IR 05000255/1987004

Insp Rept 50-255/87-04 on 870121-0302.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Enforcement Conference,Followup of Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Maint, Surveillance,Sys Walkdowns & Reportable Events

ML20205F809
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	03/17/1987
From:	Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205F776	List: IR 05000255/1987004 ML20205F771
References
50-255-87-04, 50-255-87-4, NUDOCS 8703310302
Download: ML20205F809 (11)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-255/87004(DRP)

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Docket No. 50-255 License No. OPR-20 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted: January 21 through March 2, 1987 Inspectors: E. R. Swanson C. D. Anderson Approved By: B Reactor Pro,iects Section 2A g cf 8/M[82 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on January 21 through March 2, 1987 (Report No. 50-255/87004(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors included an enforcement conference; followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; system walkdowns; and reportable event Results: Of the areas inspected no violations were identifie PDR G ADOCK 05000255 PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)

1. F. W. Buckman, Vice President, Nuclear

1. J. F. Firlit, General Manager, Palisades

1. K. W. Berry, Director, Nuclear Licensing

1. • J. G. Lewis, Plant Technical Director

1. • R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager

1. D. T. Perry, Engineering Superintendent

1. J. J. Fremeau, Director Nuclear Safety

• R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager

• D. W. Joos, Plant Planning Manager

• D. J. Malone, Licensing Engineer

• R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director

• T. J. Palmisano, Mechanical Engineering Superintendent

• K. A. Toner, Supervisory Engineer

• R. A. Vincent, Plant Safety Engineering Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission

1. C. E. Norelius, Director, Division Of Reactor Projects

1. W. L. Guldemand, Chief, Projects Branch 2

1. B. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A

• 1. E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector

1. C. D. Anderson, Resident Inspector

1. R. C. Kazmar, Project Inspector

• Denotes those present at the Management Interview on March 2, 198 # Denotes those present at Enforcement Conference on February 20, 198 Other members of the Plant Operations, Maintenance, Technical, and Chemistry Health Physics staffs, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefl . Enforcement Conference On February 20, 1987 an Enforcement Conference was held at the Region III office in Glen Ellyn, Illinois to discuss certain proposed violation These included Technical Specification violations and Quality Program violations affecting the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, Containment Air Cooler (CAC) System and the Service Water System (SWS). Details of these are contained in Inspection Report No. 50-255/86030(DRP).

Evaluation and analysis performed by the licensee in regards to the LPSI System showed that the combined effort of the P-678 pump degraded

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flow and the flow reduction caused by Valve No. CV-3006 being partly closed would result in a 10 degree increase (to 2190 degrees Fahrenheit)

in the fuel peak centerline temperature and would be less than the 2200 degree limi From reanalysis of the combined efforts of reduced CCW flow, SW flow, and CAC capacity, the licensee concluded that although evaluation and adjustment of electrical equipment environmental qualification lifetimes were required, acceptable containment cooling capacity would be availabl Evaluation of reduced SWS flow disclosed that the limiting case was for the west safeguards pump room cooler when the 1-2 diesel generator was unavailable. Reduced SW flow to this cooler would result in exceeding the analyzed limits for the pumps environmental qualification. However, the licensee concluded from evaluation of the pumps limiting components, i.e., pump oil, motor windings and solenoids, that the motors would probably surviv . Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation 255/85027-06: For approximately five minutes there was no licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) in the control room. This appears to be an isolated personnel error of both SR0s thinking they received an acknowledgement before leaving the control room. The item has been reviewed with the individuals. No similar errors have occurre (Closed) Open Item 255/86007-02: Repetitive failures of the closing coils for the charging pump breakers was identified as a concern. Subsequent problems with these breakers were identified to be caused by worn parts t which were not detectable by the normal preventive maintenance program.

I As discussed in Paragraph 8 (LER 255/87004) of this report, the breakers were rebuilt by the vendor, tested and installed. In the long term, the licensee is still considering reducing breaker cycles by installing motor contactors or improving preventive maintenance of the breaker (Closed) Open Item 255/86023-06: As documented in Report No. 86031 Paragraph 13, the licensee completed Facility Change Number 707 to eliminate the potential for a single power supply failure that would disable both trains of Safeguards pump No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspection. Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant conditions. On several occasions, the inspector observed I shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting l

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i Tours were conducted in the. turbine and auxiliary buildings, and central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in

" progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fir safety, health ' physics and . security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement .

b.- At 6:51 a.m. on January 23, 1987, the P-55A charging pump breaker failed to close.- Due to low temperature overpressure concerns, P-55A was the only operable pump and the plant was without boration control- for seven minutes while its breaker was racked out and i Although P-55A functioned correctly during subsequent breaker closure, the licensee declared the pump administratively inoperable.-

An Unusual Event'was declared at 7:58 a.m. and reported per-10 CFR 50.72 at about the same time. The Unusual Event was terminated at 10:54 a.m. when a Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump was aligned to provide a dedicated boration source to the reactor coolant syste The plant-has experienced a number of similar charging pump breaker failures due to mechanism wear from heavy cycling. The charging pump breakers were replaced with spares. (Refer to LER 255/87004, Paragraph 8). During a System Functional Evaluation walkdown on January 23. 1987, at 2:30 p.m., the licensee discovered that the Containment Air Coolers (CAC) relief panels were not built as specified in the FSA The 10 CFR 50.72 notification was made at approximately 3:30 due to the possibility that the CACs may not perform as designe The FSAR specifies the relief panels to be 4 feet by 9 feet with 5_ rivets on one side. CACs 3 and 4 have panels approximately 4 feet by 7 feet with 11 to 16 rivets. The licensee had discovered this same condition in 1971 and evaluated it as acceptable and failed, at that time, to update the FSAR. Licensee evaluation has been completed and action has been initiated to update the FSAR to reflect the actual conditio At 5:59 p.m. on February 6, 1987, the licensee made a 10 CFR 50.72 notification for having no operable boric acid flowpath to the primary coolant system as required by Technical Specification 3. due to inoperable charging pump breakers for the periods of 3:35 on January 27, 1987 to 3:10 a.m. on January 30, 1987, and 4:25 on January 30, 1987 to 6:33 a.m. on January 31, 1987. During this

time, components comprising an alternate flowpath were available but i were not verified by Operations personnel due to their lack of l knowledge that the existing path was ir. operabl ~

To enhance reliability, the licensee replaced the charging pump

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breakers with spares that they thought were compatible. However, i the licensee subsequently identified differences in breaker l electrical connections and the breakers were determined to be

' incompatible on February 5, 1987. Also affected were CAC fans V-1A l and V-2A and instrument air compressor C-28. The breakers were i replaced with the original model of breaker following rebuilding

, by the vendo (RefertoLER 255/87004, Paragraph 8).

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. During replacement of the high pressure steam inlet pipe fitting "T" to a main feed pump (refer to IE Report 50-255/86034 Paragraph 5.e)

it was found that the fitting was not eroded or corroded as indicated by ultrasonic testing (UT), but that it had been machined to meet schedule 40 specifications. It was determined that it was not unconnon for a supplier to stock castings which meet a higher schedule and then machine them to meet different specification Indications seen by UT were determined to be due to this machinin As a result, only the fitting which was removed will be replaced with a new fittin During the transfer of critical power supply "Y30" for work on the normal inverter on February 13, 1987 at 4:30 p.m., the re-energization caused a spike on the pressure instrument supplying the associated Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)

channel. The momentary signal caused no detectable motion of the power operated relief valve and no system pressure response was observed. The plant was in cold shutdown with the Primary Coolant System pressure at approximately atmospheric, and the temperature at 110 degrees Licensee corrective actions included procedural changes cautioning that the associated LTOP channel should be momentarily bypassed when switching power supplies. This situation appears to also be related to a training deficiency since other operators were aware of the need to bypass the affected channel. The inspector had no further concern On February 19, 1987 the licensee identified a discrepancy between the FSAR and the actual functioning of the iodine removal syste The 10 CFR 50.72 notification was made at 5:08 p.m. for being outside the design basis of the plant. The FSAR analysis assumes that hydrazine is injected in one minute. Actually, the valves from the hydrazine tank to the pump suctions open in one minute. The actual injection time is not yet known. The licensee evaluation is continuin No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance

, The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work

activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect

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controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention / protection, and cleanliness:

CCS 24700168 - Installation and removal of temporary gauges for SW Test T-21 SPS 24700478 - Clean battery ED-204, check torque on connections.

i SPS 24700439 - Add styrofoam between cells for seismic consideration SPS 24608544 - Troubleshooting breaker problems for P-55C.

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PS 24700887 - Rebuild of Breaker 52-1105 for P-55C (Paragraph 3.b).

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SPS 24700988 - Set up for testing fast transfer feature associated with bus 1E.

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'MSE 24701098 - Investigation of relay failures during Q0-2 surveillance

. - -test. A loose fuse holder was found and tightened.~

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No: violations or deviations were identified.

i ~ Surveillance

, The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance

. with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance _with requirements '

L relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentation. The following test activities were

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inspected:

T-233' ~SFE Test of motor start time at degraded voltag T-216 Service Water Flow Balance (Partial)

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MO-7A2 Diesel Generator 1-2 Surveillance T-245 SFE test of the fast transfer feature associated with bus IE l (see following Paragraph) f i During the performance of SFE Test T-245, the fast transfer feature for the non-vital bus IE was tested. Setup for the test required a number of i . leads to be lifted to simulate conditions that would exist on a loss of

turbine (trip). Transfer from the Station Power to Startup Power Transformer failed to occur due to a test setup error. A discrepancy

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between the as-built terminal usage and plant drawings resulted in the i procedure being in error. The procedure was changed and the incorrect

diagram vill also be corrected. The inspector noted that two different

! drawings showing the terminals were both incorrect. This problem is similar to that cited in a recent violation contained in Report i No. 255/86028 to which the licensee has not completed corrective action No violations or deviations were identified.

j System Walkdowns j The inspector performed walkdowns of portions of the following systems:

4' Fire Protection '

f Service Water

] Component Cooling Water ' Instrument Air j Diesel Generators

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Chemical and Volume Control

This inspection was done in conjunction with Inspection Report

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No. 50-255/86035(DRP). The inspe:: tor verified that accessible valves j were in their required positions, essential instrumentation was operable i i and that no conditions existed which would adversely affect system

operation. The inspector noted packing leaks or evidence of past leakage

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on valves and piping ~and instrument design diagram inconsistencies. These discrepancies are being reviewed by the licensee for possible actio (See also Inspection Report No. 50-255/86035(DRP)).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the inspectors examined the following reportable events to determine whether: reportability requirements were met; immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate; and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished per Technical Specificatio (Closed) LER 255/84004: The corrective ~ actions for this safety injection actuation have been completed. The investigation showed that the circuit protection features functioned as designe (Closed) LER 255/84018: A computerized tracking system is in use for Technical Specification surveillance scheduling so a similarly missed snubber surveillance should not recu (Closed) LER 255/84020: The valves whose surveillances were missed were incorporated into an appropriate surveillance procedure. The current modification procedures should prevent recurrence of this proble (0 pen) LER 255/84021: On September 16, 1984, Primary Coolant Pump P-50C was shutdown due to failure of all the seals except the vapor seal. The event was documented in Inspection Report 255-84019 (DRP). The supplemental LER describing the root cause investigation and analysis is overdue and has not been submitted. This LER will remain open pending receipt and review of the supplemen (Closed) LER 255/85001: System functions of the Safety Injection Actuation System (SIAS) were blocked during power operation following completion of system testing. The pressurizer heater's trip and concentrated boric acid supply valve open signal were defeated for six days. Causal factors included a sticking relay, inadequate procedures, and inadequate operator knowledge. The relay was replaced, operators were trained and the procedure was revised to include verification that the blocking relays actuated during the testing were reset. A Facility Change (FC-683) was completed which removed the pressurizer heater trip feature after an evaluation determined that it was not necessary nor desirable. The FC also added an additional alarm window so that the operability of both relays which block concentrated boric acid supply valves open are monitored. Since an alternate automatic, operable flowpath was available for the six days, no violation existe Licensee corrective actions appear adequate to prevent recurrenc I

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(Closed) LER 255/86015 Revision 1: A revision to the report discussing the March 26, 1986 loss of load (turbine trip) and subsequent reactor trip was submitted on September 12, 1986. New information was provided concerning the cause for the turbine trip. The generator voltage regulator was found to function normally, and the cause was determined to be a failure to match the automatic and manual (test) circuit outputs before moving the handswitch to the test position. The licensee concluded that the root cause was personnel erro Corrective actions include revision of the associated operating procedure (50P 8) which did not direct that a "bumpless" transfer be achieved and informing Electrical Engineering and Operations Department personnel of the cause and corrective actions. The inspector verified that these corrective actions were complete (Closed) LER 255/86018: This May 19, 1986, reactor trip is described in special Inspection Report No. 50-255/86017 (DRP) by the Augmented Inspection Team. The detailed review of the corrective actions for the equipment failures are documented in Inspection Report No. 50-255/86035 (DRP). This LER is considered close (Closed) LER 255/86021: Containment building water level instruments were found inoperable. This event was discussed in detail in' Report No. 255/86018 Paragraph 3.e. Corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence of this and similar events include a revision to the calibration procedure to ensure that the instrument is left in the operable condition and a live zero check will be performed each shift by operators when log readings are take A similar susceptibility was identified for the High Pressure Safety Injection flow instruments. The corrective actions described above were similarly applied to this instrumen (Closed) LER 255/86033 Revision 1: The revision includes the

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determination that the reduced Low Pressure Safety Injection flow did not create a condition which was outside the bounds of the safety analysi See also Inspection Report No. 50-255/86030(DRP).

(Closed) LER 255/86040 Revision 1: Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM)

Number 25 seal housing cracking was identified as a result of primary coolant system leakage during a period of plant operation in the hot

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shutdown condition in late November 1986. Subsequent investigation on December 16 and 17, 1986 identified thru-wall circumferential cracking of the motor tube sleeve. Details of the dye penetrant testing were included in Report No. 50-255/86034 Paragraph 5.b. Six additional CRDM seal housings were tested and found acceptable bringing the total tested to fourteen. This sample size is twice that recommended by the ASME cod The licensee plans to revise this LER when the particular contaminant

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introduced during manufacturing and responsible for the transgrangular corrosion is identified. A 10 CFR 21 report was not considered necessary

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because the problem identified was limited to the the three assemblies (all of the same manufacturing lot) which the licensee returned to Combustion Engineering for destructive evaluatio (Closed) LER 255/87001 Revision 1: While reviewing containment isolation circuitry on January 14, 1987, an engineer discovered that the Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System (CHMS) isolation valves were not provided with redundant isolation signals. As discussed in Report No. 50-255/86034, Paragraph 5.g additional review of the design resulted in the formulation of a design change (FC-732) which added a redundant containment isolation signal to each channel of the CHMS control circui This mcdification has been completed and tested, but licensee reviews of the package remain incomplete. Additional action was taken to review l other modifications done by the same architect / engineer (Gilbert / Commonwealth Associates) to determine if similar failures to implement channelization and containment isolation criteria exist. No cases were found. Review of the circuitry for containment isolation valves is also to be completed. A determination as to why the design error was not identified by the licensee during reviews or testing has not been mad Programmatic changes in the Major Modification process

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may be warranted. The issue of compliance continues to be evaluated under Unresolved Item No. 50/255/86034-01. This item will also track the completion of reviews for root cause determinatio (Closed) LER 255/87002: While in cold shutdown on January 15, 1987, an electronic noise spike on nuclear instrument NI-04 resulted in an inadvertent Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. The noise spike caused high startup rate, low steam generator pressure, low primary coolant system flow and thermal margin / low pressure trips in the RPS to actuate. Control rod drive package zeroing that had been in progress required that the reactor trip be reset, allowing an RPS system actuation on receipt of the spurious signal. All equipment responded as expected, and no adverse consequences resulted. As allowed by the Technical Specifications, the noisy channel was bypassed so the control rod zeroing could proceed while troubleshooting the channel. The licensee identified a highly corroded cable connector pin at the interface of the detection element and signal and high voltage leads which was a result of boric acid exposure from previous refueling activities when the instrument covers had leaked. Corrective actions taken included replacement of the detection element and connections. Plans to redesign the detector element cover and gasket to prevent moisture intrusion are underwa Other methods of sealing the connectors are also beirg explored. Longer term plans call for rep.acement of the detectors during the 1988 refueling outage with new detectors having a design which would eliminate most conceivable noise problem (Closed) LER 255/87003: During walkdowns of Electrical Environmentally Qualified (EEQ) Limitorque Valve operators in late 1986, the licensee identified the absence of T-drains on seven valve operators. These operators were environmentally qualified under test reports of valve operators which had T-drains installe The licensee concluded that the

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absence of these rendered the valve operators unqualified for EEQ. The cause of the event was a lack of adequate controls governing the replacement of the EEQ motor operators during the late 1970's and the 1981 refueling outage. The T-drains were installed and an administrative procedure was implemented to provide control over the maintenance, procurement and modification of EEQ equipment. The inspector reviewed the new Procedure (A.P. 9.12) " Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment". A two month period of operation preceded this discovery after 10 CFR 50.49 required that the operators be qualified. Unresolved Item No. 255/86032-12 will track resolution of this issu (Closed)LER 255/87004: No operable boric acid flowpath to the primary coolant system existed for three periods during January 1987 (See Paragraph 3). On January 26, 1987, with vendor concurrence of compatibility, the licensee began replacing the circuit breakers for the three charging pumps with spare breakers of another model with higher amperage ratings. On February 5, 1987, after failure of the "C" charging pump breaker, it was identified that the two breaker models were not directly interchangeable. Due to the different amperage ratings the replacement breaker's main contact fingers accept a contact stab of approximately 1/2 inch thickness, whereas, the original breaker model's contact stab is 1/4 inch thick. Therefore, the potential exists that no

contact will be made when the breaker is racked in as occurred on the P-55C charging pump. Interestingly, the A pump had previously tested satisfactoril All of the failed original model circuit breakers were returned to the j manufacturer for refurbishment, reinstalled and tested satisfactoril The Preventive Periodic Activities Control Program will be revised by the end of 1987 to include either periodic refurbishment or replacement of high usage circuit breakers in safety related load centers. This action will be tracked by Open Item No. 255/87004-01(DRP). No citation will be given for this violation as allowed by 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, V.A. The three examples of loss of an operable boric acid flowpath are a violation of Technical Specifications, however, were identified and reported by the licensee, would have been categorized as a Severity Level IV or V violation and could not have been reasonably expected to be prevented by licensee corrective action from a previous violation. The corrective actions proposed by the licensee should prevent recurrenc One violation and no deviations were identifie . Open Items Open items are matters v.hich have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 8 (LER 255/87004).

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10. Management Interview A management interview was conducted on March 2, 1987, at the conclusion of the inspection. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed. The inspectors also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar , _ - . _ . - - . . - . . - - . - . - - . - _ _ - . - . . - _ , - . - _ . - , . - - . .