IR 05000255/1993028
| ML20058C994 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1993 |
| From: | Kobetz T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18059A531 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-93-28, EA-93-277, NUDOCS 9312030021 | |
| Download: ML20058C994 (10) | |
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U. S. NOCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Report No. 50-255/93028(DRP)
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Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 EA No.93-277
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Licensee: Consumers Power Company i
212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
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Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted: October 18 through November 3,1993 Inspector:
M. E. Parker
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Approved By:(. J. K be hief 31/>//3
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Reactor Projects Section 2A N, W '
l Inspection Summary Inspection from October 18 through November 3.1993
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(Recort No. 50-255/ 93028(DRP))
Areas inspected: A special unannounced safety inspection by the senior resident inspector.
The area inspected was operations; specifically, the excessive cooldown following identification of a nonisolable thru-wall leak on the primary coolant system.
Results: Four apparent violations, two of which had multiple examples, were identified (paragraphs 3 and 4).
Two of the apparent violations involve violations of Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation
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3.1.2.a.1 and 3.1.2.a.2 for exceeding the cooldown rate limits. The remaining apparent violations involve violations of Technical Specifications 6.8.1.a and
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10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for either failure to follow procedures or to establish adequate procedures, 9312030021 931122 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G
PDR;.
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DETAILS
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Manaaement Interview (30703)
The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 9
on November 3, 1993, to discuss the scope and findings of the
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inspection.
In addition, the likely informational content of the
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inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection was discussed. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
2.
Event Description (93702)
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On September 16, 1993, plant operators initiated action to cool down and
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depressurize the reactor plant following identification of a nonisolable thru-wall leak on the power operated relief valve (PORV) line off of the
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pressurizer. The plant had just attained hot shutdown (525*F at 2060
i psig) following completion of a refueling outage that commenced on i
June 4, 1993.
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Upon identification of the primary coolant system (PCS) pressure l
boundary leak, the licensee immediately initiated plans to commence a
plant cooldown to repair the leak. The licensee restricted access to the containment until the plant was cooled down below 200*F. Upon re-entry into the containment to perform a PCS walkdown, an operator reported that the leak rate had increased. At this time the shift
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supervisor directed the control operators to increase the cooldown rate
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and to depressurize the PCS as soon as possible.
Depressurizing the reactor would entail securing the primary coolant pumps (PCPs) and the
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charging pumps.
The shift supervisor, realizing that securing the PCPs would
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significantly reduce the heat generated in the primary coolant system and result in an increased cooldown rate, briefed the crew on the cooldown rate restrictions.
Technical Specification (TS) Limiting
Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.2.a specifies a maximum heatup/cooldown rate limit of 40*F/ hour when the PCS is between 170*F and 250*F, and a maximum heatup/cooldown rate of 20*F/ hour when the PCS is below 170*F. As the PCS was greater than 170*F, the operators
increased the cooldown rate from approximately 10*F/ hour to 20*F/ hour.
However, while depressurizing the reactor and as the temperature of the PCS decreased, the allowable cooldown rate for both the 40*F/ hour and the 20*F/ hour limits were exceeded.
The excessive cooldown rate was considered an unresolved item (50-255/93021-01(DRP)) in inspection report No. 50-255/93021(DRP)
pending further review for potential enforcement action.
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Followup Review (71707)
j Followup of the ' event identified that the cooldown of the PCS, following discovery of the thru-wall leak on the PORV line, had proceeded rather smoothly up to the depressurization of the PCS. The licensee had initiated and maintained a steady conservative cooldown rate. At the-start of the "B" shift (8 a.m.) the operating crew was controlling the l
cooldown rate at approximately 10*F/ hour with the primary coolant
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temperature at about 228'F.
The licensee had previously restricted i
access to the containment for personnel safety considerations until the I
PCS had cooled down below 200*F.
At around 12 p.m., an auxiliary operator re-entered the containment to observe PCS conditions. The operator erroneously reported that the leak i
rate had increased significantly from approximately 0.25 gallons / minute j
to approximately 5 gallons / minute.
This information resulted in the
shift supervisor directing the crew to increase the cooldown rate and to j
depressurize the PCS as soon as possible.
The crew immediately.
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increased the cooldown rate from approximately 10*F/ hour-to 20*F/ hour.
l The intent of this action was to depressurize the PCS and lower the.
pressurizer level to prevent any further_ leakage of borated primary
coolant on the carbon steel pressurizer shell. As the PCS was at about
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190 F, a cooldown rate of 20*F/ hour was well within the technical specification limit of 40*F/ hour. This cooldown rate was maintained
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until the PCS temperature of 170*F was achieved. At this time the
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operators secured the two operating PCPs and the charging pumps to reduce the PCS leak rate.
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Following the depressurization of the PCS, from 1:56 p.m. to 2:56 p.m.
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on September 17, 1993, the allowable PCS cooldown rate of 20*F/ hour was exceeded with the PCS temperature below 170*F. The excessive cooldown
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rate exceeded the 20*F/ hour limit until 3:12 p.m., when it fell back within TS limits.
The maximum average cooldown rate during this time period was approximately 49'F/ hour. Technical Specification LC0
3.1.2.a.1 requires-in part, that the average heatup or cooldown rate in any one hour time perind shall not exceed the heatup or cooldown rate i
limit of 20*F/ hour when the shutdown cooling return temperature is less
than or equal to 170*F.
The failure to maintain the cooldown rate below l
20*F/ hour is considered an apparent violation of TS 3.1.2.a.1 (50-
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255/93028-01(DRP)).
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Also from 1:01 p.m. to 2:01 p.m., with the primary coolant between 170*F and 250*F the rate limit of 40*F/ hour was exceeded. The excessive cooldown rate exceeded the 40*F/ hour limit until 2:40 p.m., when it fell
back within TS limits.
The maximum average cooldown rate during this i
time period was approximately 48'F/ hour.
Technical Specification LCO , 3.1.2.a.2 requires, in part, that the average heatup or cooldown rate in
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any one hour time period shall not exceed the heatup or cooldown rate
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limit of 40*F/ hour when the primary coolant temperature is between 170*F and 250*F.
The failure to maintain the cooldown rate less than
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40*F/ hour is considered an apparent violation of TS 3.1.2.a.2 (50-255/93028-02(DRP)).
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While this violation is similar to the failure to maintain a 20*F/ hour
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cooldown rate, the cause was mainly attributable to inadequate procedures. The operators discounted all PCS cold leg temperature
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values (designated as T,,,,) after the PCPs were secured and utilized shutdown cooling return temperature.
Therefore the operators did not
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consider the transition temperature values from T,,,, to shutdown cooling return temperature but used only the values for shutdown cooling return i
temperature (See Section 4 for additional details of procedure
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inadequacies).
In reviewing the shift activities, the inspector noted that an additional licensed operator was brought into the control room to assist j
with control room shift activities.
The shift supervisor also took the
initiative to ensure the shift was aware of the cooldown limits by
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conducting a pre-job briefing. However, no specific direction or assignments were provided in the briefing. At the start of the shift, one of the control operators had been controlling the cooldown.
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However, once the leak was reported as having increased,- the operator
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started controlling the securing of the PCPs and the depressurization of
the PCS. Therefore, no specific operator was assigned nor took overall
responsibility for controlling the cooldown. Administrative Procedure
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4.00, " Operations Organization, Responsibilities, and Conduct," Revision
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11, Step 4.8.1.i, established to implement the procedures listed in
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Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 1.b, requires, in part, that the control operator remain alert and knowledgeable of all plant operations in progress that involve the functioning of equipment controlled from the main control room, and anticipate potential problem
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areas. The failure of the control operators to remain cognizant of the cooldown rate resulted in exceeding the TS LCO limits and is considered
an example of an apparent violation of TS 6.8.1.a. which requires, in i
part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and
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maintained (50-255/93028-03a(DRP)).
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In further reviewing shift composition, the inspector noted that TS 6.2.2.a only requires two senior reactor operators (SRO) on shift,
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However, three of the five shifts at Palisades have three SR0s assigned
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to the shift.
This particular shift happened to have all-three SR0s on shift during the cooldown.
In reviewing the activities of the SR0s, the inspector noted that both the shift engineer (shift technical advisor)
and the operations shift supervisor were not directly involved with the
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cooldown, but were performing other activities.
The shift supervisor i
was monitoring control room activities; however, he was not specifically overviewing the cooldown activities. Administrative Procedure 4.00,
" Operations Organization, Responsibilities, and Conduct, Step 4.4.1.n also requires, in part, that the shift supervisor shall review shift reports, shift logs, completed. checklists, and other data compiled by the shift operating crew to detect abnormal trends, assess potential operating problems, and confirm accuracy of the information. The failure of the shift supervisor to review the PCS Cooldown Data log resulted in the shift supervisor failing to remain cognizant of the cooldown rate of the PCS, and is considered another example of an apparent violation of TS 6.8.1.a (50-255/93028-03b(DRP)).
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In reviewing previous plant shutdowns, the licensee determined that the 20*F/ hour cooldown rate limit had been exceeded on nearly all of.the previous cooldowns since incorporation of the 20*F/ hour TS LC0 limit in 1990.
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Procedural Inadeouacies
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The inspector reviewed, System Operating Procedure-(S0P)-1, " Primary.
l Coolant System," Revision 25.
This procedure was written to provide the
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necessary steps to heat up and cool down the primary coolant system.
In reviewing this procedure, the inspector noted that the note in step 4.1.1. states "Use the shutdown cooling return temperature if the Shutdown Cooling System is in operation and all PCPs are off."
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note is intended to implement the requirements of TS 3.1.2.a.
However, in reviewing Attachment 2, PCS Cooldown Data log,. the inspector noted that the log does not require nor does it provide the necessary space to-
log the appropriate TS temperature monitoring parameters.
The procedure-required the operators to log core exit temperature and Tm., neither of which were appropriate, when the PCPs are secured and shutdown cooling
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is in service.
In addition, SOP-1, step 7.1.4.d.5, only requires the
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operators to log data on a one hour interval, although the operators were logging data every 30 minutes.
The logging interval was not
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appropriate for the circumstances, in that the procedure was intended to ensure that TS limits are not exceeded.
The logging of information hourly was not adequate to allow the operators to take necessary action to reduce the cooldown rate prior to exceeding the limits. The failure to provide an adequate cooldown data log is considered an example of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, which requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by
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procedures appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in
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accordance with these procedures (50-255/93028-04a(DRP)). An adequate
cooldown data log for monitoring the cooldown rate could have significantly alerted the operators that the cooldown rate was approaching or exceeding the TS LC0 limits.
In addition, SOP-1 does not provide clear direction to the. operators on what temperature parameters are appropriate for monitoring the heatup and cooldown rates. Nor does it provide the necessary direction for the operators to control the heatup or cooldown rates utilizing the shutdown i
cooling system. The purpose of the heatup or cooldown rate limits is to protect the most limiting component on the reactor vessel, that is the circumferential belt-line weld around the reactor vessel, by reducing or
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controlling cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes.
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During startup and shutdown, the rates of temperature and pressure
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changes are limited so that the maximum specified heatup and cooldown
rates are consistent with the design assumptions and satisfy the stress
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limits for cyclic operation.
Thus, heatup and cooldown temperature monitoring should utilize those values that most represent primary coolant in the vicinity of the reactor vessel belt-line weld.
When the PCPs are in service, T is most representative of the belt line welds.
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Tm, is no longer representative of the belt-line, and shutdown cooling
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return temperature is most representative of the belt-line.
SOP-1 did
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not consider the transition of temperature monitoring from T,,,, to
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shutdown cooling return, but allowed the operator to discount the
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previous T,,,, values and use the previous hours' data for shutdown cooling return temperature, thus not reflecting the true heatup or cooldown of the reactor vessel or belt-line weld. This is considered
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another example of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
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Criterion V, in that SOP-1 was inappropriate to the circumstances, because it did not consider the transition of temperature monitoring i
from T,,,, to shutdown cooling return temperature, thus reflecting the
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temperature changes on the most limiting part of the reactor vessel, the reactor vessel belt-line weld (50-255/93028-04b(DRP)).
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5.
Analysis of Root Cause
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The numerous errors identified during the investigation of this event
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indicated a serious breakdown in the control of licensed activities, t
They include the following:
a.
Although an extra licensed operator was brought into the control room to assist with licensed activities, no reactor operator was
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specifically assigned to monitor the cooldown. As a result, the operating crew did not maintain cognizance of the cooldown and
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were not aware of the excessive cooldown during their shift.
b.
The urgency on the part of the crew to reduce pressure in the PCS, in order to reduce the leak rate, took their attention away from
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temperature cooldown.
c.
Depressurization of the PCS was performed prior to completely cooling down the PCS. Typically, the plant is cooled down and stable at less than 100*F prior to depressurization of the PCS.
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This change in plans was necessitated by plant conditions and although it complicated the event, it was well within the scope of operator expectations.
d.
Although SOP-1 was intended to assist the operator, it complicated the cooldown in that it did not provide adequate or appropriate directions for monitoring the cooldown.
Specifically, it did not direct the operators to the appropriate temperature parameters to monitor / log, and it did not provide an appropriate time interval, j
More importantly, it directed operators to record T,,,, and core i
exit temperature when these values were being discounted by the operators, as the PCPs were secured and shutdown cooling was in
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service.
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Operator training and procedure guidance concerning the transition of temperature monitoring from T,,,, to shutdown cooling return temperature was not provided. Additionally, no specific caution -
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was provided to plant operators to specifically control the temperature difference across the shutdown cooling heat exchanger.
This, in itself, resulted in the excessive cooldown due to the
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I rather large differential temperature across the heat exchanger.
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The operators would have been cognizant of the cooldown had they l
been monitoring these values more closely. The low decay heat
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values of the core resulted in the large differential temperature-
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across the heat exchanger being the controlling factor.
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Although the shift supervisor did conduct a prejob briefing of the
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cooldown to the shift, he did not maintain oversight ~ or cognizance
of the cooldown and was not aware of the excessive cooldown during
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his shift.
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Licensee Actions The licensee conducted an investigation of this event and provided some of the results of their review in Licensee Event Report (LER)93-010,
dated October 18, 1993. The corrective actions associated with this l
event included:
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Evaluation of the effect on reactor vessel material as a result of
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this event and other previous events; i
b.
Evaluation and revision of the heatup and cooldown processes used
at Palisades;
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c.
Evaluation of procedures and correction of identified deficiencies;
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d.
Operator training on procedure changes; e.
Verification of proper temperature monitoring techniques for heatup and cooldown;
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Verification of equipment operation and reliability; g.
Removal of the SR0 and R0s directly involved in this event from
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licensed operator duties pending evaluation;
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h.
Remedial training and simulator performance evaluation of the
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operating crew involved in this event prior to their return to licensed operator duties; i
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Discussion with all the operating crews about the implications of-this event and similar past events involving personnel error; and j.
Incorporating the lessons learned from this event into training lesson plans.
7.
Safety Sionificance Although the TS cooldown rate limits of 40*F/ hour and 20*F/ hour were
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exceeded, the overall safety significance of this event was minor.
Both the licensee's and the NRC's evaluation of the event determined that
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10 CFR 50, Appendix G, " Fracture Toughness Requirements," were not t
violated. With the plant conditions that existed during the event (less than 170*F at 250 psig), a cooldown rate of 60*F/ hour can be supported by the Pressure and Temperature Limit curves, Figure 3-2 of Palisades TS
3.1.2.
Once the PCS is depressurized, cooldown rates of up to
100*F/ hour can be supported.
However, the conditions that led to this
event were significant in that they demonstrated a less than adequate i
attention to detail on the part of the operating crew.
Review of previous cooldowns revealed that the licensee had exceeded the 20*F/ hour cooldown rate on nearly all of the previous cooldowns since
incorporation of the 20*F/ hour TS LC0 limit in 1990.
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Inspector Conclusions There were multiple apparent violations associated with this event that
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indicate the failure to follow procedures and to establish adequate l
procedures. The operators failed to maintain cognizance of the cooldown rate during their shift, due to their lack of attentiveness. The operating shift was not aware that they had exceeded the cooldown rates until it was brought to their attention the following day.
In addition, plant procedures were also noted as being a contributing factor in that l
These examples demonstrate that there was a breakdown in the control of.
they complicated the cooldown, by failing to provide clear direction.
licensed activities that collectively represent a potentially
significant lack of attention toward licensed responsibilities.
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9.
Persons Contacted
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- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager l
- R..D. Orosz, Nuclear Engineering and Construction Manager
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R. M. Rice, Nuclear Performance and Assessment Department Manager
- T. J. Palmisano, Plant Operations Manager i
- D. J. VandeWalle, Mechanical, Civil, and Structural Engineering Manager D. W. Rogers, Safety and Licensing Director
- J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent
- K. E. Osborne, System Engineering Manager
- J. L. Kuemin, Licensing Administrator C. T. Hillman, Licensing Engineer j
Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)
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- M. E. Parker, Palisades Senior Resident Inspector
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- D. G. Passehl, Palisades Resident Inspector l
- E. R. Schweibinz, Senior Reactor Projects Engineer
- Denotes those present at the management interview conducted on
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November 3, 1993.
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In addition, the inspectors interviewed other licensee personnel including shift supervisors, control operators, and engineering personnel.
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Enclosure 2
30762 Federal Respter / Vol. 67. No.133 / Friday, July 10. 1992 / Notices Page 1 of 2
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n prior reviews for the Yankee Nuclear guides currently being developed or Appanneen Send cosunents to:ne
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Power Station. The plant was licensed improvements in all published guides Secretary of the rammission. U S.
kefore the requirement for issuance of a are encouraged at any time. Wntten Nuclear Pagulatory Commission.
Fmal Environmental Statement.
comments may be submitted to the Washington. DC 20555. ATTN:
Regulatory Pubhcations Branch.
Docketing and Service Branch.
j 4encies andPersons Consuhed Division of Freedom of Information and Hand deliver comments to: One White ne NRC staff reviewed the licensee's Publications Services. Office of Flint North.11555 Rockville Prie.
request and did not consult other Administration. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Rockville. MD between 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 agencies or persons.
Commission. Washington, DC 20555.
p.m. Federal woridays.
Findicg of No Significant impact Regulatory guides are available for Copies of comments may be examined j
in8pection at the Commission's Public at the NRC Public Document Room. 2120 The Cocunission has determined not Document Room. 2120,L Street NW, L Street NW. (lower Level).
to prepare an environmentalimpaet ashington. DC. Copies of issued Washington, DC statement for the proposed esemption.
guides may be purchased from the Pon Pm En tweosmaama cowTacT:
i Based upon the foregoing environmental Government Printing Office at the assessment, we conclude that the current GPO price. Information on James Lieberman Director. Office of proposed action will not have a current GPO prices may be obtained by Enforcement. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory sig:uficant effect on the quahty of the contacting the Superintendent of Commission. Washingten. DC 20555 j
human emironment.
Documents. U.S. Government Printing (301 4 274th For further details with respect to this Office. Post Office Box 37082, sueecasstWTAstY 8MooResADON:
aetion. see the application for exemption Washington.DC 2001::-7082 telephone dated Ma) 22.1992. which is avallable (202) 512-2249 or (202) 512-2171. Issued Background for pubhc inspection at the Evides may also be purchased from the he NRC's current policy on Commission's Public Document Room.
Natmnal Technical Information Service enforcement conferences is addressed in 2120 L Street. NW., Washington. DC n a standing order basis. Details on.
Section V of the latest revision to the 20555. and at the local pubhc document this service may be obtatned by writmg " General Statement of Policy and room at Greenfield Community College. NTIS. 5285 Port Royal Road. Springfield. Procedure for Enforcement Actions."
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1 College Drive. Greenfield.
16L Massachusetts 01301.
(Enforcement Policy)10 CFR part 2.
Auth rity: 5 U.S C. 552'a1 appendix C that was published on Dated at Rockville. Ma.; land. this 2d day Dated at Rochville. Maryland, this 3oth day February 18.1992 (57 FR 5791).The of July 1992.
of June 1992.
Enforcement Policy states that.
For the Nuclear Reg:.!ator) Comm:ssion For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- ' enforcement conferences will not Richard F. Dudley. Ir normally be open to the public."
Eric S. Beckford. Diroctor.
A etms D; rector. Non Pom er Reacton.
However.the Commission has decided Decommissionmg andEnrsionmen:c1 Project Of"sce of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
to implement a trial program to Dnectorere. Dmsson of Reccfor Precc ts-(FR Doc. B -1f.224 Filed 7M2; a 45 s'Ti)
determine whether to maintain the Ilu/P/P.0%ce ofNuclearReactor a coag w.,
Repc!ction current pobey with regard to enforcement conferences or to adept a
[FR Ds: 92-1e:32 FJed 7M:: e 45 am)
swac coot neoe-u Two-Year Trial Program for new policy that would allow most i
Conducting Open Ertforcement enforcement conferences to be open to Confeeences; Poucy Statement attendance by all members of the pubhc.
Regulatory Guides; issuance, Policy Stahant Avallab!!!!y Actucv: Nuclear Regulatory
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Position The Nuclear Regulator) Commission has issued a revision to a guide in its Acme Policy statement.
The NRC is implementing a two year trial program to allow public Regulatory Guide Senes.This series has sVWMany:The Nuclear R I" ato.
observation of selected enforcement been developed to desenbe end make Commission (NRC) is issumg this policy conferences.The NRC will monitor the available to the public such information statemerd on the implementation of a for implementing specihc parts of the.
twogear trial program to allow selected program and determine whether to as methods acceptable to the NRC staff enforcement conferences to be open to M a pe Pobc)' b*
I Cemmission's regr.Jations. techni:;ues attendance by all members of the conducting open enforcement conferences based on an assessment of used by the staff m evaluating specific eneral pubbc.This Policy statement problems or postulated accidents. and describes the two-year trial program the following criteria--
't data needed by the staff in its review of and informs the public of how to get (1) Whether the fact that the apphcations for permits and bcenses information on upcoming open conference was open impacted the Regulato y Guide B 7. Revision 1.
enfommera conferences.
NRC s ability to conduct a meanmgful
.. Instructions for Recordmg and c nference and/orimplement the NRC s Reportmg Occupational Radiation Darts:This trial program is effective on en ament program; Exposure Data." desenbes an July 10,1992. while comments on the
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. (2) Whether the open conferente j
acceptable program for the preparation. program are being received. Submit retention. and reportmg of records of comments on or before the completion
. impacted the licensee,s participation in
the conference; occupational radiation exposures. It of the tnal program scheduled for July includes copies of hRC Forms 4 and 5 11.1992. Comments received after this (3) Whether the !?RC expended a and detailed instructions on completing date will be considered if it is practical significant am6unt of resources in them to do so. but the Commission is able to making the conference public; and Comments and suggestions in assure consideration only for comments (4) The extent of public interest in i
connection with items for mclusion in received on or before this date.
opening the enforcement conference.
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l Enclosure 2 Pace 2 of 2
Federal Register / Vol. 57. No.133 / Frid y July to, tos2 / Notices 30763
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1. Criteria For Selectiog Open three categones oflicensees will be subject to personnel screening. that Enforcement Conferences commercal operating reactors, signs, hanters, posters. etc not larger f
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than 18 bc permitted, and that s
hp, e pemons may k med hospitals, and other bcensees, which Enforcement conferences will not be wW caist ne mmauung types of j
cpen to the public af the enforcement licensees.
Each regional office will continue to action bems comtemplated-conduct the enforcement conference
i (1) Would be taken against an II. Announdog Open Enforcenset p
edings in Mance wi-Wonal individual, or if the action, though not Conferences practice. The enforcement conference taken against an individual, turns on As soon as it is determined that an will continue to be a meeting between i
whether an individual has committed enforcement conference will be open to the NRC and the licensee.While the wrongdoing:
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public observation, the NRC will orally enforcement conference is open for (2) Involves s.puficant personnel notify the licensee that the enforcement public observation. it is not open for
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fritures where the NR,C has requested conference wiU be open to public public participation.
i thtt the individual [s) myolved be observation as part of the agency's trial persons attending open enforcement
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present at the conference program and send the licensee a ccpy of conferences are reminded that (1) the (3)Is based on the findings of an NRC this Federal Register notice that outlines apparent violations discussed at open Office of Investigations (OI) report; or the program. Licensees will be asked to enforcement conferences are subject to
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i (411nvolves safeguards information.
estimate the number of participants it further review and sney be subject to q
Priv:cy Act information. or other deredwill bring to the enforcement conference change prior to any resulting infonnation which could be consi so that the NRC can schedule an enforcement action and (2) the proprietary.
appropriately sized conference room.
stat:ments of views or expressions of Enforcement conferences m.volving The NRC will also notify appropriate opinion made by NRC employees at m: dical misedmimstrations or State liaison officers that an open enforcement conferences or the d
i ovIrexposures will be open assumm.g enforcement conference has been lack thereof, are not intended to
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th2 conference can be conducted scheduled and that it is open to public represent fmal determinations or beliefs.
without disclosing the exposed observation.
In addition to providing comments on
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individual's name. In addition.
Ihe NRCintends to announce open the agency's trial program in accordance
$
enforcement conferences will not be enforcement conferences to the public with the guidance in this notice, persons epen to the public if the conference w,ll normally at least10 working days in attending open enforcement conferences i
i be conducted by telephone or the advance of the enforcement conference will be provided an opportunity to conference will be conducted at a through the followmg mechanisma:
submit written comments anonymously Y
relatively smalllicensee's facility.
(1) Notiws posted in the Public to the regional office.These comments FintUy. with the approval of the Document Room; will subsequently be forwarded to the j
Ex:cutive Director for Operations.
(2) Toll-free telephone messages: and Director of the Office of Enforcement for
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enforcement conferences will not be (3) Toll-free electronic bulletin board and conMeraw.n.
re
,
open to the pubhcin special cases messages.
wh:re good cause has been shown after Pendmg establishment of the toll-free Dated at RockviUe, MD. this 7th day of July j
b11ancing the benefit of public message systems, the public may call 1992.
cbs;rvation against the potential impact (301) 4924732 to obtain a recording of For the Nuclear Reguistory Commission.
on the agency's enforcement action in a upcoming open enforcement Samuel l. r m.
j particular case.
conferences.The NRC will issue another Secretaryof the Comerussion.
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The NRC will strive to conduct open Federal Register notice after the toll-free [FR Doc. 92-162n Filed 7-0-92; 8.45 a.m.]
cnforcement conferences during the message systems are established.
m,,en coottseoewas two-year tnal program in accordance To assist the NRC in making with the followmg three goals:
appropriate arrangements to support
(1) Approxunately 25 percent of all public observation of enforeement OFFICE OF PERSONNEL eligible enforcement conferences conferences individuals interested in conducted by the NRC will be open for attending a particular enforcement public obsers ation; conference should notify the individual Request for Clearance of a Revised i
(2) At least one open enforcement identified in the meeting notice information Collection to Add Form RI J
conference will be conducted in each of announcing the open enforcement 36-7 to OMB Clearance Number 3206-
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the regional cinces; and conference no later than five business 0123
(3) Open enforcement conferences days prior to the enforcement will be conducted with a variety of the conference.
Actwcy: Office of Personnel types of bcensees.
III. Conduct of Open Enforcement
""* E* * *
To avo2d potential bias in the AcTeose: Notice.
Conferences Selection process and to attempt to neet the three Foals stated above. every in accordance with current practice, suseuAm. In accordance with the I
fourth ebg;ble enforcement conference enforcement conferences will continue Paperwork Reduction Act of1980 (title involving one of three categories of to normally be held at the NRC regional 44. U.S. Code, chapter 35), this notice hcensees will normally be open to the offices. Members of the public will be announces a request for clearance of a public dunng the tnal program.
allowed access to the NRC regional revised information collection, to add However,in cases where there is an offices to attend open enforcement form R136-7 to the Application for ongoing adjudicatory proceeding with conferences in accordance with the Refund of Retirement Deductions one or more intervenors, enforcement
" Standard Operating P ocedures For (CSRS). OPM must have SF 2802 j
conferences involving issues related to Providing Security Support For NRC completely filled out and signed before the subject matter of the ongoing Hearings And Meetings" published paying a refund of retirement adjudication may also be opened. For November t.1991 (56 FR 56251).These contributiona.SF 2802B must also be the purposes of this trial program, the procedures provide that visitors may be complete if there are spouse (s) or former m
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