IR 05000255/1993025
| ML20059B299 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1993 |
| From: | Creed J, Madeda T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18059A458 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-93-25, NUDOCS 9310280129 | |
| Download: ML20059B299 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l'
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/93025(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20
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Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection Dates: October 5 and 6, 1993 Type of Inspection: Announced, Reactive Review of Fitness-For-Duty Concerns.
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/0/2//v3 Inspector:
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Terry /J'( Madeda Dat'e '
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Physical Security Inspector
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Approved By:
Camw IJ mSt
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am4s R. Creed, ChYef Date pSafeguardsandIncidentResponse
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Section Inspection Summary
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Inspection on October 5 and 6. 1993 (Report No. 50-255/93025(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Reactive, announced review of Fitness-For-Duty concerns relating to the implementation of testing for-cause, implementation of.
' followup testing program involving a specific individual and the adequacy of the licensee's random testing program.
Results:
No violations of NRC Fitness-For-Duty requirements were identified.
None of the concerns were substantiated.
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REPORT DETAILS
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Key Persons Contacted
In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the
inspector interviewed other licensee employees. The asterisk (*)
denotes those present at the onsite Exit Interview conducted on October 6, 1993.
- G. Slade, Plant Manager
- J. Griggs, Director, Human Resources
- D. Rogers, Director, Safety and Licensing
- J. Smith, FFD Administrator, CPCo., General Office J. Warner, Senior Property Protection Operating Supervisor
Entrance and Exit Interviewt a.
At the beginning of the inspection, the licensee's Director of Human Resources was informed of the purpose of this inspection, its scope, and the topical areas to be examined.
b.
The inspector me:t with the licensee representatives, denoted in Section 1, at the conclusion of the inspection activities. A general description of the scope and conduct of the inspection was provided, Briefly listed below are the findings discussed during the exit interview. The details of each finding listed below are referenced, as noted, in the report.
(1)
The licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's comments regarding evaluation of three fitness-for-duty concerns. None of the concerns were substantiated.
No regulatory issues were identified.
(Refer to Section 3)
(2)
Two observations regarding the licensee's implementation of their fitness-for-duty program were identified.
One involved incorrectly documenting supervisor evaluations relating to testing for-cause. The other involved providing specific follow-up testing information, as contained 'in 10 CFR 26.27(b)(4) to individuals involved in this testing program.
Licensee representatives will review these issues.
3.
Fitness-For-Duty Proaram (IP 81502)
a.
Concern: The licensee, in violation of their fitness-for-duty program, did not conduct testing for-cause on plant employees involved in three plant events.
Each event resulted in a g
i degradation in the level of plant safety.
The events occurred.in
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September 1993, exceeded the plant cool down rate; August 1993,.
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rod uncoupling event; and late 1991 or early 1992, involving loss of shutdown cooling.
NRC Review:
Interviews with the NRC Resident Inspectors and cognizant licensee personnel verified that each event occurred, however, in some cases the dates differed from those reported above. The actual dates for the events were:
September 17, 1993, for the plant cool down event; June 15, 1993, for the rod.
uncoupling event; and March 27, 1992 for the loss of shutdown cooling event. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector confirmed each event had the potential to significantly degrade the level of safety to the plant.
Review of NRC fitness-for-duty requirements for testing for-cause (10 CFR 26.24[3]) and review of the licensee's established criteria for implementing for-cause testing (section 6.3.3.c of Consumers Power Company Administrative Procedure, FFD-01, Revision 3, Titled " Fitness For Duty Requirements and Responsibilities")
showed that the licensee's policy conformed with regulatory requirements.
Each required testing for-cause following:
(1) any observed behavior indicating possible substance abuse; (2) after accidents involving a failure in individual performance resulting in personal injury, in a radiation exposure or release of radioactivity in excess of regulatory limits; or (3) actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant if there is reasonable suspicion that the worker's behavior contributed to the event; or (4) after receiving credible information that an individual is abusing drugs or alcohol.
To require testing for-cause, at least one or a combination of any the four elements referenced above must occur.
In reference to the events noted above, inspection results from interviews and a review of records showed that each event was reviewed by licensee management to determine if one or more of the criteria described above had occurred.
In each event licensee management determined that the event did have the potential to substantially degrade the level of safety of the plant.
In the event of March 27, 1992, the licensee had a reasonable suspicion that the workers' behavior may have contributed to the event and for-cause testing was conducted on those individuals.
Lit.ensee's reasonable suspicion was based on two factors:
(1) the workers failed to follow a work instruction procedure, and (2) lack of supervisory observation during and prior to the event.
In addition, each worker was in a followup testing program for a previous positive fitness-for-duty test.
Management review of the other two events (September 17 and June 15, 1993) concluded that workers' behavior and performance had not contributed to either event.
Therefore, testing for-cause was not necessary. None of the events involved personal injury, or exposure to, or release of radioactivity.
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During our own review of these events, the training records of each supervisor involved in the review process were reviewed to
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determine if each had been provided the licensee's training for detecting degradation in performance, impairment, or changes in employee behavior.
Training records were found to be complete.
i Review of supervisory evaluations. relating to the three' events showed that each evaluation was documented on licensee's internal memorandum forms.
Licensee procedural requirements (FFD-0104,
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Titled, "For-Cause/ Post Accident Testing") required that a supervisory evaluation be documented on a specific form (Post Accident Evaluation). The licensee will follow their procedural guidance in future cases. The failure referenced above was administrative, and did not reduce the effectiveness of supervisory evaluations or program effectiveness.
Conclusion: This issue was not substantiated.
It appeared that each event was properly evaluated in accordance with the licensee's procedures and NRC's regulatory requirements to determine if testing for-cause was necessary.
For-cause testing was conducted for one event.
A minor issue regarding improper documentation, which the licensee will evaluate, was identified by the inspector.
Inspection results to support our conclusion included review of appropriate supervisory evaluations and training records, licensee cognizant FFD procedures, and inter-views with the Director of Human Resources and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
b.
Concern: The licensee's Fitness-For-Duty staff misled an individual regarding the length of time followup testing would be required. A specific individual was identified.
NRC Review:
Review of NRC Regulation 10 CFR 26.27 (b)(4) requires that any person granted unescorted access or whose access is reinstated under fitnes.s-for-duty provisions must be given
unannounced follow-r; tests at least once every month for four months and at least once every three months after unescorted access is reinstated to verify continued abstinence from
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proscribed substances. Review of licensee's Administrative
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Procedure FFD-01, Titled, " Fitness-For-Duty Requirements.and Responsibilities" showed that it conformed with the NRC regulation referenced above.
The duration of followup testing is for a period of three years.
The inspector reviewed the fitness-for-duty file of the named individual.
The case file included the individual's full history of substance testing for fitness-for-duty, and a letter dated March 12, 1993, from the licensee to the individual explaining the
individual's rights and responsibilities resulting from a positive d
test result. The letter did not specifically identify the testing provisions noted above, only the fact that the individual may be
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subject to more frequent controlled substance testing than other employees.
Interviews with members of the site and corporate FFD staff verified that none could recall any conversation or-
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discussion with the named individual regarding the length of time'-
followup testing would be required.
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Review of the individual's FFD test history showed that since
' testing positive, 13 followup tests, ? random tests and 1 for-cause test had been conducted. Based on NRC and licensee program requirements, the individual's followup testing program will be completed in March 1994.
The licensee does not provide substantive information regarding followup testing requirements to individuals in the program.
- Providing followup testing parameters as described in NRC
requirements could reduce confusion for program participants. The licensee current method meets regulatory requirements. The licensee will review this issue.
Conclusion: This issue was not substantiated. No information was i
developed to indicate that the licensee's FFD staff misled the named individual regarding the length of time the individual was to participate in the licensee's followup testing program.
Personnel in the licensee's followup testing program are provided -
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no information regarding the scope of followup testing requirements. No regulatory issues were -identified.
c.
Concern: The licensee's established random fitness-for-duty testing program was not effective in assuring that'all personnel have an equal probability of selection.
NRC Review:
10 CFR 26.24 (a)(2) requires licensees to establish an unannounced fitness-for-duty testing program imposed in a random manner. The tests must be administered so that a person
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completing a test is immediately eligible for another unannounced test. As a minimum, tests must be administered on.a nominal weekly frequency and at various times during the day.
Random testing shall be conducted at a rate equal to at least 100% of the work force.
An interview with the licensee's corporate Fitness-For-Duty Administrator verified that on January 3, 1990, the licensee implemented a computerized random testing program. This system is based at corporate headquarters. Unannounced random alcohol and drug testing is conducted at a rate equal to at least 100% of the work force. The work force consists of all plant personnel badged'
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for unescorted access and personnel required to physically report
to the licensee's Technical Support Center and Emergency Operating Facility.
Nominally weekly, the corporate FFD Administrator provides the cognizant Director of Human Resources names.of individual selected by the computer. Tests are administered on tarying days of the week and times of the day. The computer
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determined those factors. The selection process is administered so that an individual completing a test at any given time is immediately eligible for another unannounced test.
The inspector verified through a review of monthly FFD Schedule
Logs that tests were conducted on varying dates and times of the day. An interview of the site Director of Human Resources
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verified that when selected names are provided to the site, testing is scheduled for the first individual on the' list and
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continues in numerical order until testing is completed.
The site cannot alter the positioning of individuals on this list.
The licensee does not maintain statistics comparing site personnel selected for random tests. The licensee does maintain individual.
test histories.
The test history'of the named individual was reviewed. Our review.
showed the individual had been tested randomly on five occasions since January 1990 (2-1990, 1-1991,.and 1-1993).
Conclusion:
This issue was not substantiated.
No information was developed to show that the licensee's random test program was not adequate and it appeared that all personnel have an equal probability of selection.
The random test record of the one identified individual' did not appear to show a high number of random test.
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