IR 05000255/1987002

Insp Rept 50-255/87-02 on 870114-0215.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Radiation Protection Program During Maint Outage,Training & Qualifications of New Personnel & Internal & External Exposure Control

ML20211M889
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	02/12/1987
From:	Gill C, Greger L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211M868	List: IR 05000255/1987002 ML20211M865
References
50-255-87-02, 50-255-87-2, NUDOCS 8702270385
Download: ML20211M889 (13)

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-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

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-Report No. 50-255/87002(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Palisades Nuclear Generating Plan t Inspection At: Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted: January 14 through February 15, 1987 U

Inspectors: C d' /2-M (

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W. J. Slawinski Approved By: , he Facilities Radia ion Protection 2-M Date Section Inspection Summary Inspection on January 14 through Feb'ruary 5, 1987 (Report No. 50-255/87002(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Rout.ine, unannounced inspection of the radiation protection program during a maintenance outage including: organization and management controls; changes in organization; personnel, facilities, equipment, and procedures; planning and preparation; training and qualifications of new

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personnel; internal and external exposure control; control of radioactive materials and contamination; the ALARA program; audits and appraisals; and open item Results: No violations or deviations were identifie s PDR ADOCK 05000255 G PDR ,_ *

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DETAILS 1. Persons Cantacted

1. • C. Axtell, Health Physics Superintendent

1. • W. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager

1. • E. Bogue, ALARA Coordinator N. Campbell, Senior Health Physicist

• Dickson, Radiation Safety Supervisor

• R. Henry, Radiation Safety Supervisor L. Kenaga, Staff Health Physicist

• D. Malone, Licensing Engineer

1. M. Mennucci, General Health Physicist

• R. McCaleb, QA Director

1. • T. Neal, RMC Administrator

• G. Sturm, Senior Health Physicist

• C. Anderson, NRC Resident Inspector E. Swanson, NRC Senior Resident Inspector The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees including radiation protection technicians and members of the engineering staf * Denotes those present at the exit meeting on January 16, 1987.

1. Denotes those contacted by telephone between January 19 and February 5, 198 . General This inspection, which began at approximately 1:00 p.m. on January 14, 1987, was conducted to review the radiation protection program during a maintenance outage, including organization and management controls, planning and preparation, qualifications and training, internal and external exposure controls,its aud and appraisals, and open items.ALARA pro material and contamination,ificant During plant tours, no sign access control, posting, or procedure adherence problems were identified; housekeeping.was adequat . Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen)OpenItem(255/85010-01): Review technical specification change request concerning the organizational position of the Radiation ProtectionManager(RPM). A technical specification change request concerning the organizational position of the (RPM) was submitted to NRR in letter dated September 29, 1986. This item remains open pending NRR resolutio (0 pen)OpenItem(255/85019-01): Implement actions to prevent future flooding of the south radwaste building as a result of cooling tower overflow events. The licensee presently plans to move the DAW process

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equipmenttoanewproposedbuildingwhichwouldbelocatedadjacentto the east radwaste building. The south radwaste building would then be used for non radiological storage. If the detailed engineering study confirms the acceptability of the proposed new building, construction may begin as early as May 1987. Construction is expected to be completed within 90 days. This matter will be reviewed further during a future inspectio (Closed)OpenItem(255/86012-01): Evaluates the apparent need for a formal policy to improve controls over the movement and storage of radioactive and contaminated tools, equipment, and other materials within radiologically controlled area Based, in part, on a site visit to the D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant to review their radioactive and contaminated Material Control Program, the licensee decided to initially implement a Control Program only for the hot tool crib area. The licensee has assigned a tool crib attendant to control movement of tools and equipment and extended the tool crib caged storage area (see Section 10).

(Closed) Open Item (255/86012-02): Review adequacy of corrective actions for certain RIRs. Inspectors selectively reviewed corrective actions for RIRs written from June 1986 to date; corrective actions appear adequate to prevent recurrence. It was noted that disciplinary action was taken in response to several incidents of a serious or repetitive nature (see Section13).

(0 pen) Open Item (255/86012-03): Review administrative controls to limit filter damage problems associated with fire protection deluge system The licensee has initiated Action Item Record (AIR) No. A-PAL-86-091 in response to this Open Item. The completed AIR and associated documentation will be reviewed during a future inspectio . Changes The inspectors reviewed changes in the organization, personnel, facilities, equipment, and programs that could affect the outage radiation protection progra Due to the limited and intermittent activities for the current outage, station radiation arotection technicians (RPTs) and health physicists are working normal 40 lour week Sincethemajorityofoutageactivitiesare performed during the day shift, continuous shiftly radiation protection coverage is not normally necessary; however, duty health physicists are on-call at all time The station's two wet washers are augmented with two dry cleaning units to accommodate the outage; however, some backlog of unlaundered protective clothing has occurred due to laundry equipment problem No violations or deviations were identifie _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _. _.

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5. Organizations and Management Controls The inspectors reviewed the licensee's organization and management controls for the Radiation Protection Program including the organizational structure and staffing, staff stability, effectiveness of procedures and other management techniques used to implement these programs and experience concerning self-identification and correction of program implementation weaknesse Currently, 24 of the 25 station Radiation Protection Technician (RPT)

positions are filled. One Senior Technician was recently promoted to Radiation Safety Supervisor; the vacancy is expected to be filled with a licensed Auxiliary Operator. There are currently,13 Senior Technicians, two Technician II's, six Technician I's, and three Technician Trainees. Nearly 40% of these RPTs have less than two years of applicable experience and do not meet the selection criteria stated in ANSI 18.1-1971 for Technicians in responsible positions; the remainder have an average of approximately five years of applicable experience. Technical support for the Radiation Protection Group is provided by two Health Physics Specialists, one Engineering Technician, two Radiation Safety Supervisors, and two Health Physicists. Seven contract RPTs are currently augmenting the Radiation Protection Staf Inspection Report No. 50-255/86002 referred to poor radiological plant conditions and the resultant increased work load on the radiation protection staff. To improve plant conditions, the station has developed aMaterialConditionPlantImprovementPlan(seeSection15)5eniorHealthimplementation of this plan has begun and will continue through 1987. The Physicist ar.d the Staff Health Physicist have been assigned to the Material ConditionImprovementProjecttaskforce;theirroutineradiationsafety responsibilities are su)erseded by task force assignments. Until the Material Condition of tie plant improves, the experience level of station RPTs increases, and the profession health physicist staff members return from the task force, it ap) ears desirable for the radiation protection staff to remain augmented )y contracted technician No violations or deviations were identifie . Planning and Preparation The inspectors reviewed the outage planning and preparation performed by the licensee, including additional staffing, special training, increased equipmentsupplies,andjobrelatedhealthphysicsconsideration The station radiation protection group is augmented by seven contracted Radiation Protection Technicians for the outage. All are Senior Technicians with previous experience at the station. Outage decontamination activities are enhanced by 14 station workers and 13 temporary personne _

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The type of outage activities limited the necessity for special training; however, station and contract workers received appropriate ALARA briefings and RWP program training. No problems were noted in this are The supplies of portable survey instruments, respiratory protection equipment, and protective clothing appear adequate for the outag Radiationprotectioninfluenceinjobplanningandpreparationincludes decontamination and installation of shielding prior to allowing outage work to begin and radiation protection and ALARA participation in planning and outage meeting No violations or deviations were identifie . Training and Qualifications of New Personnel The inspectors reviewed the education and experience qualifications of contractor radiation protection personnel and training provided to the Licensee selection of contracted Radiation Protection Technicians includes review of the technicians' resumes to determine conformance to ANSI 18.1-1971 criteria for responsible technicians. Resumes of selected contractor Radiation Protection Technicians who have worked at the station during the current outage were reviewed by the inspectors. The majority of technicians appear to meet or exceed the technician selection criteria in ANSI 18.1-197 Those not meeting ANSI 18.1, approximately 15% of the contracted technicians, appear to have training and experience commensurate

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with their assigned duties. After selected technicians arrive on-site, they are required to complete general employee and site specific training, threedaysofradiationprotectionprocedurestraining,andon-the-job task training and practical factors evaluations. Following the procedures training, each contracted technician must pass a written examination on radiation protection procedures and policies and practical problem solving; a score of 70% is required. The majority of the examination questions related to station procedure and policies; problem solving questions are limited but appeared to be moderately difficult. Inspectors selectively reviewed training and exam records; no problems were note No violations or deviations were identifie . External Exposure Control The inspectors reviewed the licensee's external exposure control and personal dosimetry programs, including changes in program to men outage needs; use of dosimetry; planning and preparation for maintenance and refueling tasks including ALARA considerations; and required records, reports, and notification Exposure records of plant and contractor personnel for 1986 were selectively reviewed. No exposures greater than 10 CFR 20.101 or the station annual administrative limit of 4.5 rem were noted; eleven t

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c workers received estimated exposures greater than three rem and one worker received an estimated exposure greater than four rem. The ALARA Committee is required by Administrative Procedure No. 7.02 to review the analysis

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of the exposure history for individuals whose annual exposure exceeds 3 rem; those exposures above four rem are more critically reviewed. The

~1986 exposure histories'are scheduled for review by the ALARA Committee in March 1987, after the processing of the primary TLD A computer printout of work doses is generated on a daily. basis during routine operations and updated every shift during outages; a health physicist reviews'these dose printouts. The licensce's Management Information Dose Tracking System (MIS) is capable-of recording entry authorizations and dose for all personnel entering the RCA. The MIS software was recently' improved to permit tracking and trending of exposure informatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Internal Exposure Control The inspectors reviewed the licensee's internal exposure control and assessment programs, including: changes to procedures affecting internal exposure control and personal exposure assessment; determination

whether engineering controls, respiratory equipment, and assessment of individual intakes meet reaulatory requirements; planning and preparation for maintenanca and refueling tasks including ALARA considerations; and -

required records, reports, and notification '

Whole body counting data, respiratory protection records, MPC-hour determinations, and air activity surveys for 1966 were selectively reviewed; no problems were noted.

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-The inspectors selectively reviewed portions of Health Physics Procedure No. HP 2.19 " Airborne Radioactivity Sampling" and discussed the Air Sampling Program with radiation safety personnel; no significant problems were noted. The licensee tracks MPC-hours by computer printout of RCA

. entry time and date, RWP numbers, and air sample data. A health physicist reviews air cample results and calculates MPC-hours. If the potential exists for a worker to have received more than ten MFC-hours in seven consecutive days or two MPC-bours in any one day, the worker is whole body counted (WBC). The licensee reported that WBC data indicates that no ir.dividual received more than 10% of the maximum permissible body burden (MPBB) for 1985 or 1986; two and five individuals, respectively, received more than 1% of MPBB during 1985 and 1986. An analysis conducted by the General Health Physicist concluded that only one of those seven individuals appeared to have received actual radioactivity uptake; the other six indications of HPBB greater than 1% were to be due to external contamination. The inspectors reviewed the analysis; the conclusion that no individual in 1985 and only one individual in 1986 receive an uptake greater than 1% MPBB seems appropriat ... .. .

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i 1 Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination e

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Theinspectorsreviewedthelicensee'sprogramforcontrolofradioactiveD ,

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maintenance, ?

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materials and calibration andofcontamination, including contamination survey adequacy and monitoring equof supply,ipmenti ;'

effectiveness of survey methods, practices, equipment, and procedures; adequacy of review and dissemination of survey data; and effectiveness of

, methods of control of radioactive and contaminated materials. ,

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C radiation and contamination surveys conducted during the outagi ts dat j#

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All surveys, routine and anyand special,itions.are reviewed by the duty HP fon .

completeness unusual cond _No problems were identifie rC w .. .s

The station has implemented corrective actions for problems identified ,b in Inspection Report No. 50-255/86012 concerning controls owr redioactive 4 material and contamination in Radiologically Controlled Areas-(RCAs). ,

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.Specifically, house-keeping in general access areas of the auxiliaryJ ,

building and hot tool crib has improved, contaminated area postings was . **

adequate, and controls over movement of tools and equipment frce. the hot.s'

tool crib was strengthened. The Maintenance Department has assigned V '- , ,

hot tool crib attendant to control removal and return of tools to the ~

area; the crib is locked when unattended. Returned tools are '

covered 55 gallon drum located just outside the crib's fenbid'placed entrance. in a The drum is surveyed by Radiation Safety Personnel daily. . Returned tools are collected, decontaminated, surveyed, and placed in a temporary holding area prior to resurvey and return to their storage area. ~ Weekly smars are taken by radiation protection technicians of items on hot tool crib .

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storage shelves; records indicate reduced levels of contamination since ' ,c, the controls were improved. Also, the hot tool crib caged-storage. area D has been extended to include the electrical equipment lay-down are ,

Efforts to reduce auxiliary building contamination are continuin Primary drain tank and charging pump rooms have been decontaminated and repainted and are currently accessible without protective clothing;- y contamination is limited in these rooms to isolated spots on sections '

of pipe / valves. Percentage of auxiliary building contaminated areas has fluctuated significantly in 1986, ranging from 55% in February to 33% in .

July. By the end of December 1986, auxiliary building contaminated area e ,,

t was reported as 38%. The station has developed a broad based S lant  ;

'MaterialConditionImprovementProject"toimprovetheoverallc&ition of the plant. The auxiliary building is one of the initial target areas '

oftheprojec This project is further discussed in Section 1 ,

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The inspectors observed workers entering / exiting access son' trol and / /

working in containment. Work practices appeared good and in'co iance ' ' i > r 4 with RWP conditions. WorkersexitingtheRCAwereobserved;per@foEming

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adequate'whole body frisks. . The station has -recently installed-wall-mounted wZ ' shelves to store friskers and facilitate their us Personnel contamination

1. events are discussed in Section 14.

. 'Duetto a'n!INPQ commitment, the licensee has begun daily functional checks

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soMce loktomid-rang igh range instrument survey instruments functional checks using e.g.ap(propriate

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teletector) are- calibration E j., planned if' the purchase of an appropriate instrument calibration system ljh,-

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is approvede

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y .No violations or deviations were identifie Maintaining Occupational Exposures ALARA

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r " g The insp'dctors r$vitewed the licensee's program for maintaining occupational exp6sures ALARA, ~ibcluding changes in ALARA policy and procedures; ALARA cf

/ conside' rations fo6 maintenance and refueling outage; and establishment of goals'andobjectises,andeffectivenessinmeetingthem. Also reviewed rf were management techniques used to implement the program and experience

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M concerning selfeffentification and-correction of programmatic weaknesse t tw w f3 '

, TheprofessioOT"ALARA'staffconsistsofanewlyappointed.ALARA. Coordinator and four deg'eed r technicians. The new ALARA Coordinator, appointed in A'3 - -

r December 1986 r ism former Radiation Safety Supervisor; the previous 4 coordinator is preseittly a Station Licensing Engineer. The ALARA staff

?O appear to have the proper qualifications, experience, expertise, and

& dedication to establish and maintain and effective ALARA progra .

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Ej rs . '. Most job history file's'are maintained up.to date; pre-job briefings

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and post job reviews remain effective. The proper use of these files in m yj pre ,)ob planning aid preparation should result in.an overall reduction in E p worker expo'sure for future similar tasks. The inspectors selectively T

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reviewed portions of the job history files; no significant problems were M

D noted.

y- In April'1986, the ALARA goal'for 1986 was increased from 400 to 500 r person-rems due to unanticipated exposures from the extended maintenance

otn.sgentlich began in May 1986. -The 1986, exposures are currently

' ' esti:aated to exceed 610 person-rems due -to unplanned continuation of the

'i n N J 'maintenancesoutage This latter estimate is based on preliminary data

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from sgn-mading dosimeters (SRDs) and secondary TLDs. The licensee has gp "# - e,tnblished ALARA gonis-for 1987 including overall station and individual ,

'warking group' goals for total dose; the 1987 station goal is 435 b'- person-rem [.

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sin addition to the exposure goals outlined above, it is a station goal .

p t. hat no individual receive more than five rems during 198 This goal -

y - was met in 1986'and' remains a goal for 198 .

i wr The station' continues with its efforts to reduce the contaminated auxiliary 1/'. <bdilding areas. .The licensee's Plant Material Condition Improvement

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exposure reduction plan which details long-term efforts to reduce collective personnel exposure. The plan is oe'igned s to supplement ongoing

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'^ exposure' reduction techniques. implemented through the station's ALARA

program. Areas covered by the exposure reduction plan include:

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• Exposure analyses for pro)osed plant /s

• 1 Increasing-plant-wide ALAtA awareness.ystem modification * ' Utilization of plant cleanup ahd'radwaste treatment system *

• 'Plaat'-wide exposure rate reductio (

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.t Increased ALARA~ plannin ,

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Each of the major,' program areas covered in the plan discuss methods  !

of exposur'e reduction and associatgd cost. analysis, while improving

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maintenance practices and outage scheduling. The plan calls for increased interaction of ALARA and Engineering Staffs, emphasizing ALARA techniques in

changes involvingdioactive ra;the systems conceptual phase of facility or component To this or end, specification the station is developing an ALARA training program for both Health Physics 1 and Engineering Staffs. The training. program is being developed by the 1# station'sALARAgroupinconjunctionwiththelicensee'sMidlandTraining

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Center; the training program *is anticipated to be developed in 198 , ,

No violations or deviations are' identified.

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'1 Audits and Appraisals -

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The inspectors reviewed repovts of' audits and ap3raisals conducted for or

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by the licensee including audits required by.tec1nical specifications.

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Also, reviewed were management techniques used to implement the audit program, and experience concerning identification and correction of

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programmatic weaknesses.

L The inspectors reviewed the station's QA annual audit of the radiation j protection program for 1986, the 1985 and 1986 INP0 audit reports, and selected 1986 QA surveillance and QC activity inspection re) orts. The a '. audit and surveillance program appears adequate to assess tie radiation-protection progra ,

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The.1986_gAauditresultedinfivefindingsand-eightobservation The findings include: the lack of adequate housekeeping and cleanliness

within the Radiation Controlled Area; the failure to control high radiation areas (> 1000 mR/hr) within the containment building with locked doors or devices; receipt inspecting /acce) ting a radioactive source that the failure of property protection to provide the sec'urity force widid not meet the requireme Training in 1985 and the failure of the Plant Safety Department to have -

l- first aid kits within the plant as required by the Site Emergency Pla x Efforts-to improve housekeeping and cleanliness are continuing and are part of the stations " Plant Material Condition Improvement Project".

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Lockable high radiation area doors have recently been installed in containment to control access to 1 R/hr areas. Other findings are being

' tracked and resolved by deviation report Two findings in the Radiation Protection Program area were identified during the 1986 INP0 Audit, compared to six findings identified during the 1985 INP0 Audit. The 1986 findings concerned weakness in performing and analyzing air samples, need to improve evaluations of. personal contamination events, failure to properly use respiratory equipment and institute proper ventilation controls in highly contaminated areas, and the need for additional job site performance reviews by Health Physics Supervisors. In response, the licensee is reviewing training and retraining provided to radiation protection technicians and increasing trending and corrective action of root causes of personal contamination incidents (see Section 14).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Incident Reports Procedure No. HP 1.3, Investigation of Radiological Incidents, identifies occurrences that may be classified as Radiological Incidents, including violations of 10 CFR 20 or Palisades Radiation Protection Procedures and significant personnel contamination events. Radiological incident reports (RIRs) may be initiated by any plant worker; however, most are written by radiation protection personnel. The Radiological Services Supervisor with cognizance over the activity directly involved is responsible for the initial evaluation of the RIR. Tne Health Physics Superintendent provides technical assistance and determines if a deviation report or event report are required in accordance with Administrative Procedure No. 3.03

" Corrective Actions". All RIRs concerning violations of administrative portions of the technical specifications require review by the Plant Review Committe Fifty-three RIRs were written for 1986, one was cancelled. RIRs were selectively reviewed by the inspectors for significance, corrective actions, and timeliness of corrective actions. Most reports appeared to have adequate and timely corrective actions, disciplinary action was taken when warranted. The corrective actions, in general, appear adequate to preclude recurrence. As a result of an info recommendation, the licensee plans to categorize the causes for RIRs and track / trend the data. This should help identify programmatic breakdowns and facilitate corrective action No violations or deviations were identifie . Personnel Contamination Reports Procedure No. HP 2.18, Personnel Decontamination, requires that personnel contamination reports (PCRs) be completed when portal monitor alarms

indicate contamination or personnel frisks yield greater than 100 cpm

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above backgroun PCRs are evaluated and findings summarized in semi-annual reports issued to the Health Physics Superintendent. The reports address the number and type of personnel contamination events, the plant location where the contamination is believed to have occurred, and the apparent cause as identified by the HP technician completing the repor There was a total of 372 skin and clothing contaminations in 1986, the majoritywereshoecontaminations. In January 1986 more than 140 PCRs were initiated, this corresponds to peak activities,during the refueling /

maintenance outage. PCR trending for the first six months of 1986 attributed approximately 17% of contamination events to " leeching" of fixed contamination from PCs. The licensee is considering a review of their laundry activities to determine its. effectiveness and an evaluation of clothing survey techniques and release criteria. The licensee re)orted that approximately 28% of these events were shoe contaminations w1ich could not be attributed to a specific caus The contaminated individuals apparently had not crossed any contamination boundaries. In an attempt to reduce the number of such incidents the licensee recently began daily wet or masslin mop)ing of the auxiliary, building hallway and general access cubicles; t1e licensee is also considering the establishment of a special survey program to monitor the effectiveness of this effor The station is also considering a corrective action program for individuals who repeatedly become contaminated. A list of individuals contaminated three or more times in 1986 was recently generated. One individual, contaminated on numerous occasions in 1986, was required to repeat General Employee Training and was ultimately prohibited access to potentially contaminated area No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Material Condition Improvement Plan As reported in Inspection Report No. 50-255/86031(DRS)onMay 19, 1986, the reactor tripped from 97 percent power on high primary coolant system pressure following a failure of electro hydraulic system power supplies that resulted in closure of the turbine control valves. A number of equipment problems, some known prior to the trip, hampered the operators'

response to the plant transient. Subsequent to the plant tri), a

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Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued which confirmed tlat the l plant would be taken to cold shutdown and remain shutdown until investigations were conducted of the May 19 reactor trip to confirm the status of safety-related/important to safety, equipment. In response to the confirmatory action letter the licensee convened an eleven member Material Condition Review Task Force to address the actions required by the confirmatory letter. The findings of the task force are documented in the Material Condition Task Force Final Report dated July 3, 1986.

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For 1987,.the' licensee' set a goal to improve the material condition of the-plant and developed a Plant Material Condition Improvement Project (PMCIP).1Thisproject.isabroadbasedeffortrootedintheexisting, plant organization and will be used to supplement ongoing efforts to improve the Material Condition of the plant and allow a high~ degree of 1 system performance and appearanc The program emphasizes improvements

'in overall housekeeping, material condition of equipment and systems, 1 including maintenance and surveillance activities, and in strengthening of safety and fire protection programs. The project goals are to define-and communicate standards for Plant Material Conditions; identify, track-and resolve existing Material Condition concerns; and determine a method to ensure the Material Condition of the plant is maintaine Thus far, Material Condition standards have been develo ed, an Improvement Planning Team has been appointed and an Emp oyee Steering Committee is actively being recruited. A benchmark pol was distributed to all plant employees to make them aware of the project and solicit their input; nearly a 50% response to the poll has been received to'

dat The Senior Health Physicist and the Staff Health Physicist have been assigned to PMCIB for one year. Although, the loss of their expertise to tie Radiological-Services Department has the potential for a temporary negative effect on the radiation protection program, their participation in the project'also has the potential for a significant long term positive effect on the RP program; this matter.was discussed with both assigned individuals and appropriate station management. Potential long term benefits include improvement in general housekeeping, employee morale,

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' procedure adherence, storage of radioactive and contaminated material, decontamination efforts, contaminated process leakage repair,, painting

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and coating facility to facilitate decontamination, preventative maintenance to reduce potential process leakage, and reduction of solid radwaste generate . Auxiliary Building, Fuel Building, and Containment Tours During tours of the auxiliary, fuel and containment buildings, radioactive material controls, posting and housekeeping appeared adeguat Inspector observation of egress activity at access control points indicate that-workers are properly adhering to frisking procedure The inspectors performed radiation surveys of equipment and selected areas in the auxiliary and fuel buildings; survey results were consistent with licensee posted results. Also, an ins highradiationarea(1R/hr) doors (gates)pectorverifiedthatfiveveryrecently installed in c are adequate to control access to these areas. The inspectors also observed the modifications made to the hot tool crib in the fuel building; no problems were note No violations or deviations were identifie ;

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17. Exit Meeting The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on January 16, 1987, and by telephone through February 5, 198 The inspectors summarized the sco)e and findings of the inspection. The inspectors also discussed tie likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar . . . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _