that of the 161 leak rate surveillance tests retained by the licensee during the period under investigation, Mr. Congdon was invcived in 28 of these tests. During the 28 tests, he was either the individual who performed the surveillance test or was the operator on watch

. (i.e., the panel operator) who signed the CRO's Log for the period during which the test was conducted. The table below shows a breakdown of the overall conclusions regarding Mr. Congdon's tests.

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Breakdown of Leak Rate Tests Involving J. R. Congdon l

Evaluation Category Number of Tests l

Total number of tests on fi1e................................ 28 r

Tests with no apparent problems.............................. 8 Tests involving unstable plant conditions.................... 3 Tests involving the use of an unstable make-up tank level transmitter as input to the computer....................... 6 Feed and bleed operations during test........................ 4

, Water additions that were not included in the calculation.... 3 Hydrogen additions to the make-up tank during test........... 4 Hydrogen or water additions during test (unable to differentiate)............................................. 2 Tests indicating unidentified leakage in excess of the TS41mit...................................................2

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i Note: Four tests fall into more than one evaluation category:

Test 29 contains both unstable plant conditions and feed and bleed operations.

Tes,t 36 contains both water and hydrogen additions during the test. .

Test 42 contains both unstable plant conditions and the use of unstable LT-1.

Test 58 contains both feed and bleed operations and the use of unstable LT-T. ~

I 4 As can be seen from the table above, only 8 of the 28 tests involving Mr. Congdon appear to have been conducted in accordance with the requirements and precautions of the surveillance procedure governing the conduct of leak rate tests (SP 2301-3D1). The remaining 20 tests invohe actions that violate the limits and precautions of the procedure, thus, yielding question-able or invalid results. For some t1sts, operater actions were taken in an attempt to manipulate or influence the outcome of leak rate test results.

The bases for our conclusion on each test are presented below.'

Three tests, #29 (10/29/78), #42 (12/01/78) and #108 (02/07/79) were performed when the plant was not in a steady state condition. SP 2301-3D1 .

directs that the test be performed once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during steady state operation. The procedure also cautions the operator to maintain the RCS and make-up system in a steady state condition during the test by avoiding changes in valve line-ups, coolers-in-service, pumps-in-service, etc. Power level changes should be minimized and the operator should avoid additions or removal of water from the RCS and make-up system during the test. For the most accurate determination of the RCS leak rate, the initial and final conditions of reactor power, RCS temperature, pressure and pressurizer level should be identical. During test #29 there were large oscillations in Tave, pressurizer level and make-up tank (MUT-) level. In addition, a feed and

bleed operation of approximately 800 gallons was perfo'rmed during the test.

Test #42 was performed during a plant heat up just prior to taking the reactor critical. In addition, the unstable level transmitter (LT-1), as t

will be explained below, was used as input to the computer during the test.

Test #108 was also conducted during a period when oscillations were occurring in the plant caused either by power level changes or possible feed and bleed operations. The results of all three tests yield results that are below the Technical Specification limit for unidentified leakage; however, because of unstaole plant conditions'at the time the tests were run, the test results are invalid.

I During the months of December 1978 and January 1979, one of the two level i transmitters that provide MUT level indication had a very erratic and unreliable outp,ut. The output of one of the level transmitters drives the MUT strip chart recorder in the control room while the other level trans-mitter provides MUT level indication to the plant computer. A selector switch in the control room allowed the operator to switch level transmitters feeding the strip chart recorder and the plant computer. When the selector

, switch was" positioned to LT-1, the strip chart recorder would be driven by

l. LT-1 and LT-2 would provide autematic input to the plant computer for leak rate test calculations. When the selector switch was changed to LT-2, the strip chart recorder would be driven by LT-2 and the computer would receive its PUT level indication frem LT-1. Because of the erratic nature of the

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output of LT-1 during this period, any leak rate tests that were performed with the.use of LT-1 providing input to the computer must be considered questionable, Of the 54 tests conducted by all shifts during this period, only 16 were performed with the stable level transmitter (LT-2) providing input to the computer during the test. During th1s period, Mr. Congdon was -

involved in 7 tests, 6 of which used unstable LT-1 as input to the computer.

These tests are: #42 (12/01/78), #48 (12/05/78), #53 (12/09/78), #58 (12/12/78), #80 (12/30/78) and #86 (01/05/79). Tests #42, #48, #53 do not appear to have been affected to a significant degree by the use of LT-1;

however Tests #58, #80, #86 do show significant differences between the output of LT-1 and LT-2. The use of LT-1 during this period as input to the computer would result in a meaningless calculation of unidentified reactor i coolant system leak rate which could not demonstrate conformance with the

Technical Specification limit of 1.0 gpm.

Four tests, #6 (10/04/78), #29 (10/29/78), #58 (12/12/78) and #112 (02/10/79) involve possible feed and bleed operations during the period the leak rate tests were being conducted. The limits and precautions section of SP i

2301-3D1 directs the operator to avoid boration and deboration during the test. Section 6.3 of the procedure again cautions the operator not to make changes to the RCS inventory if at all possible; however, the procedure provides a separate data sheet to be filled out by the operator if such changes are unavoidable. The data from that sheet is to be included in the test calculation. Contrary to the above, in all four cases, the additional data sheet was not filled out and no inventory changes were included in the calculation. Similarly, three tests, #18 (10/21/78), #24 (10/26/76) and #36 (11/05/78) contain water additions to the MUT during the test. These water additions are also not included in the test calculation. In only one of the seven tests (#36) was the RCS inventory change, logged in the CRO's Log by the panel operator. ,

Four tests, #36 (11/05/78), #39 (11/09/78), #120 (02/15/79) and #134 (03/01/79) contain hydrogen additions to the MUT during the course of the leak rate test. In all four ins *.ances the hydrogen additions were logged in i the CR0's Log. For tests #36, #39 and #134, the effect on leak rate tests results appears to be small. Test #36 also contained a water addition at the -

beginning of the test that was not included in the test calculation. Both .

the water addition and the hydrogen addition were actually done on the  !

, previous watch section (Section "B"). The test was completed on Shift "C" I and signed by Mr. Congdon as the operator performing the test. The MUT strip chart for test #120 is annotated with the words " Pressurized MUT." This test i

appears to be the test Mr. Congdon referred to in his interview as being an experiment to determine what influence hydrogen additions would have on MUT level and consequently leak rate test results. (See pages 66-69 of i Mr. Congdon's 01/29/85 interview with DI/NRR). According to Mr. Congdon, the strip chart was annotated by his Shift Foreman, Chuck Adams, who was participating in the experiment. Two other tests, #126 (02/19/79) and #130

! (02/26/79) contain either water or hydrogen additions during the tests.

. There is no log entry in the CRO's Log for either test; however, the MUT strip chart trace for both tests exhibit characteristics either a hydrogen addition or a small water addition.

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Finally, two tests, #120 (10/18/78) and #12E (10/18/78) performed while Shift "C" was on watch, were unsigned leak rate tests indicating unidentified

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e 5-leakage of 1.29 gpm and 1.32 gpm, respectively. Since Mr. Cooper was the panel operster and Mr. Adams was the Shift Foreman during these two tests i it is assumed-that Mr. Congdon was the individual who ran the tests. These tests were not filed with the other surveillance tests maintained by the licensee. _Instead. these tests were filed with a set of tests that lead up -

to the submission of LER 78-62/1T on 11/01/78. The significance of this particular LER was discussed with Mr. Congdon during his DI/NRR interview (See pages 44-51). However, Mr. Congdon was not questioned on the two.

unsigned tests associated with LER 78-62/1T.

As discussed in the beginning of this section, when Mr. Congdon was interviewed by OI/NRR in January 1985, he was questioned prior to NRR's updated analysis of the 161 leak rate tests. The major revision to NRR's analysis, with respect to Mr. Congdon, involves the six tests where unstable LT-1 was used to provide input to the computer during the test. During the interview, Mr. Congdon was not questioned about his use of LT-1 during these tests. Also, two of Mr. Congdon's tests have been placed in a new category

" water and/or hydrogen additions" due to the inability to differentiate between the two characteristics for these tests. These differences are not considered significant from the perspective of conducting another interview i to obtain Mr. Congdon's statement. ,

In summary, the technical analysis shows that between 09/30/78 and 03/28/79 20 of the 28 tests (71%) involving Mr. Congdon involved actions that were contrary to the precautions and limitations of Surveillance Procedure 2301-3D1. These actions included: unstable plant conditions; use of an unstable MUT level transmitter to provide input to the computer; feed and bleed operations; water additions that were not properly included in the calculation; and hydrogen additions to the MUT. During the period where identified leakage was high (01/01/79 to 03/28/79), 7 of the 8 tests (88%)

i involving Mr. Congdon included these same procedural errors. Based upon the high number of questionable or invalid tests, it appears that the tests were accepted as valid as long as the result was less than the Technical Specification limit, regardless of the evolutions in progress during the test. For some of these tests, evolutions were identified which other i operators admitted utilizing to manipulate or influence the test results.

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. .. l III. Interview Summary During the'piriod under investigation, September 30, 1978 through March 28

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1979, Mr. Congdon indicated that he was primarily assigned to "C" Shift. The_

licensed members of his shift included: Shift Supervisor, Brian Mehler; Shift Foreman, Chuck Adams; and Control Room Operators (CR0s) Marty Cooper and himself. In addition, Mark Phillippe was an unlicensed CRO-in-training

assigned to their shift. Sy pages 5-6.

i Congdon stated that he had a very close working' relationship with his Shift Foreman and his fellow CR0s. Because the Shift Supervisor was also i responsible for the operation of TMI-1, his working relationship with the i Shift Supervisor was not as close as the.others. He would see the Shift Supervisor periodically throughout the shift. See, pag.e 7.

His working relationship with the Supervisor of Operations, J. Floyd, was not very close. He would see Floyd principally in the control room during day

, shift. Floyd would not give briefings to the shifts, that was usually done by the Shift Foreman. He could also not remember havirs any specific meetings with the TMI-2 Plant Superintendent, J. Logan; the Superintendent of Technical Support (until December 1978) J. Seelinger; or the Station Manager, G. Miller. When he wculd see management personne in the control room they would normally inquire about general plant status or ask specific questions about a particular evolution that was in progress. S g pages 8-10.

In describing how his shift was organized, Congdon stated, that one man would have the panel or desk. That operator would be responsible for maintaining

the CR0's Log and taking care of the plant (panel operator). One CR0 would i take charge of the " switching and tagging" desk and control those evolutions.

! The third CR0 would normally be involved in running surveillance tests.

See pages 12-13.

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!~ Mr. Congdon stated that the individual who was assigned to surveillance

testing would normally be the individual who would dnitiate the leak rate test. After reviewing the test, the operator running the test would take the i test to the CR0 on the panel, inform him of the resu ts and review the j results with him. Thus, the panel operator would not normally run the test; i however, on a normal basis he would be the individual who controlled i evolutions such as water additions and hydrogen additions to the make-up tank '

j (NUT) and he would be informed of the test results. 53 pages 12-13.

Since Mr. Phillippe was not a licensed CRO, Congdon stated that he was always under the supervision of one of the licensed CRos. The amount of direct .

supervision 1e would receive depended upon the evolution being performed.

Phillippe could run leak rate tests himself; however, it was with the awareness of the other CRos. They would normally review the results of any tests that he performed. S_ee pages 13-14.

J The individual running the leak rate test would usually inform the panel 1

operator prior to initiating the test in order to check on plant conditions i and upcoming evolutions that could affect the test. . Typically, they would

! try to run at least one test per shift. He stated they may have run two or i three tests because it was scmetimes difficult to get' stable plant conditions. See pages 15-16.

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4 Congden stated that they would normally start a leak rate test at the beginning~of each shift. He said that while he did not use or refer to the procedure while cenducting the-test, he was very familiar with what the -

procedure required and what the acceptance r.riteria were for the test. See -

pages 16-18.

After reviewing copies of THI-2 Technical Specification 3.4.6.2, " Reactor

. Coolant Systein Operational Leakage," and TMI-2 Surveillance Procedure.

2301-3D1, " Reactor Coolant System Inventory," Congdon confirmed that the Surveillaace Procedure was used to assure that the Limiting Condition for Operation associated with Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 was met. ~ pages See 11-12.

l Mr. Congdon was asked to describe what would happen if he ran a leak rate

, test and the results were not acceptable (i.e. unidentified leakage in excess

of 1.0 gpm). Congdon stated that if they got an unacceptable result and they did not make an administrative mistakes, such as putting the wrong number into the computer, or if there was not an operational reason to explain the ing power, they would immediately initiate another leak result, rate test. such as wou They chanq'd bring it to the Shift Foreman's attention and if there was no reason why it should be invalidated, they would proceed to look for reasons to. support why the leakage had increased. They would disoatch Auxiliary Operators (A0s) to look for leaks and they would monitor plant 4

parameters such as sump levels, atmospheric monitors and water inventory.

They would retain the test while the second one was being run. See pages i -

19-20.

j Mr. Congdon was asked if they would enter the Actier$ Statement of the l

Technical Specifications in a case like he described above. Mr. Congdon

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said:

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I consider it kind of complying with procedures to what is '

i expected when you Oet one greater than one, but it wasn't a i formal -- we wouldn't, like today, that would have been the point where you entered the action statement. You know, we would have logged it, on the and of the log, we would have put it on the board as of such and such a time, entered the l

action statement. But at that time, we weren't doing that.

See page 20.

It was pointed out to Mr. Congdon that the" action statement associated with Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 requires: .

With any Reactor Coolant System leakage' greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,

! reduce the leakage rate within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least NOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD

i. SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. See page 21.

Accordin'g tb Congdon, when this situation arose, they were doing the fcilow-up action required by the procedure but they were not entering the Action Statement. Congdon did state that he believed there were times when l

they had received a leak rate test result that showed unidentified leakage l was greater than 1.0 gpm and they had not received an acceptable result 1

_a_

within the following four hours. He stated that as they approached the date of the accident it became more difficult to get results that were less than 1.0 gpm. See pages 22-23. .

Congdon stated that once they rtceived an acceptable leak rate test, the --

unacceptable ones were thrown away. He said that they were normally thrown away by either the Shift Foreman or one of the operators. He believed that his Shift Supervisor was aware of this practice. He believed that the Supervisor of Operations was also aware of this practice; however, could not base that on a particular event or discussion. Congdon was also asked if anyone above the Supervisor of Operations may have been aware of the practice of throwing away test results that were greater than 1.0 gpm. Congdon replied:

I'm not really sure, you know, how far up what their aware-ness were. But considering the frequency of this occurring, and we didn't feel like we were doing anything -- I didn't feel like I was doing any thing wrong in discarding them, because that's the way we had always done it, I wasn't directed specifically not to do it. See page 25.

At this point in the interview, Mr. Congdon was asked if he would agree or disagree with some of the statements made by his former shift-mate Marty Cooper. Mr. Congdon agreed with the following four statements:

1. That they had little faith in the reactor coolant leak rate test calculations that were performed to show compliance with the Technical Specifications.

2. That leak rate test results were erratic even when tests were run back to back with the same stable plant conditions.

3. It was comon practice to run leak rate tests several times per shift until an acceptable result was obtained. The acceptable results were retained and the unacceptable results were thrown away.

4. That Cooper felt pressured to obtain acceptable leak rate test results on each shift; however, he did not feel that if he was unable to get an acce> table test by the end of the shift that any adverse action would se taken against him or that.his competence as an operator would be called into question. See_ pages 27-28.

Mr. Congdon was asked what rationalization they used to accept as valid, a test result that was less than one gpm and yet not accept as valid a test result that was greater than one gpm. Congdon said that he did not have a good explanation. While Congdon did not have faith in the leak rate test itself, he stated that there were other parameters that they could monitor to give them an indication of whether the leak rate result was believable or not. Congdon said, "that was the best tool we had even though we didn't have a lot of faith in it." See pages 28-29. Regardless of the results of the surveillance test, Congdon believed that the operators knew whether they had leakage or not from observing many of the other parameters in the plant. See page 30.

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Mr. Congdon stated that he thought supervisory personnel were aware of the problems operators were having. He mentioned two examples where potential sources of inaccuracy were removed from the procedure. The first was making -

the Reactor Ccolant Drain Tank (RCDT) level an automatic input to the computer instead of a manual input. The second was the density compensation --

attachment that was used shortly before the accident, to correct for the actual mass that was going into the RCDT. He said this latter modification was necess'ary due to the high leakage they were experiencing into the RCDT from either one of the code safety valves or the PORY on the top of the pressurizer. See_ pages 31-32.

Mr. Congdon was asked if they routinely logged the start and stop time of al'1 leak rate surveillance tests as required by Administrative Procedure 1012

" Shift Relief and Log Entries." He stated that they logged the completion time and the results of the acceptable tests but not the. unacceptable tests.

He did not believe that they were not logging the start times in order to

! hide the fact that they were running so many tests. He was never instructed

{ by supervisory personnel not to log in the results of bad tests. Congdon

', stated:

I didn't feel that we were doing anything wrong at the time.

l Obviously today I would look at it entirely differently.

i' But at that time, it never occurred to me that this was incon-sistent or be the improper way of doing it." ,See pages 33-35.

As best he could recall, Mr. Congdon believed that whenever he received the i results of a leak rate test, he would show the results or discuss the results

! of the test with.his Shift Foreman, Chuck Adams. When the tests were discarded, it was with the knowledge and concurrence of Adams. See pages 38-39. ,

Mr. Congdon stated that there were times when a satisfactory leak rate test result was not obtained on a shift and that result was discussed at shift

turnover. Usually, the Shift Foreman would point out and emphasize that they i

needed to keep working on the leak rates to try and get a satisfactory one.

When this occurred Congdon did not recall any discussion about why a plant shutdown had not been commenced. See pages 39-40.

Mr. Congdon was asked to review a copy of Licensee Event Report (LER) i . 78-62/1T. After reviewing the document, Mr. Congdon stated that the LER was initiated by the Company following an incident in which an NRC inspector

found several leak rate surveillance tests lying in the Control Room that indicated the unidentified leak rate was in excess of the requirements of

the Technical Specifications. It was pointed out to Mr. Congdon that the narrative section of the LER stated the event was caused by a misinterpre-i tation of the requirements of the Technical Specifications and that appropriate personnel would be instructed on the requirements of the

, Technical 5:ecifications and the requirement to insnediately invoke the Action Statement w1en the provisions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met. Mr. Congdon stated that at the time they reviewed documents of this nature by reviewing a " required reading book" in the control room. The book contained many documents that they had to sign-off on. The LER may have been 4 one of those documents; however, he did not recall this particular LER as I

standing out in his mind as far as having any impact on the way he conducted i

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leak rate surveillance tests. See pages 44-46.

Other than'the document being placed in the required reading book, Mr. Congdon could not recall any specific instruction he received as a result i of the LEit. Mr. Congdon was then advised that when Mr. Cooper was -

interviewed on this matter, Mr. Cooper stated that the only instruction he could recall was being told to ensure that bad leak rate tests were thrown away and not left lying around the control room where the NRC could find them. Mr. Congdon said that he believed an instruction to that effect was put out at one of their shift briefings. He could not be sure who'the j individual was who made the statement, but he believed it may have been his Shift Supervisor, Brian Mehler. He could not recall for sure, but he believed that his Shift Foreman, Chuck Adams was present at the time. See pages 47-51. Mr. Congdon did not know if that type of instruction was given to other shifts. He did not recall that being discussed at any point by 1 Mr. Floyd, Mr. Logan, Mr. Seelinger, or anyone else at a higher level of authority. See pages 49, 51.

When Mr. Congdon was asked to describe the type of pressure he felt to get a good leak rate test result, he responded by stating:

I think the type of pressure I was referring to would be

just an innate type pressure associated with the job in

itself. There is a lot of pressures when you are at power and operating to do all that we had to do to operate the plant safely and to meet all our obligations. And the difficulty getting leak rates irritated that, because it

! just made that unnecessary pressure because it was always i surveillances being run, a lot of things going on that required your attention.

I So the pressure to get a good leak rate was there, but it wasn't something that, don't do anything else but get a

! good leak rate. It wasn't -- it was placed -- it was .

brought to our attention like in a shift briefing, you know, we need a good leak rate. Let's try to get one. And this was in our mind. We were trying to comply with that, trying to do what were supposed to do and still do every-l thing else that had to be done in the course of that l particular shift. Bepages53-54. .

i i When asked if financial considerations played a part in keeping the plant I operating with high identified leakage, Mr. Congdon stated that the operators i believed their job was to operate the plant safely and generate electricity.

From that point of view, it was a matter of pride to keep things operating ,

safely and doing your job. He said, you would not want to be the one that shut the plant down unnecessarily, but there was never an attitude that "we wanted to violate safety issues for the sake of making a buck." See pages 54-55. ,

! Mr. Congdon was asked if operating with high identified leakage was a concern

for the operators. He stated that they were concerned about it since it certainly wasn't normal and it was certainly not the way they wanted it to i

be. It made the job of the operators much harder since they were frequently i

11 pumpkngd.ownthedraintank,frequentlymakingupwater,andfrequently recirculating.the pressurizer to equalize baron concentration. He stated -

that all of these additional things added to their responsibilities on a shift which made it more difficult to do the job in a professional and safe manner. He stated, however, that it was a situation that they believed they - ,

could live'with in a safe manner, since it was controlled leakage and they knew where it was going and it :vas not affecting the health and safety of the public. He said that they had identified the problem and it was scheduled to be fixed at the next planned out?ge, after TMI-1 was back on the line from refueling. See pages 55-57. Mr. Congdon was asked if it had ever gotten to the point on Fits shift where the operators believed that the plant should be shutdown and not wait for the planned outage. Mr. Congdon said that he did not recall that being discussed, bJt he thought that "we shared that attitude to one degree or another." See sage 58. Mr. Congdon believed that this attitude was probably sharedTf 11; Shift Foreman and Shift SLpervisor. See page 59.

Next Mr. Congdon was questioned about hydrogen additions to the MUT and its possible affect on leak rate surveillance tests. Mr. Congdon stated that hydrogen was added frequently to the MUT for use as an oxygen scavenger. He said for a great deal of the time, hydrogen was added locally by the A0s, -

since the capability to add hydrogen from the control room was not functioning properly. Mr. Ccngdon stated that hydrogen would normally be added if either pressure in the MUT was low in the operating band or if primary chemistry indicated that oxygen concentration was high in the reactor coolant system. See page 62-64.

Mr. Congdon stated that back in 1978/79 he did not consider adding hydrogen to the MUT to be a chemical addition to the RCS. Thus, he did not consider it a procedural violation to add hydrogen during a leak rate surveillance test. He would log the addition in the CRO's Log. He sa.id it was not required to log hydrogen additions; however, he would try to log as many evolutions as he could so that other people reviewing the log would know what occurred. See pages 65-66.

Mr. Congdon stated that at some point, although he could not recall when, he became aware that the addition of hydrogen to the MUT could affect MUT level indication. He said sometimes the addition had no affect on level; sometimes it would make the level go up; and sometimes it would just dampen out the normal saw tooth trend of the level recorder. He believes he became aware of the phenomenon from general discussions with other operators. At one point, Mr. Congdon stated, his shift ran an experiment to determine if hydrogen would influence the leak rate test results. He stated that he and his Shift Foreman, Chuck Adams ran the experiment. Mr. Adams actually annotated the MUT strip chart where hydrogen was added. He could not recall the date of

. the experiment, but believed it was sometime in 1979, possibly in February.

NOTE: The test Mr. Congdon referred to appears to be m Test #120. The test was performed between 2026 and 2126 on February 15, 1979. The test was performed

- by Mr. Cooper. Mr. Congdon was the panel operator and Mr. Adams was the Shift Foreman.

Mr. Congdon could not recall the results of the experiment; however, he

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believed that they may have been inconclusive. See pages 66-69.

At this point in the interview, Mr. Congdon was provided a package of material associated with the leak rate tests he was 1nvolved in during the ~

period being investigated. The package included a sumary sheet, leak rate surveillance test data sheets, extracts from the CRO's Log and the Shift Foreman's Log, and copies of the strip chart recorder trace for MUT level indication. After explaining the material in detail, Mr. Congdon was allowed to review.the package in private with his attorneys. See pages 69-77.

Following Mr. Congdon's review of leak rate test materials, he was questioned .

once again about his knowledge and use of hydrogen additions to the MUT to influence leak rate surveillance tests. Congdon stated:

I did add -- have added hydrogen in the course of a leak rate. At the time, I didn't -- I don't know how many times but I'm sure I did, but at that time I didn't see anything wrong with doing that. I didn't consider, as you mentioned .

before, hydrogen being a chemical so I didn't feel that I was violating the procedure. I didn't have a clear perception of what effect that was having on the indicator.

Sometimes it had no effect. But I am sure there were times when I did add hydrogen in hopes that it would enhance the response....Lajnd hence the results." (Emphasis added). see i page 79.

Congdon was asked if his imediate supervisors, Chuck Adams and Brian Mehler

! were aware that hydrogen was being used on occasion to try and assist in

! 'getting acceptable leak rate results. Congdon believed that both individuals

! were aware; however, he was not as sure about Mehler's knowledge, since he did not have as close comunications with Mehler as he did with Adams and the otner CR0s on his shift. Congdon also believed that both his fellow CR0s, Marty Cooper and Mark Phillippe were aware hydrogen additions were being made to inficence leak rate test results. See pages 80-83. Congdon stated his belief that these hydrogen additions were not just limited to his shift; however, he could not say how many shifts or how many other j operators were involved. See page 84.

Although Mr. Congdon stated, at the time he did not believe he was doing anything wrong when he added hydrogen, since it was not precluded by the procedure, looking back upon those events today, he admitted that they were wrong and certainly not something that he would do today. See pages 89-92.

l Hr. Congdon was then questioned regarding his April 10, 1980 interview with

the NRC concerning leak rate testing irregularities. During the interview, j Mr. Congdon admitted that he was aware of the effect hydrogen could have on j leak rate tests; however, he stated that his addition of hydrogen during tests was not a willful manipulation of the test. Mr. Congdon was asked to explain.how he could rationalize his actions that way. Mr. Congdon responded by stating:

I think that was about a year after the accident. And to give you a little background, you know, we were called in --

.I was called in for* interview. I had heard a little bit i

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. about what the nature of the interview was. I had no idea really what the substance of it was. And I really hadn't thought about leak rates or hydrogen additions, because we ,

had been very -- it had been~a stressful year as far as our _

work at the plant. I had been doing a lot of hours and hadn't really been thinking about this period of time prior to the accident.

And in that interview when, from where I was going into it, really not having thought about it too much, I was presented with a lot of documentation supporting the allegation that I

• was doing something that was obviously wrong. It was obviou' sly documented here. At that point I was -- quite literally, I was in shock, because I hadn't at that moment ,

really felt that I -- or viewed my behavior as anything but the best that I could possibly do.

I thought that I was a good operator. I felt that I was com-petent. And I felt like I was doing the job to the best of my ability. I really didn't view any of my actions, including the area of leak rates, as unprofessienal or anything less than the best I could possibly do. I tried to i be very conscientious as an operator. And when confronted

! with these allegations and the documents that on the surface, you know, supported it I was very shocked. And from that point out, I really didn't know how to confront it or how to 1

( challenge it, because'! hadn't really prepared for it.

And I think a lot of the rationalization was just out of the l stress of that confrontation and that all of a. sudden here are some people that really think, I was a lousy operator and did things to deliberately falsify records and to falsify safe conditions in the plant.

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I really didn't have that vision of myself at that point, that I had done anything less than operate to the best of my ability.

Over the years I've grown as far as my awareness of what is '

the intent of how to operate and what the intent of the specs are and procedural compliance, and lo'oking back at it I can view that behavior as certainly unacceptable in today's light. And I never would -- if I had the attitude then that

I have today, I wouldn't have viewed it that way.

l And I can't really explain why I treated it that way at that time other than just out of ignorance or out of just -- I don't have an explanation for it. See pages 95-96.

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Next, Mr. Congdon was questioned on water additions during the performance of leak rate tests. Mr. Congdon stated that to the best of his knowledge, he did not deliberately add water during the course of a leak rate test to affect the outcome of the test. Congdon said that he tried very hard not to add water during the test; however, if he had to add during the test, he would

(~ include the amount of the addition in the leak rate test calculation. See -

page 107.

Mr. Congdon stated that if water were added and not included in the calculation, it was caused by a mix-up between the individual running the test and the individual on the panel. He said whenever a leak' rate test was

. in progress, he would try to put a note on the MUT level indicator in order

' to remind the panel operator that a test was in progress. jhtepages 107-108.

Mr. Congdon was asked if during a water addition he was aware that the amount of water added in gallons, as read off the totalizer, could be different than the o. mount of water added, as shown by the change in MUT level indication.

Mr. Congdon stated he was aware that there was an inconsistency; however, he did not knoif about it at the time. This was knowledge he had picked up subsequent to'the accident. See pages 109-113.

NOTE: NRR's technical analysis supports Mr. Congdon's testi-s m mony that he did not take advantage of this inconsistency between instrumentation in order to manipulate leak rate test results,.(i.e., underrecorded water additions).

Following a detailed discussion of several' leak rate tests involving persible 1

water additionsc Mr. Congdon still maintained that he.did not make water additions to the MUT with the intent of altering the leak rate test results.

Mr. Congden did not agree with the conclusion of the technical analysis on

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some of the tests. He did not believe that some of the tests exhibited the characteristics of a ' water addition. It was explained to Mr. Congdon that it

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was possible that some of ,the tests originally categorized as water additions,"could be hydrogen additions. Unless there is an entry in the -

CRO's Log.tc differentiate the two,'the MUT strip chart trace for a hydrogen addition could look very similar to a water addition, provided the water was --

added in small amounts. See pages 117-134.

Mr. Congdon said- that he was not aware until recently that water additions may have been used to alter leak rate test results. He agreed that while hydrogen additions wer~e not explicitly prohibited by the procedure, the addition of water to the MUT without recording it and not including it in the

!' test calculation would have been a blatant violation of the procedure for conducing leak rate tests. He stated that he was not aware of any individual making water additions for this purpose. He also stated that he was not aware of any discussions with other operators about their use of water additions to influence leak rate test results. See pages 129-130.

In concluding the interview, Mr. Congdon stated that there was no additional

, information he could provide regarding his involvement or the involvement of others in the falsification of leak rate test data at THI-2. See page 135.

i IV. Conclusions i

i Throughout Mr. Congdon's interview he appeared to answer questions in an honest, straightforward manner. His testimony was consistent with the information provided by many of the other Control Room Operators at THI-2 that have been recently interviewed by OI/NRR. Mr. Congdon's statements were also consistent with the Department of Justice's Statement of Facts and other evidence developed by 01 during its earlier TMI-2 Leak Rate Investigation.

During the course of the interview, Mr. Congdon provided the following

information

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1. Congdon's shift tried to run at least one leak rate test per watch. He stated they may have had to run two or three tests during a watch because it was sometimes difficult to get stable plant conditions.

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2. Mr. Congdon stated that when leak rate test results were greater than the limit allowed by the Technical Specifications, they would initiate the follow-up actions required by the procedure, including running backup tests and looking for the source of the leakage; however, he stated that they did not enter the Action Statement of the Technical Specifications.

3. Onc'e an acceptable leak rate test result was obtained, the unsatisfactory test results would be thrown away by either the operator or the Shift Foreman. He believed that his Shift Supervisor and the Supervisor of Operations were both aware of this practice.

4.

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Mr. Congdon believec tnat there'were times when they had received a leak rate test result that shewed udidentified leakage was greater than the one gpm limit and they did not receive an acceptable result with the following four hours. He stated that as they approached the date of the I

accident..it became more difficult to get acceptable leak rate test results. ,

I Note: The Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 requires:

If Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage is greater than

. 'one gpm reduce the leakage rate within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or '

be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD --

SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. ,

5. Mr. Congdon agreed with the statements of his fonner shift-mate,

Mr. Cooper, that the operators had little faith in the RCS leak rate test calculations that were perfonned to show compliance with the .

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Technical Specifications, and that test results were erratic even when

! tests were run back to back with the same stable plant conditions.

Mr. Congdon also stated that regardless of the results of the surveillance test, he believed that the operators knew whether they had leakage or not from observing many of the other parameters in the plant.

6. Mr. Congdon stated that they routinely logged the completion time and

, the results of the acceptable tests but did not log the unacceptable tests. He denied that they were not logging the start times of all tests in order to hide the fact they were running so many tests. He was:

never instructed by supervisory personnel not to log in the results of bad tests. Note: Administrative Procedure 1012 required that the test title, test number, and the start and completion times of all surveillance tests required by the Technical Specifications be logged in the CRO's Log. ,

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) 7. Mr. Congdon stated that LER 78-62/1T did not have any impact on the way o leak rate tests were conducted on his shift. Following issuance of the LER, Mr. Congdon did recall being told to ensure that bad leak rate test results were thrown away and not to leave them lying around the control room where the NRC could find them. Although he was not positive, he 4 recalled that his Shift Supervisor, Brian Mehler was the individual who provided that instruction. He also believed that his Shift Foreman, Chuck Adams was present at the time that instruction was given. Note:

Mr. Congdon's recollection of this instruction is consistent with state-ments made by Mr. Cooper during his OI/NRR interview on September 28, 1984. Note: LER 78-62/1T stated that leak rate surveillance test problems were caused by a misinterpretation of the requirements of the Technical Specifications and that appropriate personnel would be instructed on the requirements of the applicable sections of the.

Technical Specifications and the requirement to immediately invoke the applicable Action Statements when the provisions of the Limiting Conditions for Operation were not met.

8. Mr. Congdon stated that he did feel pressure to get a good leak rate.

He said that it would be brought to their attention at shift briefings that they needed to get a good leak rate test. He said that they were trying to comply with that direction and still get everything else done that they had to complete on the shift.

9. Mr. Congdon said that the coerators did not like having to operate the plant with high identified leakage, since it led to many other .

( operational problems while they were on watch. He stated, however, that

. they considered it a situation that they could live with in a safe manner. When Mr. Congdon was asked if the operators on his shift

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( believed that the plant should be shut down to correct the problem and not 'wgit for the planned outage, Mr. Congdon stated "we shared that atti.tude'to one degree or another." He also believed that this attitude

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was shared by his Shift Foreman and his Shift Supervisor. --

10. Mr. Congdon stated that sometime around February 1979, he became aware of the fact that hydrogen additions to the MUT could influence MUT 1evel and hence leak rate test results. He described an experiment that was run on his shift by the Shift Foreman to determine if the hydrogen additions could influence MUT level and hence test results. -

11. Mr. Congdon stated that at the time, he did not consider hydrogen additions during leak rate tests to be a violation of the procedure.

Yet, he admitted that he added hydrogen to the MUT during leak rate tests with the intent of influencing leak rate test results. He stated that adding hydrogen did not always produce the same effect. He believed that the other CR0s on his shift were aware that this was being done and that both his Shift Foreman and his Shift Supervisor were also aware that hydrogen was being added during tests for the purpose of manipulating test results. Although he could not provide any details, he did not thiwk that hydrogen addttions were limited to just their shift.

12. Mr. Congdon stated that to the best of his knowledge, he did not intentionally add water to the MUT tank for the purpose of influencing

( leak rate test results. If water additions did occur and were not included in the calculation, he felt it may have been caused by miscomunication between the operator performing the test and the

operator on the panel. Mr. Congdon stateo that while he did not i consider hydrogen additions to the MUT during leak rate tests a ,

procedural violation at the time, he would have considered an intentional, unaccounted for water addition during the leak rate test a blatant violation of the procedura.

13. Mr'. Congdon was not aware until after the accident that operators may have been adding water to the MUT in an attempt to influence leak rate tests. He did not recall any discussions with other operators that they were making water additions for that purpose.

., -. 18 rate test allegations, Mr. Congdon felt he was being confronted with evidence that shoved he was a " lousy" operator who did things to deliberately falsify the safe condjtion of the plant. Congdon stated that he was not prepared to ,

face that' type of charge at the time and that many of his answers were based --

upon a defensive response to the serious charges.

Itisciearfromhistestimony,that

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while he was involved in activities that violated approved procedures and Technical Specifications, his actions were common practice among operators at THI-2 and that his first line supervision and possibly middle level manage-

- ment were aware of these practices and openly sanctioned these activities.

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J-t consent of the shift foreman and most likely the shift supervisor. He also opined that James FLOYD, the Operations Supervisor, was aware of this prac-tice (Exhibit 13, pp. 21-25).

CONGDON stated that to the best of his recollection, shift supervisors instructed the CR0s to discard unacceptable results so the NRC would not see them. He conjectured this instruction may have come from the S'11ft Supervisor, Brian MEHLER, but he was unable to provide additional amplifying or supportive information to support this statement (Exhibit 13, pp. 49-51).

CONGDON admitted during this interview that he knew hydrogen additions to the MUT during the test had a positive, although sometime erratic effect on the LRT result. He also acknowledged that he added hydrogen to the MUT in the hope that it would favorably influence the test results (Exhibit 13, pp.

69-79). CONGDON said at the time, he did not consider that this addition of

hydrogen constituted any type of violation since hydrogen was required to be i added to the MUT to scavenge oxygen; however, he acknowledged that in retro-

} spect it was wrong (Exhibit 13, pp. 89-92). CONGDON believed the other CRCs on his shift (Marty COOPER and Mark PHILLIPPE) were aware that hydrogen additions were being made to influence the test results and was also of the j opinion that his foreman, " Chuck" ADAMS and to a lesser degree, his Shift

! Supervisor, Brian MEHLER, were aware of this practice (Exhibit 13, pp. 80-84).

j CONGDON denied that he had ever attempted to manipulate the test results by failing to record or under recording additions of water to the MUT during the course of the LRT. CONGDON stated he tried to account for any water additions i he made during the test by adding the amount of the addition to the ' test E calculation. CONGDON testified that any water additions that ware unaccounted f for in the test calculation was caused by a lack of communications between the CR0 running the test and the CR0 on the panel. CONGDON concluded that he was not aware of any CR0 making water additions to the MUT for the express purpose of manipulating the test results (Exhibit 13, pp.107-135).

Technical analysis (Exhibit 7) established that of the 161 leak rate surveil-lance tests retained by the licensee, CONGDON was involved in 28 of the tests.

The analysis indicates that 20 of the 28 tests involving CONGDON involved actions that were contrary to the precautions and limitations of the leak rate curveillance procedure. These actions included: unstable plant conditions, unstable MUT level transmitter input to the computer and hydrogen and water additions to the MUT that were not properly included in the LRT calculation.

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/ ,5 1 A No. I've -- you know, in our looking at this i 2 siriib~artype--someofit, as far at the hydrogen additions, l-j i-3 because of the fact I had logged I added hydrogen, I hadn't l-4 marked the strip chart, you know, and that type of thing, 1 f.

5 you know, it became obvious that I had added hydrogen in i V

6 the course of a leak rate. I'm certainly not denying that. ',

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