IR 05000255/1986034
| ML20197D136 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1987 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197D135 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-86-34, NUDOCS 8702180380 | |
| Download: ML20197D136 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/86034(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted: December 9, 1986 through January 20, 1987 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson C. D. Anderson t~
Approved By:
B. L. Burgess, Chief A[d/N a
Reactor Projects Section 2A Date Inspection Summary Inspection on December 9,1986 through January 20, 1987 (Inspection Report No. 50-255/86034(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; and reportable events. Also management meetings were held on December 9, 1986 and January 8 and 14, 1987 to discuss the licensee's response to the November 20, 1986 10 CFR 50.54(f) information request and to make presentations of the plant status to Region III and the NRC Commissioners.
Results: Of the areas inspected no violations were identified. Two unresolved items were identified relating to containment isolation design (Paragraph 5.g) and environmental qualification of Limitorque Motor Operated Valves (Paragraph 5.h) which are both under consideration for escalated enforcement.
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Persons Contacted
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.ConsumersPowerCompany(CPCol A;
+9W. T. McCormick, Jr. Chairman and CEO 9J. W. Reynolds, Executive Vice President,: Energy Supply
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+9#F. W. -Buckman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
+9#K. W. Berry, Director, Nuclear Licensing
+9#*J. F. Firlit, General Manager.
- J. G. Lewis, Plant Technical ~ Director-
+9#*R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- W. L. Beckman,. Radiological Services Manager
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C. 6. Axtell, Health Physics Superintendent
+9#*R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager
- R. A. Fenech, Plant Operations Superintendent
+9#GJ B. Slade, Executive Director, Nuclear Assurance
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+9#D. W. Joos, Plant Planning and Administrative Manager
- K. E. Osborne, Plant Projects Superintendent
- D. J. Malone~, Licensing Engineer-
- R.- E. McCaleb,-Quality Assurance Director
- T. J. Palmisano, Mechanical Engineering Superintendent
- J. D. Alderink, Staff Engineer-
- C S.'Kozup, Technical Engineer
- K. A. Toner, Supervisory Engineer
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NRC Personnel-
+L'. W. Zech, Chairman
+K. J. Carr, Commissioner
+T. M. Roberts, Commissioner
+F. M. Bernthal, Commissioner
+J.'K. Asselstine, Commissioner
+V. Stello Jr., Executive Director for Operations
+J. M. Taylor, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
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+9#J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, RIII 9#A. B. Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator RIII l
+9#C. E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
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9#C. W. Hehl, Chief, Operations Branch 2
9#*W. G. Guldemond, Chief, Projects Branch 2
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+9#B. L. Burgess, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A
+9#*E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector
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+9#*C. D. Anderson, Resident Inspector
+9#F. J. Miraglia, Director, PWR-B, NRR
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+9#A. Thadant, Project Director, NRR
+9#T. V. Wambach, Project Manager, Palisades
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- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on January 23, 1987.
- Denotes those present at the Management Meeting on December 9, 1986.
9 Denotes those present at Management Meeting on January 8, 1987.
+ Denotes those present at Commission Meeting on January 14, 1987.
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Other members of the Plant Operations, Maintenance, Technical, and Chemistry Health Physics staffs, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefly.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (255/85009-01):
The failure to conduct a 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation for the isolation of the East Safeguards Room air cooler was addressed by conducting training sessions on 10 CFR 50.59.
The inspector reviewed the training outlined and verified that a majority of plant engineers, supervisors and managers attended one of three training sessions. Additionally, a new Administrative Procedure No. 3.07 " Safety Evaluations," was issued on July 23, 1986 which provides additional guidance to those tasked with performing the evaluations.
Comments concerning continuing improvement of this area were made at the exit meeting.
(Closed) Violation (255/85018-07):
10 CFR 50.59 considerations were incorrect for a modification (FC-452-2).
Corrective actions to address this were the same as for Violation No. 255/85009-01 and No. 255/85018-01 (reference Inspection Report No. 255/86031(DRP)).
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Systematic Evaluation Program Items (0 pen) SEP Item (255/S4006-01): The licensee committed to develop procedures to achieve Cold Shutdown using alternative sources of water and safety grade equipment if the preferred sources of water are not available. E0P 7.0 " Loss of All Feedwater" (December 19,1986) directs the operators to lineup the suction of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps to lake water if the Condensate Storage Tank is unavailable.
For a controlled cooldown following a LOCA, E0P 4.0 " Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery," Attachment 9 directs the use of alternative sources of condensate grade water after the Condensate Storage Tank is empty.
If the Safety Injection and Refueling Water Storage (SIRW) Tank is unavailable, the licensee does not have any means of providing a backup water source other than the Boric Acid Storage Tanks through the charging pumps or refilling the SIRW Tank using the Standard Operating Procedures.
The licensee has not yet formally notified the NRC of their inability to l
meet their commitment through procedural changes to resolve the concern l
for the potential loss of the SIRW Tank function. During the review of this issue it was determined that a corrective action request documenting the commitment (AIR) was open on this issue for several years and responded to as not feasible. The licensee committed to document a revised commitment in this regard by January 30, 1987.
(0 pen) SEP Item (255/S4009-00): No corrective measures for charging line and letdown line pipe breaks are proposed according to Consumers Power Company (CPC) letter dated March 31, 1985.
NRR is preparing a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of this topic.
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(0 pen) SEP Item (255/S4010-00):
Evaluation of specific components for seismic design is continuing. At this writing, CPC is responding to an NRR information request.
(0 pen) SEP Item (255/S4012-00): The licensee's submittals concerning structural loads are being reviewed by NRR and a SER will be prepared.
(0 pen) SEP Item (255/S4015-02): The licensee is preparing a new Technical Specification (T.S.) submittal regarding operability of the primary coolant leak detection systems.
(0 pen) SEP Item (255/S4028-02): The licensee's commitment to install forced cooling of inverter and charger cabinets and Auxiliary Feedwater junction boxes J-569 and J-570 was changed due to relocation of several heat loads. An SER is in preparation by NRR.
(Closed) SEP Item (255/S4027-01): In order to provide adequate cooling to the Component Cooling Water heat exchangers under LOCA conditions and single failure of the 1-2 diesel generator, the diesel driven fire water pumps must be aligned to supply the critical service water header. The
inspector verified that the newly-revised Emergency Operating Procedures contain appropriately located instructions for aligning fire water to the critical service water header.
(0 pen) SEP Item (255/54028-01):
The licensee was required to evaluate the environmental qualification of the auxiliary feedwater pumps for a 160 degrees F environment. The licensee's evaluation, completed in October 1985 considered the motor insulation and lubrication oil as the most susceptible elements to temperature degradation. The Class F motor insulation design rating exceeds the maximum anticipated temperature by 65 degrees F.
Mobil Oil Corporation provided an evaluation of the expected lifetime for the oil at 140 degrees F of over twenty five years. The licensee extrapolated this using a thumb rule of 20 degrees reducing the life time by one half to an expected temperature of 226 degrees. The inspector was not comfortable with the evaluation without knowing the range of applicability of the thumb rule. The I
turbine driver for P-8B was not evaluated and in fact has a higher operating temperature than the other components. This issue remains open pending additional review by the licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety
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a.
The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these
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activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and i
other operations records throughout the inspection.
Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirements.
Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant conditions. On several occasions, the inspector observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meetings.
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Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirements.
The inspectors made observations concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including: verification of proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; verification of selected Radiation Work Permit (RWP) compliance; and implementation of proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off pad) practices.
Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewed.
The inspectors observed physical security activities at various access control points, including proper personnel identification and search, and toured security barriers to verify maintenance of integrity.
Periodic observation of access control activities for vehicles and packages and activities in the Central Alarm Station were also conducted.
An ongoing review of all licensee corrective action program items at the Event Report level was performed.
The licensee continued implementation of their Fitness for Duty Program, the results of which the inspectors reviewed.
b.
During Hot Shutdown testing in late November a control rod drive mechanism was identified to be leaking and which appeared not to be coming from the autoclave seal, the most frequent source of control rod leakage. On December 8,1986 maintenance confirmed that leakage was due to thru-wall circumferential cracking in a stainless steel component (tubes which were real welded to a flange). These components are rotated thru stock as the drive assemblies are rebuilt and installed. This particular one has an unusual serial number which was traced. The licensee tested the remaining two seal flanges from the same lot. These two from the same manufacturing lot showed similar, but not thru-wall cracking.
Five additional seal flanges were tested and found satisfactory.
The licensee shipped the defective flange assemblies to Combustion Engineering for destructive evaluation. Their results showed transgranular cracking from contaminants likely introduced during the manufacturing process.
Palisades Technical Specifications does not specifically limit pressure boundary leakage.
Therefore, a four-hour 10 CFR 50.72
Report was not made. The licensee plans to submit an LER.
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c.
On December 12, 1986, and unidentified male tele,thoned both the Bangor, Michigan Fire Department and the South Haven Tribune newspaper threatening to randomly shoot at the Palisades Plant employees.
Both organizations notified the Michigan State Police, who then notified the licensee at about 12:32 p.m.
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The threat, recorded by the Bangor Fire Department, included the statement that "in 30 minutes I will start randomly shooting at the Palisades Nuclear Plant."
The licensee declared an " Unusual Event" at 12:46 p.m. in accordance with its Emergency Notification procedures, and notified local law enforcement agencies and the FBI.
Increased security force and law enforcement armed personnel were positioned on site. Visitation and general access to open areas of the plant was restricted.
D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant officials were advised of the threat because of the plant's proximity to Palisades. By December 15, 1986 it was concluded that the threat was a hoax and the plant security force was returned to normal staffing.
d.
During an engineering review of Service Water pump start circuitry, an apparent design problem was identified. A four-Hour Non-Emergency Report was made at 12:16 p.m. on December 17, 1986.
It was reported that with a pump in standby during an accident requiring either the normal or shutdown sequencers'to start the pump, the breaker's anti-pump feature prevents closure of the breaker until the standing close signals are removed.
Removal of the signals would have required manual operator action by repositioning the pump control switch to off or reset of the sequencer. Subsequent testing demonstrated that the design precluded this situation from occurring. This concern also affected the Containment Air Cooler fans, Component Cooling Water and Boric Acid pumps.
Since it was concluded that this concern is a non problem, no further followup action will be taken.
e.
As a result of an initiative to establish baseline wall thickness for steam lines, the licensee identified two pipe elbows below the B31.1 code allowable thickness. Two elbows on the high pressure steam inlet to the feed pump turbines had measurements of 0.236 and 0.253 inches compared to the 0.263 minimum calculated wall thickness.
Although the average th'ickness found was 0.345, the licensee plans to replace the four inch schedule 40 carbon steel pipe prior to startup. This high pressure inlet pipe is only used during startup.
During normal power opit, ration the feedpump turbines are supplied by main turbine reheat stnam.
The licensee has expanded their pipe i
selection to some feeddater lines following the Surry event, but all
locations measured werca acceptable. Based on these results a routine l
monitoring program is liaing established.
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f.
While in Cold Shutdown.on January 15, 1987 and performing control
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rod zeroing, an electrical noise spike on a Nuclear Instrument (NI)
caused a re p tor trip signal to be initiated.
No actual rod motion
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fccurred, anthough the scram breakers were closed and tripped open.
No welding 'was in progress.
The licensee is continuing their
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investigation. The trip occurred at 1:21 p.m. and was reported by ENS at 2:34 p.m. on January 15, 1987.
NI noise has been a recurring problem for which the licensee has identified a long term replacement program.
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g.
While reviewing drawings an engineer noted on January 14, 1987 that four containment penetrations related with the Post Accident Hydrogen Monitoring System did not have independent closure signals to the series isolation valves. A single failure of an actuation channel could result in two of the four penetrations not receiving an isolation signal. The licensee reported this discovery under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(tii) at 5:40 p.m. on January 16, 1987. This design will be further reviewed and will remain an Unresolved Item (255/86034-01) which could result in enforcement action.
h.
During walkdowns of Limitorque Motor Operated Valves (MOV) in November 1986 it was identified that several valves were not properly configured with respect to grease reliefs and T-drains.
While writing evaluations to justify prior periods of operation it was concluded that the missing T-drains on several Limitorque MOVs, inside containment, rendered them inoperable. This was reported to the HQ Duty Officer at 10:35 a.m. on January 19, 1987.
The plant had operated for approximately two months since November 30, 1985. This potential violation will be resolved under the Environmental Qualification issue and will be tracked as an Unresolved Item.
(255/86034-02)
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention / protection, and cleanliness:
a.
Preventive Maintenance on 24KV breakers (EPS 24607360).
b.
Service Pump disassembly and electrical reconnection (SWS 24605279).
c.
Testing of Component Cooling Water breaker (SPS 24700113).
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements
relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentation.
The following test activities were inspected.
T-220 HPSI Pump Operability, Performance and Recirculation Line Test and Hot Leg Injection Check Valve Test (Review only).
T-230 Service Water Pump Motor Heat Rise Test (Review).
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QR-22 Process Monitors Quarterly Test.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the inspectors examined the following reportable events to determine whether: reportability requirements were met; immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate; and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished per Technical Specification.
(Closed) LER 255/86038: A radioactive liquid effluent release occurred without taking compensatory measures for an administratively inoperable radiation monitor, RIA-1049.
The Shift Supervisor failed to assure that the instrument had been officially declared operable following work which required RIA-1049 to be isolated.
Instrument RIA-1049 had been unisolated, and its alarm and trip function had been verified to be fully operational.
The occurrence was subsequently reviewed with the Shift Supervisors.
(Closed) 255/85007-Revision 1: An update of problems experienced with General Electric Model CR-2940 Control Hand Switches was submitted on December 30, 1986. The switches had failed following heavy use when the internal operating cam screw backed out sufficiently to fail the switch in the closed position. Discussions with the vendor determined that no other reports of similar problems had been received, and that they considered the cause to be user related. Operators were informed through training that pushing the switch into the hard stop may cause switch failure. The cam screws were epoxied in place to prevent loosening and periodic switch replacement and epoxying of the cam screws are planned.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Unresolved Items Urresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations.
Unresolved Items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5.g and 5.h.
9.
Management Meetings A management meeting was held on December 9, 1986 between Consumers Power Company represented by Messrs. F. W. Buckman and J. F. Firlit and the Palisades Plant Staff, and the NRC represented by Messrs. J. G. Keppler
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and F. W. Miraglia and the Region III and NRR Staffs. The meeting was l
planned to discuss the licensee's 10 CFR 50.54(f) response. The major portion of the meeting consisted of presentations made by the Consumers'
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Power Staff and their actions taken and plans to pursue further actions resolving identified plant equipment problems, and the actions they have taken to assure themselves and the NRC that important plant system functions have been verified by testing or other means. The NRC Staff expressed interest in conducting a more detailed review of the System Functional Evaluation. Also, several issues were specified for which Consumers will provide additional information.
Specifics of these requests were reiterated in the NRC response to the licensee's 10 CFR 50.54(f) submittal dated December 23, 1986.
A subsequent management meeting was held on January 8,1987 with the Region III and NRR Staff members in rehearsal for the January 14, 1987 NRC Commission briefing.
The licensee presentation by Dr. McCormick, Dr. Buckman and Mr. Firlit covered the status of issues at Palisades, interim proposed resolutions and concluded with an explanation as to why the NRC should have confidence in the restart of the Palisades facility.
The NRC Staff offered additional questions to be answered in the subsequent presentation on January 14, 1987.
The Commission meeting on January 14, 1987 was attended as denoted in Paragraph 1 above.
Mr. Norelius presented a historical perspective of Palisades and outlined the inspection program for restart of the plant.
Consumers Power presentation by Dr. McCormick, Dr. Buckman and Mr. Firlit discussed the status of plant issues, their resolutions, the testing and-restart program and offered summary conclusions. The Commissioners were i
generally pleased with the briefing. After a few brief comments, the Chairman concluded that it appeared that their schedule was "rather ambitious and perhaps a bit optimistic" and that they should be conservative, looking for results in their remaining activities.
10. Management Interview A management interview (attended as indicated in Paragraph 1) was conducted on January 23, 1987, following the inspection. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
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